Akbayan Youth v.
COMELEC The right
Facts:
Petitioners in this case represent the youth sector
and they seek to seek to direct COMELEC to
conduct a special registration before the May 14,
2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21.
According to them, around four million youth failed
to register on or before the December 27, 2000
deadline set by the respondent COMELEC.
However, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
3584 disapproving the request for additional
registration of voters on the ground that Section 8
of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration
shall be conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election
and that the Commission has no more time
left to accomplish all pre-election activities.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed before the
SC the instant case which seeks to set aside and
nullify respondent COMELECs Resolution
and/or to declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189
unconstitutional insofar as said provision
effectively causes the disenfranchisement of
petitioners and others similarly situated.
Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ
of mandamus directing respondent COMELEC to
conduct a special registration of new voters and to
admit for registration petitioners and other
similarly situated young Filipinos to qualify them
to vote in the May 14, 2001 General Elections.
Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing COMELEC Resolution
2. Whether or not the SC can compel
respondent COMELEC to conduct a special
registration of new voters during the
period between the COMELECs imposed
December 27, 2000 deadline and the May
14, 2001 general elections.
Held:
1. No
of suffrage invoked by
petitioners is not at all absolute. The
exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the
enjoyment of all other rights is subject to
existing substantive and procedural
requirements embodied in our Constitution,
statute books and other repositories of law. As
to the procedural limitation, the right of a
citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon
certain procedural requirements he must
undergo: among others, the process of
registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be
qualified to exercise his right to vote, in
addition to the minimum requirements set by
the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to
register, at present, under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the
Voters Registration Act of 1996. Section 8, of
the R.A. 8189, explicitly provides that No
registration shall, however, be conducted
during the period starting one hundred
twenty (120) days before a regular election
and ninety (90) days before a special
election. The 100-day prohibitive period
serves a vital role in protecting the
integrity of the registration process.
Without the prohibitive periods, the
COMELEC would be deprived of any time to
evaluate the evidence on the application. If we
compromise on these safety nets, we may very
well end up with a voters list full of flying
voters, overflowing with unqualified
registrants, populated with shadows and
ghosts
Likewise, petitioners invoke the so called standby
powers or residual powers of the COMELEC, as
provided under the relevant provisions of Sec. 28
of RA 8436 Designation of Other Dates for
Certain Pre-election Acts.
The act of registration is concededly, by its very
nature, a pre-election act. Under Section 3(a) of
R.A. 8189, (a) Registration refers to the act
of accomplishing and filing of a sworn
application for registration by a qualified
voter before the election officer of the city or
municipality wherein he resides and
including the same in the book of registered
voters upon approval by the Election
Registration Board.
It bears emphasis that the provisions of Section 29
of R.A. 8436 invoked by herein petitioners and
Section 8 of R.A. 8189 volunteered by respondent
COMELEC, far from contradicting each other.
SC hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the
present case, for the purpose of upholding the
assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the
instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law
explicitly provides that no registration shall be
conducted during the period starting one hundred
twenty (120) days before a regular election.
The provisions of Section 28, R.A. 8436 would
come into play in cases where the pre-election
acts are susceptible of performance within
the available period prior to election day. The
stand-by power of the respondent COMELEC
under Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the
possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and
not otherwise.
Moreover, the petitioners in the instant case are not
without fault or blame. They admit in their petition
that they failed to register, for whatever reason,
within the period of registration and came to this
Court and invoked its protective mantle not
realizing, so to speak, the speck in their eyes.
Doctrine: Impuris minibus nemo accedat
curiam. Let no one come to court with unclean
hands. Well-entrenched is the rule in our
jurisdiction that the law aids the vigilant and not
those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantis sed
non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt.
2. NO
SC believes that petitioners failed to establish, to
the satisfaction of this Court, that they are entitled
to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to
effectively compel respondent COMELEC to
conduct a special registration of voters.
Baares v. Balising
DOCTRINE: The maxim interpretare et
concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi
means that every statute must be so construed and
harmonized with other statutes as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence.
CASE SUMMARY: P were filed estafa cases,
but they said case should be dismissed because the
cases have to be referred first to the Lupon of the
barangay. MTC dismissed the cases, but R later
filed motion to revive case. MTC granted motion to
revive. P filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction with RTC but RTC denied petition.
Petitioner Contends:
P contend that an order dismissing a case
without prejudice may attain finality if not
appealed within the reglementary period. Hence, if
no motion to revive the case is filed within the
reglementary 15-d period, the order of dismissal
becomes final, and may only be revived by the filing
of a new complaint or information.
Respondent Contends:
R submit that cases covered by the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure such as the criminal
cases against P are not covered by the rule
regarding finality of decisions and orders under the
Revised Rules of Court. They insist that cases
dismissed without prejudice for non-compliance
with the requirement of conciliation before the
Lupon concerned may be revived summarily by the
filing of a motion to revive regardless of the number
of days which has lapsed after the dismissal of the
case.
SC construed the law by harmonizing with
other statutes. It granted Ps petition, ordered
estafa cases dismissed. (Ruled in favor of
Petitioner)
FACTS:
 P Fidel M. Baares II, Lilia C. Valeriano,
Edgar M. Baares, Emilia Gatchialian and
Fidel Besarino were the accused in sixteen
criminal cases for estafa filed by the private
respondents. The cases were assigned to the
MTC Antipolo.
They filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that case was premature due to failure of
the parties to undergo conciliation
proceedings before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa. P averred that since they
lived in the same barangay as private
respondents, and the amount involved in each
of the cases did not exceed P200.00, the said
cases were required under Sec. 412, Sec. 408 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 and Sec 18,
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure to
be referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa or
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo in the barangay.
The MTC denied MTD on the ground that they
failed to seasonably invoke the non-referral of
the cases to the Lupong Tagapamayapa or
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. P filed MFR.
MTC then dismissed the 16 criminal cases
pursuant to Sec. 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.
After 2 mos, R filed motion to revive the
criminal cases, stating that the requirement of
referral to the Lupon had already been
complied with, but they failed to reach an
amicable settlement with respect thereto.
ISSUE:
WON an order dismissing a case without prejudice
may attain finality if not appealed within the
reglementary period. YES
RULING:
P contend that an order dismissing a case
without prejudice may attain finality if not
appealed within the reglementary period.
Hence, if no motion to revive the case is filed
within the reglementary 15-d period, the order
of dismissal becomes final, and may only be
revived by the filing of a new complaint or
information. P further argue that after the
order of dismissal of a case attains finality, the
court which issued the same loses jurisdiction
thereon and, thus, does not have the authority
to act on any motion of the parties with respect
to said case.
On the other hand, R submit that cases covered
by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure such as the criminal cases against
P . . . are not covered by the rule regarding
finality of decisions and orders under the
Revised Rules of Court. They insist that cases
dismissed without prejudice for non-compliance
with the requirement of conciliation before the
Lupon concerned may be revived summarily by
the filing of a motion to revive regardless of the
number of days which has lapsed after the
dismissal of the case.
MTC granted Rs motion to revive. P filed with
the RTC petition for certiorari, injunction and
prohibition assailing the MTC Order claiming
the criminal cases had long become final and
executory since R did not file any MFR of said
order. R argued that motion to revive was in
accordance with law Sec. 18 of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure. 20
RTC denied Ps petition for certiorari,
injunction and prohibition. It said the Order
has not attained finality. P filed petition with
SC.
 This Court has previously held that an order
dismissing a case without prejudice is a final
order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal
therefrom is timely filed. In Olympia
International vs. Court of Appeals - The
dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does
not mean dismissal order was any less final. It is
a final disposition of the complaint.
After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order
becomes final and executory and is beyond the
power or jurisdiction of the court which
rendered it to further amend or revoke. After
the order of dismissal of a case without
prejudice has become final, and therefore
becomes outside the court's power to amend and
modify, a party who wishes to reinstate the case
has no other remedy but to file a new complaint.
---- Contrary to Rs claim, the rule applies
not only to civil cases but to criminal cases
as well.
R claim that Sec. 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure allows the revival of cases
which were dismissed for failure to submit the
same to conciliation at the barangay level. There
is no declaration to the effect that said case may
be revived by mere motion even after the fifteen-
day period within which to appeal or to file a
motion for reconsideration has lapsed.
Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral
to the Lupon for conciliation under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508
where there is no showing of compliance with
such requirement, shall be dismissed without
prejudice, and may be revived only after such
requirement shall have been complied with. This
provision shall not apply to criminal cases where
the accused was arrested without a warrant.
Moreover, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure expressly provides that the Rules of
Court applies suppletorily to cases covered by
the former:
Sec. 22. Applicability of the regular rules.
The regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of
Court shall apply to the special cases herein
provided for in a suppletory capacity insofar as
they are not inconsistent therewith.
A careful examination of Sec. 18 in relation to
Sec. 22 of the 1991 Revised Rule of Summary
Procedure and Rule 40, Section 2 in relation to
Rule 13, Sections 9 and 10, and Rule 36, Section
2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, leads to no other conclusion than
that the rules regarding finality of
judgments also apply to cases covered by
the rules on summary procedure.
Doctrine: Hence, the principle expressed in the
maxim interpretare et concordare legibus
est optimus interpretandi, or that every
statute must be so construed and harmonized
with other statutes as to form a uniform system
of jurisprudence applies in interpreting both
sets of Rules.
The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on
public policy and sound practice that judgments
must become final at some definite date set by
law. It is but logical to infer that this principle
also applies to cases subject to summary
procedure since the objective of the Rule
governing the same is precisely to settle these
cases expeditiously. To construe Sec. 18 thereof
as allowing the revival of dismissed cases even
after the lapse of the period for appealing the
same would prevent the courts from settling
 justiciable controversies with finality, thereby
undermining the stability of our judicial system.
DISPOSITION:
Petition is GRANTED. Decision of the RTC is set
aside. Criminal Cases are DISMISSED, pursuant
to Sec. 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.
VDA. De Urbano v. GSIS
Facts
In 1971, petitioners mortgaged their 200 sqm
property in Q.C. to Gsis to secure a housing loan.
Since they were unable to pay the loan, GSIS
foreclosed the mortgage in 1988. GSIS bid 154k on
the property and emerged as the highest bidder.
In 1984, the petitioners tried to reclaim their
property. They wrote to the GSIS Acquired Assets
Department signifying their intent to reclaim. On
October 16, GSIS told them to pay the redemption
price of 154k in full before Nov 18, 1984.
The petitioners asked for more time to recover the
property while the Acquired Assets Department
subsequently told them to pay 174k in cash with an
extension of 30 days to the November date. Failure
to do so forfeited the reclamation of the
property and sold in a public bidding.
The petitioners wrote again requesting for
remortgage through repurchase of the
property. The Gsis AAD declined.
The petitioners wrote to the Board for an approval
to file a loan worth 240,000 with the GSIS real
estate department to repurchase their foreclosed
property.
Despite attempts from Vice Governor Mathay to
adjust to a more liberal arrangement for the
petitioners, the the petitioners were unable to pay.
GSIS then issued a TCT in its favor.
The respondent De La Cruz entered the picture and
offered to purchase the property for 250,000 spot
cash. Without knowledge of the rival offer, the
petitioners then offered a 50,000 downpayment with
the 124k balance to be paid in 5 years.
He also enclosed 10k in check as earnest money.
The Board informed them that it had adopted
resolution 881 that declined their offer to
repurchase.
At the same time, GSIS negotiated with Dela Cruz
for the purchase of the property. They accepted her
offer of purchase.
A new TCT was issued to her.
The petitioners, on the other hand, had their loan
request rescinded because a certificate of award or
sale was not issued in favor of the applicant.
Moreover, the applicant, Urbano the petitioner, was
81 years old and no longer a member of the GSIS. It
wasnt given due consideration.
Having learned about the transaction with dela
Cruz, the petitioners requested the formal
investigation with the GSIS regarding the sale. Not
satisfied, they filed a case with the RTC of QC
branch 102.
The petition was dismissed. The same view was
upheld by the court of appeals.
Hence this petition.
Issues:
1. Do petitioners have a right to repurchase the
subject property?
2. Does GSIS have a duty to dispose of the subject
property through public bidding?
3. Was Gsis in bad faith in dealing with petitioners?
Ruling: Petition Dismissed
Ratio:
1. No
Charter of the GSIS was PD 1146 which stipulated
the power of the GSIS to acquire, utilize, and
dispose of real or personal properties in the
Philippines or elsewhere. It was amended by PD
1981 which gave the GSIS the power to compromise
or release any claim or settled liability to the
system.
SC- The laws granted the GSIS Board the power to
exercise discretion in determining the terms and
condition of financial accommodations to its
members with the dual purpose of making the
GSIS more responsive to the needs of GSIS
members. The laws also stipulated that the Board
could exercise discretion on whether to accept or
reject petitioners offer to repurchase the subject
property taking into account the dual purpose
enunciated in the whereas clause of PD 1981 which
made the GSIS more responsive to the needs of its
members.
With regard to the Boards exercise of discretion, in
Natino v IAC, the Court also held that repurchase
of foreclosed property after redemption period
imposes no such obligation on the purchaser (the
board in this case) to re-sell the property since the
property belongs to him (the board as well)
The boards denial of petitioners request to
purchase the subject property was not based on
whim but on a factual assessment of the financial
capacity of the petitioners to make good their
repeated offers to purchase the subject property.
Based on the circumstances, the petitioners were
repeatedly unable to fulfill their obligations to pay.
In the comments of the AAD manager, the
observation was that the petitioners lacked the
capacity to pay up.
The petitioners are not entitled to a request
for repurchase as a matter of right. The Board
exercised its discretion in accordance with law in
denying their requests and the GSIS cant be
faulted for their failure to repurchase as it acted
under the petitioners application under Operation
Pabahay. The sale to respondent cant be annulled
on such invoked right.
2. No. The agreement with de la Cruz was valid.
Pets.- aver that Sec. 79 of PD 1445 and the COA
Circular 86-264 mandated the GSIS to dispose of
the assets through public bidding and only upon its
failure, through a public sale.
GSIS contended that SEC 79 of PD 1445 did not
apply because it covered unserviceable govt
property and not acquired assets.
SC- Gsis was right. Why? The provision (SEC 79)
applies only to unserviceable govt property or those
no longer needed. The house was obviously not
unserviceable. And it was still used by petitioners.
With regard to COA Circular 86-264 or the
General guidelines on the divestment or disposal
of assets of government owned corporations the
law stipulated that it availed of an exception
to the requirement of disposition
through public bidding and such
exception applied to sales of merchandise
held for sale in the regular course of
business. The Court read it in relation to Coa
circular 89-296 which provided for Audit
Guidelines on the Disposal of Property and other
Assets of Government Agencies, which also did not
apply the public bidding disposal requirement to
merchandise or inventory held for sale in the
regular course of business nor to the disposal by
govt financial institutions of foreclosed assets or
collaterals acquired in the regular course of
business and not transferred to the Govt under
proclamation no 50.
The modes of disposal included Public auction and
sale thru negotiation.
Doctrine: With regard to these 2 laws, the
Court held the question whether the subject
property was covered by the said Circular or
falls under its exception. It held that 89-296
was to be interpreted with 86-264 in
adherence with stat con wherein statutes that
relate to the same thing ought to be taken in
consideration in construing any one of them,
and it is an established rule of law that all
acts in pari material are to be taken together
as if they were one law.
Moreover, the court looked into the intent of both
laws and held that these were used to generate
more revenue for GOCCS through the disposition
of its non-preforming assets. (Look into PD 50 or Before us is a petition for review seeking to
the asset privatization trust in the case) According annul the Resolution[1] dated May 11, 2001 of the
to the court, the policy intent on the disposition Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64583, which
of acquired assets then governed the case at bar. denied petitioner Governor Antonio Calingins
Was the property covered by the public bidding petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary
exceptions in these laws? The court said yes, which restraining order and/or the issuance of an order
meant that their sale negotiation fell under the of status quo ante, as well as its Resolution [2] dated
regular course of business, and thus did not offend July 1, 2002, denying the motion for
the requirements of the said coa circulars. reconsideration.
3. No.
GSIS denial of petitioners further requests for The antecedent facts, as summarized by the
repurchase of subject property was based on a Court of Appeals and borne by the records, are as
factual determination of the petitioners financial follows:
capacity and the GSIS charter, PD 1146. Also, GSIS
sold the property to dela Cruz only after giving
The Office of the President issued a
them one year to repurchase.
Resolution[3] dated March 22, 2001 in OP Case No.
The petitioners, on the strength of the Valmonte
00-1-9220 (DILG ADM. Case No. P-16-99)
case, cant also impute bad faith on GSIS when it
entitled Vice Governor Danilo P. Lagbas, et al.
was secretly negotiating with Dela Cruz. In the
versus Governor Antonio P. Calingin (Misamis
Valmonte case, the court held that the
Oriental) suspending Gov. Calingin for 90 days. On
constitutional right to information was limited to
April 30, 2001, Undersecretary Eduardo R. Soliman
matters of public concern to transactions involving
of the Department of the Interior and Local
public interest.The sale of the property was not
Government (DILG), by authority of Secretary Jose
imbued by public interests as it was a purely
D. Lina, Jr., issued a Memorandum [4] implementing
private transaction. Pets. Cant demand to be
the said Resolution of the Office of the
informed of such public negotiation since they had
President. On May 3, 2001, Gov. Calingin filed
no interest on the subject property since they failed
before the Office of the President a Motion for
to comply with the GSIS terms of repurchase and
Reconsideration.[5]
the denial to repurchase under the GSIS terms.

The DILG Memorandum bore the authority of

the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which
granted an exemption to the election ban in the
movement of any public officer in its Resolution No.
3992[6] promulgated on April 24, 2001. This was in
pursuance to COMELEC Resolution No. 3401
which provides in part that

Section 1. Prohibited Acts (a) During the election

period from January 2, 2001 until July 13, 2001, no
public official shall make or cause any
transfer/detail whatsoever of any officer or employee
in the civil service, including public school teachers,
or suspend elective provincial, city, municipal or
barangay official, except upon prior written
Calingin v. CA approval of the Commission.
 On May 7, 2001, Gov. Calingin filed a petition
for prohibition before the Court of Appeals to
prevent the DILG from executing the assailed
suspension order. However, on May 11, 2001, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the said petition and by
resolution issued on July 1, 2002, denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari where
petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred
in
FINDING THAT THE EXECUTION OF THE
SUSPENSION ORDER OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD IS WITH
AUTHORITY FROM THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS.
FINDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS FINAL AND
EXECUTORY AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 67,
CHAPTER 4, OF REPUBLIC ACT 7160, THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991.[7]
In dispute is the validity of the DILG
Memorandum implementing the suspension order
issued by the Office of the President. We are asked
to resolve in this connection two issues:
(1) Was the decision of the Office of the
President already final and executory? and
(2) Was the exemption from the election ban in
the movement of any public officer granted by
COMELEC valid?
Petitioners Contention:
Petitioner contends that decisions of the Office
of the President on cases where it has original
jurisdiction become final and executory only after
the lapse of 15 days from the receipt thereof and
that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration shall
suspend the running of the said period[8] in
accordance with Section 15,[9] Chapter 3, Book VII
of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner further contends that Section 67,
Chapter 4 of the Local Government Code (Rep.
[10]
Act 7160), which provides that decisions of the
Office of the President shall be final and executory,
applies only to decisions of the Office of the
President on administrative cases appealed from
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod of highly-urbanized cities and
independent component cities, and sangguniang
bayan of municipalities within the Metro Manila
Area. It does not cover decisions on cases where the
Office of the President has original jurisdiction such
as those involving a Provincial Governor.[11]
Doctrine: In Lapid v. Court of Appeals,[12] we
held that it is a principle of statutory construction
that where there are two statutes that apply to a
particular case, that which was specially
intended for the said case must prevail.
The case on hand involves a disciplinary
action against an elective local official. Thus, the
Local Government Code is the applicable law
and must prevail over the Administrative
Code which is of general application.
[13]
Further, the Local Government Code of 1991 was
enacted much later than the Administrative Code of
1987. In statutory construction, all laws or parts
thereof which are inconsistent with the later law
are repealed or modified accordingly.[14]
Besides, even though appeal to the Court of
Appeals is granted under Sec. 1, [15] Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 12,[16] Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court in relation to Sec. 68 [17] of
the Local Government Code provides for the
immediate execution pending appeal. Under the
same case of Lapid v. Court of Appeals,[18] we
enunciated that the decisions of the Office of the
President under the Local Government Code are
immediately executory even pending appeal
because the pertinent laws under which the
decisions were rendered mandated them to be so.
In sum, the decisions of the Office of the
President are final and executory. No motion for
reconsideration is allowed by law but the
parties may appeal the decision to the Court
of Appeals. The appeal, however, does not stay the
execution of the decision. Thus, the DILG Secretary
may validly move for its immediate execution.
As to the validity of the exemption granted by
COMELEC in its Resolution No. 3992, petitioner
claims that the exemption was invalid for being
based on a mere draft resolution. According to him,
a draft resolution does not operate as a final
resolution of a case until the proper resolution is
duly signed and promulgated. Petitioner maintains
that a draft cannot produce any legal effect.
A perusal of the records, however, reveals that
the Resolution in O.P. Case No. 00-1-9220 was
approved and signed on March 22, 2001 by
Executive Secretary Renato de Villa by the
authority of the President. Hence, the approval was
before the promulgation of COMELEC Resolution
No. 3992 on April 24, 2001. The record also shows
that the request to implement the said suspension
order was filed on March 22, 2001 by the Senior
Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the
President pursuant to the requirements stated in
the Resolution.
Moreover, COMELEC Resolution No.
3529[19] which may be applied by analogy and in
relation to Sec. 2[20] of COMELEC Resolution No.
3401 merely requires the request to be in writing
indicating the office and place from which the
officer is removed, and the reason for said
movement, and submitted together with the formal
complaint executed under oath and containing the
specific charges and the answer to said
complaint. The request for the exemption was
accompanied with the Affidavit of Complaint,
Affidavit of Controversion, Reply and Draft
Resolution. The pertinent documents required by
the COMELEC to substantiate the request were
submitted. There being a proper basis for its grant
of exemption, COMELEC Resolution No. 3992 is
valid.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for
review on certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Court
of Appeals resolutions dated May 11, 2002 and July
1, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64583 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
City of Naga v. Agna
Petition for review on certiorari, which We treat as
special civil action, of the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur in Civil Case No.
7084, entitled Agna, et al. versus City of Naga, et
al., declaring Ordinance No. 360 of the City of Naga
enforceable in 1971 the year following its approval
and requiring petitioners to pay to private
respondents the amounts sought for in their
complaint plus attorney's fees and costs. Included
in the present controversy as proper parties are
Vicente P. Sibulo and Joaquin C. Cleope, the City
Mayor and City Treasurer of the City of Naga,
respectively.
On June 15, 1970, the City of Naga enacted
Ordinance No. 360 changing and amending the
graduated tax on quarterly gross sales of
merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance No.
4 of the City of Naga to percentage tax on gross
sales provided for in Section 2 thereof. Pursuant to
said ordinance, private respondents paid to the City
of Naga the following taxes on their gross sales for
the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30,
1970, as follows:
Catalino Agna paid P1,805.17 as
per Official Receipt No. 1826591;
Felipe Agna paid P625.00 as per
Official Receipt No. 1826594; and
Salud Velasco paid P129.81 as per
Official Receipt No. 1820339.
On February 13, 1971, private respondents filed
with the City Treasurer of the City of Naga a claim
for refund of the following amounts, together with
interests thereon from the date of payments: To
Catalino Agna, P1,555.17; to Felipe Agna, P560.00;
and to Salud Velasco, P127.81, representing the
difference between the amounts they paid under
Section 3, Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga, i.e.,
P250.00; P65.00 and P12.00 respectively. They
alleged that under existing law, Ordinance No. 360,
which amended Section 3, Ordinance No. 4 of the
City of Naga, did not take effect in 1970, the year it
was approved but in the next succeeding year after
the year of its approval, or in 1971, and that
therefore, the taxes they paid in 1970 on their gross
sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to
September 30, 1970 were illegal and should be
refunded to them by the petitioners.
The City Treasurer denied the claim for refund of
the amounts in question. So private respondents
filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of
Naga (Civil Case No. 7084), seeking to have
Ordinance No. 360 declared effective only in the
year following the year of its approval, that is, in
1971; to have Sections 4, 6 and 8 of Ordinance No.
360 declared unjust, oppressive and arbitrary, and
therefore, null and void; and to require petitioners
to refund the sums being claimed with interests
thereon from the date the taxes complained of were
paid and to pay all legal costs and attorney's fees in
the sum of P1,000.00. Private respondents further
prayed that the petitioners be enjoined from
enforcing Ordinance No. 360.
In their answer, the petitioners among other things,
claimed that private respondents were not
"compelled" but voluntarily made the payments of
their taxes under Ordinance No. 360; that the said
ordinance was published in accordance with law;
that in accordance with Republic Act No. 305
(Charter of the City of Naga) an ordinance takes
effect after the tenth day following its passage
unless otherwise stated in said ordinance; that
under existing law the City of Naga is authorized to
impose certain conditions to secure and accomplish
the collection of sales taxes in the most effective
manner. As special and affirmative defenses, the
petitioners allege that the private respondents have
no cause of action against them; that granting that
the collection of taxes can be enjoined. the
complaint does not allege facts sufficient to justify
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction;
that the refund prayed for by the private
respondents is untenable; that petitioners Vicente
P. Sibulo and Joaquin C. Cleope, the City Mayor
and Treasurer of the City of Naga, respectively are
not proper parties in interest; that the private
respondents are estopped from questioning the
validity and/or constitutionality of the provisions of
Ordinance No. 360. Petitioners counterclaimed for
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, for the alleged
unlawful and malicious filing of the claim against
them, in such amount as the court may determine.
During the hearing of the petition for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and at the pre-
trial conference as well as at the trial on the merits
of the case, the parties agreed on the following
stipulation of facts: That on June 15, 1970, the City
Board of the City of Naga enacted Ordinance No.
360 entitled "An ordinance repealing Ordinance No.
4, as amended, imposing a sales tax on the
quarterly sales or receipts on all businesses in the
City of Naga," which ordinance was transmitted to
the City Mayor for approval or veto on June 25,
1970; that the ordinance was duly posted in the
designated places by the Secretary of the Municipal
Board; that private respondents voluntarily paid
the gross sales tax, pursuant to Ordinance No. 360,
but that on February 15, 1971, they filed a claim for
refund with the City Treasurer who denied the
same.
On October 9, 1971, the respondent Judge rendered
judgment holding that Ordinance No. 360, series of
1970 of the City of Naga was enforceable in the year
following the date of its approval, that is, in 1971
and required the petitioners to reimburse the
following sums, from the date they paid their taxes
to the City of Naga: to Catalino Agna, the sum of
P1,555.17; to Felipe Agna, P560.00; and to Salud
Velasco, P127.81 and the corresponding interests
from the filing of the complaint up to the
reimbursement of the amounts plus the sum of
P500.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of the
proceedings.
Petitioners' submit that Ordinance No. 360, series
of 1970 of the City of Naga, took effect in the
quarter of the year of its approval, that is in July
1970, invoking Section 14 of Republic Act No.
305, 1 as amended, otherwise known as the Charter
of the City of Naga, which, among others, provides
that "Each approved ordinance ... shall take effect
and be enforced on and after the 10th day following
its passage unless otherwise stated in said
ordinance ... ". They contend that Ordinance No.
360 was enacted by the Municipal Board of the City
of Naga on June 15, 1970 2 and was transmitted to
the City Mayor for his approval or veto on June 25,
1970 3 but it was not acted upon by the City Mayor
until August 4, 1970. Ordinarily, pursuant to
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, said ordinance
should have taken effect after the 10th day
following its passage on June 15, 1970, or on June
25, 1970. But because the ordinance itself provides
that it shall take effect upon its approval, it
becomes necessary to determine when Ordinance
No. 360 was deemed approved. According to the
same Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, "if within
10 days after receipt of the ordinance the Mayor
does not return it with his veto or approval 4 the
ordinance is deemed approved." Since the ordinance
in question was not returned by the City Mayor
with his veto or approval within 10 days after he
received it on June 25, 1970, the same was deemed
approved after the lapse of ten (10) days from June
25, 1970 or on July 6, 1970. On this date, the
petitioners claim that Ordinance No. 360 became
effective. They further contend that even under
Section 2, of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local
Autonomy Acts) 5 which expressly provides: "A tax
ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day
after its passage unless the ordinance shall provide
otherwise', Ordinance No. 360 could have taken
effect on June 30, 1970, which is the fifteenth day
after its passage by the Municipal Board of the City
of Naga on June 15, 1970, or as earlier explained, it
could have taken effect on July 6, 1970, the date the
ordinance was deemed approved because the
ordinance itself provides that it shall take effect
upon its approval. Of the two provisions invoked by
petitioners to support their stand that the
ordinance in question took effect in the year of its
approval, it is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264
(Local Autonomy Act) that is more relevant because
it is the provision that specifically refers to
effectivity of a tax ordinance and being a provision
of much later law it is deemed to have superseded
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305 (Charter of the
City of Naga) in so far as effectivity of a tax
ordinance is concerned.
On the other hand, private respondents contend
that Ordinance No. 360 became effective and
enforceable in 1971, the year following the year of
its approval, invoking Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides:
Section 2309. Imposition of tax
and duration of license.A
municipal license tax already in
existence shall be subject to
change only by ordinance enacted
prior to the 15th day of December
of any year after the next
succeeding year, but an entirely
new tax may be created by any
ordinance enacted during the
quarter year effective at the
beginning of any subsequent
quarter.
They submit that since Ordinance No. 360, series of
1970 of the City of Naga, is one which changes the
existing graduated sales tax on gross sales or
receipts of dealers of merchandise and sari-sari
merchants provided for in Ordinance No. 4 of the
City of Naga to a percentage tax on their gross
sales prescribed in the questioned ordinance, the
same should take effect in the next succeeding year
after the year of its approval or in 1971.
Evidently, the divergence of opinion as to when
Ordinance No. 360 took effect and became
enforceable is mainly due to the seemingly
apparent conflict between Section 2309 of the
Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act). Is
there really such a conflict in the above-mentioned
provisions? It will be easily noted that Section 2309
of the Revised Administrative Code contemplates of
two types of municipal ordinances, namely: (1) a
municipal ordinance which changes a municipal
license tax already in existence and (2) an
ordinance which creates an entirely new tax. Under
the first type, a municipal license tax already in
existence shall be subject to change only by an
ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of
December of any year after the next succeeding
year. This means that the ordinance enacted prior
to the 15th day of December changing or repealing
a municipal license tax already in existence will
have to take effect in next succeeding year. The
evident purpose of the provision is to enable the
taxpayers to adjust themselves to the new charge or
burden brought about by the new ordinance. This is
different from the second type of a municipal
ordinance where an entirely new tax may be
created by any ordinance enacted during the
quarter year to be effective at the beginning of any
subsequent quarter. We do not find any such
distinction between an ordinance which changes a
municipal license tax already in existence and an
ordinance creating an entirely new tax in Section 2
of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act)
which merely refers to a "tax ordinance" without
any qualification whatsoever.
Now to the meat of the problem in this petition. Is
not Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative
Code deemed repealed or abrogated by Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) in so
far as effectivity of a tax ordinance is concerned? An
examination of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local
Autonomy Act) fails to show any provision expressly
repealing Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code. All that is mentioned therein
is Section 9 which reads:
Section 9 All acts, executive
orders, administrative orders,
proclamations or parts thereof,
inconsistent with any of the
provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed and modified accordingly.
The foregoing provision does not amount to an
express repeal of Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code. It is a well established
principle in statutory construction that a statute
will not be construed as repealing prior acts on the
same subject in the absence of words to that effect
unless there is an irreconcilable repugnancy
between them, or unless the new law is evidently
intended to supersede all prior acts on the matter
in hand and to comprise itself the sole and complete
system of legislation on that subject. Every new
statute should be construed in connection with
those already existing in relation to the same
subject matter and all should be made to
harmonize and stand together, if they can be done
by any fair and reasonable interpretation ... . 6 It
will also be noted that Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) refer to the same
subject matter-enactment and effectivity of a tax
ordinance. In this respect they can be considered
in pari materia. Statutes are said to be in pari
materia when they relate to the same person or
thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or
7
have the same purpose or object. When statutes
are in pari materia, the rule of statutory
construction dictates that they should be construed
together. This is because enactments of the same
legislature on the same subject matter are
supposed to form part of one uniform system; that
later statutes are supplementary or complimentary
to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its
acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the
existing legislation on the same subject and to have
enacted its new act with reference thereto. 8 Having
thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the
same subject matter, whenever the legislature
enacts a new law, it is deemed to have enacted the
new provision in accordance with the legislative
policy embodied in those prior statutes unless there
is an express repeal of the old and they all should
be construed together. 9 In construing them the old
statutes relating to the same subject matter should
be compared with the new provisions and if possible
by reasonable construction, both should be so
construed that effect may be given to every
provision of each. However, when the new provision
and the old relating to the same subject cannot be
reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter
expression of the legislative will. 10 Actually we do
not see any conflict between Section 2309 of the
Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of the
Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act). The
conflict, if any, is more apparent than real. It is one
that is not incapable of reconciliation. And the two
provisions can be reconciled by applying the first
clause of Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code when the problem refers to the
effectivity of an ordinance changing or repealing a
municipal license tax already in existence. But
where the problem refers to effectivity of an
ordinance creating an entirely new tax, let Section
2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act)
govern.
In the case before Us, the ordinance in question is
one which changes the graduated sales tax on gross
sales or receipts of dealers of merchandise and sari-
sari merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance
No. 4 of the City of Naga to percentage tax on their
gross sale-an ordinance which definitely falls within
the clause of Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Accordingly it should be
effective and enforceable in the next succeeding
year after the year of its approval or in 1971 and
private respondents should be refunded of the taxes
they have paid to the petitioners on their gross
sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to
September 30, 1970 plus the corresponding
interests from the filing of the complaint until
reimbursement of the amount.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant
petition is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and
Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.
J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Admin
Doctrine: Constitutional ConstructionNature:
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction Date:
February 18, 1970Ponente: Justice Fernando
Short version: RA 2616--the expropriation of the
Tatalon Estate authorized by Congress (the first
statute to be specifically tailored to expropriate
land), was decided unconstitutional by the lower
court, in favor of the petitioner JM Tuason & Co.
The Supreme Court then reversed this decision,
reviewing the scope of power given to Congress
under the Constitution to authorize expropriation
of lands.
With the ff opinions:Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Villamor, JJ., concur.Makalintal, J., concurs in the
result.Barredo, J. concurs in a separate opinion.
Tehankee, J., concurs and dissents in a separate
opinion.Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L. Dizon and
Castro, JJ., concur in the opinion of Justice
Tehankee
Facts:
I. Congress: RA 2616 August 3, 1959
RA 2616 took effect without executive approval
expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon
City owned by petitioner JM Tuason & Co. (to be
subdivided into small lots and sold to their
occupants) was authorized by Congress in view
of social and economic problems.
November 15, 1960
Respondent Land Tenure Administration instituted
the proceeding for the expropriation of the Tatalon
Estate RA 2616, as directed by the Executive
Secretary.
II. Lower Court: RA 2616 is unconstitutional
November 17, 1960Petitioner JM Tuason & Co.
filed special action for prohibition of RA 2616 with
preliminary injunction against the respondents to
restrain expropriation proceedings.
January 10, 1963
RA 2616 was decided unconstitutional, granting the
writ of prohibition.
III. SC: Reversing the decision and further
proceedings
 February 18, 1970
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts
decision that RA 2616 is unconstitutionaldenying
the writ of prohibition, and setting aside the
preliminary injunction filed by petitioner JM
Tuason & Co.
March 30, 1970
Motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner
invoking his rights to due process & equal
protection of laws.
SG Felix Antonio filed detailed opposition to the
reconsideration.
June 15, 1970
Petitioner filed for a rejoinder. The expropriation of
Tatalon Estate in Quezon City is unconstitutional
pursuant to RA 2616 sec 4. (as amended by RA
3453)-- prohibiting the enforceability of ejectment
proceedings or the continuance of a proceeding that
has already been commenced.
Issue: Is RA 2616 (rightfully amended)
unconstitutional because it violates the petitioners
rights to due process and equal protection of law?
Held: No.
May 27, 1970
Marcelino v. Cruz
FACTS:
1. Petitioner was charged with rape before the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch XII,
and his case was conducted and concluded on
August 04, 1975.
On the same date, counsels for the accused
(petitioner) and complainant People of the
Philippines in the rape case filed before the CFI of
Rizal, moved for time within which to submit their
respective memoranda.
Trial court granted both counsels motion and gave
them thirty (30) days to submit their memoranda.
(30 days from August 04, 1975 concludes on
September 03, 1975)
Petitioner, through counsel, filed his memorandum
in due time, but no memorandum was filed by the
People.
On November 28, 1975, respondent judge filed with
the Deputy Clerk of Court his decision in said for
promulgation. The decision was also dated
November 28, 1975.
On the date set for promulgation of the decision,
counsel for the accused moved for postponement,
citing the loss of jurisdiction of the trial court for
failure to decide the case within 90 days from
submission thereof of decision, respondent judge
granted the counsels request and reset the
promulgation to January 19, 1976.
On January 19, 1976, counsel for the accused
moved anew for the resetting of the promulgation of
the decision, and respondent judge granted the
same and moved anew the promulgation on
January 26, 1976.
On January 12, 1976, counsel for the accused filed
before the Supreme Court this petition (Petition for
prohibition and writ of habeas corpus to enjoin
respondent judge from promulgating his decision
 above mentioned). Supreme Court issued an Order
temporarily restraining respondent judge from
promulgating said decision.
9. Petitioner avers that the three-month period
prescribed by Section 11 of Article x of the 1973
Constitution, being a constitutional directive, is
mandatory in character and that non- observance
thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court
over the unresolved case.
*Section 11, Article X of the 1973 Constitution
states that:
Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the
maximum period within which a case or matter
shall be decided or resolved from the date of its
submission, shall be eighteen months for the
Supreme court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all inferior
collegiate courts, and three months for all other
inferior courts.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT respondent judge failed to
comply with the provisions of Section II, Article X of
the 1973 Constitution, in filing the decision within
the given period of three (3) months, equivalent to
ninety (90) days.
2. WHETHER OR NOT Section II, Article X of the
1973 Constitution is mandatory in character or
merely directory.
3. WHETHER OR NOT jurisdiction of the court over
the unresolved criminal case was lost due to non-
compliance by respondent judge with the above
mentioned provision.
RULING:
On November 28, 1973, or eighty five (85) days from
September 4, 1975, the date the case was deemed
submitted for decision, respondent judge filed with
the deputy clerk of court the decision in the above
mentioned criminal case. Thus, respondent judge
was able to render his decision within the three-
month period prescribed by the Constitution.
Doctrine: The established rule is that
constitutional provisions are to be construed
as mandatory, UNLESS by express provision or
by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest. Supreme Court believed that the above
mentioned provision falls within the exception
rather than the general rule, citing the case of
Albemarel Oil & Gase Co. v. Morris, which declares
that constitutional provisions are directory, and not
mandatory, where they refer to matters merely
PROCEDURAL.
Exceeded or not, a decision rendered by an inferior
court outside of the 90-day period is not void for loss
of jurisdiction. To hold that non-compliance by the
courts with the aforesaid provision would result in
loss of jurisdiction, would make the courts, through
which conflicts are resolved, the very instruments
to foster unresolved cases by reason merely of
having failed to render a decision within the
allotted term.
4. The petition was DISMISSED and the
Restraining Order issued by the Supreme Court is
lifted however, since respondent judge is already
deceased, his successor is ordered to decide the Preliminary Injunction. NLRC denied the
application.
Criminal Case on the basis of the record thereof
within 90 days from the time the case is raffled to
Issue: Whether local water districts are GOCC
him.
whose employees are subject to the provisions of the
Civil Service Law

Hagonoy Water District v. NLRC HELD: YES

The Labor Arbiter, in asserting that it has
FACTS:
jurisdiction over the employees of Hagonoy, relied
on P.D. No. 198, known as Provincial Water
Private Respondent Dante Villanueva was
Utilities Act of 1973 which exempts employees of
employed as service foreman by petitioner
water districts from the application of the Civil
Hagonoy when he was indefinitely suspended
Service Law. However, the Labor Arbiter failed
and thereafter dismissed for abandonment of
to take into account that P.D. 1479 wiped
work and conflict of interest;
away the said exemption
Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, illegal suspension and
Moreover, the NLRC relied upon Article 9, Section
underpayment of wages and emergency cost of
2, of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
living allowance against Hagonoy with the
[T]he Civil Service embraces ... government owned
Ministry of Labor and Employment in San
or controlled corporations with original charters.
Fernando, Pampanga;
Petitioner Hagonoy moved for dismissal on
At the time the dispute in the CAB arose, and at
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Being
the time the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision
government entity, its personnel are
(which is on March 17, 1986), the applicable law is
governed by the provisions of the Civil
that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to render
Service Law and not by the Labor Code.
a decision that he in fact rendered. By the time the
And the protests concerning the lawlessness of
NLRC rendered its decision (August 20, 1987), the
dismissal from service fall within the
1987 Constitution has already come into effect. The
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission
SC believes that the 1987 Constitution does not
and not the Ministry of Labor and
operate retroactively as to confer jurisdiction upon
Employment.
the Labor Arbiter to render a decision, which was
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on
before outside the scope of its competence.
favor of Villanueva
NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor
Therefore, a decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter
Arbiter. A Writ of Execution was issued by
without jurisdiction over the case is a complete
the Labor Arbiter to garnish petitioner
nullity, vesting no rights and imposing no
Hagonoys deposits with the planters
liabilities. Villanueva, if he so wishes, may refile
Development Bank.
this complaint in an appropriate
Hagonoy filed a Motion to Quash the Writ
of Execution with Application for Writ of
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED of private corporations since they perform
proprietary functions for the government.
Full Text
The Labor Arbiter proceeded to hear and try the
case and, on 17 March 1986, rendered a Decision in
favor of the private respondent and against
The present petition for certiorari seeks to annul
petitioner Hagonoy. The dispositive part of the
and set aside: a) the decision of the Labor Arbiter
decision read:
dated 17 March 1987 in NLRC Case No. RAB-III-8-
2354-85, entitled "Dante Villanueva versus LWA-
WHEREFORE, premises
Hagonoy Waterworks District/Miguel Santos;" and
considered, respondents are
b) the Resolution of the National Labor Relations
hereby ordered to reinstate
Commission dated 20 August 1987 affirming the
petitioner immediately to his
mentioned decision.
former position as Service
Foreman, without loss of seniority
Private respondent Dante Villanueva was employed
rights and privileges, with full
as service foreman by petitioner Hagonoy Water
backwages, including all benefits
District ("Hagonoy") from 3 January 1977 until 16
provided by law, from the date he
May 1985, when he was indefinitely suspended and
was terminated up to his actual
thereafter dismissed on 12 July 1985 for
date of reinstatement.
abandonment of work and conflict of interest.

In addition, respondents are

On 14 August 1985, private respondent filed a
hereby ordered to pay the
complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension
petitioner the amount of P4,927.50
and underpayment of wages and emergency cost of
representing the underpayments
living allowance against petitioner Hagonoy with
of wages from July 1983 to May
the then Ministry of Labor and Employment,
16, 1985.
Regional Arbitration Branch III, San Fernando,
Pampanga.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner immediately moved for outright

dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Being a government entity, petitioner
claimed, its personnel are governed by the
provisions of the Civil Service Law, not by the
Labor Code, and protests concerning the lawfulness
of dismissals from the service fall within the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, not
the Ministry of Labor and Employment. Petitioner
cited Resolution No. 1540 of the Social Security
Commission cancelling petitioner's compulsory
coverage from the system effective 16 May 1979
"considering the rulings that local water districts
are instrumentalities owned and controlled by the
government and that their officers and employees
are government employees." In opposing the
motion, private respondent Villanueva contended
that local water districts, like petitioner Hagonoy,
though quasi-public corporations, are in the nature
On appeal, the National Labor Relations
Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter in a Resolution dated 20 August 1987.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, insisting
that public respondents had no jurisdiction over the
case. Meanwhile, a Writ of Execution was issued by
the Labor Arbiter on 16 November 1987. The writ
was enforced by garnishing petitioner Hagonoy's
deposits with the Planters Development Bank of
Hagonoy.
Petitioner then filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of
Execution with Application for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction arguing that the writ was prematurely
issued as its motion for reconsideration had not yet
been resolved. By Resolution dated 10 December
1987, public respondent Commission denied the
application for a preliminary injunction. The
motion to quash was similarly denied by the
Commission which directed petitioner to reinstate
immediately private respondent and to pay him the
amount of P63,577.75 out of petitioner's garnished
deposits.
Hence, the instant petition.
The only question here in whether or not local
water districts are government owned or controlled
corporations whose employees are subject to the
provisions of the Civil Service Law. The Labor
Arbiter asserted jurisdiction over the alleged illegal
dismissal of private respondent Villanueva by
relying on Section 25 of Presidential Decree No.
198, known as the "Provincial Water Utilities Act of
1973" which went into effect on 25 May 1973, and
which provides as follows:
Exemption from Civil Service.
The district and its employees,
being engaged in a proprietary
function, are hereby exempt from
the provisions of the Civil Service
Law. Collective Bargaining shall
be available only to personnel
below supervisory levels:
Provided, however, That the total
of all salaries, wages,
emoluments, benefits or other
compensation paid to all
employees in any month shall not
exceed fifty percent (50%) of
average net monthly revenue, said
net revenue representing income
from water sales and sewerage
service charges, lease pro-rata
share of debt service and expenses
for fuel or energy for pumping
during the preceding fiscal year.
The Labor Arbiter however failed to take into
account the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1479, which went into effect on 11 June 1978. P.D.
No. 1479 wiped away Section 25 of P.D. 198 quoted
above, and Section 26 of P.D. 198 was renumbered
as Section 25 in the following manner:
Section 26 of the same decree
[P.D. 198] is hereby amended to
read as Section 25 as follows:
Section 25. Authorization. The
district may exercise all the
powers which are expressly
granted by this Title or which are
necessarily implied from or
incidental to the powers and
purposes herein stated. For the
purpose of carrying out the
objectives of this Act, a district is
hereby granted the power of
eminent domain, the exercise
thereof shall, however, be subject
to review by the Administration.
Thus, Section 25 of P.D. 198 exempting the
employees of water districts from the application of
the Civil Service Law was removed from the statute
books.
This is not the first time that officials of the
Department of Labor and Employment have taken
the position that the Labor Arbiter here adopted. In
Baguio Water District vs. Cresenciano B. Trajano,
etc. et al., 1 the petitioner Water District sought
review of a decision of the Bureau of Labor
Relations which affirmed that of a Med-Arbiter
calling for a certification election among the regular
rank-and-file employees of the Baguio Water
District (BWD). In granting the petition, the Court
said:
The Baguio Water District was
formed pursuant to Title II-Local
Water District Law of P.D. No.
198, as amended, The BWD is by
Sec. 6 of that decree 'a quasi-
public corporation performing
public service and supplying
public wants.
A part of the public respondent's
decision rendered in September,
1983, reads in part:
 We find the appeal [of the BWD]
to be devoid of merit. The records
show that the operation and
administration of BWD is
governed and regulated by special
laws, that is, Presidential Decrees
Nos. 198 and 1479 which created
local water districts throughout
the country. Section 25 of
Presidential Decree (PD) 198
clearly provides that the district
and its employees shall be exempt
from the provisions of the Civil
Service Law and that its
personnel below supervisory level
shall have the right to collectively
bargain. Contrary to appellant's
claim, said provision has not been
amended much more abrogated
expressly or impliedly by PD 1479
which does not make mention of
any matter on Civil Service Law
or collective bargaining. (Rollo, p.
590.)
We grant the petition for the following reasons:
1. Section 25 of P.D. No. 198 was
repealed by Sec. 3 of P.D. No.
1479; Sec. 26 of P.D. No. 198 was
amended to read as Sec. 25 by Sec.
4 of P.D. No. 1479. The
amendatory decree took effect on
June 11, 1978.
xxx xxx xxx
3. The BWD is a corporation
created pursuant to a special law
P.D. No. 198, as amended. As
such its officers and employees are
part of the Civil Service. (Sec. 1,
Art. XII-B, [1973] Constitution;
P.D. No. 686.)
The broader question of whether employees of
government owned or controlled corporations are
governed by the Civil Service Law and Civil Service
Rules and Regulations was addressed by this Court
in 1985 in National Housing Corporation vs. Juco. 2
After a review of constitutional, statutory and case
law on the matter, the Court, through Mr. Justice
Gutierrez, held:
There should no longer be any
question at this time that
employees of government-owned
or controlled corporations are
governed by the civil service law
and civil service rules and
regulations.
Section 1. Article XII-B of the
[1973] Constitution specifically
provides:
The Civil Service embraces every
branch, agency, subdivision, and
instrumentality of the
Government, including every
government-owned or controlled
corporation. ...
The 1935 Constitution had a
similar provision in its Section 1,
Article XII which stated:
A Civil Service embracing all
branches and subdivisions of the
Government shall be provided by
law.
The inclusion of "government-
owned or controlled corporations"
within the embrace of the civil
service shows a deliberate effort of
the framers to plug an earlier
loophole which allowed
government-owned or controlled
corporations to avoid the full
consequences of the all
encompassing coverage of the,
civil service system. The same
explicit intent is shown by the
addition of "agency" and
"instrumentality" to branches and
 subdivisions of the Government.
All offices and firms of the
government are covered.
The amendments introduced in
1973 are not Idle exercises or
meaningless gestures. They carry
the strong message that civil
service coverage is broad and all-
embracing insofar as employment
in the government in any of its
governmental. or corporate arms
is concerned.
xxx xxx xxx
Section I of Article XII-B, [1973]
Constitution uses the word "every"
to modify the phrase "government-
owned or controlled corporation."
"Every" means each one of a
group, without exception. It means
all possible and all, taken one by
one. Of course, our decision in this
case refers to a corporation
created as a government-owned or
controlled entity. It does not cover
cases involving private firms
taken over by the government in
foreclosure or similar proceedings.
We reserve judgment on these
latter cases when the appropriate
controversy is brought to this
Court. 3
In Juco, the Court spelled out the law on the issue
at bar as such law existed under the 1973
Constitution and the Provisional Constitution of
1984, 4 until just before the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution. Public respondent Commission, in
confirming the Labor Arbiter's assumption of
jurisdiction over this case, apparently relied upon
Article IX (B), Section 2 (1) of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that:
[T]he Civil Service embraces ...
government owned or controlled
corporations with original
charters. (Emphasis supplied)
The NLRC took the position that although
petitioner Hagonoy is a government owned or
controlled corporation, it had no original charter
having been created simply by resolution of a local
legislative council. The NLRC concluded that
therefore petitioner Hagonoy fell outside the scope
of the civil service.
At the time the dispute in the case at bar arose, and
at the time the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision
(i.e., 17 March 1986), there is no question that the
applicable law was that spelled out in National
Housing Corporation vs. Juco (supra) and Baguio
Water District vs. Cresenciano B. Trajano (supra)
and that under such applicable law, the Labor
Arbiter had no jurisdiction to render the decision
that he in fact rendered. By the time the public
respondent Commission rendered its decision of 20
August 1987 which is here assailed, the 1987
Constitution had already come into effect. 5 There
is, nonetheless, no necessity for this Court at the
present time and in the present case to pass upon
the question of the effect of the provisions of Article
DC (B), Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution upon
the pre-existing statutory and case law. For
whatever that effect might be, and we will deal
with that when an appropriate case comes before
the Court we believe and so hold that the 1987
Constitution did not operate retrospectively so as to
confer jurisdiction upon the Labor Arbiter to render
a decision which, under the law applicable at the
time of the rendition of such decision, was clearly
outside the scope of competence of the Labor
Arbiter. Thus, the respondent Commission had
nothing before it which it could pass upon in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. For it is self-
evident that a decision rendered by the Labor
Arbiter without jurisdiction over the case is a
complete nullity, vesting no rights and imposing no
liabilities.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for certiorari is
GRANTED. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dated
17 March 1986, and public respondent
Commission's Resolution dated 20 August 1987 and
all other Resolutions and Orders issued by the SO ORDERED.
Commission in this case subsequent thereto, are
hereby SET ASIDE. This decision is, however, Fernan C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ.,
without prejudice to the right of private respondent concur.
Villanueva to refile, if he so wishes, this complaint
in an appropriate forum. No pronouncement as to
costs.