MCFI sv.

CA
Synopsis:

Petitioner Miriam College Foundation, Inc., through its Discipline

Committee, imposed disciplinary sanctions upon herein private
respondents, members of the editorial board of the Miriam College's
School Paper "Chi Rho" and the magazine "Ang Magasing
Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho." The School described the September-
October 1994 issue of the said publications "vulgar," "indecent,"
"gross," "explicit," "injurious to young readers," and devoid of all
moral values." The students filed a petition for prohibition and
certiorari with preliminary injunction/restraining order before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City questioning the jurisdiction of the
Miriam College Discipline Board over them. The trial court granted
the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the school from enforcing
and/or implementing the expulsion or dismissal orders. Both parties
moved for reconsideration, but the trial court eventually dismissed
the petition. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court. The Court, however, resolved to refer the case to
the Court of Appeals for disposition. Respondent appellate court
granted the students' petition. The appellate court declared the RTC
decision as well the students' suspension and dismissal, void. Hence,
the present petition by Miriam College.
The Supreme Court ruled that Miriam College has the authority
to hear and decide cases filed against respondent students.
According to the Court, the power of the school to investigate is an
adjunct of its power to suspend or expel and as a necessary
corollary the enforcement of rules and regulations and the
maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment
conducive to learning. The Court, however, stressed that such power
to regulate is subject to the requirement of reasonableness because
the Constitution allows merely the regulation and supervision of
educational institutions, not the deprivation of their rights. The Court
also ruled that under Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act (R.A.
7079), the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the
basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such
articles materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder
or the invasion of the rights of others.

Issue:
Whether Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act precludes the
schools right to discipline its students

Held:

Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all

institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional
academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to
decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain
them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when
the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.
The essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic
freedom" encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on
academic grounds: (1) Who may teach, (2) What may be taught, (3)
How it shall be taught, and (4) Who may be admitted to study
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once
apparent in the third freedom, i. e., "how it shall be taught." A
school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy. Thus,
there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational
institution requires rules and regulations necessary for the
maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of
an educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules and
regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students,
faculty, and property. Moreover, the school has an interest in
teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable,
value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school
teaches discipline.
Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds
basis in the freedom "what to teach." Incidentally, the school not
only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its students.
The Constitution no less imposes such duty. [All educational
institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of
humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of
national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach
the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual
values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage
critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological
knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.

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The right of the students to free speech in school premises,

however, is not absolute. The right to free speech must always be
applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment. Thus, while we upheld the right of the students to free
expression in these cases, we did not rule out disciplinary action by
the school for "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which
for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of
behavior which materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others."
Section 7 should be read in a manner as not to infringe upon
the school's right to discipline its students. At the same time,
however, we should not construe said provision as to unduly restrict
the right of the students to free speech. Consistent with
jurisprudence, we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act to
mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on
the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such
articles materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder
or invasion of the rights of others.

Ateneo de Manila vs. Capulong

Facts:
On February 8, 9, and 10 of 1991, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School
named Aquila Legis conducted its initiation rites upon neophytes.
Unfortunately, one neophyte died as a result thereof and one was
hospitalized due to serious physical injuries. In a resolution dated March 9,
1991, the Disciplinary Board formed by Ateneo found seven students
guilty of violating Rule 3 of the Rules on Discipline. Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
then president of Ateneo, on the basis of the findings, ordered the
expulsion of the seven students. However, on May 17, 1991, Judge Ignacio
Capulong of the Makati RTC, upon the students petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision and
reinstate the said students.

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Issues (Academic Freedom) :

(1) Whether a school is within its rights in expelling students
from its academic community pursuant to its disciplinary rules and
moral standards
(2) Whether or not the penalty imposed by the school
administration is proper under the circumstances

Held:
1. YES
2. YES

At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential

freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the term
"academic freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
37 37 thus: (1) who may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how it
shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study.
"Academic freedom", the term as it evolved to describe the
emerging rights related to intellectual liberty, has traditionally
 been associated with freedom of thought, speech, expression
and the press;
o in other words, with the right of individuals in university
communities, such as professors, researchers and
administrators, to investigate, pursue, discuss and, in the
immortal words of Socrates, "to follow the argument
wherever it may lead," free from internal and external
interference or pressure.
Early cases on this individual aspect of academic freedom
have stressed the need for assuring to such individuals a
measure of independence through the guarantees of autonomy
and security of tenure.
o The components of this aspect of academic freedom have
been categorized under the areas of:
(1) who may teach and
(2) how to teach.
o It is to be realized that this individual aspect of academic
freedom could have developed only pari passu with its
institutional counterpart. As corporate entities, educational
institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with
the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise,
unhampered by external controls or pressure.
o In the Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the
areas of:
what shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum and
who may be admitted to study.
o In an attempt to give an explicit definition with an expanded
coverage, the Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission
of 1986 came up with this formulation: "Academic freedom shall
be enjoyed by students, by teachers, and by researchers."
After protracted debate and ringing speeches, the final version
which was none too different from the way it was couched in
the previous two (2) Constitutions, as found in Article XIV,
Section 5 (2) states: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning."
o In anticipation of the question as to whether and what aspects
of academic freedom are included herein, ConCom Commissioner
Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic freedom is a
dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom,
especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to the
courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom."
o While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right
"to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing
curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the
established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by
the academic institution.
o [Section 9 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, effective September
11, 1982]. "For private schools have the right to establish
 reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline
and promotion of students. This right . . . extends as well to
parents . . . as parents are under a social and moral (if not
legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and
cooperate with the schools." (Yap Chin Fah v. Court of Appeals
[Resolution], G.R. No. 90063, December 12, 1989) Such rules
are "incident to the very object of incorporation and
indispensable to the successful management of the college. The
rules may include those governing student discipline." Going a
step further, the establishment of rules governing university-
student relations, particularly those pertaining to student
discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth
and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.

Laxamana vs. Borlaza of Philipine Normal College

Facts:
Emiliano C. Ramirez, issued on August 27, 1964 a memorandum
directed to Felicitas P. Laxamana, in her capacity as Director of
Publications, requesting that more care be exercised in guiding the
students in the preparation of editorials and articles, at the same
time calling Director Laxamana's attention to an earlier communication
from the PNC President proposing certain guidelines aimed at
impressing upon the members of the editorial staff the need for
propriety, justice and decency in the discharge of their tasks. The
PNC President observed that it would be desirable if the Director of
Publications would have the page proofs of The Torch and The Torch
Newsette gone over before they are finally printed, by Mr. Edilberto
Dagot (a representative of the PNC President) who will then take up
with her (Director of Publications) such suggestions as this Office
may find it necessary to make from time to time. Less than two
months later the PNC President issued a second memorandum, dated
October 14, 1964, formally informing the Director of Publications of
the constitution of the 1964-65 Board of Management of The Torch.
Again inviting attention to the PNC President's instructions 4 given when
Felicitas P. Laxamana was first designated Director of Publications in
1961, this second memorandum requested the early convening of
the newly-reconstituted Board of Management to restudy the policies
of the Torch affecting its editorial and reportorial practices and
business management.
Director Laxamana filed a complaint against the PNC President
on December 4, 1964 in the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging
that the said memoranda should be annulled on the ground that they
"abridge the fundamental liberties of thought, speech and press,
unburden the State from the obligation to patronize arts and letters,
deny the Philippine Normal College the right to enjoy academic
freedom, and relieve it from the duty to develop moral character,
personal discipline, and civic conscience and to teach the duties of
citizenship to its students. Even before the PNC President filed his
answer, Laxamana was relieved as Director of Publications and
advised by the PNC President to assume a full time teaching
assignment in the English department of the college, effective
immediately, without any change in professorial rank and salary.
In the defendant's answer, he prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of cause of action, and opposed the issuance of
a preliminary injunction on the ground that the act sought to be
enjoined, i.e. the relief of the plaintiff as Director of Publications,
was already a fait accompli. Thereafter certain developments 7 moved
Laxamana to file, with previous leave of court, a couple of
supplemental complaints intended to seek additional relief in the
form of damages she allegedly suffered as a result of what she
termed as the PNC President's "oppressive" acts.
The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint upon a finding
that the assailed directives had been issued in the legitimate exercise by
the PNC President of his administrative and supervisory authority for the
orderly management of the college and the preservation of discipline
therein. The court likewise ruled that Laxamanas relief as Director of
Publications was valid, on the premise that since Laxamana was never
appointed, but merely designated, as Director of Publications, she could
be replaced anytime. Hence, this appeal was taken by Laxamana on the
ground that she was denied due process from being relieved as Director of
Publications and that the Court erred in not declaring the memoranda as
unconstitutional
Issue: Whether or not Laxamana was denied due process when she was
relieved as Director of Publications

Held: NO

Although the memorandum of August 27, 1964 had become

academic and the second one dated October 14, 1964, merely
informed petitioner of the new board of management there is
plausible meaning thereto which could be attached. They would, for
me, run counter to the primacy, the high estate accorded the right
of free expression, if viewed as indicative of a tendency to impose
censorship or to predicate liability for its exercise. That is to ignore
a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. No law shall
be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. . . . So
reads our Constitution. That is a guarantee of the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter of public intents without previous
censorship or subsequent punishment. There is to be then no
restraint imposed in advance on the communication of views or
liability to be incurred whether in libel suits, prosecution for
sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there
be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has
a right to prevent.

The vital need in a constitutional democracy for freedom of

expression is undeniable whether as a means of assuring individual
self fulfillment of attaining the truth, of securing participation by the
people in social, including political decision-making, and of
maintaining the balance between stability and change.

Nowhere should there be greater respect for the commands of

the freedom of speech and of the press than in educational
institutions. It would make a mockery of academic freedom if there
is the gnawing fear on the part of those competent to contribute
with their knowledge gained through the years of study and research
that what they say, or what they write, if displeasing to the powers
that be could be visited with retribution. Nor is it a fine example
for students if such an atmosphere would infect the campus. While
there is no particular tight of petitioner violated when she was
removed from a position not appearing in the school plantilla and
without diminution of salary and rank what did transpire bodes ill
for the spirit of free inquiry which should permeate campus life.

Arreza vs. Gregorio Araneta University

Facts:
According to the version of petitioners, they were either leaders or
participants in what respondent University referred to as a
rally/demonstration held on September 28, 1982, in front of the Life
Science Building of the respondent University, but which for them, could
be more accurately described as "a continuation of the General Assembly
of the student body held the day before one authorized by the School
Administration." Its purpose was to register the opposition of the students
to the abolition of the school's Institute of Animal Science, as those taking
courses therein would not be able to graduate. Such exercise of their right
to peaceable assembly was visited by respondent University with a refusal
to let them enroll after what for petitioners was a sham investigation of
their alleged violation of school rules and regulations.

Respondent University denied granting the authorization to hold

such general assembly, or student rally on September 28, 1982, alleging
that the students on said date through the use of battery-operated
megaphones criticized and lambasted the school administration,
specifically the decision of the Board of Trustees of respondent University
to merge its Institute of Animal Science with its Institute of Agriculture,
ignoring the fact that the aforementioned merger of the above-named
Institutes - intended as a cost-saving measure - would not deprive the
students enrolled in the former Institute of Animal Science from earning
their degrees. Moreover, there were other rallies, according to respondent,
held on September 8, 27 and 29, 1982, for the purpose of sympathizing
with the suspension of five (5) student leaders who conducted an illegal
assembly on August 27, 1982, causing additional disturbance on the
campus, not only by the disorderly conduct observed but also by the
resulting boycott of classes.

Issue: Whether or not the refusal of the respondent to allow the

petitioners to enroll, as a disciplinary acton for the conduct of the rally, is
violative of cognate rights of free speech and peaceful assembly

Held: YES. Infractions of University rules or regulations by petitioner-

students justify the filing of appropriate charges. What cannot be justified
is the infliction of the highly-disproportionate penalty of denial of
enrollment and the consequent failure of senior students to graduate, if in
the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly,
improper conduct could be attributed to them.

Villar vs. Technological Institute of the Philippines

Facts:
 Petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression against the
respondents, in their refusal to admit the said petitioners at the
Technological Institute of the Philippines. However, reference was made to
academic records of petitioners :
Rufino G. Salcon, Jr. : failed in only one subject in either semester of
1984-1985 school year
Romeo L. Guilatco, Jr. : failed in only one subject, having passed in
eight other subjects in the 1984-1985 school year
Petitioner Venecio Villar failed in two subjects but passed in four
subjects in the first semester of the academic year, 1983-1984.
Petitioner Inocencio F. Recitis passed all his subjects in the first
semester of 1983-1984 school year and had one failing grade during
its second semester. He had two failing grades during the first
semester of 1984-1985 school year.
Petitioner Noverto Barreto, had five failing grades in the first
semester of school year 1983-1984, six failing grades in the second
semester of the same school year, and six failing grades in the first
semester of 1984-1985 school year.
Petitioner Edgardo de Leon, Jr., had three failing grades, one passing
grade and one subject dropped in the first semester of school year
1984-1985.
Petitioner Regloben Laxamana had five failing grades with no
passing grade in the first semester of 1984-1985 school year.

Petitioners Barreto, de Leon, Jr. and Laxamana could be denied

enrollment in view of such failing grades.

Respondent educational institution is under no obligation to admit

them this coming academic year. The constitutional provision on
academic freedom enjoyed by institutions of higher learning justifies such
refusal

Issue: Whether or not the exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part
of certain students of respondent Technological Institute of the Philippines
could be a basis for their being barred from enrollment

Held: NO.

o this Court held: "As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v.
Bagatsing, the invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable
assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech
has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of
freedom of expression, which is Identified with the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without
censorship or punishment and which 'is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing ... of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent
 They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in
Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 'shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.'
Petitioners, therefore, have a valid cause for complaint if the
exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and
peaceable assembly was visited by their expulsion from
respondent College.
o The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning"
includes the right to set academic standards to determine under
what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of
students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be
followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against
those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate
grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal
protection clause being disregarded.
o WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted to petitioners Venecio
Villar, Inocencio F. Recitis, Rufino G. Salcon, Jr. and Romeo Guilatco,
Jr. to nullify the action taken by respondents in violation of their
constitutional rights. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted to
such petitioners to enjoin respondents from acts of surveillance,
black-listing, suspension and refusal to allow them to enroll in the
coming academic year 1985-1986, if so minded. The petition is
dismissed as to Noverto Barreto, Edgardo de Leon, Jr. and Regloben
Laxamana. No costs.