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Causality
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Causality or causation denotes a directional relationship between one event (called cause) and
another event (called effect) which is the consequence (result) of the first. [1]
This informal understanding suffices in everyday usage, however the philosophical analysis of
causality or causation has proved exceedingly difficult. The work of philosophers to understand
causality and how best to characterize it extends over millennia. In the western philosophical
tradition explicit discussion stretches back at least as far as Aristotle, and the topic remains a staple
in contemporary philosophy journals. Though cause and effect are typically related to events, other
candidates include processes, properties, variables, facts, and states of affairs; which of these
comprise the correct causal relata, and how best to characterize the nature of the relationship
between them, has as yet no universally accepted answer, and remains under discussion.
According to Sowa (2000),[2] up until the twentieth century, three assumptions described by Max
Born in 1949 were dominant in the definition of causality:
1. "Causality postulates that there are laws by which the occurrence of an entity B of a certain
class depends on the occurrence of an entity A of another class, where the word entity means
any physical object, phenomenon, situation, or event. A is called the cause, B the effect.
2. "Antecedence postulates that the cause must be prior to, or at least simultaneous with, the
effect.
3. "Contiguity postulates that cause and effect must be in spatial contact or connected by a chain
of intermediate things in contact." (Born, 1949, as cited in Sowa, 2000)
However, according to Sowa (2000), "relativity and quantum mechanics have forced physicists to
abandon these assumptions as exact statements of what happens at the most fundamental levels, but
they remain valid at the level of human experience."[2]
Contents
1 History
1.1 Hindu philosophy
1.2 Western philosophy
1.2.1 Aristotle
1.2.2 Causality, determinism, and existentialism
2 Logic
2.1 Necessary and sufficient causes
2.2 Causality contrasted with conditionals
3 Theories
3.1 Counterfactual theories
3.2 Probabilistic causation
3.3 Causal Calculus
3.4 Structure Learning
3.5 Derivation theories
3.6 Manipulation theories
3.7 Process theories
4 Fields
4.1 Science
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causal 31/12/2007
4.1.1 Physics
4.1.2 Engineering
4.2 Biology and medicine
4.2.1 Psychology
4.3 Humanities
4.3.1 History
4.3.2 Law
4.3.3 Religion and theology
5 See also
6 References
6.1 Other references
7 External links
7.1 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
7.2 General
History
Hindu philosophy
The Upanishads (namely Chandogya Upanishad, Sarva Sara Upanishad and Mandukya Upanishad)
and some other texts (namely Brahma Sutras, Yoga Vashishta, Avadhuta Gita and Ashtavakra Gita)
mention causality. However, causality therein is limited to explanations of the creation of the
universe. The idea of causality is not itself the subject of study in these scriptures.
The ancient scriptures and commentaries on these scriptures have the following common themes
with regard to causation:
"Cause is the effect concealed, effect is the cause revealed" which is also expressed as "Cause
is the effect unmanifested, effect is the cause manifested"[3]
Effect is same as cause only.[4]
Western philosophy
Aristotle
In Metaphysics and Posterior Analytics, Aristotle said: "All causes of things are beginnings; that we
have scientific knowledge when we know the cause; that to know a thing's existence is to know the
reason why it is". This formulation set the guidelines for subsequent causal theories by specifying
the number, nature, principles, elements, varieties, order of causes as well as the modes of causation.
Aristotle's account of the causes of things is a comprehensive model. Aristotle's theory enumerates
the possible causes which fall into several wide groups, amounting to the ways the question "why"
may be answered; namely, by reference to the material worked upon (as by an artisan) or what might
be called the substratum; to the essence, i.e., the pattern, the form, or the structure by reference to
which the "matter" or "substratum" is to be worked; to the primary moving agent of change or the
agent and its action; and to the goal, the plan, the end, or the good that the figurative artisan intended
to obtain. As a result, the major kinds of causes come under the following divisions:
The material cause is that "raw material" from which a thing is produced as from its parts,
constituents, substratum, or materials. This rubric limits the explanation of cause to the parts
(the factors, elements, constituents, ingredients) forming the whole (the system, structure,
compound, complex, composite, or combination) (the part-whole causation).
The formal cause tells us what, by analogy to the plans of an artisan, a thing is intended and
planned to be. Any thing is thought to be determined by its definition, form (mold), pattern,
essence, whole, synthesis, or archetype. This analysis embraces the account of causes in terms
of fundamental principles or general laws, as the intended whole (macrostructure) is the cause
that explains the production of its parts (the whole-part causation).
The efficient cause is that external entity from which the change or the ending of the change
first starts. It identifies 'what makes of what is made and what causes change of what is
changed' and so suggests all sorts of agents, nonliving or living, acting as the sources of
change or movement or rest. Representing the current understanding of causality as the
relation of cause and effect, this analysis covers the modern definitions of "cause" as either the
agent, agency, particular causal events, or the relevant causal states of affairs.
The final cause is that for the sake of which a thing exists, or is done - including both
purposeful and instrumental actions. The final cause, or telos, is the purpose, or end, that
something is supposed to serve; or it is that from which, and that to which, the change is. This
analysis also covers modern ideas of mental causation involving such psychological causes as
volition, need, motivation, or motives; rational, irrational, ethical - all that gives purpose to
behavior.
Additionally, things can be causes of one another, reciprocally causing each other, as hard work
causes fitness, and vice versa - although not in the same way or by means of the same function: the
one is as the beginning of change, the other is as its goal. (Thus Aristotle first suggested a reciprocal
or circular causality - as a relation of mutual dependence, action, or influence of cause and effect.)
Also; Aristotle indicated that the same thing can be the cause of contrary effects - as its presence and
absence may result in different outcomes. In speaking thus he formulated what currently is ordinarily
termed a "causal factor," e.g., atmospheric pressure as it affects chemical or physical reactions.
Aristotle marked two modes of causation: proper (prior) causation and accidental (chance) causation.
All causes, proper and incidental, can be spoken as potential or as actual, particular or generic. The
same language refers to the effects of causes; so that generic effects assigned to generic causes,
particular effects to particular causes, and operating causes to actual effects. It is also essential that
ontological causality does not suggest the temporal relation of before and after - between the cause
and the effect; that spontaneity (in nature) and chance (in the sphere of moral actions) are among the
causes of effects belonging to the efficient causation, and that no incidental, spontaneous, or chance
cause can be prior to a proper, real, or underlying cause per se.
All investigations of causality coming later in history will consist in imposing a favorite hierarchy on
the order (priority) of causes; such as "final > efficient > material > formal" (Aquinas), or in
restricting all causality to the material and efficient causes or, to the efficient causality (deterministic
or chance), or just to regular sequences and correlations of natural phenomena (the natural sciences
describing how things happen rather than asking why they happen).
Causality, determinism, and existentialism
The deterministic world-view is one in which the universe is no more than a chain of events
following one after another according to the law of cause and effect. To hold this worldview, as an
incompatibilist, there is no such thing as "free will". However, compatibilists argue that determinism
is compatible with, or even necessary for, free will.
Learning to bear the burden of a meaningless universe, and justify one's own existence, is the first
step toward becoming the "bermensch" (English: "overman" or "superman") that Nietzsche speaks
of extensively in his philosophical writings.
Existentialists have suggested that people have the courage to accept that while no meaning has been
designed in the universe, we each can provide a meaning for ourselves.
Though philosophers have pointed out the difficulties in establishing theories of the validity of
causal relations, there is yet the plausible example of causation afforded daily which is our own
ability to be the cause of events. This concept of causation does not prevent seeing ourselves as
moral agents.
Logic
Necessary and sufficient causes
A similar concept occurs in logic, for this see Necessary and sufficient conditions
Causes are often distinguished into two types: Necessary and sufficient.
Necessary causes:
If x is a necessary cause of y, then the presence of y necessarily implies the presence of x. The
presence of x, however, does not imply that y will occur.
Sufficient causes:
If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the presence of y. However,
another cause z may alternatively cause y. Thus the presence of y does not imply the presence of x.
J. L. Mackie argues that usual talk of "cause", in fact, refers to INUS conditions (insufficient and
non-redundant parts of unnecessary but sufficient causes). For example; consider the short circuit as
a cause of the house burning down. Consider the collection of events, the short circuit, the proximity
of flammable material, and the absence of firefighters. Considered together these are unnecessary but
sufficient to the house's destruction (since many other collection of events certainly could have
destroyed the house). Within this collection; the short circuit is an insufficient but non-redundant
part (since the short circuit by itself would not cause the fire, but the fire will not happen without it).
So the short circuit is an INUS cause of the house burning down.
Causality contrasted with conditionals
Conditional statements are not statements of causality. Perhaps the most important distinction is that
statements of causality require the antecedent to precede the consequent in time, whereas this
temporal order is not required by a conditional statement. Since many different statements may be
presented using "If...then..." in English (and, arguably, because this form is far more commonly used
to make a statement of causality), they are commonly confused; they are distinct, however.
For example all of the following statements are true interpreting "If... then..." as the material
conditional:
1. If George Bush was president of the United States in 2004, then Germany is in Europe.
2. If George Washington was president of the United States in 2004, then Germany is in Europe.
3. If George Washington was president of the United States in 2004, then Germany is not in
Europe.
The first is true since both the antecedent and the consequent are true. The second is true because the
antecedent is false and the consequent is true. The third is true because both the consequent and
antecedent are both false. These statement are trivial examples. Of course, none of these statements
express a causal connection between the antecedent and consequent, but they are true because they
do not have the combination of having both true antecedent and false consequent.
The ordinary indicative conditional seems to have some more structure than the material conditional
- for instance, none of the three statements above seem to be correct under an ordinary indicative
reading, though the first is closest. But the sentence
If Shakespeare of Stratford on Avon didn't write Macbeth then someone else did.
seems to be true, even though there is no straightforward causal relation (in this hypothetical
situation) between Shakespeare's not writing Macbeth and someone else's actually writing it.
Another sort of conditional, known as the counterfactual conditional has a stronger connection with
causality. However, not even all counterfactual statements count as examples of causality. Consider
the following two statements:
1. If A were a triangle, then A would have three sides.

2. If switch S were thrown, then bulb B would light.
In the first case it would not be correct to say that A's being a triangle caused it to have three sides,
since the relationship between triangularity and three-sidedness is one of definition. It is actually the
three sides that determine A's state as a triangle. Nonetheless, even interpreted counterfactually, the
first statement is true.
It is probably important to fully grasp the concept of conditionals before the literature on causality
can be understood. A crucial stumbling block is that, in everyday usage, conditionals are usually
used to describe a general situation. For example "if I drop my coffee, then my shoe gets wet" relates
an infinite number of possible events; it is shorthand for "for any fact that would count as 'dropping
my coffee', some fact that counts as 'my shoe gets wet' will be true". This general statement will be
strictly false if there is any circumstance where I drop my coffee and my shoe doesn't get wet.
However, an "if... then..." statement in logic typically relates two specific events or facts - a specific
coffee-dropping did or did not occur, and a specific shoe-wetting did or did not follow. Thus, with
explicit events in mind, if I drop my coffee and wet my shoe then it is true that "if I dropped my
coffee then I wet my shoe", regardless of the fact that yesterday I dropped a coffee in the trash for
the opposite effect - the conditional relates to specific facts. More counter-intuitively, if I didn't drop
my coffee at all then it is also true that "if I drop my coffee then I wet my shoe", or "dropping my
coffee implies I wet my shoe", regardless of whether I wet my shoe or not by any means. This usage
would not be counter-intuitive if it weren't for the everyday usage. Briefly, "if X then Y" is
equivalent to the first-order logic statement "A implies B" or "not B-and-not-A", where A and B are
predicates, but the more familiar usage of an "if A then B" statement would need to be written
symbolically using a higher order logic using quantifiers ("for all" and "there exists").
Theories
Counterfactual theories
The philosopher David Lewis notably suggested that all statements about causality can be
understood as counterfactual statements.[5][6][7] So, for instance, the statement that John's smoking
caused his premature death is equivalent to saying that had John not smoked he would not have
prematurely died. (In addition, it need also be true that John did smoke and did prematurely die,
although this requirement is not unique to Lewis' theory.)
Translating causal into counterfactual statements would only be beneficial if the latter were less
problematic than the former. This is indeed the case, as is demonstrated by the structural account of
counterfactual conditionals devised by the computer scientist Judea Pearl (2000).[8] This account
provides clear semantics and effective algorithms for computing counterfactuals which, in contrast to
Lewis' closest world semantics does not rely on the ambiguous notion of similarity among worlds.
For instance, one can compute unambiguously the probability that John would be alive had he not
smoked given that, in reality, John did smoke and did die. The quest for a counterfactual
interpretation of causal statements is therefore justified.
One problem Lewis' theory confronts is causal preemption. Suppose that John did smoke and did in
fact die as a result of that smoking. However, there was a murderer who was bent on killing John,
and would have killed him a second later had he not first died from smoking. Here we still want to
say that smoking caused John's death. This presents a problem for Lewis' theory since, had John not
smoked, he still would have died prematurely. Lewis himself discusses this example, and it has
received substantial discussion (cf.[9][10][11]). A structural solution to this problem has been given in
[Halpern and Pearl, 2005].[12]
Probabilistic causation
Interpreting causation as a deterministic relation means that if A causes B, then A must always be
followed by B. In this sense, war does not cause deaths, nor does smoking cause cancer. As a result,
many turn to a notion of probabilistic causation. Informally, A probabilistically causes B if A's
occurrence increases the probability of B. This is sometimes interpreted to reflect imperfect
knowledge of a deterministic system but other times interpreted to mean that the causal system under
study has an inherently chancy nature.
Causal Calculus
When experiments are infeasible or illegal, the derivation of cause effect relationship from
observational studies must rest on some qualitative theoretical assumptions, for example, that
symptoms do not cause diseases, usually expressed in the form of missing arrows in causal graphs
such as Bayesian Networks or path diagrams. The mathematical theory underlying these derivations
relies on the distinction between conditional probabilities, as in P(cancer | smoking), and
interventional probabilities, as in P(cancer | do(smoking)). The former reads: "the probability of
finding cancer in a person known to smoke" while the latter reads: "the probability of finding cancer
in a person forced to smoke". The former is a statistical notion that can be estimated directly in
observational studies, while the latter is a causal notion (also called "causal effect") which is what we
estimate in a controlled randomized experiment.
The theory of "causal calculus"[8] permits one to infer interventional probabilities from conditional
probabilities in causal Bayesian Networks with unmeasured variables. One very practical result of
this theory is the characterization of confounding variables, namely, a sufficient set of variables that,
if adjusted for, would yield the correct causal effect between variables of interest. It can be shown
that a sufficient set for estimating the causal effect of X on Y is any set of non-descendants of X that
d-separate X from Y after removing all arrows emanating from X. This criterion, called "backdoor",
provides a mathematical definition of "confounding" and helps researchers identify accessible sets of
variables worthy of measurement.
Structure Learning
While derivations in Causal Calculus rely on the structure of the causal graph, parts of the causal
structure can, under certain assumptions, be learned from statistical data. The basic idea goes back to
a recovery algorithm developed by Rebane and Pearl (1987)[13] and rests on the distinction between
the three possible types of causal substructures allowed in a DAG:
1.
2.
3.
Type 1 and type 2 represent the same statistical dependencies (i.e., X and Z are independent given Y)
and are, therefore, indistinguishable. Type 3, however, can be uniquely identified, since X and Z are
marginally independent and all other pairs are dependent. Thus, while the skeletons (the graphs
stripped of arrows) of these three triplets are identical, the directionality of the arrows is partially
identifiable. The same distinction applies when X and Z have common ancestors, except that one
must first condition on those ancestors. Algorithms have been developed to systematically determine
the skeleton of the underlying graph and, then, orient all arrows whose directionality is dictated by
the conditional independencies observed[8] [14] [15] [16].
Alternative methods of structure learning search through the many possible causal structures among
the variables, and remove ones which are strongly incompatible with the observed correlations. In
general this leaves a set of possible causal relations, which should then be tested by designing
appropriate experiments. If experimental data is already available, the algorithms can take advantage
of that as well. In contrast with Bayesian Networks, path analysis and its generalization, structural
equation modeling, serve better to estimate a known causal effect or test a causal model than to
generate causal hypotheses.
For nonexperimental data, causal direction can be hinted if information about time is available. This
is because (according to many, though not all, theories) causes must precede their effects temporally.
This can be set up by simple linear regression models, for instance, with an analysis of covariance in
which baseline and follow up values are known for a theorized cause and effect. The addition of time
as a variable, though not proving causality, is a big help in supporting a pre-existing theory of causal
direction. For instance, our degree of confidence in the direction and nature of causality is much
clearer with a longitudinal epidemiologic study than with a cross-sectional one.
Derivation theories
The Nobel Prize holder Herbert Simon and Philosopher Nicholas Rescher[17] claim that the
asymmetry of the causal relation is unrelated to the asymmetry of any mode of implication that
contraposes. Rather, a causal relation is not a relation between values of variables, but a function of
one variable (the cause) on to another (the effect). So, given a system of equations, and a set of
variables appearing in these equations, we can introduce an asymmetric relation among individual
equations and variables that corresponds perfectly to our commonsense notion of a causal ordering.
The system of equations must have certain properties, most importantly, if some values are chosen
arbitrarily, the remaining values will be determined uniquely through a path of serial discovery that
is perfectly causal. They postulate the inherent serialization of such a system of equations may
correctly capture causation in all empirical fields, including physics and economics.
Manipulation theories
Some theorists have equated causality with manipulability.[18][19][20][21] Under these theories, x
causes y just in case one can change x in order to change y. This coincides with commonsense
notions of causations, since often we ask causal questions in order to change some feature of the
world. For instance, we are interested in knowing the causes of crime so that we might find ways of
reducing it.
These theories have been criticized on two primary grounds. First, theorists complain that these
accounts are circular. Attempting to reduce causal claims to manipulation requires that manipulation
is more basic than causal interaction. But describing manipulations in non-causal terms has provided
a substantial difficulty.
The second criticism centers around concerns of anthropocentrism. It seems to many people that
causality is some existing relationship in the world that we can harness for our desires. If causality is
identified with our manipulation, then this intuition is lost. In this sense, it makes humans overly
central to interactions in the world.
Some attempts to save manipulability theories are recent accounts that don't claim to reduce causality
to manipulation. These account use manipulation as a sign or feature in causation without claiming
that manipulation is more fundamental than causation.[8] [22]
Process theories
Some theorists are interested in distinguishing between causal processes and non-causal processes
(Russell 1948; Salmon 1984).[23][24] These theorists often want to distinguish between a process and
a pseudo-process. As an example, a ball moving through the air (a process) is contrasted with the
motion of a shadow (a pseudo-process). The former is causal in nature while the latter is not.
Salmon (1984)[23] claims that causal processes can be identified by their ability to transmit an
alteration over space and time. An alteration of the ball (a mark by a pen, perhaps) is carried with it
as the ball goes through the air. On the other hand an alteration of the shadow (insofar as it is
possible) will not be transmitted by the shadow as it moves along.
These theorists claim that the important concept for understanding causality is not causal
relationships or causal interactions, but rather identifying causal processes. The former notions can
then be defined in terms of causal processes.
Fields
Science
Using the scientific method, scientists set up experiments to determine causality in the physical
world. Certain elemental forces such as gravity, the strong and weak nuclear forces, and
electromagnetism are said to be the four fundamental forces which are the causes of all other events
in the universe. The issue of to what degree a scientific experiment is replicable, however, has been
often raised but rarely addressed. The fact that no experiment is entirely replicable questions some
core assumptions in science.
In addition, many scientists in a variety of fields disagree that experiments are necessary to
determine causality. For example, the link between smoking and lung cancer is considered proven by
health agencies of the United States government, but experimental methods (for example,
randomized controlled trials) were not used to establish that link. This view has been controversial.
In addition, many philosophers are beginning to turn to more relativized notions of causality. Rather
than providing a theory of causality in toto, they opt to provide a theory of causality in biology or
causality in physics.
Physics
Causality is hard to interpret to ordinary language from many different physical theories. One
problem is typified by the moon's gravity. It isn't accurate to say, "the moon exerts a gravitic pull and
then the tides rise." In Newtonian mechanics gravity, rather, is a law expressing a constant
observable relationship among masses, and the movement of the tides is an example of that
relationship. There are no discrete events or "pulls" that can be said to precede the rising of tides.
Interpreting gravity causally is even more complicated in general relativity. Another important
implication of Causality in physics is its intimate connection to the Second Law of Thermodynamics
(see the fluctuation theorem). Quantum mechanics is yet another branch of physics in which the
nature of causality is somewhat unclear.
The treatment of the concept of causality within the Second Law of Thermodynamics yields a loss in
the translation. The statistical basis of the maintenance of the exchange of entropy confines the
subject to an extent such that the observer loses perspective. The 2nd Law states that "in a closed
system, disorder increases". This is a corollary of the concept that an effect cannot be greater that the
cause. Consider information content. Applying the 2nd Law, the information content in a closed
system cannot increase. If the boundaries of the system are penetrated then a system can increase in
information content but the loss is felt elsewhere. Strict adherence to the principles of the second law
preclude boundary violation. Consider artificial intelligence as an extreme example of information
content. Based on the 2nd law, and causality, AI, where AI is greater than its creator, is impossible.
This is not explicitly stated in the discussion of the Second Law of Thermodynamics yet it is extent
from,and relevant to the discussion of causality in Physics.
Engineering
A causal system is a system with output and internal states that depends only on the current and
previous input values. A system that has some dependence on input values from the future (in
addition to possible past or current input values) is termed an acausal system, and a system that
depends solely on future input values is an anticausal system. Acausal filters, for example, can only
exist as digital filters, because these filters can extract future values from a memory buffer or a file.
Biology and medicine
A. B. Hill built upon the work of Hume and Popper and suggested that the following aspects of an
association be considered in attempting to distinguish causal from noncausal associations: 1)
strength, 2) consistency, 3) specificity, 4) temporality, 5) biological gradient, 6) plausibility, 7)
coherence, 8) experimental evidence, and 9) analogy.[25]
Psychology
The above theories are attempts to define a reflectively stable notion of causality. This process uses
our standard causal intuitions to develop a theory that we would find satisfactory in identifying
causes. Another avenue of research is to empirically investigate how people (and non-human
animals) learn and reason about causal relations in the world. This approach is taken by work in
psychology. It also is possible to tackle causalities in surveys with a technique of elaboration. Given
a relationship between two variables, what can be learned by introducing a third variable into the
analysis (Rosenberg, 1968, xiii)? So elaboration is a device of the analysis that results in different
kinds of relationships between variables e.g. suppression, extraneous, and distorter relations.
Attribution
Attribution theory is the theory concerning how people explain individual occurrences of causation.
Attribution can be external (assigning causality to an outside agent or force - claiming that some
outside thing motivated the event) or internal (assigning causality to factors within the person -
taking personal responsibility or accountability for one's actions and claiming that the person was
directly responsible for the event). Taking causation one step further, the type of attribution a person
provides influences their future behavior.
The intention behind the cause or the effect can be covered by the subject of action (philosophy). See
also accident; blame; intent; and responsibility.
Causal powers
Whereas David Hume argued that causes are inferred from non-causal observations, Immanuel Kant
claimed that people have innate assumptions about causes. Within psychology, Patricia Cheng
(1997)[26] attempted to reconcile the Humean and Kantian views. According to her power PC theory,
people filter observations of events through a basic belief that causes have the power to generate (or
prevent) their effects, thereby inferring specific cause-effect relations. The theory assumes
probabilistic causation. Pearl (2000)[8] has shown that Cheng's causal power can be given a
counterfactual interpretation, (i.e., the probability that, absent x and y, y would be true if x were true)
and is computable therefore using structural models.
Causation and salience
Our view of causation depends on what we consider to be the relevant events. Another way to view
the statement, "Lightning causes thunder" is to see both lightning and thunder as two perceptions of
the same event, viz., an electric discharge that we perceive first visually and then aurally.
Naming and causality
While the names we give objects often refer to their appearance, they can also refer to an object's
causal powers - what that object can do, the effects it has on other objects or people. David Sobel
and Alison Gopnik from the Psychology Department of UC Berkeley designed a device known as
the blicket detector which suggests that "when causal property and perceptual features are equally
evident, children are equally as likely to use causal powers as they are to use perceptual properties
when naming objects".
Humanities
History
In the discussion of history, events are often considered as if in some way being agents that can then
bring about other historical events. Thus, the combination of poor harvests, the hardships of the
peasants, high taxes, lack of representation of the people, and kingly ineptitude are among the causes
of the French Revolution. This is a somewhat Platonic and Hegelian view that reifies causes as
ontological entities. In Aristotelian terminology, this use approximates to the case of the efficient
cause.
Law
Main article: causation (law)
According to law and jurisprudence, legal cause must be demonstrated in order to hold a defendant
liable for a crime or a tort (ie. a civil wrong such as negligence or trespass). It must be proven that
causality, or a 'sufficient causal link' relates the defendant's actions to the criminal event or damage
in question.
Religion and theology
Cosmological argument
One of the classic arguments for the existence of God is known as the "Cosmological argument" or
"First cause" argument. It works from the premise that every natural event is the effect of a cause. If
this is so, then the events that caused today's events must have had causes themselves, which must
have had causes, and so forth. If the chain never ends, then one must uphold the hypothesis of an
"actual infinite", which is often regarded as problematic, see Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel. If
the chain does end, it must end with a non-natural or supernatural cause at the start of the natural
world -- e.g. a creation by God.
Sometimes the argument is made in non-temporal terms. The chain doesn't go back in time, it goes
downward into the ever-more enduring facts, and thus toward the timeless.
Two questions that can help to focus the argument are:
1. What is an event without cause?

2. How does an event without a cause occur?
Critics of this argument point out problems with it.
A question related to this argument is which came first, The chicken or the egg?
Karma
Karma is the belief held by some major religions that a person's actions cause certain effects in the
current life and/or in future life, positively or negatively.
For example, if a person always does good deeds then it is believed that he or she will be "rewarded"
for his or her behavior with fortunate events such as avoiding fatal accident or winning the lottery. If
he or she always commits antagonistic behaviors, then it is believed that he will be punished with
unfortunate events.
In Buddhist philosophy, especially Zen, the word karma simply means the law of cause and effect,
ie. causality.
Reverse causality
Destiny might be considered reverse causality in that a cause is predated by an effect; e.g., "I found a
twenty dollar bill on the ground because later I would need it."
Some modern religious movements have postulated along the lines of philosophical idealism that
causality is actually reversed from the direction normally presumed, and that causality does not
proceed inward, from external random causes toward effects on a perceiving individual, but rather
outward, from a perceiving individual's causative mental requests toward responsive external
physical effects that only seem to be independent causes. Such thought gives rise to new causality
principles such as the doctrine of responsibility assumption.
See also
Statistics: Philosophy: Psychology and Sociology:

Medicine:
Causal loop diagram Aetiology Granger
Causal Markov Chicken or the egg Adverse effect causality
condition Determinism Force Dynamics Linear
Condition of Efficient cause Clinical trial regression
possibility Final cause Iatrogenesis Self-fulfilling
Correlation does not (Teleology) Nocebo prophecy
imply causation Free will Placebo (Sugar Unintended
Experimental design Predestination pill) consequence
Randomness paradox Scientific
Rubin Causal Model Material cause control
Mill's Methods Suggestibility
Newcomb's paradox Suggestion
Ontological paradox
Post hoc ergo
propter hoc
Proximate and
ultimate causation
Unintended
consequence
Physics:
Anthropic principle
Butterfly effect
Chain reaction
Grandfather paradox
Schrdinger's cat
Causal system
Causal filter
General
Domino effect
References
1. ^ Random House Unabridged Dictionary
2. ^ a b Processes and Causality by John F. Sowa, retrieved Dec. 5, 2006.
3. ^ Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda and Yoga Vashishta.
4. ^ Sankaracharya's commentary on Bhagvad Gita

5. ^ Lewis, David. (1973) "Causality." The Journal of Philosophy 70:556-567.
6. ^ Lewis, David. (1979) "Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow" Nos 13: 445-476.
7. ^ Lewis, David. (2000) "Causation as Influence" The Journal of Philosophy 97: 182-197.
8. ^ a b c d e Pearl, Judea (2000). Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference, Cambridge
University Press.
9. ^ Bunzl, Martin. (1980) "Causal Preemption and Counterfactuals." Philosophical Studies 37:
115-124
10. ^ Ganeri, Jonardon, Paul Noordhof, and Murali Ramachandran. (1996) "Counterfactuals and
Preemptive Causation" Analysis 56(4): 219-225.
11. ^ Paul, L.A. (1998) "Problems with Late Preemption" Analysis 58(1): 48-53.
12. ^ Halpern and Pearl (2005), "Actual Causality," Part I, British Journal of Philosophy of
Science, 56:843-887.
13. ^ Rebane, G. and Pearl, J., "The Recovery of Causal Poly-trees from Statistical Data,"
Proceedings, 3rd Workshop on Uncertainty in AI, (Seattle, WA) pp. 222-228,1987
14. ^ Spirtes, P. and Glymour, C., "An algorithm for fast recovery of sparse causal graphs", Social
Science Computer Review, Vol. 9, pp. 62-72, 1991.
15. ^ Spirtes, P. and Glymour, C. and Scheines, R., Causation, Prediction, and Search, New York:
Springer-Verlag, 1993
16. ^ Verma, T. and Pearl, J., "Equivalence and Synthesis of Causal Models," Proceedings of the
Sixth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, (July, Cambridge, MA), pp. 220-
227, 1990. Reprinted in P. Bonissone, M. Henrion, L.N. Kanal and J.F.\ Lemmer (Eds.),
Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 6, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, B.V., pp.
225-268, 1991
17. ^ Simon, Herbert, and Rescher, Nicholas (1966) "Cause and Counterfactual." Philosophy of
Science 33: 32340.
18. ^ Collingwood, R.(1940) An Essay on Metaphysics. Clarendon Press.
19. ^ Gasking, D. (1955) "Causation and Recipes" Mind (64): 479-487.
20. ^ Menzies, P. and H. Price (1993) "Causation as a Secondary Quality" British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science (44): 187-203.
21. ^ von Wright, G.(1971) Explanation and Understanding. Cornell University Press.
22. ^ Woodward, James (2003) Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford
University Press, ISBN 0-19-515527-0
23. ^ a b Salmon, W. (1984) Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World.
Princeton University Press.
24. ^ Russell, B. (1948) Human Knowledge. Simon and Schuster.
25. ^ Hill, A. B. (1965). "The environment and disease: association or causation?". Proc R Soc
Med 58: 295-300.
26. ^ Cheng, P.W. (1997). "From Covariation to Causation: A Causal Power Theory."
Psychological Review 104: 367-405.
Other references
Judea Pearl (2000) Causality: Models of Reasoning and Inference [1] Cambridge University
Press ISBN-13: 978-0521773621
Journal articles of faculty at the University of California, including Judea Pearl's articles
between 1984-1998 [2].
Spirtes, Peter, Clark Glymour and Richard Scheines Causation, Prediction, and Search, MIT
Press, ISBN 0-262-19440-6
Abdoullaev, A. (2000)The Ultimate of Reality: Reversible Causality, in Proceedings of the
20th World Congress of Philosophy, Boston: Philosophy Documentation Centre, internet site,
Paideia Project On-Line: http://www.bu.edu/wcp/MainMeta.htm
Green, Celia (2003). The Lost Cause: Causation and the Mind-Body Problem. Oxford: Oxford
Forum. ISBN 0-9536772-1-4 Includes three chapters on causality at the microlevel in physics.
Rosenberg, M.(1968). The logic of survey analysis. New York: Basic Books, Inc.,Publishers
External links
"The Art and Science of Cause and Effect": a slide show and tutorial lecture by Judea Pearl
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Backwards Causation
Probabilistic Causation
Causation and Manipulability
Counterfactual Theories of Causation
Causal Processes
Causation in the Law
Medieval Theories of Causation
The Metaphysics of Causation
General
Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Causation

Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Causation in Law
Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Causation in History
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality"
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Causality - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Page 1 of 14

Causality, determinism, and existentialism

Causality contrasted with conditionals

1. If A were a triangle, then A would have three sides.

variables worthy of measurement.

Biology and medicine

Causation and salience

Naming and causality

Main article: causation (law)

Religion and theology

Two questions that can help to focus the argument are:

1. What is an event without cause?

Critics of this argument point out problems with it.

Statistics: Philosophy: Psychology and Sociology:

4. ^ Sankaracharya's commentary on Bhagvad Gita

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Causation

This page was last modified 20:50, 17 December 2007.

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