Senate Hearing, 106TH Congress - Administrative Oversight of The Investigation of Twa Flight 800

S. HRG.
106534
ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT OF THE

INVESTIGATION OF TWA FLIGHT 800
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT

AND THE COURTS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
THE INVESTIGATION OF TWA FLIGHT 800
MAY 10, 1999
Serial No. J10624
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
(
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah, Chairman
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
JON KYL, Arizona HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin
MIKE DEWINE, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
MANUS COONEY, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
BRUCE COHEN, Minority Chief Counsel
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT AND THE COURTS

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa, Chairman
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
KOLAN DAVIS, Chief Counsel
MATT TANIELIAN, Minority Chief Counsel
(II)
CONTENTS
STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Page
Grassley, Hon. Charles E., U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa ........................ 1
Thurmond, Hon. Strom, U.S. Senator from the State of South Carolina ........... 4
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Panel consisting of Michael Marx, former metallurgist, National Transpor-
tation Safety Board; Henry F. Hughes, senior accident investigator, Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board; and Frank Zakar, metallurgist, Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board .................................................................... 5
Testimony of William A. Tobin, former chief metallurgist, Federal Bureau
of Investigation; accompanied by Charles A. DeMonaco, Dickie, McCamey
and Chilcote, Pittsburgh, PA; and Stephen M. Kohn, Kohn, Kohn and
Colapinto, Washington, DC ................................................................................. 21
Testimony of Andrew Vita, assistant director, field operations, Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms .......................................................................... 34
Panel consisting of Donald M. Kerr, assistant director, laboratory division,
Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Lewis D. Schiliro, assistant director
in charge, New York Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation ..................... 44
ALPHABETICAL LIST AND MATERIAL SUBMITTED

Hughes, Henry F.: Testimony ................................................................................. 8
Kerr, Donald M.:
Testimony .......................................................................................................... 44
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47
Marx, Michael: Testimony ...................................................................................... 7
Schiliro, Lewis D.:
Testimony .......................................................................................................... 51
Attachment to Statement of Lewis D. Schiliro, Overview of FBI Investiga-
tion of TWA Flight 800, dated Janurary 20, 1997 ..................................... 55
Tobin, William A.:
Testimony .......................................................................................................... 21
Vita, Andrew: Testimony ........................................................................................ 34
Zakar, Frank: Testimony ........................................................................................ 12
APPENDIX
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Questions of Senator Thurmond for:
Michael L. Marx ............................................................................................... 71
Henry H. Hughes .............................................................................................. 72
Frank P. Zakar ................................................................................................. 72
William A. Tobin ............................................................................................... 73
Andrew Vita ...................................................................................................... 74
Lewis D. Schiliro .............................................................................................. 77
Questions of Senator Grassley for:
Donald M. Kerr ................................................................................................. 76
Lewis D. Schiliro ..............................................................................................78, 82
(III)
IV
Page
ADDITIONAL SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Documents and memos of various investigative organizations submitted by
Hon. Charles E. Grassley .................................................................................... 84
GAO, Office of Special Investigations, Briefing Paper, submitted to Hon.
Charles E. Grassley, dated Aug. 13, 1999 .......................................................... 162
GAO, Office of Special Investigations, letter to Hon. Charles E. Grassley,
dated Nov. 13, 1999 ............................................................................................. 166
Letter from National Transportation Safety Board, to James Roth, Chief
Division Counsel, New York Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated Aug.
20, 1999 ................................................................................................................. 170
GAO, Office of Special Investigations letter to Michael DeFeo, Office of Profes-
sional Responsibility, Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated Sept. 13, 1999 171
Letter to Hon. Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
from Hon. Charles E. Grassley, dated June 3, 1999 ......................................... 174
Letter to Hon. Charles E. Grassley, from FBIs New York Office, dated May
25, 1999 ................................................................................................................. 178
ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT OF THE
MONDAY, MAY 10, 1999
U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT
ON
AND THE COURTS,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:05 p.m., in room
SD226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles E. Grassley
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF IOWA
Senator GRASSLEY. I call the hearing to order. I am Senator
Chuck Grassley, chairman of this subcommittee, and I welcome ev-
erybody to the hearing and particularly welcome our witnesses,
many who had to go out of their way to be here. We appreciate it
very much.
Todays hearing is the result of a 2-year review by the sub-
committee into how Federal agencies handled the investigation of
what caused the crash of TWA Flight 800. The subcommittee con-
ducted dozens of interviews of professionals from various agencies
who were either on the crash scene or were at high levels within
the various headquarters of the various agencies.
A consensus emerged from the interviews, supported by docu-
mentary evidence, about the conduct of the investigation. The col-
lective testimony from todays witnesses will leave a very clear pic-
ture of that conduct, and, of course, it is a troubling picture.
This investigation was run by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion. There is much doubt about whether the FBI had statutory au-
thority as the lead agency. There will be more on that point later.
What the public knows about the crash and its cause is what
they know through countless press conferences and leaks to the
press. The public also has heard numerous conspiracy theories and
myths or disinformation.
The purpose of this hearing is to provide a much more real pic-
ture of what happened and, hopefully, why it happened. The moti-
vation for the subcommittees efforts is to continue to help restore
public confidence in Federal law enforcement. It is my intention to
examine some very basic and systemic problems uncovered in this
investigation.
The goal is to have a constructive dialogue with the FBI to en-
sure similar problems are not repeated in the future. No one will
(1)
2
be fingered as a scapegoat. However, if the FBI says today that its

problems are of the past and it is now fixed, I will not buy that,
and I warn the public not to buy it, either. There is a whole lot
more to be done before the root causes of the problem are fixed. It
is a systemic cultural problem that transcends any simplistic fix.
I would like to give a word about todays witnesses, because it
is not easy for them to be critical of questionable actions that they
saw by FBI personnel. These witnesses will likely have to work
with the FBI again, and the FBI is bigger and more powerful than
their agencies. So there is an intimidation factor here.
But that is not why these witnesses are coming forward. They
are coming forward because of what they saw and what they saw
offended them, both from a law enforcement standpoint and from
the standpoint of public safety. They are coming forward because
they truly believe it will serve the public interest and will improve
the way that we investigate future incidents. This is an honorable
thing for these people to do. The subcommittee appreciates their
testimony and I am confident that the public will, as well.
This is a story about how the worlds preeminent law enforce-
ment agency, at least in terms of image and expectation, sometimes
acted like it did not even have a clue. I believe that each and every
FBI agent and employee who showed up on the scene of that tragic
crash did the best job they could and had the best motives. The
same goes for the employees of the other agencies and groups that
worked so hard. Many volunteered to do that, and they sacrificed
their time and their commitment to a greater and humanitarian
good.
There was a basic problem, however. In my view, it was one of
leadership. FBI leadership in the case of the TWA Flight 800 was
a disaster. The FBI says that its investigation in this case is a
model for the future. The FBI believes that even now. I say that
because of their testimony they submitted for this hearing. If the
FBI still believes that after this hearing, then I think the American
people should be very alarmed about whether or not the FBI gets
the message, because this investigation, which by statute was sup-
posed to be run by the NTSB but which was commandeered by the
FBI, is a model of failure, not success. And anyone who doubts that
is not confronting reality.
The testimony that we will hear today will describe three things.
First, it will show how the FBI lacked the proper training to han-
dle an investigation of this type and violated the most basic stand-
ards of forensic science in terms of collecting evidence, handling
that evidence, and preserving the evidence. It is the kind of thing
that would make even rookie cops wince.
Second, we will try to understand the culture within the FBI
that allows this sort of thing to happen. Why does the worlds pre-
eminent law enforcement agency make the kinds of mistakes that
even rookies do not make?
And third, why is it that the FBI would try to prevent critical
public safety information from getting to the proper authorities?
A January 1997 ATF report, which will be discussed today,
showed that the cause of the crash of the TWA Flight 800 was a
mechanical failure. The FBI did not want that report out. It tried
to suppress it. The FBI feared that if the case became a criminal
3
case and went to court, the ATF report would be discoverable

through Brady doctrine and might help exculpate the potential sus-
pects.
But the FBI had the cart before the horse. You cannot start sup-
pressing information when there is no crime. The vast majority of
explosions like TWA are due to accidents, not to sabotage. For the
FBI to assume first that an explosion is sabotage reveals its lack
of experience in dealing with explosion incidents. Indeed, the FBI
rarely investigates explosions and fires. Other law enforcement
agencies, most notably the ATF, investigate many explosions and
have lots of experience.
The proof is in the pudding. The ATF called the cause of the
crash correctly, 10 months before the FBI did. In fact, it is fair to
say that the FBI hindered the investigation and the publics and
the families right to know, and in the process, in my view, the FBI
risked public safety.
Before we begin, I would like to clarify one critical issue. The
FBIs suppression of the ATF report is a serious matter. In testi-
mony from the third panel today, we will hear how the top FBI
manager on this case, Mr. Jim Kallstrom, did not want crucial pub-
lic safety information to go to public safety officials, and that is the
National Transportation Safety Board. He succeeded in bottling it
up. The NTSB has told us and told us all along that they never
received a copy of the report.
Last Friday, pursuant to a document request of the FBI by the
subcommittee, we discovered a draft letter dated March 17, 1997,
from Mr. Kallstrom to the Chairman of the NTSB, Mr. Jim Hall.
The unsigned draft letter said that a copy of the ATF report was
enclosed. The FBI is claiming that this draft letter lets them off the
hook, saying that they did, indeed, send the ATF report to the
NTSB.
The fact is, it does not let them off the hook. I have been through
too many Ruby Ridges and Wacos and Richard Jewel investigations
to buy into that argument. I suspect that maybe the American pub-
lic will be equally skeptical.
When the draft transmittal letter came to the subcommittees at-
tention, I asked the NTSB to verify if such a letter had indeed been
received by them. The computerized mail system that logs in all
letters to the Chairman showed that no such letter came in. An
interview of the appropriate handlers of such letters showed no
recollection of that letter.
Moreover, the FBI says that, pursuant to the subcommittees doc-
ument request, all relevant documents have been produced. Since
no signed, finalized letter appears in the document production, I
think it is wise to be skeptical that the ATF report was ever sent
to the NTSB. And, in fact, that is what the NTSB has stated. In
my view, that means the FBI is still not off the hook in terms of
risking public safety in this case.
Once again, the purpose of this hearing is to continue the sub-
committees efforts to help restore public confidence in Federal law
enforcement. As the Nations preeminent Federal law enforcement
agency, the FBI, under the scrutiny of the publics eye, has an obli-
gation to ensure that the egregious problems that we will hear
4
about today never happen again, and I will do all that I can to help
us through that process.
I would like to include in the record a statement from Senator
Strom Thurmond.
[The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Mr. Chairman: At the time TWA Flight 800 exploded, there was a great deal of
uncertainty, and one of the primary fears was that the disaster was intentionally
caused by a bomb or missile. There was much speculation in the media and in other
public forums about the possibility that terrorists were involved and that they might
strike again.
Public awareness of the unpredictability and severity of domestic terrorism had
already been heightened by the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1995 Okla-
homa City blast, and the ongoing trial of Ramzi Yousef for conspiracy to destroy cer-
tain American airliners. Moreover, it was only 10 days after the crash that the At-
lanta Olympics would be interrupted by a bomb explosion.
In such an environment and with its vastly superior resources, it should not be
surprising that the FBI was instrumental immediately after the crash. It was also
appropriate for the FBI to aggressively search for evidence of a bomb or missile.
However, the FBIs responsibility is to search for the truth, like any other agency.
I am concerned about reports that the FBI may have been preoccupied with the the-
ory that the crash was the result of a criminal act. I am also concerned about press
reports of faulty handling of evidence. If true, these actions may have delayed the
investigations arrival at the correct conclusions and unnecessarily postponed correc-
tive measures that were needed to help prevent such aircraft failures in the future.
It is clear that the FBI and all other investigative and law-enforcement agencies
need to work as closely as possible and conduct their investigations in a thorough,
open-minded, and collaborative manner. I hope that much has been learned from
the complex TWA investigation that will be beneficial in future disasters.
The FBIs response to problems identified 2 years ago by the Department of Jus-
tice Inspector General regarding its Crime Laboratory show that the Bureau can ad-
dress legitimate concerns about its operations. To its credit, the FBI has made great
strides in addressing the serious weaknesses uncovered in certain aspects of the
Labs operation. The FBI has undertaken the first major reorganization of the Crime
Lab in 20 years, which will be even more effective once the Lab moves to its new
headquarters in 2001. It now appears that reports undergo significant peer review
to assure accuracy. Even more important is that many aspects of the Crime Lab
have now received long-overdue accreditation from the American Society of Crime
Laboratory Directors.
The reforms are still on-going. For example, in follow-up reviews, the Inspector
General expressed concerns about an apparent preference to staff the Explosives
Operations Group of the Crime Lab with special agent bomb technicians rather than
simply having the most qualified scientists in these positions. The FBI is working
to address concerns such as these.
I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses regarding the FBIs investigation
of the TWA disaster.
Senator GRASSLEY. We will go now to our first panel. I call Mr.
Hank Hughes, Senior Accident Investigator, the NTSB, also in
charge of one of the hangars; Mr. Michael Marx, former Chief Met-
allurgist of the NTSB; and Mr. Frank Zakar, current NTSB Metal-
lurgist.
I would ask you to raise your right hand. Do you swear to tell
the truth, the whole truth, nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. HUGHES. I do.
Mr. MARX. I do.
Mr. ZAKAR. I do.
Senator GRASSLEY. We have asked witnesses, except for the last
panel, not to prepare remarks, so we will be getting the informa-
tion from all of you through question and answer. I am going to
start with you, Mr. Marx.
5
PANEL CONSISTING OF MICHAEL MARX, FORMER METAL-
LURGIST, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD;
HENRY F. HUGHES, SENIOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATOR, NA-
TIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD; AND FRANK
ZAKAR, METALLURGIST, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFE-
TY BOARD
Senator GRASSLEY. Were you aware that the FBI had violated se-
curity and brought in a psychic?
Mr. MARX. I was not directly aware of it, but I hadI was aware
that they did. I did not see the psychic come into the hangar.
Senator GRASSLEY. How were you aware of that?
Mr. MARX. I saw some documentation that indicated that there
was a report of the psychic.
Senator GRASSLEY. What was the reaction by you and others
when you learned about this happening?
Mr. MARX. It is a reaction that it certainly was uncalled for, es-
pecially at that particular point in the investigation.
Senator GRASSLEY. Why would it be unusual for a psychic to be
brought in on the scene at this time?
Mr. MARX. Well, I do not know what theat the Safety Board
itself, we would never bring in a psychic to do any investigation be-
cause it is the scientific examination of wreckage and the overall
investigation that determines the causes or at least towards the
causes. So we would not bring anyit would be against the grain
to bring a psychic in to find out what happened on the aircraft.
Senator GRASSLEY. In your view, did FBI personnel unreasonably
push the bomb and missile theories, to your knowledge?
Mr. MARX. Yes.
Senator GRASSLEY. Would you explain your rationale?
Mr. MARX. Well, the rationale behind that statement would be
the fact that there is a period of time when it would be a possibility
that some sabotage, such as a missile or a bomb, could be on board
the airplane, and this was during the initial portion of the inves-
tigation, where we had an airplane that came out of the sky for no
apparent reason. Howeverand there was also the fact that most
of the wreckage was sitting 100 feet down on the sea floor. So most
of the wreckage was not available, except for flotsam that came up.
So it was after the initial investigation when they started to get
the majority of the wreckage into the hangar and you are able to
look at the wreckage and determine how the airplane broke up as
well as get the information from where they found it, the actual
wreckage. At this particular point, in looking at all of the physical
evidence and not seeing any evidence of any bomb or missile dam-
age, it became unreasonable to continue to push that theory.
Senator GRASSLEY. Give us the approximate time frame for what
you have just told me.
Mr. MARX. This would be in the neighborhood of September, late
September, October, and November of 1996. This would be the year
of the accident.
Senator GRASSLEY. Would you please describe for me the difficul-
ties that you encountered from the FBI with your photography?
Mr. MARX. The FBI set up the security at the Calverton hangar.
As an organization, it had it clearly marked that no cameras were
allowed inside the Calverton hangar, and the only way that proce-
6
dures could be produced to get photography was through the FBI

directly. In other words, the FBI photographer had to take the pho-
tographs. Any photographs that were taken at that particular time
had to be developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and all
photographs, as I understand it, that were returned back had to
stay within the hangar, could not go outside the hangar.
Senator GRASSLEY. You are describing a situation where you, in
your work, normally take lots of pictures
Mr. MARX. That is correct.
Senator GRASSLEY [continuing]. And use them as part of your sci-
entific investigation, right?
Mr. MARX. That is correct.
Senator GRASSLEY. They were going to allow you to take pic-
tures, but they had to develop them, or they did not even allow you
to take pictures?
Mr. MARX. In the case, initially, there wasthe procedures sort
of changed from one point to another, but, basically, the photo-
graphs basically had to be taken initially by the FBI, as I under-
stood it. Then, if you did take photographs, you had to then have
a certain procedure, but all the film had to be developed by the
FBI.
Senator GRASSLEY. What sort of a reason did they give you, that
you could not develop your own pictures?
Mr. MARX. They did not give me any reason.
Senator GRASSLEY. They did not give you any reason? That is
just the way it is going to be? How did this impede your work?
Mr. MARX. Well, in the case of theon the second time that I
was there, this was in October, and when I was taking photo-
graphs, having the FBI photographer take photographs, he had a
film, of course, which he then took and went back to the New York
field office to get developed. And I was there for a period of time
of 3 to 4 days at that particular time, and then a month later,
when I came back to get the photographs, they also said that it
would take a week to 2 weeks to get these photographs. These pho-
tographs never showed up. To this day, I do not have those particu-
lar photographs.
So how does it impede the investigation is that there was no ap-
parent record of the photographs that was taken and it was not
disseminated properly so that we could get these particular photo-
graphs later on.
So it wasthen, after that, I challenged the FBI in the photo-
graphic arena. Since I could not get photographs, I then, even
though the signs said not to take a camera in there and do photo-
graphic by yourself, I ended up doing it, since I was the chief of
the materials lab for the NTSB at that particular time and that is
part of our duties. We were looking at the structural break-up of
this particular airplane.
I ended up challenging that procedure, that the FBI was to do
all their own photography, in other words, do all the processing of
the film. And eventually, I got that to come through. But there was
a threat that I was not supposed to be doing this, and eventually
it came back from a higher-up in the FBI that I would be allowed
to do it.
7
Senator GRASSLEY. The FBI brought in a company called

Brookhaven Laboratories. What do you know about the company
and why were they brought in?
Mr. MARX. Brookhaven National Laboratories is a government
facility that is close by to the Calverton hangar. The people that
were ahead of the investigation for the FBI were pushing to get an
outside expertise, so to speak, to look at some of the wreckage and
they were mainly looking at areas that had to do with penetra-
tions, small penetrations that were in the fuselage, and they want-
ed to get somebody that apparently they thought was independent
or somebody to check what we would be doing or do something that
is separate than what we would be doing during the accident inves-
tigation. They were looking for evidence of some type of sabotage
or some type of penetration that was in the fuselage.
Senator GRASSLEY. I probably should have done this before I
asked you your first question, but I think I am going to ask you,
and each of you before you answer questions, and I will give you
the opportunity now, you should supply for the committee orally
now your background, expertise, and what your role was in the
TWA investigation.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL MARX
Mr. MARX. Well, I have a Bachelor of Science and Masters of
Science from Michigan Technological University, which I obtained
in 1966 and 1967. I then worked for 2 years at the Boeing Aircraft
Company in Seattle, WA. And then following that, I worked 1 year
at the Bell Helicopter Company in Fort Worth, TX, all in failure
analysis of aircraft components.
Since November of 1970, I worked continuously for the National
Transportation Safety Board, start off as a Metallurgist, going to
Senior Metallurgist, going to the Chief of the Materials Laboratory
Division, and eventually the Chief Technical Advisor for Metallurgy
for the Safety Board.
During the time of the investigation of TWA, I was the Chief of
the Materials Laboratory Division, and at that time, one of the
other gentlemen here that is going to testify, Mr. Frank Zakar, I
was his supervisor at that particular time. Frank had been on-
scene since very shortly after the accident until approximatelyfor
about 3 months, when the wreckage was starting to come in.
In late September, I went into theI got involved in the inves-
tigation when we had a lot of the wreckage that was already recov-
ered. I was the principal person that was involved in looking over
the reports that dealt with the investigation as far as metallurgical
engineering is concerned, metallurgy in general, but I also was in-
volved with the structure metallurgy sequencing group that was
formed, and that was formed and put into effect in around the first
of December 1996 and lasted for most of the time during December,
and it was a pivotal point to analyze the structure of the airplane
from a sequencing standpoint.
The reason being is that even though there was evidence that
there was an explosion that was in the fuel tank, there was still
a need to find out whether anything else could have caused that
explosion in that fuel tank other than some source that was on the
airplane or some secondary type of damage that could have caused
8
the explosion in the fuel tank. It was not the idea to have this se-
quencing group determine the exact reason whywhat the specific
reason for the explosion, but only to indicate through its analysis
whether it could be the initiating event that caused the structural
damage.
So I was imminently involved in that, set up the sequencing
group, and that is how I got involved. After that, I was more or
less involved in various other aspects of the investigation, including
some of the stuff that dealt with the holes and with the FBI want-
ing to solicit other expertise.
Senator GRASSLEY. I would assume that it has got to be incred-
ible to you that a person with your background in this area and
working for as long as you have with the key agency that is in-
volved in transportation safety, that you would have these prob-
lems with the FBI doing your job, the very same agency bringing
in a psychic to see why a plane went down. Does that not seem
kind of odd to you?
Mr. MARX. Well, yes. As I understand it, the NTSB, the National
Transportation Safety Board, is the lead agency for aircraft acci-
dent investigation, and until there is a criminal act that was de-
clared, I mean, it was my understanding that we should be doing
the investigation of that aircraft accident.
Senator GRASSLEY. What did Brookhaven do that the Federal
Government could not do, and did Brookhaven add anything to the
investigation?
Mr. MARX. Brookhaven did not have thethey have very intel-
ligent people that work at Brookhaven. It is a very good organiza-
tion. But they have neither the expertise nor the experience to do
any aircraft accident investigation. They have never looked at any
wreckage. They had basically a very poor background to do any fo-
rensic-type investigation or any kind of an accident investigation in
this particular case because the Safety Board had all the expertise
that is needed to do that and was advising the FBI that this was
notwe were just kind of like stand-by, looking at what they were
trying to produce, but we more or less discouraged this type of an
operation.
Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Hughes, before I ask you your first ques-
tion, would you give us your background, your expertise, and what
was your role in this investigation?
TESTIMONY OF HENRY F. HUGHES
Mr. HUGHES. Yes, sir. I started my career in investigative work
in 1967. I was trained by the Army as a military intelligence spe-
cialist. In 1972, I joined the Fairfax County Police Department in
Virginia. Subsequent to my completion of training and a few years
on the job, I served as a staff member and instructor at the North-
ern Virginia Criminal Justice Academy, for 8 years on the instruc-
tional staff at Virginia Commonwealth University, and I have also
served for 4 years at the University of Southern California teaching
accident investigation.
I came to the Safety Board in 1985 and joined as a member of
the Highway Division. Approximately 3 years later, I transferred to
the Bureau of Technology, where I cross-trained. I have been with
the Safety Board, as I said, since 1985, and during the course of
9
my tenure there, I have investigated 109 major transportation acci-

dents in all five modes of transportation.
On the TWA investigation, I was assigned initially with the Go
Team as the teams survival factor specialist. Upon arrival, it was
quite clear that my expertise in that area was limited in terms of
need. At that time, I was directed by the investigator in charge to
find a suitable place to try to reconstruct the airplane, and along
with some of our folks from management, they found a suitable
place, the Calverton facility, which was a former Grummond Air-
craft plant, and it was my responsibility to set up the reconstruc-
tion area, the layout of the aircraft, and then about 3 weeks into
the investigation, I was transferred and led the team that recon-
structed the interior of the aircraft.
Senator GRASSLEY. I am going to have my staff bring a sheet of
paper to you, and the purpose of bringing this to you is to ask you
to verify if those are notes that you provided my subcommittee in-
vestigators.
Mr. HUGHES. Yes, sir, it certainly is.
Senator GRASSLEY. OK. Let me ask, do those notes reflect the
handwritten contemporaneous notes that you kept in the diary dur-
ing the TWA investigation?
Mr. HUGHES. Yes, they do.
Senator GRASSLEY. Would you tell the subcommittee why you felt
compelled to take those notes?
Mr. HUGHES. From a professional standpoint, I was greatly dis-
tressed and disturbed with the professional working relationship
we had with the FBI, along with my observations of the working
relationship with the FBI and the other organizations, to include
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and the Federal
Aviation administration and TWA and the other parties. But it was
a matter of professional concern.
Senator GRASSLEY. Would you summarize, in general, the nature
of the problems that you saw and why you believe they occurred,
for example, from the standpoint of inadequate training, that and
anything else that you can lend to our body of information we need.
Mr. HUGHES. Yes, sir. The FBI has a group called the Evidence
Recovery Team, or I should say several groups. To my knowledge,
there were about 30 to 32 that participated in the TWA investiga-
tion. It is also my understanding that 28 of the 32 had absolutely
no or very little forensic science training whatsoever. It got to a
point where, after a few months, I was asked by the FBI to teach
a 4-hour class on basic forensic procedures and biohazard protec-
tion to the newly-arriving emergencyor, I should say, Evidence
Recovery Teams to provide them with a basic knowledge of how to
perform their duties at the accident reconstruction area.
Senator GRASSLEY. Would you go down the list and briefly de-
scribe each of these points and indicate the proper way to do them,
what the proper way would have been?
Mr. HUGHES. Yes, sir. I think, early on, part of my job in survival
factors is crash worthiness and basically investigating the deaths
of the passengers and crew. Part of that job is to coordinate with
the medical examiners office, in this case, the Suffolk County Med-
ical Examiners Office. Dr. Charles Wattley is in charge.
10
It was distressing to me when I first went to the MEs office to

see that the FBI agents, although there were several, in fact, prob-
ably dozens at the MEs office, there was little or no consideration
to establishing the chain of custody on the clothing of the victims,
and for that matter, some of the particulate matter that had been
extracted from the victims and the clothing. Clothing and particu-
late matter were commingled and the documentation as to what
came from where was spotty, at best.
Another concern that I had initially was that in terms of our in-
vestigative effort, it was very important to know where the victims
had been recovered from, yet little or no effort was made to do a
GPS fix on the victims, and subsequently, we know little in a lot
of cases as to where people came from. That is the first item. There
are about 16 of them.
I mentioned that the clothing was storedwas collected and com-
mingled. Stated procedure for any clothing in a crime scene or
other accident siteand the procedures are basically the same,
there is no difference between a crime scene and an accident scene
investigation in terms of the handling of evidencebut wet cloth-
ing, whether it is wet by chemicals, body chemicals, blood, or
water, salt water in this case, the proper procedure is to air dry
the clothing, wrap it in clean butcher paper after it has been photo-
graphed, catalog it, and put it away for safekeeping.
In the case of TWA, all of the clothing was taken to a refrigerator
truck marked Anderson on the side, which had been towed to the
accident site. Unfortunately, about 7 or 8 weeks into the investiga-
tion, the refrigerator truck refrigeration unit ran out of diesel fuel,
and for approximately a day-and-a-half, the clothing got warm and
began to mold, along with the other material stored in this trailer,
and was destroyed as far as any evidentiary value.
Seat covers on the seats were another issue. Again, if there had
been an explosion, whether it is a mechanical or structural problem
or an intentional event, any damage to any part of the airplane has
to be scrutinized closely. Many, many of the seat coversthere
were 430 passenger seats and 21 crew seatshad the seat covers
removed and they were commingled in a dumpster. About 2
months into the investigation, I went to the dumpster with the as-
sistance, I have to say, of an FBI agent and tried to sort out the
materials in there. We found, in addition to the seat covers, actu-
ally seats that had been missing that were mistakenly thrown in
there.
Senator GRASSLEY. Before you go on, whose decision was that on
the point you just made?
Mr. HUGHES. That was a decision made by the FBI, sir.
Another area of concern with regard to the reconstruction of the
interior was the chemical swabbing of the seats, and, as well, when
you are especially looking for projectile shrapnel, like debris, would
be to x-ray the seats. However, there was never any consistency in
either the x-raying of the passenger seats or the chemical swabbing
of the seats, although as the seats were collected, my team and I
went to great pains to specifically tag the seats to identify those
that had not been examined. Yet, to this day, those tags are still
there because they have notthe FBI never went back and did a
subsequent exam, either by chemical swab or x-ray examination.
11
Another problem that occurred, and it was recognized about 2

months into the investigation, was the disappearance of parts from
the hangar. I complained about it at several of our nightly inves-
tigative progress meetings, yet it fell on deaf ears for a long time.
Finally, the group that I worked withthere were 10 of us, I might
add, including ATF and three New York State Troopers as well as
TWA personnelscoured our hangar, verified exactly what was
there 1 day, and not to our surprise, I might add, we found that
seats were missing and other evidence had been disturbed.
The FBI, on my last complaint, did act and they found at 3:00
a.m. on a Saturday morning, two or three of their own agents were
in our hangar. It was not authorized. I supervised that project and
these people had no connection to it. After that
Senator GRASSLEY. Do you know who those two agents would be?
Mr. HUGHES. No, sir, I do not.
On another occasion, in the main hangar, when I was working
there, an agent from the FBI was brought in from Los Angeles. Ap-
parently, from what I understood from other agents I talked to,
subsequent to my observation of this individual, he had arrived
from the West Coast, had some experience in bomb investigations,
and I saw him in the middle of the hangar with a hammer in the
process of trying to flatten a piece of wreckage. In investigative
work, you do not alter evidence. You take it in its original state
and preserve it. But I actually saw this man with a hammer,
pounding on a piece of evidence, trying to flatten it out.
Senator GRASSLEY. What was the purpose of his doing that?
Mr. HUGHES. I have no idea, sir.
Senator GRASSLEY. Was that agent Mr. Ricky Hahn?
Mr. HUGHES. I believe his name is Hahn.
Another problem that I observed was that there wereprobably,
I guess, the ratio in the hangar between Safety Board investigators
and FBI and other folks was about 100-to-one. But I noticed during
the course of documentation that the bomb technicians did not
seem to use the conventional method of documenting the evidence.
When you look at a piece of potential evidence, it should be pho-
tographed, measured, and then collected safely. On one occasion, I
observed an agent walk up to a seat back, a tray table, if you can
envision where they might be mounted on the back of the seat, and
instead of looking at this piece of metalit was a piece of plastic
that was embedded in metaland documenting it properly, the in-
dividual took out a pair of pliers, a leatherman tool, and put tool
marks on that piece of evidence and attempted to pull it out of the
seat back to examine ittotally unacceptable procedure.
Senator GRASSLEY. Do you know the name of that individual?
Mr. HUGHES. No, sir, I do not.
Another problem that occurred, and I think it was administra-
tive, but it did affect the investigation, was the FBIs reluctance to
commit its agents to participate on investigative groups. As you
know, the Safety Board, when we send a Go Team, has specialists.
Each one of those specialists form an investigative group. Those
groups are comprised of people from the FAA, from the airplane
manufacturer, from the carrier, and any other agencies that might
help lend expertise to the investigation. They were certainly wel-
12
come to participate, but at no time were they offered to participate

on groups.
Conversely, for a period of about a month, five ATF agents
worked on my group and I have to say that they did contribute sig-
nificantly to assisting in the reconstruction of the interior of the
airplane.
I think the other area of concern, and it is an administrative one,
is the unkind, I guess is the best way I can put it, attitude that
FBI management displayed toward the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms agents. I can understand because of some of the past
history that there may be some friction, but I can remember sev-
eral days where ATF agents were basically told to sit at picnic ta-
bles in the hangar and not allowed to actively participate in the in-
vestigation. Those were the exact times when we needed all the
help we could get. Fortunately, I got five folks to help me in my
hangar because I was in a separate facility.
But I do not think it was an efficient use of manpower. The Bu-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms is a very fine agency in
terms of explosives investigation and not to have that talent avail-
able, especially in my hangar with the reconstruction of the inte-
rior, did lead to some difficulties.
I think the other two items, the release of personal items without
consultation of the Safety Board, had this been a criminal act, and
there is no evidence to suggest that it is, I would think that every
piece of material on that airplane, to include personal items, should
have been documented and inventoried, and before any release was
authorized, it should have been with the consensus of the NTSB
and other parties to the investigation.
Senator GRASSLEY. That is the end of your list?
Mr. HUGHES. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator GRASSLEY. My staff was hoping you had one more thing
on your list, about the psychic.
Mr. HUGHES. Yes. That was already mentioned by Mr. Marx, my
colleague, but I did not see the psychic. I arrived at the hangar
about 10 minutes after the fact and there was quite a bit of commo-
tion. From what I understand, the visit to the hangar by the psy-
chic was not authorized by any of the FBI supervisory personnel
at the hangar.
I have to say that, for the most part, the FBI supervisors I
worked with, they were pretty reasonable people, but I can remem-
ber they were extremely distraught and concerned about the psy-
chic. As a matter of fact, at our progress meeting that night, all of
the folks that represented the parties to the investigation, and
there were probably 80 in the room, in the interest of public, dis-
cussed it and everybody expressed their concern. But it did happen.
Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Hughes.
Mr. Zakar, would you please give us your background, your ex-
pertise, and what role you played in the TWA investigation?
TESTIMONY OF FRANK ZAKAR
Mr. ZAKAR. Yes. My name is Frank Zakar. I am a Senior Metal-
lurgist at the National Transportation Safety Board. I have been
working there for approximately 11 years now. My educational
background basically is a Bachelor of Science in metallurgical engi-
13
neering, which I earned in 1980, and a Master of Science in

metallurgic, which I earned in 1984. My expertise is in performing
failure analysis of components involved in transportation-related
accidents.
My first 2 years with the Safety Board basically involved inves-
tigating airplane accidents, where I would go out to the field and
document wreckage and document any failures that might be relat-
ed to, basicallythat might be related to structural failures, major
structural failures. My major work is involved in the materials lab-
oratory, and at times, I am requested to go out to the field and per-
form examinations. Our laboratory basically examines 150 cases a
year and I approximately work on about 30 cases.
Prior to coming to the Safety Board, I worked as a materials en-
gineer for Lockheed Martin for a period of 4 years.
My participation in the Flight 800 investigation was the first 3
months of the investigation, I reported to the investigation in the
hangar approximately 3 days after the accident occurred and the
purpose was to examine for evidence of preexisting structural fail-
ures in the airplane, looking for clues for corrosion, manufacturing
defects, improper maintenance, and explosion damage, and second,
to assist any of the investigators and the Safety Board with issues
regarding materials used in manufacturing the airplane.
Senator GRASSLEY. In a very general way, for my first question,
I would like to have you give us your recollections and thoughts on
the way that the FBI recovered and handled the wreckage.
Mr. ZAKAR. Well, first of all, I felt that there were some restric-
tions during the course of the investigation which impeded our
ability to perform our examinations. The first policy was, as Mr.
Marx already indicated, restriction on photography. The problem
was that the FBI was concerned with safety and the information
that might leak from the hangar, so restrictions were imposed on
photography.
At that time, it was decided that in documenting evidence in the
hangar, photographs were to be taken by FBI agents. We thought
that was impractical and we were able to work out an agreement
that would allow us to take photographs, and in such case, we were
allowed to take photographs only when we were wearing red vests
in the hangar. That would indicate to the FBI that basically there
was a person with a camera on the scene and it was part of the
investigation. Of course, there was a double standard there in that
the FBI photographer did not wear any red vests.
Another issue that I would like to bring out was the developing
of film. Again, this is relating to basically the first 2 weeks of the
investigation. It was agreed upon that if we wanted to have film
developed, they were to be taken to the command post within the
hangar, the FBI command post, and that they would basically have
the film processed for us and the turnaround rate would be 1 day.
I recall during my first submission, I submitted one roll of film
and that roll of film was not returned. I had a second submission
of photographs, which I submitted two or three rolls of film that
documented the wreckage. There was something very critical that
I wanted to have on the second submission and those were photo-
graphs that I took within the hangar of the entire layout of the op-
eration. Our management had basically askedthey were inter-
14
ested in finding out how the operation had gone in the hangar and
I felt at that time that it was important to get an overall photo-
graph of the entire layout. Because that film was given to the FBI
and it was not returned, I was not able to make a presentation to
our headquarters office concerning the operation within the hang-
ar.
Senator GRASSLEY. It just disappeared?
Mr. ZAKAR. Yes. Basically, I delivered the film to an FBI agent
at the command post within the hangar, and there were several of
them, of course. That contributed to a problem. I gave my name.
I gave the roll of film. He jotted down my name, put the roll of film
next to that piece of paper, and I walked away, assuming that the
film would be processed and returned the following day.
Senator GRASSLEY. Who is that person?
Mr. ZAKAR. I do not recall the name of the agent. I had a ques-
tion whether or not that film had been developed. I had asked that
question to a FBI photographer. He said he would look into it
and
Senator GRASSLEY. To this day, you do not know?
Mr. ZAKAR. To this day, I
Senator GRASSLEY. You do not know if it was ever developed?
Mr. ZAKAR. To the best of my knowledge, the film has not been
recovered. I would like to add that when the film and prints were
delivered, they were supposed to be delivered to a specific metal
hangar within our command post. Our name would be on the enve-
lope, and all we had to do was pick them up. I remember the first
3 weeks after the submission of these rolls of film, I checked every
one of those envelopes in the metal file cabinet and they were not
to be found.
Senator GRASSLEY. Did you read into this a message from the
FBI that we do not need you as an employee of the NTSB, that,
somehow, your work was not respected, your work was not needed,
we really do not need you around, or do you not read a signal like
that into that sort of activity?
Mr. ZAKAR. I feel that possibly there were too many people in-
volved in the proceedings and the procedure and that possibly the
film was mishandled. And, of course, that brings other suspicions
as to why photographs of the entire operation could not be deliv-
ered to the NTSB. It raises concern.
Senator GRASSLEY. I interrupted you, so please continue.
Mr. ZAKAR. The other problems we had in the hangar was dif-
ficulties in exchanging of information. I found that there were
many levels of management involved in handling information.
There was the New York office of the FBI, the DC office. There
were several agents running the FBI command post. That made it
difficult for information to be transmitted to the proper offices.
I found that to be quite different than our organization. At the
NTSB, we have a list of investigators who are predetermined, prior
to being launched to the investigation. Each investigator has a spe-
cialty and we feel that because this organization is predetermined
prior to the launch, our goal is very specific, it is detailed, and
there is no quarrel who is in charge of the specific areas of the in-
vestigation.
15
The other problem I encountered in the hangar was getting infor-

mation in regard to how much of the wreckage was recovered. At
times, inquiry would come up to our hangar regarding how much
of the wreckage have you recovered. I found that, for example, the
FBI had an evidence room which locked up personal items and
other objects from the wreckage.
I also found out, at times, we were interested in finding out what
wreckage or what pieces of components from the airplane were
being sent between the hangar and the FBI headquarters for lab-
oratory examination. I found that to be a difficult subject. It took
several days for us to find out what was being sent between the
hangar and the headquarters in Washington, DC. When inquiring
about getting a list of items that were sent to the headquarters of-
fice, the response was, basically, we cannot give you a list, but we
will verbally give you the information that we have available and
you jot it down on a piece of paper. I thought that was a rather
awkward way of conducting business.
The other concern is altering of physical evidence. As Mr. Hank
Hughes has indicated earlier, this is in regard to the examination
of a passenger seat. I recall several agents working on a chair of
a passenger and pulling out fragments from within the chair. There
was some tearing involved and rather sloppy handling of the mate-
rial that was removed from within that seat.
Senator GRASSLEY. I would ask you at this point if you know who
that individual or individuals may have been. Do you have the
names of those people?
Mr. ZAKAR. No, not atI do not recall. One of the interesting
points that I would like to make is that during the first several
weeks of the operation, it was rather difficult to focus on one spe-
cific area. Wreckage was coming in by the truckload. In countering
some of these problems, I was needed in the area where the un-
loading occurred so we could examine the wreckage, because it was
rather difficult to keep focus on several of the problem areas within
the hangar.
But what I do want to stress is that we have expertise within
the Safety Board which handles the area of seating, and one of
them is Hank Hughes, and I think it would have been proper at
that time if anybody was going to handle any part of the wreckage
that they would notify the specific investigator at the NTSB what
the activities were being performed and to what extent.
One of the problems we faced is that after the wreckage is moved
from one side of the hangar to the other, the evidence could be al-
tered and that could at the end cause a problem in interpretation
of what will come out of the investigation.
Another problem I had with observation at the hangar was a spe-
cific person, a special agent of the FBI, who rushed to judgment in
looking at some evidence in the hangar. One of them was specifi-
callyas I recall, this special agent was raising above his head a
leg portion of a chair, and because he noted that the piece was se-
verely damaged, he concluded that the damage was a result of
bomb damage, without any scientific evidence, and this was in
front of other investigators.
Senator GRASSLEY. Did you see that yourself?
16
Mr. ZAKAR. I saw that myself. I walked up to this gentleman and

I asked him what basis did he have for this, and his answer was,
basically, if it is that badly damaged, what else could cause that
damage?
Senator GRASSLEY. That is what he said?
Mr. ZAKAR. Right.
Senator GRASSLEY. Who was that individual?
Mr. ZAKAR. I do not remember. And the interesting thing about
it is, I approached this gentleman and specifically told him, I think
it is important to realize that it is important to keep an open mind
and to also leave open the possibility that this damage could be
caused by the airplane from a high altitude impacting the water,
and sure enough, several weeks after I talked to this gentleman,
the seats were laid out in the hangar in a position similar to what
you would find inside the airplane and it was concluded that the
seats did have damage as a result of impact with the water.
Another observation I made was that there was a specific atti-
tude on the part of the FBI to continue the bomb and missile the-
ory. There was a fixation on the bomb and missile case. I feel that
this was not open-minded thinking and that was not a professional
manner to conduct the investigation. We at the Safety Board, when
we examine wreckage, we keep an open mind and we look for fac-
tual information which will develop a case, regardless of what the
outcome is. We did not particularly care if the examination was
going to be leading to a bomb theory or complete catastrophic fail-
ure of the airplane.
Senator GRASSLEY. Was this approach really unreasonable, in
your point of view?
Mr. ZAKAR. I think because of the overwhelming number of
agents in the case and because of possible motivation that it was
bomb damage, that the large mass of agents at the hangar over-
shadowed the fact that we had an accident investigation and that
there was basically a domino effect from the very beginning, and
the philosophy just continued down through the entire operation.
As I indicated earlier, it overshadowed the fact that the NTSB was
conducting an accident investigation.
Senator GRASSLEY. When you say it continues through the entire
investigation, would you give me approximate dates, from the start
of the investigation until what time?
Mr. ZAKAR. Well, I could only specify that I was in the hangar
for the first 3 months, so during the first 3 months of the
investigation
Senator GRASSLEY. Very dominant?
Mr. ZAKAR. Very dominant from the very beginning. One more
item.
Senator GRASSLEY. Yes.
Mr. ZAKAR. I would like to say that the situation, in the case of
the FBI, was not whether someone was going to find evidence of
a bomb, it is a matter of when, and there is a differentiate between
whether and when. I believe that possibly the FBI had knowledge
of something that we were not aware of that possibly could have
led them to believe there was missile damage and that information
was not shared with us early in the investigation.
17
Senator GRASSLEY. But in hindsight, then, you think that that

was an unreasonable supposition on their part?
Mr. ZAKAR. I think it is important we all have a specific job. I
feel that the FBI had a job to look for a missile, any criminal
wrongdoing, but to not keep an open mind and to not realize that
there is another agency of the government performing investigation
is rather unprofessional.
Senator GRASSLEY. I would ask you, Mr. Zakar, as well as Mr.
Hughes, did you have any contact with a person by the name of
Tom Thurman, and if so, what kind of contact?
Mr. HUGHES. Yes, sir, I did. Mr. Thurman, at the time, was the
Chief of the FBI Explosives Unit. I, in fact, arrived with some of
his agents at the accident site. Early on, we worked for a period
of several weeks. I will not say we worked with them, because they
would not work with us, but we worked in close proximity with Mr.
Thurman and his colleagues.
Senator GRASSLEY. Were his actions consistent with the criticism
that we have heard thus far?
Mr. HUGHES. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, I think in Mr. Thur-
mans caseI am trying to pick my words carefully because I want
to be accurate, but it was almost caustic. He showed no respect or
no regard for our concerns in many cases, and a lot of our concerns
and questions that we raised went ignored.
Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Zakar, would you answer the same ques-
tion about knowing Mr. Thurman and what sort of contact you had
with him.
Mr. ZAKAR. I have not met Mr. Thurman before or have worked
with him before, so I cannot go any further in describing that.
Senator GRASSLEY. That is OK. Mr. Hughes, then maybe you can
tell me a little more specifically, how did Mr. Thurmans actions
impede your work?
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. Thurman represented what, from a practical
standpoint, at least to the Safety Board investigators on scene, and
basically, there were two, Dr. Merrett Birky and I, one-third of
theit is almost like there were three different FBIs. We had the
FBI Explosives Unit, the FBI Manhattan office, and FBI head-
quarters.
Mr. Thurmans group basically got to the scene and when we
started to assemble the parts and catalog them for later reconstruc-
tion, began to do the chemical screening and examination, looking
for what they believed was an explosive device, you know, a bomb
or missile. The problem was, we have an organized, systematic ap-
proach to reconstructing aircraft, as well as trucks, buses, and
trains, that has worked very well for many years, and when that
conflicted with Mr. Thurmans operation, we clashed. We wanted to
do it in a systematic, organized way. Their job, from what I could
see, was more of a shotgun approach, trying to look at as much as
possible in as short a time as they could, and it caused some prob-
lems and friction.
Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you. Mr. Zakar, I think I will go back
to you on the next question. You touched on it here or there, but
I just kind of want to bring it together, all in one answer, and that
is your impression of FBI leadership at the scene.
18
Mr. ZAKAR. I would like to add that I did not have specific prob-
lems with the individuals in the FBI. It was more a philosophy and
policy. I think that, just to be open-minded, just to give an opinion,
I think that the operation would probably have been better if the
agency kept an open mind that another agency was in the hangar
and was involved in TWA Flight 800.
Senator GRASSLEY. My last question, did you know about or hear
about the FBI bringing in a psychic and what was your reaction?
Mr. ZAKAR. I learned about the psychic during the hangar oper-
ation, but was nowhere near the psychic. My original impression
is that, basically, its an unscientific approach and, basically, if it
did not interfere with my job, I basically did not have any feelings
towards it. But I thought it was a rather unscientific approach on
the part of the FBI and possibly a desperate attempt to further
look at the possibility that the bomb did hit the airplane.
Senator GRASSLEY. A final question to all of you, but maybe all
of you do not want to answer it, but it just a simple summation,
whether or not any of you have anything you would like to add in
the interest of how to avoid problems like this in the future.
Mr. HUGHES. Yes, sir, I have some ideas.
Senator GRASSLEY. Please go ahead.
Mr. HUGHES. The idea of professional respect, I think, is the first
thing that needs to be considered. I know since the on-scene inves-
tigation has been completed, the Safety Board has initiated meet-
ings with the FBI forensic folks, but I think the cultural attitude
of turf fighting and that sort of thing has got to be done away with.
We have one job and that is an objective search for the truth.
The only way we can do that is to respect each other and work
in partnership, and I think from the top down in both organiza-
tions, if we adopt that philosophy, on an individual basis, we are
going to get along fine. The FBI agents in the hangar that we
worked with on a day-to-day basis were excellent people. They did
the best they could. They worked their heart out.
But I agree with what Mr. Zakar said. There is an institutional
philosophy that is very troubling. It is not new to me. I spent 14
years in police work before I came to the Safety Board, so I am fa-
miliar with it, but it is not constructive and it needs to go.
Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Marx.
Mr. MARX. Well, the comments that were just made by Hank
areI can second those. Basically, I think that there was just too
many people that were involved from the FBI in this particular
case. That overshadowed anything else in the investigation.
I think that there is a need to have a presence of the FBI and
ATF or whatever, but not such an overbearing presence in a par-
ticular case, and, of course, in the future, I think that it would be
better to have the overall lead agency be the ones that do know
how to investigate the accident from the standpoint of the scientific
and professional manner, and that being the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board.
Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Zakar, would you like to add anything?
Mr. ZAKAR. Yes. I feel that some of the difficulties within the in-
vestigation could be improved with increasing the speed of informa-
tion that is traveled from one agency to another. I feel that we may
have to have a designated representative work closer to our organi-
19
zation early on and, somehow or another, allow exchange of infor-

mation in a much quicker manner without going through the dif-
ferent layers of management that we found within the investiga-
tion.
Senator GRASSLEY. I know that you have been here just with us
in this official environment for a little over an hour, talking to the
American people and to the Congress about the issue before this
committee, this investigation and the mishandling of the TWA
Flight 800 investigation, but I want the American public to know
that you have been working with the committee staff and other in-
terested people over a long, long period of time.
So I want to thank you very much for your testimony, for the
benefit of your knowledge into these matters, and we greatly appre-
ciate your cooperation, your contribution in educating us about how
we can avoid these problems in the future. Because everything we
talked about here is what can we do to make sure that when peo-
ple step onto an airplane, they know that their government has
been fully behind them in efforts to make for safe transportation.
I know you know that is what your job is about, all forms of trans-
portation, for that matter, for you. They expect that, and when we
have these sorts of bureaucratic and turf battles that you have
talked about, it really does not give the American public the satis-
faction that everybody in government is concerned about their safe-
ty. I think you have shown that you have, but you ran into too
many obstacles to do your work.
We thank you for the work you do, and I will dismiss you now.
Thank you very much. You are welcome to stay if you want to stay
through the entire hearing.
Senator GRASSLEY. Our next panel consists of Mr. Bill Tobin,
former Chief Metallurgist of the FBI and one of the worlds most
renowned metallurgists. Mr. Tobin testified before this committee
in September 1997. He was still an FBI employee in the laboratory
at that time. I would like to have Mr. Tobin give the committee his
background, and I would like to ask the two people who are with
you, who are attorneys, their purpose for accompanying Mr. Tobin,
and anything that they would like to say.
It does not matter whether Mr. Tobin wants to speak first or the
attorneys speak first. Maybe it would be better if we would have
the attorneys say why you are here, and then we will go to Mr.
Tobin for his background and expertise. Please introduce yourself.
Mr. DEMONACO. Yes. My name is Charles A. DeMonaco. I am an
attorney in Pittsburgh with the law firm of Dickie, McCamey and
Chilcote. We, along with Attorney Stephen Kohn, co-represent Mr.
Tobin.
Prior to joining the law firm of Dickie, McCamey and Chilcote,
I was with the U.S. Department of Justice for 15 years. I served
as an Assistant Chief of the Environmental Crime Section here in
Washington, DC, for about 9 years, and then prior to that, I was
an Assistant U.S. Attorney in Pittsburgh for about 6 years. Prior
to that, I was a prosecutor in the local district attorneys office for
about 7 years. So my background is primarily that involved in
criminal prosecutions.
While I was an Assistant Chief of the Environmental Crime Sec-
tion in Washington, DC, I had the honor of serving the United
20
States of America as the counsel in the criminal prosecution relat-

ing to the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The National Transportation Safe-
ty Board played a very vital role in that investigation and the re-
sult for the United States was tremendous, with a settlement in
criminal and civil litigation in excess of $1 billion.
I also had the honor of serving as Senior Counsel in a criminal
prosecution of a major oil spill in San Juan, PR, and that resulted
in a jury conviction of three corporations, as well as a criminal fine
imposed of $75 million.
William A. Tobin served as the Chief Metallurgist at the FBI and
he played an important role in determining the cause and the fail-
ure and provided expert testimony to the jury. He was extremely
thorough in his analysis and clear in his testimony. He was profes-
sional at all times.
We are here providing counsel to Mr. Tobin because we under-
stand the science is extremely important in disaster investigations.
Without a proper scientific analysis that serves as a bedrock, inves-
tigative theories may be flawed and subsequent prosecutions, if
any, may be problematic, and the coordination is the key to suc-
cessful investigations and prosecutions.
It is an honor for Attorney Stephen Kohn and me to represent
William Tobin in this proceeding. His only objective is to be cooper-
ative and helpful to the subcommittee and we would like to thank
the chairman and the subcommittee for inviting William A. Tobin
to provide testimony to the subcommittee in this important matter.
Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Kohn, do you have anything you want to
say?
Mr. KOHN. Yes, Senator. My name is Stephen Kohn. I am an at-
torney with the firm of Kohn, Kohn and Colapinto, and also I am
the chairman of a nonprofit group, the National Whistleblower
Center. In these capacities, I represent a number of current and
former FBI agents.
Unfortunately, the rules and regulations which govern FBI
agents speech are, at best, unclear, at worst, very restrictive, and
part of my reason for being here is to provide counsel to Mr. Tobin.
The FBI requires even its former agents to submit various testi-
mony or public documents to the FBI, essentially to a censor, for
pre-publication clearance. It is our position that this requirement
concerning communications with Congress is illegal and inappro-
priate. However, because there is some ambiguity in the law, we
believe that Mr. Tobin does need representation here to ensure
that his presentation complies with both the Constitution and the
FBI regulations. Thank you.
Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Tobin, would you please stand. Would
you raise your right hand. Do you promise to tell the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. TOBIN. I do.
Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you. Do you have any sort of a state-
ment that you would like to make? I do want you to tell us about
your background and your role with the TWA investigation, but
any sort of statement you want to make beyond that is OK, as well,
and then I will ask you questions.
Mr. TOBIN. No, Mr. Chairman, I do not.
21
Senator GRASSLEY. Would you please give us your background,

then.
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM A. TOBIN, FORMER CHIEF METAL-
LURGIST, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; ACCOM-
PANIED BY CHARLES A. DeMONACO, DICKIE, McCAMEY AND
CHILCOTE, PITTSBURGH, PA; AND STEPHEN M. KOHN, KOHN,
KOHN AND COLAPINTO, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. TOBIN. I have a Bachelor of Science degree in metallurgy
from Case Institute of Technology in Cleveland. I continued my for-
mal education in graduate school at Ohio State University, in
George Washington University, and in the University of Virginia.
I have studied and authored a number of publications in the foren-
sic metallurgy arena and I have been the guest speaker for all of
the prominent professional societies throughout this country and in
Canada.
Senator GRASSLEY. For my first question, what was your position
at the FBI?
Mr. TOBIN. At that time, I was the civilian equivalent of the
Chief Metallurgist for the FBI laboratory.
Senator GRASSLEY. And then your role in the TWA 800 crash in-
vestigation.
Mr. TOBIN. My role was to evaluate whether there could be or
was any criminal activity associated with any of theas to the
cause or the materials deformation or damage issues related to the
crash.
Senator GRASSLEY. When did you arrive at the hangar in Calver-
ton, NY, where the plane was being reconstructed?
Mr. TOBIN. I arrived on August 4, 1996.
Senator GRASSLEY. At that time, did you have any inclination as
to whether or not a bomb was the cause of the crash?
Mr. TOBIN. From what I had seen and heard in the media, it did
have the earmarks, potentially, of having been a bomb.
Senator GRASSLEY. Generally, what were the scientific issues you
confronted in order to be able to reach any valid conclusions con-
cerning the cause of the crash?
Mr. TOBIN. This air crash, in particular, was a very dynamic
interaction of materials and forces that resulted in a massive
amount of fractured and otherwise damaged metal aircraft compo-
nents, known to have been subjected to three of the most hostile
circumstances that materials can undergo.
In this particular case, there was a midair fuel explosion, there
was impact of the pieces from approximately 2.5 miles in the air
with the waters surface, and subsequent undersea saltwater corro-
sion. The results were fractures, punctures, fragmentations, tears
and rips, deformation, and thermal, mechanical, chemical, and
electro-chemical damage processes, including unavoidable recovery
damage. This was an extraordinary combination of material inter-
action and degradation processes, each of which can serve to mask
characteristics of the other processes. So, in short, this was a mas-
sive and technically complex metallurgical undertaking.
Senator GRASSLEY. Was your initial inclination that the cause of
the crash was a bomb, was it confirmed by your evaluations?
Mr. TOBIN. No, Mr. Chairman, they were not.
22
Senator GRASSLEY. Why not?

Mr. TOBIN. The materials just lacked, completely lacked any of
the characteristics that would support impulsively loaded materials
from within the aircraft. The various characteristics, and there are
numerous, that would indicate the presence of a bomb resulting in
impulsive loading were absent in the component.
Senator GRASSLEY. What was it about the crash debris which dis-
proved a bomb or missile theory?
Mr. TOBIN. Well, the bombdisproved the bomb theory because
of the complete absence of any of the characteristics associated
with the type of behavior that bombs can cause. As to the missile
component, the same arguments would apply because that is also
generally considered impulsive loading. But in addition, there were
penetration problems. Admittedly, 100 percent of the aircraft was
not recovered, but every time there was a portion of material miss-
ing, I could actually track through the multi-layered structures and
actually find a component that existed in the path of what could
have been viewed as an external penetration.
Further, I would add that in some of those areas where there did
appear to be a hole, the holes were from within outward rather
than from outward in. That was another characteristic, and that
the material behavior was consistent with the fuel explosion known
to have occurred.
Senator GRASSLEY. Now I would like to have you tell me what
there is about your area of scientific expertise which qualified you
to reach these conclusions that the cause of the crash was not a
bomb.
Mr. TOBIN. Metallurgy or material science is the most appro-
priate scientific discipline to make the evaluations as to the mate-
rial behavior and the deformation and damage associated with the
various degradation and destructive processes.
Senator GRASSLEY. Did you work with any other branches of the
Federal Government during your years of disaster investigations?
Mr. TOBIN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I did.
Senator GRASSLEY. How did you find working with the NTSB?
Mr. TOBIN. In my view, they are unsurpassed in their expertise,
in their competence, and in their professionalism.
Senator GRASSLEY. Within 30 days of arriving at Calverton, what
was your professional assessment as to whether the cause of the
crash was a bomb?
Mr. TOBIN. It progressed from an inclination of viewing the ear-
marks as possibly a bomb, but it changed rather quickly to con-
firmation within my mind that there was no indication of a bomb,
and unlikely to be that of a missile, within the first 30 days.
Senator GRASSLEY. Did you discuss that assessment with mem-
bers of the National Transportation Safety Board? If so, how did
they respond?
Mr. TOBIN. I did. We wereI have a very intimate relationship
with them from having worked these disasters for approximately
25 years with them at that point. That, of course, would include
derailments and maritime disasters, but we were in daily and I
would almostI probably could safely say hourly contact in our
very intimate working relationship. So there was not really any
23
proactive discussion needed because we were in a constant informa-

tion exchange mode while we were working together.
Senator GRASSLEY. Did there come a time when explosive resi-
dues were found on crash pieces of the plane, and what was your
reaction to this discovery?
Mr. TOBIN. Yes, there were three separate incidents, or in-
stances, of the finding of high-explosive residues on various parts.
The first incident, I was quite skeptical, but when I reexamined the
areas from which the residues were recovered, I confirmed that the
surrounding materials showed no evidence whatsoever of any dam-
age processes caused by a bomb.
So at that point, I began to urge, partially because of my Marine
Corps combat experience, urged that the history of this research
that this aircraft be researched, because when I was in combat, we
all carried basically some C4, which is a high explosive, and it is
very easy to transfer the residues, so I thought the possibility ex-
isted that this aircraft may have been used to ferry troops to the
Middle East for the Middle East war, or that another possibility for
the deposition was that the aircraft was used in drug-sniffing exer-
cises for canines.
Senator GRASSLEY. When the second incident of explosive resi-
dues was found on a piece of the plane, what was your reaction?
Mr. TOBIN. I again repeated the process of confirmation as to the
site and location from which the residues were recovered and con-
firmed, again, no indication whatsoever of impulsive loading or
bomb or missile damage. I strengthened and reiterated my sugges-
tion that the history of this aircraft be researched.
Senator GRASSLEY. How did Mr. Kallstrom inform you when the
third incident, the high-explosive RDX was found on a piece of the
recovered plane? What did he say?
Mr. TOBIN. When I was advised of that third finding of the resi-
dues, I was approached in a very excited manner and the state-
ment was, We have got it. We have got it. It is confirmed. And
I asked what was confirmed, and he says, We got it, proof of the
bomb. And I saw in the very agitated or hyper-emotional state
that he was in that I needed to do some significant calming, or try
to bring it back down to earth, or to urge prudence and caution in
interpretation of those RDX residues.
I then decided that I probably shouldI used the analogy of a
cardboard box at that particular time and what I was trying to con-
vey to him was a simple materials analogy. My representation was,
I said, Jim, basically, from a materials science standpoint, this is
what you have got. You have got a cardboard box. Your chemists
are finding residues inside the cardboard box and the sides of the
box are not even bulged out. In my business, that is called a clue.
That did not sit well, and at that point, he got about 6 inches
from my face and proceeded to advise me in rather graphic terms
that it was a bomb, and that is the most suitable presentation I
can put on for prime time right now.
Senator GRASSLEY. Was the insinuation when he is 6 inches
away from your face is that he says it is a bomb and you, as a sci-
entist, had better say it is a bomb?
Mr. TOBIN. I do not know what he intended to insinuate or in-
tended for me tohow he intended for me to use that. I do know
24
that he was rather graphic in his approach that it was a bomb,

and, in fact, I ended up wearing several particles of his saliva from
that presentation, but
Senator GRASSLEY. Did you tell Mr. Kallstrom that if there was
to be a public pronouncement that Flight 800 crashed due to a
bomb, that you would not support that announcement from a mate-
rial science standpoint?
Mr. TOBIN. Yes, Senator, that is correct.
Senator GRASSLEY. Why did you say this to Mr. Kallstrom?
Mr. TOBIN. After the finding of the third explosive residue hit
and I saw the reaction and the fervor and the intensity and the
frenzied reaction, and I also saw the clothes that he had that day
and hisI recognized the behavior immediately preceding most of
the press conferences. And at that particular timeI am sorry, I
have something in my eye hereat that particular time, I saw that
a major PR gaffe was imminent, was in the making, and I think
in large part due to my loyalty to the FBI, I decided at that point
that, as we would say in Vietnam, I needed to throw my body on
the grenade at that particular time.
I wanted to preclude or prevent a major, major PR gaffe that, in
my view, was about to happen, from which I do not believe the FBI
would have recovered for a very long time. I then thought the last
tool in my arsenal at that point was to indicateto basically put
the emperor without clothes, that if he was going to proceed to
make an announcement that there was a bomb, that he would not
be supported from the material science standpoint. So that was, at
that point, the last tool in my arsenal.
Senator GRASSLEY. My next point is kind of a summation,
maybe, of what you said, but I want to ask it very directly. Based
upon your direct personal observations, your direct contacts with
Mr. Kallstrom and Mr. Maxwell, and your discussions with bomb
tech and chemical analysts at the crash site, at the investigation
site, had you not forcefully protested directly to Mr. Kallstrom, do
you believe that the FBI would have publicly declared the cause of
the TWA Flight 800 crash to have been a bomb, and why do you
think so, if you think so?
Mr. TOBIN. It is my opinion that that was imminent and would
have occurred. But even if there was not a 100 percent probability
that it was going to occur, the odds were so high, based on the ac-
tions and the demeanor and the tension, that for the Bureaus
sake, I decided it was not worth the chance. So Ithat is when I
interceded, at that point, and tried to put him in a position expos-
ing him thatto give him pause to think about any announcement
that may be imminent.
Senator GRASSLEY. I am told that on August 13, 1996, you wrote
in a memo to your supervisor, I am underwhelmed by the finding
of RDX. Why did you write this?
Mr. TOBIN. Several reasons. One is I, in fact, was underwhelmed
by the finding of RDX, as I have already indicated. But Iit is par-
tially my style to introduce some humor to try to get a point across,
so I think I made up my own word in that particular time, but I
decided after that proclamation from Mr. Kallstrom to me that it
was a f-ing bomb that I needed to start a documentation, because
I could foresee claims of malfeasance from the material science side
25
or that the metallurgist never communicated his findings orthere

was no recording of my opinions, my positions.
So at that point, I decidedand that was August, midAugust,
I believeI think it was August 13, only several weeks after I ar-
rived. And I also needed to try to start reversing the tide, to try
to introduce back to headquarters the crack in the dam thatto
start trying to opening the focus of causes.
Senator GRASSLEY. Did you have occasion to have to deal with
an order for 1,000 random samples to be carved out of the aircraft?
Mr. TOBIN. Yes, I did.
Senator GRASSLEY. What were your reasons for refusing to com-
ply?
Mr. TOBIN. Throughout the whole interaction, except maybe the
first week, I had some serious problems with statutory authority,
title 49 versus title 18 issues. I throughout the investigation felt,
and particularly in view of having worked so many of these with
the NTSB in the past, that this was not our aircraft to be carving
up. I also saw that that would have an effect, from the material
science standpoint, a significant impeding effect on their carrying
out their chartered mission under title 49. I did not feel that it was
our place to be carving up their aircraft.
Second, I had a problem. I and my colleague have spent almost
our entire lives in metallurgy classrooms and in the practice of
metallurgy and material science issues and we were being told, ba-
sically, what samples we needed, how many samples we needed to
draw our conclusions, and what tests would be conducted, albeit
the test that was insisted that weby an individual who had not
spent a minute in a metallurgy classroom.
I would also add that the request was so absurd on its face, in
part because we were ordered to put 1,000 random samples in a
metallurgy machine, and to this day, we are not real sure what a
metallurgy machine is, but that was the order at the time.
Senator GRASSLEY. Did you ever
Mr. TOBIN. I am sorry. May I amend my
Senator GRASSLEY. Please do.
Mr. TOBIN. Part of the issues in that were that they were dissat-
isfied with the examinations we had conducted. They were dissatis-
fied with my lack of note-taking and there were five reasons that
I enunciated as to why I was not taking detailed notes on the ex-
amination of these fragments, and there was dissatisfaction of the
techniques that we were using to conduct these examinations,
again, by the individual who had not spent a minute in a material
science classroom.
We werebasically, they were dissatisfied with the visual exami-
nations. We were doing macroscopic examinations and micro-
scopicstereo-microscopic evaluations, but the supervisor in charge
of the on-site investigation was dissatisfied with those investiga-
tions and was insisting that we put 1,000 random parts through a
metallurgy machine.
I would also add that those were the same techniques used by
the financially interested parties, the parties who had billions of
dollars at stake. They were using thenot only using the same ex-
amination techniques that my colleague and I were doing, in fact,
26
they asked where I was able toif they could purchase one of the
items that I used for my examinations to help their examination.
Senator GRASSLEY. Did you ever hear the phrase, bomb techs
three, Tobin zero, and what did that mean if you heard it?
Mr. TOBIN. I was not aware you had that information. That was
basically an analogy to a baseball game. The first week or so, I
kept trying to urge prudence and caution in the interpretation of
these explosive residue hits. When the third one came, I was basi-
cally told in this baseball game that metallurgy had no runs and
that the bomb techs had three runs, and how was there any credi-
bility to be attached to my urgings of prudence and caution in the
material science issues? I, at that point, tried to explain that NTSB
and my joint materials data stream or data flow was a long, a very
long, complex, drawn-out process, that we could not just walk up
to an aircraft and take a swab and then get an instant hit.
But in answer to your question, Senator, that was a baseball
game analogy that was demonstrated to me.
Senator GRASSLEY. At some point, did the bomb techs agree with
yours and the NTSBs assessment that the cause of the crash was
not a bomb?
Mr. TOBIN. Yes, Senator. I would estimate that probably 4 to 6
weeks, after about 4 to 6 weeks, we were all unanimously, or near
unanimously, on the same page, and all being the bomb techs, the
National Transportation Safety Board, and the metallurgy or the
material science interest in the FBI laboratory. We were all unani-
mouslyor we were united in our observations and conclusions
that there was no bomb or missile damage evident on those aircraft
parts.
Senator GRASSLEY. The term 4 to 6 weeks brings you to what
date on the calendar, approximatelyjust approximately?
Mr. TOBIN. My guess would be mid-September, early to mid-Sep-
tember.
Senator GRASSLEY. Were you aware of the visit of a psychic at
the investigation site?
Mr. TOBIN. Yes, I was.
Senator GRASSLEY. What was your reaction to this visit?
Mr. TOBIN. I was very disturbed.
Senator GRASSLEY. Tell me how disturbed you were.
Mr. TOBIN. That was at a very sensitive time in the investiga-
tion. Up to that point, there had been no release of scientific infor-
mation to the American public. I feltI am sorry.
Senator GRASSLEY. Go ahead.
Mr. TOBIN. I felt that that was a very wrong signal to be sending
out to the American public, that two of the foremost agencies
charged with being guardians of the public safety had to resort to
a psychic to resolve this aircraftthese aircraft issues, that their
scientists were not sufficiently competent to deal with it. I also took
it as a collective slap in our scientific and investigative faces in
view of the mountain of experience that the NTSB and I had had
working these things, that they felt the need to resort to a psychic
at that particular time.
Senator GRASSLEY. Go ahead.
27
Mr. TOBIN. I did understand and learn eventually that it was not
an authorized visit by the psychic, but then that brings the next
question, raises the next question, of if we were so
Senator GRASSLEY. Why?
Mr. TOBIN. Yes, Senator. If we were so controlling of another
agencys personnel, why could we not control our own personnel?
Senator GRASSLEY. Do you think someone was thinking in terms
of getting brownie points by bringing in a psychic?
Mr. TOBIN. I cannot address the motives for bringing a psychic
in. I do not have any firsthand information.
Senator GRASSLEY. Did you learn what the psychics findings
were?
Mr. TOBIN. I believe I did.
Senator GRASSLEY. Do you want to say what those findings were?
Mr. TOBIN. I do not recall. They went in one ear and out the
other, but that may have been the catalyst, and I did not even put
this together until recently, that may have been the catalyst for the
pristine overhead bin incident that
Senator GRASSLEY. Let us talk about that.
Mr. TOBIN. I was ordered to, in a rather frenzied manner, to go
conduct an exhaustive search and contact with my NTSB liaison,
in liaison capacity, to find a certain overhead bin that was charac-
terized as in pristine condition, but it was in a very emotional, very
frenzied manner, so I inquired as to why I was looking for this par-
ticular pristine overhead bin on the port side of the aircraft, that
was from the left-hand side of the aircraft. I was told that that was
proof that NTSB was, squirreling away evidence and stashing
evidence, which, again, flies in the face of my interpretation of
whose aircraft this was.
So I inquired as to why the pristine overhead bin was of such
significance. I was told that that was demonstrative proof that they
were squirreling away evidence, that the recovery had been cap-
tured on a videotape from the USS Grapple or the USS Grasp, one
of the recovery ships, and on the videotape, it showed this overhead
bin being raised or set on the deck.
And I said, well, I am still missing some critical information.
Why is this important? Why is this critical? To which I was advised
that it had a suitcase, a badly charred and damaged suitcase inside
the overhead bin. My response at that point was, well, I am still
missing some critical information. Why are we looking for this,
pristine overhead bin? Are you suggesting that there was a bomb
in the suitcase that went off? Yes. Well, that went off, instanta-
neously brought down a 747 with no recording on the FDR or CVR,
the flight data recorder or the cockpit voice recorder, and did not
put a scratch in the overhead bin, and I was told, yes. We want
that overhead bin. And I was told to go find that overhead bin.
Senator GRASSLEY. Did you ever hear the expression that 260-
some witnesses cannot be wrong, referring to various eyewitness
accounts which supported the bomb and missile theory?
Mr. TOBIN. Yes, I did.
Senator GRASSLEY. Under what circumstances did you hear that
position and how did you respond to those comments?
Mr. TOBIN. That was the continual argument advanced when I
continued to try to use the cardboard box analogy, that, basically,
28
NTSB, in my position, in a material scientist position, is that the

box fragmentsif you have a bomb in a box, the box fragments will
tell the story. And my position was, I do not care how many wit-
nesses say what. The boxthe container has to tell the story, and
I was continually told that 260-some witnesses cannot be wrong.
Well, I repeatedly tried to convey the physics involved in the ma-
terials interactions, No. 1, the velocity of sound and air and why,
from my experience from having worked the streets as an agent,
why eyewitness testimony can be flawed, and I conveyed that the
speed of lightI am sorry, the speed of sound and air and the
problems with audible and visual stimuli from witnesses that
260-some witnesses whose focus would have been brought to the
same XYZ coordinates in space, that there were reasons why that
those 260-some witnesses could not havehighly unlikely that they
would have all seen the initial conflagration or explosion of that
aircraft, a position which was ignored for a very long time, but
which eventually was confirmed by CIA analysis.
Senator GRASSLEY. What was the reaction of the FBI officials to
your scientific position?
Mr. TOBIN. Well, I wouldthe officials on site afterwhen I first
got there, I basically walked on water, but after about a week to
10 days, when it became clear that I was not supportive of the
bomb or the missile proponents, I began to methodically get ex-
cluded from any input in the decision making process with regard
to bomb or missile or even mechanical failure causes.
Senator GRASSLEY. Was your position ever validated, and if so,
by whom and how?
Mr. TOBIN. My position ofoh, with regard to the reasons why
260 witnesses could be wrong?
Mr. TOBIN. Yes. In fact, as I indicated, the CIA did a very excel-
lent study and videotape showing the effects of audible and visual
stimulation and external stimuli and that they, in fact, confirmed
that those witnesses, it was highly unlikely that they would have
seen the original event. And again, there were logical reasons why.
When ones attention is drawn over to thatto an omni-directional
explosion, individuals will probably see fragments or something
proceeding in an upward direction, trailing smoke and flames, par-
ticularly if it is from the fuel tank. So there were reasons why
some of the characteristics that were described probably were seen.
Senator GRASSLEY. Was there any scientific support justifying
the missile theory cause of the crash?
Mr. TOBIN. No.
Senator GRASSLEY. What were some of the characteristics which
negated the missile theory?
Mr. TOBIN. Well, probably the most prominentactually, there
were two main areas negating the missile theory. One, of course,
again, is the absence of impulsive loading, or very high-speed frac-
ture and failure mechanisms.
But second was there were serious issues with every theory, or
almost every theory, as to access of an external missile to the fuel,
to the fuel tank. Even with, as I indicated earlier, if one would
focus on an area where we did not recover all of the fuel tank,
there were components nearby that would have blocked or at least
29
recorded passage of any externally penetrating object. And if that

were not the case, there were many layers, including the external
underbelly of the aircraft, and that was recovered almosta huge
portion of that was recovered.
So that, basically, the only plausible theory for some of the mis-
siles to have occurred would have been if there were missiles such
that could maybe get through a 1- or 2-inch opening, make an im-
mediate left, go 90 degrees through a seam, and then maybe take
another 90-degree right, and then maybe reverse itself and come
back over. But those were some of the considerations.
Senator GRASSLEY. Like the single bullet theory. Despite the sci-
entific explanations, did any FBI officials with responsibility over
the crash scene continue to advance the missile theories?
Mr. TOBIN. Yes.
Senator GRASSLEY. Did they continue to pursue these missile
theories in a scientifically responsible manner, and please explain
your answer, and particularly, I would like to have you explain the
pickle fork missile theory.
Mr. TOBIN. The answer to the first portion of that is no, they
were not scientifically responsible. The pickle fork area or theory
was a continued thorn in our sides. I tried to negate it and brunt
it, but it reared its head in about the third or fourth day.
That was an area on the starboard side of the aircraft, the right
side of the aircraft, that had the appearance of a significant
amount of material missing. Now, I would also add that what is
important in the evaluations of the damage was the missile size
that was the most prevalent and available to have penetrated the
aircraft or was of the most reasonable threat was 3.5 to 4 inches
in diameter. That is a critical dimension.
This pickle fork area, I overheard the supervisor running the op-
eration in briefings, again, of dignitaries and other officials, indi-
cating that there was material missing about like this. Well, the
hands, I first of all noted, were in a curved manner, which was not
consistent with the damage, but second, it was also roughly 3.5 to
4 inches or 6 inches in diameter. So I saw that several times and
I thought I probably should step in and try to clarify this, to nip
this in the bud, because that was, I saw, fuelingno pun in-
tendedthe perception and drawing out the theory that the missile
caused the damage.
So I went to the supervisor and I said, let me, if you have got
a few minutes, let me describe to you the process by which a metal-
lurgist or material scientist, or in this case, I conclude that there
is notthere was only about an inch to an inch-and-a-half of mate-
rial missing from this site. So I proceeded to take him through the
logic processes. I actually used cardboard and cut-outs and got him
to agree that the fracture here was of this shape and we cut the
cardboard to the fracture shape.
We went to another portion of the hangar and I got an agree-
ment that these fractures, in fact, matched. This is where it is
from, in the front portion of the fuel tank and the starboard side,
and proceeded to then show, OK, now, if we unfold this folded ma-
terial, there is an additional 3 inches. I went through the whole
process and got him to agree that there was only 1 to 112 inches
of material missing.
30
The very next day, I heard the same story to the next group of
dignitaries he was briefing, so I thought, well, I will try this again.
So I went back that day or the next day and went through the
same process again, and 2 days later, the same 3.5 to 4 inches of
material was missing from this pickle fork area. At that point, both
the bomb techs and I threw up our hands and
Senator GRASSLEY. Can you give me the name of the individual
involved?
Mr. TOBIN. That would be SSA Ken Maxwell.
Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you. Did they continue toI think you
have answered that. Let me ask you if you have any recommenda-
tions as to how transportation disasters should be investigated by
the forensic communities in the future.
Mr. TOBIN. I would have several recommendations in that re-
gard. First, let me clarify, if you do not mind, just one sentence be-
fore I answer that. I would like to make clear that this was not a
usual course of events for FBINTSB interaction. The 25 years that
I had been working this and my colleagues had been working this
with the NTSB was a beautiful system. It worked very, very well.
This particular investigation was the aberration, in my experience.
So I would be reticent to suggest some coarse tuning but rather
some fine tuning. So the observations that I would offer, I would
suggest be taken in a fine-tuning mode.
My first observation is that the outcome or practice of science for
public safety issues of such magnitude should not be dependent on
a single individuals agenda, biases, idiosyncracies, or the strength
of their personality, which it clearly was in this case.
My second observation or suggestion is that scientists are not on
an equal footing inside the law enforcement community with the
strategicin the strategic decision making process. There are a
number of examples of that, but, basically, scientists are, I will not
say viewed as second-class citizens, but, basically, what happens
inside the forensic community is if we corroborate or validate the
prevailing theory, we walk on water. If the science does not vali-
date the prevailing theory, then the science is just basically ig-
nored.
There are some other issues. I think the third would be that if
there is some fine tuning to beadditional fine tuning, I would
suggest that we revert back to the way that FBI and NTSB have
worked these cases in the past, that the FBIs interest can be pre-
served by the presence of a materials scientist, who is experienced
in materials deformation and damage, working alongside the
NTSB, whether it is rail, maritime, or aircraft disasters, represent
the FBIs interest in determining whether there is or could be po-
tential criminal activity involved in the cause, and then allow that
contingent to ratchet up whatever additional support or FBI in-
volvement that there should be.
So that would be mybasically, that theI think part of the
problem that occurred here was that with the process and the sys-
tem being so singularly dependent upon a single individual, a
strong personality individual, that what I was seeing there in the
first 4 to 6 weeks is what psychologists have found or concluded to
be basically what was called group think, what they called group
think, and I saw that very evident there, whereand that was, if
31
I may explain the term, was after the Bay of Pigs failure, psycholo-
gists determined one, if not the, major cause of that disaster was
that the decision making process was comprised of individuals of
very similar backgrounds, similar training, similar careers. In that
strategic decision making process, there was no dissenting opinion
within that process.
I saw that there was such a unanimity of opinion that it was a
veryI felt like I was trying to stop a train singlehandedly going
90 miles an hour there, but that is part of why I am suggesting
that if there is a way of fine tuning, or if fine tuning is desired,
that it should be somehow or otherand I think the resolution I
am offering is by allowing the materials scientists and a very small
contingent to liaison and represent the FBIs interest. I believe that
could go a long way in reducing the vulnerability of group think,
because NTSB clearly, in my personal experience, are the world re-
nowned experts in disaster investigation.
Senator GRASSLEY. What you just described here are some of the
same problems that we found in Waco. The experts advice is not
given a voice. The negotiators and the HRT was in hard control at
that particular time, in that event.
Let me ask you something along the same line, and that is about
advice and about how this went and what needs to be done for the
future. We have had FBI officials claim that the TWA Flight 800
investigation was so good that it is a model for the future. Is it a
model for the future?
Mr. TOBIN. I can only address the materials science and the sci-
entific issues, but I would say, yes, it is a model, but it is a model
how not to integrate proper science and how not to integrate the
scientific conclusions into the strategic decision making process.
But, clearly, that is on the opposite end of the spectrum from the
term that I believe the model was intended.
Senator GRASSLEY. Are the problems you encountered during the
TWA Flight 800 investigation characteristic of other disaster inves-
tigations that you have conducted for the FBI?
Mr. TOBIN. No, Senator. I will underscore that this was a sin-
gular aberration that was not characteristic of my prior working
arrangement with NTSB or on behalf of the FBI. It was a beautiful
synergy and relationship in every other situation that I rep-
resented the FBIs material interests in.
Senator GRASSLEY. This is my last question, for your observa-
tions or recommendations you might have of what went wrong with
the system with regard to the flow of scientific information.
Mr. TOBIN. A major flaw that I do see in the system is that it
is too easily ignored by the strategic decision makers. I think if you
look at the Unabomber situation, the Richard Jewel Centennial
Park bombing, the TWA 800, the common thread is that the sci-
entific flow of information is ignored when it does not support the
prevailing theory. And again, that is the basis by whichpart of
the basis by which I suggest that scientists are not on an equal
footing in the decision making process within the law enforcement,
or at least within the FBI.
Senator GRASSLEY. You are a breath of fresh air, Mr. Tobin. You
have been very helpful to us for not only appearing today, but for
our getting the necessary background that needs to be done to
32
make this a valuable contribution to the process of constitutional

oversight by the Congress. I do not know how to thank you other
than just to say thank you. Obviously, you set an example for a
person who was trained to seek the truth, to work for an organiza-
tion that is always supposed to seek the truth and let the truth de-
termine guilt or innocence, and I think you have lived up to that
very well, and particularly you shine in this otherwise black hole
of investigation that we had in regard to the TWA case. I thank
you very much and I will dismiss you at this point.
Mr. TOBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DEMONACO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. KOHN. Thank you.
Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you all.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tobin follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM TOBIN, SUBMITTED BY STEPHEN M. KOHN,
COUNSEL FOR WILLIAM TOBIN
Mr. William A. Tobin, a former Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) for the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was requested by the Chairman of the Subcommit-
tee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts to testify and provide pre-filed testi-
mony for hearings on the Administrative Oversight of the Investigation of TWA
Flight 800. As a former FBI Supervisory Special Agent Mr. Tobin is required by
his FBI employment contract to submit any written material, including written tes-
timony before the U.S. Congress, to the FBI for prior review of its content. This rule
remains in effect even though Mr. Tobin retired from the agency on March 31, 1998.
Because of the FBIs pre-publication rules, Mr. Tobin, at this time, is not able to
submit written testimony to the Subcommittee.1 This statement was prepared by
Counsel for Mr. Tobin and is submitted on Mr. Tobins behalf. Mr. Tobin will testify
before the Subcommittee and will answer questions posed by members of the Sub-
committee.
Mr. Tobin shall be joined by his two attorneys, Mr. Charles A. DeMonaco of
Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote and Mr. Stephen M. Kohn of Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto,
P.C. Mr. DeMonaco is a former Assistant Head of Environmental Crimes at the
United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and is very knowledgeable concerning
the role of professional scientific conduct in disaster investigations. Mr. Kohn has
represented a number of employees employed at the FBI who have raised science
and management related concerns within the FBI crime lab, including Dr. Frederic
Whitehurst. Mr. Kohn also represents three former FBI employees in a federal law
suit concerning proposed DOJ regulations related to FBI employee protection.
WILLIAM A. TOBIN
On June 27, 1971, Mr. William A. Tobin was appointed a Special Agent for the
FBI. Before joining the Bureau, Mr. Tobin served three years in the Marine Corps
two in active combat duty in the Republic of South Vietnam. While in the Marines
he received the Bronze Star with Combat V, two crosses of Gallantry and twenty
additional military combat decorations. After joining the FBI he worked organized
crime and police corruption in Chicago, and general crimes in Detroit. In September,
1974 Mr. Tobin was assigned as a forensic metallurgist in the FBI crime laboratory
in Washington, DC. In 1976 he was promoted to a Supervisory Special Agent and
in 1986 became the civilian equivalent of the FBIs Chief Forensic Metallurgist. In
this position, Mr. Tobin was the leading expert, nationwide, in the law enforcement
community on forensic metallurgy (i.e. the examination and analysis of materials
deformation and damage).
In this position, Mr. Tobin was qualified as an expert witness on behalf of the
FBI or the U.S. Government in over 200 local, state and federal courts. He served
as the FBIs leading forensic metallurgist on thousands of cases, such as the
UNABOM, Judge Robert S. Vance mail bomb murder case and numerous accident/
1 The FBIs pre-clearance regulations appear to conflict with the Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912,
which guaranteed the right of federal employees to communicate with members of Congress.
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 150 (1974). The FBIs refusal to recognize the right of agents
to communicate with members of Congress is very troubling and is not in accordance with either
the laws of Congress and the United States Constitution.
33
disaster cases (i.e. the Escambron. Beach Puerto Rico Oil Spill, the Willow Island
West Virginia Scaffold Collapse, the Wilberg Coal Mine Disaster in Utah, the Pan-
ama City Florida Train Derailment, the USS Iowa explosion and the Mobile, Ala-
bama Train Derailment). In his 24 years in the crime lab Mr. Tobin provided foren-
sic analyses in approximately 75100 aircraft incidents (i.e, ranging from mechani-
cal failures to suspected sabotage to actual crash damage examinations).
In regard to the July 17, 1996 crash of TWA Flight 800, Mr. Tobin arrived in New
York at the crash reconstruction site on August 4, 1996. He devoted his efforts as
the FBIs chief metallurgist at the crash reconstruction site for 89 straight days, and
as necessary thereafter. The science of metallurgy is the only scientifically appro-
priate discipline to evaluate metal damage and causes of the metal damage of the
recovered parts of Flight 800. Mr. Tobin was the most scientifically qualified and
experienced metallurgist involved in the evaluation of the crash damaged materials
in the law enforcement community.
Mr. Tobin repeatedly raised concerns to FBI personnel and officials who were in
control of the criminal investigation of the crash of TWA Flight 800. Mr. Tobin
will answer questions regarding the concerns he raised, the bases for these con-
cerns, the administrative response to these concerns and the impact of these con-
cerns on future disaster/public safety investigations.
For three decades Mr. Tobin loyally and effectively served the American public,
first, in combat, second as an agent for the FBI and then as a scientist for the FBI.
He continuously obtained exceptional or outstanding performance ratings and
was the recipient of numerous awards and recognitions, including five separate com-
mendations and cash awards issued by two directors for the FBI and a personal
commendation from the U.S. Attorney General. At the TWA crash investigation site
in Calverton, New York, Mr. Tobin stressed the importance of strict adherence to
the professional scientific process, despite the pressures from federal law enforce-
ment officials in charge of the investigation. The actions of Mr. Tobin, and other in-
vestigators at the crash scene, prevented a false identification of the cause of the
crash. Had Mr. Tobin and others succumbed to the pressure to validate the bomb
or missile theories, the public safety of the American people would have been be-
trayed.
FREEDOM TO RAISE CONCERNS
The ability of FBI employees, such as Mr. Tobin, to freely raise concerns within
the FBI is of particular concern to counsel for Mr. Tobin. At the time Mr. Tobin
raised concerns to the FBI officials responsible for overseeing the TWA Flight 800
crash investigation, the FBI/DOJ internal operating rules prohibited FBI super-
visors from taking adverse action against an FBI employee who raised such con-
cerns. However, the Department of Justice has proposed new whistleblower regu-
lations for the FBI. These regulations do not protect FBI employees from retaliation
for concerns raised to their supervisors or other officials within the Bureau.2
In addition, the regulations do not provide the right to a hearing on retaliation-
related issues, do not provide for judicial review and do not mandate that an inde-
pendent judge or agency review retaliation cases. In short, under the new regula-
tions, an FBI employee, such as Mr. Tobin, could be fired merely for informing his
supervisor that bad science is involved in a case. In order to insure that FBI em-
ployees in the future will be free to raise concerns, such as the concerns Mr. Tobin
will testify to during this hearing, the proposed DOJ regulations must be substan-
tially changed.
CONCLUSION
On behalf of Mr. Tobin and his co-counsel, I thank the Chairman and members
of the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts for the oppor-
tunity to share our views and present testimony before this Subcommittee. The im-
portance of effective oversight cannot be underestimated in insuring the effective op-
eration of government in its law enforcement and public safety capacities.
2 These regulations are seriously deficient and are currently being challenged by three former
FBI employees in U.S. District Court. The regulations only protect employees who contact the
DOJ Office of inspector General, DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility or the FBIs Office
of Professional Responsibility. The proposed regulations not only fail to protect FBI employees
who raise concerns directly to supervision, they fail to protect FBI employees who report con-
cerns to the U.S. Congress, the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI or even the President
of the United States.
34
Senator GRASSLEY. At this point, I would like to ascertain if a

Mr. Andrew Vita, our next witness, is in the audience. He is here?
Then we are going to proceed with Mr. Vita. Would you come for-
ward, please.
As I said, Mr. Vita is our third panel. Andrew Vita is his entire
name. He is Assistant Director of the ATF for Field Operations.
Mr. Vitas testimony is of great value to the subcommittee. He has
many years of experience as a Federal law enforcement officer and
as a senior manager within the ATF. He also has a reputation for
high integrity, and I thank you for that. He was directly involved
in the issues surrounding the ATF CFI report.
Mr. Vita also rushed back to Washington, and this is why I owe
him a particular thank you, because he did it at much inconven-
ience to him and his family. He had previously had a weekend
planned over Mothers Day, and so, obviously, it is an inconven-
ience not only to him, but his family. So we are very appreciative
of your being here, Mr. Vita.
I have sworn other witnesses, so I would like to have you rise
and raise your right hand and say, do you promise to tell the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. VITA. I do.
Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you. As I have asked everybody else,
an opportunity to say whatever they want to, but at the very least,
I would like to have you share your background, your expertise,
and what your role was in the TWA investigation.
TESTIMONY OF ANDREW VITA, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, FIELD
OPERATIONS, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIRE-
ARMS
Mr. VITA. Senator, I have been with ATF for 2912 years. I began
my criminal investigative career in Chicago as a Special Agent and
have moved up through the organization in various positions of in-
creasing responsibility.
During that tenure, I have also been the supervisor of one of our
national response teams. I had that responsibility for 312 years
while I was the ASAC in Philadelphia, during which time I had an
opportunity to conduct a number of investigations of major explo-
sive and fire scenes that have occurred around the country.
In addition to that, since coming into headquarters, I have over-
seen the development of the majority of our criminal enforcement
programs, both in the firearms and explosives areas, as well as our
other areas of responsibility, and currently, I oversee all of our field
operations.
Senator GRASSLEY. Before I ask questions, do you have anything
you would like to open with?
Mr. VITA. No, sir. I do not have an opening statement.
Senator GRASSLEY. We have just delivered the copy of the ATF
report. Is this the report that was prepared by the ATF certified
fire investigators in 1997?
Mr. VITA. Yes, Senator, it appears to be.
Senator GRASSLEY. Could you explain the bottom line of the re-
port?
Mr. VITA. I think, Senator, it probably can be best explained
through one section of the synopsis, probably in better words than
35
I could summarize, and then another section on the last page of the
report.
This document was prepared by our certified fire investigators,
a team of investigators, along with our fire protection engineer,
who reviewed the facts and circumstances and the evidence that
was available on the date on which they prepared this report. It
was to document our investigative findings and our kind of captur-
ing in time what our opinion was as to what may have caused the
downing of this aircraft.
The report itself was developed over a period of time in collabora-
tion with representatives from the NTSB and other investigators
who worked on the TWA 800 flight investigation. The report itself
is a documentation of their opinion, based on theory and scientific
evidence. It is critically important any time we document our find-
ings or our opinion that we not only provide what we believe to be
an accurate representation of the element that caused this event to
occur, but in our process, we also try and make sure that we inves-
tigate as many of the other potential theories as possible so that
we cannot find that there is a conflict between theories.
As important as it is for us to prove what we believe did happen,
it is equally as important to make sure that we can show that
other theories are not equally as convincing or compelling. So we
will try not only to prove our position, but will also look to try and
disprove other potential positions.
This report was done by three very experienced investigators
who had a great deal of past experience and had an opportunity
to work at the scene in Long Island for a number of weeks and it
really documents their findings. What they say is that their inves-
tigation shows that the center fuel tank failed as a result of a fuel
air explosion. The event occurred at an altitude of approximately
13,800 feet. The air speed of TWA 800 at the time was approxi-
mately 400 miles per hour. This explosion caused structural fail-
ures of parts of the aircraft which compromised its airworthiness.
At the time, Senator, you must realize that there was still inves-
tigation going on. There was a number of investigative pursuits
that had to be explored. But what they were trying to do was docu-
ment what they saw after evaluating the physical evidence recov-
ered from that scene and thoroughly examining the airplane itself,
what remained from the airplane, to capture at that moment what
they believe to have been the cause of that crash.
It also leaves enough room so that there were a few parts that
were missing, as in any puzzle. In this particular case, there were
a couple of electronic components that were not recovered. There
were some pumps and some probes and some other electronic ele-
ments of the system that controlled the fuel exchange within that
aircraft that had not been recovered for a whole host of reasons.
This report basically documented what we believe most probably
did happen, but that we also had the opportunity that if those
other components were recovered at a later date, or if additional
evidence came to light that was not available at the time the report
was written, that we would be able to explore the evidentiary value
of those new findings to further revise and refine the final opinion
of the reporters.
36
Senator GRASSLEY. How convinced was ATF that the cause was
a mechanical failure as opposed to sabotage?
Mr. VITA. At the time that the investigators wrote this report,
they saw evidence of a mechanical failure. You bring up the point
sabotage. I would think that if there was an effort to sabotage this
aircraft, there is always the possibility that the saboteur would try
and make whatever event caused the downing of this airplane to
appear to be a mechanical or accidental nature. That would be a
very realistic possibility.
Because we say there was a mechanical failure, to then further
explore the possibility that this mechanical failure may have been
influenced by human intervention was another issue that had to be
explored, as well, and I know as the investigation continued, we
are always looking for evidence of such behavior. I am not aware
that any was found in this particular case, but it is something that
needs to be explored to its full extent.
Senator GRASSLEY. How qualified were the experts who worked
on this report?
Mr. VITA. The three CFIs that worked on this report, as well as
other people that contributed to it, are probably as skilled criminal
investigators in the fire science and explosive investigation as there
is in Federal Government. I think these people are the renowned
experts, at least within our organization.
As we progressed through this investigation, I had an oppor-
tunity to travel to New York in late September 1996 and I had a
chance to watch the processing of the evidence that was there. I
had a chance to go through the hangars that were being used for
the reconstruction of various systems that comprised that aircraft.
While I was there, I had a number of the investigators that were
working from ATF, from the NTSB, from the FBI, and the other
contributing agencies give me a series of briefings on the progress
of that investigation. As I watched and listened and made my own
personal observations, as well as processed the information that
they were providing, it was very important for me personally to un-
derstand the theories that were being provided so that I could un-
derstand and that I would feel comfortable with conveying a final
report on behalf of ATF as to the origin and cause of this matter.
When I supervised the National Response Team, I tried in every
investigation to remain neutral as our investigators, our scientists,
and all of our other technicians reviewed the facts and cir-
cumstances of their investigation, and only at the end of that inves-
tigation did I allow each of them to kind of brief me and try and
explain to me and convince me that this is, in fact, what actually
did happen in the series of events.
I did the same thing with this report. As the investigators pro-
ceeded with it, I had periodic briefings, and then when they kind
of concluded with the investigation, at least as far as processing
the evidence that was available, I had them come into Washington
and provide a briefing for me and explain to me their theories, and
I listened and I asked a lot of questions about some contrary opin-
ions and some other views that may have conflicted with their the-
ory.
Throughout their examination and discussion, they were able to
provide a very compelling argument for the theory that they pro-
37
vided, and I think even on one of the reports that I saw from them,
I had written a note that it appears that the conditions are very
ripe for the theory that you have described, but it is critically im-
portant that you are able to say exactly what caused the spark that
may have been the initiator that caused this event to occur.
At the time we discussed this, the key elements of that decision
were not available, and those were some of the pumps and some
of the probes that were a part of that system. Because they were
not available, we could not actually analyze those elements, which
could be very important to the final decision, but the conditions
certainly existed at that time in that center fuel tank of that air-
craft that it appeared that a mechanical cause was probably the
cause of the downing of that airplane.
Senator GRASSLEY. When the report was concluded, you at-
tempted to deliver one copy to the NTSB and one copy to the FBI.
I am going to send something up for you to look at, but my general
question is, would you tell us what happened subsequent to that?
What we are delivering to you, are these your handwritten contem-
poraneous notes that were made, and could you walk us through
the sequence of events as reflected in this chart here?
Mr. VITA. Yes, Senator, this does appear to be my contempora-
neous notes. As we concluded our portion of that investigation, we
discussed how the information should best be conveyed to the ap-
propriate authorities who were responsible for that investigation.
Those deliberations include not only representatives from ATF, but
also representatives from the Department, so that we could prop-
erly and most professionally deliver our findings and our opinions
at that time to the appropriate authorities.
We briefed the Under Secretarys office, the Under Secretary of
Treasurys office, in February 1997. At that time, I had the same
team that briefed me in December come back with the answers to
the questions that I had presented to them, as well as any more
additional or conclusive findings that they may have developed,
and provide a briefing to the Under Secretarys office.
At the time, the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement was Mr.
James Johnson, who was present during that briefing. I believe
Under Secretary Kelly was unavailable on the date that we
brought our people in. But we went over and discussed the issues
and talked about our findings and the status of our review and re-
port and how it should best be conveyed to the appropriate authori-
ties.
During the same time, I had an opportunity to talk both by
phone and in person with Bill Esposito. Bill was, at the timeI am
not sure if he was the Assistant Director for their investigators or
he had been promoted to the Deputy Director, but at some point
during our very cordial relations, that promotion occurred, and I
am not sure where he was at the time we had our discussions.
But during those discussions, I had mentioned to him what our
people were doing on scene and what this report that we were
going to put together was going to be. I explained to Bill that it
was, again, as I mentioned, kind of a snapshot in time and docu-
mentation of what we had viewed and kind of what our opinions
of as to the cause and origin of that explosion.
38
I had asked BillI had advised Bill that we would be very happy
to provide a similar briefing for the Director of the FBI, as well as
Bill and other representatives of NTSB and the FBI at any time
on our findings and our recommendations. We were working to con-
vey and kind of put that session together, and I kind of left it in
Bills hands to set that up. The last discussion that he and I had
had on that topic was that he was going to look into the availabil-
ity of the people that would like to participate.
Once our investigation, at least that point of the investigation,
had concluded, we finally decided that it was important to convey
that report as quickly as possible to the appropriate authorities,
and at the time, the FBI out of the New York office was in charge
of the investigation, as we understood. So we had asked that our
Special Agent in Charge in New York, who was Jack Balles at the
time, convey that report to the Assistant Director for the FBI, who
was Jim Kallstrom. I believe that occurred on aboutright around
March 13, 1997.
In Jacks initial attempt to deliver the report, he met some re-
sistance from the FBI as to accepting the report, and eventually,
I had to intervene and directed Jack to make sure that that report
was delivered to the FBI.
Prior to coming to ATF, I was a designer and my background and
training were such that as I reviewed the findings of our investiga-
tors that was documented in the report, that I had an understand-
ing of the possibility that perhaps there could be a design flaw, if
the opinions that were reflected in this report were accurate, that
there could be a design concern within the construction of that air-
craft that could be common to other airplanes made by that same
company at or around the same time.
I know in most products, as they go through an evolutionary de-
sign, they are improved periodically as the product is remanufac-
tured, and I would be sure that, as time went on, that design that
may have been present in the airplane that was made when this
plane was may not have been consistent for a great amount of time
after that airplane was kind of readdressed or maybe redesigned.
So I wanted to make sure that if this design characteristic that
was found in this airplane, if that was present in other planes of
that same vintage, that the appropriate authorities would have an
opportunity to examine those aircraft to ensure that the same oc-
currence that happened on July 17 did not reoccur on another air-
craft of similar design.
So it was very important to me, both from a criminal investiga-
tive perspective and from my past design background, that the ap-
propriate information was delivered to the appropriate authorities
so they could make those judgments, and if there was corrective ac-
tion required, take that corrective action.
Senator GRASSLEY. Following up on what you just said, and not
disputing anything that you said, I want to, in regard to how these
notes would have been received, ask in regard to Mr. Kallstrom, is
it true that he would not take them at first, but later was kind of
forced to take them?
Mr. VITA. Well, I had gotten most of my feedback from one of my
deputies who was in discussions and consultation with the SAC in
New York and he conveyed to me that the FBI was reluctant to ac-
39
cept the report that we had written. It was my opinion that it was
so important, that that was unacceptable to me, and that is when
I directed our Special Agent in Charge to ensure that the FBI did
get a copy of that report on the date that we were trying to convey
that to them.
Senator GRASSLEY. Then is it your understanding that Mr.
Kallstrom called Assistant Secretary Kelly in order for the report
not to be released?
Mr. VITA. Well, I can only interpret that from occurrences that
came about after that first contact was made. I had received infor-
mation from Director John Magaw, the Director of ATF, from con-
versations that I understood him to have had with Under Secretary
Kelly about the delivery of the report. In my past conversations
with Jack Balles, it appears that after he delivered the report to
Mr. Kallstrom, that Mr. Kallstrom may have contacted Under Sec-
retary Kelly directly about that report, and I do not know exactly
what was discussed in that conversation.
Senator GRASSLEY. Do you have reason to believe that Mr.
Magaw conveyed public safety concerns to Mr. Kelly but that Mr.
Kelly disagreed?
Mr. VITA. Well, I know that the Director, Director Magaw, and
I discussed this matter throughout this chain of events and we
both were very concerned about the safety of the flying public and
we wanted to make sure that the information was conveyed to the
appropriate authorities.
Senator again, I make a distinction between the report and the
information. It was most important for me that the information got
to the appropriate authorities. If it was conveyed formally through
that report, that would have been fine. But if it was not, as long
as the information got to the appropriate authorities, that was the
critical point for me.
Senator GRASSLEY. So in the final analysis, the NTSB never did
get the report officially, but it did get a bootlegged copy of it, and
the information was shared with the National Transportation Safe-
ty Board?
Mr. VITA. Immediately upon finding that there was some dif-
ficulty in getting that report to the FBI, I made contact with the
investigators that wrote the report, the three CFIs. I talked to one
of the three CFIs and asked him how involved the NTSB was in
developing the theory that they had documented in their report.
They convinced me that the NTSB had collaborated in a lot of the
investigative work that had been done and were very familiar with
the information that was documented in their report. As long as I
was comfortable with the fact that the NTSB officials were familiar
with the information, I was comfortable with the fact that that had
been timely referred to that authority.
Senator GRASSLEY. Could I ask you to refer to your first notation,
quote, as I read your handwriting, Kallstrom upset with report,
locks him into eliminating missile. Would you explain that, your
handwritten note?
Mr. VITA. Yes, sir. The notations to the left of the quote that you
just referred to is a time, a phone number, and another name. The
name there is Donnie, which would have been Donnie Carter, who
is one of my Deputy Assistant Directors, who would have been in
40
direct contact with Jack Balles. That was a note that I had kind
of scribbled, scratched to myself after I had talked with Donnie,
who had advised me that, from the conversation that he had with
Mr. Balles, that this was the impression that was given to him,
that a reflection of Mr. Kallstroms response to the report.
Senator GRASSLEY. Do you think insinuated in that is that if that
were true, if you eliminated the missile, then the FBI would not
have a case?
Mr. VITA. I do not know if I would say that, Senator, but I just
documented what the response was, that Mr. Kallstrom had some
concerns about the report.
Senator GRASSLEY. OK. Now, could I ask you to look at your sec-
ond memo and explain that. You also have that in front of you.
Mr. VITA. Yes, sir. That is a contemporaneous note that I wrote
to myself as we went through this process. If I can, because of the
glare, I will refer to a copy that I have here before me.
Senator GRASSLEY. Could you just read No. 2 there, in your
handwriting?
Mr. VITA. Yes, sir.
Senator GRASSLEY. It goes also over to page three.
Mr. VITA. No. 2 says that, We have what we believe, whether
right or wrong, evidence of possible design flaws in Boeing 727 air-
planesnow, 727 is a mistake, sir. It should be 747, but as I was
writing here, I wrote the wrong number down.
Senator GRASSLEY. OK.
Mr. VITA [continuing]. Which, again, we believe to be respon-
sible to be responsible for the downing of TWA Flight 800. This
same configuration exists in possibly 100 similar planes in the
United States, which could result, it looks likeI am having trou-
ble reading my own handwriting, Senator.
Senator GRASSLEY. I think it is result.
Mr. VITA [continuing]. Result in another similar air disaster.
This is a xerox copy and it is a little bit tough to read.
Mr. VITA. Then going on to the next page, and we are being or-
dered not to release that information to the appropriate authorities
for no compelling good reason to risk hundreds of human lives.
That is what it says, sir.
Senator GRASSLEY. Did your agency agree with this assessment?
Mr. VITA. When you say my agency, I can only express that I be-
lieve that this was kind of my documentation of my thoughts at the
moment, after discussions with Director Magaw. I believe he
shared a lot of the same feelings.
My real concern was that the information, again, Senator, was
given to the appropriate authorities, and at the time, Under Sec-
retary Kelly was a member of the Presidential Commission on
Aviation Safety and Security, and I was of the understanding that
if the Under Secretary saw that there was some concern for the
safety of the flying public, his role in that commission would cer-
tainly have been an excellent opportunity for him to share that
with the appropriate authorities. So I was confident that that
would be done, and in my discussions with our agents about the
drafting of their report, I was also confident that the NTSB was
aware of the information that we had developed.
41
Senator GRASSLEY. What is the difference in the methodologies

between the way that the FBI investigates an incident and the way
the ATF does? For instance, ATF investigates accidents, but the
FBI does not. How did this difference affect the TWA investigation?
Mr. VITA. There are probably several differences in our methodol-
ogy in approaching those type investigations. Any major event,
whether it is a major fire or an explosion, we go to the scene and
try and get to the heart of where and how the explosion occurred,
whether it was an explosion that may have caused a fire or if it
was a bomb of some type, or even an accidental explosion.
We have authority under title 18 to examine not only criminal
locations or criminal acts, but also accidental explosions, where
there is a reasonable cause to believe that explosives could have
been present.
When we approach that investigation, we have no preconceptions
whether it was the hand of a criminal act or if it was an accidental
cause to that particular situation. We try and examine the scene
from the heart out. We go to the heart of the scene and follow the
scientific evidence that we recover and evaluate to lead us to fol-
low-up investigation, whether it be interviews or additional sci-
entific work that needs to be done.
We try and focus our investigation at the scene of the crime, or
scene of the occurrence. Oftentimes, I have seen the FBIs approach
being differently in that they will try and take evidence from the
scene to a separate location where they will reconstruct the situa-
tion as best they can. That is a little different approach than we
take. We try and keep everything right there.
But, of course, when you deal with a mid-air crash such as this
or mid-air explosion, there was no way possible that anyone could
examine the evidence recovered at the location it was found. It had
to be taken up off the ocean floor and brought to someplace where
it could be examined. So that is a little bit of a difference there.
But we try and focus our investigation on the heart and cause
of the investigation in place and then follow the evidence to wher-
ever it leads us as far as processing that evidence and any inter-
views that we develop.
Senator GRASSLEY. Then how did this difference in methodology
you have just explained affect the TWA investigation?
Mr. VITA. As I mentioned, Senator, this is one of those rare cir-
cumstances that you could not examine the evidence where it was
found. It is extremely difficult to first locate all the debris fields
that would have resulted from that mid-air explosion and then re-
trieve that evidence, bring it up, and then bring it and catalog it
as far as location that it was found.
As I remember, when I was in Long Island examining the evi-
dence that had been recovered, the Navy, I believe, had used some
side-scan sonar equipment to help locate the various pieces of the
aircraft that laid at the ocean floor and did, I thought, an excep-
tional job. I thought that was a terrific use of technology to try and
identify where pieces of that airplane ended up at the bottom of the
ocean floor.
Those debris fields oftenin this case, did provide the investiga-
tors some very valuable information as to what may have broken
away from the airplane first in the course that the airplane trav-
42
eled. They found pieces of the nose in one place. They found pieces
of wing and side panels of the fuselage at another place. And then
they found the wings and the engine farther down course, which
gave the impression, certainly, that the nose of the airplane was
blown free of the aircraft in mid-air and fell as the rest of the plane
proceeded down its course. There is some extremely valuable infor-
mation gained from that. But the side-scan sonar that the Navy
provided was invaluable in trying to document the location of all
those pieces of evidence.
Senator GRASSLEY. Is it your view that the criminal nature of the
FBIs methodology prolonged finding the cause of the crash?
Mr. VITA. Senator, when you say prolonged, I know that as you
conduct an investigation, there are numerous theories that evolve
during that investigation. There will be theories that agents within
your own agency feel very strongly about that you need to further
examine and totally explore until you exhaust all the potential for
those leads.
Only when everyone is of the common understanding of the
cause of that explosion can I feel comfortable with the final deter-
mination made by ATF. I have been on some very complex inves-
tigations where there have been a number of competing theories
that evolve during the early stages of the investigation. So to say
that they prolong the investigation would be unfair without know-
ing all the information that they potentially had. I would expect
that they had information of perhaps a national security concern
that I would not be privy to, nor would I expect them to share di-
rectly with me.
But I would expect and hope that if they did have that informa-
tion, that they would thoroughly explore those leads until they
were exhausted so that we could be absolutely sure that the find-
ings that we did come to were accurate and properly represented
the Federal Governments investigation of that matter.
Senator GRASSLEY. Would you compare for me the FBI and ATFs
methodology in ruling out accidental and/or mechanical failure?
Mr. VITA. Well, I have not had much experience in dealing with
the FBI in investigating an accidental explosion. Our work has
beenwhen we have worked with them, in every case that I can
recall, other than TWA 800, it was more from a criminal investiga-
tive nature.
We go in there and try and be as objective as we possibly can,
Senator, as we approach that, and again, not have a preconception
as to what may have caused the fire or the explosion that we are
looking at. We do not go to an explosive scene and say, this is a
bombing. We go to the explosive scene and say that there was an
unexplained explosion here that we are going to have to determine
how it happened, and that could have been a mechanical cause,
that could have been an accidental cause, it could have been an act
of God. There are all kinds of different events that may have oc-
curred that triggered the explosion that ultimately caused the
plane to crash. You look at lightning. Was there a possibility that
lightning could have caused it?
Even though we have found what we believe to be the mechani-
cal cause, we were never able to precisely explain the arc or the
sparking that was the initial detonator to the explosion. That is
43
something that is done through science and theory without any

firsthand experience or eyewitness accounts.
Senator GRASSLEY. You have advocated pre-incident protocols as
a way to help future investigations. Could you explain what they
are and why you feel they are so darn important?
Mr. VITA. Senator, interestingly enough, every time ATF re-
sponds to a major fire or explosive scene anywhere in the country,
there are other agencies that also have jurisdictional concerns with
those investigations. Invariably, you will have several agencies re-
sponding to a scene and bringing with them a tremendous amount
of expertise, resources, ideas that would be of great value to the
overall impact of that investigation.
We have seen, over time, especially in areasperhaps I can use
an example of national church arson task force. When there is a
fire at a church or a house of worship anywhere in the country,
ATF, the FBI, and State and local authorities will most likely be
responding to those situations. It is very important for the effi-
ciency of operations and the publics trust in the confidence of law
enforcement that when we do respond, we operate very efficiently
in a collaborative way and take advantage of the value that each
agency brings to that scene.
For the last 212 years, I have been trying to workI started to
work with Bill Esposito in developing pre-response protocols that
both ATF and the FBI could use when we respond to major inci-
dents. Too often, there is a dispute over who has lead agency status
when we arrive at the scene, and that lead agency status often-
times dictates to which laboratory evidence that is recovered is
going to go for processing.
We need to have protocols in place so that when we do respond
to those major incidents, that all responding agencies are working
together, bringing the valuable assets and expertise that they have
to that scene, and work together toward dealing with and identify-
ing the source and the cause of that explosion or fire, whichever
the case may be. It is important that we have these pre-incident
protocols so that we do not have to rely on agency relationships in
the field, personalities that may sometimes influence the way peo-
ple work together. It is really critically important that we have this
plan in place for the efficiency and effectiveness of our operations.
Senator GRASSLEY. Is the ATF explosives unit accredited?
Mr. VITA. Our laboratory is, sir, if that is the question.
Mr. VITA. Our laboratory is accredited, yes, sir.
Senator GRASSLEY. When was that done?
Mr. VITA. I believe that we were accredited in 1984.
Senator GRASSLEY. And is the FBI explosives unit accredited?
Mr. VITA. I do not know, sir. Not that I know of.
Senator GRASSLEY. I am done asking questions. Once again, I
know you have gone way out of your way to be with us today and
we really appreciate it. You and the ATF have been very coopera-
tive, and most importantly, you have expressed from the early days
of the investigation your concern about public safety and the work
with the National Transportation Safety Board and the airlines to
get that information out. Everybody that travels by air owes you
44
a great deal of gratitude for that approach. We thank you very

much for your testimony.
Mr. VITA. Thank you, Senator.
Senator GRASSLEY. Our final panel, we have representatives of
the FBI. We have Dr. Donald Kerr, Assistant Director of the FBI
in charge of the Laboratory Division, and we have Mr. Lewis
Schiliro, Assistant Director in Charge of the New York office.
I have had the occasion to work with Dr. Kerr and he has made
many much-needed changes in the FBI lab, and not only for myself
but for the American people, we thank Dr. Kerr for that. Mr.
Schiliro is Mr. Kallstroms successor in the New York office and we
welcome both of you here.
Before you get seated, if I could go through the process of asking
you to raise your right hand and say, do you promise to tell the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you,
God?
Mr. KERR. I will.
Mr. SCHILIRO. I do.
Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you. Be seated. I assume, Dr. Kerr, in
your position as Assistant Director, we should start with your testi-
mony and then go to Mr. Schiliro, and then we will have questions
afterward.
PANEL CONSISTING OF DONALD M. KERR, ASSISTANT DIREC-
TOR, LABORATORY DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVES-
TIGATION; AND LEWIS D. SCHILIRO, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
IN CHARGE, NEW YORK DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF IN-
VESTIGATION
STATEMENT OF DONALD M. KERR

Mr. KERR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will assume that the
rather long statement could be submitted for the record.
Senator GRASSLEY. Yes. Let me make it clear for both of you. We
are aware of the fact that you have a long statement. It will be in-
cluded in the record as submitted, and the most recent revision will
be included, as well, and the same for Mr. Schiliro, if you could
summarize.
Mr. KERR. That is good. We have saved a lot of your time, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator GRASSLEY. Normally, in 5 minutes, we ask you to sum-
marize.
Mr. KERR. What I would like to do is just quickly hit a few points
about the present status of the FBI laboratory, our plans for re-
sponding to major crime and the scenes of other incidents, and a
few other points that I think are material to the interests you have
today.
First of all, with respect to accreditation, the FBI laboratory has
been accredited in all eight of the disciplines for which accredita-
tion is offered by the American Society of Crime Lab Directors, and
that took place last September.
In areas where no accreditation is offered by ASCLD, such as
digital evidence and certain areas of explosives investigation, we,
in fact, are leading international efforts to try to come up with
standards, guidance, and protocols that would support that. In the
45
case of digital evidence, we chair the Interpol group, as well as the

standards working group in the United States. In the case of explo-
sives, we are working with colleagues from ATF, and more impor-
tantly, with people from the United Kingdom, Ireland, Israel, Ger-
many, and Australia in order to build up a body of knowledge to
which people could be tested and shown proficient.
Last, with respect to the laboratorys current structure, we have,
in fact, divided it into three branches, one of which deals with the
traditional work with evidence and provides forensic examinations
in all the disciplines. A second provides investigative technology
support to our field offices and investigators. And the third in-
cludes, among other things, the response capabilities of the labora-
tory, which I will explain. Those latter are driven by our experience
during the East Africa bombing investigations, after the embassy
explosions, informed, as well, by the TWA 800 involvement that we
had and prior major bombings, as well.
The FBI now has five rapid deployment teams with people iden-
tified by name. They are teams of investigators, scientists, and en-
gineers. Each is based on one of our field offices, for example, New
York, with Mr. Schiliro has one of them. Two are based on our
Washington field office, one on Miami, and one on Los Angeles.
The Laboratory Division provides the scientific and technical
component of that deployment team. They are, when on duty, ex-
pected to be able to move in a period of 4 to 8 hours. It includes
a senior section chief from the Laboratory Division who then be-
comes the agent in charge scientific advisor on scene, backed up by
Laboratory Division people here in our op center, just as we did it
during the African Bombing case.
The roughly 20 people as part of the technical team, they are
chosen from the disciplines that fit the incident. So, in fact, if it
is a bombing, it would be rather heavier in chemists and explosives
examiners and trace examiners. On the other hand, if it was an-
other kind of event, it would have a different makeup, including
people, for example, from the DNA Unit.
The other response capabilities that we include are drawn from
our Bomb Data Center, which not only trains the bomb techs for
State and local police forces across the country, but also the FBI
bomb techs. Our senior bomb techs within the Bomb Data Center
also have rendered safe authority for improvised explosive devices.
They work closely with the Hazardous Materials Unit, which de-
ploys when weapons of mass destruction are suspected. They are
the people who deal with the chemical and biological threats, the
majority of which, you are aware, have been hoaxes in the last
months.
We have mobile laboratories that we can deploy, designed by the
Army, actually, for treaty monitoring purposes, but it is a flyaway
laboratory to support this kind of thing.
The last part of our deployment capability is one that came into
play during TWA 800, as well. You have spoken so far about the
people from the forensic examination part of the division. We are
also responsible for the FBI disaster squad, which is used for disas-
ter victim identification, largely based on latent prints as a dis-
cipline, increasingly using mitochondrial DNA techniques, as well.
46
So those people deployed in addition to the roughly 60 who de-

ployed on TWA 800 from the Laboratory Division.
The first examiners on site were from what is today the Mate-
rials and Devices Unit, which encompasses a lot of what used to
be the explosives group, and at the same time, the disaster squad
appeared to work in conjunction with the medical examiner to help
with identifying the victims as the remains were brought back.
Two of the laboratory staff members received significant recogni-
tion for their participation. One was Bob Heckman, who was, in
fact, the examiner in charge of the case for the Laboratory Division
and had a lot to do with the day-to-day interaction with the New
York Field Office. The other was Steve Burmeister. Dr. Burmeister
is head of the Chemistry Unit, and they are the people who did the
work examining the explosive residues and determining what they
were. It was a difficult piece of work to do because those pieces of
debris had been in the ocean, so finding it at all was a major sci-
entific feat.
A number of other people were recognized at a somewhat lesser
level for their performance, among them, Mr. Tobin, who just testi-
fied to you.
We now plan for some of the coordination that you are concerned
with joint training with NTSB. In fact, there is work ongoing for
cross-training between the NTSB crash investigation courses and
the courses that our evidence response teams get to be trained. We
are responsible for training some 1,000 members of the evidence re-
sponse teams in the field offices. It is a thing that started a few
years ago. It is coming to a greater level of maturity today. But it
is, in fact, the people who are most likely to be working the crime
scene for the FBI before laboratory people arrive, and so the con-
cern is that they be well-versed in discovering, recovering, preserv-
ing, properly packaging evidence for shipment for examination.
And lastly, a specific follow-up, again, from TWA 800, is the work
we are doing with the Department of Energys Pacific Northwest
laboratory, together with the Naval Air Warfare Center, and, in
fact, to do a specific set of field tests involving man-portable air de-
fense systems fired at aerostructures to determine, in fact, what
those aircraft structures look like after missile impact and also to
look at what forensic information might be available from the firing
position, because it turns out, for all the talk about these sorts of
things in the past, that fundamental data is missing.
And while metallurgists and others had some sense of what they
might look for in the debris from the airplane, in fact, at the firing
position, people have rarely, if ever, looked for specific information
that would be probative in terms of investigation. And even with
respect to the damage to the aircraft itself, in most of the studies
conducted by the Department of Defense, their concern ends when
the airplane is hit and not so much with looking at damage mecha-
nisms that might have forensic value to us. So we are trying to
remedy that lack of knowledge at this point in time.
And that, Mr. Chairman, completes the update I wanted to give
you and we can go on.
Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Dr. Kerr.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kerr follows:]
47
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD M. KERR
Good Afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. Thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon to address the role of the FBI
Laboratory in the investigation of TWA 800.
As you may know, I did not become Assistant Director of the FBIs Laboratory
Division until October 1997, more than a year after the explosion of TWA flight 800
off the Long Island shore. I am familiar with the performance of Laboratory person-
nel in that investigation, however, and am happy to answer any questions you may
have in that regard. Before discussing the details of the Laboratory involvement in
that investigation, I would first like to provide a brief overview of current Labora-
tory operations.
I. Current Overview Of The FBI Laboratory
First, and foremost, the FBI Laboratory is stronger, more efficient, and better or-
ganized than it has ever been before. This is due in part to the important role of
oversight, including that provided by this Committee, in ensuring the effective per-
formance of all components within the Laboratory. Perhaps the most significant
achievement during my tenure as Assistant Director has been the formal accredita-
tion of the Laboratory by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Lab-
oratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB).
Even before it became an official recommendation by the Department of Justice,
Office of the Inspector General (OIG), accreditation by ASCLD/LAB was among the
top priorities of Director Freeh. During the past several years, the Laboratory has
undergone numerous internal and external reviews, enhanced its quality assurance
system, and modified its policies, practices and procedures in preparation for accred-
itation. The FBI Laboratory includes eight disciplines for which accreditation is
available through ASCLD/LAB. Those disciplinesControlled Substances, DNA, Se-
rology, Firearms/Toolmarks, Latent Prints, Questioned Documents, Toxicology, and
Trace Evidencewere all fully accredited by ASCLD/LAB on September 11, 1998.
Two of the scientific disciplines that I believe are of particular interest to the
Committeeexplosives examinations and metallurgyare not accreditable by
ASCLD/LAB. With regard to explosives examinations, however, the chief of the
FBIs Materials and Devices Unit, Dr. Tom Jourdan, has been tirelessly pursuing
a program to provide for accreditation of explosives and hazardous devices examina-
tions. Toward that end, Mr. Jourdan has examined protocols and policies of forensic
laboratories worldwide and engaged in the exchange of information with France,
England, Ireland, Israel, and Australia. As a result of these efforts, Dr. Jourdan
hopes to present ASCLD/LAB with an accreditation program for explosives and haz-
ardous devices at its annual meeting this September.
As for metallurgy, it is not presently an accreditable discipline under ASCLD/LAB
for several reasons. First, forensic metallurgy is a narrow field of science with a
very limited number of qualified experts. Second, metallurgical examinations are
varied and often require a number of novel examination approaches. Since examina-
tion protocols must necessarily be general in their application, ASCLD/LAB has not
developed a program for certifying the metallurgical examination procedures.
Although only eight of the Laboratorys disciplines were subject to, and approved
for, ASCLD/LAB accreditation, all of the other disciplines throughout the Labora-
tory, including explosives and metallurgy, are held to similar standards.
A. RESTRUCTURING OF THE LABORATORY DIVISION
In February, 1997, the FBI Laboratory sought approval from the U.S. Department
of Justice and the Office of Personnel Management to establish four senior-level sci-
entists positions in the following disciplines: biological sciences, chemical sciences,
physical/materials sciences, and computer/information sciences. Due in large part to
the exemption from Title V hiring restrictions granted by the Congress, the Labora-
tory was able to select individuals who possess exceptional qualifications for these
positions.
In addition, the Engineering Sections at the Engineering Research Facility at
Quantico, Virginia have recently been assimilated into Laboratory operations. This
restructuring will be particularly beneficial following the relocation of the FBI Lab-
oratory to its new facility in Quantico. Construction is currently underway with a
target relocation date of 2001.
B. EXPANSION AND UPGRADING OF PROGRAMS
During the past several years, the nation has witnessed several major cata-
strophic events which have required the immediate deployment of Laboratory per-
48
sonnel. The explosion aboard TWA 800, as well as the bombing of the federal build-
ing in Oklahoma City, highlighted the critical need for immediate assistance of sci-
entific experts and evidence technicians at such mass disaster scenes. As a result,
the FBI Laboratory established five Rapid Deployment Teams (RDTs) to respond
to future crises.
Each of the teams includes Laboratory examiners and technicians, as well as a
senior-level Laboratory manager who serves as Team Leader and liaison with the
on-scene commander. Although the teams are configured primarily to address bomb-
ing and hazardous materials incidents, personnel from any discipline may be as-
signed depending on the type of event requiring their assistance.
The FBIs Evidence Response Team Program has continued to expand and Evi-
dence Response Teams have been deployed around the world to major bombing
crime scenes, most recently in East Africa. There are presently over 100 teams lo-
cated in the various FBI Field offices. Approximately 700 Agent ERT members have
received post-blast bombing crime scene training.
In February, 1997, the Explosives Unit of the FBI Laboratory was restructured,
separating the Bomb Data Center (BDC) from the unit and merging the remainder
of the unit with most functions of the Materials Analysis Unit to form the Materials
and Devices Unit (MDU). The Chief of the MDU, Dr. Tom Jourdan, holds a Masters
Degrees in Synthetic Organic Chemistry and Nuclear Chemistry, a Ph.D. in Chem-
istry, and has completed the U.S. Navys Explosive Ordnance School, Basic Demoli-
tion Course.
Under Dr. Jourdans leadership, the MDU has increased its personnel resources
and technical capabilities. The MDU has four broad areas of responsibility: exami-
nations of evidence associated with bombing matters, elemental analyses, scanning
electron microscopy, and metallurgical/materials science examinations.
The bombing matters examinations involve the identification and intended func-
tion of recovered bomb components, as well as direct field support in bombing crime
scenes. During the last couple of years, the following individuals have been added
to the staff of the MDU.
Five bomb component and reconstruction examiners who have recently joined the
MDU:
John K. Underbakke, B.S. in Criminal Justice, over 12 years of explosives train-
ing and experience in the military. Chief of the Army EOD Training Department
and the Hazardous Devices School. Experience as field Evidence Response Team
member.
Rex A. Stockham, B.S. in Chemistry, formerly worked as a Physical Science Tech-
nician in the MDU prior to going to Agents Training.
Michael W. Hughes, B.S. in Chemistry, formerly worked as a Physical Science
Technician in the MDU prior to going to Agents Training.
John W. McSwain, B.S. in Accounting, Special Agent Bomb Technician (SABT) for
over 5 years. Extensive experience in major bombing matters to include OKBOMB,
SOURGAS, and East Africa Embassy Bombings.
Mark Withworth, B.S. in Aeronautical Engineering, SABT for four years. Exten-
sive experience in bombing matters, to include a number of international bombing
scenes.
Metallurgists:
Dr. Mike Smith, Senior FBI metallurgist who is presently receiving cross-training
as an explosives device examiner.
Eric Jensen, M.S. in Physics.
In addition to its present staff, two applicants have been selected to join the MDU
and are currently in a background investigation phase. One individual has a Ph.D.
in Inorganic Chemistry and postdoctoral work in the areas of energetic materials,
as well as analytical chemistry. This individual directs research and development
for the testing of energetic materials and has conducted contract research for a
number of domestic and international agencies. He brings with him significant
hands-on experience with explosives. The other applicant has an M.S. degree in
Physics. He is also a research scientist who has directed operations and research
programs which involve the field testing of improvised explosives. In addition, he
has managed the mathematical modeling of these energetic materials.
The staffing concept of the MDU has been to meld together individuals who pos-
sess extensive experience in hands-on, post- blast bombing crime scene search and
component recognition/reconstruction with scientists who possess strong explosives
backgrounds and academic credentials that complement and support the collection
and examination processes, as well as research and development activities. It should
be noted that in any major bombing investigation, the Laboratory employs an inter-
49
disciplinary team approach in which the MDU examiners work with colleagues from
the Chemistry Unit and other forensic units of the Laboratory, as well as field crime
scene search and bomb technician personnel.
In furtherance of its training mission, the MDU has centralized the FBIs post-
blast investigations training and staffed it with the SABT instructors who also con-
duct the forensic bomb device examinations and reconstructions.
As a separate unit, the BDC has expanded and upgraded a number of its pro-
grams. SABTs have received expanded training and now, upon request, can assist
as well as provide training to state and local bomb squads. The BDC provides pro-
gram management and oversight to the Hazardous Devices School (HDS), at Red-
stone Arsenal, Alabama, which is the only source of certification for public safety
bomb technicians. It also recently hosted a National Bomb Squad Commanders
Conference which was attended by over 130 participants. In addition, the BDC has
been actively involved in a variety of research and development projects seeking to
increase the technical capabilities of public safety bomb squads to safely detect, di-
agnose, and defeat bombs, with an emphasis on chemical and biological devices and
large vehicle bombs. As part of its mission, the BDC provides planning and oper-
ational assistance to public safety bomb squads during special events, such as the
recent NATO 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington, D.C.
The Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU), which was formed in 1986, has
expanded its programs to counteract the threat of terrorism involving nuclear, bio-
logical and chemical weapons. The HMRU has provided on-scene field support and
special event support on an ever-increasing basis. It has provided training and
equipment to FBI agents so that they can respond to criminal acts involving the use
of hazardous materials.
As a result of its emphasis on nuclear and mitochondrial DNA programs, the FBI
Laboratory has personal identification capabilities that can materially assist in the
identification of remains. Such capabilities are available to support the identify of
victims of mass disasters, such as bombings and air crashes and complement the
capabilities of the FBI Disaster Squad.
C. PARTNERSHIPS
The FBI Laboratory is committed to and has long promoted interaction with other
Laboratories on specific cases and in technical working groups examining broader
issues. The Laboratory has established working partnerships with other forensic
laboratories, including the New York State Police, the Texas Department of Public
Safety, the Illinois State Police, and the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehen-
sion. These partnerships provide for bilateral exchanges in areas of quality assur-
ance, audits, and training, resulting in stronger forensic programs for all.
The Laboratory has also been instrumental in the formation and technical leader-
ship of numerous scientific working groups within the forensic community. The pur-
pose of the scientific working groups is to develop and standardize protocols and an-
alytical practices in disciplines such as materials analysis; friction ridge analysis,
study and technology; imaging technologies; digital evidence, bombing and arson
matters. Many FBI Laboratory examiners serve in leadership roles in these groups
as they seek to bring together national and international experts to develop proce-
dures, protocols, training and accreditation guidelines.
Similar arrangements have been developed between the FBI Laboratory and
members of the Federal scientific community. Through partnerships with the De-
partment of Energy, the Department of Defense, and the Environmental Protection
Agency, the FBI has been able to share information and enhance forensic applica-
tions, the transfer of technology, research and development, and specialized train-
ing.
The FBI Laboratorys involvement in the TWA 800 investigation was an outstand-
ing example of good quality assurance practice. The same procedures that are rou-
tinely utilized to ensure the integrity of evidence and guard against contamination
in the FBI Laboratory were employed during the examinations at the Calverton
Hangar, where the aircraft examination and reconstruction efforts took place. The
FBI Laboratory assumed responsibility for preparing the hangar, and utilized exam-
iners from the Chemistry Unit for analysis of control swabbings taken from the
walls and interior portions of the hangar. The Laboratory arranged for a hazardous
material contractor to cover the hangar floor with protective material to guard
against contamination.
During and since the TWA 800 investigation the FBI Laboratory has been acquir-
ing the most modern laboratory equipment and instrumentation to support forensic
analyses, particularly those relating to bombings and weapons of mass destruction
matters. In addition, Mobile Modular Laboratories have been configured for deploy-
50
ment to support on-site forensic analyses and examinations in a wide spectrum of
environments.
As part of its research and development mission, the Laboratory has targeted crit-
ical areas which will enhance its support of major crime investigations. These efforts
presently involve 16 internal research and development activities, as well as 30
counterterrorism research projects that have been outsourced to DOE national lab-
oratories, private sector vendors and academic institutions. These initiatives focus
on:
1. Field Portable Explosives Detection Technology
2. Forensic Evidence Analysis and Crime Scene Technology
3. Information Infrastructure Technology
4. Specialized and Examiner Training
5. Victim and Terrorist Identification
6. Remote, Render-safe Technology, Detection of Explosives and Neutralization
Techniques
7. Hazardous Materials Response
8. Computer Analysis Response Team (CART)
9. Latent Print Automation
II. Laboratory, Support of TWA 800 Investigation
The FBI Laboratory responded quickly to the TWA 800 disaster on July 17, 1996.
That evening, the Evidence Response Team (ERT) from the Newark Division of the
FBI arrived at the scene. The following morning, three examiners from the Mate-
rials and Devices Unit at FBI Headquarters arrived in Calverton and were joined
later that morning by three examiners from the Chemistry Unit.
The first week following the crash was devoted to the recovery of bodies. This was
the first priority of all personnel who arrived at the scene. As a result, the only de-
bris recovered was that which contained bodies and that which was floating and
washed up on the beach.
During the course of the investigation, approximately 5,000 hours of on-site sup-
port was provided by Laboratory examiners. Laboratory support was maintained by
teams who were rotated in and out during the investigation. Over a million pieces
of debris were recovered. Explosive residue chemists conducted an exhaustive sur-
vey of wreckage that entailed over 9,000 swabbings and examinations. Tens of thou-
sands of pieces of debris were visually inspected by bomb technicians, with 116 sub-
sequently submitted to the Laboratory for further analysis.
It is important to note that the FBI Laboratorys on-site support was provided de-
spite numerous other demands on its resources. Several examiners and evidence
technicians were reassigned to New York from the ongoing investigation of the
Kobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia. Others reported to New York from Atlanta
where the Olympic Games were underway. Approximately one week after the TWA
800 crash, the bombing of Centennial Park in Atlanta occurred.
One of the major issues which arose during the recovery phase, was the storage
of the quickly accumulating evidence. An FBI Agent from the Long Island Resident
Agency arranged for the use of an empty Grumman/U.S. Navy hangar for evidence
storage and ultimately for reconstruction of the aircraft. The FBI and ATF then pro-
vided mobile equipment for use in analyzing evidence at the site, while the U.S.
Navy engaged a private contractor to map out the location of the debris on the ocean
floor.
Security in and around the testing areas of the hangar was tight. Only designated
laboratory personnel were allowed access and no weapons or ammunition were al-
lowed inside the hangar. Personnel from the FBIs Chemistry Unit manned the test-
ing area of the hangar from July 18, 1996, the day after the crash, until November
8, 1996. Throughout that time, all ships and vehicles used to transport evidence
were swabbed to ensure that no preexisting residues were present. In addition,
over 9000 swabs and vacuum samples were collected and tested, including all recov-
ered seats and floorboards and over 500 swabs were taken of the center fuel cell
alone.
Over 60 Laboratory Division employees from the Evidence Response Team, Mate-
rials and Devices, Bomb Data Center, Chemistry, Trace Evidence, Latent Finger-
print and Special Photographic units worked on the case back in Washington, pro-
viding many additional thousands of hours of support.
On August 23, 1996, we announced that scientific analysis conducted by federal
examiners had found microscopic explosive traces of unknown origin relating to
flight 800. We also advised, however, that based upon all of the scientific and foren-
sic evidence analyzed up to that time, we could not conclude that the flight had
crashed as a result of an explosive device.
51
Shortly thereafter, on August 30, 1996, we announced that additional microscopic
explosive traces of unknown origin had been found. We again reiterated that we still
could not conclude that the aircraft was brought down by an explosive device.
These announcements came after extensive discussions among senior level sci-
entists and the on-scene commanders. The Laboratory personnel noted that the find-
ing of explosives residue without the corresponding blast damage could not yet be
explained and cautioned against jumping to false conclusions.
The New York Office management carefully weighed the information provided by
the Laboratory and, together with Director Freeh, decided to issue the above an-
nouncements. These events portray a careful, deliberative process in which scientific
findings were given proper consideration and, ultimately, an appropriate public re-
lease of the information was made.
During the initial months, continued scientific testing continued to confirm that
there was evidence of explosives residue with no evidence of bomb blast or missile
effects. It was not until September 1996, that the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) announced that in June 1996, the Boeing 747 known as TWA flight 800 had
been used in a Bomb Dog training exercise. Although this announcement solved the
anomaly of the bomb residue, it did not solve the mystery of the cause of the explo-
sion.
The Laboratorys finding and reporting of these residues constituted the consum-
mate double blind test. Through the practice of good science and protocol, the Lab-
oratory confidently reported its findings at a time when there was no explanation
for the presence of such residues.
A number of metallurgists from a number of different organizations worked on,
or were consulted about, the TWA 800 crash. These metallurgists worked well to-
gether and were in agreement with the Laboratory explosives examiners that there
was no indicia of blast effects or missile strike.
II. Lessons Learned

Earlier this year, an after-action meeting was held at Calverton to discuss the
events surrounding the investigation of TWA flight 800 and to identify optimal prac-
tices for a future major aircraft downing investigation. The agencies attending the
meeting were as follows: the FBI, the National Transportation Safety Board, the Bu-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Federal Aviation Administration, the De-
partment of DefenseOffice of Special Technology, Defense Intelligence Agency
Missile and Space Intelligence Center, Naval Air Warfare Center, Air Force Re-
search Laboratory, and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. I would like to
note that all attendees expressed satisfaction with the meeting and found it to be
very constructive and productive. There was no sign of hostility, nor disagreement,
among the participants.
At this meeting the need for a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between
the FBI and the NTSB was recognized. This MOU would set forth each agencys role
and responsibilities and define the interaction that should occur between the two
agencies during the investigation of a transportation disaster.
The FBI and the NTSB also agreed to pursue cross-training of personnel in order
to provide investigators with a better understanding of each agencys mission and
responsibilities. As a result, the FBIs Evidence Response Teams will participate in
NTSB Crash Investigation Courses and NTSB investigators will attend FBI ERT
training. This cross-training will commence next month.
In closing, I would like to say that in the TWA 800 investigation and the more
recent East Africa bombings, the FBI has demonstrated its ability to address major
challenges wherever they may occur. The lessons learned have enhanced our capa-
bilities and identified optimal practices that will help the FBI Laboratory to meet
the challenges of the future.
Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Schiliro.
TESTIMONY OF LEWIS D. SCHILIRO
Mr. SCHILIRO. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much for having
me today. I will just explain briefly, at the time of the TWA disas-
ter, I was the Agent in Charge in New York of the Criminal Divi-
sion and I was directed to report to Moriches Coast Guard Base
some 2 hours after the flight went down.
And I flew out over the flight scene about 212 hours after the
plane went into the ocean, and I can tell you that everyone in-
52
volved in that task that night believed at first that it would be a

search and rescue mission, that, in fact, we would find survivors.
The response that we received from the Suffolk County Police De-
partment, the Coast Guard, the New York City Police and Fire De-
partment, and a lot of private craft was just absolutely phenomenal
within the first few hours.
I can also tell you that as the Agent in Charge at the Coast
Guard station that night that everyone involved was deeply and
emotionally affected by what they saw. Their hearts went out to
the families of those victims, and I have no doubt that the experi-
ence is indelibly etched in their minds. And having personally wit-
nessed it, I can tell you that it is something that I will never forget.
I think, as I heard the testimony today, I think that just one or
two points I think that are important to bear in mind, and that is
how we saw the events at the time, or at least my 3 weeks that
I spent out there. Certainly, the way that the aircraft went down,
the fact that there was no warning, there was no radio traffic be-
tween the aircraft and the tower, the fact that it fell off the radar
screen. I think the fact, also, that within a day, the witness ac-
counts that described seeing the craft go down in a ball of flames,
and several saw flare-like devices heading upwards. At least from
the investigators that were on scene that night, it became a very,
very difficult issue to deal with.
Particularly at the time of the tragedy, Ramzi Yousef was on
trial in the U.S. District Court in the Southern District of New
York and he was charged in a conspiracy to blow up 12 U.S. air-
lines simultaneously over the Pacific Ocean. Yousefs plot, for
which he was subsequently convicted, was not the stuff of science
fiction. In fact, he had already tested the theory of concealing a
small-shaped explosive charge on an aircraft, a test that resulted
in the death of a Japanese citizen.
It is against this background, Mr. Chairman, the sudden dis-
appearance of an aircraft with no distress call in an explosive fire-
ball, that we didthe FBI undertook a very massive and aggres-
sive investigation, and we also had a fear, based on what the wit-
nesses described to us, that if it were a human intervention, and
particularly if it were a missile, that those responsible were still at
large, and the geography of Suffolk County made that extremely
difficult to contain. They, if, in fact, existed, were under the flight
path of one of the busiest airports in the world and we know we
needed to resolve that issue as quickly and expeditiously as pos-
sible.
I have no doubt from the testimony I heard today that there
were issues created, certainly initially and over the course of that
investigation, but I can assure you, today, I represent, I believe,
some of the finest men and women in the FBI, and that is those
of the New York office, and that we traveled some 9 miles out to
sea and 150 feet below the ocean floor to recover over a million
pieces of that aircraft in order to come to a sound both scientific
and investigative resolution to that case.
That office also traveled most recently to East Africa to resolve
the embassy bombings there. We were involved with many of the
agencies represented here today in the World Trade Center bomb-
ing. We have a very proud, I think, tradition in New York of work-
53
ing terrorism cases and certainly working in a multi-agency envi-

ronment.
But I welcome the questions that you have here today. I think
it is an important issue, but I think, certainly, that there are
many, many aspects of TWA 800 that we feel very proud to have
been a part of.
Senator GRASSLEY. I thank you very much for your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schiliro follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF LEWIS D. SCHILIRO
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to appear
before you today to discuss the FBIs investigation of the crash of TWA Flight 800.
On the night of July 17, 1996, I responded to a page and was advised that a TWA
747 in the sky just off the south shore of Long Island had disappeared from the
radar and was believed to have crashed. Because I was the Special Agent in Charge
of the New York Office Criminal Division, I was directed to report to the Coast
Guard Station at Moriches, New York and was assigned to oversee and direct the
FBIs efforts for what we initially believed would be a search and rescue operation.
Upon arrival, additional reports came in that changed the nature of our mission,
including that there had been a large explosion and fireball, that all communica-
tions from the plane had been normal, that no distress calls had been issued, and
that numerous eyewitnesses reported seeing flarelike objects and other events in the
sky. Within a day, the law enforcement team had interviewed numerous eye-
witnesses, including some who witnessed the events while in the air, and many of
them provided credible accounts of these flarelike objects. Recognizing the limits of
our own capabilities, the FBI contacted the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and
requested assistance in evaluating these reports of events in the sky.
Two days after the crash, experienced analysts from DIAs Missile and Space In-
telligence Center (MISIC) were on the scene in Long Island and accompanying FBI
Agents on interviews and reinterviews of some of the eyewitnesses. The MISIC per-
sonnel who reported to Long Island are among the U.S. Governments foremost ex-
perts on shoulder launched surface to air missiles, known as MANPADS. They re-
ported to us that many of the descriptions given by eyewitnesses were very consist-
ent with the characteristics of the flight of such missiles.
In addition, at the time of this tragedy, Ramzi Yousef was on trial in the U.S.
District Court in the Southern District of New York charged in a conspiracy to blow
up twelve U.S. airliners, simultaneously, over the Pacific Ocean. Yousefs plot, for
which he was subsequently convicted, was not the stuff of science fiction. In fact,
he had already tested his theory of that resulted in the death of a Japanese citizen.
It is against this backgrounda sudden disappearance of an aircraft, with no dis-
tress calls, in an explosive fireball resulting in the deaths of 230 men, women and
childrenwith descriptions by credible eyewitnesses deemed by government experts
to be consistent with the flight of a missileat the same time that one of the
worlds foremost terrorists was on trial in Federal court charged with an audacious
conspiracy to attack American airlinersthat the FBI launched its criminal inves-
tigation of the TWA Flight 800 tragedy, an investigation that would become among
the most far reaching and thorough ever conducted by the FBI. If there was ever
a chance, whether it was 10 percent or 90 percent, that this catastrophe was crimi-
nal, that a terrorist operating under the flight path of one of the nations busiest
airports had brought down an aircraft with a shoulder launched missile and could
still be at large planning further attacks, it was critical that a proper and aggressive
investigation take place immediately.
Hundreds of FBI Agents and other law enforcement officers responded almost im-
mediately, including elements from the FBI/NYPD Terrorist Task Force, the ATF,
Secret Service, U.S. State Department, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, U.S.
Park Police, INS, Port Authority PD, Suffolk County PD, Suffolk County Park Po-
lice, Nassau County PD, New York City PD, NY State Police, along with the NTSB,
the FAA, the Coast Guard and the United States Navy, whose divers worked around
the clock risking their lives to recover the bodies of the victims and, later, the air-
craft wreckage. In the first days after the crash, many of the law enforcement team
were assigned to the Coast Guard Station in Moriches receiving the bodies of the
victims of the crash and, in the following days and weeks, witnessing the autopsies
conducted by the Medical Examiners Office. Mr. Chairman, as the Agent in Charge
at the Coast Guard Station, I can tell you that everyone involved in that task was
54
deeply and emotionally affected by this experience and their hearts went out to the
families of these victims.
As the Committee knows, the FBIs responsibility for conducting investigations in
a case such as TWA Flight 800 flows from a number of Federal statutes, including,
among others, terrorism, destruction of aircraft, crime aboard aircraft, false state-
ments. In this investigation, the FBI and the law enforcement team initially focused
on the possibility that the aircraft was destroyed by a missile, either a direct hit
on the plane or a proximity explosion, a bomb placed on the aircraft, to include in
the center fuel tank area. As a result of some of the initial interviews of mechanics
and other information we received, the FBI also looked at that the possibility of
Federal criminal violations applicable to any intentional violations of regulations or
reporting requirements relating to compliance with certification procedures for air-
craft products and parts, manufacturing quality control or maintenance and safety
procedures. Our investigation included more than 7,000 interviews, including eye-
witnesses, individuals in contact with the aircraft at both JFK and in Athens, family
members, and passengers from the flight that preceded Flight 800; we reconciled
and traced all luggage and cargo placed on the aircraft; reviewed all unusual event
reports, stolen motor vehicle and boat reports, records of all boats traveling through
New York Harbor and the area of Long Island, records of all drawbridge openings
on Long Island for a three month period; our Laboratory conducted over 3,000 resi-
due examinations and ultimately, together with NTSB, engaged in a massive recon-
struction of portions of the aircraft. An outline of our investigative efforts is at-
tached to my statement and is submitted for the record. The result of the FBIs 16
month long investigation was that no evidence was found which would indicate that
a criminal act was the cause of the TWA flight 800 tragedy.
I understand that there are several issues of particular interest to the Committee
and I would like to address them briefly. In the recovery effort, the FBI treated all
the recovered wreckage as evidence and endeavored to maintain the best possible
chain of custody of the evidence we could given the large amount of wreckage recov-
ered (over one million items) and the fact that it had to be recovered, for the most
part, from the ocean floor, 120 feet below the surface. All evidence was brought to
the hangar at Calverton where it was initially handled by FBI evidence response
teams and examined by certified bomb technicians, metallurgists, and chemists for
explosive damage. Pieces exhibiting any unusual characteristics were referred for
subsequent intensive testing/examination. As investigators, we knew from the out-
set that science and the work of scientists would play a crucial role in the investiga-
tion, as it does in many of our investigations. We, therefore, aggressively sought to
locate and use the finest scientific minds and techniques available to provide insight
and direction to our efforts.
Examinations and analyses were conducted by scientist from the FBI Laboratory
as well as outside experts, including the U.S. Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons
Division, China Lake, California; U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Lab Fort Rucker,
Alabama; U.S. Air Force, Wright Patterson AFB, Aircraft Accident Investigation Of-
fice, Dayton, Ohio; Armed Forces Institute of Pathology Bethesda, Maryland; De-
fense Intelligence Agency, Missile and Space Intelligence Center, Redstone Arsenal,
Alabama; Picatinny Arsenal; Hughes Missile Systems, Hughes Aircraft Company; a
Contract Metallurgist recommended by the FBI Laboratory and Department of En-
ergys Brookhaven National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratory.
I am well aware that there was some tension and disagreement between the New
York Office Field investigators and metallurgists at the FBI Laboratory over the
need for additional intensive testing of some of the recovered wreckage. The field
investigators were mindful that the aircraft damage noted as being possibly indic-
ative of a bomb or a missile could also be attributed to the stresses of the break-
up of the aircraft. However, this investigation, and the possibility that the aircraft
could have been brought down by a missile or a proximity missile explosion was,
in our view, unprecedented.
As I understand it, the FBI, indeed the U.S. Government, had no baseline forensic
data regarding a missile strike on a commercial aircraft such as a Boeing 747 to
use as a basis of comparison. We sought additional intensive examination of what
certified bomb technicians had identified as unusual pieces to see if there was any-
thing unusual that could be observed. We firmly believed that we owed no less than
a complete, thorough and exhaustive effort to the victims and their families. We did
not desire to speculate or project results; we wanted, and the families and the Amer-
ican people deserved, the best science available to the government.
As I said earlier, we recognize the critical role of science in many of our investiga-
tions and we have a high degree of respect for the talents and insights provided by
FBI scientists, who are among the finest forensic scientists in the world. They pro-
vide insight, direction and very often, the critical evidence necessary to bring a case
55
to a logical and just conclusion. However, it is important for all of us involved in
investigations to understand and respect our various roles. Ultimately, when there
is disagreement on whether or how to proceed, the responsibility for the decision
rests squarely on the shoulders of the investigators in charge of the case.
The FBI conducted the TWA Flight 800 investigation in a professional, respon-
sible, and methodical manner. We worked to ensure that we were thorough and
complete before coming to a conclusion as to whether this tragedy was the result
of a criminal act. Can you imagine, Mr. Chairman, if we had not pushed to look
at every possibility, no matter how remote; if we had relied on cursory examinations
by magnifying glass and not sought to use every sophisticated tool of science avail-
able to us to reach a decision in this case and later found out that this was a very
sophisticated criminal act or had overlooked something that may have brought us
to a different conclusion. I and all of the law enforcement people who worked on
this would not have been doing our jobs and would have been, rightly, subject to
harsh criticism.
Let me briefly address the issue of jurisdictional disputes with the NTSB. Mr.
Chairman, you cannot have an investigation of this magnitude, with the level of
media attention this case attracted, with the number of people and the number of
agencies involved that ran for as long as this one did without from time to time hav-
ing disagreements or differences of opinion that need to be resolved. When we had
differences of opinion, we sought to, and, usually did, resolve them amicably. Some
of these disagreements were the result of our very different methods of conducting
investigations. The FBI had no problem in sharing investigative results with NTSB
and the morning after the crash, we offered to have NTSB personnel participate in
all our interviews. Overall, the cooperation between the FBI and the NTSB was ex-
cellent at every level. All of us who were involved never lost sight of the reason we
were there, of the goal of our efforts, which was to determine what caused TWA
Flight 800 to plunge in a fireball into the ocean with the terrible loss of 230 lives.
I would also like to address the issue of the ATF report dated January 20, 1997,
concluding that the cause of the crash was a mechanical malfunction. ADIC
Kallstrom received that ATF report on Thursday, March 13, 1997. On Monday,
March 17, 1997, ADIC Kallstrom forwarded a copy of the report to NTSB Chairman,
Jim Hall, as evidenced in the transmittal letter, a copy of which is attached to my
statement. Allegations that the FBI attempted to hide the report from NTSB are
ludicrous. It is also inexplicable that NTSB now fails to recall receiving Mr.
Kallstroms letter.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to state for the record that the FBIs investigation
of the TWA Flight 800 was one of the most thorough and finest ever conducted by
this agency. We have learned much from the experience of TWA Flight 800 and
have been working, under the leadership of the FBI Laboratory along with NTSB
to institutionalize what we have learned, to incorporate it into our procedures so
that we improve our response and investigative product in the event a tragedy like
this recurs in the future.
In early March, in furtherance of this effort, we held a meeting at Calverton that
brought together representatives of virtually all the agencies that participated in
the TWA investigation. The meeting was productive and additional meetings will
take place in the future. Separate from that effort, we have held several preliminary
discussions with NTSB in an effort to write a Memorandum of Understanding be-
tween our respective agencies, to formalize and structure our relationship in a man-
ner that leads to improved training, better understanding of our respective missions
and investigative requirements and, better service to the American public.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
New York, NY, March 17, 1997.
Mr. JAMES E. HALL, Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board,
Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Enclosed please find one copy of a Statement of ATF Cer-
tified Fire Investigator, I/N 63122 96 0060 Z, dated January 20, 1997. This report
was provided to me on March 13, 1997 by the ATF Special Agent in Charge in New
York.
The publication of this unsolicited and premature report by the ATF violates the
agreement made by them regarding their participation in this investigation. I be-
lieve it is unfortunate that ATF, for reasons that are unknown to me, chose to pre-
pare a report expressing an opinion regarding the cause of this tragedy before the
56
investigation has been completed. It is an extraordinary violation of investigative
protocol.
I have provided the original and a copy to FBIHQ and requested that the FBI
Laboratory review the information in the report and contact ATF to obtain all infor-
mation they relied upon to produce this document. I have also asked Director Freeh
to express the FBIs displeasure regarding this incident to the highest levels of the
ATF.
Sincerely,
JAMES K. KALLSTROM,
Assistant Director in Charge.
ATTACHMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF LEWIS D. SCHILIRO: OVERVIEW OF FBI
I. TWA 800 Explosion
TWA 800 was on the tarmac at JFKIA for approximately 3 hours and 48 minutes
prior to departure. The outside temperature was approximately 81. The flight ar-
rived from Athens at 4:31 p.m. and lifted off the ground at 8:19 p.m. At approxi-
mately 8:31 p.m. the flight experienced a mid-air explosion.
II. Response To Event
A. FBI RESOURCES
Initial response to scene: Hundreds of Agents.

Command centers established: New York Office, U.S. Coast Guard East Moriches,
Westhampton Fire Department, GrummanCalverton, Long Island.
B. FEDERAL/LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES
Response to the tragedy of Flight 800.

Federal response
FBI, ATF, NTSB, FAA, Secret Service, U.S. State Department, Naval Criminal In-
vestigative Service, U.S. Park Police, INS, U.S. Navy.
Local law enforcement response
Port Authority PD, Suffolk County PD, Suffolk County Park Police, Nassau Coun-
ty PD, New York City PD, NY State Police and local town police.
C. OTHER AGENCIES
1. NY Fire Department and local Volunteer Fire Department.

2. Red Cross.
3. Suffolk County Medical Examiners Office.
4. Clergy.
III. Recovery EffortsVictims/Aircraft

First 3 days: Massive on the water recovery of bodies/plane parts.
Dive Efforts: 4,600 dives.
Search Area: 40 square miles.
Trawling Operation: 75 square miles.
A. RECOVERY OF VICTIMS
Two hundred and thirty victims recovered and positively identified.

B. RECOVERY OF AIRCRAFT
Ninety-six percent of aircraft recovered, approximately 1 million pieces.

C. RECOVERY OF PERSONAL EFFECTS
Thirty-nine thousand and six hundred items recovered.
IV. Airport InvestigationJFK AirportTWA 800

One hundred and eighty-six interviews were conducted with all individuals who
had access to TWA Flight 800. All met with negative results.
1. Security personnel.
2. Mechanics and fuelers.
57
3. Luggage/Cargo handlers.
4. Caterers/Food service.
5. Cleaners.
6. Customer service.
7. Ogden food service.
8. Outside contractorsi.e., in-flight movie, special catering, linen, dry cleaning.
B. PASSENGER/BAGGAGE RECONCILIATION
All passengers flight coupons were matched to the passenger manifest. All
checked baggage was accounted for prior to departure.
C. CARGO RECONCILIATION
All cargo was identified from point of origin until placement on Flight 800. All
shippers were identified as legitimate.
D. FAA/AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS
Air traffic controllers interviewed.

Radar tapes duplicated and analyzed.
Air Traffic Controller transcripts obtained and reviewed.
Analysis determined no unusual activity.
V. Airport InvestigationAthens, GreeceTWA Flight 881

Four hundred and fifty-two interviews were conducted with all individuals who
had access to TWA Flight 881, information requesting unusual person(s), events, ob-
jects, met with negative results.
A. PASSENGER INTERVIEWS
Three hundred and forty-nine passengers interviewed.

B. CREW INTERVIEWS
Seventeen crew members interviewed.

C. AIRPORT PERSONNEL
Eighty-six airport personnell interviewed.

1. Security personnel.
2. Mechanics.
3. Luggage/Cargo loaders.
4. Caterers/Food service.
5. Customer service employees.
6. Fuelers.
7. Outside Contractorsi.e., duty free merchandise, in-flight movies, linen, dry
cleaning, etc.
D. PASSENGER/BAGGAGE RECONCILIATION
All passenger flight coupons were matched to the passenger manifest. All pas-
senger baggage was identified.
E. CARGO RECONCILIATION
The authenticity of all cargo and shippers was verified. No cargo from Flight 881
was placed on TWA Flight 800.
VI. Bomb Investigation

A. VICTIM FAMILY INTERVIEWS
Two hundred and thirty-six victim family members from the USA, France, Italy,
Sweden and Norway were interviewed. The results of all interviews met with nega-
tive results regarding possible sabotage, conspiracy to bomb or criminal acts. Five
victim families refused to be interviewed.
B. PREVIOUS AIRCRAFT BOMBINGS
Investigators reviewed ten previous airline bombings covering a period of fourteen

years. The purpose of this review was to identify vulnerable areas for the placement
of explosive devices and modus operandi of individuals involved in bombings.
58
C. REVIEW OF COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER
The cockpit voice recorder tape contains 31:47 (thirty-one minutes and forty-seven
seconds) of cockpit crew/ATC conversation. This tape starts while the aircraft is po-
sitioned at the gate prior to takeoff and ends at the time of the explosion. The CVR
review disclosed no evidence of a criminal act.
D. INVESTIGATION OF CLAIMS OF RESPONSIBILITY
All claims of responsibility were without credibility.

E. COMMERCIAL HISTORY OF AIRCRAFT
The 25 year old Boeing aircraft was sold to Iran in 1975. Iran never took physical
possession. The aircraft never left hangar in the United States and was never
touched by Iranian personnel. The aircraft was returned to the TWA fleet.
F. MILITARY HISTORY OF THE AIRCRAFT
Military records reflect that the aircraft was utilized for troop transport on April
12, 1996, including 8 Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) personnel were onboard.
Records reflect that all troops were issued new uniforms and gear. Little potential
for explosive residue transfer.
G. TRAINING CONDUCTED ON AIRCRAFT
On June 10, 1996, the St. Louis Airport Police Department conducted canine ex-
plosives training aboard the victim aircraft. The residue collected after the explosion
of Flight 800 was consistent with the explosives utilized during the exercise.
Overseas law enforcement agencies routinely conduct canine training utilizing ex-
plosives with little or no documentation.
VII. Missile Investigation

A. WITNESS EVENT INTERVIEWS/PLOTTING
Two hundred and forty-four eyewitness accounts were analyzed. Witnesses obser-
vations and their location in relation to the event were recorded, plotted and mathe-
matically analyzed.
B. ROADSIDE CHECKPOINTS
Roadside checkpoints established in the vicinity of East Moriches to identify po-

tential witnesses to the event or suspicious persons or activity. Investigation met
with negative results.
C. CANVASS OF MARINAS
Tri-state area marinas were canvassed for any witnesses or suspicious activities
related to the explosion. Investigation met with negative results.
D. POLICE DEPARTMENTS UNUSUAL EVENT/PERSONS COMPLAINTS
Police Departments provided all 911 telephone calls and persons complaints re-
porting suspicious behavior/cars/boats in all precincts bordering waterways and JFK
Airport for a period of two months prior to the event. Investigation met with nega-
tive results.
Twenty-nine 911 calls received by Suffolk County Police were investigated and
met with negative results.
E. REPORTED STOLEN/ABANDONED BOATS
Reported stolen or abandoned boats in the tri-state area were identified and held
for forensic examination. This investigation was met with negative results.
F. PREVIOUS ROCKET ATTACKS
Investigators reviewed nine missile attacks on aircraft during a fourteen year pe-
riod. Those attacks occurred in the former Soviet Union, Afghanistan and Africa.
The purpose of this review was to identify potential missiles utilized and launch
sites. Forensic evidence from those aircraft were not available for comparison to
Flight 800, therefore prompting our own testing.
59
G. REVIEW OF VESSEL TRAVEL THROUGH NEW YORK HARBOR
During the 24-hour period371 vessells identified, area of Long Island.

One month period20,000 records, area New York Harbor.
Investigation met negative results.
H. INVESTIGATION OF SUFFOLK COUNTY BRIDGE OPENINGS
Twenty thousand records obtained for every vessel that passed under three Suf-
folk County Drawbridges for 3 months prior to the crash and 2 weeks after the
crash. Investigation met with negative results.
I. RADAR ANALYSIS
Radar data was collected, reviewed and analyzed by the FAA and an independent
radar consultant who examined radar tapes and determined that what was depicted
on the screen was NORMAL AIR TRAFFIC and NOT A MISSILE.
Sources of Radar Tapes
Nine FAA locations: Islip, JFK, Newark, White Plains, Stewarts Field, Riverhead
New York, Trevose PA, North Truro MA, Cummington, MA.
Three other radar sources: Sikorsky Aircraft, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
AdministrationBoston and New York.
VIII. Calverton Investigation
A. EVIDENCE COLLECTION
Law Enforcement Team personnel supervised evidence collection and transpor-

tation from the crash site to the Calverton facility, always mindful of contamination
and chain of custody.
B. EVIDENCE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS
All evidence received at the Calverton facility was initially examined by certified
bomb techs, metallurgists, and chemists for explosive damage with negative results.
Subsequent intensive testing/examination of pieces exhibiting any unusual charac-
teristics was conducted by law enforcement, military, and independent experts and
was met with negative results.
The following agencies/personnel provided additional expertise:
1. U.S. Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, California
2. U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Lab Fort Rucker, Alabama
3. U.S. Air Force, Wright Patterson AFB, Aircraft Accident Investigation Office,
Dayton, Ohio
4. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology Bethesda, Maryland
5. Defense Intelligence Agency, Missile and Space Intelligence Center, Redstone
Arsenal, Alabama
6. Picatinny Arsenal
7. Hughes Missile Systems, Hughes Aircraft Company
8. Independent Radar Consultant
9. Contract Metallurgist
10. Department of Energy Laboratories, Brookhaven National Lab, Sandia Na-
tional Lab
C. AIRCRAFT RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT
FBI/NTSB projects resulted in extensive reconstruction of areas of the aircraft

deemed to be vulnerable to a missile and/or explosive device.
The reconstruction project included the following:
1. Main 92 Foot Forward Fuselage
2. Aft Cargo Bay
3. Left and Right Wing Spars (front and rear)
4. Cabin Interior
5. Cargo Containers
6. Underbelly Fairing
7. Power Cable Routing
8. Left and Right Leading Edge Wing Structure
9. Nose Wheel Well and Surrounding Structure
10. Top Skin-Left Wing
11. Cabin Interior Carpet/Flooring over the Center Wing Fuel Tank
12. Flight Data Recorder (FDR)/Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) Wire Routing
60
13. Center Wing Fuel Tank Section
D. DAMAGE ANALYSIS
Combined metallurgical and engineering review of aircraft debris (reconstructed

and non-reconstructed) IDENTIFIED OVER 1,400 PENETRATIONS and 259
AREAS OF MISSING FUSELAGE MATERIAL that WERE CLOSELY EVALU-
ATED.
An alternate light examination (blacklight) of all aircraft wreckage for the purpose
of identifying latent material deposits was conducted with negative results.
All wreckage was also inspected by industry experts for any evidence of drone air-
craft impact with negative results.
E. RECOVERY ANALYSIS
The logged recovery location of all debris from the wings and the cabin structure
was verified.
F. FORENSIC BOMB/MISSILE ANALYSIS CONDUCTED AT CALVERTON
Over ONE MILLION PIECES of aircraft debris VISUALLY INSPECTED by bomb

technicians and laboratory personnel. This screening process included taking over
2,000 CHEMICAL SWABBINGS, x-raying all seat cushions and utilizing explosive
detection canines on site.
Examination and analysis at DAVIS MONTHAM AIR FORCE BASE at Tucson,
Arizona with STATIC DETONATIONS of man pads in pressurized and non-pressur-
ized aircraft fuselage produced DAMAGE which was NOT SIMILAR to any
WRECKAGE observed AT CALVERTON. ALL WRECKAGE was REVIEWED.
Inspection of missile damaged aircraft at the NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER
(CHINA LAKE) revealed NO SIMILARITIES to the wreckage AT CALVERTON.
ALL WRECKAGE was REVIEWED.
G. LABORATORY ANALYSIS
Man hours: 5,000

Examiners: 12
Residue examinations: 3,000
FBI/ATF Laboratory Conclusion:
No Evidence: High Explosive Damage
No Evidence: Explosion of a Missile Warhead
No Evidence: Missile Impact
Independent Experts Conclusions:
No Evidence: High Explosive Damage
No Evidence: Explosion of a Missile Warhead
No Evidence: Missile Impact
Metallurgical Examiners Conclusions Damage Consistent With:
OVER PRESSURIZATION of the CENTER FUEL TANK;
BREAK UP of the aircraft;
FIRE;
IMPACT of the aircraft into the ocean.
IX. Military InvestigationFriendly Fire

A. SIGNED CERTIFICATIONS RECEIVED FROM EACH CHAIN OF COMMAND
All military assets within 200 Nautical Miles

Documentation of all training exercises.
Accounting of all armaments capable of reaching Flight 800.
B. INTERVIEWS AND INSPECTIONS
The crew of the following vessels/aircraft were interviewed and their ships in-
spected, due to their immediate vicinity to the crash site. Investigation determined
the crafts were either out of range, unarmed or did not have the vertical launch ca-
pability of reaching Flight 800.
USS NORMANDYU.S. NAVY CRUISER
USS TREPANGU.S. NAVY SUBMARINE
USS ALBUQUERQUEU.S. NAVY SUBMARINE
USS WYOMINGU.S. NAVY SUBMARINE
U.S. NAVY P3 ORION
61
NY AIR NATIONAL GUARDHH60 HELICOPTER
NY AIR NATIONAL GUARDC130 AIRCRAFT
NY AIR NATIONAL GUARDCC10
CALIFORNIA AIR NATIONAL GUARDC141 (TRANSITING AIR SPACE)
X. Criminal Act/Non-Terrorist
Investigation was not limited strictly to terrorist motives. All avenues of potential
criminality were explored with negative results.
XI. Public Response
Over 3,000 leads were generated through the establishment of the FBI 800 lines,
Internet and U.S. Mail.
XII. Depth of the Investigation
There were a total of over 7,000 INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED in this investiga-
tion.
XIII. Issues
A. RUSSELL TAPE (RICHARD RUSSELL): SALINGERS MISSILE
The SPLITT (GHOSTING) from the Russell tape IS FROM JET EXPRESS 18.
Analysis by experts determined that the OBJECT WAS NOT A MISSILE, since it
was positively identified. Object was a Ghost of Jet Express 18 which was at a
different location.
B. THE LINDA KABOT PHOTO
The photo taken by Kabot depicts a bearing of north/northeast. TWA Flight 800
was south/southwest almost directly behind her.
Photograph analyzed by CIA National Imagery and Mapping Administration
(NIMA) advised that:
1. There is object in photo
2. Object is not a missile
3. Object appears to be an aircraft, not possible to id aircraft because:
Not possible to determine distance of object from camera.
Exact time of photo unknown: (time frame only is known).
Insufficient detail in photo to determine type of aircraft.
4. Object is not a drone
No drone-exercises conducted near Long Island July 17, 1996.
C. HEIDI KRIEGER PHOTOGRAPH (STREAK IN SKY)
Negative was sent to FBIHQ for analysis, which determined that there was DE-
BRIS ON THE FILM SURFACE.
D. SEAT CUSHION RESIDUE (REPORTED IN RIVERSIDE CALIFORNIA PRESS)
The residue appeared red and flaky and was subjected to microscopic and chemi-
cal examination. The analysis determined the items were consistent with a
chlorinated polymeric material, commonly used as CONTACT ADHESIVE. The red
material is NOT ROCKET FUEL OR RESIDUE OF ROCKET FUEL. Three people
convicted in U.S. District Court (one misdemeanor, 2 felony after trial) of charges
related to theft of parts of the seat cushion from the hangar.
E. U.S. NAVY ACTIVITY IN W. 105106107AREAS CLOSEST TO THE
SHORES OF LONG ISLAND
The warning areas mutually co-exist with commercial air traffic and were open
for COMMERCIAL USE ON JULY 17, 1996.
There were NO MISSILE FIRINGS FOR TWO YEARS prior to July 17, 1996, in
the Whiskey 105106107 areas.
Military Search and Rescue Exercise conducted July 17, 1996. NO WEAPONS
UTILIZED. NO WEAPONS ON BOARD.
NO TRAINING EXERCISES UTILIZING ANY WEAPONS were conducted in
those areas on JULY 17, 1996.
There are designated live firing areas within the Whiskey areas. Artillery and
small caliber weapons fire are authorized in these areas. The closest area of this
62
type is 86 miles east of the crash site. There was no Navy firing on July 17, 1996
in that area.
F. SALINGER/GODDARD STATEMENT
I believe promoting the Navy-missile theory was a big mistake. I believe that the
evidence is not sufficient to blame the Navy, and I wish to move away from that and
all areas of conspiracy inquiry forever.
(Ian Goddards E-mail to the New York Office dated 11/6/97 5:40 a.m.)
Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Schiliro, in your new testimony that was
submitted today, you attached an unsigned letter purportedly from
Mr. Kallstrom that you refer to as a transmittal letter used to send
the ATF report to the NTSB. Apparently, no signed letter exists,
and according to the NTSB, no letter was received. Also, if you
read the letter, it seemed to me the main purpose was to under-
mine and criticize the ATF report, not to transmit it as an official
document.
So any objective reading of the evidence tells me that no official
transmittal took place, and certainly an unsigned letter is no proof
of anything. As an agent who collects evidence, I would hope that
you would agree. What proof do you have that an official transmit-
tal of the report was made?
Mr. SCHILIRO. Mr. Chairman, if I could respectfully disagree. In
our original files, the original letter is signed out, as indicated by
the block stamp on this file and a file number having been put in.
The file copy, the one you have before you today, the one that was
used for documentation, is not signed. That is usually the case in
how the FBI maintains their files.
Having reviewed this, the transmittal letter, I would find it very
unusual for the report not to have been transmitted to the NTSB
on the date of March 17, 1997. But the file copy, the file you re-
ceived, would not have been signed.
Senator GRASSLEY. Do you maintain a correspondence log?
Mr. SCHILIRO. The file copy that you see is our log. It is dated,
or it is stamped with the file number 265A.
Senator GRASSLEY. Where is the signed letter, then?
Mr. SCHILIRO. The signed letter would have been the transmittal
letter, the one sent to NTSB. The copy letter, the file copy, would
not have been signed.
Senator GRASSLEY. That was my next question. The NTSB does
not have a record
Mr. SCHILIRO. There is no doubt in my mind that this letter was
sent and the copy was forwarded to NTSB.
Senator GRASSLEY. Then let me ask you, why do you think the
NTSB never received it?
Mr. SCHILIRO. I have no idea, Senator.
Senator GRASSLEY. There are some heavy slashes and strokes
through here. What is the meaning of that?
Mr. SCHILIRO. That was indexed into our file system in order to
allow us to retrieve the document.
Senator GRASSLEY. Did Mr. Kallstrom tell you that he signed and
sent the letter and report?
Mr. SCHILIRO. Not on this particular letter, but I have had con-
versations with Mr. Kallstrom about that report and I do recall
hearing him speak of his conversations with the NTSB about it.
63
Senator GRASSLEY. I would say that it is my opinion that a lack

of a valid copy lacks credibility. Of all the hundreds of documents
that we have from Mr. Kallstrom, this is the only one that is not
signed. That is a fact. This is the only one that is not signed, and
we had boxes of documents delivered on Friday to us.
Does the FBI confirm that a psychic was brought to the scene of
the TWA 800, and if so, why?
Mr. SCHILIRO. It is my understanding that that did occur, yes,
sir. That was an inadvertent mistake on the part of the agent. He
was out at Calverton at the time the psychic called in and asked
to be allowed to appear and he allowed that to happen. But, again,
as previously testified to, that was unauthorized.
Senator GRASSLEY. OK. Let me ask you, Mr. Kerr, is that your
understanding, as well, that a psychic was there?
Mr. KERR. That occurred prior to my joining the FBI in midOc-
tober 1997, so I cannot comment on it.
Senator GRASSLEY. Let me ask you from the standpoint of your
being an outstanding scientist, still are, but before you took over,
as well, what do you think of that, if that did happen?
Mr. KERR. Well, I sympathize with the position that Mr. Schiliro
and Mr. Kallstrom were in. It was an unauthorized visit, and, I
suspect, quite inappropriate at the time, and had they known of it,
I expect it would not have happened.
Senator GRASSLEY. To both of you on another question, does the
FBI acknowledge that the NTSB under title 49 has the lead on in-
vestigating accidents until there is a determination of a criminal
act? Would you start out, Mr. Schiliro?
Mr. SCHILIRO. I do agree with that, Senator, obviously. I think,
though, that each case has to be looked at individually, certainly
the circumstances and the initial factual predicate that we usually
undertake or attempt to undertake any investigation that we par-
ticipate in. Certainly, specifically at TWA, the circumstances sur-
rounding the way the craft went down and the possible involve-
ment of a terrorist act on any one of them, but I think you have
to balance that on each occasion and a separate determination
made.
Senator GRASSLEY. How would you respond to the proposed legis-
lation which would establish that all transportation accidents be
investigated by the NTSB until evidence of criminal activity arose?
Mr. SCHILIRO. Well, I think the predication that you suggest is
a valid one. However, I also think it is important to bear in mind
that, certainly in TWA and other cases, there is a great deal of in-
formation that comes in to us outside of the actual crime scene, or
accident scene, as the case may be, to include both human intel-
ligence, international information that we receive regarding terror-
ist threats, and certainly electronic information that we are receiv-
ing, and I think there is a great need to balance all those things
so that we can come to a just and expeditious resolution. To the
extent that the public is in danger as a result of human interven-
tion, that also needs to be taken into account, and I think it was
certainly in this case.
But my experience, just as a caveat, at Calverton and certainly
at Moriches, was a very positive one. The number of agencies that
were involved, I think for the most part, the reaction, the bringing
64
to bear of a great amount of expertise, both within the government

and outside the government, and I think, for the most part, it
worked pretty well. So I think that, basically, the system did work
as it should have worked.
Senator GRASSLEY. Was there any disciplinary action imposed be-
cause of the unauthorized visit by the psychic?
Mr. SCHILIRO. To my knowledge, no, although I believe the agent
was spoken to about it.
Senator GRASSLEY. Dr. Kerr, when investigating a plane crash,
does the FBI first rule out mechanical failures or design flaws in
the aircraft?
Mr. KERR. In the part of the FBI that I am associated with and
responsible for, we do not rule in or rule out. Our job, basically, is
to collect and examine whatever physical evidence there might be
and to reach whatever conclusions that evidence might allow.
The other thing we do is provide some of our technical people to
support searches and other aspects of the investigation. They are
typically not people who would be subsequently involved in exam-
ining the evidence.
Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Schiliro, the same question for you.
Mr. SCHILIRO. Yes, basically, Senator, although I do think our
focus is one of a criminal nature. I mean, our job is to determine
whether or not there is evidence of a criminal act, to make that de-
termination as fairly and as objectively as we can, and to the ex-
tent that the evidence rules that out, certainly, there are other
agencies in this government that have the responsibility to deter-
mine the cause of that crash.
Senator GRASSLEY. In the case of your answer being yes, why
was it not done, then, in the case of the TWA 800?
Mr. SCHILIRO. I think it was done, Senator. I think that the fact
that over a million pieces of that craft needed to be recovered, the
fact that it was 9 miles out and 120 feet below the ocean took some
time to do. The fact of reconciling the manifests, the cargo mani-
fest, the passenger manifest, the number of outside agencies we
brought to bear to determine the best science that we could pos-
sibly bring to the resolution of that case, the fact that it took 16
months from the beginning until actually a final resolution was
made, I do not find to be that extraordinary under these cir-
cumstances. And I think as soon as enough evidence was deter-
mined that there was no criminal cause, the FBI did remove itself,
for the most part, from this investigation.
Senator GRASSLEY. I think that it is fair to say that todays wit-
nesses disagree with you on that point.
Let me start with Dr. Kerr. Why were basic evidentiary proce-
dures so clearly violated in the following: The removal of a seat
cover without regard to blast damage location, the mishandling of
the victims clothing in a refrigerated truck, pulling fragments out
of seat cushions without photographing and documenting alter-
ations, and that is just three examples of a lot I could give, and
I will not give any more, but you get the gist of the question.
Mr. KERR. No, I get the gist of the question. I am afraid that I
have to plead ignorance. I was not there. I was not in charge at
the time.
Senator GRASSLEY. Then I will ask Mr. Schiliro.
65
Mr. SCHILIRO. Senator, certainly, I do not dispute those ren-

ditions of what could have occurred in the handling of over a mil-
lion pieces of evidence. There may have been some mistakes along
the way. But I disagree to the extent that the number of pieces
that we brought in, the fact that we had agents on each of the re-
covery craft that cataloged it. We did take GPS of the bodies recov-
ered. The initial bodies, as you are aware, were not taken from be-
neath the sea. They were brought in from the surface. But the oth-
ers were. I think it is a tribute to that effort that every one of the
victims were recovered. The number of items that we logged in ex-
ceeded a million. To the extent that there were errors made in sev-
eral of those, I mean, I do not disagree with that, but we made
every attempt to maintain a chain of custody.
The issue on the photographs, I know that that became an issue
early on in the investigation, but the reason, the simple reason for
that was that if any of those photographs became evidentiary in
nature, that we needed to maintain the negatives. It was no more
or less than that.
And I think that, for the most part, the investigators out there
did get along and did maintain a dialogue on those issues, and as
they came up, there were every attempt made to resolve them. I
kind of think that there is a sense that there was a great deal of
animosity out there and I did not see that at all.
Senator GRASSLEY. Dr. Kerr, even though you were not there, so
you could not answer my question, I assume that there is an un-
derstanding that the procedure does not follow scientific protocol,
so what would you be doing to make sure that it does not happen
in the future, then?
Mr. KERR. One reason we have invested so much effort both in
training our own people in the Laboratory Division with regard to
chain of custody and proper treatment of evidence and are extend-
ing that as quickly and as completely as we can to the Evidence
Response Team is to avoid any question in the future about proper
handling of evidence.
Senator GRASSLEY. Dr. Kerr, why is not the FBIs explosives
group accredited like the ATF lab is? What is it that the explosives
group does that lends itself to not being accredited?
Mr. KERR. I do not think that ASCLD has accredited the ATF lab
in the explosives group, either. There are eight disciplines that are
accredited and explosives is not one. A part of the explosives group
that has to do with elemental analysis is, in fact, part of the ac-
creditation, but there is no accreditation, for example, for the ex-
aminers who work on explosive components, for example.
Senator GRASSLEY. Is the explosives group ever audited to make
sure that it is following protocols and procedures?
Mr. KERR. Yes, it is.
Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Schiliro, why did Mr. Kallstrom initially
refuse to accept the ATF report?
Mr. SCHILIRO. I do not know, Senator, if I would describe it as
initially refused it. I think the problem was, as Mr. Tobin referred
to the cardboard box theory, was before an opinion or a conclusion
or a theory was finalized or written to report, that the whole box
be looked at. At the time that report was written, the investigation
66
had not concluded yet, and I think he felt from our discussions
with him that it was premature in nature.
The issue at that time certainly still could have been that had
a criminal defendant been uncovered, that, of course, all the infor-
mation that was goingthat we wanted to be consistent with a
final conclusion, and I think his feeling on this was, from our con-
versations with him, that it was premature, not that he was
against the actual submission of it.
Senator GRASSLEY. Dr. Kerr, could you share with us the results
of the audit of the explosives group?
Mr. KERR. Well, we actually have a quality assurance unit in the
laboratory and a separate reporting chain and they, roughly quar-
terly, ascertain that the Materials and Devices Unit is, in fact, ad-
hering to our requirements to follow the ASCLD procedures for
handling evidence, maintaining the chain of custody. We do pro-
ficiency tests of the examiners and they are subject to the same
moot court training that the examiners in the other disciplines in
the laboratory are.
Senator GRASSLEY. I guess I would maybe later on ask you to
brief us on that.
Mr. KERR. I would be happy to.
Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you. Let me start with you, Dr. Kerr,
and Mr. Schiliro on the same question, why does the ATF meth-
odology involve ruling out accidents prior to establishing a criminal
act, while the FBI methodology is solely to prove a criminal act?
Let me start with you, Mr. Schiliro.
Mr. SCHILIRO. I am not so sure I agree that we go into it at-
tempting to prove or disprove a criminal act as much as it is an
attempt, as ATF does, to objectively go in and determine a cause.
Our focus, admittedly, is the enforcement and investigation of title
18. That is what we are there for. So I do not dispute the fact that
we focus our efforts and our resources in a determination as to
whether or not a criminal act occurred, and second, if an act did
occur, whether or not a Federal prosecution will emanate from
that.
I do not think, though, that is inconsistent with any of the agen-
cies represented here today. And, as a matter of fact, in the TWA
case, there were two distinct groups formed. One was the mechani-
cal failures group and the other one was the law enforcement
group, and I think that under the right circumstances, the inves-
tigative effort from each of those groups can be conducted in a con-
sistent and objective matter.
The fact that we have a criminal focus does not necessarily mean
that we are not objective in our approach to that. But by our very
nature and by what we are charged with, the responsibility of, we
do have a criminal focus. There is no dispute with that.
Senator GRASSLEY. Dr. Kerr, anything to add?
Mr. KERR. I would only add that there were a number of theories
advanced both in the press by individuals who chose to come for-
ward and, of course, by those who were witnesses to the event.
Within that highly speculative environment, one has to review the
physical evidence and as much of it as possible in order to rule out
a number of the theories that were, in fact, on the table. So I do
67
not think it unusual at all, nor representative of a bias, to have the

investigation go on for the period it did.
And, in fact, since I arrived as it was concluding, I did have the
opportunity to talk to Jim Kallstrom. He was preparing to, in fact,
go to the public with the results of the investigation in November.
He was trying to assure himself, even in October and November
1997, that all of the leads, all of the possibilities, and all of the ex-
pertise that he might have been able to call on had been consulted.
And so we, in fact, brought in several outside people to assist in
reviewing the reports before he went public.
Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Schiliro, in light of todays testimony,
does the FBI still feel that the way that the TWA investigation was
handled is a model for the future?
Mr. SCHILIRO. Senator, having seen the beginnings of it, at least
for the first month or two, I was amazed at the great expertise that
the NTSB was able to bring to bear in terms of the accident inves-
tigation. Truly, never having participated in an investigation of
that nature before, it amazed me in terms of the expertise, the or-
ganizational skills, and how they went about organizing, actually,
the reconstruction effort. It was just phenomenal in terms of this
government, I think, at its finest.
Certainly, I think, we reacted from the Terrorist Task Force. I
mean, we did send, for the most part, the people who are associ-
ated with that group out to participate that and to, certainly, if a
criminal act had occurred, to investigate it and to resolve it.
I think, certainly, with the amount of people involved and abso-
lutely the horrendous nature of that tragedy, there were issues
that were created. I think most of them were resolved on-site.
Some of them still linger, and others that you heard about here
today. But I do not find that distressing. I think it is a constructive
way to look at it. Obviously, if we had to do it again, there were
certain things that we would go ahead and probably redo dif-
ferently.
But, I think, bear in mind, we had never, at least in New York,
reacted to a crime scene some distance out to sea and the distance
that it was below the ocean floor. We needed to learn from that.
We now are beginning a cross-training program with the NTSB,
and, hopefully, the cultural differences will become less as that pro-
gram proceeds.
But I do believe that that, in many ways, was a good effort. It
brought together a lot of people of varying backgroundsI think
that was healthyin terms of a resolution to this. If there were dif-
ferences, those differences were debated and, I think, brought to
light.
So I do think that, from what I saw from the agents and the in-
vestigators involved out there, the sacrifice that they put forth,
and, I think, still the emotional issues that remain today as a re-
sult of their dealings out there, I do believe that it was a good ef-
fort. Do I think there were mistakes that could be improved upon?
Certainly.
Senator GRASSLEY. I hope you have an opportunity. I am going
to send you a list of the documents that were released today and
after you study them see if you still have the same opinion.
68
Dr. Kerr, have you begun negotiating a memorandum of under-

standing with the NTSB for future investigations?
Mr. KERR. People from the Laboratory Division were involved in
the after-action report, and the specific thing that I mentioned to
you about the cross-training between the NTSB program and our
ERT program is something we will work on. The agency-to-agency
MOU is not something that I am responsible for.
Senator GRASSLEY. It is my understanding that there has not ac-
tually begun that process of that memorandum of understanding,
and I suppose if I want to know why, I will have to ask somebody
else other than you, then, is that correct?
Mr. KERR. That is correct.
Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Schiliro, your statement says, The FBI
investigation of TWA Flight 800 was one of the most thorough and
finest ever concluded by the agency. I draw a very different con-
clusion based upon the testimony and evidence presented here. I
think that the public was ill-served by the FBI in the TWA Flight
800 investigation and I intend to make sure that this type of inves-
tigation does not take place again.
Dr. Kerr, are the rapid deployment teams the result of lessons
learned from the problems discovered during the TWA case or any
other case?
Mr. KERR. They are really an outgrowth of looking back at TWA
800, but more importantly, they were the result of discussions that
Mr. Schiliro, Director Freeh, the Assistant Director in Charge of
the Washington Field Office Jimmy Carter, and I had on our way
to East Africa as we thought through what we had already been
doing to deploy our capabilities and what we ought to be planning
to do in the future. It was decided that we ought to formally iden-
tify these teams, train them, have their equipment ready for load-
out in a short time so that our response could basically be as fast
as finding the transportation to get there. So it was, yes, learning
and finding a way to improve our response.
Senator GRASSLEY. The Inspector General, Dr. Kerr, last year
raised the red flag that there were still cultural problems with the
explosives group. At a minimum, I think the groups should be
heavily and constantly audited to know if they are doing their jobs
right, and I would like to know if you have that same concern.
Mr. KERR. Having watched them perform halfway around the
world at two crime scenes the equivalent of the Oklahoma City
bombing, I am not concerned with their present level of perform-
ance. They are doing it very well.
Senator GRASSLEY. So you disagree with the Inspector General,
then?
Mr. KERR. He made the statement before that happened, I be-
lieve.
Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Schiliro, this is in regard to the films
being made by the FBI instead of the National Transportation
Safety Board. If you needed to keep the negatives, where are those
films now?
Mr. SCHILIRO. My understanding, Senator, is well over 400-and
and I could get back to you on this, but about 400 outside rolls of
film were processed through our lab. My belief is we still have all
those negatives.
69
Senator GRASSLEY. Why did you need to keep the whole roll and
not give Mr. Zakar his pictures?
Mr. SCHILIRO. I am not familiar with Mr. Zakars pictures, but
the reason to keep the negatives is if any one of those pictures be-
came evidentiary and we needed to introduce them in court, the
U.S. attorney who did come out and review the procedures in place
would have had to have the original negative. That was just solely
the reason to maintain chain of custody on that.
Senator GRASSLEY. I thank you all very much for answering our
questions. You are the last panel, so the hearing is over now. I
thank all of the witnesses, and particularly the FBI, for cooperating
with the subcommittee. I think the whole issue here is the efforts
that agencies put forth to make sure that the traveling safety is
there, the public safety is there, and also increasing confidence in
Federal law enforcement.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
FORENSIC ENGINEERING INTERNATIONAL,

June 18, 1999.
Senator CHARLES E. GRASSLEY,
Hart Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Thank you for your letter of June 8, 1999 regarding my testimony of May 10, 1999
before the Judiciary Subcommittee hearing on Administrative Oversight of the In-
vestigation of TWA Flight 800.
RESPONSE OF MICHAEL L. MARX TO A QUESTION FROM SENATOR THURMOND

Accompanying your letter was a question from Senator Thurmond asking if I had
advised any of my superiors at the NTSB about FBI errors made during this inves-
tigation and if so, what actions did my superiors take.
From my standpoint the primary impropriety by the FBI was the handling of pho-
tographic evidence for the NTSB. As indicated at the hearing, I initially was not
allowed to take photographs of the structure. Instead photographs had to be ob-
tained and processed by FBI representatives. Photographs that I requested were
never returned to me and to this day I have no idea if they were ever processed.
At a group meeting at NTSB headquarters in November of 1996, I informed the
NTSB Office Directors that photographs were not processed as claimed by the FBI
or, if they were, had not been made available to the NTSB. During that meeting,
I was supported by Dr. Bernard Loeb, Director of the Office of Aviation Safety, to
do whatever was necessary to obtain photographs. It was his support that gave me
the courage to challenge the entrenched procedure of having all photographs proc-
essed by the FBI.
The NTSB had little or no control over the direction the FBI was taking during
its investigation of the airplane structure. In-flight breakup deformations and holes
obvious to investigators experienced in looking at fragmented aircraft structure were
considered suspicious by management of the FBI investigation team. The FBI would
not rely on the NTSB expertise regarding assessment of this damage. Instead the
FBI brought in representatives of the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) to do
examinations of these holes even though BNL had no experience in looking at struc-
tural deformations of the magnitude involved. I notified NTSB management that the
FBI was soliciting the services of BNL for these purposes and that I did not believe
they were qualified to make a proper assessment of this damage. NTSB manage-
ment made it clear to me that any of these examinations had to be at least overseen
or be produced by NTSB, representatives instead of being left solely in the hands
of inexperienced personnel.
In conclusion, I apprised the NTSB management about any problems or apparent
improper investigative procedures initiated by the FBI and my management in turn
directed or supported any changes that I felt were necessary to move forward with
the investigation.
I appreciate being able to comment to any questions from your committee regard-
ing this matter. Please feel free to contact me should you need further clarification.
Sincerely,
MICHAEL L. MARX.
(71)
72
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD,
Washington, DC, June 14, 1999.
Senator CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts,
Committee on the Judiciary U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
DEAR CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY: In response to your letter of June 8, 1999, requesting
that I provide additional information concerning my testimony before your commit-
tee on May 10, 1999, offer the following:
RESPONSE OF HENRY H. HUGHES TO A QUESTION FROM SENATOR THURMOND

Question. You testified that the FBI made errors in the investigation, handling,
and processing of evidence. Did you advise any of your superiors at NTSB of these
errors? If so, what actions, if any, did they take with respect to them?
Answer. I and others advised Investigator-In-Charge Alfred Dickenson,Office of
Aviation Safety Director Dr. Bernard Loeb, and NTSB Chairman Jim Hall of the
problems related to the collection, processing, and safeguarding of evidence as well
the investigative process on a continual basis.
Unfortunately, things such as an evidence control log which should be used to
document all evidence submitted to any laboratory for examination or testing fell
on deaf ears and was not accepted despite many complaints over a several month
period by all the parties to the investigation. The absence of an evidence control log
made it impossible to know what evidence had been removed from the hangers,
what laboratory it had been sent to or by whom, what the nature and results or
the tests were, and what the final disposition of the evidence was. To this day there
are still unanswered questions concerning evidence sent for examination.
I saw little positive action taken by the NTSB to address these problems. In my
opinion, we (NTSB) had a serious leadership problem during the course of the inves-
tigation. One of many examples of this was the Vice Chairmans Robert Francis ab-
sence on a daily basis from all daily investigative progress meetings. These meetings
are critical in charting the progress and direction of an investigation. I have partici-
pated in over 110 major transportation accident investigations while with the NTSB
and the TWA-800 investigation is the only one in which the NTSB Board Member
in charge was never available to the investigative staff.
During the course of the on scene investigation, which lasted over a 15 plus
month period, the NTSB Vice Chairman in charge of the NTSB investigation not
only never showed up for daily investigative progress meetings, he gave away the
Safety Boards authority, to without, to my knowledge, consulting the staff or the
headquarters managers. It is easy to see how the FBI just resorted to their usual
modus operandi of taking charge even if they didnt know what they were getting
into.
The FBI made several mistakes however, to be fair the NTSB is also responsible
for its share of errors, the most serious of which was the inexcusable absence of
leadership.
In the event I may be of further service please do not hesitate to contact me at
my office.
Sincerely,
HENRY F. HUGHES.
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD,

Senator CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts,
Committee on the Judiciary U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
DEAR CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY: This letter is in response to your June 8, 1999, trans-
mittal of a post-hearing question from Senator Strom Thurmond. Below is the infor-
mation requested.
RESPONSE OF FRANK P. ZAKAR TO A QUESTION FROM SENATOR THURMOND

Question. You testified that the FBI made errors in the investigation, handling,
and processing of evidence. Did you advise your superiors at the NTSB of these er-
rors? If so, what actions, if any, did they take with respect to them?
73
Answer. All of my observations concerning handling of the airplane wreckage and
investigation procedures were verbally shared with other NTSB investigators and
the NTSB investigator-in-charge that were working in the hangar. My concerns
were also verbally transmitted within the confines of the hangar to the coordinators
of the FBI who at that time oversaw the hangar operation. There was no aggressive
effort on behalf of either agency (FBI and NTSB) to pursue many of the issues pre-
sented in my testimony before the Committee. I believe the control, organization,
and philosophy of future investigations could be clarified by developing a memoran-
dum of understanding between the two agencies.
If your office requires additional information, I can be contacted at my office.
Sincerely,
FRANK P. ZAKAR.
RESPONSES OF WILLIAM A. TOBIN TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR THURMOND

Question 1. The substance of your testimony appears to be that you had concluded
by mid-September 1996 that the cause of the Flight 800 crash was mechanical. Was
your conclusion in mid-September preliminary or final? Please explain fully.
Answer. My conclusion and testimony were that there was no indication of crimi-
nal activity, not that the cause of the Flight 800 crash was mechanical. Absence
of criminal activity does not, per se, suggest mechanical failure. In my experience,
non-criminal human performance issues have periodically been found to cause or
contribute to transport, structure and/or system failures.
The terms preliminary and final imply a more distinct or emphatic delineation
than warrants for the circumstances. I was very strong in my opinion as of the end
of August 1996 that no criminal activity was evident. My opinion was sufficiently
strong that, to use FBI resources more effectively, I urged keeping only a small con-
tingent to represent FBI interests, e.g., one metallurgist and several local agents,
as had been done with almost all other transport disasters I had worked the prior
25 years. I indicated that the NTSB was quite qualified and capable of recognizing
unusual transport material deformation and damage and that having an FBI foren-
sic metallurgist on site would maintain FBI interests and allow for escalating FBI
presence if necessary or desired.
As strong as my opinion was by late August 1996, I was always open for addi-
tional information and data, should unusual circumstances be discovered. However,
I considered that possibility very remote. As my colleague, Dr. Michael Smith, whom
I was training at the time indicated when he returned from the Bruntingthorpe
testing, even the smallest of charges (used in the tests) was so demonstrative that
* * * it was so obvious * * * that we had no such indication on any of the pieces
recovered from the TWA 800 crash. And, again, the charge used for the testing was
miniscule compared to what could be expected from bombs or missiles.
Question 2. You testified that, in September 1996, all the metallurgists, including
those from NTSB, and all the explosives examiners were united in their opinion that
the crash was not the result of a bomb or a missile. Yet, in June 1997, Chairman
Hall, testifying before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Subcommittee on Aviation said that the NTSB was pursuing six scenarios as the
cause of the crash, including a proximity missile explosion and a small explosive
charge placed in or near the center fuel tank. In addition, NTSB funded a series
of tests at Bruntingthorpe, United Kingdom, that ran for several months from early
to mid-1997 to test various theories, including the small-explosive-charge theory.
Please explain the need for this continued study if there was no difference in opin-
ion.
Answer. It was my understanding that the Bruntingthorpe testing was scheduled,
among numerous other considerations, primarily to view an explosion of the center
fuel tank. The NTSB was convinced early on that the initial reason the aircraft lost
structural integrity was that the center wing tank exploded due to ignition of fuel
vapor in the tank. However, they could not explain what ignited the tank and,
therefore, all scenarios or possibilities had to be entertained until enough evidence
existed to support one to the exclusion of the others. The additional testing was ex-
pected to show that the impulsive loading scenarios (bombs, missiles, shaped
charges) would have left distinct physical evidence which would be identifiable in
the wreckage. Since such testing was a rare occurrence and few 747s were available
for repeated testing, testing for most of the scenarios was scheduled for the
Bruntingthorpe tests.
In the light of Mr. Kallstroms continuing insistence that all the pieces of the
wreckage [had] not been recovered, one of the reasons supporting scheduling the
tests was that the tests would be useful to convey what was known to the forensic
74
metallurgists: that characteristics of bomb or missile damage would have been evi-
dent even if substantially less of the aircraft had been recovered.
Question 3. You testified that there were reasons you. did not take notes or other-
wise document your examinations in TWA Flight 800. Please explain those reasons.
Answer. (1) By Mr. Kallstroms own public representations, there were over one
million damaged aircraft pieces and parts. Metallurgical examination notes would
likely average two or three full pages per part, particularly when it would nec-
essarily include a complete description of the part, its geometry and uniquely identi-
fying characteristics (for subsequent identification). I would still be taking notes in
Calverton, N.Y. today if in the normal forensic examination mode. This would have
comprised an unduly burdensome and unwarranted effort, particularly inasmuch as
no statutory authority existed for the FBI to determine the cause of the crash,
only whether any characteristic existed suggestive of criminal activity. The alter-
native would have been to record, Metallurgical examinations revealed no char-
acteristic indicative of criminal activity one million times, a notation that would
still require a complete description and measurements of each part to uniquely iden-
tify the item at a later date.
(2) The material damage and component failures were concluded to have resulted
from low order explosion (fuel tank), impact and corrosion mechanisms, with enough
representative parts to effectively and strongly indicate no FBI metallurgical or ma-
terials science involvement was mandated unless NTSB subsequently developed
characteristics or indications of possible criminal activity or cause(s). This was obvi-
ous to Dr. Michael Smith (my colleague) and I within the first several weeks.
(3) Every recovered piece was examined at least once and jointly, by both FBI and
NTSB metallurgists. I was part of the fracture sequencing group and regularly re-
viewed the logs/reports of the Metallurgy Group findings, which all parties signed,
including metallurgists from the financially interested parties.
(4) I did not believe the taxpayers should fund duplicitous and costly note taking,
particularly when there existed notes jointly obtained and agreed upon by all metal-
lurgists involved; there existed a contemporaneous log and recording of the groups
findings, we were all in agreement, and there was no indication of criminal involve-
ment.
(5) Duplicitous notes have been used in the past to muddy the waters or to the
serious detriment of interested parties in a judicial process. Two scientists will gen-
erally not take identical readings or measurements of undamaged and undeformed
parts, let alone badly damaged (extensively bent and crushed) items.
(6) It was my conviction that prima facie statutory authority rested with the
NTSB, and until they, my colleague or I concluded that material damage suggested
a reasonable possibility of criminal involvement, there was plenty of time to crank
up a forensic investigation and subject the appropriate pieces to extensive forensic
examinations. There were no time or schedule exigencies which would have pre-
cluded extensive note taking immediately upon observation of a characteristic sug-
gestive or criminal activity. As far as I am aware, the aircraft remnants are still
in position as reconstructed in Calverton, New York.
RESPONSES OF ANDREW VITA TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR THURMOND

Question 1. You testified that ATF collaborated with the National Transportation
Safety Board and other investigators in the preparation of the January 20, 1997,
ATF report on Flight 800. Please elaborate on which agencies collaborated and the
extent of such collaboration.
Answer. During the TWA Flight 800 investigation, the role of the Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) was to support both the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (FBI) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Throughout
the investigation, ATF worked with members of various multi-agency teams. The
teams included all the member agencies of the FBI/NYPD Joint Terrorist Task
Force, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Suffolk and Nassau County Police
Departments, the United States Coast Guard, the United States Navy, the Airline
Pilots Association, TWA, and the Boeing Corporation. ATF worked side-by-side with
the other agency teams in the onsite recovery and examination effort, continuously
sharing and exchanging ideas and expertise among the team members. The ATF
Certified Fire Investigators Report (CFI report) was based on information pre-
viously obtained from collaboration with other agency investigative teams, and
ATFs conclusions regarding fire progression, independent research, fuel/air blast
patterns and the lack of high explosive blast patterns.
75
Question 2. Prior to the preparation of the ATF report, did ATF inform anyone
from the FBI at the Calverton facility, the FBIs New York field office, the FBI
Crime Laboratory, or FBI Headquarters in Washington that ATF was preparing a
report on Flight 800? Please explain.
Answer. After being briefed on December 23, 1996, by the CFI team, I directed
the team to document their findings in a written report. I later advised Bill
Esposito, Deputy Director of the FBI, that we were concluding our examination of
the airplane wreckage and were preparing a report of our findings, which I offered
to brief Mr. Esposito, the FBI Director, and any other FBI personnel at the earliest
opportunity. Mr. Esposito indicated he would check with the Directors schedule and
get back to me if they wanted a briefing. I believe this conversation occurred some-
time early in 1997. Mr. Esposito never requested the briefing.
Question 3. You testified that, based on the information in the ATF report, you
were very concerned about air safety and the possibility of design flaws in the air-
craft. The report was dated January 20, 1997, but apparently there was a consider-
able delay before the FBI actually received it. When was the report provided to the
FBI? Also, when did you become aware of the substance of the reports findings, and
when did you become concerned about design flaws and air safety issues?
Answer. I was initially briefed by the Certified Fire Investigators concerning their
findings as to the crash of TWA Flight 800 on December 23, 1996. I subsequently
received a draft report of those findings. Upon my review, I requested clarification
of certain technical references made in the report. The report was revised and
signed on January 20, 1997. Subsequent briefings on the information in the report
were given to Treasury Department officials. ATF delivered a copy of the CFI report
to the FBI Assistant Director in New York City on March 13, 1997.
During the initial briefing in December 1996, I became aware of possible design
flaws and air safety issues. I planned to have the final written CFI report transmit-
ted to both the FBI and the NTSB. I was of the belief that NTSB personnel were
familiar with the conclusions contained in the report as the result of ATFs frequent
interaction with the agency throughout the investigation.
Question 4. Did the FBI invite ATF to assist in the investigation?
Answer. Within hours of the crash, the FBI Assistant Director in New York tele-
phoned ATFs New York Special Agent in Charge and requested ATFs assistance
in the investigation.
Question 5. Given the magnitude of the Flight 800 tragedy and the need to coordi-
nate the law enforcement investigation and response, do you believe the FBIs proto-
cols or conditions were reasonable? Did ATF follow these protocols? Please explain.
Answer. I believe that in any investigation, it is important for information to be
shared among all the agencies to ensure that the collective knowledge of those in-
volved is used to its fullest. I do not know of any specific protocols or conditions es-
tablished by the FBI in this investigation.
Question 6. You testified that the ATF report was a Snapshot and that it was
issued at a time when ATF was aware the investigation was continuing with many
initiatives underway. Was the ATF report intended to offer a definitive conclusion
about the causes of the Flight 800 crash?
Answer. The CFI report was completed after most of the aircraft had been recov-
ered. The CFI report was intended to convey to the FBI and the NTSB the Certified
Fire Investigators opinions based on the information then available to them. The
CFI report was intended to assist those agencies in their continuing investigations.
The CFI report documented the opinion of the CFI investigators that a fuel/air ex-
plosion within the planes center fuel tank caused the crash of TWA 800. The report
further documents the lack of evidence regarding a high explosive initiation of the
fuel tank and indicates that the fuel/air blast patterns identify an area of origin in
the second cell from the rear on the starboard side of the center fuel tank. Investiga-
tion failed to identify any potential spark producing item in that particular cell ex-
cept for a fuel indicator probe. Based on the process of elimination the CFIs con-
cluded that this probe was the probable source of ignition. Due to the design of the
probe it would have had to have been subjected to some unknown electrical feedback
of sufficient intensity to generate the needed spark. The CFIs were unable to deter-
mine the specific source of the electrical energy, which could have bled into the fuel
indicator system causing the initiation of the vapor mixture.
76
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Honorable CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Administrative
Oversight and the Courts,
Hart Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.
DEAR SENATOR GRASSLEY: This is in response to your letter of June 7, 1999, which
enclosed four follow-up questions concerning my testimony on May 10, 1999, at the
hearing on Administrative Oversight of the Investigation of TWA Flight 800. I am
pleased to respond to these questions in an effort to clarify any misconceptions
which may have arisen from the testimony provided by witnesses at the hearing.
RESPONSES OF DONALD M. KERR TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR GRASSLEY
Your first two questions addressed the accreditation status of the FBI and ATF
Laboratories, specifically in the area of explosives examinations. The FBI Labora-
tory was fully accredited by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors
Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLDLAB) on September 11, 1998, as recorded
on Certificate of Accreditation No. 186. This certificate documents that the FBI Lab-
oratory is accredited in the disciplines of: Controlled Substances, Toxicology, Trace
Evidence, Serology, DNA, Firearms-Toolmarks, Questioned Documents and Latent
Prints. This accreditation is granted for a five-year period provided that the labora-
tory continues to meet ASCLDLAB standards and requirements. Thus, the FBI
Laboratorys present accreditation will remain in effect until September 10, 2003,
at which time the FBI will submit a new application for accreditation and undergo
another on-site inspection.
ASCLDLAB is presently capable of accrediting only the eight disciplines listed
above. Therefore, the FBI enjoys a fully accredited status. Contact with ASCLD
LAB determined that the ATF Laboratory was initially accredited in 1984, but is
presently accredited in only four of these disciplines (Trace Evidence, Firearms-
Toolmarks, Questioned Documents and Latent Prints). Therefore, I am somewhat
dismayed that an impression was created that the ATF Laboratorys accreditation
status is superior to that of the FBI Laboratorys in that it is inconsistent with the
facts.
With respect to the specific accreditation status of explosives unit personnel, it is
important to note that explosive device construction and function examinations com-
prise a discipline that is not accreditable by ASCLDLAB. However, the FBI and
ATF chemists who conduct explosive and arson residue analyses are accredited by
ASCLDLAB under the trace evidence discipline.
Recognizing the benefits of operational assessment and conformance to estab-
lished standards, the FBI Laboratory elected to have its non-accreditable functions
(e.g. explosive device construction and function examinations, metallurgical exami-
nations, etc.) operate in the same framework as its accreditable disciplines. More-
over, Dr. Thomas Jourdan, Chief of the Materials and Devices Unit, has taken the
initiative to interact with the present and past head of ASCLDLAB to plan for fu-
ture accreditation of explosives and hazardous devices examinations. In furtherance
of this endeavor, Dr. Jourdan and his staff have visited a number of foreign labora-
tories which have been heavily engaged in such examinations. These include: the
Defense Establishment Research Agency Laboratory in Kent, England; the Northern
Ireland Forensic Agency in Belfast, Ireland; the French National Laboratory in
Paris, France; the Israeli National Police Laboratory in Jerusalem, Israel; and the
Victoria Forensic Science Centre in Melbourne, Australia. The objectives of these
visits have been the exchange of examination protocols and the establishment of
consensus on good laboratory practice. The FBI Laboratory has provided its explo-
sive device construction and function examination protocols to these laboratories for
review and comment. In addition, the FBI Laboratory has been an active participant
in the establishment of a Technical Working Group for Fire and Explosive Debris
(TWGFEX) in cooperation with the National Center For Forensic Science, Univer-
sity of Central Florida, Orlando, Florida.
I would also point out that the FBI Laboratory presently has five examiners who
are certified ASCLDLAB inspectors who are periodically called upon to serve on
inspection teams detailed to conduct on-site inspections of other forensic laboratories
that are seeking accreditation.
Your third question dealt with the FBI Laboratorys experience in the investiga-
tion of accidental explosions. The Devices Operations Group of the Materials and
Devices Unit (formerly referred to as the Explosives Unit prior to a restructuring
77
in 1997) has over the years conducted a number of suspected explosion investiga-
tions which were determined to be accidental. Some of the more notable of these
include: the USS Iowa explosion in 1989; the explosion at the Navy Research Lab-
oratory at White Oak, Maryland in 1992; the crash of PSA Flight 1171 in California
in 1987, the crash of US Air Flight 427 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in 1994; and
the crash of Tarom Airlines Flight R0371 in Bucharest, Romania in 1995.
FBI explosive experts have provided forensic support to a number of aircraft
bombing investigations. A listing of suspected/known terrorist activities targeting
civil aviation were provided under Tab No. 15 in the briefing book that was com-
piled in response to your letter of April 8, 1999.
Your fourth question pertained to evidentiary protocols, namely the examination
of seat cushions and consideration of their blast damage placement; as well as, a
recommendation attributed to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) for the
rinsing and protective coating of aircraft debris recovered from sea water.
Having checked with my staff, I am not aware of the removal of seat cushions
without consideration to their blast damage placement. I am informed that the seat
cushions were soaking wet when recovered and were initially placed in a separate
hangar to dry. Many of the seat cushions were found disengaged from their seat
frames and were recovered as floating debris. Determination of the exact location
of these loose cushions in the aircraft prior to the incident would have been ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible. Most of these seat cushions were impregnated
with Jet-A fuel, thus posing a biohazard. Those seat cushions which had not become
disengaged from their seat frames were left attached to the frames and were pains-
takingly placed in a hangar and arranged according to seat row and number.
Blast damage effects and placement would have been most evident on the seat
frames, which were thorougly examined. Moreover, it would not have been possible
to positively attribute seat cushion damage specifically to blast damage, impact with
the water, thermal damage, or recovery, to the exclusion of the other causes.
I and my staff have no knowledge of seat cushions or seats being removed from
the hangar without prior approval of the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB). All explosive residue sampling of the seat frames and cushions was per-
formed on-site and only swabs and vacuum samples were taken away for laboratory
analyses. The FBI had full authorization from the NTSB to perform such chemical
testing on the seats.
Members of my staff recall consideration of a suggestion to coat aircraft debris
subsequent to its recovery from the ocean to reduce corrosion of the metal surfaces.
The suggestion was attributed to the RCMP, but it was not clear as to whether this
suggestion was communicated to the FBI by an ATF employee.
The suggestion was not acted upon because of concerns that a fresh coating of
light oil would constitute an additional contaminant that would have a very nega-
tive impact on explosives residue sampling. This position was communicated to the
investigators by Mr. Steven Burmeister, Chief of the FBI Laboratorys Chemistry
Unit. The decision was made to not coat the debris and was reportedly agreed to
by all parties.
I hope that the above information is of assistance. if I can be of any further assist-
ance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely yours,
DONALD M. KERR,
Assistant Director,
Laboratory Division.
RESPONSE OF FBI ASSISTANT DIRECTOR SCHILIRO TO A QUESTION FROM

SENATOR THURMOND
Question. Please comment on how the FBIs efforts in the Flight 800 matter as-
sisted and/or expedited the progress of the NTSB investigation or enhanced air safe-
ty.
Answer. The FBI did a number of things that assisted and expedited NTSBs ef-
forts and enhanced air safety.
Beginning the very night of the crash, the FBI provided significant communica-
tion and logistical support essential to managing a tremendously chaotic situation.
This included ensuring that each investigative team on land and at sea were
equipped with voice privacy radio communication so that real time accurate infor-
mation could be relayed from the various venues to the decision makers within the
FBI and the NTSB. The FBI secured a mobile command post (Winnebago trailer)
for NTSBs use at the Center Moriches Coast Guard station and provided NTSB
telephone communications without which they would have been unable to effectively
78
manage the investigation. Also, contrary to statements by some at NTSB, it was the
FBI, through its extensive liaison contacts on Long Island, that located and success-
fully negotiated with the U.S. Navy the use of the Calverton hangar, the cost of
which was later funded by an appropriation to NTSB, where the massive amounts
of aircraft debris could be brought and analyzed. The FBI also provided the tele-
phone communications for NTSB at the hangar. Due in large measure to the efforts
of the FBI with the Department of Defense and the U.S. Navy, the Navy dispatched
a second salvage ship and a flag officer, Admiral.
The FBI and its law enforcement partners, working closely with the U.S. Navy
and the U.S. Coast Guard, assumed the primary responsibility for securing the var-
ious debris sites, the recovery of victims and the recovery and transportation of
wreckage to the Calverton hangar. This was a manpower intensive and a complex
undertaking due to the ocean venue. The FBI also ensured that the evidence was
collected properly with a well- established chain of custody in place. The FBI also
provided round the clock security for the recovery operations and for the Calverton
hangar up until mid-February 1998, approximately three months after the FBI
withdrew from active investigation. In addition, the FBI Disaster squad was dis-
patched to the scene and worked tirelessly in the effort to identify the recovered re-
mains of the victims. These efforts involved hundreds of FBI Agents and Profes-
sional Support employees from New York and throughout the country. Such an un-
dertaking could not have been accomplished in such a timely, effective and legally
sound manner without the direction of the FBI.
FBI investigation at the scene, at Calverton and throughout the world accom-
plished a number of tasks ranging from tracking down and interviewing all pas-
sengers and crew of TWA Flight 881 (Athens to New York) around the globe, to pro-
viding infusions of manpower on numerous occasions to look for particular items of
debris located among the many thousands of pieces at Calverton or to complete a
reconstruction project. If undertaken by NTSB, such efforts would have seriously
strained their limited resources. It should also be pointed out that the main 92 foot
reconstruction project of the planes fuselage was initiated at the insistence and urg-
ing of the FBI to identify possible patterns of damage or directional forces in a
three-dimensional perspective, despite the repeated objection and reluctance of
many NTSB senior managers to take on such an investigative project. FBI Agents
were an integral part of this and other reconstruction projects both in terms of pro-
viding the labor force necessary to build and with respect to, detailed analyses of
the completed projects.
It was also at the urging of the FBI that the evidence collection effort continued
after the cessation of diving operations on November 3, 1996 due to weather condi-
tions. The FBI contracted for the services of four (4) scallop trawlers to literally
rake the ocean floor for aircraft debris from November 1996 until the end of April
1997. Each trawler operated 24 hours a day, weather permitting, and was staffed
by two FBI Special Agents who painstakingly separated sea life from manmade ob-
jects and ensured a proper chain of custody. Through such arduous and thorough
efforts, the FBI and the NTSB and its parties were afforded an unprecedented op-
portunity to conduct further forensic and engineering analyses which assisted in the
overall decision making process.
These are just a few examples of how the FBI not only addressed its own mission,
but provided tremendous assistance and enhancement to the NTSBs investigation.
It should also be mentioned that this view was shared on numerous occasions by
NTSB personnel on the scene and by many of its corporate parties who not only
expressed their sincere gratitude, but candidly commented that the investigation
would have never proceeded in such a dynamic and thorough fashion had it not
been for the massive infusion of FBI resources.
RESPONSES OF FBI ASSISTANT DIRECTOR SCHILIRO TO QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR GRASSLEY
Question 1. The NTSB made safety recommendations to the FAA regarding Cen-
ter Fuel Tanks of Boeing 747 aircrafts in a report dated 12/13/96. Is it policy of the
FBI to condemn NTSB safety recommendations as pre-mature and ill-timed as is
indicated in the FBI report of SA Dennis Smith dated 12/15/96? Does the FBI have
a policy of criticizing NTSB safety recommendations in transportation accidents as
indicated in your portrayal of the TWA 800 investigation as a model for the fu-
ture?
Answer. Your reference to SA Dennis Smiths FBI report as a * * * policy of
the FBI to condemn NTSB safety recommendations * * * is mischaracterized. SA
Smith is one of two specially trained FBI pilots who had previously attended NTSB
79
aircraft accident investigation schools and are fully qualified to conduct FBI aircraft
accident investigations. Their primary role in the TWA 800 investigation was to act
as the principal FBI coordinator with the NTSB and each of its participating par-
ties.
The document that you refer to was not an official FBI report, but rather an infor-
mal note to FBI managers outlining his professional concerns regarding the meth-
odology and justification supporting the NTSBs proposed safety recommendation. In
SA Smiths view, which was shared by a number of the parties, the NTSBs pro-
posed recommendation did not have a sufficient scientific or aeronautical basis to
justify its issuance. SA Smith was also relaying his professional opinion to FBI man-
agers. It was forwarded to FBI management for information purposes. At no time
did the FBI publicize SA Smiths observations or try to influence or delay the
NTSBs issuance of the recommendations.
Ouestion 2. Were any disciplinary measures taken against the FBI agents who
were unauthorized into the hangar of which Mr. Hughs was a team member?
Answer. The FBI is not aware of any unauthorized access into the Cabin Recon-
struction Hangar where Mr. Hughs was assigned.
Question 3. You testified that photographic negatives are evidentiary in nature.
I understand the Bureau has reason to retain the negatives for evidentiary pur-
poses. However, this does not preclude any prints that the NTSB required from
being made. Please explain in detail why prints of Mr. Zakars photos were of evi-
dentiary value and why Mr. Zakar never received them in furtherance of his NTSB
accident investigation. Since our hearing, what efforts have been made to get these
photos to Mr. Zakar.
Answer. When the FBI takes photographs during the course of its investigations,
the negatives are maintained as items of evidence in the exhibits section of the case
file because the negatives are the best evidence and would be what is used in the
event there were questions as to the validity of any photographs used at trial. While
I have not had the opportunity to review a transcript of the hearing, I do not believe
that I testified that the prints of Mr. Zakars photographs were of evidentiary value
and could not be provided to him. To the contrary, I believe that the FBI should
have provided the prints of the film Mr. Zakar testified he submitted to the FBI
for processing to him and I do not believe that I stated in my testimony that the
requirement to maintain the negatives precluded providing prints to Mr. Zakar for
his use in the NTSB investigation.
I have no information why prints of film that Mr. Zakar testified he submitted
to the FBI for processing were not returned to him. The FBIs New York Office
Photo Lab routinely processed thousands of photographs for the FBI, NTSB and
other involved parties during the TWA investigation. The individual submitting the
film to the FBI for processing had to fill out a short form to accompany the film
to the FBIs photo lab for development. After developing, the photographs were for-
warded to Calverton and turned over to the NTSB where they were deposited into
an NTSB file cabinet divided by investigative group. There would be no reason to
retain Mr. Zakars photographs and not follow the established procedure. There
were a few occasions when an NTSB investigator could not initially locate photo-
graphs which later were discovered either in the NTSB file cabinet or within the
NTSBs record keeping system.
As noted above, photographic negatives are maintained as exhibits to the FBI
case file. The TWA case file has an extraordinarily large number of exhibits. Since
the hearing, the FBI has undertaken a review of the TWA file in an effort to locate
the negatives of the film which Mr. Zakar testified that he provided to the FBI for
developing. To date, that review has not located the negatives of any film submitted
by Mr. Zakar. We will continue this review and notify NTSB of the results when
completed.
Ouestion 4. Why did the FBI initially take the lead in showing the victims family
their personal items? Describe the use of your photo album and the subsequent re-
linquishing of this task to the NTSB. Is it common practice for the FBI to process
victims belongings in NTSB accident investigations?
Answer. At the outset of the investigation, all victim clothing and personal items
were considered to be potential evidence in the case and were processed by the FBI
and the participating law enforcement agencies. After processing, the personal prop-
erty items were maintained in a room at Calverton. Valuable items were maintained
in a safe at the Calverton facility. In early August 1996, the FBI established a pol-
icy that all documentary materials (address books, passports, drivers licenses etc.)
were to be photocopied and all luggage and personal effects photographed before re-
turn. The FBI and the NTSB were in agreement that personal property should be
returned when it had been established by investigative and forensic personnel that
80
it is of no forensic, evidentiary or lead value. If there was doubt regarding the evi-
dentiary or lead value of particular property, the doubt would be resolved in favor
of retaining that property. These procedures were approved by the United States At-
torneys office for the Eastern District of New York.
At a meeting on September 30, 1996 at the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), which was attended by Mr. Jeffrey Erickson, President of TWA and other
TWA representatives, it was agreed that TWA, through a contractor, would be re-
sponsible for returning personal property, including the valuables, to the families
and/or legal representatives of the victims of the TWA Flight 800 tragedy. TWA had
engaged Kenyon International Emergency Services, Houston, Texas to handle this
task. In addition, TWA agreed, through their contractors, to arrange for viewing of
a photo album of unassociated items which the FBI agreed to prepare by the vic-
tims families and/or legal representative of their estate. The FBI and NTSB agreed
that TWA, through its agent, Kenyon, was responsible for the custody of the prop-
erty of TWAs passengers recovered from the wreckage and the delivery of that
property to the families of TWAs passengers once it had been determined that it
was of no further investigative value.
In a letter to Kenyon dated October 28, 1996, a copy of which was sent to Chair-
man Hall at NTSB, the FBI advised Kenyon that the investigative/forensic review
of the personal property had been completed and could be returned to the families
and/or legal representatives of the estates of the victims. The FBI advised Kenyon
that it would deliver to Kenyons representatives at the Grumman facility in Calver-
ton, Long Island, associated and unassociated personal property, including the
valuables, recovered from the wreckage on Friday, November 1, 1998. At the same
time, the FBI agreed to deliver multiple copies of a photo album of the unassociated
personal property which may be used to identify the owners of these items. The FBI
delivered three copies of the photo album to Kenyon on November 1, 1996. However,
TWA reneged on the agreement with the FBI and the NTSB and directed Kenyon
to refuse to take possession of the property and to display photographs of personal
property to the families. There were numerous written and oral follow-ups with
TWA and Kenyon by the FBI and NTSB, separately and jointly, in an effort to re-
solve the issue of the return of the property of the victims of Flight 800. The FBI
also took a lead role in pressuring TWA to authorize Kenyon representatives to ap-
pear and discuss the issue with the families in February 1997 when the families
were given a group tour of the Calverton hangar.
Ultimately, TWA, through Kenyon, did return personal items that had been asso-
ciated with a victim and reproduced the photo albums of unassociated personal
property supplied by the FBI. TWA eventually mailed a copy of the photo albums
to each family requesting one for review. Procedures were also established whereby
TWA or its contractor would handle claims for unassociated personal items. At no
time during this process did NTSB ask for or indicate any desire to take custody
of the victims personal effects or express any objection or concerns regarding the
FBIs role with respect to the victims belongings. In early November 1997, NTSB
accepted custody of these items from the FBI.
It is not common practice for the FBI to process victims belongings in NTSB acci-
dent investigations. However, it is the practice of the FBI to conduct thorough and
complete criminal investigations, which includes processing of all items that may be
evidentiary in nature. It is for that reason that the personal belongings of the vic-
tims were initially processed by the FBI. While the FBI, with NTSBs agreement,
did return some items of personal property that had been associated with a particu-
lar victim to the victims family, the FBI did not take a lead role in either exhibiting
or returning personal belongings to the families. As noted above, the FBI, with
NTSBs support, strongly believed that this task was the responsibility of TWA and
we were anxious for them to undertake that task. Contrary to what is implied by
your question, the FBI and the NTSB were in agreement on the issues of victims
belongings and worked together closely in an effort to have TWA fulfill its respon-
sibilities to return property to the families of the victims.
Ouestion 5. On May 22, 1999, a story appeared in the New York Times stating
that the rank and file of the FBI was distributing a strongly worded letter to Sen.
Grassley criticizing the TWA 800 Hearing by this Subcommittee. This letter has
now been sent. Who initiated this letter?
Answer. The idea of sending you a letter from the employees of the New York Of-
fice was initiated by a street level agent in the New York Office. The letter you
received was a collaborative effort by several agents, including some supervisory/
management level agents whom the street agent asked for advice and input. All
of those who were involved in the drafting process signed the letter. Although, as
you know, senior management officials in New York were aware of and, in their in-
dividual capacities, signed the letter, the letter was not inspired, proposed, insti-
81
gated, orchestrated or any manner originated by management officials of the New
York Office.
As I testified at the hearing, the enormity of the tragedy of TWA Flight 800 deep-
ly affected all of us involved in the investigation. Each of us, management, Agents
and Professional Support employees believed we owed it to the victims, their fami-
lies and the American people to give them the most thorough and professional inves-
tigation that the FBI was capable of producing. They believe that is exactly what
they did. These FBI employees are proud of their work and were offended to hear
and read that you, your staff and some of your witnesses portrayed that effort as
one rife with efforts that would embarrass a rookie police officer. It is, I believe,
why they wrote to you. With all due respect, I ask that as you continue to review
this matter you also keep in mind that not only did we participate in this case as
FBI employees and managers but also as parents, husbands and wives. It is in this
regard that every effort was made to conduct a thorough and complete investigation
ever mindful of the tragedy that had occurred. The letter presented was an attempt
by the personnel in this office to present an accurate viewpoint and to, hopefully,
provide a basis to understand that the protection of the public safety was our para-
mount goal.
Ouestion 5a. I noted that you, Assistant Director Schiliro, signed the letter in
question. Do you think this is appropriate? In other words, how do you distinguish
yourself as a private citizen in the letter and as an Assistant Director of FBI man-
agement in a Senate hearing?
Answer. Like all citizens, FBI employees enjoy rights protected by the First
Amendment to the Constitution. I am well aware that the FBI has interests as an
employer in regulating speech of FBI employees when that speech relates to and
may affect the FBIs mission. The FBIs interests in promoting the effective and effi-
cient discharge of its responsibilities must be balanced against the employees First
Amendment right to comment regarding issues closely related to the FBIs mission
that may be matters of public concern. I am also fully aware that as a senior man-
agement employee of the FBI, I have a correspondingly higher duty of loyalty to the
FBI; that the level of my FBI position may preclude me from publicly commenting
on some issues of public concern and that I must be especially careful that there
is no confusion regarding the capacity in which I am speaking when I do speak re-
garding issues closely related to the FBIs mission. Not only did I sign to endorse
the position of the working agent, but I also signed to endorse their right to present
this viewpoint. If I did not believe that signing the letter was an appropriate exer-
cise of my rights under the First Amendment, I would not have signed it.
Ouestion 6. A Subcommittee interview of the Vice President of the TWA 800 Vic-
tims Association reveals that ADIC Kallstrom allowed many victims families to
enter the hangar and take pictures of the evidence. Please answer the following
questions regarding this fact:
Why were relatives allowed to enter the hangar and take photos and the NTSB
was not allowed to take photos in furtherance of their accident investigation?
Was the film taken by the relatives processed by the FBI lab as required by the
FBI in regards to NTSB photographs?
Answers. Contrary to what is stated in your question, the FBI did allow the NTSB
to take photographs in furtherance of their investigation. Procedures regarding
wreckage photography by NTSB, including the wearing of red safety vests were
agreed to by NTSB managers at Calverton early in the investigation. At the time,
both the FBI and the NTSB were concerned about unauthorized photographs being
taken and being misused to the detriment of the investigation as well as such photo-
graphs being exploited in the media thereby increasing the grief of the families of
the victims. It should be noted that FBI personnel taking photographs were also
limited in number and were required by the FBI to be wearing either hats or shirts
that clearly identified them as FBI personnel. The use of the FBI New York photo
laboratory to develop the photographs actually benefited the NTSB which did not
have an available facility for processing and otherwise would have been taking their
film to local commercial establishments for development, thereby increasing the risk
that photographs would have been misused.
To my knowledge, there were two occasions in which victims families were al-
lowed to enter the hangar at Calverton to view the wreckage. These en-masse tours,
the first of which took place in February 1997, were arranged in coordination with
the NTSB. Prior to the two en-masse tours of the Calverton hangar by the victims
families, during preliminary briefings, it was made clear that no photographs were
to be taken. I am told, however, that there may have been an isolated incident or
two when during a private tour of the hangar, a family member may have taken
a photograph of the cabin seat their loved one had last been seated in. In those in-
82
stances, the film was not taken or processed by the FBI when assurances were re-
ceived that the photographs would not be released and that they would only be
viewed by the immediate family. To have taken the film would have been an insen-
sitive disregard for the painful emotions of the family and a disruption of the be-
reavement process.
RESPONSE OF LEWIS SCHILIRO TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION FROM

SENATOR GRASSLEY
Question. Please comment on legislation proposed by NTSB in the proposed Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board Amendments of 1999 regarding accident-scene
priority and the impact such legislation may have should a future Flight 800-type
case turn out to be the result of a criminal act rather than a mechanical failure.
Answer. The FBI strongly opposes the amendments affecting accident scene and
accident investigation priority.
The legislation proposed by NTSB would, among other things,
(1) amend 49 U.S.C. 1101 by inserting a new subsection b which would read
The term accident as used in this chapter includes damage to instrumentalities
of transportation whether accidental or otherwise.;
(2) amend 49 U.S.C. 1132(a)(2) by striking the words (A)(D) or (F); and
(3) amend 49 U.S.C. 1131(d) by striking 1134(b)(2) and inserting in lieu
thereof 1134 (a), (b), (d), and (f).
The accompanying Statement of Justification for these changes states that NTSB
has, through precedent and international convention, traditionally undertaken thor-
ough investigation of all downed or destroyed commercial aircraft within U.S. juris-
diction and that its obligations under international agreement anticipate that it
would continue to do so. NTSB further states that these amendments would not
affect the authorities of any other federal agency under 49 U.S.C. 1131(a)(3) and
merely clarify existing NTSB authority. The FBI believes that NTSB understates
the effect of these amendments and that the amendments, in fact, would dramati-
cally alter the nature of interagency relationships in non-accidental transportation
investigations. The overall effect of these amendments would be to afford the NTSB
lead agency status in all investigations of any incident, accidental or intentional,
that includes damage to instrumentalities of transportation with the exclusive
legal authority to control all aspects of relating to the custody, handling and testing
of evidence, including criminal law enforcement investigations.
Existing Federal law gives the NTSB has authority to investigate various trans-
portation accidents and Civil aviation accidents and provides that such accident in-
vestigations (except for major marine casualties in which they have concurrent juris-
diction with the U.S. Coast Guard) 1 shall have priority over investigations by other
departments or agencies. The legislative history of the investigations priority clause
of 49 U.S.C. 1131(a)(2), which is alluded to in NTSBs Justification Statement, was
designed to give NTSB priority over other Federal agencies in conducting accident
investigations and was requested by the NTSB to reduce duplicate Federal accident
investigations. H.R. Rep. 108 (I) , 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1981, reprinted in 1981 U.S.
Code Cong. and Ad. News 1729 (emphasis added). The Congress believed it was de-
sirable to have one Federal agency responsible for coordinating accident investiga-
tions. The amendments were not intended to prevent the Department of Transpor-
tations operating administrations, such as the Federal Railway Administration,
from conducting concurrent investigations required by their statutory responsibil-
ities or from taking necessary regulatory or enforcement actions. H.R. Rep. No. 108
(II), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1981 reprinted at 1981 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News
1734.
NTSB is obliged pursuant to conventions of the International Civil Aviation Orga-
nization to investigate not only civil aviation accidents but, also, occurrences result-
ing in damage to aircraft. This treaty obligation is broad enough to afford NTSB,
exercising its obligations to address issues of aviation safety, a role in criminal in-
vestigations of aviation incidents that are the result of intentional criminal acts,
such as a bombing or sabotage. Congress, however, has never given NTSBs inves-
tigations of such incidents or occurrences priority or assigned the NTSB, a safety
agency, lead agency status over criminal law enforcement investigations of inten-
tional criminal acts resulting in damage to or the destruction of aircraft.2 The
1 It should be noted that the proposed amendments would also eliminate the Coast Guards
concurrent jurisdiction in major marine casualty investigations.
2 In fact, the family assistance amendments enacted by congress in 1996 supports this view.
49 U.S.C. 1136(h), for purposes of the family assistance authority conferred on NTSB, specifi-
83
amendments proposed by NTSB would do just that and more by extending NTSB
primacy and control over wreckage evidence to all criminal investigations of acts
that result in damage to any instrumentalities of transportation, not just aviation,
including intentional actions such as a terrorist incident using a bomb or a missile.
NTSB cites the TWA Flight 800 investigation with parallel FBI criminal and
NTSB safety investigations as the exemplifying the need for the accident scene pri-
ority investigations. However, an agreement, dated September 19, 1973, between
the FBI and the NTSB and the FBI regarding Aircraft Accident Investigations,
NTSB, after noting the FBIs criminal investigative jurisdiction, states Whenever
the FBI preliminary investigation results in a determination that a criminal inves-
tigation is required, such investigation will be conducted concurrently and in coordi-
nation with the NTSB investigation. The 1973 agreement also provides for FBI par-
ticipation, including assignment to NTSB investigative groups of FBI personnel, in
NTSB aircraft accident investigations, which participation is in addition to separate
investigative activities conducted by the FBI concurrent with the NTSB investiga-
tion. The agreement also contemplates a complete and expeditious exchange of infor-
mation. The FBI submits that the TWA investigation was carried out in conformity
with the existing agreement and that the manner in which the FBI conducted the
TWA criminal investigation does not provide a basis for such a dramatic alteration
of the FBI/NTSB relationship in non- accidental investigations.
By broadly defining the term accident as it relates to NTSB investigative author-
ity, the amendments will encroach on the authority of the Attorney General,
through the FBI, to lead and conduct criminal law enforcement investigations, par-
ticularly in those cases in which the damage to instrumentalities of transportation
results from intentional criminal conduct, in part by ceding to NTSB complete au-
thority over the handling and testing of wreckage evidence. The FBI is opposed to
the amendments.
cally defined the term aircraft accident to mean any aviation disaster regardless of its cause
or suspected cause. If Congress had understood the term accident in the NTSB statutes to in-
clude all incidents, including intentional criminal acts, if would not have been necessary to enact
subsection (h).
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Senate Hearing, 106TH Congress - Administrative Oversight of The Investigation of Twa Flight 800

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Senate Hearing, 106TH Congress - Administrative Oversight of The Investigation of Twa Flight 800

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S. HRG.

ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT OF THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

THE INVESTIGATION OF TWA FLIGHT 800

MAY 10, 1999

Serial No. J10624

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT AND THE COURTS

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

ALPHABETICAL LIST AND MATERIAL SUBMITTED

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

MONDAY, MAY 10, 1999

be fingered as a scapegoat. However, if the FBI says today that its

case and went to court, the ATF report would be discoverable

dures could be produced to get photography was through the FBI

Senator GRASSLEY. The FBI brought in a company called

my tenure there, I have investigated 109 major transportation acci-

It was distressing to me when I first went to the MEs office to

Another problem that occurred, and it was recognized about 2

come to participate, but at no time were they offered to participate

neering, which I earned in 1980, and a Master of Science in

The other problem I encountered in the hangar was getting infor-

Mr. ZAKAR. I saw that myself. I walked up to this gentleman and

Senator GRASSLEY. But in hindsight, then, you think that that

zation early on and, somehow or another, allow exchange of infor-

States of America as the counsel in the criminal prosecution relat-

Senator GRASSLEY. Would you please give us your background,

Senator GRASSLEY. Why not?

proactive discussion needed because we were in a constant informa-

that he was rather graphic in his approach that it was a bomb,

or that the metallurgist never communicated his findings orthere

NTSB, in my position, in a material scientist position, is that the

recorded passage of any externally penetrating object. And if that

make this a valuable contribution to the process of constitutional

Senator GRASSLEY. At this point, I would like to ascertain if a

Senator GRASSLEY. What is the difference in the methodologies

something that is done through science and theory without any

a great deal of gratitude for that approach. We thank you very

STATEMENT OF DONALD M. KERR

case of digital evidence, we chair the Interpol group, as well as the

So those people deployed in addition to the roughly 60 who de-

II. Lessons Learned

volved in that task that night believed at first that it would be a

ing terrorism cases and certainly working in a multi-agency envi-

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Initial response to scene: Hundreds of Agents.

Response to the tragedy of Flight 800.

1. NY Fire Department and local Volunteer Fire Department.

III. Recovery EffortsVictims/Aircraft

Two hundred and thirty victims recovered and positively identified.

Ninety-six percent of aircraft recovered, approximately 1 million pieces.

Thirty-nine thousand and six hundred items recovered.

IV. Airport InvestigationJFK AirportTWA 800

Air traffic controllers interviewed.

V. Airport InvestigationAthens, GreeceTWA Flight 881

Three hundred and forty-nine passengers interviewed.

Seventeen crew members interviewed.

Eighty-six airport personnell interviewed.

VI. Bomb Investigation

Investigators reviewed ten previous airline bombings covering a period of fourteen

All claims of responsibility were without credibility.