Explaining the Belief in God for Self, In-Group, and Out-Group Targets

Author(s): Jared B. Kenworthy

Source: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Mar., 2003), pp. 137-
146
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Society for the Scientific Study of Religion
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1387991
Accessed: 06-03-2017 20:20 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms

Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Wiley are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion

This content downloaded from 128.172.10.194 on Mon, 06 Mar 2017 20:20:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Explaining the Belief in God for Self, In-Group,
and Out-Group Targets

JARED B. KENWORTHY

Previous work suggests that people perceive their attitudes and beliefs as derivingfrom an internal, rational
process, but not from an emotional process or from external sources. This work has examined explanation
belief in God using such an attributional approach. The current study examines the explanations individ
for why (1) they themselves, (2) the group of those who hold the same belief position, or (3) the group
who hold the opposite position, believe (or not) in God. The attributional dimensions of internality, ext
emotionality, and rationality are used to assess explanations for belief or nonbelief. Believers reported
at their own belief position because of an internal, rational process despite the average characterization
belief in God as less rational and more emotional.

For at least the past 60 years in this country, the percentage of individuals reporting
believe in God has been consistently above 90 percent.1 The belief in God is an impor
of many people's identities and positive self-evaluations (e.g., Blaine and Crocker 199
the importance of the belief in God in contemporary and historical society, however, ex
research has not examined the explanations people give for why they and others hold
they do regarding the existence of God. Sociologists and anthropologists have posited
the widespread and almost ubiquitous belief in a God or a Supreme Being, but how do
person explain the origin of his or her belief or nonbelief?

ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND EXPLAINING BELIEF

Research in attribution theory is concerned with how people explain their social
its many phenomena. For the past few decades, researchers studying attributional pro
examined the tendency of people to explain social behavior by making inferences o
states that correspond to outward behavior (Hewstone 1990; Jones and Davis 1965; J
Harris 1967; Snyder and Jones 1974; Trope and Higgins 1993; Yandrell and Insko 19
Gilbert and Malone 1995, for a review). This literature largely examines the condit
which people exhibit the bias of assuming that some relatively stable disposition, a
belief of an individual caused his or her behavior. Researchers have recently recognize
of attribution theorists to examine the attributed causes of behavior as phenomena to be
(e.g., Buss 1978; Locke and Pennington 1982; Malle 1999). Recent empirical wor
with the kinds of explanations people give for behavior, recognizing the fact that the ex
people give for social behavior are themselves behaviors that should be explained (e
and Pennington 1982; Malle et al. 2000; Malle 1999). To the degree that beliefs-specifi
belief in God-play a causal or explanatory role in behavior (e.g., Ajzen 1996; Ajzen and
1977; Manstead 1996; Terry, Hogg, and White 2000), they necessitate explanation. Nev
even if the belief in God cannot be empirically shown to be a cause of other behaviors, it
expressed, a social phenomenon to be explained. This is the focus of the current artic
people explain why others hold the beliefs about God that they do?

Jared B. Kenworthy can be reached at the University of Oxford, Department of Experimental Psychology
Road, Oxford OXI 3UD, UK. E-mail: Jared.kenworthy@psy.ox.ac.uk

Journalfor the Scientific Study of Religion 42:1 (2003) 137-146

This content downloaded from 128.172.10.194 on Mon, 06 Mar 2017 20:20:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
138 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

Until recently (e.g., Kenworthy and Miller 2002), no research examined the kinds of attri-
butions people make for attitudes. In that article, the authors examined attributions for a variety
of attitude issues, but not for the issue of belief in God. In their review of the scientific literature
on attitude structure they found that a commonly discussed structural aspect of attitudes is their
cognitive-affective foundation (Chaiken, Pomerantz, and Giner-Sorolla 1995; Eagly and Chaiken
1998; Zanna and Rempel 1988). Accordingly, an attitude may be affectively based, meaning that
it derives from how an individual feels about holding an attitude position, or it may be cognitively
based, meaning that it derives from an inspection of facts, or from a rational examination of
the characteristics of an object, person, or event (e.g., Eagly and Chaiken 1998). Research has
shown, however, that attitudes can usually be characterized as having both affective and cognitive
components (e.g., Fabrigar and Petty 1999; Trafimow and Sheeran 1998). However, studies of
attribution processes, biases, and errors have typically been constrained to explanations of social
behavior, and have not until recently (i.e., Kenworthy and Miller 2002) examined the extent to
which people attribute differential levels of the cognitive, affective, or any other dimension to
their own or to others' attitudes. This examination can also be applied to the belief or nonbelief
in God, and as mentioned, this is the focus of the current article.
For most attitude issues (e.g., abortion rights, legalization of medicinal marijuana, death
penalty, etc.) individuals perceive themselves, and those who hold the same position, as holding
that position because of a personal, rational thought process (Kenworthy and Miller 2002). When
asked about the group of people that holds the opposite attitude position, participants explained
that opposing position as deriving from (1) an emotional process (e.g., because of how it feels to
hold that position, because it is emotionally reassuring), and (2) external sources (e.g., friends,
family, media, etc.). Moreover, they also presented some data demonstrating that these attributional
dimensions (i.e., rationality, exterality, emotionality) have clear evaluative components. That is,
use of these dimensions when explaining attitudes and beliefs is tantamount to making positive
or negative evaluations of an attitude position. Specifically, an internal, rational process is seen as
positive (see also Jellison and Greene 1981), and an emotional or external origin for an attitude
is seen as negative.
It is based on these latter findings that the present research was conducted. The current
examination of explanations for the belief in God was undertaken to find out how these attributional
dimensions would be used when explaining (1) one's own belief, (2) that of the group of people
holding the same belief position (i.e., believers or nonbelievers), and (3) that of the group of
people holding the opposite belief position (i.e., nonbelievers for believers, and vice versa).
This study holds significant practical value to those interested in the nature of the belief in
God because it examines, within an experimental context, some of the ways people conceptualize
not only their own belief in deity but also the same belief held by other people. It should be
pointed out, however, that the present examination does not explore the origins per se of the belief
in God, but rather people's explanations for such origins. In this sense, the dependent measures
assess a potential bias in the perception of human social reality concerning a fundamental basis
for many people's ideologies. Specifically, does our tendency to perceive ourselves and our social
in-groups positively in comparison to others and their groups (Hewstone 1990; Pettigrew 1979)
extend even into the domain of the belief in God? Very few, if any, empirical studies speak to
this issue. It is also an important domain of investigation because many contemporary intergroup
conflicts-whether violent or not-including those in Kosovo, Northern Ireland, or even Salt Lake
City, Utah, can be seen as having a basis in religious beliefs. At the root of almost any religious
belief is the belief in God, and this study begins its investigation at that point.

OVERVIEW AND PREDICTIONS

This study assessed attributions of externality, emotionality, interality, and rationality for
the belief in God across three levels of a between-subjects target variable: self, in-group, and

This content downloaded from 128.172.10.194 on Mon, 06 Mar 2017 20:20:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
EXPLAINING THE BELIEF IN GOD 139

out-group. Because the belief in God is a fairly important issue, and because people cha
themselves favorably on important attitude dimensions (e.g., Cadinu and Rothbart 1996
1988), the least amount of externality and emotionality was expected to be attributed to
pants' own belief position, as compared to the responses in the in-group and out-group co
At the same time, internality and rationality were expected to be more strongly invoked t
participants' own position in contrast to both the in-group and the out-group targets.
externality and emotionality, but more internality and rationality, were expected to be att
to the attitudes of one's in-group than to those of the out-group (e.g., Brewer 1979; Ke
and Miller 2002; Pettigrew 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1986).

METHOD

This experiment was an attempt to conceptually replicate the attitude attribution fin
Kenworthy and Miller (2002, Experiment 1) within the context of belief in God. Specif
individuals perceive exterality and emotionality as relatively less desirable bases for t
in God, then they will eschew use of these dimensions in attributions for their own bel
tion. Likewise, attributions about the in-group position will be characterized by less use
dimensions than will those about the out-group position. Conversely, if internality and rat
are perceived as being relatively more positive explanations for the origin of belief, then
tions about one's own attitude will be more strongly characterized by these dimensions.
attributions about the in-group position will be characterized by more internality and r
than will those about the out-group position.

Participants and Design

One-hundred-two participants from various psychology courses at a large, private (

university in southern California volunteered to complete a study on the perceptions of th
of belief and received partial course credit as compensation. Participants were randomly
to one of three experimental conditions (self, in-group, out-group). Thirty-five participa
assigned to the self condition, 32 to the in-group condition, and 35 to the out-group con
Although adequate for the small experimental design involved here, the sample size d
allow for a direct examination of attributions for belief or nonbelief between different de
tions, cultures, or socioeconomic categories. Also, the relatively small sample here prec
possibility of gathering data from a large number of nonbelievers, given the general tende
belief.

Procedure and Materials

Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were informed that they would respond to a
questionnaire pertaining to their perceptions of the belief in God and where it comes from. The
were verbally instructed to answer the questions in terms of (1) their own belief position (belie
or nonbelief), (2) that of the in-group ("the group of people that holds the same position"), or
(3) that of the out-group ("the group of people that holds the opposite position"). Paralleling the
verbal instructions, the questionnaire itself also contained instructions about the belief issue an
the attribution target.

Dependent Measures

The questionnaire asked for the participants' belief position for the question, "Do you believe
in a God or Gods?" and then asked him or her to complete several items that served as the main
dependent measures. The items were in a constant, fixed, but randomized, order for all participants

This content downloaded from 128.172.10.194 on Mon, 06 Mar 2017 20:20:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
140 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

TABLE 1
ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS OF THE FOUR MAIN DEPENDENT MEASURES

1 2 3 4

1. Interality
2. Externality -0.806**
3. Rationality 0.474** -0.321**
4. Emotionality -0.597** 0.177 -0.166
Note. N = 102.

**p <0.01.

The main dependent measures, based on items used in previous research on attributions
about attitude positions (Kenworthy and Miller 2002), were items assessing perceived interality,
externality, emotionality, and rationality of the origin of the belief or nonbelief in God. The
internality item asked to what degree the participant thought the target (i.e., self, in-group, or out-
group) arrived at that respective position because of a personal, internal process. The externality
item asked to what degree the participant thought the target arrived at the belief position because
of the influence of external sources, such as friends or family. The emotionality item asked to what
degree the participant thought the target held the belief position because it is emotionally reassuring
to do so. The rationality item asked to what degree the participant thought the target arrived at the
belief position based on a rational thought process. Finally, participants were asked to indicate
the degree to which holding their belief position was personally important to them (participants
in all target conditions answered this question for themselves). All items were assessed on a
nine-point scale with the endpoints marked as not at all (1) and very much (9). Thus, a higher
number indicated greater endorsement of the item.

RESULTS

Correlations Among Dimensions

Table 1 shows the correlations among the dependent measures. As indicated, an attribution
of interality was highly related (positively) to an attribution of rationality, but negatively related
to an attribution of externality and emotionality.

Importance of Belief

As expected, participants reported that the belief (or nonbelief) in God was highly important
to them (M = 6.98). This mean importance rating was tested from the midpoint of the scale (5),
and was found to be highly reliable in the positive direction, t(101) = 9.25, p < 0.001. Importance
did not differ (all post-hoc p values > 0.64) between target groups (self, in-group, out-group), nor
did it differ (p = 0.54) between believers (M = 6.97) and nonbelievers (M = 6.69).

Target Effects

Each dimension (interality, externality, rationality, emotionality) was submitted to a prelim-

inary analysis of variance (ANOVA) consisting of the between-subjects factors (1) Target (self,
in-group, out-group), and (2) Belief Position (believers, nonbelievers). The Target X Belief Posi-
tion interaction was reliable for internality, F(2, 96) = 4.8, p < 0.05, externality, F(2, 96) = 3.29,
p < 0.05, rationality, F(2, 96) = 12.11, p < 0.01, and emotionality, F(2, 96) = 8.79, p < 0.05,

This content downloaded from 128.172.10.194 on Mon, 06 Mar 2017 20:20:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
EXPLAINING THE BELIEF IN GOD 141

TABLE 2
MEAN INTERNALITY, EXTERNALITY, EMOTIONALITY, AND INTERNALITY
ATTRIBUTIONS AS A FUNCTION OF ATTRIBUTION TARGET CONDITION
AND BELIEF/NONBELIEF POSITION

Self In-Group Out-Group

Interality
Believers 7.29a (1.55) 5.67b (2.22) 5.39b (2.04)
Nonbelievers 8.80a (0.45) 6.60b (0.89) 2.66c (0.58)
Externality
Believers 3.17a (1.50) 4.88b (1.76) 5.65b (1.91)
Nonbelievers 2.34a (0.89) 4.09a (1.78) 7.15b (0.65)
Rationality
Believers 6.66a (2.15) 3.75b (2.52) 4.93b (1.93)
Nonbelievers 6.69a (1.53) 7.56a (1.29) 2.50b (1.00)
Emotionality
Believers 5.16a (2.13) 6.90b (1.70) 5.04a (1.91)
Nonbelievers 2.87 (1.47) 4.79a (2.19) 7.33b* (1.54)

Note. Means with different superscripts within rows differ at

attribution of internality, externality, rationality, and emotionali
* p < 0.08 for the comparison between in-group and out-group c

indicating that for all dimensions the target effect was m

Thus, reported below are the separate effects of attribution

Target Effects Within Belief Positions

Eighty-one of the 102 participants (approximately 79 p

(approximately 21 percent) reported not believing in God
responses made by believers and nonbelievers for the thr

Internality

For believers, the one-way ANOVA between conditions was reliable, F(2, 78) =5.86,
p < 0.01. Supporting the predictions, post-hoc comparisons revealed that attributed internality
was higher in the self condition (see Table 2) than in both the in-group (p < 0.05) and the out-
group conditions (p < 0.01). In-group and out-group means did not differ (p > 0.05) for believers,
indicating that they perceived equivalent lower amounts of internality for those who believe in
God and those who do not. For nonbelievers, the overall test between conditions was also reliable,
F(2, 18) = 75.60, p < 0.001. Supporting the predictions again, post-hoc comparisons revealed
that the degree of attributed internality was higher in the self condition than in both the in-group
(p < 0.01) and the out-group conditions (p < 0.01). By contrast with believers, the nonbelieving
in-group was attributed more interality than was the believing out-group (p < 0.01).

Externality

For believers, the one-way ANOVA between conditions was again reliable, F(2, 78) = 15.01,
p < 0.001. Supporting the predictions, post-hoc comparisons revealed that attributed externality
was lower in the self condition (see Table 2) than in both the in-group (p < 0.001) and the

This content downloaded from 128.172.10.194 on Mon, 06 Mar 2017 20:20:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
142 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

out-group conditions (p < 0.001). In-group and out-group means did not differ for belie
indicating that they perceived equivalent higher amounts of external influence for those
believe in God and those who do not. For nonbelievers, the overall test between condition
also reliable, F(2, 18)= 21.65, p <0.001. By contrast with believers, post-hoc compar
revealed that the degree of attributed externality was lower in the self condition than in the
group condition (p < 0.001), but not lower than that found in the in-group condition (p >
Attributed externality was reliably higher in the out-group condition than in the in-group con
(p < 0.01).

Rationality

For believers, the ANOVA between conditions was reliable, F(2, 78) = 11.47, p < 0.001.
Supporting the predictions, post-hoc comparisons revealed that the degree of attributed rationality
was higher in the self condition (see Table 2) than in both the in-group (p < 0.05) and the out-
group conditions (p < 0.05). In-group and out-group means did not differ (p > 0.05), indicating
that they perceived equivalent lower amounts of rationality for those who believe in God and those
who do not. For nonbelievers, the overall test was also reliable, F(2, 18) = 23.64, p < 0.001.
Post-hoc comparisons revealed that the degree of attributed interality was higher in the self
condition than in the out-group condition (p < 0.009), but not higher than that found in the in-
group condition (p > 0.05). By contrast with believers, attributed rationality was also higher in
the in-group condition than in the out-group condition (p < 0.05).

Emotionality

For believers, the ANOVA between conditions was reliable, F(2, 78) = 7.39, p < 0.001. Sup-
porting the predictions, post-hoc comparisons revealed that the degree of attributed emotionality
was lower in the self condition (see Table 2) than in the in-group condition (p < 0.001), but not
lower than in the (nonbelieving) out-group condition (p > 0.05). Notably, the degree of attributed
emotionality was higher in the in-group condition than in the out-group condition (p < 0.001). For
nonbelievers, the overall test between conditions was also reliable, F(2, 18) = 9.45, p < 0.002.
Post-hoc comparisons revealed that, by contrast with believers, the self and in-group means did
not differ (p > 0.05), but that the attributed emotionality was higher in the out-group condition
than in the self condition (p < 0.001), and was marginally higher than in the in-group condition
(p < 0.08).

DISCUSSION

With respect to comparisons for the self versus in-group/out-group conditions, the findings
of this study generally replicate those of recent research (e.g., Kenworthy and Miller 2002) in
which participants' own attitude positions, by comparison with the in-group and the out-group
as targets, were attributed the highest degree of interality and rationality, and the least degree of
emotionality and externality.
As mentioned in the introduction, the least amount of externality and emotionality was
expected to be attributed to participants' own belief position, as compared to the responses in the
in-group and out-group conditions. At the same time, interality and rationality were expected to
be more strongly invoked to explain participants' own position by contrast with both the in-group
and the out-group as judgment targets. Less exterality and emotionality, but more internality and
rationality, were expected to be attributed to the attitudes of one's in-group, as compared to those
of the out-group.
For the self versus in-groups and out-groups, the predictions were supported for interality
and externality when participants attributed more interality, and less externality, to their belief

This content downloaded from 128.172.10.194 on Mon, 06 Mar 2017 20:20:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
EXPLAINING THE BELIEF IN GOD 143

position in the self condition than in the in-group or out-group conditions. This was true f
believers and nonbelievers.3 The results for rationality support the self versus in-group/ou
predictions only for believers. Believers perceived their own position as being more
than both the in-group or the out-group. Nonbelievers, by contrast, attributed equivalent
of rationality to themselves and to the in-group, both of which exceeded that attribut
believing out-group. Thus, whereas believers and nonbelievers both characterized the o
as holding their belief position for less rational reasons, these two groups differed in their
attributions of rationality to their own in-groups. The results for emotionality directionally
the self versus in-group/out-group predictions only for nonbelievers (see Table 2). Beli
contrast, attributed equal amounts of emotionality to themselves and the nonbelieving o
Only the believing in-group was attributed a relatively high degree of emotionality for
position.
The in-group versus out-group predictions were uniformly supported by nonbelievers. The
nonbelieving in-group was always attributed more internality and rationality, yet less externality
and emotionality, than the believing out-group. For believers, although the degree of attributed
internality was directionally less for the out-group than for the in-group, the difference was not
reliable. Likewise, although more externality was attributed to the out-group than to the in-group,
this difference did not attain statistical reliability. Believers actually attributed equivalent amounts
of rationality to the in-group and out-group for their respective belief positions. Finally, believers
attributed more emotionality to the in-group than to the out-group. This was clearly counter to
the predictions.
With respect to these anomalous emotionality findings, the results for believers are under-
standable given that the nonbelief (i.e., atheist) position in society is typically characterized as
a less emotionally-based one. That is, people do not choose the nonbelief position because it is
emotionally reassuring. The present findings indicate that the position of belief in God, however,
is perceived as one characterized by a relatively high degree of emotionality and a relatively
low degree of rationality. Thus, the findings that were contrary to the expectations may still be
fruitful for future research because they help researchers examining the actual and attributed
sources of beliefs and values to draw possible theoretical distinctions between different kinds of
beliefs.

One important finding of the current study is that believers reported arriving at their own belief
position because of a rational thought process despite the average characterization of the position
of the believing in-group as less rational and more emotional. For nonbelievers, the nonbelieving
in-group position was characterized as relatively more internal and rational, and less emotional,
indicating somewhat parallel perceptions of the belief versus nonbelief positions by believers and
nonbelievers, respectively.
The comparisons between attributions to in-group and out-group belief positions were ex-
pected to fit with Pettigrew's (1979) analyses showing that in-groups receive more favorable
attributions than out-groups (see also Brewer 1979; Hewstone 1990; Tajfel and Turner 1986).
In the present analysis of the belief in God, however, this was true only for the nonbelievers.
The lack of difference on the other measures by believers may be indicative of a difference
between everyday political attitudes and the issue of belief in God. For example, differing attri-
butions about groups who hold opposite political attitudes may reflect intergroup motivations and
biases (see Kenworthy and Miller 2001; Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; Simon, Hastedt, and
Aufderheide 1997), such as those found between racial, ethnic, or religious denominational groups,
whereas attributions for one's in-group with respect to the belief in God may not reflect such bi-
ases because the position of belief in God is a category that is inclusive of and comprises many
other socially important categories, including even those mentioned above (i.e., race, ethnicity,
religious denominations, etc.). Thus, the high degree of perceived similarity on other dimensions
(e.g., personality, values, lifestyle) that members of groups defined by racial, ethnic, and political
attitude positions report may not be present for members of the group of people that believe in

This content downloaded from 128.172.10.194 on Mon, 06 Mar 2017 20:20:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
144 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

God. This may be especially true given that over 90 percent of people report believing in Go
some social psychologists have argued and demonstrated a negative relationship between
size and perceived similarity among members of that group (e.g., Brewer, Weber, and
1995).
In related research (e.g., Brewer 1991), people have been found to be motivated for uniqueness
from other group members in the face of a large, heterogeneous in-group. This might partially ex-
plain the finding that the attributions made to participants' own belief position, for believers, were
always characterized by more rationality, less emotionality, and less externality than those made
to the in-group as a whole.4 For the numerical minority nonbelievers, by contrast, the in-group was
typically perceived and judged as equivalent to the self on the attribution measures. A possible fu-
ture experiment might manipulate perceptions of the relative size of the believing or nonbelieving
majority (e.g., a moderate majority vs. a very large majority; a very small minority vs. a moderate
minority) to examine whether such perceptions will moderate these attributional effects.
It may be the case that asking whether individuals believe in "God or Gods" primed them to
think about the diversity of beliefs within the general category of "belief." That is, someone who
is a monotheist may think about other monotheists as well as about polytheists when answering
the attribution questions for in-group members (viz., those that "believe"). This consideration
of in-group heterogeneity (Brewer 1991), in turn, may make it less likely that he or she will
make a general attribution on a particular dimension to the group of "believers" as a whole. By
contrast, those that do not believe are easier to think about as a group because the issue of one God
versus many Gods is relatively irrelevant to nonbelief. Perhaps a future examination of attributions
about theological beliefs will include belief specificity as a factor in the design, or experimentally
manipulate heterogeneity or homogeneity within in-groups and out-groups of a relatively more
specific (viz., Christian vs. Judaic monotheism, etc.) belief position.

Practical Implications

One implication of the current findings is that interactions with social others may be affected
adversely or beneficially by the perceptions people have of how other believers or nonbelievers
(i.e., in-group members) arrived at their belief position. The potentially adverse effect on interac-
tion may not occur in the majority of situations in which belief by similar others (family, friends,
congregation members, etc.) is assumed or even known, presumably because the issue of the
origin of belief doesn't arise in most conversations or interactions. It may occur, however, if an
individual discloses that his or her belief position is based on a less desirable (e.g., less rational, or
external) process. Social psychological research suggests that group members negatively evaluate
or even derogate other group members if these other members do not represent the core values
of the group or if they are atypical (see Bierat, Vescio, and Billings 1999; Wilder, Simon, and
Faith 1996). Thus, if the belief in God is supposed to, or is expected to, derive from a personal,
rational thought process (as most people report for their own position), then the violation of this
implicit norm may result in negative evaluations, derogation, or rejection. Conversely, however,
if an individual finds out that another person holds his or her belief for internal, rational, and less
emotional reasons, this may lead to more positive evaluations or an increased desire for affiliation.
The analysis of having the "correct" belief for the "wrong" reasons might also be conducted using,
not the belief in God, but, rather, specific membership in a denomination or congregation as the
topic of inquiry. That is, if membership in a religious group is expected to occur as a result of a
personal process and a deliberate choice to join that group, then negative evaluations or rejection
may ensue if that person discloses that the influence of external sources is a basis of the desire
for inclusion.

The question of religious tolerance and religion-based bias is timely in the aftermath of
September 11, and such events may prompt researchers to develop a model of religious tolerance
that incorporates the present findings along with accompanying social psychological theoretical

This content downloaded from 128.172.10.194 on Mon, 06 Mar 2017 20:20:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
EXPLAINING THE BELIEF IN GOD 145

concepts, such as group inclusiveness, specificity, and size. Specifically, would a theoreti
of tolerance propose that those with more attributional bias (with respect to the origin
own and others' beliefs) will exhibit more or less tolerance toward people with opposing
Are attributional biases related to strength of belief? Certainly, it is not unreasonable t
that the perceived basis for one's beliefs may have some causal influence on the percep
and behavior toward, similar or dissimilar others.
The present findings implicate that the perceptions believers have of other believe
respect to their own belief in God may not accurately predict their perceptions of i
assumed that they are typical believers. The findings also suggest that the perceptions w
our own belief or nonbelief in God may not be as unique as we like to think.

NOTES

1. Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr010329.asp, which no longer displays this content free o

2. The author acknowledges the correlational nature of the BeliefPosition factor in the model and cautions agai
it as a pure experimental variable.
3. Although the externality difference between self and in-group conditions for nonbelievers is not statistica
the difference is in the predicted direction. Moreover, the small sample of nonbelievers makes drawing c
about differences difficult.

4. In partial confirmation of this argument, other data collected at the same university (Kenworthy 2000) s
when majority and minority numerical status was explicitly manipulated, the mean attributions of exter
rationality made for the in-group attitude position by numerical minorities were reliably closer to the mean att
on these dimensions made for the self than were those made to the in-group by numerical majorities.

REFERENCES

Ajzen, I. 1996. The directive influence of attitudes on behavior. In The psychology of action: Linking cog
motivation to behavior, edited by P. M. Gollwitzer and J. A. Bargh, pp. 385-403. New York: Guilford Pr
Ajzen, I. and M. Fishbein. 1977. Attitude-behavior relations: A theoretical analysis and review of empiric
Psychological Bulletin 84:888-918.
Biemat, M., T. K. Vescio, and L. S. Billings. 1999. Black sheep and expectancy violation: Integrating two mode
judgment. European Journal of Social Psychology 29:523-42.
Blaine, B. and J. Crocker. 1995. Religiousness, race, and psychological well-being: Exploring social psyc
mediators. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 21:1031-41.
Brewer, M. B. 1979. In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive-motivational analysis. Ps
Bulletin 86:307-24.

.1991. The social self: On being the same and different at the same time. Personality and Social Psycho
Bulletin 17:475-82.

Brewer, M. B., J. G. Weber, and B. Carini. 1995. Person memory in intergroup contexts: Categorization versus indiv
ation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69:29-40.
Buss, A. R. 1978. Causes and reasons in attribution theory: A conceptual critique. Journal of Personality and
Psychology 36:1311-21.
Cadinu, M. R. and M. Rothbart. 1996. Self-anchoring and differentiation processes in the minimal group setting. Jo
of Personality and Social Psychology 70:661-77.
Chaiken, S., E. M. Pomerantz, and R. Giner-Sorolla. 1995. Structural consistency and attitude strength. In Attitude streng
Antecedents and consequences, edited by R. E. Petty and J. A. Krosnick, pp. 387-412. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Eagly, A. H. and S. Chaiken. 1998. Attitude structure and function. In The handbook of social psychology, edit
D. T. Gilbert and S. T. Fiske, 4th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 269-322. Boston, MA: Mcgraw-Hill.
Fabrigar L. R. and R. E. Petty. 1999. The role of the affective and cognitive bases of attitudes in susceptibilit
affectively and cognitively based persuasion. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 25:363-81.
Gilbert, D. T. and P. S. Malone. 1995. The correspondence bias. Psychological Bulletin 117:21-38.
Hewstone, M. 1990. The "ultimate attribution error"? A review of the literature on intergroup causal attribution. Eur
Journal of Social Psychology 20:311-35.
Jellison, J. M. and J. Greene. 1981. A self-presentation approach to the fundamental attribution error: The norm
interality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 40:643-49.
Jones, E. E. and K. E. Davis. 1965. From acts to dispositions: The attribution process in person perception. In Adva
in experimental social psychology, edited by L. Berkowitz, Vol. 2. San Deigo, CA: Academic Press.

This content downloaded from 128.172.10.194 on Mon, 06 Mar 2017 20:20:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
146 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

Jones, E. E. and V. A. Harris. 1967. The attribution of attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 3:
Kenworthy, J. B. 2000. Attributional biases about attitudes. Unpublished raw data.
Kenworthy, J. B. and N. Miller. 2001. Perceptual asymmetry in consensus estimates of majority and minority
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80:597-612.
.2002. Attributional biases about the origins of attitudes: Externality, emotionality, and rationality. Jo
Personality and Social Psychology 82:693-707.
Locke, D. and D. Pennington. 1982. Reasons and other causes: Their role in attribution processes. Journal of Pe
and Social Psychology 42:212-23.
Mackie, D. M., T. Devos, and E. R. Smith. 2000. Intergroup emotions: Explaining offensive action tendenci
intergroup context. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79:602-16.
Malle, B. F. 1999. How people explain behavior: A new theoretical framework. Personality and Social Psycholog
3:23-48.

Malle, B. F, J. Knobe, M. J. O'Laughlin, and G. E. Pearce. 2000. Conceptual structure and social functions of behavi
explanations: Beyond person-situation attributions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79:309-26.
Manstead, A. S. R. 1996. Attitudes and behaviour. In Applied social psychology, edited by G. R. Semin and K. Fiedle
pp. 3-29. London: Sage.
Pettigrew, T. F. 1979. The ultimate attribution error: Extending Allport's cognitive analysis of prejudice. Personality
Social Psychology Bulletin 5:461-76.
Simon, B., C. Hastedt, and B. Aufderheide. 1997. When self-categorization makes sense: The role of meaningful soc
categorization in minority and majority members' self-perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psycholo
73:310-20.

Snyder, M. and E. E. Jones. 1974. Attitude attribution when behavior is constrained. Journal of Experimental
Psychology 10:585-600.
Tajfel, H. and J. C. Turner. 1986. The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In Psychology of intergroup relation
edited by S. Worchel and W. G. Austin, pp. 7-24. Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.
Terry, D. J., M. A. Hogg, and K. M. White. 2000. Attitude-behavior relations: Social identity and group membersh
Attitudes, behavior, and social context. The role of norms and group membership, edited by D. J. Terry and M
Hogg, pp. 67-93. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Tesser, A. 1988. Toward a self-evaluation maintenance model of social behavior. In Advances in experimental
psychology, edited by L. Berkowitz, Vol. 21, pp. 181-227. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Trafimow, D. and P. Sheeran. 1998. Some tests of the distinction between cognitive and affective beliefs. Jour
Experimental Social Psychology 34:378-97.
Trope, Y. and E. T. Higgins. 1993. The what, when, and how of dispositional inference: New answers and new ques
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 19:493-500.
Wilder, D. A., A. F. Simon, and M. Faith. 1996. Enhancing the impact of counterstereotypic information: Disposit
attributions for deviance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71:276-87.
Yandrell, B. and C. A. Insko. 1977. Attribution of attitudes to speakers and listeners under assigned-behavior condit
Does behavior engulf the field? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 13:269-78.
Zanna, M. P. and J. K. Rempel. 1988. Attitudes: A new look at an old concept. In The social psychology of knowled
edited by A. W. Kruglanski and D. Bar-Tal, pp. 315-34. New York: Cambridge University Press.

This content downloaded from 128.172.10.194 on Mon, 06 Mar 2017 20:20:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms