50.

CANON 12
PNB V UY TENG PIAO
VICKERS; 1932(romy ramirez)
NATURE
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
FACTS
- Defendant-appellant, Uy Teng Piao, was sued by PNB for non payment of obligations
at the CFI of Manila and said court rendered judgment in favor of PNB on September 9,
1934 for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest of seven percent per annum from June
1,1924. The court ordered the defendant appellant to deposit the money due with the
clerk of the court within three months from thedate of judgment. In case of failure to pay,
the mortgage properties should be sold at auction in accordance with law
and theproceeds to be applied to the payment of the judgment.- The defendant failed to
comply with the payment order and the properties were auctioned by the sheriff of
Manila for a total of P1,300 with PNB as the buyer.-
On February 11, 1925, PNB secured from defendant a waiver of the latters right
to redeem one of the proper
ties described as TCTno. 8274 and thereafter sold the same to one Mariano Santos for
P8,600.- The other property, TCT No. 7264 was likewise resold and the proceeds was
credited to the account of Uy. The total amountgenerated with the resale of the lots
amonted to P 11, 300.- On August 1, 1930, PNB instituted another court action for the
recover of the balance of the judgment amounting to P11,574.38with interest at seven
percent per annum.- The defendant claimed that in exchange for his waiver of his right
to redeem the first property resold by PNB, the bank would notcollect from him the
balance of the judgment.- The CFI ruled that there was in fact a condonation made by
the bank through one of its officer, a certain Mr. Pecson.- Hence this appeal

ISSUES
1. WON PNB condoned the balance of the judgment
2.WON a lawyer can appear as both counsel and witness in the same case

HELD
1. No. There was no evidence presented except the uncertain testimony of the
defendant, that the bank did in fact agree to thecondonation. Even if the SC
grants that Mr. Pecson did agree to the condonation, there is not evidence
presented that Mr. Pecsonwas authorized by the bank through its board of
directors or persons authorized by the said board to bind the bank
to theagreement
2. Yes (No). The SC held that the appearance of a lawyer as both counsel and
witness in a trial is not strictly prohibited. The SChowever stated that it would be
preferable if the lawyer in this case can appear only as one or the other. In other
words, if they areto testify as required by the case, they should withdraw from the
active management of the case. This is embodied in Canon 19 of the Code of
Legal Ethics.
Disposition
The decision of the CFI is reversed and the defendant is ordered to pay PNB the sum of
P11,574.38 with interest thereonat the rate of seven percent per annum to be reckoned
from August 1, 1930. Costs for the defendant.
51.

MARTELINO vs. ALEJANDRO

FACTS:
Major Eduardo Martelino is charged with the violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of
War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then
undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor. On August 12, 1969
Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of the general court-martial,
following the latter's admission that he read newspaper stories of theCorregidor
incident. Martelino contended that the case had received such an amount of publicity in
the press and other news media and in fact was being exploited for political purposes in
connection with the presidential election on November 11, 1969 as to imperilhis right to
a fair trial. After deliberating, the military court denied the challenge.Respondents assert
that despite the publicity which the case had received, noproof has been presented
showing that the court-martial's president's fairness andimpartiality have been impaired.
On the contrary, they claim, the petitioner's own counselexpressed confidence in the
"integrity, experience and background" of the members of thecourt.

ISSUE:

Whether the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as toprejudice
their right to a fair trial?

HELD:
NO, the spate of publicity in this case did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners
butrather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be
a "massacre" ofMuslim trainees.If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of
the petitioners but of theGovernment. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-
martial to protect the accusedfrom massive publicity encouraged by those connected
with the conduct of the trial eitherby a failure to control the release of information or to
remove the trial to another venue orto postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity
shall have subsided. Indeed we cannotsay that the trial of the petitioners was being held
under circumstances which did notpermit the observance of those imperative decencies
of procedure which have come to beidentified with due process.Granting the existence
of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the petitionershere do not contend that the
respondents have been unduly influenced but simply that theymight be by the "barrage"
of publicity, we think that the suspension of the court-martialproceedings has
accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause,by postponing
the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have returned. The atmospherehas since
been cleared and the publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so farabated that
we believe the trial may now be resumed in tranquility.

56.

MONTEREY VS ARAYATA

FACTS: Atty. Arayata drew up in his favor deed of sale of a land, stating therein that the
person who executed the document and sold the land to him was his father who is
already dead. He appears to Notary public Montoya to legalize said document.
However, in the course of investigation, he alleged that it was his uncle who signed the
deed of transfer and ratified it before Montoya.

ISSUE:

WON Atty. Arayatas acts constitute malpractice and unprofessional conduct meriting for
him a disciplinary action.
RULING:

The acts committed by Atty. Arayata relative to the deed of sale and his statements to
notary Montoya with regards to said document, constitute malpractice and
unprofessional conduct, meriting for him a disciplinary action mitigated by the
circumstance the he was the heir and complainant has no direct interest. He was
suspended for one month.

57.

60.

BEREGUER VS CARRANZA

FACTS: Pedro Carranza is a lawyer handling a cadastral case. In the presentation

evidence, an affidavit of adjudication and transfer was introduced to prove the property
in question to his client. However, the said affidavit has falsehood, it provides that it was
executed by his clients mother, making his client as the only heir, when in fact; there
are four daughters and their father. He was then charge of deceiving the court. Atty.
Carranza contends that he had nothing to do with the affidavit since it was subscribe
from Pasay City.

ISSUE:

WON Atty. Carranza is liable for discretionary action for not warranting a greater
diligence to read the entirety of the affidavit to clear up inconsistencies and doubts.

RULING: Even if there be no intent to deceive, Atty. Carranza betrays inatention or

carelessness should not be allowed. A lawyers oath is not impressed with the utmost
seriousness; it must not be taken lightly. Every lawyer must do his best to live up to it.
Every member of the bar must be on his guard the way he conducts his case or the
evidence he presents could conceivably reprimanded and wained.

62.

The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU vs. The
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., 37 SCRA 244 , January 30, 1971
This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt
against the respondent Judge and the respondents counsels. We are inclined to believe
that the misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on
the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. We fully realize how saddled with many
pending cases are the courts of the land, and it is not difficult to imagine that because of
the pressure of their varied and multifarious work, clerical errors may escape their
notice. Upon the other hand, the respondents counsel have the prima facie right to rely
on the quotation as it appears in the respondent Judges decision, to copy it verbatim,
and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway, the import of the underscored sentences of
the quotation in the respondent Judges decision is substantially the same as, and
faithfully reflects, the particular ruling in this Courts decision, i.e., that [N]ot even the
acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employers
right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal
charges were based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employers
interest.
Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Courts decisions
and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy
the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a
salient and salutary reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunals decisions
and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their bearings. This
is because the decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which reads, Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines, are only those enunciated by this Court of last resort.
We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al (77 Phil. 1066) that
[O]nly the decisions of this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this
jurisdiction. Thus, ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the
decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the
detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. But if
inferior courts and members of the bar meticulously discharge their duty to check and
recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from this Courts decisions but from
other sources and make certain that they are verbatim reproductions down to the last
word and punctuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on
misinformation, as well as be saved precious time in finding out whether the citations
are correct.

Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents counsel there was no
substantial change in the thrust of this Courts particular ruling which they cited. It is our
view, nonetheless, that for their mistake, they should be, as they are hereby,
admonished to be more careful when citing jurisprudence in the future. [The Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU vs. The Insular Life Assurance Co.,
Ltd., 37 SCRA 244(1971)]

66.

EGMPC VS CA

FACTS: A case started on 1981 when spouses Seelin filed a complaint against Central
Dyeing. RTC and CA decided in favor of the spouses. The lawyer, however, filed
different petitions despite said decisions. The case runs for 17 years because of said
petitions.

ISSUE: WON the lawyer violated Canon 12 - a lawyer shall exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

RULING: We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients
and zeal in the defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they are officers
of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to
defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes."As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist
in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless
petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is
burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them
when a case such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the
already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their
clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the
attention of the courts."

67.

Kelly R. Wicker et. al vs. hon. Paul T. Arcangel

G.R. No. 112869. Jan. 29, 1996. 252 SCRA 444 PONENTE: Mendoza

FACTS: It appears that on Nov 18, 1993, Wicker's counsel, Atty. Rayos, filed a motion
seeking the inhibition of the respondent Judge Arcangel from the case. Respondent
judge found offense in the allegations on the motion for inhibition filed by complainants,
and in an order, held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer
imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for lack of merit in his order of Dec 17,
1993.

HELD:

The power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. Only occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect
without which the administration of justice will fail. Consistent with the foregoing
principles and based on the abovementioned facts, the Court sustains Judge Arcangel's
finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt. Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade
responsibility for the allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just an instrument of
his client. His client came to him for professional assistance in the representation of a
cause, and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were bounds set by his
responsibility as a lawyer which he could not overstep. Based on Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the
contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client. Atty. Rayos' duty to
the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility
enjoins him to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others" and "not [to] attribute to a Judge
motives not supported by the record or have materiality to the case."

70.

GARCIA VS FRANCISCO

FACTS: Garcia with five others leased a parcel of land to Lee for a period of 25 years.
Lee refused to vacate after expiration of lease. On the other hand, Lees counsel, Atty.
Francisco, commenced various suits to thwarts Garcias right to regain her property.
Thus, violating proscription shopping. The latter contends that such remedies are
authorized by law.

ISSUE:

WON Atty. Francisco violated Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

RULING:

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the
administration justice. Atty. Francisco violated his oath no to delay any man for money
or malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved
himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the court. He was
suspended for one year.