478

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 24(4)

Is Waltz a Realist?
Jonathan Joseph

Abstract
In the opening chapter of Theory of International Politics Waltz makes an interesting
distinction between scientific laws and theory construction. Recent special issues of
this journal have suggested that this distinction allows Waltz to be read in different
ways for example, as a scientific realist who conceives of unobservable entities, or as a
constructivist interested in how we create models. This contribution argues against both
these interpretations by analysing the first chapter of Waltzs book and suggesting that his
distinction between theories and law-like statements is fully consistent with mainstream
discussions in the philosophy of social science. It argues that Waltzs position still depends
on the identification of empirical regularities, something that makes him an empirical realist,
but which undermines the claim that he is a scientific realist.

Keywords: constructivism, IR theory, philosophy of social science, positivism, realism,

Kenneth Waltz

Of course everyone knows that Kenneth Waltz is a political realist. Maybe he is the
realist in IR. But recently it has been suggested in this journal that he might also be a
philosophical realist.1 But then it has also been suggested2 that he is a constructivist.
Or perhaps more precisely, it has been suggested, on the one hand, that some of
Waltzs comments can be read as supporting some sort of philosophical realism,
on the other that there are striking similarities between some of his philosophical
assumptions and the approach of constructivism. The normal black-and-white way
of doing philosophy in IR would require that he be either one thing or the other, but
surely not both. This piece will argue that he is in fact neither.
Instead of focusing on Waltzs theory of international politics, his conception
of structure or notion of system, this piece will concentrate on the first chapter of
Theory of International Politics (hereafter TIP)3 and on two recent papers on his
understanding of theory and models. This piece therefore limits itself to a discussion
of issues relating to Waltzs philosophical position and his understanding of what
theory is and what it tries to do, looking at his theory of IR only when we get to the
ontological consequences of his philosophical position. The first section concentrates
on Chapter 1 of TIP since this is where Waltz sets out the difference between making
law-like statements and developing theories. The two pieces by Onuf and Wver in
this journals recent special issues on Waltz have suggested that Waltzs conception
of theory is compatible with scientific realist or constructivist approaches. One argues
that Waltzs use of models means he recognises that there are also unobservable
things out there, the other that models require that we see our view of the world as

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 IS WALTZ A REALIST? 479

a construction. This piece goes on to question both these interpretations and suggests
that Waltzs discussion of models and theories fits comfortably within mainstream
positivist debates on how to do social or political science.
Unfortunately it is unavoidable that if a discussion of two contending
philosophies realism and constructivism takes place, then a third position
positivism inevitably emerges in the negative sense that if one is not one of the
above, one must be something else instead. The question of whether Waltz is a
positivist is a rather tired one. Yet it raises its head because both Ole Wver and
Nicholas Onuf suggest he is far too complex for such a label. Perhaps we should
deal with this problem by turning it round the other way. The way that positivism
is often understood, especially by those who claim to dismiss it, is really far too
narrow and restricted to fit Waltz or maybe anyone else. Rather than saying that
there is nothing really wrong with Waltzs philosophy, this alternative approach
would say that most IR theorists have a very limited conception of what positivism
is. For a start, positivism is often regarded as no more than a methodology. Those
who argue that positivism places its emphasis on particular types of data collection
and analysis often hold this more methodological definition. On this basis serious
issues could be raised about whether Waltz is a positivist, since he explicitly argues
for the limits of this sort of methodology and claims that the inductive method
is not an adequate basis for developing theories. A related mistake would be to focus
on Waltzs epistemology and to claim that he has a positivist theory of knowledge.
According to this view, positivism would be defined as an approach that bases its
theories on observable facts. But again Waltz would not fit with such a description.
He explicitly argues that theories involve an imaginary element, that models cannot
be reduced to numerical data, etc.4 He also, as Wver notes, hints at the existence
of unobservable things.
However, positivism is neither a methodology nor an epistemology. It is a
philosophy that has methodological, epistemological and, crucially, ontological
elements. We must look at how these balance against one another and what features
dominate. This is not an attempt to firmly pin the positivist label on Waltz, but it is an
attempt to examine what features dominate in his approach and to argue against him
being seen as belonging to an alternative tradition such as realism or constructivism.
Rather than being one of the latter, it is argued that Waltz should be seen as someone
whose work engages with the disputes within positivist social science present at
that time of writing. We can fit Waltz into this position because of a number of
key assumptions he makes about the importance of finding empirical regularities
and patterns of events (even if he raises questions about over-reliance on this), the
associated belief in closed systems and conflation of what exists with what we think
exists, a behaviouristic model based on atomistic assumptions of extrinsic relationality
and a belief in the symmetry between explanation and prediction. Whether accepted
or not, these have significant ontological consequences that ultimately find their way
into Waltzs theoretical claims about the nature of the international system, including
his atomistic view of states, his rationalist assumptions about their behaviour and
his view that the texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns
480 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 24(4)

recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly.5 However, we will not proceed with
this discussion of Waltzs theory of international politics until we have first examined
the opening chapter of TIP and then moved on to a philosophical discussion of his
use of theories and laws.

Waltz on theory and law

This section provides a summary of the important, but often neglected, first chapter
of Waltzs Theory of International Politics. The arguments here will be analysed later.
First it is important to clarify what Waltz is saying, since this is crucial in addressing
some of the claims and counter-claims being made about his approach.
From the very first page of his most famous book, Waltz introduces a crucial
distinction that is at the heart of his approach to theory, but which is often overlooked
in accounts of his work. Clearly, for Waltz, it is an essential matter. It is the distinction
he makes between what counts as a theory and what counts as a law. He correctly
notes that while there are different understandings of theory, a particular definition of
law is much more widely accepted in the field. Indeed we can say that this definition
of law does reflect the standard definition found in the positivist mainstream inside
the sciences and social sciences. This familiar argument (which goes uncontested
in Waltz) is that a law establishes relations between variables such that if a then b.
This relationship may be established as invariant or highly constant and is something
that is found repeatedly.6
For philosophers of social science, especially those who follow recent trends
in philosophical realism,7 this approach can be labelled the Humean approach to
causality. Humeanism seeks constant conjunctions of events, otherwise known as
empirical regularities. The scientific status of a claim to law-like status depends
upon whether these regularities can be empirically verified. Nothing more can be
said regarding the status of these relationships, how they arise, how they should be
understood, or whether they will endure. We find that Waltz is also very Humean in
his scepticism about whether these laws provide an adequate picture of the world
and whether we can really rely on our sense impressions to reveal things as they
really are. There is nothing very remarkable about this argument; it is fully consistent
with Humes own arguments against relying on induction (relying on inference
from patterns of repeated experience). Despite identifying a correlation, we cannot
necessarily say that any causal relation exists (although the language of dependent
and independent variables might push us in the direction of saying so).8 Waltzs next
step is to say that laws do not make a theory, and that we cannot proceed just by
gathering together such statements relating to particular behaviour or phenomena. As
he says: Statistics do not show how anything works or fits together.9 We cannot rely
on counting and measuring.10 In making this claim, Waltz is clearly hitting out at the
limits of an inductivist approach. He believes that we cannot explain how things in the
world work simply by accumulating more and more data. Induction only deals with
part of the problem. Observation and experience do not lead us to identify causes.11
 IS WALTZ A REALIST? 481

Adding things together does not lead us to make the right connections. Inductivism
cannot help us decide how to arrange the parts.
We have now moved to Waltzs account of theory, something that has recently been
revisited in Onufs and Wvers discussions. For Waltz, theories are not collections
of laws, but the things that explain them. Whereas laws show probable associations,
theories explain why these associations obtain. Theories necessarily involve some
sort of mental work that tries to provide this explanation. If such an approach is non-
empirical, it is so in the sense that theories cannot be constructed through induction
alone, for theoretical notions can only be invented and not discovered.12 This gives
theory more of a speculative rather than a factual character. For Waltz, theoretical
notions do not explain or predict; they are not based on facts of observation.13 While
we may ask whether laws are true, with theories we must ask if they have explanatory
power.14 To summarise the difference, Waltz argues that: Laws are different from
theories, and the difference is reflected in the distinction between the way in which
laws may be discovered and the way in which theories have to be constructed.15 This
difference, we will see later, is crucial to Onufs discussion of Waltz.
According to Waltzs argument, theories are therefore creative constructions.
That is why Waltz can be interpreted as a constructivist. But we also find that Waltz
justifies these creative constructions as a way of overcoming the limits of relying on
observable law-like activities and to convey a sense of the unobservable relations of
things.16 That is why he can be interpreted as a philosophical realist. Going beyond
reliance on law-like statements, Waltz says that theories will be about connections
and causes by which sense is made of things observed. A theory is not about the
occurrences seen and the associations recorded, but is instead the explanation of
them.17 Waltz therefore develops this notion of theory because he cannot accept that
reality can be reduced to the observation of empirical regularities and because he
thinks that explanation cannot be reduced to making law-like statements. There are
two directions in which this argument can go. One is a realist direction. This would
ask questions about the nature of reality itself. The other direction is to ask questions
about the nature of theory. Waltz takes this second course by asking questions about
how theory constructs its own reality. Thus a theory is not an edifice of truth as
some positivists might claim, nor a reproduction of reality as some realists might
think. Rather, theory is a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of
activity. A theory is a depiction of the organization of a domain and of the connections
among its parts.18
According to Waltz, theory works by use of models. A model works by picturing
reality while simplifying it.19 This is necessary in order to indicate which factors
are more important and to establish relations between them. Models isolate one
realm from another and allow us to focus on specific features. We have just said
that Waltz chooses what looks like a constructivist rather than a realist path.
This can be seen in his argument that a model is not a picture of reality, but rather
a picture of a theory of reality. He writes that: In modelling a theory, one looks for
suggestive ways of depicting the theory, and not the reality it deals with.20 There
are of course a number of statements that can be accepted by both constructivists
482 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 24(4)

and realists. For example: A theory, though related to the world about which
explanations are wanted, always remains distinct from that world. Reality will
be congruent neither with a theory nor with a model that may represent it.21 Some
crude realists may of course insist that theories correspond to reality more directly
than this. And some constructivists may insist that the model of reality is reality.
In fact these two opposite views are not dissimilar in their outcomes. In the main,
though, most can probably agree with Waltzs claim: Theories do construct a
reality, but no one can ever say that it is the reality.22 But this does not mean that
we can all agree with one another on Waltzs understanding of theory. As the next
section will discuss, a major problem with Waltzs approach to theory is that it is
instrumentalist. This is best expressed in Waltzs statement that: The question, as
ever with theories, is not whether the isolation of a realm is realistic, but whether
it is useful. And usefulness is judged by the explanatory and predictive powers of
the theory that may be fashioned.23
Finally, we can note a few things about Waltzs overall method. We have seen how
he draws a clear distinction between theories and law-like statements, or between
theoretical modelling and induction. Waltz does not reject induction but argues that it
is used at the level of hypotheses and laws rather than at the level of theories.24 This
is important because we nevertheless need some sense of the puzzling connections
of things and events before we can worry about constructing theories.25 But we also
need theory in order to know what data and connections to look for.26 This dilemma
of where to begin is somewhat reminiscent of the Kantian adage that thoughts without
content are empty and intuitions without concepts are blind. For Waltz we cannot
simply move from experience to the setting up of the theory; to do so is to claim that
we understand phenomena before the means for their explanation are contrived.27
Nevertheless, observable phenomena help tell us what sorts of connections we are
looking for. Waltzs method therefore moves back and forth between theory and
observation. Indeed he even moves from a sharp distinction between theory and law
to something like a conflation in saying that theories are themselves combinations of
theoretical and descriptive statements where the theoretical is the non-factual part,
introduced to make explanation possible.28 The method of explanation works in four
ways: (1) through isolation, viewing the interactions of a small number of factors;
(2) by abstraction through concentrating on certain things; (3) by aggregation or
lumping disparate elements together; (4) through idealisation which proceeds as if
perfection can be reached.29 The method of testing the theory works by stating the
theory and inferring the hypothesis and subjecting this to empirical tests.30
Again, there is nothing particularly unusual in Waltzs approach. We find all of this
in mainstream accounts of the philosophy of social science. Waltzs questioning of
induction can be found in Poppers critique of observation and verification. Waltzs
correct insistence that unfavourable testing should not lead to the hasty rejection of
theory31 is similar to Lakatoss arguments about research programmes. Waltz even
draws on Kuhn to describe the relationship between theories and objects when a
change of similarity relations from one theory to another leads to objects that are
grouped under one theory being grouped differently under another.32 Waltz goes on
 IS WALTZ A REALIST? 483

to say that changes in theory produce changes in meaning that are both theoretical
and factual.33 He also says that theories define the terms and the operations that can
be performed.34 All of this is interesting and challenging of a very narrowly defined
empiricism founded on inductivism. But, as we shall go on to see, none of this is
challenging of a more broadly defined positivist approach. We should note that
nowhere does Waltz categorically reject inductivism; rather he is concerned with
its limits. He believes that the search for empirical regularities is a vital part of the
scientific approach. What he expresses in this chapter is a healthy concern with the
limitations of the positivist approach. This is not the same as rejecting the general
assumptions of this tradition in favour of a radically different one such as scientific
realism or constructivism.

Induction and the positivist illusion

The first chapter of TIP is summarised above because, as Wver notes, most debates
on the book avoid the question of what theory is despite Waltz making this his point
of departure.35 It is also true that Waltz read widely and thought a lot about philosophy
of science, in contrast to many of those who would later comment on him while
ignoring the matter of what exactly he means by theory.36
It should not really come as a great surprise that TIP should both focus on
empirical regularities and agonise over this focus. It is with good reason that
induction is known, following C. D. Broad,37 as the glory of science but also the
scandal of philosophy since ultimately it is revealed that we lack any grounds for
trusting our experiences. Hume raised the problem that we can only ever experience
a finite number of occurrences of something; thus we can never be absolutely
certain that what we are witnessing is universally valid. Positivists try to deal with
this by saying that laws will hold to a greater or lesser degree, but we can never
rest assured either (a) that statements are universally valid or (b) that our actual
mental perceptions actually conform to objective reality. Constant conjunctions can
never lead us to justify the existence of real causal connections; thus we have to
produce a psychological or imaginary explanation of possible causal connections.
This is why Waltz emphasises the role of theory and models and why he wrestles
with alternatives to induction.
A highly influential alternative to induction is the deductive nomological (D-N)
covering law model where the event to be explained is inferred from a regularity or
law and a set of initial conditions. This approach fits with a number of Waltzs claims
about the importance of theory and the need to make theoretical idealisations. Carl
Hempel argues that this should be the starting point for science, although in social
science these idealisations tend to be more intuitive rather than theoretical.38 These
idealisations need not be true, but they must reflect what real things approximate
towards hence they are models that explain patterns of behaviour. This explanation
of macro level patterns is done through hypothetical assumptions at the micro level.
Here Hempel gives an account of microeconomic theory:
484 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 24(4)

Among the ideal-type concepts in social theory, those used in analytical economics
approximate most closely the status of idealizations in natural science: the concepts
of perfectly free competition, of monopoly, of economically rational behaviour on
the part of an individual or a firm, etc., all represent schemata for the interpretation
of certain aspects of human behaviour and involve the idealizing assumption that
non-economic factors of the sort that in fact do influence human action may be
rejected for the purposes at hand. In the context of rigorous theory construction,
those ideal constructions are given a precise meaning in the form of hypotheses
which postulate specified mathematical connections between certain economic
variables, frequently such postulates characterize the ideal type of behaviour as
maximising a given function of these variables (say profit).39

We know that Waltz criticises as reductionist those theories that focus on the unit
level rather than the system. Rather than looking at the capabilities of states and
their national socio-economic characteristics, we are told our focus should be at the
international level.40 However, none of this should deflect us from the fact that Waltz
refers to microeconomic theory as a model to explain the creation of international
structure.41 This micro theory describes how an order is spontaneously formed from
the self-interested acts and interactions of individual units.42 Comparing international
relations to economic systems, Waltz writes that:

International-political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the coaction

of self-regarding units. International structures are defined in terms of the primary
political units of an era, be they city states, empires or nations. Structures emerge
from the coexistence of states International-political systems, like economic
markets, are individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended. In
both systems, structures are formed by the coaction of their units Both systems
are formed and maintained on a principle of self-help that applies to the units.43

Waltzs microeconomic assumptions have significant ontological implications, all of

which are consistent with what are normally considered key features of a positivist
approach. These include the belief that states are the basic units of the international
system, that they are unitary actors and that, above all else, they are rational, self-
interested actors. We cannot look inside the state, so we must treat relations between
them as external interactions between atomistic parts. Of course states need not
behave rationally, but the system punishes them if they do not. The system is an
aggregate of (the behaviour of) rational units. That is why Waltz compares it to the
market. Ultimately structure is nothing more than such interactions. The system is
a product of individual behaviour which Waltz assumes to be based on self-help or
egotistical views. As he says: In a microtheory, whether of international politics
or of economics, the motivation of the actors is assumed rather than realistically
described. I assume that states seek to ensure their survival.44 As such, his approach
is consistent with Hempels point that theory construction characterises ideal types
of behaviour as maximising a given function such as profit, power or survival. This
 IS WALTZ A REALIST? 485

approach, as we have already noted, is an instrumentalist one. As Waltz says of the

survival motive: The assumption is a radical simplification, the question to ask of it
is not whether it is true, but whether it is the most sensible and useful one to make.45
Of course the point of this piece is not to claim that Waltz is a follower of the D-N
model there is little explicit discussion of deduction in TIP and just a couple, albeit
positive, references to Ernest Nagel. The point is that Waltz passes through a variety of
different views on the relation between theory construction and empirical regularities
corresponding closely to the mainstream debates in philosophy of science at that time
of writing. He sometimes seems to advocate theory plus induction; he sometimes
seems to advocate views inconsistent with induction and closer to deduction or to
critics of induction such as Popper, Lakatos and even Kuhn. As Wver had noted,
Waltzs approach has sometimes been likened to Poppers hypothetico-deductive
method. As with the D-N arguments of Hempel, Popper argues that science proceeds
deductively rather than inductively and that we should test our theoretical hypotheses
by trying to falsify them. Knowledge starts from existing theoretical problems rather
than from our innocent perceptions. Since we can never be sure of reaching the truth
we use imagination to suggest plausible explanations and then set out to test if these
are wrong. This is known as a process of conjecture and refutation.46 Waltzs outline
of theory testing47 seems pretty Popperian in its move from stating the theory and
inferring the hypothesis to subjecting this to tests. However, it also looks Lakatosian
insofar as he insists that if a test is not passed (or if falsification takes place) we need to
decide if the whole theory flunks, or if modifications are required: The unfavourable
results of tests should not lead to the hasty rejection of theories.48 A significant
difference between Poppers approach and that of Lakatos is that for the latter we
are testing things that are part of a wider research programme which is comprised
of a hard core and a protective belt. We have to decide, as Waltz indicates, what the
consequences would be for the research programme if a particular test is not passed.
To summarise, different arguments present in TIP reflect different positions
within debates in philosophy of social science. The fact that Waltz often questions
the validity of induction does not mean that he rejects positivism but that he is
engaged with debates about positivism and the inductive method. Like the Popper
Hempel theory of explanation, he questions positivist reliance on induction, but
accepts the idea that science should be predictive and that it is based on testing
empirical regularities. While some of his arguments may not fit with a very narrow
definition of empiricism, positivism is a sufficiently diverse tradition to allow for
many variations. For example, there is plenty of room in this tradition for the use of
theoretical idealisations. Indeed it might be said to be a necessity in order to save
science from being ravaged by scepticism. Now it would be vulgar to conclude that
Waltz is a positivist. These days the word is never used in respectable company. Let
us instead cite positivist family resemblances. This family includes post-positivists
in the proper sense of the term i.e. not IR people who have never been interested
in positivism, but people such as Popper and Lakatos whose arguments pass through
positivism and who still accept many of its fundamental assumptions. Wver
argues against reading Waltz as a positivist because he is aware of what he calls the
486 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 24(4)

inductivist illusion.49 A more appropriate illusion that we should be wary of what

might be termed the positivist illusion whereby we can never be certain just how
positivist someone or something is. The illusion works both ways in that the term
positivism is so over-generalised that it becomes virtually meaningless, but also that
it is applied so narrowly (for example, as equivalent to induction) that we lose sight
of family resemblances between different types of approaches. Yet it is clear to see
that all family members commit to (1) the belief that science searches for empirical
invariances and (2) the belief in instance confirmation or falsification of these.50 To
reiterate the conclusion of the previous section, Waltz expresses a healthy concern
with the limits of a positivist approach. But he does so as a family member, not an
outsider to the tradition.

Neither a realist nor a constructivist

This section responds to recent claims that Waltz may be a closet constructivist or
realist and argues that his positivist family resemblances are much stronger than
alternative realist or constructivist features. Recently Wver has said that the label
positivist is misplaced because the main enemy of the theoretical chapter of TIP is
the inductivist illusion.51 To tidy up this part of his argument first, we repeat the
point that it is not the case that Waltz rejects inductivism. He sees it as an important
part of theory (providing the descriptive element), but he is against reliance on
induction to make law-like statements without the accompanying theoretical task
of providing an explanation of how these relations fit together. As noted, this can be
seen as consistent with a tradition of work associated with Hempel, Popper, Lakatos
and other philosophers who do question the inductive approach, but who remain
committed to the quest for empirical regularities. We can argue whether the continued
reliance on constant conjunctions makes Waltz or these other writers positivists,
but we can at least say that their arguments are framed by positivist controversies.
Wvers argument is that Waltz rejected positivism when in fact his work is located
squarely within this problem field.
This is important in order to challenge Wvers next claim that Waltz could be
read as a scientific realist. Wver believes that the scientific realist label can fit
because Waltz searches for unobservable mechanisms that are always present but not
always materialised.52 Our argument is that Waltz is not searching for unobservable
mechanisms that exist out there in the real world. He may perhaps believe that such
things are out there, but he does not go searching for them. He goes searching instead
for repeatable patterns of behaviour that confirm the coherence of his theoretical
(imaginary, or intuitive) account of structures. So TIP is searching for two things
regularities out there and theoretical models in here. This is entirely consistent
with the positivist tradition. Structure exists in the theoretical model, not in the real
world. The purpose of his theoretical models is to fill the gaps between positive laws
in the way we have just suggested. This approach is instrumental because structures
do not necessarily exist out there but they are used in the theory as if they really
 IS WALTZ A REALIST? 487

did in order to give meaning to the empirical data. As Wver goes on to admit,
Waltz insists that key elements of structure are analytical categories not real ones.
He distinguishes between what is real (the empirical observations) and what is a
model (the theorisation of structure). Unlike realism, this is not phrased in terms
of different levels of reality.53 This is the crucial point, not the mere aside Wver
presents it as. The key question here is whether Waltzs structures are real? Are they
really out there in the world, even if they cannot be observed? Waltzs answer is that
they are not real. They are useful fictions. Theories are not descriptions of the real
world; they are instruments that we design in order to apprehend some part of it.54
There is nothing out there that Waltzs theory of structure can be said to refer to. The
theoretical notion of structure in TIP rather than referring to something out there is
used to apprehend the behaviour of states.
If Waltz really were a scientific realist, he would do more than introduce
theoretical models. He would break with a number of assumptions that have
particular ontological consequences. Instead of adding models to explain constant
conjunctions, he would note that constant conjunctions are neither the necessary nor
the sufficient condition for a causal law. While observations and events are located
in the empirical level of what is observed and the actual level of manifestations,
causal laws are located at the real level of the tendencies of things, not the
conjunction of events.55 Waltzs approach is therefore closer to what critical realists
call actualism because of its focus on recurring events rather than underlying
causal mechanisms. Waltzs commitment to a Humean causality means he cannot
admit to the real existence of such underlying causal mechanisms hence his
instrumental use of models to fill the gap. This Humeanism also commits Waltz to
atomistic assumptions of state behaviour whereby their relations are defined in terms
of external causes rather than the nature (powers and liabilities) of things.56 These
assumptions are reflected in Waltzs use of simplified models that reflect the use
they are put to, giving meaning to constant conjunctions rather than investigating
the underlying complexity of the social world. While an empirical realism can
happily allow for the real existence of events, the key test of a scientific realism
is whether it attempts to establish the real existence of deeper, underlying powers
(irreducible to their actual exercise or manifestation), causal mechanisms, tendencies,
counter-tendencies, complexes and ensembles, emergent processes, real absences,
contradictions and over-determinations. In doing social science, scientific realists
might also point to the fact that these things are historical. Against Waltzs rationalist
assumptions it should be argued that the subject matter of political science is both
law-like and historical. The things IR theory looks at are necessary and contingent,
intrinsic and extrinsic. None of these are present in TIP, only the highly constant
occurrence of patterns and repetition of events.57
To try a different line, Wver also suggests that Waltzs insistence on the distance
between theory and reality together with the crucial importance of theory actually
makes neorealism compatible with much reflectivism.58 This is also taken up in
Onufs article where he goes as far as to call Waltzs approach a kind of structural
idealism that supports a strong version of constructivism. It should not be hard to
488 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 24(4)

guess by now that our answer to this claim is a strong no it isnt, but it is interesting
to pursue this argument a bit further to see where Onuf himself wants to go.
Onuf soon kills any idea that Waltz might be a philosophical realist. He argues
that Waltzs strong positivism is closer to post-Kantian constructivism in its rejection
of the idea that real structures are out there in the world.59 This much we can agree
on. For both Kantians and positivists reality is beyond the reach of our knowledge
so that the world we come to know is the one constructed by our concepts. Instead
of reality, we can only speak of reality as it is to us (a phenomenalist position),
expressed in Waltzs comment: What we think of as reality is itself an elaborate
conception constructed and reconstructed though the ages. Reality emerges from
our selection and organization of materials that are available in infinite quality.60
The idea that we select and organise materials does sound similar to Kant. For Kant
something like cause is not derived from experience but is an organising concept.
Onuf suggests we may find it surprising that positivism and Kantian idealism can be
philosophical allies against philosophical realism.61 But this should not come as any
sort of surprise to philosophers of science. Kant after all was deeply influenced by
Humes empiricism and he was seeking a way to overcome his scepticism. But Kants
rationalist solution to the problem of whether we can trust our experiences is to say
that they are ordered by the universal categories of the mind, a step no positivist would
take. If positivists construct theories it is for the quite different (instrumentalist) reason
that they are useful fictions that help us to make sense of empirical regularities. Thus
while both Kant and Waltz might be considered to be empirical realists, Kant, unlike
Waltz, is also a transcendental idealist in that he moves from observable sequences
of events to ask the question: what it is that produces this empirical reality for us?
Unlike transcendental realism, Kantians believe that the things that order the empirical
world such as the time and space within which things exist are intuitions of the
mind rather than real in themselves. There is a world of difference between this
approach and the kinds of issues raised by Waltzs discussion of the use of models.
In outlining Waltzs approach to science Onuf rightly notes his Humean
presumption that we can never conclusively know the cause of the worlds many
apparent regularities.62 Thus laws are subject to observational tests, while concepts
are theoretical notions we impose. This imposition, as Onuf appears to concede, is
not a Kantian one but an instrumentalist one. This instrumentalism treats theories
as useful fictions that help us to make scientific predictions and provide plausible
answers to questions raised by our observations. Theories, writes Waltz, are not
descriptions of the real world; they are instruments that we design in order to apprehend
some part of it.63 The purpose of continually repeating the point about instrumentalism
is to show that there is no need to introduce either Kantianism or constructivism in order
to make sense of Waltzs discussion of theories and models. Of course Onuf knows that
everything discussed so far can be covered by the disputes over positivism or mainstream
philosophy of science. Reading his latest article on Waltz one gets the impression that
he reluctantly (if silently) concedes that Waltz is not a crypto-constructivist and moves
instead to lament the fact that Waltz did not engage with constructivism. He then
provides an account of what would have happened had he done so.
 IS WALTZ A REALIST? 489

In fact it is clear that Onuf does not want to claim that Waltz is a Kantian.
He really wants to tie his arguments to a more social version of constructivism.
Onufs argument starts by claiming to follow Kant in describing how we impose
models on what we see where the sensing mind determines the manifold of
representations. Onuf believes this makes Kants approach radically constructivist:
the mind gives order to the world and makes it real in our heads although it seems
to exist out there in the world.64 But he notes how there is no we in Kants
model. Instead the constructions take place in solitary confinement. In breaking
with this approach, Onuf moves to a quite different sort of social constructivism.
Now the issue is no longer the puzzling relationship between my model and
the world, but between my model and other peoples models.65 This brings in
an element of sociality missing in the approaches discussed thus far. Models
are constructions, but they are social constructions rather than constructions of
the mind. They exist socially in different forms where some models converge,
some conflict, some are exchanged and others are superseded. Different agents
engage in the making of models and the consequence is that these models have
what Onuf calls institutional effects.66 Setting this up against both a realist view
that things are out there in the world and a Kantian view that we are imprisoned
in our own construction Onuf says:

Most observers would call these dynamics real effects, to be found in the world,
not the model. I would call them institutional effects. When agents see a world
of patterns and act on them, in the first instance by telling each other what they
see, they have begun a process of transforming patterns into institutions (models
whose formal properties are more or less fixed and publicly available as ensembles
of rules).67

While the models are not real in themselves, Onuf argues that they substitute
one reality for another and in doing so become an integral feature of the world
they are said to represent.68 In other words, the models become a part of the
world by virtue of the way they offer us a picture of the world, or of the particular
practices by which we engage in the world. Their main role is to guide our social
practice. Hence Onuf writes: Instead of asking if models are true we should
ask can we trust them?69 Can we trust them, that is, to help guide us through
our social practices? We are now back on familiar constructivist territory where
the main focus is not on structures but on practices which can be understood
through rules, norms and language. This is what is meant by models all the way
down70 insofar as for Onuf models are no longer just a way of understanding
the world (as with Waltz), they are in fact the stuff of the world. As opposed to
Waltzs phenomenalism (model plus empirical observation as explanatory tool),
Onufs view is that models construct the world. There is no way that Waltzs
instrumental use of models as explanatory devices can be compared to Onufs
turning of the theoretical model into institutional practices with the significant
ontological consequences that follow from this.
490 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 24(4)

Conclusion

This piece is intended more as an explanation of Waltzs position than a critique,

although of course the latter is unavoidable if we believe, contra positivism, that it is
impossible to separate facts from values. Nevertheless, we have tried to steer clear of
stating the ontological consequences of Waltzs philosophical views as manifested in
his claims about state behaviour and the nature of the international system.
However, it is worth saying something on this issue in conclusion, not least to
ward off criticisms that this article has been overly philosophical. The piece has
concentrated on elaborating upon Waltzs philosophical views precisely because so
few IR scholars actually bother to do this. But for those who think there are more
important things to do than split hairs over Waltzs philosophy, the point to make is
that our philosophical position stands behind and informs the way these important
things get addressed. If we can show that Waltz is neither a constructivist nor a
scientific realist but someone who is influenced by positivist disputes about social
science, then we can better understand why Waltzs theory contains problematic
ontological assumptions about such things as the behaviour of actors or the structure
of the international system. For example, Waltzs instrumental use of models
contrasts with Onufs constructivist view which, as we shall go on to summarise,
makes the ontological claim that these models are bound up with and give meaning
to intersubjective practices. And it most certainly contrasts with the scientific realist
view that models refer to things out there. While the scientific realist ontology would
see among the things out there deep structures, causal properties and generative
mechanisms, Waltzs instrumental use of models denies the actuality of such things
and leaves us with nothing but the atomistic relations between units. Seeing Waltzs
use of models as instrumental rather than realist or constructivist explains why, despite
his protestations, he is unable to break from the search for empirical regularities and
patterns of events as reflected in his theoretical claim that the texture of international
politics is highly constant. From here one could go on to analyse how it is that an
ontology that only admits to the reality of events (and not anything underlying these)
necessarily leads to behaviouralist, individualist and ahistorical accounts of state
behaviour. It also explains why Waltzs account of structure can never be anything
more than the arrangement of the parts and why it is ultimately no more than the
result of individual interaction among formally equal units. In other words, what
we get is a billiard ball model of state interaction whose ontology derives not from
constructivism or scientific realism, but from Hume and the classical empiricists.
If the alternatives are scientific realism or constructivism, then we are forced to
say that Waltz is located within the positivist camp. At least we can temper this by
saying that positivism is a more complex and diverse tradition than it seems to most
who use the word as a term of abuse. Part of the diversity of the positivist tradition
is reflected in the fact that debates about the use of models happen all the time. But
the difference between Waltzs understanding of models and Onufs is huge. It can
be summarised thus: for Waltz a model is a theoretical device used for the simple
purpose of explaining an observed regularity. For Onuf the model becomes reality,
 IS WALTZ A REALIST? 491

not in the Kantian sense of one transcendental view, nor in the realist sense of a
mind-independent reality, but in the constructivist sense of interacting models all
the way down.
Onufs interpretation pushes us more and more in the direction of a social ontology
made up of different models linked to practices. This is different from Waltzs model-
building approach. Waltz does this to provide theoretical explanation, Onuf more
directly to talk of the constructed nature of the world clearly a significant ontological
claim. Waltz makes the negative ontological claim, by contrast, that models do not
really exist but we treat them as if they do, for the purposes of providing explanation.
Of course many critics, including Onuf, would note that this instrumentalist approach
does not really make sense. As Onuf says, Waltz tries to have it both ways, notably in
his claim that markets do not really exist yet they are said to act causally in producing
real effects.71 His resolution of this problem is to see markets as institutions and to
argue that people see these markets in action which reinforces market behaviour and
hence reinforces the institution.72 This is an interesting argument, but it no longer has
anything to do with Waltzs work!
For constructivists in IR Onufs contribution will no doubt be useful in its
own right. For the purposes of this piece it is also useful in providing intelligent
arguments against the claim by Wver that Waltz comes close to scientific realism.
Rather than helping the argument for scientific realism, this particular claim does
more harm that good. Where Wvers piece might be more helpful is in showing
that Waltzs approach is model-theoretic and thus gets us beyond what he identifies
as the mainstream American IR focus on causal laws (a position identified with the
seminal book by King, Keohane and Verba).73 He then mentions scientific realism as
a third way that could also avoid the excessively wide theoretical approach adopted
by most Europeans (what might be called pluralism). To put it in terms other than
Europe versus America, scientific realism offers a way to challenge the dominant view
of political science with its flat ontology of constant conjunctions and its atomistic,
rationalist and behaviourist assumptions. But in contrast to the post-positivists, it
defends the idea that we should be doing science and searching for meaningful
statements about an objective reality. Indeed it goes beyond positivist science in
arguing that the only way to defend science is to break with the idea that constant
conjunctions are necessary and sufficient since this ultimately leads to anti-scientific
conclusions that conflate the world with the (experimental) knowledge we have of
it, assumes closed systems (where conjunctions are produced) and lacks ontological
depth (i.e. the real causes of things). In short, it misidentifies causal laws with their
empirical grounds. Ironically, the scepticism bound up with the Humean view of
causality also leads in the same direction as constructivism to the view that the
image we have of the world is all we have to go on.
This leads to a final irony. For if it is any consolation, we can perhaps finally give
a yes answer to the question, is Waltz a realist? But he is an empirical realist.74
And empirical realists only believe in that which can be observed or proved to have
occurred. Anything else, however useful it may be to us, remains an image. Thus
empirical realism actually encourages people to embrace the imaginary while denying
492 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 24(4)

that there are real things out there that this imaginary might be trying to capture.
Empirical realism is therefore ultimately an anti-realism something it shares with
constructivism. Except that for constructivism these images are a part of the world
as Onuf demonstrates. Instead of asking who is a realist, it makes more sense to ask
what their ontology involves. One approach on offer gives us patterns of regular
events with no depth, another offers depth, but as models all the way down. Such
a choice does indeed require a third way, although an answer to the question what
is scientific realism? will present us with yet more difficulties.

Notes

1 Ole Wver, Waltzs Theory of Theory, International Relations, 23(2), 2009, pp. 20122.
2 Nicholas Onuf, Structure, What Structure?, International Relations, 23(2), 2009, pp. 18399.
3 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
4 Waltz TIP, p. 66.
5 Waltz TIP, p. 66.
6 Waltz TIP, p. 2.
7 Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (London: Verso, 1997). For an IR view see Milja Kurki,
Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008).
8 Waltz TIP, p. 2.
9 Waltz TIP, p. 3.
10 Waltz TIP, p. 66.
11 Waltz TIP, p. 4.
12 Waltz TIP, p. 5.
13 Waltz TIP, pp. 56.
14 Waltz TIP, p. 6.
15 Waltz TIP, p. 7.
16 Waltz TIP, p. 9.
17 Waltz TIP, p .9.
18 Waltz TIP, p. 8.
19 Waltz TIP, p. 7.
20 Waltz TIP, p. 7.
21 Waltz TIP, pp. 67. Most realists would accept this since they believe that reality is mind-independent
thus theories can never fully capture this reality and we must work on the assumption of explanatory
adequacy instead. However, contra idealists, postmodernists and some constructivists it is argued that
we do have grounds for preferring one account of reality to another. Thus the typical realist philosophy
is comprised of ontological realism (about the world out there), epistemic relativism (that we can
never hope to fully capture this reality because of its mind-independence), and judgmental rationalism
(that we nevertheless have good (ontological) grounds for preferring one theory to another).
22 Waltz TIP, p. 9.
23 Waltz TIP, p. 8. And in making predictive powers a test of usefulness it ties theory to the ontological
commitment of instance confirmation (of constant conjunctions).
24 Waltz TIP, p. 7.
25 Waltz TIP, p. 8.
26 Waltz TIP, p. 8.
27 Waltz TIP, p. 7.
28 Waltz TIP, p. 10.
29 Waltz TIP, p. 10.
30 Waltz TIP, p. 13.
31 Waltz TIP, p. 14.
32 Waltz TIP, p. 12.
33 Waltz TIP, p. 12.
34 Waltz TIP, p. 12.
 IS WALTZ A REALIST? 493

35 Wver, Waltzs Theory of Theory, p. 202.

36 Wver, Waltzs Theory of Theory, p. 202.
37 Charles Dunbar Broad, Ethics and the History of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1952).
38 Carl Gustav Hempel, Concept and Theory in Social Science, in Gerard Delanty and Piet Strydom
(eds), Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic and Contemporary Readings, (Maidenhead: Open
University Press, 2003), p. 36.
39 Hempel, Concept and Theory in Social Science, p. 36.
40 Waltz TIP, p. 19.
41 Despite TIP outlining a structural theory, Waltz is far from clear about what he means by structure.
For example, within one page Waltz says both that structure is defined by the arrangement of its
parts and that structure defines the arrangement, or the ordering of the parts of a system, TIP, p. 81.
42 Waltz, TIP, p. 89.
43 Waltz TIP, p. 91.
44 Waltz TIP, p. 91.
45 Waltz TIP, p. 91.
46 See Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (London:
Routledge, 2002), especially chapter 1.
47 Waltz TIP, p. 13.
48 Waltz TIP, p. 14.
49 Wver, Waltzs Theory of Theory, p. 203.
50 For an account of this see Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1989), p. 9.
51 Wver, Waltzs Theory of Theory, p. 203.
52 Wver, Waltzs Theory of Theory, p. 204.
53 Wver, Waltzs Theory of Theory, p. 204.
54 Waltz, cited in Onuf, Structure, What Structure?, p. 186.
55 Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, p. 13.
56 See Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, pp. 1218.
57 Waltz TIP, p. 66.
58 Wver, Waltzs Theory of Theory, p. 217.
59 Onuf, Structure, What Structure?, pp. 1834.
60 Waltz TIP, p. 5.
61 Onuf, Structure, What Structure?, p. 184.
62 Onuf, Structure, What Structure?, p. 188.
63 Waltz, cited in Onuf, Structure, What Structure?, p. 186.
64 Onuf, Structure, What Structure?, p. 194.
65 Onuf, Structure, What Structure?, p. 194.
66 Onuf, Structure, What Structure?, p. 195.
67 Onuf, Structure, What Structure?, p. 189.
68 Onuf, Structure, What Structure?, p. 187.
69 Onuf, Structure, What Structure?, p. 188.
70 This was first raised with Nick Onuf in discussions. See also Onuf, Structure, What Structure?,
p.195.
71 Onuf, Structure, What Structure?, p. 190.
72 Onuf, Structure, What Structure?, p. 190.
73 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in
Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Of course scientific realists
do the best job of challenging this approach. Wver, Waltzs Theory of Theory, p. 207.
74 Indeed we could describe Waltz as an empirical realist in the political sense as well if we follow
Foxs distinction between doctrinal realists who over-emphasise conflict and the struggle for power
and empirical realists, including neorealists, who try to show the possibilities for cooperation in an
interdependent world. See Elizabeth C. Hanson, William T. R. Fox and the Study of World Politics,
in Robert L. Rothstein (ed.), The Evolution of Theory in International Relations (Columbia: University
of South Carolina Press, 1991), pp. 120.