Assembly and petition-digests
PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO [L-18000. JAN
27, 1948]
Doctrine:
Clear and Present Danger Test, Freedom of
Assembly and Expression
FACTS:
This case is an action of mandamus instituted
by petitioner Cipriano Primicias, manager of
the Coalesced Minority Parties, against
respondent Manila City Mayor, Valeriano
Fugoso, to compel the latter to issue a permit
for the holding of a public meeting at the Plaza
Miranda on Nov 16, 1947. The petitioner
requested for a permit to hold a peaceful public
meeting. However, the respondent refused to
issue such permit because he found that there
is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon
previous utterances and upon the fact that
passions, especially on the part of the losing
groups, remains bitter and high, that similar
speeches will be delivered tending to
undermine the faith and confidence of the
people in their government, and in the duly
peace and a disruption of public order.
Respondent based his refusal to the Revised
Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense
against public peace, and penalizes as a
misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place,
meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the
peace or excite a riot; or collect with other
persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful
purpose; or disturb or disquiet any
congregation engaged in any lawful assembly."
Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public
Place.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Mayor has the right to
refuse to issue permit hence violating freedom
of assembly.
HELD:
The answer is negative. Supreme Court states
that the freedom of speech, and to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances, are fundamental
personal rights of thepeople recognized and
guaranteed by the constitution. However,
these rights are not absolute. They can be
regulated under the states police power that
they should not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor to
the rights of the community or society. The
Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations
of Sec. 1119: 1) the Mayor of the City of Manila
is vested with unregulated discretion to grant
or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a
lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or
procession in the streets and other public
places of the City of Manila; and 2) The right of
the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used with the view to prevent
confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient
use of the streets and public places by others,
and to provide adequate and proper policing to
minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored
the second construction since the first
construction is tantamount to authorizing the
Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under
our democratic system of government no such
unlimited power may be validly granted to any
officer of the government, except perhaps in
cases of national emergency. It is to be noted
that the permit to be issued is for the use of
public places and not for the assembly itself.
The Court holds that the assembly is lawful and
thus cannot be struck down. Fear of serious
injury cannot alone justifies suppression of free
speech and assembly. It is the function of
speech to free men from the bondage of
irrational fears. To justify suppression of free
speech there must be reasonable ground to
fear that serious evil will result if free speech is
practiced. There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the danger apprehended is
imminent. There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the evil to be prevented is a
serious one . The fact that speech is likely to
result in some violence or in destruction of
property is not enough to justify its
suppression. There must be the probability of
serious injury to the state.
PETITION IS GRANTED.
MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO [129 SCRA
359; G.R. NO.62270; 21 MAY 1984]
Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme
Student Council of respondent University. They
sought and were granted by the school
authorities a permit to hold a meeting from
8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982.
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Assembly and petition-digests
Pursuant to such permit, along with other
students, they held a general assembly at the
Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science
basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in
such permit, not in the basketball court as
therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At
such gathering they manifested in vehement
and vigorous language their opposition to the
proposed merger of the Institute of Animal
Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The
same day, they marched toward the Life
Science Building and continued their rally. It
was outside the area covered by their permit.
Even they rallied beyond the period allowed.
They were asked to explain on the same day
why they should not be held liable for holding
an illegal assembly. Then on September 9,
1982, they were informed that they were under
preventive suspension for their failure to
explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The
validity thereof was challenged by petitioners
both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
against private respondents and before the
Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports.
Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty
of the charge of illegal assembly which was
characterized by the violation of the permit
granted resulting in the disturbance of classes
and oral defamation. The penalty was
suspension for one academic year. Hence this
petition.
Issue: Whether on the facts as disclosed
resulting in the disciplinary action and the
penalty imposed, there was an infringement of
the right to peaceable assembly and its
cognate right of free speech.
Held: Yes. Student leaders are likely to be
assertive and dogmatic. They would be
ineffective if during a rally they speak in the
guarded and judicious language of the
academe. But with the activity taking place in
the school premises and during the daytime,
no clear and present danger of public disorder
is discernible. This is without prejudice to the
taking of disciplinary action for conduct,
"materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others."
The rights to peaceable assembly and free
speech are guaranteed students of educational
institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to
discuss matters affecting their welfare or
involving public interest is not to be subjected
to previous restraint or subsequent punishment
unless there be a showing of a clear and
present danger to a substantive evil that the
state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the
utmost leeway and scope is accorded the
content of the placards displayed or utterances
made. The peaceable character of an assembly
could be lost, however, by an advocacy of
disorder under the name of dissent, whatever
grievances that may be aired being susceptible
to correction through the ways of the law. If the
assembly is to be held in school premises,
permit must be sought from its school
authorities, who are devoid of the power to
deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably.
In granting such permit, there may be
conditions as to the time and place of the
assembly to avoid disruption of classes or
stoppage of work of the non-academic
personnel. Even if, however, there be violations
of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS
EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION (PBMEO)
VS. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO.,
INC.
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacaang in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig police and
that they informed the Philippine Blooming
Mills Inc. (Company) of their proposed
demonstration.
The company called a meeting with the officers
of PBMEO after learning the about the planned
mass. During the meeting, the planned
demonstration was confirmed by the union,
explaining further that the demonstration has
nothing to do with the Company because the
union has no quarrel or dispute with
Management. It was stressed out that the
demonstration was not a strike against the
company but was in fact an exercise of the
laborers inalienable constitutional right to
freedom of expression, freedom of speech and
freedom for petition for redress of grievances.
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Assembly and petition-digests
Company informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the
union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration
for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company. For which
reason, the Company warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who without
previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly , the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration,
who shall fail to report for work shall be
dismissed.
Another meeting was convoked Company. It
reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join
the Malacaang demonstration, those from the
1st and regular shifts should not absent
themselves to participate, otherwise, they
would be dismissed. Since it was too late to
cancel the plan, the rally took place and the
officers of the PBMEO were eventually
dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and
No Lockout clause of their Collective
Bargaining
The lower court decided in favor of the
company and the officers of the PBMEO were
found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their
motion for reconsideration was subsequently
denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for
being filed two days late.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the workers who joined the
strike violated the CBA
2. Whether the company is guilty of unfair
labor practice for dismissing its employees
RULING:
1. No. The rights of free expression, free
assembly and petition, are not only civil rights
but also political rights essential to man's
enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to
his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these
freedoms the citizens can participate not
merely in the periodic establishment of the
government through their suffrage but also in
the administration of public affairs as well as in
the discipline of abusive public officers. The
citizen is accorded these rights so that he can
appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection
as well as for the imposition of the lawful
sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
While the Bill of Rights also protects property
rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized. Because
these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable,
as well as supremely precious in our society"
and the "threat of sanctions may deter
their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions," they "need
breathing space to survive," permitting
government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." Property and property rights can be
lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are
extinguished by the passage of time,
then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to
limit the power of government and ceases to
be an efficacious shield against the tyranny
of officials, of majorities, of the influential and
powerful, and of oligarchs political, economic
or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of
free expression and of assembly occupy
a preferred position as they are essential
to the preservation and vitality of our
civil and political institutions; and such
priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and
the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as
well as of peaceful assembly and of petition
for redress of grievances are absolute when
directed against public officials or "when
exercised in relation to our right to choose the
men and women by whom we shall be
governed.
2. Company is the one guilty of unfair
labor practice. Because the refusal on its part
to permit all its employees and workers to join
the mass demonstration against alleged police
abuses and the subsequent separation of the
eight (8) workers from the service constituted
an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly and freedom
petition for redress of grievances, the company
committed an unfair labor practice defined in
Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the
Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right
"to engage in concert activities for ... mutual
aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards
as an unfair labor practice for an employer
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section
Three."
BAYAN v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA
G.R. NO. 169838; 25 APR 2006
Facts
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Assembly and petition-digests
Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6,
2005 is at issue. BAYANs rally was violently
dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested
and detained when a peaceful mass action
they was preempted and violently dispersed by
the police. KMU asserts that the right to
peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas
Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of
Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) being
followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that
on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored
was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge
but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and
Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them,
causing injuries to several of their members.
They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a
multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-
sponsored was scheduled to proceed along
Espaa Avenue in front of the UST and going
towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers
blocked them along Morayta Street and
prevented them from proceeding further. They
were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries
on one of them. Three other rallyists were
arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880
The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them
in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12,
13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR.
They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies
under the no permit, no rally policy and the
CPR policy announced on Sept. 21, 2005.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is
clearly a violation ofthe Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and other human rights treaties of which
the Philippines is a signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit
before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a
clear and present danger. It also curtails the
choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the
freedom of expression clause as the time and
place of a public assembly form part of the
message for which the expression is sought.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue
that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a
curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble
and petition for redress of grievances because
it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that
right. It also characterizes public assemblies
without a permit as illegal and penalizes them
and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions
are not mere regulations but are actually
prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is
void for being an ultra vires act that alters the
standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P.
No. 880, aside from being void for being vague
and for lack of publication.
KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no
limits on the right to assembly and therefore
B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement
of securing a permit. And even assuming that
the legislature can set limits to this right, the
limits provided are unreasonable: First,
allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear
and convincingevidence of a clear and present
danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-
day requirement to apply for a permit is too
long as certain events require instant public
assembly, otherwise interest on the issue
would possibly wane.As to the CPR policy, they
argue that it is preemptive, that the
government takes action even before the
rallyists can perform their act, and that no law,
ordinance or executive order supports the
policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the
maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and
violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling
effect on the exercise by the people of the right
to peaceably assemble.
Respondents argued that petitioners have no
standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to
prevent grave public inconvenience and
serious or undue interference in the free flow
of commerce and trade. It is content-neutral
regulation of the time, place and manner of
holding public assemblies. According to Atienza
RA. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a
permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that
the permit is for the use of a public place and
not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No.
880 is not a content-based regulation because
it covers all rallies.
Issue
Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy
unconstitutional.
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Assembly and petition-digests
Held
No question as to standing. Their right as
citizens to engage in peaceful assembly
and exercise the right of petition, as
guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly
affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an
absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place
and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all
kinds of public assemblies that would use
public places. The reference to lawful cause
does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be peaceable and
entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance1 is
for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and
is independent of the content of the
expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no
priorrestraint, since the content of the speech
is not relevant to the regulation.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response
policy has no place in our legal firmament and
must be struck down as a darkness that
shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people
and is used by some police agents to
justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to
differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance,
this was declared null and void.
The Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments, are DIRECTED to take all
necessary steps for the immediate compliance
with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880
through the establishment or designation of at
least one suitable freedom park or plaza in
every city and municipality of the country. After
thirty (30) days from the finality of this
Decision, subject to the giving of advance
notices, no prior permit shall be required
to exercise the right to peaceably assemble
and petition in the public parks or plazas of a
city or municipality that has not yet complied
with Section 15 of the law.