50.

CANON 12
PNB V UY TENG PIAO
VICKERS; 1932(romy ramirez)
NATURE
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
FACTS
- Defendant-appellant, Uy Teng Piao, was sued by PNB for non payment of obligations
at the CFI of Manila and said court rendered judgment in favor of PNB on September 9,
1934 for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest of seven percent per annum from June
1,1924. The court ordered the defendant appellant to deposit the money due with the
clerk of the court within three months from thedate of judgment. In case of failure to pay,
the mortgage properties should be sold at auction in accordance with law
and theproceeds to be applied to the payment of the judgment.- The defendant failed to
comply with the payment order and the properties were auctioned by the sheriff of
Manila for a total of P1,300 with PNB as the buyer.-
On February 11, 1925, PNB secured from defendant a waiver of the latters right
to redeem one of the proper
ties described as TCTno. 8274 and thereafter sold the same to one Mariano Santos for
P8,600.- The other property, TCT No. 7264 was likewise resold and the proceeds was
credited to the account of Uy. The total amountgenerated with the resale of the lots
amonted to P 11, 300.- On August 1, 1930, PNB instituted another court action for the
recover of the balance of the judgment amounting to P11,574.38with interest at seven
percent per annum.- The defendant claimed that in exchange for his waiver of his right
to redeem the first property resold by PNB, the bank would notcollect from him the
balance of the judgment.- The CFI ruled that there was in fact a condonation made by
the bank through one of its officer, a certain Mr. Pecson.- Hence this appeal

ISSUES
1. WON PNB condoned the balance of the judgment
2.WON a lawyer can appear as both counsel and witness in the same case

HELD
1. No. There was no evidence presented except the uncertain testimony of the
defendant, that the bank did in fact agree to thecondonation. Even if the SC
grants that Mr. Pecson did agree to the condonation, there is not evidence
presented that Mr. Pecsonwas authorized by the bank through its board of
directors or persons authorized by the said board to bind the bank
to theagreement
2. Yes (No). The SC held that the appearance of a lawyer as both counsel and
witness in a trial is not strictly prohibited. The SChowever stated that it would be
preferable if the lawyer in this case can appear only as one or the other. In other
words, if they areto testify as required by the case, they should withdraw from the
active management of the case. This is embodied in Canon 19 of the Code of
Legal Ethics.
Disposition
The decision of the CFI is reversed and the defendant is ordered to pay PNB the sum of
P11,574.38 with interest thereonat the rate of seven percent per annum to be reckoned
from August 1, 1930. Costs for the defendant.
51.

MARTELINO vs. ALEJANDRO

FACTS:
Major Eduardo Martelino is charged with the violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of
War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then
undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor. On August 12, 1969
Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of the general court-martial,
following the latter's admission that he read newspaper stories of theCorregidor
incident. Martelino contended that the case had received such an amount of publicity in
the press and other news media and in fact was being exploited for political purposes in
connection with the presidential election on November 11, 1969 as to imperilhis right to
a fair trial. After deliberating, the military court denied the challenge.Respondents assert
that despite the publicity which the case had received, noproof has been presented
showing that the court-martial's president's fairness andimpartiality have been impaired.
On the contrary, they claim, the petitioner's own counselexpressed confidence in the
"integrity, experience and background" of the members of thecourt.

ISSUE:

Whether the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as toprejudice
their right to a fair trial?

HELD:
NO, the spate of publicity in this case did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners
butrather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be
a "massacre" ofMuslim trainees.If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of
the petitioners but of theGovernment. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-
martial to protect the accusedfrom massive publicity encouraged by those connected
with the conduct of the trial eitherby a failure to control the release of information or to
remove the trial to another venue orto postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity
shall have subsided. Indeed we cannotsay that the trial of the petitioners was being held
under circumstances which did notpermit the observance of those imperative decencies
of procedure which have come to beidentified with due process.Granting the existence
of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the petitionershere do not contend that the
respondents have been unduly influenced but simply that theymight be by the "barrage"
of publicity, we think that the suspension of the court-martialproceedings has
accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause,by postponing
the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have returned. The atmospherehas since
been cleared and the publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so farabated that
we believe the trial may now be resumed in tranquility.

52.