Ong vs.

Ong
Facts:
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong and Lucita G. Ong were married ong July
13, 1975 at San Agustin Church in Manila. They have three children: Kingston,
Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority. On March 21 1996,
Lucita filed a complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family
Code alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats,
intimidation and grossly abusive conduct. Lucita claimed that soon after three years
of marriage, she and William quarreled almost everday, and the causes of these
fights were petty things regarding their children or their busines. There was an
instance when a violent quarrel ensured and William severely hit her and pointed a
gun at her and asked her to leave the house. She went to her sisters house and
was fetched brought to their parents house in Dagupan. She went to Dr. Vicente
Elinzano for treatment of her injuries, the following day. William for his part denied
that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting language against her,
or whipped the children with the buckle of his belt.
On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation with
all the legal effects attendant thereto, particularly the dissolution and liquidation of
the conjugal partnership properties, for which purpose the parties are hereby
ordered to submit a complete inventory of said properties so that the Court can
make a just and proper division. Herein petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
but the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court for it believed that the
he straightforward and candid testimonies of the witnesses were uncontroverted
and credible. Likewise, the motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner,
reasserting his claims in his petition, averred for the first time that since respondent
is guilty of abandonment, the petition for legal separation should be denied
following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether the respondent herself has given ground for legal separation by
abandoning the family and thus, no decree of legal separation should be issued in
her favor under Art. 56 par. (4) of the Family Code.
Held:
No, the contention of the petitioner that the decree of Legal Separation shall not be
granted because his wife actually abandoned her family, is bereft of merit. The
abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable
cause for more than one year. Also, It is a well-settled rule that the Court also gives
a great amount of consideration to the assessment of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses as trial court judges enjoy the unique opportunity of
observing the deportment of witnesses on the stand, a vantage point denied
appellate tribunals. In this case, the Court gives great weight as to the findings of
the trial court that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not
constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision. Therefore, the petition
is denied and a decree of Legal Separation is granted in favor of Lucita.

Quiao v. Quaio
Facts:
On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao filed a complaint for legal
separation against herein petitioner Biragido B. Quiao. Subsequently, RTC rendered
a Decision dated October 10, 2005, declaring the legal separation of Rita Quiao and
Brigido Quaio purusant to Article 55 of the Family Code. As such, the herein parties
shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bind shall not
be severed. Except for Leticia C. Quaio who is of legal age, the three minor children
shall remain under the custody of the petitioner who is the innocent spouse.
Further, except of the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC,
all the remaining properties shall be divided equally between herein respondent and
petitioner subject to the respective legtimes of the children and the payment of the
unpaid conjugal liabilities of P45, 740. Brigidos share, however, of the net profits
earned by the conugal partnership is foreited in favor of the common children.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period
provided by law. The trial court, on February 10, 2006, issued a writ of execution. On
July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed. The petitioner filed before the RTC a
Motion for Clarification. To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the held
that the phrase Net Profit Earned denotes the remainder of the properties of the
parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouse and the debts.
The Order further held that, the share of the petitioner shall be forfeited in favor of
the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any
share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the
Family Code. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but the RTC held the Decision
dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory. The petitioner claims that
he has vested rights under the New Civil Code, thus, the provisions in the Family
Code cannot be given a retroactive effect.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners vested right over half of the common properties of the
conjugal partnership wiolated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his
children pusuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code.
Held:
No, the trial court is correct in its decision to forfeit the share of the petitioner, who
is the guilty spouse, from the net profits of the conjugal partnership. It clear as a
rule that while one may no tbe deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if
there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. In
this case, the Court held that that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's vested
right is one founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176
of the Civil Code. This provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the
forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits. Finally, as
earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its Decision dated October
10, 2005 that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7) of the Family Code.
The petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus,
the petitioner is now precluded from questioning the trial court's decision since it
has become final and executory. Therefore, the decision of the RTC is affirmed,
hence, the petitioner is not entitled to any property at all.

People v. Jumawan
Facts:
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married on October 18, 1975. They Iived
together since then and raised their four (4) children as they put up several
businesses over the years. On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-
Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant, raped at their residence
in Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the
accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him. KKK vividly
remembered that on October 16, 1998, she did not lie on the matrimonial bed with
the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. She
insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal
pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease her
husband and the latter got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it
against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where
she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed. The accused-appellant then lay
beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by
tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and
reiterating that she was not feeling well and if not for the interference of their
daugthers, she would have been subjected to another sexual intercourse against
her will.
KKK explains that conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between
her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He
treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm.
However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her
panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method
of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush
but he would threaten her into submission. The trial court found the accused Edgar
Jumawan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate charges of rape
which decision was affirmed by the Court of appeals in toto. The accused-appellant
posited that he cannot be convicted for the crime of rape since there is an implied
consent between husband and wife.
Issue:
Whether there can be a marital rape and accused-appellant be convicted of such
crime
Held:
Yes, the law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those
committed without a marriage. As a rule, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A.
No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c)
marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. Furthermore,
Article 68 of the Family Code provides that husband and wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual held and
support. In this case, accused-appellant subjects his wife, KKK, into sexual
intercourse throuhg force and intimidation, against the will of the latter. The said
acts of accused appellant definietly falls within the purview of the crime of rape. The
Court held that since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-
marital rape nor provide for different definition or elements for either, the Court,
tasked to interpret and apply what the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden
sphere of judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth.
Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the CA with modification as to the
amount of civil indemnity and damages awarded to the victim.
Ayala v. CA
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills obtained a P50, 300, 000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation. As added securty for the credit line
extented to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, made
himself jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM
failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a a case for sum of money against PBM and
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching. The trial court rendered a judgment ordering
PBM and Ching to pay AIDC the principal amount of P50, 300, 000.00 with interests.
Pending appeal of the judgment, ipon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ
of execution pending appeal. The Sr. Deputy Sherrif caused the issuance and
service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale of their conjugal
properties. Private respondents file a case of injunction against petitioners to enjoin
the acution sale alleging that the petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against
the conugal partnership levied on the groun that the subject loan did not redound to
the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. The lower court issued a temporary
restraining order which was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
On June 25, 1982, the auction sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder, was
issued a Certificate of Sale by petitioner Magsajo, which was registered on July 2,
1982. Upon expiration of the redemption period, petitioner sheriff issued the final
deed of sale on August 4, 1982 which was registered on August 9, 1983. On
September 3, 1983, AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the petition for injunction but the
lower court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, trial on the merits proceeded and
promulgated its decision declaring the sale on execution null and void. Petitioners
appealed to the respondent court, albeit it affirmed the decision of the trial court
holding that the loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the
advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
Issue:
Whether the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
HELD:
No. Petition is denied. As provided in Article 73 of the Family Code, etither spouses
may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the
consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious and moral grounds
and in case of disagreement the court shall decide whether the objection is proper
and the benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the
benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced
against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent. The
loan obtained by the husband from AIDC was for the benefit of PBM and not for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. The debt incurred by Ching is a
corporate debt and the right of recourse to respondent as surety is only to the
extent of his corporate stocks. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the
benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption
can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof
must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Therefore, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit.