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G.R. No. 143483 January 31, 2002
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF PASAY CITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER 3RD DIVISION) AND AMADA
H. SOLANO, assisted by her husband ROMEO SOLANO, respondents.
BELLOSILLO , J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify two (2) Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated 12 November 1998 and 4 May 2000 giving due course to the
petition for annulment of judgment filed by private respondent Amada H.
Solano on 3 February 1997 and denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) private respondent
Amada Solano served as the all-around personal domestic helper of the late
Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national. During Ms. Hankins'
lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her life, respondent
Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion since no close
relative was available to tend to her needs.
In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms. Hankins
executed in her favor two (2) deeds of donation involving two (2) parcels of
land covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 of the Registry of Deeds. Private
respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation and were
nowhere to be found.
While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the
escheat of the estate of Elizabeth Hankins before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City.1 During the proceedings, a motion for intervention was filed by
Romeo Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio Regosa,
but on 24 June 1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for the reason
that "they miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the properties in
question."2 Since it was established that there were no known heirs and
persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court
escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of the
Philippines.
Page 1 of 43
By virtue of the decision of the trial court, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City
cancelled TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 and issued new ones, TCT Nos. 129551
and 129552, both in the name of Pasay City.
In the meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally found the
deeds of donation she had been looking for a long time. In view of this
development, respondent Amada Solano filed on 28 January 1997 a petition
before the Court of Appeals for the annulment of the lower court's decision
alleging, among other, that3 -
13.1. The deceased Elizabeth Hankins having donated the subject
properties to the petitioner in 1983 (for TCT No. 7807) and 1984 (for
TCT No. 7808), these properties did not and could not form part of
her estate when she died on September 20, 1985. Consequently,
they could not validly be escheated to the Pasay City Government;
13.2. Even assuming arguendo that the properties could be subject
of escheat proceedings, the decision is still legally infirm for
escheating the properties to an entity, the Pasay City Government,
which is not authorized by law to be the recipient thereof. The
property should have been escheated in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines under Rule 91, Section 1 of the New Rules of Court x x x
x
On 17 March 1997 the Office of the Solicitor General representing public
respondents RTC and the Register of Deeds (herein petitioner) filed an
answer setting forth their affirmative defenses, to wit: (a) lack of jurisdiction
over the nature of the action; and, (b) the cause of action was barred by the
statute of limitations.
Finding no cogent reason to justify the dismissal of the petition for
annulment, the Court of Appeals issued on 12 November 1998 the first of its
assailed Resolutions giving due course to the petition for annulment of
judgment and setting the date for trial on the merits. In upholding the theory
of respondent Solano, the Appeals Court ruled that -
Herein petitioner invokes lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
on the part of respondent RTC to entertain the escheat proceedings
x x x because the parcels of land have been earlier donated to
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herein petitioner in 1983 and 1984 prior to the death of said Hankins;
and therefore, respondent court could not have ordered the escheat
of said properties in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, assign
them to respondent Pasay City government, order the cancellation of
the old titles in the name of Hankins and order the properties
registered in the name of respondent Pasay City x x x x The 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure specifically laid down the grounds of
annulment filed before this Court, to wit: extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law
and this jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint.
It is axiomatic that the averments of the complaint determine the
nature of the action and consequently the jurisdiction of the courts.
Thus whether or not the properties in question are no longer part of
the estate of the deceased Hankins at the time of her death; and,
whether or not the alleged donations are valid are issues in the
present petition for annulment which can be resolved only after a full
blown trial x x x x
It is for the same reason that respondents espousal of the statute of
limitations against herein petition for annulment cannot prosper at
this stage of the proceedings. Indeed, Section 4, Rule 91 of the
Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that a person entitled to
the estate must file his claim with the court a quo within five (5) years
from the date of said judgment. However, it is clear to this Court that
herein petitioner is not claiming anything from the estate of the
deceased at the time of her death on September 20, 1985; rather
she is claiming that the subject parcels of land should not have been
included as part of the estate of the said decedent as she is the
owner thereof by virtue of the deeds of donation in her favor.
In effect, herein petitioner, who alleges to be in possession of the
premises in question, is claiming ownership of the properties in
question and the consequent reconveyance thereof in her favor
which cause of action prescribes ten (10) years after the issuance of
title in favor of respondent Pasay City on August 7, 1990. Herein
petition was seasonably filed on February 3, 1997 under Article 1144,
to wit:
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues: (1) Upon a
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written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3)
Upon a judgment.
And Article 1456, to wit:
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud,
the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes.4
In its Resolution of 4 May 2000 the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by public respondents Register of Deeds of Pasay City
and the Presiding judge of the lower court and set the trial on the merits for
June 15 and 16, 2000.
In its effort to nullify the Resolutions herein before mentioned, petitioner
points out that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (a) in denying petitioner's
affirmative defenses set forth in its answer and motion for reconsideration,
and in setting the case for trial and reception of evidence; and, (b) in giving
due course to private respondent's petition for annulment of decision despite
the palpable setting-in of the 5-year statute of limitations within which to file
claims before the court a quoset forth in Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of
Court and Art. 1014 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner argues that the lower court had jurisdiction when it escheated the
properties in question in favor of the city government and the filing of a
petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of subsequent discovery of
the deeds of donation did not divest the lower court of its jurisdiction on the
matter. It further contends that Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
only provides for two (2) grounds for the annulment of judgment, namely:
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. As such the discovery of the deeds of
donation seven (7) years after the finality of the escheat proceedings is an
extraneous matter which is clearly not an instance of extrinsic fraud nor a
ground to oust the lower court of its jurisdiction.
Petitioner also insists that notwithstanding the execution of the deeds of
donation in favor of private respondent, the 5-year statute of limitations within
which to file claims before the court a quo as set forth in Rule 91 of the
Revised Rules of Court has set in.
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The present controversy revolves around the nature of the parcels of land
purportedly donated to private respondent which will ultimately determine
whether the lower court had jurisdiction to declare the same escheated in
favor of the state.
We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession
or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and
claims the real or personal property of a person who dies intestate leaving no
heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to
forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers." 5 Since
escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually
does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to
such property may be made. The procedure by which the escheated property
may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is
imposed within which such action must be brought.
In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim
"within five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have
possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be
accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim
not made shall be barred forever."6 The 5-year period is not a device
capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it
is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in
asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final
judgment.
Incidentally, the question may be asked: Does herein private respondent, not
being an heir but allegedly a donee, have the personality to be a claimant
within the purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91, of the Revised Rules of Court? In this
regard, we agree with the Solicitor General that the case of Municipal
Council of San Pedro, Laguna v. Colegio de San Jose, Inc.,7 is applicable at
least insofar as it concerns the Court's discussion on who is an "interested
party" in an escheat proceeding -
In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the
petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person
alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be
escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and
oppose the petition for escheat. In the present case, the Colegio de
San Jose, Inc. and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a
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material interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan; the former
because it claims to be the exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the
latter because he claims to be the lessee thereof under a contract
legally entered with the former (underscoring supplied).
In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower
court as early as 27 June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or
less seven (7) years after, when private respondent decided to contest the
escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of judgment before
the Court of Appeals. Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion of her
right over the escheated properties militates against recovery.
A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive
notice, but not against those who are not parties or privies thereto. As held
in Hamilton v. Brown,8 "a judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon
persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. Absolute lack on
the part of petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any
right, or in any way injure him, constitutes due process of law, proper notice
having been observed." With the lapse of the 5-year period therefore, private
respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the supposed
"discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification to nullify the
escheat judgment which has long attained finality.
In the mind of this Court the subject properties were owned by the decedent
during the time that the escheat proceedings were being conducted and the
lower court was not divested of its jurisdiction to escheat them in favor of
Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation that they had been previously
donated. We recall that a motion for intervention was earlier denied by the
escheat court for failure to show "valid claim or right to the properties in
question."9 Where a person comes into an escheat proceeding as a claimant,
the burden is on such intervenor to establish his title to the property and his
right to intervene. A fortiori, the certificates of title covering the subject
properties were in the name of the decedent indicating that no transfer of
ownership involving the disputed properties was ever made by the deceased
during her lifetime. In the absence therefore of any clear and convincing
proof showing that the subject lands had been conveyed by Hankins to
private respondent Solano, the same still remained, at least before the
escheat, part of the estate of the decedent and the lower court was right not
to assume otherwise. The Court of Appeals therefore cannot perfunctorily
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presuppose that the subject properties were no longer part of the decedent's
estate at the time the lower court handed down its decision on the strength of
a belated allegation that the same had previously been disposed of by the
owner. It is settled that courts decide only after a close scrutiny of every
piece of evidence and analyze each case with deliberate precision and
unadulterated thoroughness, the judgment not being diluted by speculations,
conjectures and unsubstantiated assertions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the

Court of Appeals dated 12 November 1998 giving due course to the petition
for annulment of judgment, and its Resolution dated 4 May 2000 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are SET ASIDE. The decision of the
RTC-Br. 114, Pasay City, dated 27 June 1989, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Buena J., no part for being a co-signee of res. in question.
G.R. No. 158230 July 16, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, Petitioner,
vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY, ELIZABETH LEE, and PACITA
YU-LEE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 12 July 2002 and the
Resolution dated 9 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
53890.
The Facts
In March 1936, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, bought Lot No. 398 from
Vicenta Arcenas, Francisco, Carmen Ramon, Mercedes, Concepcion,
Mariano, Jose, and Manuel, all surnamed Dinglasan. Lot No. 398, with an
area of 1,574 square meters, is located at the corner of Roxas Avenue and
Pavia Street in Roxas City. In February 1944, Lee Liong died intestate and
was survived by his widow Ang Chia, and his sons Lee Bing Hoo and Lee
Bun Ting. On 30 June 1947, the surviving heirs of Lee Liong extrajudicially
settled the estate of the deceased and partitioned among themselves Lot No.
398. When Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting died, Lot No. 398 was

Page 4 of 43
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transferred by succession to their respective wives, Elizabeth Lee (Elizabeth)
and Pacita Yu-Lee (Pacita).
In the 1956 case of Dinglasan v. Lee Bun Ting,3 involving Lot No. 398, the
Court held that even if the sale of the property was null and void for violating
the constitutional prohibition on the sale of land to an alien, still the doctrine
of in pari delicto barred the sellers from recovering the title to the property.
Eleven years later, in the case of Lee Bun Ting v. Judge Aligaen,4 the Court
ordered the trial court to dismiss the complaint of the Dinglasans for the
recovery of Lot No. 398. Applying the doctrine of res judicata, the Court held
that the case was a mere relitigation of the same issues previously adjudged
with finality in the Dinglasan case, involving the same parties or their privies
and concerning the same subject matter.
On 7 September 1993, Elizabeth and Pacita (private respondents) filed a
petition for reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398 because the records of the
Register of Deeds, Roxas City were burned during the war. On 3 October
2001, the Court held that the trial courts order of reconstitution was void for
lack of factual support because it was based merely on the plan and
technical description approved by the Land Registration Authority.5
Meanwhile, on 26 January 1995, petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Roxas City a Complaint 6 for Reversion of Title against
private respondents and the Register of Deeds of Roxas City, praying that (1)
the sale of Lot No. 398 to Lee Liong be set aside for being null and void ab
initio; and (2) Lot No. 398 be reverted to the public domain for the States
disposal in accordance with law.
In their Answer, private respondents invoked as affirmative defenses: (1)
prescription; (2) private ownership of Lot No. 398; and (3) Lee Liongs being
a buyer in good faith and for value. Furthermore, private respondents
claimed that as Filipino citizens, they are qualified to acquire Lot No. 398 by
succession.
The Register of Deeds of Roxas City did not file an answer.
On 7 May 1996, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the reversion of
Lot No. 398 to the State.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision 7 dated 12 July 2002,
reversing the trial courts decision and declaring private respondents as the
absolute and lawful owners of Lot No. 398. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution 8 dated 9
May 2003.
Hence, this petition for review.
Page 5 of 43
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ordered the reversion of Lot No. 398 to the State. The trial
court held that private respondents could not have acquired a valid title over
Lot No. 398 because the sale of the lot to their predecessor-in-interest Lee
Liong was null and void. Being an innocent purchaser in good faith and for
value did not cure Lee Liongs disqualification as an alien who is prohibited
from acquiring land under the Constitution. The trial court further held that
prescription cannot be invoked against the State as regards an action for
reversion or reconveyance of land to the State.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the State is not barred
by prescription. However, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred
in ordering the reversion of Lot No. 398 to the State. Although the sale of Lot
No. 398 to Lee Liong violated the constitutional prohibition on aliens
acquiring land, the Court of Appeals noted that Lot No. 398 had already been
acquired by private respondents through succession. The transfer of Lot No.
398 to private respondents, who are Filipino citizens qualified to acquire
lands, can no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial
transfer. The flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title
of the transferee is deemed valid considering that the objective of the
constitutional proscription against alien ownership of lands, that is to keep
our lands in Filipino hands, has been achieved.
The Issue
Petitioner raises the lone issue that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE THE APPEALED DECISION AND DECLARED PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS THE ABSOLUTE AND LAWFUL OWNERS AND
POSSESSORS OF LOT NO. 398 OF ROXAS CITY CADASTRE
CONSIDERING THAT LEE LIONG, WHO IS AN ALIEN, AND THUS,
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROHIBITED TO OWN REAL PROPERTY IN THE
PHILIPPINES, ACQUIRED NO RIGHT OR TITLE OVER SUBJECT LOT
WHICH HE COULD HAVE TRANSMITTED BY SUCCESSION TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner argues that since the sale of Lot No. 398 to Lee Liong was void,
Lot No. 398 never became part of the deceased Lee Liongs estate. Hence,
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Lot No. 398 could not be transmitted by succession to Lee Liongs surviving
heirs and eventually to private respondents.
We do not subscribe to petitioners position. The circumstances of this case
are similar to the case of De Castro v. Teng Queen Tan,9 wherein a
residential lot was sold to a Chinese citizen. Upon the death of the alien
vendee, his heirs entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
deceased and the subject land was transferred to a son who was a
naturalized Filipino. Subsequently, the vendor of the lot filed a suit for
annulment of sale for alleged violation of the Constitution prohibiting the sale
of land to aliens. Independently of the doctrine of in pari delicto, the Court
sustained the sale, holding that while the vendee was an alien at the time of
the sale, the land has since become the property of a naturalized Filipino
citizen who is constitutionally qualified to own land.
Similarly, in this case, upon the death of the original vendee who was a
Chinese citizen, his widow and two sons extrajudicially settled his estate,
including Lot No. 398. When the two sons died, Lot No. 398 was transferred
by succession to their respective spouses, herein private respondents who
are Filipino citizens.
We now discuss whether reversion proceedings is still viable considering that
Lot No. 398 has already been transfered to Filipino citizens. In the
reconstitution case of Lee v. Republic of the Philippines10 involving Lot No.
398, this Court explained that the OSG may initiate an action for reversion or
escheat of lands which were sold to aliens disqualified from acquiring lands
under the Constitution. However, in the case of Lot No. 398, the fact that it
was already transferred to Filipinos militates against escheat proceedings,
thus:
Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because
of the doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for
reversion or escheat of the land to the State, subject to other defenses, as
hereafter set forth.
In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat
proceedings because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The
original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has been
inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein
[Elizabeth Lee and Pacita Yu Lee]. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a
fact the Solicitor General does not dispute.
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or
private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-
Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated
Page 6 of 43
since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such
land. "If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid." Thus, the
subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be
impugned on the basis of invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been
achieved.11 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the reversion proceedings was initiated only after almost 40
years from the promulgation of the case of Dinglasan v. Lee Bun
Ting,12 where the Court held that the sale of Lot No. 398 was null and void for
violating the constitutional prohibition on the sale of land to an alien. If
petitioner had commenced reversion proceedings when Lot No. 398 was still
in the hands of the original vendee who was an alien disqualified to hold title
thereto, then reversion of the land to the State would undoubtedly be
allowed. However, this is not the case here. When petitioner instituted the
action for reversion of title in 1995, Lot No. 398 had already been transferred
by succession to private respondents who are Filipino citizens.1avvphi1
Since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to Filipino citizens, the flaw
in the original transaction is considered cured. 13 As held in Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority:14
Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that where a Filipino citizen sells land
to an alien who later sells the land to a Filipino, the invalidity of the first
transfer is corrected by the subsequent sale to a citizen. Similarly, where the
alien who buys the land subsequently acquires Philippine citizenship, the
sale was validated since the purpose of the constitutional ban to limit land
ownership to Filipinos has been achieved. In short, the law disregards the
constitutional disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the land is
subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer himself
becomes a qualified party.15 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to private
respondents who are Filipino citizens, the prior invalid sale to Lee Liong can
no longer be assailed. Hence, reversion proceedings will no longer prosper
since the land is now in the hands of Filipino citizens.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 12
July 2002 and the Resolution dated 9 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 53890.
SO ORDERED.
specprocases

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

G.R. No. L-30381 August 30, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XIII, HON. JESUS P.
MORFE, PRESIDING JUDGE, AND PRES. ROXAS RURAL BANK
INC., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Leonardo De Ocampo, Jr. and Alfredo Arungayan Jr., for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
The instant appeal by certiorari seeks (1) to annul and set aside the Orders
dated October 26,1968 and March 1, 1969 of the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Manila, Branch XIII in Civil Case No. 73707 entitled "Republic of the
Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Bank of America, et al., Defendants," which
orders respectively dismissed herein petitioner's complaint for escheat as
against private respondent Pres. Roxas Rural Bank for improper venue and
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of such dismissal order; and (2)
the reinstatement of the aforesaid against private respondent.
The antecedents are as follows:
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act No. 3936, otherwise known as the Unclaimed
Balance Law, some 31 banks including herein private respondent Pres.
Roxas Rural Bank forwarded to the Treasurer of the Philippines in January of

Page 7 of 43
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1968 separate statements under oath by their respective managing officers
of all deposits and credits held by them in favor, or in the names of such
depositors or creditors known to be dead, or who have not been heard from,
or who have not made further deposits or withdrawals during the preceding
ten years or more. In the sworn statement submitted by private respondent
Bank, only two (2) names appeared: Jesus Ydirin with a balance of P126.54
and Leonora Trumpeta with a deposit of P62.91.
Upon receipt of these sworn statements, the Treasurer of the Philippines
caused the same to be published in the February 25, March 3 and March 10,
1968 issues of the "Philippines Herald", an English newspaper, and the"El
Debate", a Spanish newspaper, both of general circulation in the Philippines.
Thereafter, or on July 25, 1968, the Republic of the Philippines instituted
before the CFI of Manila a complaint for escheat against the aforesaid 31
banks, including herein private respondent. Likewise named defendants
therein were the individual depositors and/or creditors reported in the sworn
statements and listed in Annex "A" of the complaint. Summonses were
accordingly issued to defendant banks and the creditors/depositors requiring
them to file severally their answers to the complaint within 60 days after the
first publication of the summons with notice that should they fail to file their
answers, plaintiff would take judgment against them by default. The aforesaid
complaint, list of depositors-creditors (Annex "A"of the complaint), summons
and notice were duly published in the August 25, September 1, and
September 8, 1968 issues of the "Philippines Herald" and "El Debate."
On October 5,1968, private respondent Bank filed before the CFI a motion to
dismiss the complaint as against it on the ground of improper venue.
Opposed by the petitioner, the motion to dismiss was granted in the first
assailed Order. Its motion for reconsideration of said dismissal order having
been denied in the second assailed order, petitioner interposed the instant
appeal on pure questions of law, to wit:
a. Whether or not Pres. Roxas Rural Bank is a real party in interest in the
escheat proceedings or in Civil Case No. 73707 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila.
b. Whether or not venue of action in Civil Case No. 73707 has been properly
laid in the City of Manila, since all defendant banks, wherever they may be
found, could be included in one single action, pursuant to the provisions of
Act No. 3936.
c. Whether or not Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court on
venue, likewise, governs escheat proceedings instituted by the Republic in
the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Page 8 of 43
It is petitioner's contention that private respondent bank, being a mere
nominal party, could not file a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper
venue, the real party in interest being the depositors themselves; that the
avowed purpose of Act No. 3936 is to benefit the government by escheating
unto itself dormant bank deposits and that this purpose will be defeated if
escheat proceedings will have to be instituted in each and every province or
city where a bank is located because of the publication expense; that the
convenience or inconvenience of the depositors is not the determining factor
as to venue of action, but that in view of Rule 144 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides that all cases brought after the effectivity of the Rules
on January 1, 1964 shall be governed by the provisions of the Rules of
Court, Section 2(b) of Rule 4 on venue is made applicable and available to
the Republic in the instant case.
We find these contentions unmeritorious.
A "real party in interest" has been defined as the party who would be
benefitted or injured by the judgment of the suit or the party entitled to avail
of the suit. 1 There can be no doubt that private respondent bank falls under
this definition for the escheat of the dormant deposits in favor of the
government would necessarily deprive said bank of the use of such deposits.
It is in this sense that it stands to be "injured by the judgment of the suit;" and
it is for this reason that Section 3 of Act No. 3936 specifically provides that
the bank shall be joined as a party in the action for escheat, thus:
Section 3. Whenever the Attorney General shall be informed of such
unclaimed balances, he shall commence an action or actions in the name of
the People of the Philippines in the Court of First Instance of the province
where the bank is located, in which shall be joined as parties the bank and
such creditors or depositors. All or any member of such creditors or
depositors or banks, may be included in one action. (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, if the bank were not a real party in interest, the legislature would not
have provided for its joining as a party in the escheat proceedings.
Besides, under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, private respondent
bank is a real party in interest as its presence in the action is necessary for a
complete determination and settlement of the questions involved therein.
Private respondent bank being a real party in interest, it may and can file a
motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
In defense of the second issue raised, petitioner points to the last sentence
of Section 3 of Act No. 3936 above-quoted as authority for saying that the
venue of the escheat proceedings was properly laid in the City of Manila.
Petitioner's reliance on said sentence is patently misplaced, the same having
specprocases

been obviously read out of context instead of in relation to the sentence

preceding it.
The first sentence of Section 3 of Act No. 3936 directs the Attorney General,
now Solicitor General, to commence an action or actions in the name of the
People of the Philippines in the Court of First Instance of the province where
the bank is located. The phrase "or actions" in this section is very significant.
It manifests awareness on the part of the legislators that a single action to
cover all banks wherever located in the Philippines would not be legally
feasible in view of the venue prescribed for such action under the same
section, i.e., the province where the bank is located. Thus, the addition of the
last sentence, which the lower court had correctly interpreted to mean "that
for escheat of unclaimed bank balances all banks located in one and the
same province where the Court of First Instance concerned is located may
be made parties defendant "in one action" 2 was clearly intended to save on
litigation and publication expenses, but certainly not as authority for the
G.R. No. L-57438 January 3, 1984
lumping together of all banks wherever found in the Philippines in one single
escheat proceedings. FELICIANO FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
Anent the third issue raised, suffice it to say that Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of the
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PELAGIO FRANCISCO, respondents.
Revised Rules of Court cannot govern escheat proceedings principally
because said section refers to personal actions. Escheat proceedings are Nicomedes M. Jajardo for petitioner.
actions in rem which must be brought in the province or city where the rem in Crescini & Associates Law Office for private respondent.
this case the dormant deposits, is located.
We note that while private respondent bank's motion to dismiss was granted, GUERRERO, J.:
the trial court in a subsequent order dated November 16, 1968 declared
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the annulment of the decision and
private respondent bank's depositors and co-defendants Jose Ydirin and
resolution of the defunct Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court,
Leonora Trumpeta in default for failure to file their answers. Considering that
dated April 27, 1981. and June 26, 1981. respectively, dismissing the petition
the complaint in Civil Case No. 73707 states a common cause of action
for certiorari filed by petitioner Feliciano Francisco docketed as CA-G.R. No.
against private respondent bank and its depositors-co-defendants, and
12172 entitled "Feliciano Francisco versus Judge Jesus R. De Vega and
considering further that the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent
Pelagio Francisco". In the said petition for certiorari, petitioner Feliciano
bank alleged facts 3 that would warrant dismissal of the complaint against
Francisco challenged the validity of the Order of the Court of First Instance of
said co-defendants, we apply by analogy Section 4 of Rule 18 of the Rules of
Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch II, now Regional Trial Court, granting
Court, 4thereby decreeing the benefits of the dismissal of the complaint to
execution pending appeal of its decision by relieving petitioner Feliciano
extend to private respondent bank's co-defendants Jose Ydirin and Leonora
Francisco as guardian of incompetent Estefania San Pedro and appointing
Trumpeta and their successors- in-interest.
respondent herein, Pelagio Francisco, in his instead.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal by certiorari is hereby denied. No costs.
The antecedent facts as recited in the appealed decision of the Court of
SO ORDERED. Appeals showed that:
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur. Petitioner is the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent Estefania San
Pedro in Special Proceedings No. 532 of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan presided over by respondent Judge. On August 30, 1974

Page 9 of 43
specprocases
respondent Pelagio Francisco, claiming to be a first cousin of Estefania San
Pedro, together with two others, said to be nieces of the incompetent,
petitioned the court for the removal of petitioner and for the appointment in
his stead of respondent Pelagio Francisco. Among other grounds, the petition
was based on the failure of the guardian to submit an inventory of the estate
of his ward and to render an accounting.
It would seem that petitioner subsequently rendered an accounting but failed
to submit an inventory, for which reason the court on March 20, 1975 gave
petitioner ten (10) days within which to do so, otherwise he would be
removed from guardianship Petitioner thereafter submitted an inventory to
which respondent Pelagio Francisco filed an objection on the ground that
petitioner actually received P14,000.00 for the sale of a residential land and
not P12,000.00 only as stated in the deed of sale and reported by him in his
inventory. The respondent Judge found the claim to be true, and, in his order
of April 17, 1980 relieved the petitioner as guardian.
On motion of petitioner, however, the respondent Judge reconsidered his
finding, relying on the deed of sale as the best evidence of the price paid for
the sale of the land. in his order dated September 12, 1980, respondent
judge acknowledged that his finding was "rather harsh and somewhat unfair
to the said guardian." Nevertheless, respondent Judge ordered the
retirement of petitioner on the ground of old age. The order states in part as
follows:
"... considering the rather advanced age of the present guardian, this Court is
inclined and so decrees, that he should nevertheless be, as he is hereby,
retired to take effect upon the appointment by this court and the assumption
of office of his replacement, who shall be taken from the recommendees of
the parties herein. For this purpose, the present guardian is hereby given
twenty (20) days from receipt of a copy of this order within which to submit
his proposal for a replacement for himself and to comment on petitioner's
recommendee and the latter a like period within which to comment on the
present guardian's proposed substitute, after which the matter will be
deemed submitted for resolution and final action by the court.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he was only 72
years of age and still fit to continue with the management of the estate of his
ward as he had done with zeal for the past twelve years. In an order dated
November 13, 1980 the court denied his motion. Accordingly, on December
17, 1980, petiti/ner filed a notice of appeal 'from the order issued by the court
Page 10 of 43
on November 13, 1980' and paid the appeal bond. On February 2, 1981 he
filed the record on appeal. 1
Meanwhile, on January 27, 1981, the court, on motion of private respondent,
required petitioner to submit within three days his nomination for guardian of
Estefania San Pedro as required in its order of September 12, 1980. In
issuing the order, the court stated that 'an indefinite discontinuance in office
would defeat the intent and purpose of the said order of September 12, 1980
relieving the present guardian.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.
(referring to CA-G.R. No. SP-1217)"
On December 5, 1980, before the appeal was perfected, Pelagio Francisco
filed an "Omnibus Motion" with the court a quo with the prayer (1) to restrain
guardian from exercising office; (2) order guardian to surrender to court all
properties of the ward; and (3) appoint new guardian . 2
Petitioner, on December 9, 1980 filed his opposition to the omnibus motion
claiming that the same was premature. 3 The trial court, however,
disregarded the opposition and required petitioner on January 27, 1981 to
submit within three (3) days his nomination for guardian of Estefania San
Pedro as required in its order of September 12, 1980, the court holding that
"an indefinite continuance in office would defeat the intent and purpose of the
said order of September 12, 1980, relieving the present guardian." 4
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said order, 5 but the trial court
overruled the same on March 4, 1981. Subsequently, on March 11,
1981, 6 the court a quo appointed respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new
guardian of the person and property of the incompetent Estefania San
Pedro. 7
On March 13, 1981, petitioner filed with the defunct Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari challenging the validity of the order of the trial court
granting the execution pending appeal of its decision and appointing
respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new guardian despite the fact that
respondent is five (5) years older than petitioner, docketed as CA-G.R. No.
12172.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on April 23, 1981, the pertinent
portion of its decision reading as follows:
The Rules of Court authorizes executions pending appeal "upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order." (Rule 39, Sec. 2). In the case at bar,
the retirement of petitioner was ordered on the ground of old age. When this
ground is considered in relation to the delay of the petitioner in the making of
an accounting and the submission of an inventory, the order amounts to a
specprocases
finding that petitioner, considering his "rather advanced age," was no longer
capable of managing the estate of his ward. Rule 97, Sec. 2). Given this
finding, it is clear that petitioner's continuance in office would not be in the
best interest of the ward.
It is of course true that the order of removal is not yet final. Considering the
time -it normally takes for appeals to be finally determined as well as the
purpose of the order under appeal, which would be frustrated if it is not
immediately executed, we cannot say that respondent acted with grave and
irreparable damage and that the order of September 12, 1980 is not yet final,
petitioner has not demonstrated that in ordering execution pending appeal,
the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion.
Indeed, the granting of execution pending appeal ties within the sound
discretion of a court. Appellate courts win not interfere to discretion, unless it
modify control or inquire into the exercise of this be shown that there has
been an abuse of that discretion. (2 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
260 [1979].
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioner subsequently filed another motion for reconsideration advancing
the following arguments: that to grant execution pending appeal would render
petitioner's appeal moot and academic that "advanced age" was not one of
the, grounds raised by private respondent in the court below; that the court a
quo abuse its discretion in appointing respondent as guardian despite the
fact that private respondent is five (5) years older than petitioner. 9
The respondent appellate court, in its resolution dated June 26, 1981, denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the court finding it unnecessary to
repeat the discussion of the arguments which it had already considered and
only entertained the argument regarding the competency of the respondent
as the new guardian. On this point, respondent Court ruled:
The order of March 11, 1981 appointing respondent Francisco as guardian
was never assailed in the petition in this case. As already stated, this case
concerns the validity only of the orders of January 27, 1981 and March 4,
1981 which required petitioner to recommend his own replacement,
otherwise the court would appoint a new guardian. It does not appear that
petitioner objected to the appointment of respondent Francisco on the ground
now invoked, namely, that Francisco is in fact older than petitioner. Nor does
it appear that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
March 11, 1981, calling attention to the fact that respondent Francisco is
Page 11 of 43
older than petitioner, In short, the point now raised does not appear to have
been urged in the lower court so that the latter could have rectified the error,
if it was error at all, For this reason, it is not proper ground for certiorari
before this Court, much less for a motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 10
In the petition at bar, petitioner contends that (a) The Honorable Court of
Appeals has committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the removal
of petitioner as guardian of the ward Estefania San Pedro on the ground of
old age is a good ground for the execution of the decision pending appeal;
and (b) The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave misapprehension
and misinterpretation of facts when it declared that petitioner did not question
the appointment of private respondent as guardian in his stead on the ground
that the latter is older than the former by five (5) years.
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one
person, called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law
regards as incapable of managing his own affairs.11 A guardianship is
designed to further the ward's well-being, not that of the guardian, It is
intended to preserve the ward's property, as wen as to render any assistance
that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody
involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those
responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well. 12
Having in mind that guardianship proceeding is instituted for the benefit and
welfare of the ward, the selection of a guardian must, therefore, suit this very
purpose. Thus, in determining the selection of a guardian, the court may
consider the financial situation, the physical condition, the sound judgment,
prudence and trustworthiness, the morals, character and conduct, and the
present and past history of a prospective appointee, as wen as the
probability of his, being able to exercise the powers and duties of guardian
for the full period during which guardianship will be necessary. 13
A guardian is or becomes incompetent to serve the trust if he is so
disqualified by mental incapacity, conviction of crime, moral delinquency or
physical disability as to be prevented from properly discharging the duties of
his office. 14 A guardian, once appointed may be removed in case he
becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable
therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty (30)
days after it is due to render an account or make a return.15
We agree with the trial court and the appellate court that there is need for
petitioner Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the guardianship over the
specprocases
person and property of incompetent Estefania San Pedro. The conclusion
reached by the trial court about the "rather advanced age" of petitioner at 72
years old (petitioner is now 76 years old) finding him unfit to continue the
trust cannot be disturbed. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, this
finds direct support in the delay of the accounting and inventory made by
petitioner. To sustain petitioner as guardian would, therefore, be detrimental
to the ward. While age alone is not a control criterion in determining a
person's fitness or qualification to be appointed or be retained as guardian, it
may be a factor for consideration. 16
Considering the difficult and complicated responsibilities and duties of a
guardian, We sustain the immediate retirement of petitioner Feliciano
Francisco as guardian, affirming thereby the rulings of both the trial court and
the appellate court.
With respect to the issue of execution pending appeal in appointing
respondent Pelagio Francisco as guardian to succeed petitioner while the
latter's appeal was still pending, We hold and rule that respondent appellate
court correctly sustained the propriety of said execution pending appeal.
Upon urgent and compelling reasons, execution pending appeal is a matter
of sound discretion on the part of the trial court, 17 and the appellate court
will not interfere, control or inquire into the exercise of this discretion, unless
there has been an abuse thereof, 18 which We find none herein.
Inasmuch as the primary objective for the institution of guardianship is for the
protection of the ward, there is more than sufficient reason for the immediate
execution of the lower court's judgment for the replacement of the first
guardian. We agree with the reason given by the appellate court in sustaining
execution pending appeal that "an indefinite continuance in office would
defeat the intent and purpose of the order of September 12, 1980, relieving
the present guardian (Feliciano Francisco)."
As to the issue concerning the appointment of respondent Pelagio Francisco
as the new guardian, We likewise agree with the respondent appellate court
in denying in its resolution of June 26, 1981 for lack of merit the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner questioning the appointment of private
respondent Pelagio Francisco. We also find no abuse of discretion
committed by the appellate court.
The rule is well-established that appellate courts may not entertain issues
brought before it for the first time on appeal. (Jose Matienzo vs. Martin
Servidad, 107 SCRA 276; Garcian vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 597;
Director of Lands vs. Dano 96 SCRA 160).
Page 12 of 43
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed decision and
resolution of the respondent court dated April 27, 1981 and June 26, 1981,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr. and De Castro, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 139400. September 3, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MAURICIO
WATIWAT, appellant.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Rape is a repulsive crime done only by the most morally depraved
individuals. When committed against a child of tender years, especially
against an orphan born with nothing but hope and yearning for affection, the
despicable lechery swells into manifest heartlessness that must be
condemned.
For automatic review is the Decision[1] dated April 22, 1999 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Criminal Case No. P-5690,
Branch 42, the dispositive portion of which states:
ACCORDINGLY, accused MAURICIO WATIWAT is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the heinous crime of RAPE,
defined and penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7659, and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme
penalty of DEATH.
Additionally, accused is ordered to indemnify the victim MARITES WATIWAT,
the amount of P50,000.00.
Let the complete record of this case together wit the transcript of
stenographic notes be forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court, for
automatic review pursuant to Sec. 10, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
specprocases
SO ORDERED.[2]
The accusatory portion of the Amended Information against appellant
Mauricio Watiwat reads:
That on or about the month of March, 1996 and subsequent thereto in
barangay Bato, municipality of Bansud, province of Oriental Mindoro,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with lewd and unchaste design, by means of force, threat
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay
with and have carnal knowledge of one MARITES WATIWAT, his 10-year-old
niece living in his own house and therefore a guardian and relative within the
third civil degree, against her will and without her consent, to the damage
and prejudice of the Offended Party.
CONTRARY TO ART. 335 OF THE RPC, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 7659.[3]
Upon being arraigned, with the assistance of his counsel, appellant pleaded
not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that Marites Watiwat, complaining
witness, was born on April 7, 1986, as shown by her Certificate of Live Birth,
[4]
to her mentally deranged mother, Adoracion Areglado. Since her father
was already dead, appellant caused its registration and had Watiwat
recorded as her surname.[5] Marites grew with the belief that he was her
uncle, being the husband of her mothers sister, Ineseria.
When Marites was one month old, she lived with appellant and his family in
Bato, Bansud, Oriental Mindoro. When she reached the age of three, her
grandfather Cipriano Areglado took her under his custody in Batangas where
she studied. She returned to appellants house when she was already in
Grade III.
In March 1996, while Marites was sleeping in the house of appellant, he
brought her to another room and undressed her. He then took off his clothes,
placed himself on top of her and forcibly inserted his penis into her
genitals. She felt pain. She could only beg and mutter huwag. Her plea,
however, was unheeded. Appellant succumbed to his lustful desires and
completely penetrated her private part, making a pumping motion. The
incident was repeated several times. He stopped molesting her only in
November 1996 when her grandfather Cipriano brought her to Hilaria
Amparos house at Villapag-asa, Bansud. [6] Hilaria is Marites grandaunt, being
Ciprianos sister.
Hilaria observed that Marites seemed to be always lost in her thoughts and
would constantly complain of pains in her stomach and head. On July 7,
1997, or after more than one (1) year from the incident, she finally revealed
Page 13 of 43
her harrowing experience to Hilaria who immediately brought her to Dr.
Preciosa Soller for examination.[7] She issued a Medico-Legal Report[8] with
the following findings:
1. Breasts not developed.
2. Perineum No pubic hair
Labia majora not developed
skin in labial area congested.
3. Hymen complete old healed lacerations at 6
oclock, 9 oclock, 11 oclock and 12
oclock.
Incomplete old healed laceration at 5
oclock and 3 oclock
REMARKS: Physical virginity lost
Thereafter, Hilaria reported the matter to the police.
Eventually, an Information for rape was filed against appellant.
Appellant vehemently denied the charge. He testified that prior to the
incident, he and his children transferred their residence from Bato, Bansud to
Salcedo, also of the same town, after he separated from his live-in partner
Ineseria Areglado in 1992. As proof that he was then residing in Salcedo, he
presented a bible, Transfer Form of Application of Voters, and a Certification
by the Commission on Elections attesting that he is a voter of Salcedo. While
there, he cultivated the farm of Alberto Evangelista.
Alberto corroborated appellants testimony.
Simeon Mores, the Barangay Captain of Barangay Batu, controverted
appellants claim that he resided in Barangay Salcedo from 1992-
1998. Simeon presented the 1995 Census Files of Barangay Batu wherein
appellant was enlisted as one if its residents [9] and a yellow pad paper
containing a mortgage agreement[10] between him and one Salustiano Gupit
prepared by Alfredo Gonzales, councilor of Barangay Batu.
In convicting appellant, the trial court held:
While there is delay in reporting the incident in question, the story Marites
presented is credible and consistent. Her testimony withstood the test of
cross-examination and there is no cogent reason why she should not be
believed as the defense had not even shown any reason at all why a ten (10)
year old Marites would fabricate a story of rape upon herself and impute it to
a person whom she looks up to as her very own father if her story were not
true.
specprocases
When there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witness to testify falsely against an accused or to falsely
implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that no
such improper motive exists and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit (People vs. Tabao, G.R. No. 111290, Jan. 30, 1995, 240 SCRA 758).
There is an explanation why there was such a delay. There is no one close to
her and no shoulder to lean on so to speak, except the accused
himself. Marites had no family to cling to. Besides, accused and Marites
are not strangers to each other, the former being the guardian, while
the latter the ward, living under he same roof. Had it not been for a mere
coincidence that she was taken by her Nanay Laling to live with her in her
house, there could have no chance for Marites to divulge her painful and
horrifying ordeal. She could have kept for herself forever the humiliating
secret. Thus, it would not be proper to apply the norms of behavior expected
under the circumstances from mature women.
A ten-year old girl, like Marites, unlike a mature woman, cannot be
expected to have the courage and intelligence to immediately report a sexual
assault committed against her especially when the offender is one she looks
up to as her very own father.
Marites should be looked upon despite her minority considering her courage
and determination to seek justice and plea for redress for a crime of such a
nature that is otherwise better left forgotten. She could have chosen to keep
numb and silent and forget the whole incident, but she did not. It is a clear
manifestation of her intent to pursue her morbid cry for the injustice
committed against her, at the opportune time (People vs. Guererro, 242
SCRA 606).
Where accused was positively identified by the victim of the rape herself who
harbored no ill motive against the accused, the defense of alibi must
fail. (People vs. Canada, 253 SCRA 256)
Bare alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime. (People vs. Alimon, 257 SCRA 658)
(People vs. Nazareno, 260 SCRA 256) (Emphasis supplied)
In his brief, appellant ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
I parent of the victim.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME, AS
DEFINED AND PUNISHED UNDER ARTICLE 335 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 7659.
Page 14 of 43
II
ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT ONLY THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT IS GUILTY AS CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT STILL ERRED
IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH.[11]
Appellant contends that Marites failure to report the matter immediately to the
authorities casts doubt on her credibility. Moreover, when the incident took
place in March 1996, she was no longer living with his family in Bato,
Bansud. As early as 1992, her grandfather brought her to Batangas. He, on
the other hand, transferred residence to Barangay Salcedo. And even
assuming that he is guilty of rape, the imposition of the death penalty upon
him is erroneous since the qualifying circumstance of relationship was not
proved. Neither can he be considered her guardian. Thus, he should not be
convicted of qualified rape and that the penalty that should have been
imposed against him should be reclusion perpetua.
The law governing the instant case is Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, [12] the pertinent portions
of which provide:
SEC. 11. Article 335 of the same [Revised Penal] Code is hereby amended
to read as follows:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the
X x x (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court held that Marites was telling the truth when she testified that
she was sexually abused by appellant. We see no reason to differ from such
finding.
specprocases
For one, it is well entwined into the bedrock of our jurisprudence that the trial
judges evaluation of the testimony of a witness and its factual findings are
accorded not only the highest respect, but also finality, unless some weighty
circumstance has been ignored or misunderstood which could alter the result
of the judgment rendered. Given the direct opportunity to observe the witness
on the stand, the trial judge was in a vantage position to assess his
demeanor and determine if he was telling the truth or not. [13] Thus:
In the resolution of the factual issues, the Court relies heavily on the trial
court for its evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the
opportunity to observe them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that
sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a
mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will
not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the
contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor
of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the
forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have
darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a
serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if
tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned
innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the
basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict.[14]
For another, complainant never wavered in her assertion that appellant raped
her. Her testimony is clear, positive, and convincing. Indeed, the fact of rape
and the identity of appellant as the malefactor were sufficiently and
convincingly established by the prosecution through her straightforward
narration, thus:
Q. Why did you file the case against your Kakang Muling or Mauricio
Watiwat?
A. Because I was raped, sir.
Q. Do you still remember the date and month when you were raped by this
Kakang Muling or Mauricio Watiwat?
A. It was in March, 1996, sir.
Q. In that particular month of March, 1996, how old were you if you still
remember?
A. I was less than 10 years old, sir.
Q. Tell us how you were raped by your Kakang Muling or Mauricio Watiwat?
Page 15 of 43
A. I was then living in his house and while I was sleeping beside with other
children, I was carried by the accused to the other room, sir.
Q. After you were lifted and carried to the other room, what else was done by
your Ka Muling?
A. He took off my shorts and panty, sir.
Q. After your shorts and panty were removed by the accused, what else did
he do if any?
A. He undressed himself and put himself on top of me, sir. (Naghubo po siya
at pagkatapos ay pumatong sa akin.)
FISCAL (Continuing):
Q. After he placed himself on top of you, what else did he do?
A. He insisted in inserting his penis inside me. (Pilit po niyang ipinasok ang
kanyang ari sa akin.)
Q. When he forcibly tried to insert his penis to your body, what did you feel?
A. I was hurt, sir.
Q. And because you were hurt, what, if any, did you plea or say to your
uncle?
A. I told him, huwag, but he continued to insert his penis in my private part,
sir.
Q. Will you please tell the Court if your uncle Muling was successful in
completely inserting his penis towards your sexual organ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What else did your uncle Muling do after he was able to insert his penis to
your sexual organ?
A. (No answer)
Note: After a few seconds she answered: Siya po ay nagkakayod. (He made
a pumping motion.)[15]
Indeed, complainants testimony, stamped with consistency and accuracy,
must be given full faith and credit. [16] When a woman testifies that she has
been raped, she says in effect, all that is necessary to show that rape has
been committed, for as long as her testimony meets the test of credibility.[17]
Also, Marites does not appear to have any strong reason or fiendish motive
to fabricate such a grave charge against appellant and thus expose herself
and her family to shame and scandal. A victim of sexual assault would
certainly not be willing to undergo the humiliation of a public trial, let alone
testify on the details of her torment, if she had reasons other than her natural
specprocases
passion to avenge her honor and to decry a grave injustice done to her.[18] To
be sure, complainants testimony, which is untainted with any proof of ill
motive, bears the hallmarks of truth.
For his part, appellant assails Marites inaction in reporting the crime for more
than one year. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time
the assault against their virtue. [19] Barely out of childhood, Marites could be
easily intimidated and cowed into silence. [20] While it is true that it took her a
long time to report her defloration, it must be stressed that she was merely
10 years old when she was subjected to bestial abuse. Afraid and with no
family to assist her, she could not report the incident to the authorities. It was
only when her grandaunt took care of her that she had the courage to do
so. Under the circumstances, it is unreasonable to judge her action by the
norms of behavior expected of mature individuals. [21] The delay in reporting
the incident of rape ought not to be taken against her and cannot be used to
weaken her credibility.
Appellants defense merely consists of alibi and bare denial. His claim that he
was residing in another place during the incident does not persuade us. We
have held that an accused who raises the defense of alibi must not only
prove his presence at another place at the time of commission of the crime,
he must also establish that it would be physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime during the incident. It must be observed that Barangay
Salcedo and Barangay Bato are both within the municipality of
Bansud. Clearly, it is safe to conclude that it was not physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime at that time.
Moreover, firmly established is the rule that alibi and denial are inherently
weak and have always been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the
facility with which they can be concocted. [22] Such defense warrants the least
credibility or none at all[23] and cannot prevail over the positive identification of
the accused by the prosecution witness. [24] Denial is a self-serving negative
evidence that cannot be given greater weight than the declaration of a
credible witness who testified on affirmative matters.[25]
The prosecution has not only established beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant had carnal knowledge of Marites, it has likewise proved that, at the
time the offense was committed, she was only 10 years old as shown by her
Certificate of Live Birth. Thus, appellant must be held guilty of statutory
rape under paragraph 1, No. 3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7659, quoted earlier, the victim being under twelve years of
age. It bears stressing that the Information specifically alleges that Marites
was 10 years old when appellant sexually abused her in March
1996. Consequently, he must be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Page 16 of 43
The trial court imposed upon appellant the death penalty on the basis of its
conclusion that he is her guardian. We hold that the lower court erred in this
point.
In People vs. Garcia,[26] we held:
In the law on rape, the role of a guardian is provided for in Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code, specifically as one who, aside from the offended party,
her parents or grandparents, is authorized to file the sworn written complaint
to commence the prosecution for that crime. In People vs. De la Cruz (59
Phil. 531 [1934]), it was held that the guardian referred to in the law is
either a legal or judicial guardian as understood in the rules on civil
procedure.
xxx
It would not be logical to say that the word guardian in the third paragraph of
Article 344 which is mentioned together with parents and grandparents of the
offended party would have a concept different from the guardian in the recent
amendments of Article 335 where he is also mentioned in the company of
parents and ascendants of the victim. In Article 344, the inclusion of the
guardian is only to invest him with the power to sign a sworn written
complaint to initiate the prosecution of four crimes against chastity, while his
inclusion in the enumeration of the offenders in Article 335 is to authorize the
imposition of the death penalty on him. With much more reason, therefore,
should the restrictive concept announced in De la Cruz, that is, that he
be a legal or judicial guardian, be required in the latter article.
The Court notes from the transcripts of the proceedings in Congress on this
particular point that the formulators were not definitive on the concept of
guardian as it now appears in the attendant circumstances added to the
original provisions of Article 335 of the Code. They took note of the status of
a guardian as contemplated in the law on rape but, apparently on pragmatic
considerations to be determined by the courts on an ad hoc basis, they
agreed to just state guardian without the qualification that he should be a
legal or judicial guardian. It was assumed, however, that he should at the
very least be a de facto guardian. Indeed, they must have been aware of
jurisprudence that the guardian envisaged in Article 335 of the Code,
even after its amendment by Republic Act No. 4111, would either be a
natural guardian, sometimes referred to as a legal or statutory
guardian, or a judicial guardian appointed by the court over the person
of the ward.
xxx
specprocases

The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the In view of the failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance
consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which of guardianship or relationship, it is error for the trial court to convict appellant
impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and for qualified rape and impose upon him the supreme penalty of death.
normally deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do Anent the award of damages, we observed that the trial court failed to award
not obtain in appellants case or, for that matter, any person similarly moral damages to Marites.
circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or anothers property. The
Moral damages are additionally awarded without need of pleading or proof of
fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting
the basis thereof.[31] This is because it is recognized that the victim's injury
sanctions should he betray the trust. (Emphasis supplied)
necessarily results from an abysmal crime to warrant by itself the award of
A guardian is a person lawfully invested with the power and charged with the moral damages. The anguish and the pain she has to endure are
duty of taking care of the person and managing the property and rights of evident. Indeed, the offended party in a rape case is a victim many times
another person who, for defect of age, understanding, or self-control, is over. In our culture, which puts a premium on the virtue of purity or virginity,
considered incapable of administering his own affairs.[27] rape stigmatizes the victim more than the perpetrator.[32]
There are three kinds of guardians under the law: (a) the legal guardian, WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 22, 1999 of the Regional
who is such by provision of law without the need of judicial appointment, as Trial Court, Branch 42, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Criminal Case No.
in the case of the parents over the persons of their minor children, or the P-5690, is MODIFIED in the sense that appellant MAURICIO WATIWAT is
father, or in his absence the mother, with respect to the property of the minor found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape and is
children not exceeding P50,000.00 in value;[28] (b) the guardian ad litem, a hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to
competent person appointed by the court for purposes of a particular action pay the victim Marites Watiwat P50,000.00 as moral damages, in addition to
or proceeding involving a minor; and (c) the judicial guardian, one the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court.
appointed by the court over the person and/or property of the ward to
Costs against appellant.
represent the latter in all his civil acts and transaction. [29]
SO ORDERED.
As shown by the facts in this case, appellant is not Marites guardian, whether
natural, legal or judicial. That he allowed his surname to be used as her Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
surname in her Certificate of Live Birth is inconsequential. It appears that Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
such arrangement was merely upon Ciprianos request. Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., on official leave.
At most, appellant was only an uncommitted caretaker of Marites over a
limited period of time. Clearly, he cannot be considered a guardian falling
within the ambit of the amendatory provision of Section 11, Republic Act No.
7659.
Neither is Marites the niece of appellant and hence, a relative within the third
civil degree, as alleged in the Information. The prosecution utterly failed to
prove that appellant is legally married to Marites aunt. In fact, it did not
present the marriage contract between them to establish that Marites is
appellants niece, a relative within the third civil degree by
affinity. Relationship, as a qualifying circumstance in rape, must not only be
alleged clearly; it must also be proved beyond reasonable doubt, just as the
crime itself.[30]

Page 17 of 43
specprocases

G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008

LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, petitioner,
vs.
ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed
PABALE, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri) seeking the
reversal and setting aside of the Decision, 2 dated 10 April 2001, of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133; as well as the Resolution, 3 dated 19
December 2001 of the same court denying reconsideration of its
aforementioned Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision,
upheld the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 20 February 1984,
executed by Nelly S. Nave (Nave) in favor of siblings Rommel, Elmer, Erwin,
Roiler and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale (the Pabale siblings) over a piece
of land (subject property) in Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3317 (27604); and, thus, reversed and set
aside the Decision,4 dated 2 December 1997, of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C. 5 The 2
December 1997 Decision of the RTC declared null and void the two sales
agreements involving the subject property entered into by Nave with different
parties, namely, Sesinando M. Fernando (Fernando) and the Pabale siblings;
and ordered the reconveyance of the subject property to Alamayri, as Naves
successor-in-interest.

Page 18 of 43
specprocases
There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to the present Petition,
determined by the Court of Appeals to be as follows:
This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by
Sesinando M. Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation
[Fernando] on February 6, 1984 before the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna presided over by Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., docketed as
Civil Case No. 675-84-C against Nelly S. Nave [Nave], owner of a parcel of
land located in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604).
[Fernando] alleged that on January 3, 1984, a handwritten "Kasunduan Sa
Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) was entered into by and between him and
[Nave] involving said parcel of land. However, [Nave] reneged on their
agreement when the latter refused to accept the partial down payment he
tendered to her as previously agreed because she did not want to sell her
property to him anymore. [Fernando] prayed that after trial on the merits,
[Nave] be ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in his favor,
and to pay attorneys fees, litigation expenses and damages.
[Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be ordered to
execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of [Fernando] based on the
following grounds: (1) she was not fully apprised of the nature of the piece of
paper [Fernando] handed to her for her signature on January 3, 1984. When
she was informed that it was for the sale of her property in Calamba, Laguna
covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604), she immediately returned to [Fernando]
the said piece of paper and at the same time repudiating the same. Her
repudiation was further bolstered by the fact that when [Fernando] tendered
the partial down payment to her, she refused to receive the same; and (2)
she already sold the property in good faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller
and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale [the Pabale siblings] on February 20,
1984 after the complaint was filed against her but before she received a copy
thereof. Moreover, she alleged that [Fernando] has no cause of action
against her as he is suing for and in behalf of S.M. Fernando Realty
Corporation who is not a party to the alleged Contract to Sell. Even assuming
that said entity is the real party in interest, still, [Fernando] cannot sue in
representation of the corporation there being no evidence to show that he
was duly authorized to do so.
Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to Intervene alleging that
they are now the land owners of the subject property. Thus, the complaint
was amended to include [the Pabale siblings] as party defendants. In an
Order dated April 24, 1984, the trial court denied [Naves] Motion to Dismiss
prompting her to file a Manifestation and Motion stating that she was
Page 19 of 43
adopting the allegations in her Motion to Dismiss in answer to [Fernandos]
amended complaint.
Thereafter, [Nave] filed a Motion to Admit her Amended Answer with
Counterclaim and Cross-claim praying that her husband, Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo be impleaded as her co-defendant, and including as her defense
undue influence and fraud by reason of the fact that she was made to appear
as widow when in fact she was very much married at the time of the
transaction in issue. Despite the opposition of [Fernando] and [the Pabale
siblings], the trial court admitted the aforesaid Amended Answer with
Counterclaim and Cross-claim.
Still unsatisfied with her defense, [Nave] and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a
Motion to Admit Second Amended Answer and Amended Reply and Cross-
claim against [the Pabale siblings], this time including the fact of her
incapacity to contract for being mentally deficient based on the psychological
evaluation report conducted on December 2, 1985 by Dra. Virginia P.
Panlasigui, M. A., a clinical psychologist. Finding the motion unmeritorious,
the same was denied by the court a quo.
[Nave] filed a motion for reconsideration thereof asseverating that in Criminal
Case No. 1308-85-C entitled "People vs. Nelly S. Nave" she raised therein
as a defense her mental deficiency. This being a decisive factor to determine
once and for all whether the contract entered into by [Nave] with respect to
the subject property is null and void, the Second Amended Answer and
Amended Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings] should be
admitted.
Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the proceedings
in this case was suspended sometime in 1987 in view of the filing of a
Petition for Guardianship of [Nave] with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36
of Calamba, Laguna, docketed as SP No. 146-86-C with Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo as the petitioner. On June 22, 1988, a Decision was rendered in
the said guardianship proceedings, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Under the circumstances, specially since Nelly S. Nave who now resides
with the Brosas spouses has categorically refused to be examined again at
the National Mental Hospital, the Court is constrained to accept the Neuro-
Psychiatric Evaluation report dated April 14, 1986 submitted by Dra. Nona
Jean Alviso-Ramos and the supporting report dated April 20, 1987 submitted
by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, both of the National Mental Hospital and hereby
finds Nelly S. Nave an incompetent within the purview of Rule 92 of the
Revised Rules of Court, a person who, by reason of age, disease, weak mind
and deteriorating mental processes cannot without outside aid take care of
specprocases
herself and manage her properties, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit
and exploitation, said condition having become severe since the year 1980.
She and her estate are hereby placed under guardianship. Atty. Leonardo C.
Paner is hereby appointed as her regular guardian without need of bond,
until further orders from this Court. Upon his taking his oath of office as
regular guardian, Atty. Paner is ordered to participate actively in the pending
cases of Nelly S. Nave with the end in view of protecting her interests from
the prejudicial sales of her real properties, from the overpayment in the
foreclosure made by Ms. Gilda Mendoza-Ong, and in recovering her lost
jewelries and monies and other personal effects.
SO ORDERED."
Both [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings] did not appeal therefrom, while the
appeal interposed by spouses Juliano and Evangelina Brosas was dismissed
by this Court for failure to pay the required docketing fees within the
reglementary period.
In the meantime, [Nave] died on December 9, 1992. On September 20, 1993,
Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo, [Naves] sole heir, she being an orphan and
childless, executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pertaining to his inherited
properties from [Nave].
On account of such development, a motion for the dismissal of the instant
case and for the issuance of a writ of execution of the Decision dated June
22, 1988 in SP No. 146-86-C (petition for guardianship) was filed by Atty.
Vedasto Gesmundo on February 14, 1996 with the court a quo. [The Pabale
siblings] filed their Opposition to the motion on grounds that (1) they were not
made a party to the guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be bound by
the Decision therein; and (2) that the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by the late [Nave] in their favor was never raised in the
guardianship case.
The case was then set for an annual conference. On January 9, 1997, Atty.
Vedasto Gesmundo filed a motion seeking the courts permission for his
substitution for the late defendant Nelly in the instant case. Not long after the
parties submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, a motion for substitution
was filed by Lolita R. Alamayre (sic) [Alamayri] alleging that since the subject
property was sold to her by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale, she should be substituted in his stead. In refutation,
Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a Manifestation stating that what he executed
is a Deed of Donation and not a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of [Alamayri]
and that the same was already revoked by him on March 5, 1997. Thus, the
motion for substitution should be denied.
Page 20 of 43
On July 29, 1997, the court a quo issued an Order declaring that it cannot
make a ruling as to the conflicting claims of [Alamayri] and Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo. After the case was heard on the merits, the trial court rendered
its Decision on December 2, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the handwritten Contract to Sell dated January 3, 1984 executed
by Nelly S. Nave and Sesinando Fernando null and void and of no force and
effect;
2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984 executed by
Nelly S. Nave in favor of the [Pabale siblings] similarly null and void and of no
force and effect;
3. Recognizing Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] as the owner of the property covered
by TCT No. 111249 of the land records of Calamba, Laguna;
4. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to execute a transfer of title over the
property in favor of Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] in the concept of reconveyance
because the sale in their favor has been declared null and void;
5. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to surrender possession over the property to
Ms. [Alamayri] and to account for its income from the time they took over
possession to the time the same is turned over to Ms. Lolita [Alamayri], and
thereafter pay the said income to the latter;
6. Ordering [Fernando] and the [Pabale siblings], jointly and severally, to pay
Ms. [Alamayri]:
a. attorneys fees in the sum of P30,000.00; and
b. the costs.6
S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation, still represented by Fernando, filed an
appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, solely
to question the portion of the 2 December 1997 Decision of the RTC ordering
him and the Pabale siblings to jointly and severally pay Alamayri the amount
of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees.
The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133
averring that the RTC erred in declaring in its 2 December 1997 Decision that
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 20 February 1984 executed by Nave in their
favor was null and void on the ground that Nave was found incompetent
since the year 1980.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 10 April 2001, granted the
appeals of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation and the Pabale siblings. It
ruled thus:
specprocases
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal filed by S. M. Fernando
Realty Corporation, represented by its President, Sesinando M. Fernando as
well as the appeal interposed by Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda,
all surnamed Pabale, are hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered upholding the
VALIDITY of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984.
No pronouncements as to costs.7
Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision of the
appellate court, invoking the Decision,8 dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in
the guardianship proceedings, docketed as SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, which
found Nave incompetent, her condition becoming severe since 1980; and
thus appointed Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Said Decision
already became final and executory when no one appealed therefrom.
Alamayri argued that since Nave was already judicially determined to be an
incompetent since 1980, then all contracts she subsequently entered into
should be declared null and void, including the Deed of Sale, dated 20
February 1984, which she executed over the subject property in favor of the
Pabale siblings.
According to Alamayri, the Pabale siblings should be bound by the findings of
the RTC in its 22 June 1988 Decision in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, having
participated in the said guardianship proceedings through their father Jose
Pabale. She pointed out that the RTC explicitly named in its orders Jose
Pabale as among those present during the hearings held on 30 October
1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. Alamayri thus filed
on 21 November 2001 a Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in
Evidence so she could mark and submit as evidence certain documents to
establish that the Pabale siblings are indeed the children of Jose Pabale.
Atty. Gesmundo, Naves surviving spouse, likewise filed his own Motion for
Reconsideration of the 10 April 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 58133, asserting Naves incompetence since 1980 as found by
the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, and his right to the subject property as
owner upon Naves death in accordance with the laws of succession. It must
be remembered that Atty. Gesmundo disputed before the RTC the supposed
transfer of his rights to the subject property to Alamayri, but the court a
quo refrained from ruling thereon.
In a Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals denied for
lack of merit the Motions for Reconsideration of Alamayri and Atty.
Gesmundo.
Page 21 of 43
Hence, Alamayri comes before this Court via the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the following
assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FINDING
THAT NELLY S. NAVE WAS INCOMPETENT IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING
NO. 146-86-C ON JUNE 22, 1988 CANNOT RETROACT TO AFFECT THE
VALIDITY OF THE DEED OF SALE SHE EXECUTED ON FEBRUARY 20,
1984 IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN
SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C DATED JUNE 22, 1988 IS NOT
BINDING ON RESPONDENTS PABALES.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION
TO SCHEDULE HEARING TO MARK DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS IN
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF JOSE PABALE AS THE
FATHER OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.9
It is Alamayris position that given the final and executory Decision, dated 22
June 1988, of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C finding Nave incompetent
since 1980, then the same fact may no longer be re-litigated in Civil Case
No. 675-84-C, based on the doctrine of res judicata, more particularly, the
rule on conclusiveness of judgment.
This Court is not persuaded.
Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon
or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." Res judicata lays the rule
that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without
fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter
within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies,
in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of
concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. 10
It is espoused in the Rules of Court, under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section
47, Rule 39, which read:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or
final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxxx
specprocases
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or
final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which
was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be
stated as follows: (1) The judgment or decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the
litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) Any
right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in
the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment
or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies
whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the
two suits are the same. These two main rules mark the distinction between
the principles governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may
operate as evidence.11 In speaking of these cases, the first general rule
above stated, and which corresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is referred to as "bar by former
judgment"; while the second general rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c)
of the same section and rule, is known as "conclusiveness of judgment."
The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds provides the
following enlightening discourse on conclusiveness of judgment:
The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by
former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or
question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed
upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively
settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and
persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in
any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or
any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different
cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority.
Page 22 of 43
It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive
as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their
privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or
question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on
the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment
between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the
second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first
suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of
action is not required but merely identity of issues.
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals (197 SCRA 201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez vs. Reyes (76 SCRA
179 [1977]) in regard to the distinction between bar by former judgment
which bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim,
demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of judgment which bars the
relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same
parties on a different claim or cause of action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions
which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied
to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation.
Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in the final judgment,
although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto and
although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not
actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the record of the former trial
shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the
particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all
future actions between the parties and if a judgment necessarily
presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment
itself.12
Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation,
further differentiated between the two rules of res judicata, as follows:
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be
barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to
the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the
parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit
involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
specprocases
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no
identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to
those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as
to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known
as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact, or
matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and
cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not
the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the
same.13
In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of
a fact or question already settled in a previous case. The second case,
however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer touch on the same
fact or question adjudged in the first case. Conclusiveness of judgment
requires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of action.
Contrary to Alamayris assertion, conclusiveness of judgment has no
application to the instant Petition since there is no identity of parties and
issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
No identity of parties
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty.
Gesmundo for the appointment of a guardian over the person and estate of
his late wife Nave alleging her incompetence.
A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of a
minor or an incompetent, the latter being described as a person "suffering the
penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and
dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind,
even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound
mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,
cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their
property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation." 14
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court governs the proceedings for the appointment of
a guardian, to wit:
Rule 93
APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS
SECTION 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian for resident.
Any relative, friend, or other person on behalf of a resident minor or
incompetent who has no parent or lawful guardian, or the minor himself if
Page 23 of 43
fourteen years of age or over, may petition the court having jurisdiction for
the appointment of a general guardian for the person or estate, or both, of
such minor or incompetent. An officer of the Federal Administration of the
United States in the Philippines may also file a petition in favor of a ward
thereof, and the Director of Health, in favor of an insane person who should
be hospitalized, or in favor of an isolated leper.
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for the appointment of a general
guardian must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the appointment necessary or
convenient;
(c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of the minor or
incompetent, and of the persons having him in their care;
(d) The probable value and character of his estate;
(e) The name of the person for whom letters of guardianship are prayed.
The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or verification shall
render void the issuance of letters of guardianship.
SEC. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition for
the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and
place for hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be
given to the persons mentioned in the petition residing in the province,
including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself, and
may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given.
SEC. 4. Opposition to petition. Any interested person may, by filing a
written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of majority of the
alleged minor, competency of the alleged incompetent, or the unsuitability of
the person for whom letters are prayed, and may pray that the petition be
dismissed, or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to any suitable
person named in the opposition.
SEC. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. At the hearing of the petition
the alleged incompetent must be present if able to attend, and it must be
shown that the required notice has been given. Thereupon the court shall
hear the evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations,
and, if the person in question is a minor or incompetent it shall appoint a
suitable guardian of his person or estate, or both, with the powers and duties
hereinafter specified.
xxxx
specprocases
SEC. 8. Service of judgment. Final orders or judgments under this rule
shall be served upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the
minor or incompetent person resides or where his property or part thereof is
situated.
A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without the
usual parties, i.e., petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case.
Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bears the title: In re: Guardianship of
Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency, Verdasto Gesmundo y Banayo, petitioner,
with no named respondent/s.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that the
petition contain the names, ages, and residences of relatives of the
supposed minor or incompetent and those having him in their care, so that
those residing within the same province as the minor or incompetent can be
notified of the time and place of the hearing on the petition.
The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian
under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a person is
indeed a minor or an incompetent who has no capacity to care for himself
and/or his properties; and, second, who is most qualified to be appointed as
his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people who best could
help the trial court settle such issues would be those who are closest to and
most familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his relatives
living within the same province and/or the persons caring for him.
It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of the
minor or incompetent be likewise identified and notified. The reason is
simple: because their presence is not essential to the proceedings for
appointment of a guardian. It is almost a given, and understandably so, that
they will only insist that the supposed minor or incompetent is actually
capacitated to enter into contracts, so as to preserve the validity of said
contracts and keep the supposed minor or incompetent obligated to comply
therewith.
Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice and
actually took part in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. They are not Naves relatives,
nor are they the ones caring for her. Although the rules allow the RTC to
direct the giving of other general or special notices of the hearings on the
petition for appointment of a guardian, it was not established that the RTC
actually did so in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
Alamayris allegation that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C rests on two Orders, dated 30 October 1987 15 and 19 November
1987,16 issued by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, expressly mentioning
Page 24 of 43
the presence of a Jose Pabale, who was supposedly the father of the Pabale
siblings, during the hearings held on the same dates. However, the said
Orders by themselves cannot confirm that Jose Pabale was indeed the father
of the Pabale siblings and that he was authorized by his children to appear in
the said hearings on their behalf.
Alamayri decries that she was not allowed by the Court of Appeals to submit
and mark additional evidence to prove that Jose Pabale was the father of the
Pabale siblings.
It is true that the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate
jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings. In general, however, the Court of Appeals conducts hearings
and receives evidence prior to the submission of the case for judgment. 17 It
must be pointed out that, in this case, Alamayri filed her Motion to Schedule
Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence on 21 November 2001. She thus
sought to submit additional evidence as to the identity of Jose Pabale, not
only after CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 had been submitted for judgment,
but after the Court of Appeals had already promulgated its Decision in said
case on 10 April 2001.
The parties must diligently and conscientiously present all arguments and
available evidences in support of their respective positions to the court before
the case is deemed submitted for judgment. Only under exceptional
circumstances may the court receive new evidence after having rendered
judgment;18 otherwise, its judgment may never attain finality since the parties
may continually refute the findings therein with further evidence. Alamayri
failed to provide any explanation why she did not present her evidence
earlier. Merely invoking that the ends of justice would have been best served
if she was allowed to present additional evidence is not sufficient to justify
deviation from the general rules of procedure. Obedience to the requirements
of procedural rules is needed if the parties are to expect fair results
therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by
harking on the policy of liberal construction. 19 Procedural rules are tools
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are
thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some
instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress,
was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules
with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules
applies only to proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true
specprocases
that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. 20
Moreover, contrary to Alamayris assertion, the Court of Appeals did not deny
her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence merely for
being late. In its Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals
also denied the said motion on the following grounds:
While it is now alleged, for the first time, that the [herein respondents Pabale
siblings] participated in the guardianship proceedings considering that the
Jose Pabale mentioned therein is their late father, [herein petitioner Alamayri]
submitting herein documentary evidence to prove their filiation, even though
admitted in evidence at this late stage, cannot bind [the Pabale siblings] as
verily, notice to their father is not notice to them there being no allegation to
the effect that he represented them before the Calamba Court. 21
As the appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence Alamayri wanted to
submit do prove that the Jose Pabale who attended the RTC hearings on 30
October 1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was the
father of the Pabale siblings, they would still not confirm his authority to
represent his children in the said proceedings. Worth stressing is the fact that
Jose Pabale was not at all a party to the Deed of Sale dated 20 February
1984 over the subject property, which was executed by Nave in favor of the
Pabale siblings. Without proper authority, Jose Pabales presence at the
hearings in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C should not bind his children to the
outcome of said proceedings or affect their right to the subject property.
Since it was not established that the Pabale siblings participated in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C, then any finding therein should not bind them in Civil
Case No. 675-84-C.
No identity of issues
Neither is there identity of issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil
Case No. 675-84-C that may bar the latter, by conclusiveness of judgment,
from ruling on Naves competency in 1984, when she executed the Deed of
Sale over the subject property in favor the Pabale siblings.
In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was
incompetent at the time of filing of the petition with the RTC in 1986, thus,
requiring the appointment of a guardian over her person and estate.
In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale siblings in
Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the issue was whether Nave was an incompetent
when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in favor of the
Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984, hence, rendering the said sale void.
Page 25 of 43
While both cases involve a determination of Naves incompetency, it must be
established at two separate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A
finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean that
she was so in 1984. In Carillo v. Jaojoco,22 the Court ruled that despite the
fact that the seller was declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court only
nine days after the execution of the contract of sale, it does not prove that
she was so when she executed the contract. Hence, the significance of the
two-year gap herein cannot be gainsaid since Naves mental condition in
1986 may vastly differ from that of 1984 given the intervening period.
Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously
been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long
as the contrary be not proved; that is, that at the moment of his acting he was
incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind. 23 The burden of proving
incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests upon the person who
alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be
presumed.24
Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated
only in 1986, when the RTC started hearing SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C; and
she was not judicially declared an incompetent until 22 June 1988 when a
Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC, resulting in the appointment
of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still
presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into contracts such as
the Deed of Sale over the subject property, which she executed in favor of
the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984. The burden of proving otherwise
falls upon Alamayri, which she dismally failed to do, having relied entirely on
the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
Alamayri capitalizes on the declaration of the RTC in its Decision dated 22
June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C on Naves condition "having become
severe since the year 1980." 25 But there is no basis for such a
declaration. The medical reports extensively quoted in said Decision,
prepared by: (1) Dr. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos, dated 14 April 1986, 26 and (2)
by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, dated 20 April 1987, 27 both stated that upon their
examination, Nave was suffering from "organic brain syndrome secondary to
cerebral arteriosclerosis with psychotic episodes," which impaired her
judgment. There was nothing in the said medical reports, however, which
may shed light on when Nave began to suffer from said mental condition. All
they said was that it existed at the time Nave was examined in 1986, and
again in 1987. Even the RTC judge was only able to observe Nave, which
made him realize that her mind was very impressionable and capable of
being manipulated, on the occasions when Nave visited the court from 1987
specprocases

to 1988. Hence, for this Court, the RTC Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C may be conclusive as to Naves incompetency from
1986 onwards, but not as to her incompetency in 1984. And other than
invoking the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C,
Alamayri did not bother to establish with her own evidence that Nave was
mentally incapacitated when she executed the 20 February 1984 Deed of
Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to render
the said deed void.
All told, there being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in the
former on Naves incompetency by the year 1986 should not bar, by
conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter case that Nave still had
capacity and was competent when she executed on 20 February 1984 the
Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it upheld the
[G.R. No. 45662. May 5, 1939.]
validity of the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is JUAN GOROSTIAGA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MANUELA
hereby DENIED. The Decision, dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals SARTE, Defendant-Appellant.
in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the
petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri. Calleja & Sierra for Appellant.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Bonto & Gutierrez Lora for Appellee.
Associate Justice
SYLLABUS
1. INCAPACITY; JURISDICTION UPON AN INCOMPETENT PERSON.
During all the proceedings in the case at bar, from the time of the defendant
of the complaint to the rendition of the judgment, the defendant was
physically and mentally unfit to manage her affairs, and there having been no
summons and notices of the proceedings served upon her guardian,
because no guardian was then appointed for her, the court trying the action
acquired no jurisdiction over her person (sec. 396, No. 4, Act No. 190).

2. ID.; ID.; DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION; ATTORNEYS GOOD FAITH. It

is argued that attorney G. A. S. appeared for the defendant in the case and
filed an answer in her behalf and that the attorneys authority is presumed as
well as the capacity of the defendant giving the authority of the defendant
giving the authority. But this presumption is disputable and it is here entirely
rebutted by no less than an order of the same court declaring the defendant
physically and mentally unfit to manage her state since at least May 18,
1936. If the defendant was thus incompetent, she could not have validly

Page 26 of 43
specprocases
authorized the attorney to represent her. And if the authority was given by her
relatives, it was not sufficient except to show the attorneys good in appearing
in the case.
3. ID.; ID.; ANNULMENT OF PROCEEDINGS. In matters of this kind,
affecting the jurisdiction of the court and the validly of all the proceedings, the
court, instead of observing a passive attitude, should take the initiative of,
and exercise utmost care in, ascertaining the facts. And although the
evidence gathered at the trial is insufficient, if, after judgment, the lack of
jurisdiction is clearly shown, and there has been no waiver thereof, as in this
case where a waiver could not have been possible, it is the duty of the court
to set aside all the proceedings, take the necessary steps to acquire
jurisdiction, and grant a new trial. The position taken by the lower court in this
case an hardly be reconciled with its position in the guardianship
proceedings.
4. ID.; ID.; REMEDY PROVIDED IN SECTION 113, CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE. Appellee contends that in the motion filed by the guardian
under Section 113 there is no showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or
excusable negligence as ground for relief provided therein. It is, however,
more than a surprise to the defendant that she be tried and sentenced
without valid summon or notice. And as to the affidavits of merits required to
be attached to a motion under section 113 they are not necessary as we
have already held, where the court acted without jurisdiction over the
defendants person. (Coombs v. Santos, 24 Phil., 446.)
DECISION
MORAN, J.:
On May 27, 1936, Juan Gorostiaga, plaintiff-appellee, instituted an action
against Manuela Sarte to recover the sum of P2,285.51. An answer was filed
by attorney Gregorio A. Sabater in the name of the defendant, wherein a
general denial was made, and several defenses interposed, among them,
that the defendant was physically and mentally incompetent to manage her
estate. At the trial, the defendant did not appear in court and her non-
Page 27 of 43
appearance had not been accounted for. On September 21, 1936, judgment
was rendered sentencing the defendant to pay the amount claimed. On
December 23, 1936, a motion under section 113 of Act No. 190 was filed by
general guardian of the defendant, praying that all the proceedings and
against the defendant to declared null and void for act of jurisdiction over the
person. The motion was denied; hence, this appeal.
There is no question about the facts. On May 18, 1936, that is, nine days
prior to the institution of the action against the defendant, a petition for
guardianship was filed with the lower court in favor of the defendant, on the
ground the she was incompetent to manage her estate by reason for her
physical and mental incapacity. After hearing the petition, wherein
depositions of alienists were presented, the court issued an order declaring
that the defendant Manuela Sarte "se halla fisica y mentalemente
incapacitada para administrar sus bienes por razon de belidad senil, cuya
inteligencia si bien le permite sostener una conversacion por algunos
minutos de una manera satisfactoria, no tiene la consistencia necesaria para
atender a sus necesidades y administrar sus propios bienes."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Although this order was issued on December 3, 1936, it relates to the
incapacity alleged in the petition of May 18, 1963. Consequently, the
incapacity thus declared existed at least on the date of the filing of the
petition, that is, on May 18, 1936, nine days prior to the institution of the
action relied upon by the lower court, the defendant was incompetent to
manage her affairs for about two or three years prior to her examination by
the alienists. It appears thus clear that during all the proceedings in the case
at bar, from the time of the filing of the complaint to the rendition of the
judgment, the defendant was physically and mentally unfit to manage her
affairs, and there having been no summons and notices of the proceedings
served upon her and her guardian, because no guardian was then appointed
for her, the court trying the action acquired no jurisdiction over her person
(sec. 396, No. 4, of Act No. 190).
It is argued that Attorney Gregorio A. Sabater appeared for the defendant in
the case and filed an answer in her behalf and that the attorneys authority is
presumed as well as the capacity of the defendant giving the authority. But
this presumption is disputable and it is here entirely rebutted by no less than
an order of the same court declaring the defendant physically and mentally
unfit the manage her estate since at least May 18, 1936. If the defendant was
thus incompetent, she could not have validly authorized the attorney to
specprocases

represent her. And if the authority was given by the relatives, it was not
sufficient except to show the attorneys good faith in appearing in the case.

It is contended that the issue as to the incapacity of the defendant was

pleaded in defendants answer and was squarely decided and that therefore
it cannot be reopened unless on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
That answer was, however, filed by an attorney not validly authorized to
appear for the defendant who had never been in court except when her
guardian filed a motion to quash all the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. In
matters of this kind, affecting the jurisdiction of the court and the validity of all
proceedings, the court, instead of observing a passive attitude, should take
the initiative of, and exercise utmost care in, ascertaining the facts. And
although the evidence gathered at the trial insufficient, if, after judgment, the
lack of jurisdiction is clearly shown, and there has been no waiver thereof, as
G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000
in this case where a waiver could not set aside all the proceedings, take the
necessary steps to acquire jurisdiction, and grant a new trial. the position JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L.
taken by the lower court in this case can hardly be reconciled with its position JARDELEZA, petitioners,
in the guardianship proceedings. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
Appellee contends that in the motion filed by the guardian under section 113 DECISION
there is no showing of mistakes, inadvertence, surprise or excusable PARDO, J.:
negligence as grounds for relied provided therein. It is, however, more than a
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision1 of the Court of Appeals
surprise to the defendant that she be tried and sentenced without valid
and its resolution denying reconsideration 2 reversing that of the Regional
summons or notice. And as to the affidavits of merit required to be attached
Trial Court, Iloilo, Branch 323 and declaring void the special proceedings
to a motion under section 113, they are not necessary, as well as have
instituted therein by petitioners to authorize petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza, in
already held, where the court acted without jurisdiction over the defendants
view of the comatose condition of her husband, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., with
person. (Coombs v. Santos, 24 Phil., 446).
the approval of the court, to dispose of their conjugal property in favor of co-
petitioners, their daughter and son in law, for the ostensible purpose of
Judgment is reversed, all the proceedings had in the lower court are hereby
"financial need in the personal, business and medical expenses of her
declared null and void, and the case is remanded to the court bellow for new
incapacitated husband."
trial after the guardian has pleaded to an amended complaint duly served
upon him making him party defendant. With costs against appellee. The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein respondent) on
Avancea, C.J., Villa-real, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur. the one hand, against his mother Gilda L. Jardeleza, and sister and brother-
in-law, the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda Jardeleza (herein petitioners) on the
other hand. The controversy came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr.s suffering of a stroke on March 25, 1991, which left him comatose and
bereft of any motor or mental faculties. Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the
father of herein respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private
respondent Gilda Jardeleza.

Page 28 of 43
specprocases
"Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the senior
Jardeleza spouses was about to be sold, petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza, on
June 6, 1991, filed a petition (Annex "A") before the R.T.C. of Iloilo City,
Branch 25, where it was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4689, in the
matter of the guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. The petitioner
averred therein that the present physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. prevent him from competently administering his properties,
and in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the Jardelezas real and
personal assets, there was a need for a court-appointed guardian to
administer said properties. It was prayed therein that Letters of Guardianship
be issued in favor of herein private respondent Gilda Ledesma Jardeleza,
wife of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. It was further prayed that in the meantime,
no property of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. be negotiated, mortgaged or
otherwise alienated to third persons, particularly Lot No. 4291 and all the
improvements thereon, located along Bonifacio Drive, Iloilo City, and covered
by T.C.T. No. 47337.
"A few days later, or on June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza herself
filed a petition docketed as Special Proceeding NO. 4691, before Branch 32
of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal
properties, and authorization to sell the same (Annex "B"). Therein, the
petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza averred the physical and mental incapacity of
her husband, who was then confined for intensive medical care and
treatment at the Iloilo Doctors Hospital. She signified to the court her desire
to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties. She
also alleged that her husbands medical treatment and hospitalization
expenses were piling up, accumulating to several hundred thousands of
pesos already. For this, she urgently needed to sell one piece of real
property, specifically Lot No. 4291 and its improvements. Thus, she prayed
for authorization from the court to sell said property.
"The following day, June 14, 1991, Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City
issued an Order (Annex "C") finding the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 to
be sufficient in form and substance, and setting the hearing thereof for June
20, 1991. The scheduled hearing of the petition proceeded, attended by
therein petitioner Gilda Jardeleza, her counsel, her two children, namely
Ernesto Jardeleza, Jr., and Glenda Jardeleza Uy, and Dr. Rolando Padilla,
one of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s attending physicians.
"On that same day, June 20, 1991, Branch 32 of the RTC of Iloilo City
rendered its Decision (Annex "D"), finding that it was convinced that Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of
Page 29 of 43
the conjugal properties, and that the sale of Lot No. 4291 and the
improvements thereon was necessary to defray the mounting expenses for
treatment and Hospitalization. The said court also made the pronouncement
that the petition filed by Gilda L. Jardeleza was "pursuant to Article 124 of the
Family Code, and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on
summary proceedings sanctioned under Article 253 of the same Code x x x.
"The said court then disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, there being factual and legal bases to the petition dated
June 13, 1991, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
"1) declaring Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., petitioners husband, to be incapacitated
and unable to participate in the administration of conjugal properties;
"2) authorizing petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza to assume sole powers of
administration of their conjugal properties; and
"3) authorizing aforesaid petitioner to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral
Survey of Iloilo, situated in Iloilo City and covered by TCT No. 47337 issued
in the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the
buildings standing thereof.
"SO ORDERED.
"On June 24, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition
to the proceedings before Branch 32 in Spec. Proc. Case No. 4691, said
petitioner being unaware and not knowing that a decision has already been
rendered on the case by public respondent.
"On July 3, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed a motion for
reconsideration of the judgment in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 and a motion for
consolidation of the two cases (Annex "F"). He propounded the argument
that the petition for declaration of incapacity, assumption of sole powers of
administration, and authority to sell the conjugal properties was essentially a
petition for guardianship of the person and properties of Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr. As such, it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on
summary proceedings set out in Article 253 of the Family Code. It should
follow the rules governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court
which require procedural due process, particularly the need for notice and a
hearing on the merits. On the other hand, even if Gilda Jardelezas petition
can be prosecuted by summary proceedings, there was still a failure to
comply with the basic requirements thereof, making the decision in Spec.
Proc. No. 4691 a defective one. He further alleged that under the New Civil
Code, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. had acquired vested rights as a conjugal
partner, and that these rights cannot be impaired or prejudiced without his
consent. Neither can he be deprived of his share in the conjugal properties
specprocases
through mere summary proceedings. He then restated his position that Spec.
Proc. No. 4691 should be consolidated with Spec. Proc. No. 4689 which was
filed earlier and pending before Branch 25.
"Teodoro Jardeleza also questioned the propriety of the sale of Lot No. 4291
and the improvements thereon supposedly to pay the accumulated financial
obligations arising from Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s hospitalization. He alleged
that the market value of the property would be around Twelve to Fifteen
Million Pesos, but that he had been informed that it would be sold for much
less. He also pointed out that the building thereon which houses the
Jardeleza Clinic is a monument to Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.s industry, labor and
service to his fellowmen. Hence, the said property has a lot of sentimental
value to his family. Besides, argued Teodoro Jardeleza, then conjugal
partnership had other liquid assets to pay off all financial obligations. He
mentioned that apart from sufficient cash, Jardeleza, Sr. owned stocks of
Iloilo Doctors Hospital which can be off-set against the cost of medical and
hospital bills. Furthermore, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. enjoys certain privileges at
the said hospital which allows him to pay on installment basis. Moreover, two
of Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.s attending physicians are his own sons who do not
charge anything for their professional services.
"On July 4, 1991, Teodoro Jardeleza filed in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a
supplement to his motion for reconsideration (Annex "G"). He reiterated his
contention that summary proceedings was irregularly applied. He also noted
that the provisions on summary proceedings found in Chapter 2 of the Family
Code comes under the heading on "Separation in Fact Between Husband
and Wife" which contemplates of a situation where both spouses are of
disposing mind. Thus, he argued that were one spouse is "comatose without
motor and mental faculties," the said provisions cannot be made to apply.
"While the motion for reconsideration was pending, Gilda Jardeleza disposed
by absolute sale Lot No. 4291 and all its improvements to her daughter, Ma.
Glenda Jardeleza Uy, for Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00), as evidenced
by a Deed Absolute Sale dated July 8, 1991 executed between them (p. 111,
Rollo). Under date of July 23, 1991, Gilda Jardeleza filed an urgent ex-parte
motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale.
"On August 12, 1991 Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the motion for
approval of the deed of sale on the grounds that: (1) the motion was
prematurely filed and should be held in abeyance until the final resolution of
the petition; (2) the motion does not allege nor prove the justifications for the
sale; and (3) the motion does not allege that had Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. been
competent, he would have given his consent to the sale.
Page 30 of 43
"Judge Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto of Branch 32 of the respondent
Court, who had penned the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 had in the
meantime formally inhibited herself from further acting in this case (Annex
"I"). The case was then reraffled to Branch 28 of the said court.
"On December 19, 1991, the said court issued an Order (Annex "M") denying
herein petitioners motion for reconsideration and approving respondent
Jardelezas motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale. The said court
ruled that:
"After a careful and thorough perusal of the decision, dated June 20, 1991,
the Motion for Reconsideration, as well as its supplements filed by
"oppositor", Teodoro L. Jardeleza, through counsel, and the opposition to the
Motion for Reconsideration, including its supplements, filed by petitioner,
through counsel, this Court is of the opinion and so holds, that her Honor,
Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto, Presiding Judge of Branch 32, of this
Court, has properly observed the procedure embodied under Article 253, in
relation to Article 124, of the Family Code, in rendering her decision dated
June 20, 1991.
"Also, as correctly stated by petitioner, through counsel, that "oppositor"
Teodor L. Jardeleza does not have the personality to oppose the instant
petition considering that the property or properties, subject of the petition,
belongs to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Ernesto and Gilda
Jardeleza, who are both still alive.
"In view thereof, the Motion for Reconsideration of "oppositor" Teodoro L.
Jardeleza, is hereby denied for lack of merit.
"Considering the validity of the decision dated June 20, 1991, which among
others, authorized Gilda L. Jardeleza to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral
Survey of Iloilo, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47337 issued in
the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the building
standing thereon, the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Approval of Deed of
Absolute Sale dated July 23, 1991, filed by petitioner, through counsel, is
hereby granted and the deed of absolute sale, executed and notarized on
July 8, 1991, by and between Gilda L. Jardeleza, as vendor, and Ma. Glenda
Jardeleza, as vendee, is hereby approved, and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo
City, is directed to register the sale and issue the corresponding transfer
certificate of title to the vendee.
"SO ORDERED."4
On December 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
reversing the appealed decision and ordering the trial court to dismiss the
specprocases
special proceedings to approve the deed of sale, which was also declared
void.5
On December 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for
6
reconsideration, however, on March 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion, finding no cogent and compelling reason to disturb the decision. 7
Hence, this appeal.8
The issue raised is whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke, a cerebrovascular accident,
rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, and could not
manage their conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code
and dispose of a parcel of land with its improvements, worth more than
twelve million pesos, with the approval of the court in a summary
proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own daughter and son-in-law, for the
amount of eight million pesos.
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.,
the procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the
Family Code are not applicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to
take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to illness that had
rendered him comatose, the proper remedy was the appointment of a judicial
guardian of the person or estate or both of such incompetent, under Rule 93,
Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier had filed
such a petition for judicial guardianship.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
"ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife
for a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date
of the contract implementing such decision.
"In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the
powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)."
Page 31 of 43
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code.
The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated
in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be
obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse
is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court
found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or
semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident,
without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem
infarct.9 In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship
proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code may apply to the wife's administration of the conjugal property,
the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of administration
has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court. 10
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such
administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the
sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964
Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the
Revised Rules of Court.1wphi1 Indeed, the trial court did not even observe
the requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family
Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the
incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition
should not be granted.
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an opportunity to be
heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process.
The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court is that a denial of due
process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the
government the impress of nullity.11 A decision rendered without due process
is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally.12 "A decision is
void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the
opportunity of being heard." 13 "A void decision may be assailed or impugned
at any time either directly or collaterally, by means of a separate action, or by
resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked." 14
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G. R. SP No. 26936, in toto.
Costs against petitioners.
specprocases

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,
concur.

G.R. No. 159567 July 31, 2007

CORAZON CATALAN, LIBRADA CATALAN-LIM, EULOGIO CATALAN,
MILA CATALAN-MILAN, ZENAIDA CATALAN, ALEX CATALAN, DAISY
CATALAN, FLORIDA CATALAN and GEMMA CATALAN, Heirs of the late
FELICIANO CATALAN, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE BASA, MANUEL BASA, LAURETA BASA, DELIA BASA, JESUS
BASA and ROSALINDA BASA, Heirs of the late MERCEDES
CATALAN, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court of the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073, which
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, in Civil Case No. 17666, dismissing the Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership,
and damages.
The facts, which are undisputed by the parties, follow:
On October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) was discharged
from active military service. The Board of Medical Officers of the Department
of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service due to his
"schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type, which incapacitates him because of
flattening of mood and affect, preoccupation with worries, withdrawal, and
sparce (sic) and pointless speech."1
On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. 2
On June 16, 1951, a document was executed, titled "Absolute Deed of
Donation,"3 wherein Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister MERCEDES
CATALAN(Mercedes) one-half of the real property described, viz:

Page 32 of 43
specprocases
A parcel of land located at Barangay Basing, Binmaley, Pangasinan.
Bounded on the North by heirs of Felipe Basa; on the South by Barrio Road;
On the East by heirs of Segundo Catalan; and on the West by Roman Basa.
Containing an area of Eight Hundred One (801) square meters, more or less.
The donation was registered with the Register of Deeds. The Bureau of
Internal Revenue then cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2876, and, in lieu
thereof, issued Tax Declaration No. 180804 to Mercedes for the 400.50
square meters donated to her. The remaining half of the property remained in
Felicianos name under Tax Declaration No. 18081.5
On December 11, 1953, Peoples Bank and Trust Company filed Special
Proceedings No. 45636 before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to
declare Feliciano incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial court issued
its Order for Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the
Estate and Fixing Allowance7 of Feliciano. The following day, the trial court
appointed Peoples Bank and Trust Company as Felicianos
guardian.8 Peoples Bank and Trust Company has been subsequently
renamed, and is presently known as the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI).
On November 22, 1978, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lots 1 and 3
of their property, registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
18920, to their son Eulogio Catalan.9
On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property in issue in favor of her
children Delia and Jesus Basa.10 The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered
with the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan on February 20, 1992, and Tax
Declaration No. 12911 was issued in the name of respondents. 11
On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 2 of the
aforementioned property registered under OCT No. 18920 to their children
Alex Catalan, Librada Catalan and Zenaida Catalan. On February 14, 1983,
Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 4 (Plan Psu-215956) of the same
OCT No. 18920 to Eulogio and Florida Catalan.12
On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Felicianos guardian, filed a case for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and
Ownership,13 as well as damages against the herein respondents. BPI
alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio,
as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI
averred that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her,
the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound mind and was
therefore incapable of giving valid consent. Thus, it claimed that if the Deed
of Absolute Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent Deed of Absolute
Sale to Delia and Jesus Basa should likewise be nullified, for Mercedes
Page 33 of 43
Catalan had no right to sell the property to anyone. BPI raised doubts about
the authenticity of the deed of sale, saying that its registration long after the
death of Mercedes Catalan indicated fraud. Thus, BPI sought remuneration
for incurred damages and litigation expenses.
On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. The original complaint was
amended to substitute his heirs in lieu of BPI as complainants in Civil Case
No. 17666.
On December 7, 1999, the trial court found that the evidence presented by
the complainants was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano
was sane and competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in
favor of Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared, the presumption of
sanity or competency not having been duly impugned, the presumption of
due execution of the donation in question must be upheld. 14 It rendered
judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Dismissing plaintiffs complaint;
2. Declaring the defendants Jesus Basa and Delia Basa the lawful owners of
the land in question which is now declared in their names under Tax
Declaration No. 12911 (Exhibit 4);
3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants Attorneys fees of P10,000.00,
and to pay the Costs.(sic)
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioners challenged the trial courts decision before the Court of Appeals
via a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of
Court.16 The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and held,
viz:
In sum, the Regional Trial Court did not commit a reversible error in
disposing that plaintiff-appellants failed to prove the insanity or mental
incapacity of late (sic) Feliciano Catalan at the precise moment when the
property in dispute was donated.
Thus, all the elements for validity of contracts having been present in the
1951 donation coupled with compliance with certain solemnities required by
the Civil Code in donation inter vivos of real property under Article 749, which
provides:
xxx
Mercedes Catalan acquired valid title of ownership over the property in
dispute. By virtue of her ownership, the property is completely subjected to
specprocases
her will in everything not prohibited by law of the concurrence with the rights
of others (Art. 428, NCC).
The validity of the subsequent sale dated 26 March 1979 (Exhibit 3,
appellees Folder of Exhibits) of the property by Mercedes Catalan to
defendant-appellees Jesus Basa and Delia Basa must be upheld. Nothing of
the infirmities which allegedly flawed its authenticity is evident much less
apparent in the deed itself or from the evidence adduced. As correctly stated
by the RTC, the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered only in
1992, after the death of Mercedes Catalan does not make the sale void ab
initio. Moreover, as a notarized document, the deed of absolute sale carries
the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with respect to
its due execution (Garrido vs. CA 236 SCRA 450). In a similar vein,
jurisprudence has it that documents acknowledged before a notary public
have in their favor the presumption of regularity, and to contradict the same,
there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than preponderant
(Salame vs. CA, 239 SCRA 256).
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated
December 7, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.17
Thus, petitioners filed the present appeal and raised the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO. 66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE COURT IN HOLDING THAT "THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
DID NOT COMMIT A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISPOSING THAT
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS (PETITIONERS) FAILED TO PROVE THE
INSANITY OR MENTAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATE FELICIANO CATALAN
AT THE PRECISE MOMENT WHEN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE WAS
DONATED";
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATE OF DISABILITY FOR
DISCHARGE (EXHIBIT "S") AND THE REPORT OF A BOARD OF
OFFICERS CONVENED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARMY
REGULATIONS (EXHIBITS "S-1" AND "S-2") ARE ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO. 66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE COURT IN UPHOLDING THE SUBSEQUENT SALE OF THE
Page 34 of 43
PROPERTY IN DISPUTE BY THE DONEE MERCEDES CATALAN TO HER
CHILDREN RESPONDENTS JESUS AND DELIA BASA; AND-
4. WHETHER OR NOT CIVIL CASE NO. 17666 IS BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.18
Petitioners aver that the presumption of Felicianos competence to donate
property to Mercedes had been rebutted because they presented more than
the requisite preponderance of evidence. First, they presented the Certificate
of Disability for the Discharge of Feliciano Catalan issued on October 20,
1948 by the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs.
Second, they proved that on December 22, 1953, Feliciano was judged an
incompetent by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and put under the
guardianship of BPI. Based on these two pieces of evidence, petitioners
conclude that Feliciano had been suffering from a mental condition since
1948 which incapacitated him from entering into any contract thereafter, until
his death on August 14, 1997. Petitioners contend that Felicianos marriage
to Corazon Cerezo on September 28, 1948 does not prove that he was not
insane at the time he made the questioned donation. They further argue that
the donations Feliciano executed in favor of his successors (Decision, CA-
G.R. CV No. 66073) also cannot prove his competency because these
donations were approved and confirmed in the guardianship
proceedings.19 In addition, petitioners claim that the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed on March 26, 1979 by Mercedes Catalan and her children Jesus
and Delia Basa is simulated and fictitious. This is allegedly borne out by the
fact that the document was registered only on February 20, 1992, more that
10 years after Mercedes Catalan had already died. Since Delia Basa and
Jesus Basa both knew that Feliciano was incompetent to enter into any
contract, they cannot claim to be innocent purchasers of the property in
question.20 Lastly, petitioners assert that their case is not barred by
prescription or laches under Article 1391 of the New Civil Code because they
had filed their case on April 1, 1997, even before the four year period after
Felicianos death on August 14, 1997 had begun.21
The petition is bereft of merit, and we affirm the findings of the Court of
Appeals and the trial court.
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a
thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. 22 Like any other contract, an
agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the
following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the
matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be
spontaneous.23 The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of a
vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable. 24
specprocases
In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donors
capacity to give consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no
doubt in the fact that insanity impinges on consent freely given. 25 However,
the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it; if
no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed. 26
A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that
the evidence presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the
presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in
question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado of the fact that, as early
as 1948, Feliciano had been found to be suffering from schizophrenia by the
Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself,
however, the allegation cannot prove the incompetence of Feliciano.
A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be
presumed capable of attending to his property rights. Schizophrenia was
brought to the attention of the public when, in the late 1800s, Emil Kraepelin,
a German psychiatrist, combined "hebrephrenia" and "catatonia" with certain
paranoid states and called the condition "dementia praecox." Eugene Bleuler,
a Swiss psychiatrist, modified Kraepelins conception in the early 1900s to
include cases with a better outlook and in 1911 renamed the condition
"schizophrenia." According to medical references, in persons with
schizophrenia, there is a gradual onset of symptoms, with symptoms
becoming increasingly bizarre as the disease progresses.1avvphi1 The
condition improves (remission or residual stage) and worsens (relapses) in
cycles. Sometimes, sufferers may appear relatively normal, while other
patients in remission may appear strange because they speak in a
monotone, have odd speech habits, appear to have no emotional feelings
and are prone to have "ideas of reference." The latter refers to the idea that
random social behaviors are directed against the sufferers. 27 It has been
proven that the administration of the correct medicine helps the patient.
Antipsychotic medications help bring biochemical imbalances closer to
normal in a schizophrenic. Medications reduce delusions, hallucinations and
incoherent thoughts and reduce or eliminate chances of
relapse.28 Schizophrenia can result in a dementing illness similar in many
aspects to Alzheimers disease. However, the illness will wax and wane over
many years, with only very slow deterioration of intellect. 29
From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person suffering from
schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently
dispose his property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia,
petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation,
June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental faculties.
Page 35 of 43
Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that
time and that this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was
adduced.30 Sufficient proof of his infirmity to give consent to contracts was
only established when the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared
him an incompetent on December 22, 1953.31
It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Felicianos capacity at
the time he donated the property, yet did not see fit to question his mental
competence when he entered into a contract of marriage with Corazon
Cerezo or when he executed deeds of donation of his other properties in
their favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute
contracts, despite his illness, is bolstered by the existence of these other
contracts. Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have
existed in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to
continue until the contrary is shown.32
Needless to state, since the donation was valid, Mercedes had the right to
sell the property to whomever she chose. 33 Not a shred of evidence has been
presented to prove the claim that Mercedes sale of the property to her
children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. It is of little bearing that the
Deed of Sale was registered only after the death of Mercedes. What is
material is that the sale of the property to Delia and Jesus Basa was legal
and binding at the time of its execution. Thus, the property in question
belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa.
Finally, we note that the petitioners raised the issue of prescription and
laches for the first time on appeal before this Court. It is sufficient for this
Court to note that even if the present appeal had prospered, the Deed of
Donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained
binding as it was not annulled in a proper action in court within four years. 34
IN VIEW WHEREOF, there being no merit in the arguments of the
petitioners, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 66073 is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
specprocases

G.R. No. L-42215 July 13, 1976

ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE LEONOR INES LUCIANO, Presiding Judge, Juvenile &
Domestic Relations Court, Quezon City, CRISTETA DE CUESTA and
GUADALUPE DE VIRAY, respondents.
Santiago, Salunat & Agbayani for petitioner.
Bengzon, Bengzon, Villaroman & De Vera for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
Encarnacion Lopez Vda. de Baluyut appealed by certiorari from (1) the order
dated September 25, 1975 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Quezon City, declaring her an incompetent and scheduling hearing to
determine who should be appointed as her guardian and (2) its order of
December 10, 1975, denying her motion to set aside the declaration of
incompetency, which was issued before her counsel could cross-examine the
psychiatrist, and scheduling the cross-examination on January 21, 1976
(Special Proceeding No. QC-00939). The antecedents of the appeal are as
follows:
Sotero Baluyut, a resident of 59 Quezon Boulevard Extension Quezon City,
died at the age of eighty-six years, leaving an estate allegedly valued at not
less than two million pesos. He was survived by Encarnacion Lopez, his
seventy-five-year old widow.
Soon after Sotero Baluyut's death, his alleged nephew, Alfredo G. Baluyut,
exerted efforts to control the decedent's estate. Assisting him in the
attainment of that goal were the widow's sisters, Cristeta Lopez Vda. de la
Cuesta and Guadalupe Lopez Viray. Their antagonists were the widow and
her ally, Jose G. Espino an alleged natural child of Sotero Baluyut.

Page 36 of 43
specprocases
On February, 20, 1975, or forty-five days after Sotero Baluyut's demise,
Alfredo filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the
settlement of the decedent's estate. He alleged that Mrs. Baluyut was
mentally incapable of administering her affairs and the decedent's estate or
of acting as executrix of his will, if any. He prayed that, after hearing, he be
appointed administrator and, in the meantime, special administrator (Special
Proceeding No. Q-19794. See L-42088, Baluyut vs. Judge Pano, May 7,
1976).
Alfredo did not content himself with the filing of the administration
proceeding. On that same day, February 20, he filed in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City a petition to declare Mrs. Baluyut
an incompetent and to place her under guardianship.
He alleged that due to a head injury she "has suffered impairment of her
mental faculties" and that "she is no longer competent, physically and
mentally", to manage her affairs. He claimed that he was able, qualified and
ready to act as her guardian. Evidently, Alfredo sought to immobilize Mrs.
Baluyut and prevent her from administering the decedent's estate, supposely
a conjugal estate (Special Proceeding No. Q-00925).
After the petition was partially heard, Mrs. Baluyut learned of the
guardianship proceeding. She filed a verified opposition wherein she denied
the allegations regarding her alleged mental incompetency. She alleged that
the petition was filed after Alfredo's attempts to get possession of the
decedent's estate were aborted and after Mrs. Baluyut's residence was
ransacked on February 12, resulting in the loss of important papers and cash
of not less than one hundred thousand pesos.
She alleged that the documents being used by Alfredo against her were "the
product not only of an illegal seizure but of a plain and simple robbery"; that
the filing of the petition was "an act of disrespect to the deceased", since
Alfredo and his cohorts were "cuddled and reared" by the spouses Sotero
Baluyut and Encarnacion Lopez; that there could be no justice in declaring
her an incompetent just to enable Alfredo to take her properties, and that
Because of the malicious petition she suffered sleepless nights and serious
anxiety.
On April 7 Alfredo filed a motion praying that Mrs. Baluyut be subjected to a
neuropsychiatric examination. She filed a countermotion to expunge that
motion from the record.
On April 15, Alfredo filed an amended petition praying that Mrs Cuesta and
Mrs. Viray be appointed guardians of the person and property of their sister,
Mrs. Baluyut. The latter vehemently opposed the amended petition. Later,
Page 37 of 43
Alfredo moved orally that he be considered disqualified to act as guardian in
view of his appointment as special administrator.
The lower court in its order of April 28, 1975, granted Alfredo's motions that
he be considered disqualified to act as guardian and that Mrs. Baluyut should
undergo a neuropsychiatric examination which was scheduled on May 7 at
the Philippine General Hospital before Doctors Lourdes V. Lapuz or Baltazar
Reyes. The lower court advised Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray to file their own
petition for appointment as guardians of Mrs. Baluyut.
The lower court in its order of June 20, 1975 dismissed Alfredo's petition for
guardianship. That ended round one of the guardianship incident.
The second round started on May 6, 1975 when Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray
filed in the same court their petition dated April 28, praying that Mrs. Baluyut
be declared an incompetent and that they he appointed as her guardian.
They repleaded the material allegations of Alfredo's amended petition
(Special Proceeding No. QC-00.939). *
On the following day, May 7, Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray filed an urgent ex-
parte motion praying that Mrs. Baluyut be ordered to remain at the conjugal
residence and that she be placed under the court's protection or in her
sisters' custody so that she could be available for psychiatric examination.
Without hearing Mrs. Baluyut, the lower court on May 8 granted the motion.
On May 16 Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray filed an amended petition dated May
8 to cure the deficiencies of their original petition. On May 21, Mrs. Baluyut
filed a motion to set aside the May 8 order. On the following day, May 22,
Mrs. Baluyut filed a motion to strike out the original petition for guardianship.
The motion was alternatively labelled as an opposition to the petition. Those
motions were denied in the lower court's order of June 23, 1975.
On June 18 Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray filed a new petition for guardianship,
without mentioning their petitions of April 28 and May 8. Mrs. Baluyut's
counsel claims that no filing fee was paid for docketing the petition.
On July 21 the lower court issued an order appointing Doctor Lapuz as
commissioner to determine the competency of Mrs. Baluyut at an
examination scheduled on August 12 at her residence and to report whether
she should be placed under guardianship. On August 11 Mrs. Baluyut's
counsel manifested that she was ready to submit to neuropsychiatric
examination at her new domicile, 53 East Maya Street, Phil-Am Life Homes,
Quezon City.
On September 25 the lower court issued the questioned order declaring Mrs.
Baluyut an incompetent on the basis of the report of Doctor Lapuz. Mrs.
Baluyut was first examined by Ma. Paz U. Guzman, a psychologist. The latter
specprocases
found that as of September 11 Mrs. Baluyut was "an integrated well-
functioning individual", "an aware and responsive individual who has a mind
of her own", and "competent enough to understand her Position relative to
the case involving her".
Doctor Lapuz found that Mrs. Baluyut was aware of what the present court
case was all about; that Mrs. Baluyut spontaneously declared that she
preferred to associate with the Espino spouses because they treated her
kindly, and that Mrs. Baluyut said that her other relatives were probably
envious and desired to get hold of her assets.
The evaluations of the psychologist and the psychiatrist, which according to
Mrs. Baluyut's counsel do not sustain the declaration of incompetency, are
reproduced below:
Psychological Evaluation
Observation and Interview. Subject came smartly dressed in a jersey
gown and looking well groomed. She was bejeweled with several bracelets
on both arms, 5 rings, a necklace and watch. She appeared in good physical
condition. She walked and seated herself unassisted. She moved about with
comfort. She took the test independently except the Personal Data Sheet
which she filled out with the assistance of Mr. and Mrs. Espino.
Her testing behavior was positive. She followed instructions without
questions or signs of resistance. She displayed appropriate affect, (sic) was
coherent and spontaneously made several relevant remarks in relation to the
various test stimuli presented to her. She was friendly and pleasant,
However, she reacted indignantly when the Examiner encouraged her to try
her best at the tests because the result would be presented to Dra. Lapuz.
She denied having met Dra. Lapuz and momentarily refused to go on with
the tests saying that she did not care if people thought she was crazy. She
was appeased and reassured and was able to resume working at the tests
with her full cooperation. She later apologized to the Examiner for her
outbursts and for having taken so much of the Examiner's time.
Test Results. The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale yielded a
Performance Scale IQ of 80 which places the Subject's intellectual
functioning at, the Dull Normal range. This represent her current functioning
and how she compares with her peer group. The subject scores indicate her
weakest area to be in visual motor functioning. This deterioratiori appears to
be purely a function of impaired vision and reduced motoric speed due to her
advanced age rather than a psychogenically based depression.
Similar impressions were gathered from the Bender-Gestalt reproductions of
subject. Her figures showed integration and accurate perception of the stimuli
Page 38 of 43
although her motoric expression is characterized by mild tremors and poor
control of the movements of her arm and hand.
The subject's immediate recall is impaired. However, her long term memory
for past events appears to be relatively intact. Specifically, she failed to
reproduce from memory a single figure out of several she had previously
copied. However, she could recall and recount a conversation that she
carried or with her companion some 30 minutes earlier.
The test data showed no signs of psychosis or severe personality
disturbance. Her responses to the projective tests showed that her
perception of stimuli is very much like those of the majority. Her percepts
tended to be common place and ordinary but accurate. There were no
bizarre responses. She is aware and is in adequate touch with reality.
Allowing for some neurological deterioration due to her age, the subject's
cognitive and affective functioning indicates that she is intellectually and
emotionally competent. She knows what she wants, and is in control of her
volition. However, although she has a strong will and is determined, she is
not often physically able to carry out her desires.
Summary: The subject's test data point up an integrated well-functioning
individual. She reaches Dull Normal limits on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale in comparison to her age group. She is relevant and in touch with
reality. No gross pathology is gathered from the tests, Rather the results
show an aware and responsive individual who has a mind of her own. She is
competent enough to understand her position relative to the case involving
her.
Submitted by:
Ma. Paz U. de Guzman
Clinical Psychologist
Psychiatric Evaluation
Patient: Encarnacion Baluyot
Widow, 74 years old
Childless
The patient was referred by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,
Quezon City, for a psychiatric evaluation to help determine her competence
in handling her finances. She was seen twice by the undersigned in the
latter's office at St. Luke's Hospital. At each visit, she was accompanied by
Mrs. Jose Espino, a relative, but was interviewed alone.
She is stylishly dressed and groomed, wearing much jewelry. She
cooperates in a friendly manner but grows impatient and irritable when the
specprocases
questions obviously test her capacity for intellectual concentrating on the
discussion, but on the whole, she gave relevant and coherent answers,
which tended to be quite brief. There was prolonged reaction time to
questions which tested memory and orientation, indicating quite clearly that
memory and orientation are impaired. She seemed to best remember
discreet tidbits about the highlights of her life when her late husband was at
the peak of his public career. However, she cannot integrate such bits of
memory into a full recollection of how her life was at that time. The same was
true in response to inquiry about any aspect of her life. She can give one or
two very brief statements but fails to pursue further the discussion. There is
clearly an impairment of thought processes.
She is aware however of what the present court case is all about. She
declares quite spontaneously that she likes being with the Espino's because
she is treated kindly and thought fully by them. She mentions other relatives
who are probably envious and wish to get hold of her assets.
Her personal history, pieced together with information from Mrs. Espino, the
wife of an adopted son, indicate that she has been a mother to many of her
late husband's nieces and nephews, who were sent to school and given a
start in life by the couple. She has always been over-concerned with money
to the point of eccentricity but has a generous heart. Pampered by her
husband, she has always enjoyed being with friends, socializing and still
goes off to dance session with friends her age. The death of her husband has
obviously made her even more dependent and helpless.
In summary, the subject is a 74 year-old woman in whom the ageing process
has rendered the intellectual capacity sufficiently impaired to warrant a
recommendation for kind and consistent guidance in the handling of her
affairs. She would best be helped by people who are truly interested in her
welfare. Being of a kind and dependent nature herself, she need to be looked
after. She would be more confused and lost if continuously in the center of
hostilities. She needs a simple, well-directed life among kind people who will
tend to her day-to-day activities. She may be able to grasp a situation
correctly and superficially but she will need help regarding details and more
complex procedures. Psychological testing (Weschler Adult Intelligence;
Bender-Gestalt; Roscharch) shows functions at the dull normal, but
otherwise integrated and in touch with reality. The test also showed
impairment for recent memory and in visual-motor functions.
Lourdes V. Lapuz, M.D.
Mrs. Baluyut's counsel observed that the lower court's order was "issued in a
blitz manner", without any hearing on the psychiatriat's report, without giving
Page 39 of 43
notice to her, and without giving her a copy of the report. On October 6 she
filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order declaring her an
incompetent. She called attention to the fact that in the administration
proceeding Judge Vicente G. Ericta had declared her "competent" in his
order of March 24, 1975 and that Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (the successsor of
Judge Ericta) in his order of November 27, 1975 appointed Mrs. Baluyut as
administratrix after concluding that she was competent to act as such,
considering the findings of Judge Ericta and of the psychologist and Doctor
Lapuz.
The lower court had scheduled a hearing on October 8 to determine who
should be appointed guardian of Mrs. Baluyut. Her counsel did not appear at
the hearing may be because of his pending motion for reconsideration. At
that hearing, Mrs. Cuesta, Mrs. Viray, her husband Atty. Fortunato Viray, Sr.
and Alfredo G. Baluyut testified upon direct examination by Atty. Fortunato
Viray, Jr. The oral evidence was presented for the purpose of proving that
Mrs. Viray was competent to act as guardian of her sister, Mrs. Baluyut.
On October 20 the lower court motu proprio issued another order justifying its
prior declaration that Mrs. Baluyut is an incompetent. It scheduled the cross-
examination of Doctor Lapuz on October 24. The hearing was not held due to
the indisposition of Doctor Lapuz. In the meantime, Mrs. Baluyut filed another
motion to set aside the declaration of incompetency.
On December 10 the lower court issued an order denying Mrs. Baluyut's
motion for reconsideration. In ruled, that as a socio-legal court, in was duly
empowered under section 29-B of the charter of Quezon City to avail itself of
the consultative services of psychiatrists, psychologists and other qualified
specialists (Republic Act No. 4836, creating the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court by amending Republic Act No. 537, the charter of Quezon
City).
The lower court further held that the declaration of incompetency was
interlocutory and that a prompt resolution of the issue as to Mrs. Baluyut's
incompetency was imperative in view of the verified statements of her two
sisters and nephew-in-law that more than one million pesos had been
"withdrawn by her through the machinations of third persons".
The instant petition for review was filed on December 29, 1975. In that
petition Mrs. Baluyut's counsel assails for the first time the lower court's
jurisdiction to declare her an incompetent. She contends that her
competency is involved in the administration proceedings pending in Branch
XVIII of the Court of First Instance of Quezon city which court (not the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court) has jurisdiction over the issue as to
specprocases
her competency. She invokes section 29-A of the Quezon City charter which
provides that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court has exclusive
original jurisdiction in guardianship cases (paragraph 2), but which also
provides an exception in its last sentence quoted below:
If any question involving any of the above matters (the seven classes of
cases over which the court has exclusive original jurisdiction) should arise as
an incident in any case pending in the ordinary court, said incident shall be
determined in the main case.
The issues are (1) whether the resolution in the guardianship proceeding of
the question as to Mrs. Baluyut's alleged incompetency should await the
adjudication in the administrative proceeding (pending in the probate court)
of the issue as to her competency to act as administratrix and (2) whether
she was denied due process when the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court summarily declared her an incompetent just one day after it received
the psychiatrist's report and before that report was set for hearing.
Jurisdictional issue. The lower court has exclusive original jurisdiction to
entertain the proceeding for the guardianship of Mrs. Baluyut as an alleged
incompetent. (As to rulings on the original exclusive jurisdiction of Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court, see Perez vs. Tuason de Perez, 109 Phil. 54;
In re Angela Tuason de Perez,
L-28114, October 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 608; Rayray vs. Chae Kyung Lee, L-
18176, October 26, 1966, 18 SCRA 450; Paterno vs. Paterno, L-23060, June
30, 1967, 20 SCRA 585; Bartolome vs. Bartolome, L-23661, December 20,
1967, 21 SCRA 1324; Eusebio vs. Eusebio, L-39581, March 31, 1976).
However, as noted earlier, Mrs. Baluyut's competency to act as administratrix
is in issue in Special Proceeding No. Q-19794 of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Quezon city Branch XVIII. That proceeding was instituted by Alfredo
G. Baluyut for the settlement of the estate of Sotero Baluyut, the deceased
spouse of Mrs. Baluyut. Alfredo alleged in his petition that Mrs. Baluyut was
mentally incapable of administering the estate. She characterized that
allegation as libelous. She prayed in a counter-petition that she be appointed
administratrix.
The probate court appointed her as administratrix after finding that she
was sui juris or was still in possession of her capacidad de obrar o capacidad
de ejercicio. In fact, she qualified as administratrix on November 29, 1975.
This Court in Baluyut vs. Judge Pao, supra, set aside that appointment, not
because Mrs. Baluyut was an incompetent but because that adequate
opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.
Page 40 of 43
We hold that in consonance with the last sentence of section 29-A of the
charter of Quezon City the guardianship proceedings should be suspended
and should await the adjudication await the adjudication of the issue as to
Mrs. Baluyut's competency to act as administratrix.
It is true, as observed by Justices Barredo and Antonio during the
deliberation on this case, that the incompetency to act as executor or
administrator cannot be equated with the incompetency that justifies the
placing of a person under guardianship. From the fact that a person may be
incompetent to act as executor or administrator, it does not follow that he
could be placed under guardianship. But if a person is competent to act as
executor or administrator, then he is not the incompetent person envisaged in
the law of guardianship.
Section 29-A in divesting the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
jurisdiction or authority to resolve questions already in issue as an incident in
any case pending in the ordinary court has a salutary purpose. That provision
or exception is designed to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on the
same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court.
Issue as to alleged denial of the process. As previously stated, the lower
court appointed Doctor Lapuz as "commissioner to determine the
competency" of Mrs. Baluyut. She was directed to recommend whether Mrs.
Baluyut needed a guardian for her person and property. Doctor Lapuz took
her oath as commissioner. She referred Mrs. Baluyut to Mr. Paz U. de
Guzman for psychological evaluation. The psychologist found that Mrs.
Baluyut was "an integrated well-functioning individual", "competent enough to
understand her position relative to the case involving her"
Doctor Lapuz interviewed Mrs. Baluyut alone "for a psychiatric evaluation".
The psychiatrist in her report did not categorically recommend that a
guardian be appointed for the person and property of Mrs. Baluyut. Doctor
Lapuz said that Mrs. Baluyut needed "kind and consistent guidance in the
handling of her affairs" and required "help regarding details and more
complex procedures". (Mrs. Baluyut's counsel volunteered the hearsay
information that the psychologist and psychiatrist were allegedly surprised
that the court declared her an incompetent on the basis of their reports,
considering that their evaluations were favorable to her. Pages 10 and 20 of
memorandum).
The lower court did not notify the parties of the filing of the psychiatrist's
report, did not give them a chance to register their objections and did not set
the report for hearing as required in sections 9 to 11, Rule 33 of the Rules of
specprocases
Court. Instead, on the day following the receipt of the report, the lower court
declared Mrs. Baluyut an incompetent within the meaning of Rule 92 of the
Rules of Court, which provides that the word "incompetent" includes "persons
not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and
other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves
and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and
exploitation" (Sec. 2).
The declaration was made although the guardianship court had not
examined the alleged incompetent. Mrs. Baluyut's counsel in a pleading
dated October 21, 1975 called the guardianship court's attention to the fact
that in the administration proceeding Judge Ericta had already found in his
order of March 24, 1975 that she was "healthy and mentally qualified". That
conclusion was based on the following examination made by Judge Ericta:
COURT: Will you (addressing Mrs. Baluyut) take the witness stand and we
will find out if you are mentally deranged as alleged in the petition (for letters
of administration filed by Alfredo G. Baluyut).
Interpreter (To the witness):
Q Do you swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth? A. yes, I do.
A Please state your name, age, address, civil status, and your other personal
circumstances? A. ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUT, 70 years
old, widow, and residing at Quezon Boulevard, corner Banawe, Quezon City.
Court: Ready?
Atty. Santiago: Yes, Your Honor.
Court: No, I will be the on to ask the question...
Court (to Mrs. baluyut): When were you born? A. March 25, 1901.
Q (by Court): Where? A. Lingayen, Pangasinan.
Q Who is your father? A. Jose Lopez.
Q Who is your mother? A. Carmen Escao.
Q Did you go to school? A. Yes, you Honor.
Q What is your highest educational attainment? A. I am a teacher.
Atty. Salunat: At this juncture, your Honor, may we ask that the question(s) of
the court be translated in the Spanish dialect (language)?
Court: She can answer and understand my question in English.
Atty. Salunat: She finds difficulty, you Honor.
Court: If she finds difficulty, advise her to do so.
Atty. Salunat: Yes, you Honor.
Page 41 of 43
Court: All right, What is your highest education attainment? E. Lopez Vda.
de Baluyut: I am a teacher but I never teach. I don't need to work.
Court: What? A. I am a senior teacher, you honor.
Q Do you have any children? A. I had one who died.
Q Do you have any grandchildren of that child of yours who died? A.
None, sir. He was very young when he died.
Q How do you earn your livelihood? A. From my properties.
Q Where are your properties located? a. They are in San Jose, Nueva
Ecija.
Q Where else? A. In my house.
Q Where is your house? A. At the corner of Quezon Boulevard and
Banawe, Quezon City.
Court: All right, I think that is enough in the meantime.
xxx xxx xxx
Court: All right.
ORDER
Submitted for resolution is a motion dated March 19, 1975, asking for the
setting aside for the appointment of Alfredo G. Baluyut as special
administrator by order of the court dated February 24, 1975.
This Court was misled in appointing him as special administrator by the
allegation in the petition that the widow Encarnacion Lopez Vda. de Baluyut
is no longer mentally capable of administrator (administering) her personal
properties.
During the hearing of this motion for reconsideration, the Court placed the
widow Encarnacion Lopez Vda. de Baluyut on the witness stand and asked a
series of questiones to determine her mental capacity.
The cross-examination by the Court shows this woman is healthy and
mentally qualified.
In view hereof, the Court sets aside the order dated February 24, 1975,
appointing Alfredo G. Baluyut petitioner here as special administrator...
The lower court, upon being apprised of the foregoing conclusion of the
probate judge, should have at least tried to take judicial notice of what was
happening in the administration proceeding. The voice of prudence should
have cautioned the guardianship court to avoid the issuance of a declaration
contracting the probate court's pronouncement on Mrs. Baluyut's capacity to
act.
specprocases
As shown in Baluyut vs. Judge Pao, supra, Judge Ernani Cruz Pao, who
succeeded Judge Ericta, confirmed the latter's finding in his (Judge Pao's)
order of November 27, 1975. After interrogating Mrs. Baluyutm he was
convinced on her supposed incompetency.
In this appeal, Mrs. Baluyut contends that she was denied due process of law
when the guardianship court summarily announced its verdict on her
incompetency notwithstanding that her lawyer had not cross-examined the
psychiatrist.
We hold that Mrs. Baluyut's contention is tanable. A finding that a person is
incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence
(Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, 29 Phil. 183, 190). That kind of
proof has not yet been presented to the guardianship court to justify its
precipitate conclusion that Mrs, Baluyut is an incompetent.
Here, we have the sorry spectacle of two court of Quezon City making
divergent findings on Mrs. Baluyut's capacity to act (Art. 37, Civil Code).
What the guardianship court did (as the saying goes) was to take the second
step before having taken the first step. It declared Mrs. Baluyut as an
incompetent and then scheduled the cross-examination of the psychiatrist so
that the parties could ascertain whether the declaration of incompetency is
correct or not.
In the nature of things, the guardianship court should have first set for
hearing the psychiatrist's report and examined Mrs. Baluyut before
prematurely adjudging that she is an incompetent. Its hasty and premature
pronouncement, with its derogatory implications, was not the offspring of
fundamental fairness which is the essence of due process.
Moreover, the lower court should have adhered strictly to the procedure laid
down in Rule 93 of the Rules of Court for appointment of guardians. Rule 93
provides that after the filing of the petition, the court should fix a time and
place for hearing and give the proper notices. At the hearing, "the alleged
incompetent must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the
required notice has been given. Thereupon, the court shall hear the evidence
of the parties in support of their respective allegations" (Sec. 5, Rule 93).
In the instant case, the lower court before hearing the evidence of the
parties, particularly Mrs. Baluyutm immediately subjected her to a psychiatric
examination. That unorthodox procedure was not warranted. Undoubtedly,
the lower court could consult a psychiatrist but the normal procedure is to
hear first the evidence of the parties and examine the prospective ward. The
testimony of the alleged incompetent himself has peculiar cogency in the
Page 42 of 43
determination of whether he should be placed under guardianship (22 ALR
2nd 762).
Issue as to filing and legal research fees. Mrs. Baluyut's counsel
repeatedly assets that Mrs. Viray and Mrs. Cuesta did not pay the
corresponding filing and legal research fees for the docketing of their petition
for guardianship.
The cover of the expediente of Special Proceeding No. QC-00939 shows that
on May 6, 1975 the sums of thirty-two pesos and two pesos were paid as
docket fee and legal research fee under Official Receipts Nos. 8981855 and
8982309, respectively. Mrs. Baluyut's counsel contends that those payments
corresponded to the petition of Mrs. Viray and Mrs. Cuesta in Special
Proceeding No. QC-00925 which was dismissed.
As Mrs. Baluyut did not ask the lower court to resolve this point squarely and
as the order being questioned herein are silent on that matter, we hold that
he lower court should first determine whether the legal fees fixed in section
5[e], Rule 141 of the Rules of court were duly paid by Mrs. Viray and Mrs.
Cuesta.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of September 25 and December 10,
1975 are set aside.
The Court a quo is directed to suspend the guardianship proceeding and to
await the final verdict of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City
Branch XVII of the competency of Encarnacion Lopez Vda. de Baluyut to act
as executing or administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Sotero
Baluyut.
Should it be finally ruled therein that Mrs. Baluyut is competent to act as
executrix or administratrix and should there be no other supervening
circumstances that justify the continuation of the guardianship proceeding,
then the same should be dismissed.
The lower court is further directed to determine whether Cristeta Lopez Vda.
de Cuesta and Guadalupe Lopez Viray paid docket and legal research fees
for their petition. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
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