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1 Hazard Evaluation, HE, Techniques

The following HE, techniques have been used in chronological order:

1960 - 2001 1960 - 2001 1965 - 2001 1970 - 2001 1972 - 1974 1974 - 2001
Safety Check Lists Relative PHA What if HAZOP
Review Ranking

Walk Historical ICI Mond Preliminary Brainstorming Hazards


Through Lists Index Hazard Operability
Inspection Analysis Analysis
Yes / No Dow FEI
Hazardous Mtls Line by Line
Hazardous Opns Deviation
Analysis
This presentation only considers the HAZOP technique.

Press Page Down for 9 pages of further information on HAZOPS.


(Best viewed with 24 lines per screen - adjust your Zoom% to suit)

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2 HAZOP Hazards and Operability Analysis

HAZOP was developed by Lawley (1974) of ICI. Based on early account by Elliott & Owen (1968)

Hazop studies are carried out by an experienced, multidisciplanary team, who review all physical
aspects of a process (lines, equipment, instrumentation) to discover potential hazards and
operability problems using a check list approach.

The basis for a HAZOP is a critical examination of information found in a word model, a process
flowsheet, a plant layout, equipment specification or a P&ID, (Piping and Instrument Drawing).

The principals of examination include: See tabs D1 to D3 for examples of computer forms.

1 Intention
2 Deviation
3 Causes
4 Consequences
(a) hazards
(b) operating difficulties
5 Safeguards
6 Recommendations / Actions
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3 Early HAZOP studies used the following set of Guide Words to systematically review the process:

NO or NOT Negation of intention No Flow of A

MORE Quantitative increase Flow of A greater than design flow

LESS Quantitative decrease Flow of A less than design flow

AS WELL AS Quantitative increase Transfer of some component additional to A

PART OF Quantitative decrease Failure to transfer all components of A

REVERSE Logical opposite of intention Flow of A in direction opposite to design direction

OTHER THAN Complete substitution Transfer of some material other than A

More recent computerization techniques use a Standard Set Of Generic Deviations


For Specific Section Types. See Dev'ns tab for examples.

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4 Some Common HAZOP Analysis Process Parameters

Flow Time Frequency Mixing

Pressure Composition Viscosity Addition

Temperature pH Voltage Separation

Level Speed Toxicity Reaction

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5 Prepare for the review

Attitude
Preparation Meeting Leadership

HAZOP
Review By Documentation Follow-up
Team

Knowledge Info for study


Experience Teams HAZOP P&Ids, Layout
Experience

Table

Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Action

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6 HAZOP analysis method flow diagram

Select a process
section or
operating step

Explain design Repeat for all


intention process sections

Select a process Repeat for all


variable or task process variables

Apply guide word Repeat for all


to process variable guide words

Examine Develop action


Consequences items
associated with
contiue page down deviation

6 con't
List possible Assess acceptability
causes of of risk based on
deviation consequences

Identify existing
safeguards to
prevent deviation

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7 Potential HAZOP Pitfalls

1 Poor understanding by management of the HAZOP procedure

An Ethylene plant has 100 P&IDs, 625 equip't items. 625 items a
Consider 5 variables, Pressure, Temperature, Flow
Composition and Function. 5 variables b
Consider 6 Guidewords, None, More of, Less of
Part of, More than and Other than. 6 guide words c
Questions to be answered = 18750 questions d = axbxc
Consider 5 minutes per question = 5 min./question e
Time for ethylene plant HAZOP study = 93750 minutes f = dxe
4 hour, 240 minutes sessions per day = 250 minutes/day g
No. working of days = 375 days h=f/g
Days per week = 5 days/week I
No. of weeks to complete HAZOP for plant = 75 weeks j=h/I

2 Inexperienced HAZOP team

3 Inadequately trained or in-experienced leader

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8 Common Mistakes

1 Failing to establish a "safe" environment for team members

2 Consequences of events not carried to conclusion.

3 Taking unwarranted credit for safeguards See example on page 9 - one page down

4 Too little credit given for safeguards

5 Making recommendations as specific as possible

6 Poor recording of HAZOPS

7 Failure to HAZOP start-up and shut-down procedures

8 Poorly up-dated P&IDs

9 A HAZOP is performed in lieu of properly executed design reviews

10 Wrong technique for system being reviewed (See spreadsheet titled Fig 5.3)
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9 HAZOP Example See page 8 - item No. 3

To Compressor Inlet

LAH
Teams tend to quickly identify alarms, shut-downs
FV
1 and controls, and claim them for safeguards.

An alarm not tested may not work when called upon


Inlet Line to do so.
LIC
1
Nuisance alarms are frequently bypassed and are
not effective as safeguards.

Often operators are not monitoring control panel.

Valve in manual Automatic control routines are often set in manual


mode.

end See tab D1 for computer documentation example


Dev'ns

Table 1 Example Standard Set Of Generic Deviations For Process Section Types
Source Lessons Learned From HAZOPS Reviews of FCCUs by P.E. McCluer et al, Hydrocarbon Processing, Aug 1992, p-140-C

Tank or Heat
ID No. Deviation Column Vessel Line Exchanger Pump Compressor
1 High Flow X
2 High Level X X
3 High Interface X
4 High Pressure X X X X
5 High Temperature X X X X
6 High Concentration X X X
7 Low / No Flow X X
8 Low Level X X
9 Low Interface X
10 Low Pressure X X X X
11 Low Temperature X X X X
12 Low Concentration X X X
13 Reverse / Misdirected Flow X X
14 Tube Leak X
15 Tube Rupture X
16 Leak X X X X X X
17 Rupture X X X X X X

Some other typical HAZOP deviations Press Page Down

More Flow
Less Flow
More Pressure
Less Pressure
More Level
Less Level
Part of, wrong concentration
As well as, contaminants
other than, wrong material
More Reaction
Less Reaction
No Reaction
More Mixing
Less Mixing
More Corrosion
More Erosion
Sampling

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D1

Company Nova Revision 0 Date 2-Jun-97


Location Corunna Dwg No. Cor -123-4567 Page 1
Leader RAH Proc Des JB Research Op Tech
Scribe GFR Instr'ts GH Electrical HH Other
Prod'n PM Mech FD Safety MN Other

Node No. 1 Describe Transfer Ethane from Deethanizer to C2 KO Pot

Intention The intent is to transfer 150,000 lb/hr of C2/C2= mix at 300 psig and at -30 F for the startup period.

Guide Wrd High Param Flow Dev'n High Flow

Possible Causes
1 FV-1 Wide open
2 Line break.
3
Consequences
1 High level in KO pot with liquid carry-over to compressor with serious damage to rotor. Potential hydrocarbons release.
2 Potential hydrocarbon release.
3
Safeguards
1 High level alarm LAH-1
2 High - High level alarm HHLA - 1 shutdown.
3 Vessel inspection yearly.
Recommendation / Actions Respib By Date
1 Consider limiting flow orifice, auto SD trip on High-High level, smart check valve. 1 JB 1-Jan-99
2 Determine extent of typical hydrocarbon release. 2 PM ###
3 Set-up vessel inspection yearly. 3 FD ###

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D2

Company Nova Revision 0 Date 2-Jun-97


Location Corunna Dwg No. Cor -123-4567 Page 2
Leader RAH Proc Des JB Research 0 Op Tech 0
Scribe GFR Instr'ts GH Electrical HH Other 0
Prod'n PM Mech FD Safety MN Other 0

Node No. 1 Describe Transfer Ethane from Deethanizer to C2 KO Pot

Intention The intent is to transfer 150,000 lb/hr of C2/C2= mix at 300 psig and at -30 F for the startup period.
0
0

Guide Wrd Low Param Flow Dev'n Low Flow

Possible Causes
1
2
3
Consequences
1
2
3
Safeguards
1
2
3
Rec / Actions Respib By Date
1 1
2 2
3 3

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D3

Company Revision Date


Location Dwg No. Page
Leader Proc Des Research Op Tech
Scribe Instr'ts Electrical Other
Prod'n Mech Safety Other

Node No. Describe

Intention

Guide Wrd Param Dev'n

Possible Causes
1
2
3
Consequences
1
2
3
Safeguards
1
2
3
Rec / Actions Respib By Date
1 1
2 2
3 3

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Chk List

Hazard & Operability Studies Check List Example

1 Changes In Quantity a High Flow 1 Pump racing, delivery vessel pressure lost, Loss of automatic
suction pressurized, scale dislodged, leak in control
heat exchanger
b Low Flow 2 Pump failure, scaling of delivery, presence Operator error
of foreign body, poor suction condition,
cavitation, leak in heat exchanger, drain
leak, valve jammed
c No Flow 3 Pump failure, delivery vessel Failure of joint, pipe,
overpressurized, gas blockage, presence of valve, trap, bursting
foreign body, scale, sediment, suction vessel disc, relief valve.
empty.
d Reverse Flow 4 Pump failure, pump reversed, delivery
vessel over pressurized, poor isolation, gas
locking, surging, back siphoning.

2 Changes in physical a High or Low 1 Boiling, cavitation, freezing, chemical


condition pressure breakdown, flashing, condensation,
sedimentation, scaling, foaming, gas
release, priming, exploding, imploding.
Changes in viscosity, density. External Fire,
Weather conditions, Hammer.
b High or Low 2 same as 1
Temperature
c Static buildup 3 Source of Ignition, Personnel shock.

3 Changes in chemical a High or Low 1 Changes in proportion of mixture, in water or


condition Conentration solvent content.
b Contaminants 2 Ingress of air, water, steam, fuel, lubricant,
corrosion products, other process materials
from high pressure system, leakage through
heat exchangers. gas entrainment, spray,
mist.

4 Startup and a Testing 1 Vacuum, pressure testing with with harmless


Shutdown Condition. material.
b Commissioning 2 Concentration of reactants, intermediates

c Maintenance 3 Purging, venting, sweetening, drying,


warming. Access, spares.

5 Hazardous Pipelines a Pipeline 1 Should this pipe be considered for


registration registration?

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