FACTS:
1. Jose
Reyes
filed
a
complaint
for
reconveyance
of
land
situated
in
Espana,
Manila
against
Markina
Valley
and
Milagros
Liamzon.
2. It
was
alleged
that
Reyes
entrusted
some
funds
to
Liamzon,
sister
in
law
of
his
wife
Aurelia
Liamzon,
in
order
to
purchase
the
Espana
property
for
them.
3. Liamzon,
however,
in
alleged
violation
of
such
trust,
purchased
the
property
in
her
own
name
and
had
the
title
registered
in
her
own
name.
Liamzon
then
transferred
the
title
of
said
property
to
Markina
Valley,
a
close
property
owned
by
the
Liamzon
family.
4. In
the
petitioners
answer,
they
denied
the
allegations
of
Reyes.
Instead,
they
contended
that
Milagros
purchased
the
property
in
her
own
name
with
funds
coming
from
the
Markina
Valley
and
that
Reyes
waived
their
right
to
buy
the
property
in
question
to
Milagros.
5. The
RTC
ruled
in
favor
of
respondents
and
ordered
the
petitioner
to
execute
a
Deed
of
Conveyance
in
favor
of
respondents.
(11
October
1991)
6. Marikina
Valley
received
a
copy
of
the
decision
of
the
trial
court
in
October
28,
1991.
They
filed
a
MFR
on
November
7,
1991.
o Insufficiency
of
evidence
7. Private
respondents
opposed
the
MFR
on
the
ground
that
it
was
pro
forma.
They
contend
that
they
allegations
of
insufficiency
of
evidence
were
couched
in
very
general
terms,
contrary
to
the
requirement
of
Section
2
of
Rule
37.
8. TC
denied
the
MFR.
The
order
was
received
by
the
petitioners
on
22
November
1991.
On
November
25,
1991,
they
filed
a
notice
of
appeal
with
the
TC.
On
the
other
hand,
private
respondents
moved
for
the
execution
of
the
(October)
decision.
They
insisted
that
the
petitioners
had
failed
to
perfect
an
appeal
within
the
reglementary
period.
9. RTC
ruling:
o The
Notice
of
Appeal
was
denied
on
the
ground
of
failure
to
filed
within
the
reglementary
to
period.
o The
trial
judge
reasoned
that
petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration
was
pro
forma
and
hence
did
not
stop
the
running
of
the
reglementary
period.
Thereupon
the
trial
judge
granted
private
respondents
motions
for
execution.
10. Upon
appeal,
CA
dismissed
the
petition
for
certiorari
and
injunction.
MFR
was
indeed
pro
forma.
o Where
a
MFR
merely
submits,
reiterates,
repleads,
repeats
or
reaffirms
the
same
arguments
that
had
been
previously
considered
and
resolved
in
decision,
it
is
pro
forma.
o Thus,
the
pro
forma
decision
did
not
toll
the
running
of
the
period
to
perfect
an
appeal
and
that,
accordingly,
the
judgment
had
become
final
and
executory.
11. Hence,
this
petition.
o MFR
was
sufficient
in
form
and
substance
and
had
effectively
suspended
the
running
of
the
reglementary
period
and
that
their
notice
of
appeal
filed
3
days
from
receipt
of
the
order
denying
the
motion
for
reconsideration
had
been
filed
within
the
remaining
period
of
perfecting
an
appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N
the
MFR
was
pro
forma
and
should
not
toll
the
running
of
the
reglementary
period.
HELD:
NO.
The
MFR
was
not
pro
forma.
1. Under
Rule
37,
an
aggrieved
party
may
file
a
MFR
on
the
ground
of
(1)
Excessive
damages;
(2)
Insufficiency
of
evidence
;
(3)
Void
decision.
o A
MFR
based
on
2
and
3
must
point
out
specifically
the
findings
and
conclusions
of
judgment
which
are
not
supported
by
evidence
or
which
are
contrary
to
law,
making
express
reference
to
the
testimonial
or
documentary
evidence
or
to
the
provision
of
law
alleged
to
be
contrary
to
such
findings
and
conclusions.
2. A
MFR
which
satisfies
the
requirement
under
Rule
37,
Section
2
interrupts
the
running
of
the
period
to
perfect
an
appeal.
3. A
MFR
which
does
not
satisfy
the
requirements
are
to
be
treated
as
pro
forma,
intended
merely
to
delay
the
proceedings.
And
as
such,
will
not
suspend
the
reglementary
period.The
net
result
will
be
the
dismissal
of
the
appeal
for
having
been
unseasonably
filed.
o Where
a
MFR
merely
submits,
reiterates,
repleads,
repeats
or
reaffirms
the
same
arguments
that
had
been
previously
considered
and
resolved
in
decision,
it
is
pro
forma.
o It
should,
however,
be
noted
that
the
circumstance
that
a
motion
for
reconsideration
deals
with
the
same
issues
and
arguments
posed
and
resolved
by
the
trial
court
in
its
decision
does
not
necessarily
mean
that
the
motion
must
be
characterized
as
merely
pro
forma.
o One
example
of
a
pro
forma
MFR
is
when
it
alleged
the
ff:
(1)
Order
is
contrary
to
law;
(2)
The
the
order
is
contrary
to
the
facts
of
the
case.
The
movant
fails
to
make
reference
to
the
testimonial
and
documentary
evidence
on
record
or
the
provisions
of
law
said
to
be
contrary
to
the
trial
courts
conclusions.
In
other
words,
the
movant
is
also
required
to
point
out
succinctly
why
reconsideration
is
warranted.
It
is
not
enough
that
a
motion
for
reconsideration
should
state
what
part
of
the
decision
is
contrary
to
law
or
the
evidence;
it
should
also
point
out
why
it
is
so.
Failure
to
explain
why
will
render
the
MFR
pro
forma.
o Where
a
substantial
bonafide
effort
is
made
to
explain
where
and
why
the
trial
court
should
be
regarded
as
having
erred
in
its
main
decision,
the
fact
that
the
trial
court
thereafter
found
such
argument
unmeritorious
or
as
inadequate
to
warrant
modification
or
reversal
of
the
main
decision,
does
not,
of
course,
mean
that
the
motion
for
reconsideration
should
have
been
regarded,
or
was
properly
regarded,
as
merely
pro
forma
o Where
the
circumstances
of
a
case
do
not
show
an
intent
on
the
part
of
the
movant
merely
to
delay
the
proceedings,
our
Court
has
refused
to
characterize
the
motion
as
simply
pro
forma.
4. APPLICATION
IN
THE
CASE
AT
BAR
o In
the
case
at
bar,
plaintiffs
MFR
pointed
out
each
and
every
error
the
TC
committed
and
which
they
did
not
discuss
that
will
warrant
the
reversal
of
the
decision
of
the
case.
They
pointed
out
which
circumstances
which
was
not
sufficiently
proved
by
evidence.
o However,
it
should
not
be
inferred
from
the
decision
of
the
SC
regarding
the
MFR
as
not
a
pro
forma
one,
that
the
motion
was
meritorious.
The
SC
remanded
the
case
and
give
due
course
to
the
petitioners
appeal.
5. The
doctrine
relating
to
pro
forma
motions
for
reconsideration
impacts
upon
the
reality
and
substance
of
the
statutory
right
of
appeal,
that
doctrine
should
be
applied
reasonably,
rather
than
literally.
The
right
to
appeal,
where
it
exists,
is
an
important
and
valuable
right.
Public
policy
would
be
better
served
by
according
the
appellate
court
an
effective
opportunity
to
review
the
decision
of
the
trial
court
on
the
merits,
rather
than
by
aborting
the
right
to
appeal
by
a
literal
application
of
the
procedural
rule
relating
to
pro
forma
motions
for
reconsideration.