MONCUPA VS. PONCE-ENRILE [GR L-63345, 30 JANUARY 1986] En Banc, Gutierrez Jr.

(J): 8
concur, 1 took no part, 1 reserves vote

Facts: Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on 22 April 1982 at about 10:50 p.m.
at the corner of D. Tuazon Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Moncupa was brought to MIG-
15 Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City where he was detained. On 23 April 1982, on the allegation
that he was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order
(PCO) was issued against him and 8 other persons. After two separate investigations, conducted
first, by Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force Makabansa Investigation
Group and second, by Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales of Quezon City, it was ascertained
that Moncupa was not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators
recommended the prosecution of Moncupa only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal
possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree 33. Consequently, two separate
informations were filed against Moncupa, one, for illegal possession of firearms before the Court
of First Instance of Rizal and the other for violation of PD 33 before the City Court of Quezon City.
Against the other accused, however, the cases filed were for violation of PD 885 as amended.
Moncupa was excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-Subversion Law. Moncupa's
arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued, and yet, Moncupa's motions for
bail were denied by the lower court. Moncupa filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Juan
Ponce Enrile, Fabian C. Ver, Galileo Kintanar, Fernando Gorospe, and Jose Castro contend that the
petition has become moot and academic must necessarily be denied, as Moncupa may have
been released from his detention cell (i.e. temporary release).

Issue: Whether the petition for the writ of habeas corpus has become moot and academic in
view of Moncupa's temporary release.

Held: Attached to Moncupa's temporary release are restrictions imposed on him, i.e. (1) His
freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the approval of
respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila. (2) His liberty of abode is restricted because
prior approval of respondents is also required in case petitioner wants to change his place of
residence. (3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not "participate
in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass media representatives nor give any
press release or information that is inimical to the interest of national security." (4) He is required
to report regularly to respondents or their representatives. The reservation of the military in the
form of restrictions attached to the temporary release constitute restraints on the liberty of
Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of Moncupa. It is not physical restraint
alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus. In the light of the ruling in Villavicencio
vs. Lukban, which held that "a prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is
restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into
all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient," the present petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic. A release
that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free
from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are
not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom
originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person
concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.
GLENN CABALLES y CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. EMMANUEL D. LAUREA, HON. BENJAMIN T. ANTONIO, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
1. RTC: Petitioner Glenn Chua Caballes was charged with rape of a minor (Pio)
a. Because the petitioner was charged with a non-bailable offense, he was detained.
2. The petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
a. (The facts below are about the speedy trial issue. Just in case lang)
b. The petitioners original counsel commenced his cross-examination of Pio, but
failed to complete the same.
c. Petitioners new counsel continued his cross-examination of Pio but still failed to
terminate the same.
d. The trial was set to terminate the cross-examination of Pio but once again failed
due to the illness of the private prosecutor. Trial was further reset to another date.
e. Thereafter, the prosecution declared that its next witness would be Dr. Marquez,
the Medico-Legal Officer of PNP, who had conducted an examination of the private
complainant, but stated that he had not been subpoenad. Trial was rescheduled.
f. The rescheduled trial did not proceed because petitioners counsel filed a
manifestation that he was required to be present in an execution sale. Rescheduled
again.
g. Dr. Marquez failed to receive the subpoena. Rescheduled.
h. Subpoena was issued again against the doctor. Still, the doctor failed to receive.
Rescheduled.
i. The Judge issued an order to be replaced. Rescheduled.
3. Petitioner filed a petition for bail.
a. The trial court denied the petition for bail, on its finding that the evidence of guilt
against the petitioner was strong.
4. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the courts Order denying his petition
for bail.
a. However, the petitioner preempted the resolution of his motion for reconsideration
and filed a Motion to Dismiss the case on the ground that his right to speedy
trial had been violated.
5. Trial court denied petitioners motion to dismiss.
a. The trial court reasoned that there was no violation of the petitioners right to
speedy trial, considering that the apparent delays could not be attributed to the
fault of the prosecution alone.
b. The motion for reconsideration was considered to be abandoned upon filing of
motion to dismiss by the petitioner.
6. CA: The petitioner filed a "Petition for Habeas Corpus and/or Certiorari and
Prohibition."
a. CA asked which remedy would petitioner avail between Habeas Corpus and
Certiorari. Petitioner chose Habeas Corpus.
b. The petitioner averred that (1) he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial and his
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case; and (2) the trial court
committed grave abuse of its discretion in denying his petition for bail.
7. PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS is DISMISSED. According to the appellate court:
a. It was not the proper remedy to review and examine the proceedings before the
trial court as a relief from the petitioners perceived oppressive situation in the trial
court.
 b. A writ of habeas corpus is NOT a writ of error; that it could not exercise its
certiorari jurisdiction over the acts or omission of the respondent judge as a
concomitant remedy; and that the remedy for habeas corpus and certiorari are
different in nature, scope and purpose.
8. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration DENIED
9. Hence, this petition (certiorari - rule 65)
ISSUE#1: Whether the proper remedy from the appellate courts denial of a petitioner for a writ
of habeas corpus is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court;
HELD: No. Petitioner should have filed an appeal instead.
The resort to a petition for certiorari is inappropriate. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 provides that the period for appeal from the judgment of any court in habeas
corpus cases shall be forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment appealed
from.
Following the rule, the petitioner should have appealed to this Court from the CA decision
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as well as the denial of his motion for
reconsideration thereof; instead, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, as amended.
The well-settled rule is that certiorari is not available where the aggrieved
partys remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course,
the reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other
adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to
the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These two remedies are mutually
exclusive. An appeal in this case would still have been a speedy and adequate remedy.
Consequently, when the petitioner filed his petition in this Court, the decision of the CA
was already final and executory.
ISSUE#2: Whether the petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the writ.
HELD: No. The records show that the petitioner was charged with rape punishable by reclusion
perpetua and was detained based on the said charge; hence, if the evidence of his guilt is strong,
he shall not be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. There is no
question that the trial court had jurisdiction over the offense charged and over the person of the
petitioner. The jail warden has the authority and, in fact, is mandated to detain the petitioner
until granted bail by the court, or the case against him dismissed, or until he is acquitted after
trial. The petitioner failed to establish that his incarceration pendente lite was illegal,
and likewise failed to establish exceptional circumstances warranting the issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus by the appellate court
About Habeas Corpus:
A writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial courts denial of the
petitioners motion to dismiss the case, the denial of the petition for bail, as well as the
voluntary inhibition of Judge Laurea.
Habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of civil
rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint is
made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to
be served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a
criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitioner for a writ of HC, he
thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that court.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for
the trial courts function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The
writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised
relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is
addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any
reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other
remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances.
Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of
trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where
exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus
 cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and
irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the
trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be
preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been held that where restraint is under legal
process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not
grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when
instituted for the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge
in order that the cause of his detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The
writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person
who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties
before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in
custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to
deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to show
facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty" is a prerogative writ
which does not issue as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge.
It, is, however, a writ of right on proper formalities being made by proof. Resort to the writ
is to inquire into the criminal act of which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty,
notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal
restraint. The primary, if not the only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad
subjuciendum is to determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is held.
We agree with the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be joined with the
special civil action for certiorari because the two remedies are governed by a different set
of rules. We also agree with the ruling of the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is a remedy different from the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, as amended.
Writ of Habeas Corpus Certiorari
The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral A writ of certiorari reaches only
attack on the processes, orders, or jurisdictional errors. It has no other use,
judgment of the trial court, while certiorari except to bring before the court a record
is a direct attack of said processes, orders, material to be considered in exercising
or judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
On the other hand, a writ of habeas A writ of certiorari reaches the record
corpus reaches the body but not the record;
it also reaches jurisdictional matters but
does not reach the record.
We agree with the petitioner that a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus may be filed if one is deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
under Article IV, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution and of his right to due
process. However, the petitioner never invoked in the trial court his constitutional right to a
speedy disposition of the case against him. What he invoked was his right to a speedy trial under
Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. He invoked his constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of the case against him, for the first time, only in the Court of Appeals when he filed
his petition for habeas corpus.
Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioner was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of
the case simply because the private prosecutor failed to submit a medical certificate for his
absence during the trial of March 6, 2003. The petitioner could have asked the court to cite the
private prosecutor in contempt of court for his failure to submit the said certificate; he failed to
do so. Moreover, the petitioner failed to establish any serious prejudice by the delay of the trial,
and that the State deliberately delayed the trial to prejudice him.
PETITION DENIED!
Writ of Habeas Corpus The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement,
detention or deprivation of liberty. It was devised as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint. More specifically, it is a remedy to obtain immediate relief for
those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus
deliver them from unlawful custody. It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the
circumstances under which a person is detained. (Barredo vs. Vinarao, GR 168728, 2
August 2007; First Division, Corona J.)

The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue
of a valid judgment. However, the writ may be allowed as a post-conviction remedy when the
proceedings leading to the conviction were attended by any of the following exceptional
circumstances: (1) there was a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence or (3) the imposed penalty was
excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess. (Barredo vs. Vinarao, GR 168728, 2
August 2007; First Division, Corona J.)

IN THE MATTER OF THE G.R. No. 167193

PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS

ENGR. ASHRAF KUNTING

Facts:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing Police Chief
Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan and General Robert Delfin,[1] Philippine National Police (PNP)
Intelligence Chief, to bring petitioner Ashraf Kunting before this Court and show cause why he is
illegally detained.

On October 19, 2001, petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian
Internal Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,
turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahipursuant to warrants for his arrest
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela City, Basilan, Branch 2, Ninth Judicial
Region. Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal
Detention with the RTC.
On September 15, 2003, the RTC issued an Order directing the Police Superintendent and
Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court
since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation.

On November 5, 2003, PNP-IG Director Arturo C. Lomibao wrote a letter to Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo, Department of Justice (DOJ), requesting for representation and a
motion to be filed for the transfer of the venue of the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City,
for the following reasons: (1) Several intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG
stating that utmost effort will be exerted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover the custody
of Kunting from the PNP considering his importance to the ASG; and (2) there is a big possibility
that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he will be detained in Basilan due to inadequate
security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity to the area of operation of the ASG.

On August 13, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision against petitioners co-accused in the
consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165, finding 17
of the accused, who were tried, guilty of the crime/s charged.

On February 11, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying Kuntings Motion to Set Case for
Preliminary Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting. The trial court reiterated
its Order dated September 15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs
Division, PNP-IG, to turn over Kunting to the court.
In a letter dated February 22, 2005, Police Chief
Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan reiterated the request to Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo to facilitate the transfer of the venue of the trial of Kuntings case,
citing the same grounds in the previous letter. He added that if Kunting had been transferred
to Isabela City, Basilan, he could have been one of the escapees in a jail break that occurred
on April 10, 2004 as suspected ASG members were able to go scot-free.

On March 15, 2005, Police Inspector Amado L. Barbasa, Jr., OIC, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-
IG, filed with the RTC a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Order dated February 11, 2005,
citing, among other grounds, the existence of a pending motion for the transfer of the venue of
the trial of Criminal Case No. 3537-1129 against Kunting, which was allegedly filed by the DOJ
before this Court. Police Inspector Barbasa prayed that the Order of the RTC dated February 11,
2005, directing the turnover of Kunting to the court, be suspended until the motion for the
transfer of venue is resolved.

On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus. Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty since June 12,
2003 by the PNP-IG led by Police Chief Superintendent Ismael Rafanan and assisted by PNP
Intelligence Chief, General Robert Delfin. He alleged that he was never informed of the charges
filed against him until he requested his family to research in Zamboanga City. It was discovered
in the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan that his name appeared in the list of accused who allegedly
participated in the kidnapping incident which occurred on June 2, 2001 in Lamitan, Basilan.
Kunting asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping incident, so he promptly
filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation on

September 8, 2003. He was aware that the PNP-IG requested Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo for representation to file a motion with this Court for the transfer of
venue of his case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. Having no further information on the
status of his case, he filed a Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation on January 26,
2005. He stated that since no action was taken by the trial court or the DOJ, he filed this petition
to put an end to his illegal detention classified in the records as for safekeeping purposes only.

Issue: WON the petition for habeas corpus can prosper

Held: No. It cannot proper.

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to all case of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The remedy
of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, [3] and if
found illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee. [4] If, however, the detention is proven
lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.
In this case, Kuntings detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He
was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy,
RTC, Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary detention at PNP-
IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial court.

MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, and ROSARIO C.

SALIENTES,Petitioners,
vs.
LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO SABUNDAYO, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 203, MUNTINLUPA CITY,\

Facts:
Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the
parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonettes parents,
petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private
respondent suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Marie Antonette
refused. So, he alone left the house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing
his son.
Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a
Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody.
Petitioners posit that even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy for
private respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert
that habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of
custody of the minor. They insist there was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his
own mother. There was no need for the mother to show cause and explain the custody of her
very own child.
Private respondent counters that petitioners argument based on Article 213 of the Family Code
applies only to the second part of his petition regarding the custody of his son. It does not
address the first part, which pertains to his right as the father to see his son. He asserts that the
writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains the minors right to see his
father and vice versa. He avers that the instant petition is merely filed for delay, for had
petitioners really intended to bring the child before the court in accordance with the new rules on
custody of minors, they would have done so on the dates specified in the January 23, 2003 and
the February 24, 2003 orders of the trial court.
On January 23, 2003, the trial court issued the following order:
Upon verified Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by Petitioners, the Respondents Marie
Antonette Abigail C. Salientes, Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes are hereby directed
to produce and bring before this Court the body of minor Lorenzo Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla
on January 31, 2003 at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon and to show cause why the said child should
not be discharged from restraint. CA affirmed RTCs.

Issue: WON the writ of habeas corpus is available to him.

Held: Yes. It is available to him.

Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person
entitled thereto. 9Under Article 211 10 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie
Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further,
although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the
court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to
the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondents cause of action is the
deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. 11 Hence, the remedy of habeas
corpus is available to him.