VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs. CA, PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B.

GARCIA, 74 SCRA 189 (1976) (SpecPro 2016)

FACTS: Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister) filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters
of administration alleging that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of
Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal
properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court. At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratix
over the estate. Judge Malvar granted the motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia, the surviving spouse of the
deceased, contending that

1) The decedent resided in QC for 3 months before his death as shown by his death
certificate and therefore have an improper venue.
2) The CFI of Calamba lacks jurisdiction over the petition.

CFI denied the motion.

CA reversed and affirmed making Preciosa the administratix.

Thus, Fule elevated the matter to the SC on appeal by certiorari.

ISSUES:
a.) Are venue and jurisdiction the same? How can it be determined in the present case?
b.) What does the word resides in Revised Rules of Court Rule 73 Section 1 Mean?
c.) Who is entitled as special administratix of the estate?
Held:
1. No, jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try, hear and decide a case base on the
merits or the substance of the facts. It is a substantive aspect of the trial proceeding. It is
granted by law or by the constitution and cannot be waived or stipulated.
On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court define venue as the proper court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein real property involved or a portion thereof is situated.
Venue is the location of the court with jurisdiction. It is more on convenience purposes. Its
more on procedural aspect of the case. In some cases it may be waived or stipulated by the
parties.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: If the decedent is an inhabitant
of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had
estate.
1. Resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the
term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be
more than temporary.

1. In the present case, SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased should
be the venue of the court. Amado G. Garcia was in Quezon City, and not at Calamba,
Laguna base on his death certificate. A death certificate is admissible to prove the
residence of the decedent at the time of his death.
Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fules petition for
letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna. Therefore Preciosa B. Garcia was granted as a special administratix.

9. EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, petitioner, -v- CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION,ELENA FIGURACION-

ANCHETA, HILARIA A. FIGURACION, FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, QUINTIN FIGURACION and MARY
FIGURACION-GINEZ, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 154322, August 22, 2006, CORONA, J.:]

FACTS:
1. Spouses Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion had 6 children
a. Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in favor of his six children.
b. When he died in 1958, he left behind two parcels of land: (1) Lot 2299 and (2) Lot 705
2. Leandro sold a portion of Lot 1 to Lazaro Adviento
3. A dispute between 2 of the children Emilia and Mary rose over the eastern half of Lot 707
a. Lot 707 belonged to Eulalio Adviento
i. When he died his 2 daughters Agripina and Carolina succeeded him
ii. Agripina executed a quitclaim in favor of Emilia over the one-half eastern portion of Lot 707.
iii. Agripina died single and without any issue
1. Before her death Carolina adjudicated unto herself, via affidavit under Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, the entire lot which she later sold to Felipa and Jilaria
4. Emilia and her family stayed in the US for 10 years
a. Upon return she built a house made of strong materials on the eastern half-portion of Lot 707
b. She continued paying her share of the realty taxes thereon
5. Emilia sought the extrajudicial partition of all properties held in common by her and respondents
6. Emilia filed a complaint in the RTC of Urdaneta City for partition, annulment of documents, reconveyance,
quieting of title and damages against respondents, praying, among others, for:
a. the partition of Lots 2299 and 705;
b. the nullification of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by respondent Carolina over Lot 707, the
deed of absolute sale in favor of respondents Felipa and Hilaria, and TCT No. 42244;
c. a declaration that petitioner was the owner of one-half of Lot 707 and
d. damages
7. Respondents contended that Leandros estate should first undergo settlement proceedings before partition
among the heirs could take place.
a. Also claimed that an accounting of expenses chargeable to the estate was necessary for such
settlement.
b. RTc nullified Carolinas affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of absolute sale of Lot 707
i. Also declared Lots 2299 and 705 as exclusive properties of Leandro Figuracion and therefore
part of his estate.
ii. Dismissed the complaint for partition, reconveyance and damages
1. REASON: it could not grant the reliefs prayed for by petitioner without any (prior)
settlement proceedings wherein the transfer of title of the properties should first
be effected
8. CA upheld the dismissal of petitioners action for partition for being premature.
a. Reversed decision with respect to the nullification of the self-adjudication and the deed of sale

ISSUE: W/N there needs to be a prior settlement of Leandros intestate estate before the properties can be partitioned
or distributed.

HELD:
1. partition is premature when ownership of the lot 705 is still in dispute
a. theres a pending case in the CA where issues cannot be deciphered.
2. two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69:
a. by agreement under Section 2
b. through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6.
Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the decedents estate.
2. Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real propertys income (rentals and
profits) in the course of an action for partition, [13] there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which
 property belonging to the decedents estate may be answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes
and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
3. the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their fathers estate to settlement because the
determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition.
a. To settle the medical burial expense of their father
4. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the properties may take possession thereof
even before the settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a bond conditioned on the payment of the
estates obligations.

10. VOLTAIRE ARBOLARIO, LUCENA ARBOLARIO TA-ALA, FE ARBOLARIO, EXALTACION ARBOLARIO,

CARLOS ARBOLARIO, and Spouses ROSALITA RODRIGUEZ and CARLITO SALHAY, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, IRENE COLINCO, RUTH COLINCO, ORPHA COLINCO and GOLDELINA COLINCO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 129163. April 22, 2003 PANGANIBAN, J.:]

FACTS:
1. spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan had 5 children, all are dead now
Child FACTS AFTER DEATH
Agueda Colinco 1.Antonio Colinco (+) (respondent) Ruth
Orpha and Goldelina, and
2. (respondent) Irene Colinco
Catalina Baloyo - Juan Arbolario Purificacion Arbolario (+)
Juans children with Francisca (petitioners)
Voltaire, Lucena, Taala, Fe, Exaltacion
2. Eduardo Baloyo sold his entire interest to his sister Agueda by virtue of a notarized document
acknowledged before Notary Public Deogracias Riego.
3. Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her interest in the said lot in favor of her two nieces, Irene Colinco to one-half
(1/2) and Purificacion Arbolario to the other half.
4. Julian Baloyo died without any issue
5. Respondents contend that they are the only heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed a
Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement,
6. The Colincos filed a civil case against spouses Rosalita Salhay and Carlito Salhay to recover possession
of a portion of the aforesaid lot occupied by [respondent] spouses (Salhays hereinafter) since 1970.
a. Salhays alleged in their defense that they have been the lawful lessees of the late Purificacion Arbolario
since 1971 up to 1978; and that said spouses allegedly purchased the disputed portion of Lot No. 323
from the deceased lessor sometime in [September] 1978.
7. The petitioners filed a Civil Case for the cancellation of title with Damages against the Colincos
a. They contend that the Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement executed by the Colincos was
defective and thus voidable as they (Arbolarios) were excluded therein
b. Arbolarios claim that they succeeded intestate to the inheritance of their alleged half-sister, Purificacion
Arbolario; and, as forced heirs, they should be included in the distribution of the aforesaid lot
8. RTC ruled in favour of the Abolarios declaring them as heirs of Purificacion Arbolario
a. Their 1987 Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement was made in bad faith, because they knew
all along the existence of, and their relationship with, the Arbolarios.
b. The Salhays, on the other hand, had no document to prove their acquisition and possession of a
portion of the disputed lot.
9. CA declared the Arbolarios as are illegitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of Purificacion, the daughter of
Juan and Catalina.
a. They were born before the death of Catalina, under the extramarital affair of Juan and Francisca
b. Illegitimate children are barred by Article 992 of the Civil Code from inheriting intestate from the
legitimate children and relatives of their father or mother.
c. no clear and reliable evidence to support the allegation of the Salhays that they purchased from the
decedent,

ISSUE: W/N the petitioners have a right in the lot in question.

HELD:
Illegitimacy of Petitioners
1. A marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof is necessary to establish the marriage as an
undisputable fact.
a. No marriage certificate was shown, petitioners relied on the fact that they were born after the first wife
died
Evidence of Purchase
1. Sc stood by the findings of the CA and ruled that no supporting evidence was presented to prove the sale.
Partition
1. the partition of the property had not been contemplated by the parties, because respondents merely sought
recovery of possession of the parcel held by the Salhays, while petitioners sought the annulment of the Deed of
Partition respondents had entered into.
2. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual
interests of co-owners, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and a right to enjoy
the allotted estate without supervision or interference
3. Petitioners were unable to establish any right to partition
a. Failed to establish that they were legitimate brothers and sisters of Purificacion
4. Questions as to the determination of the heirs of a decedent, the proof of filiation, and the determination of the
estate of a decedent and claims thereto should be brought up before the proper probate court or in special
proceedings instituted for the purpose. Such issues cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for the
recovery of ownership and possession

ARBOLARIO v CA
(G.R. No. 129163; April 22, 2003; J. Panganiban)

FACTS: The original owners of the controverted lot, spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, had 5 children. Everyone mentioned is
dead. The first child, Agueda Colinco, was survived by her two children, namely, Antonio Colinco and Irene Colinco (respondent); Antonio
Colinco predeceased his three daughters, respondents Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco. The second child, Catalina
Baloyo, was married to Juan Arbolario and their union was blessed with the birth of only one child, Purificacion Arbolario, who, in 1985, died
a spinster and without issue. Juan Arbolario, consorted with another woman by the name of Francisca Malvas and from this cohabitation
petitioners Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Taala, Fe Arbolario, Exaltacion Arbolario, and Carlos Arbolario (referred to hereinafter as
Arbolarios) were born. All the foregoing petitioners were born well before the year 1951.

In 1946, the third child, Eduardo Baloyo, sold his entire interest in the lot to his sister, Agueda (first child), by virtue of a notarized document.
In 1951, a notarized declaration of heirship was executed by and between Agueda, Catalina, Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and
Julian, who extrajudicially declared themselves to be the only heirs of the late spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan. The fourth
child, Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her interest in the said lot in favor of her two nieces, Irene Colinco to one-half (1/2) and Purificacion
Arbolario to the other half. Purificacion Arbolario was then allowed to take possession of a portion of the disputed parcel until her death
sometime in 1984 or 1985.

Respondents Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco, and Goldelina Colinco, believing themselves to be the only surviving heirs of
Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed a Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement, dated May 8, 1987 where they
adjudicated upon themselves their proportionate or ideal shares: Irene Colinco, to one-half (1/2); while the surviving daughters of her
(Irenes) late brother Antonio, namely Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina Colinco, to share in equal, ideal proportions to the remaining half (1/2).

On October 2, 1987, the Colincos filed a case against Spouses Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay and Carlito Salhay, seeking to recover
possession of a portion of the aforesaid lot occupied by respondent spouses (Salhays hereinafter) since 1970. The Salhays alleged in their
defense that they have been the lawful lessees of the late Purificacion Arbolario since 1971 up to 1978; and that said spouses allegedly
purchased the disputed portion of Lot from the deceased lessor sometime in September 1978.

On May 9, 1988 before the case was tried the Arbolarios and spouses Carlito Salhay and Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay (all respondents in the
case) filed another case [f]or Cancellation of Title with Damages. The Arbolarios, joined by the Salhays, contend that the Declaration of
Heirship and Partition Agreement executed by the Colincos was defective and thus voidable as they (Arbolarios) were excluded therein.
The Arbolarios claim that they succeeded intestate to the inheritance of their alleged half-sister, Purificacion Arbolario; and, as forced heirs,
they should be included in the distribution of the aforesaid lot.

(Relevant) ISSUE:
(1) WoN Arbolarios are illegitimate children

HELD:

(1) YES, they are illegitimate.** There is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners that Juan Arbolarios marriage to Francisca
Malvas was valid. It does not follow that just because his first wife has died, a man is already conclusively married to the woman
who bore his children. A marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof is necessary to establish the marriage as an
undisputable fact. Since they failed to prove the fact (or even the presumption) of marriage between their parents, Juan Arbolario
 and Francisca Malvas; hence, they cannot invoke a presumption of legitimacy in their favor. Paternity or filiation, or the lack of
it, is a relationship that must be judicially established.

NOTES:

LOWER COURT RULINGS:

o RTC: Arbolarios were the brothers and the sisters of the deceased Purificacion Arbolario, while the Colincos were her
cousins and nieces. The Colincos could not inherit from her, because she had half-brothers and half-sisters (CC, Article
1009). Their 1987 Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement was made in bad faith, because they knew all along
the existence of, and their relationship with, the Arbolarios. The Salhays, on the other hand, had no document to prove
their acquisition and possession of a portion of the disputed lot.
o CA: Arbolarios are illegitimate. Illegitimate children are barred by Article 992 of the Civil Code from inheriting intestate
from the legitimate children and relatives of their father or mother. As the illegitimate siblings of the late Purificacion
Arbolario, petitioners cannot conveniently undermine the legal limitations by insisting that they were treated as half-
brothers and half-sisters by the deceased.
**(other reasons for illegitimacy, seemed less important): A review of the 1951 Declaration reveals that the year of Catalinas
death was intercalated. The first two numbers (1 and 9) and the last digit (3) are legible; but the third digit has been written over to
make it look like a 0. Further, the paragraph quoted by petitioners should show a chronological progression in the heirs years of
death: Agueda died in 1940 and Eduardo in 1947. Hence, if Catalina had indeed died in 1903, why then was her name written
after Aguedas and not before it? Moreover, the document, being in Spanish, requires an official translation. We cannot readily
accept the English translation proffered by petitioners, since respondents did not agree to its correctness. Besides, it consisted of
only a paragraph of the whole document.
OTHER ISSUES IN THE CASE:
o WoN CA committed a serious error when it disregarded the testimony that the Salhays had purchased the portion of the
lot they had been occupying since 1970; SC says NO, though the sale was not expressly assigned as an error in their
Brief, respondents (as petitioners in the CA) still assailed the existence of the sale
o WoN CA overstepped its bounds when it ruled that since respondents did not raise the issue of partition on appeal, the
RTC had no jurisdiction to divide the disputed lot; SC says NO, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership.
It seeks a severance of the individual interests of co-owners, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property
and a right to enjoy the allotted estate without supervision or interference.
Azuela vs CA

Facts:
The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the
notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son
of the cousin of the decedent.The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the
vernacular Pilipino. The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-
hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause.The
probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent,
namely: petitioner himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided
abroad. Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to
the designated executor, Vart Prague.The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo
(Geralda Castillo), who represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs"
of the decedent. Oppositor Geralda Castillo argued that the will was not executed and
attested to in accordance with law.After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an
Order dated 10 August 1992. The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto
Castillo, who had substituted his since deceased mother-in-law, Geralda Castillo. In a Decision
dated 17 August 1995, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of the petition for probate.Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the can be probated?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative and affirmed the decision of the appellate court. It
held that the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will
 was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the
clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against
possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or
decrease in the pages. The failure to state the number of pages equates with the absence of
an averment on the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted the
will, the execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to. It is the
witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805 to state the number of
pages used upon which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and
every page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in
the presence of the testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses
have stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.Thus,
the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental
witnesses, as they failed to sign the attestation clause.
AZUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written
is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is
fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an
acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to
deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.
FACTS:
Felix Azuela filed a petition with the trial court for the probate of a notarial will purportedly
executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo on June 10, 1981 and notarized on the same day. The will consisted
of two (2) pages and was written in Filipino. The attestation clause did not state the number of
pages and it was not signed by the attesting witnesses at the bottom thereof. The said witnesses
affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will though. Geralda Castillo
opposed the petition, claiming that the will was a forgery. She also argued that the will was not
executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that the decedents signature
did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged.
The trial court held the will to be authentic and to have been executed in accordance with law
and, thus, admitted it to probate, calling to fore the modern tendency in respect to the
formalities in the execution of a willwith the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in
expressing his last wishes. According to the trial court, the declaration at the end of the will
under the sub-title, Patunay Ng Mga Saksi, comprised the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement, and was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. It also
held that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the
will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof,
substantially satisfied the purpose of identification and attestation of the will. The Court of
Appeals, however, reversed the trial courts decision and ordered the dismissal of the petition for
probate. It noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will,
thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate.
Azuela argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that the number of pages
used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause is merely directory, rather than
mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as the substantial compliance rule.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject will complied with the requirements of the law and, hence, should be
admitted to probate.
HELD:
The petition is DENIED.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written
is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is
fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an
acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to
deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.
 Prior to the New Civil Code, the statutory provision governing the formal requirements of wills was
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Extant therefrom is the requirement that the
attestation state the number of pages of the will. The enactment of the New Civil Code put in
force a rule of interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause
is concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that governed the said Section 618. Article 809
of the Civil Code, the Code Commission opted to recommend a more liberal construction through
the substantial compliance rule. However, Justice J.B.L. Reyes cautioned that the rule must be
limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself:
whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and
every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarizedBut the total
number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other
must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the
probate proceedings. The Court suggested in Caneda v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 103554, May
28, 1993, 222 SCRA 781): the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which can be supplied by
an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be
fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed.
However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in
the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written
remains a fatal flaw, despite Art. 809. This requirement aims at safeguarding the will against
possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and thus preventing any increase or
decrease in the pages. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this requirement if
the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the situation in Singson
and Taboada. In this case, however, there could have been no substantial compliance with the
requirements under Art. 805 of the Civil Code since there is no statement in the attestation clause
or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will. There was an
incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for the insertion of
the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in.
The subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental
witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of
the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause. Art. 805 particularly
segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the
requisite that the will be attested and subscribed by them. The signatures on the left-hand corner
of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing
forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that
the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. An
unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses
signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such
signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses undertakings in the clause, since the signatures
that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.
The notary public who notarized the subject will wrote, Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10
ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila. By no manner of contemplation can these
words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or
deed. It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not follow to
the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that
before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.
It may not have been said before, but a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to
before a notary public. The importance of the requirement of acknowledgment is highlighted by
the fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements under Art. 805 and entrusted
into a separate provision, Art. 806. The express requirement of Art. 806 is that the will be
 acknowledged, and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The acknowledgment coerces the
testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had
executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath
and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in
the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also
provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of certain mindset in making the
testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will.
DEFECTS:
(1) AC did not state number of pages
(2) Witnesses did not sign the AC
(3) No acknowledgment by a notary
(4) No signature of the testator in each and every page
(5) Pages were not numbered consecutively
12. CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, et al. Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO H. PROVIDO,
Respondents.
[G.R. No. 156021, September 23, 2005, TINGA, J.:]

FACTS:
1. respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad
Provido Elevencionado
a. ALLEGATION: he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will.
b. RTCs RULING: allowed the probate of the will and directed the issuance of letters testamentary to
respondent
2. Petitioners after 4 months filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings
a. CLAIMs:
1) they are the intestate heirs of the decedent.
2) RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the correct docket
fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs.
3) will could not have been probated because:
a) the signature of the decedent was forged;
b) the will was not executed in accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign
below the attestation clause;
c) the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will;
d) the will was executed by force and under duress and improper pressure;
e) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of affixing of her signature; and
f) she did not know the properties to be disposed of, having included in the will properties
which no longer belonged to her.
b. RTCs Ruling: denied motion
1) petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by publication and that the deficiency in the
payment of docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of the petition.
2) RTCs Decision was already final and executory even before petitioners filing of the motion to
reopen
3. Petitioners filed a petition to annule RTCs decision
a. CLAIM: there was a compromise agreement between petitioners and respondents and they learnt the
probate proceeding only in July 2001
b. CAs RULING: petition dismissed
1) no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies through no fault of their
own

ISSUE: W/N the allowance of the will to probate should be annulled for failure to mention the petitioners as parties

HELD: No
1. Probate of a will is considered action in rem
a. Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person
interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having
jurisdiction to have the will allowed.[36] Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be
 published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, [37] as
well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
b. Petitioners became parties due to the publication of the notice of hearing
2. The filing of motion to reopen is similar to a motion for new trial
a. The ruling became final and executor because the motion was filed out of time
b. Given that they knew of the decision 4 months after they could have filed a petition for relief from
judgment after the denial of their motion to reopen.
3. petition for annulment of judgment must still fail for failure to comply with the substantive requisites,
a. An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment
sought to be annulled was rendered
b. PURPOSE: to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of
litigation.
c. 2 Grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process
d. An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in
character
i. Extrinsic if it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court,
or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in
which it is procured.
4. notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
a. the will states that the respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent thus he has no legal
obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate or personally notify them

FLEUMER v. HIX

54 Phil 610

FACTS:

The petitioner is a special administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. He alleged that the
latters will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia on November 3, 1925 by Hix who had his
residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of that state govern. To this end, the
petitioner submitted a copy of Section 3868 of Acts 1882, as found in West Virginia
Code and as certifi ed to by the Director of National Library. The Judge of the First
Instance however denied the probate of the will on the grounds that Sec 300 and 301 of
the Code of Civil Procedure were not complied with. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of such

law in West Virginia as a prerequisite to the allowance and recording of said will.

RULING:

Yes.

The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the
Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various states
of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements
of the law were not met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was
taken was printed or published under the authority of the state of West Virginia, as
provided in Sec 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested
by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State
of West Virginia as provided in Sec 301. No evidence was introduced showing that
the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time alleged will was
executed. The court therefore did not err in denying the probate of the will. The existence
of such law in West Virginia must be proved.
Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, GR No. 139868 June 8, 2006

Facts:

2 American citizens have resided in the Philippines. They have an adopted daughter. The
wife died and left a will where she left her entire estate to her husband. 2 years after the
wife's death, the husband married a Candelaria. 4 years after, Richard died and left a will
where he left his entire estate to Candelaria except for some of his shares in a company
which he left to his adopted daughter. Audreys will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal.
Inventory was taken on their conjugal properties. Ancheta, as the administrator, filed for a
partition of the first wife's estate. The will was also admitted in a court in her native land
(Maryland).

Issue: Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the
property is situated

Ruling:

Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated.
However, since the first wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is
governed by her national law. The national law of the person who made the will shall
regulate whose succession is in consideration whatever the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where the property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife's
properties may be found in the Philipppines, however the successional rights over those
properties are governed by the national law of the testator.