Whitehead and the
Ontological Difference
lewis s. ford
Throughout its long history
metaphysics has been subject to many
criticisms. One of the profoundest has
been made in recent years by Martin
Heidegger. He argues that metaphysics
has concentrated on the Being of par-
ticular beings, thereby neglecting what
may be called primordial thinking, the
thinking of Being as such. By limiting
itself to a science of first principles
specifying the generic features of all
beings metaphysics has been unable to
discern the Being out of which these be-
ings arise.
For the purposes of this essay, I
readily grant the power of Heidegger's
ar gument and acknowledge the ontolog-
ical difference between beings and
Being upon which it is based. Here I
wish to consider whether this critique is
a pplicable to one particular example of
metaphysics, that of Alfred North
Whitehead. This issue has rarely been
discussed . Neither philosopher seems
to be acquainted with the thought of the
other, a nd their students have largely
avoided the problem. Recently , how-
ever, Raymond J . Devetterre has in-
vestigated it in some detail.* Since his
* I n Cross Currents, Vol ume 30, 1980, pp. 309-322 . " Whit eh ead's M etaphy s-
ics and H eidegger ' s Critique ."
Pill LOSO P/1 l . TODA l .
14M
conclusion opposes mine , I need to
examine his argument closely.
After a brief presentation of
Heidegger's critique of metaphysics
(also making the terminological point,
which I have adopted, of using being
for Seiende and Being for Sein), Devet-
terre remarks: "Accord ing to Heideg-
ger the thinking that came to be known
as metaphysics is defined by three es-
sential characteris tics .. . : 1) the dis-
tinction between essence and exis-
tence ; 2) the distinction between there-
ally real and the appa rently real - that
is, the differentiation of reality a nd ap-
pearance; and 3) the domination of
thought by a logic buill on the principle
of sufficient reason. " These three dis-
tinctions are fleshed out in terms of
Heidegger 's unders tanding of them.
Devetterrc then shows (lar gely suc-
cessfully) how Whitehead 's philosophy
exemplifies these features, though
perhaps not in the sa me way as tradi-
tional metaphysics / concluding that
while this philosophy may not be vul-
nerable to a ttack as many other posi-
tions, it is "still very much exposed to a
critique such as Heidegger's. "3
SU.\IMHU 1985
 Devetterre does a good job of show-
ing that Whitehead is a Western meta-
physician participating in the tradition
Heidegger has characterized. He does
not show that Whitehead obscures
Being or neglects primordial thinking
unless metaphysics eo i pso does so. To
make that argument, Devetterre would
have to show that these three charac-
teristics of metaphysical thinking nec-
essarily follow from its neglect of
Being. Even so, the argument m ight
just commit the fallacy of affir ming the
consequent as applied to Whitehead,
J since he could exemplify these three
principles for other r easons than ne-
.0
glecting Being. What is r ea lly needed is
the reverse argument: that these three
,r principles of metaphys ics exemplified
s by Whitehead necessarily lead to the
t, obscuring of Being. Such a demonstra-
g pression occupies less than two pages.5
tion is not undertaken.
t- As I conceive of Whitehead's
r_
)
thought relative to Heidegger's con-
n cerns, it is primarily a metaphysics ,
,-
. not of being, but of becoming. To be
;-
sure, eight different kinds of beings or
;-
entities are differentiated according to
!-
the categories of existence. 4 But the
!t
categories of explanation and the
1-
,f categoral obl igations m a inly set down
conditions a "concrescence" must
e
i-
exemplify in order to become fully and
,f determinately actual. A "concres-
[.
cence" is the "growing together" of the
many causal influences into one con-
- crete being. Concrescence is not the
'I
h
Being of beings, that is, the common
Being which the various entities have,
t
but the becoming out of which ac-
tualities arise. Whitehead tends to con-
trast being and becoming, such that
being excludes becoming, but if we
adopt Heidegger's practice of us ing
Being more inclusively, concrescence
is not the Being of beings (entities) but
the Being which is prior to beings, that
which is disclosed to us in the
emergence of actual beings. Here we
have penetrated behind the Being of be-
ings to probe that out of which they
ar is e. True to his phenomenological ap-
proach Heidegger conceives this in
terms of disclosure, while Whitehead
analyzes it in terms of self-creation.
So far we have been operating on a
metaphys ical level , at least as
Whitehead conceives it, s ince we have
been concerned with the bas ic genera l
principles conscr escence exemplifies ,
and have not yet moved to that which is
beyond , or before, s uch principles.
Cons idered in terms of Heidegger's
distinctions, Whitehead's philosophy is
primarily, even overwhelmingly, a
metaphys ics , yet it also contains a pre-
metaphys ical ontology. This ontology is
certainly minimal , centered in the Cat-
egory of the Ultimate, whose fullest ex-
On the other hand , this ontology is es-
sential, for the metaphysica l principles
exemplified by a ll beings cannot ex-
pla in the obvious continuation of the
creative advance. In like manner , on-
tology needs metaphysics for without
metaphysics ontology would not only be
vague but unable to relate to the spe-
cial sciences or dis ciplines. Meta-
physics is the means of that relation-
s hip.
The necessary relations hip between
ontology a nd metaphysics is evident
even in the description of Whitehead's
Category of the Ultimate , which
generalizes from the basic nature of
concrescence. E ach concrescence is a
many become one in a creative unifica-
ti on producing new being. Abs tracting
from the s pecific character of the m any
caus al infJuences from past actualities,
the discussion concentrates on the
rhythm between the many and the one.
In each act of becoming what was
many is now one, contributing its deter-
minate individuali ty to a newly emer-
WJ-1/TEHBA D
149
gent multiplicity formed out of itself
and all other beings just then existent,
calling for further unification. If "it lies
in the nature of things that the many
enter into complex unity, 116 then this
r hythm of the many and one is unend-
ing, a dynam ic matrix out of which all
actualities arise. This activity, whereby
the many become one, is termed
"creativity. 117 Creativity depends upon
past beings, for without a prior many
there would be nothing to unify , while
beings depend upon creativity since
they could not be except as the result of
their own becoming.
Because it lies beyond the cate-
gories of existence and explanation ,
creativity in itself cannot be particu-
larized except by those beings which
are the outcome of its rhythm. These
can be properly considered to be acci-
dents of creativity. The particular ways
they exemplify creativity are not deter-
mined by creativity, and cannot be de-
rived from its essential features. This
is true even for the most basic meta-
physical principles. Thus Whitehead
speaks of his ultimate as creativity
" and God is its primordial, non-tem-
poral accident. 118 God is not identified
with Being (creativity), even though
one meaning of his remark refers to the
metaphysical principles that are
grounded in God's primordial envisage-
ment. This is the nontemporal exempli-
fica tion of creative unification, where-
by God orders all pure possibilities,
thereby establishing the metaphysica l
boundary between possibility and im-
possibility. Thus even the nature of
metaphysical principles is accidental
relative to creativity, the s ubject-mat-
ter of ontology.
Devetterre concedes that it might
be possible to consider creativity "as
somewhat similar to Heidegger 's Being
and thus a n indication that Whitehead's
thought is already an overcoming of
PH ILOSOPHY TODAY
150
metaphysics by its insistence on an ulti-
mate that does not share the generic
traits of the metaphysical actual en-
tities. 119 As we have seen, creativity is
not an actuality. nor even an entity,
exemplifying one of the eight cate-
gories of existence. Though creativity
is manifes t only be means of its acci-
dents , its essential character is inde-
pendent of them , whether we think of
these accidents as particular beings or
as metaphysical principles. Neverthe-
less all actualities necessarily exempli-
fy creativity. It is not that creativity
somehow creates these particular acti-
vities, for that suggests that creativity
might be some sort of external agency.
Rather, each actuality creates itself,
and each such act of self-creation in-
stantiates creativity.
Having made that concession, how-
ever, Devetterre then makes an impor-
tant qualification : ''The crucial point,
however, is whether Whitehead's ulti-
mate can be thought as such and not
just in regard to its manifestations. ,
Heidegger readily grants metaphysics
thinks more than beings. It thinks the
ultimate, Being, but only as the Being
of beings and never as such. By claim-
ing creativity 'is only . .. capable of
characterization through its accidental
em bodiments' Whitehead remains
within classical metaphysics. To think
the ultimate, creativity. only as ac-
tualized in actual entities is, in Heideg-
ger's language, to think the ultimate,
Being, only as the Being of beings. This
is, in Heidegger's opinion, the fatal
flaw in ' metaphysics ' since it indicates
a forgetfulness of Being (creativity) as
such. 11 10
In this critique the very means
Whitehead uses to place creativity
beyond metaphysics is taken to bind
creativity to the metaphysical enter-
prise. To be sure, creati vity is only cap-
able of metaphysical characterization
through its accidents. Yet an ontologi-
cal characterization in terms of the
creative rhythm of one and many still
seems possible. Creativity is something
over and above particular beings and
cannot be reduced to them.
Devetterre places great emphasis
on this distinction between "being
thought as such" and "not just in re-
gard to its manifestations." Now
Whitehead 's ontology permits us to
"think" the ultimate as such in terms of
the r hythm of creativity, the theory of
becoming, and the analysis of the con-
ditions of self-creation. We know some-
thing of that which lies beyond the
realm of beings. Deveterre's insistence
upon severing the connection between
Being and beings, however, runs the
risk of emptying Being of all meaning.
He writes: "Heidegger wants ' to think
Being without regard to its being
grounded in terms of beings.' " 11 The
key to this text may lie in the qual ifica-
tion, "being grounded," but Devetterre
reads past this to suggest that Being
must be thought without any relation to
beings whatsoever. If so, how could it
possibly be thought? Or if thought, how
would it be Being? Whatever, on the
other hand, can be thought beyond be-
ings as still having some relation to be-
ings should at least have a family re-
semblance to creativity. It is not on this
issue that Whitehead and Heidegger
differ.
Thus fa r we have argued for the
possibility of a minim al fundamental
ontology based on creativity within
Whitehead's philosophy. Whether his
philosophy necessarily requires s uch an
ontology depends on whether creativity
can be dispensed with. Since some
highly reputed Whiteheadian interpret-
ers think that it ca n be, and seek to re-
duce all ontological claims to one which
can be made sim-ply within the bounds
of metaphysical principles, we must in-
vestigate whether such a metaphysical
reduction is either possible or desira-
ble.
William A. Christian, author of
perhaps the fo remost study of
Whitehead's thought, has proposed just
such a reduction based on his distinc-
tion between "pre-sys tematic" and
"systematic" language. He under-
stands "creativity" to be a pre-sys-
tematic term whose meanings can be
explained in other ways within the sys-
tem of categories. For creativity is
neither an entity s pecified by the
categories of existence nor can it be
fou nd a mong the categories of explana-
tion. One category of explanation, the
ontological principle, even seems to
exclude it. Christian observes that the
ontological " principle clearly rules out
creativity as a n ontological ground. It
calls for actual entities (to provide such
grounding ), and creativity is not an ac-
tual entity, nor indeed an entity of any
other systematic kind. "'2
Since the basic notions of the Cate-
gory of the Ultimate are thus regarded
as " pre-systematic" terms, Christian
embarks on a program of translation:
" ... for the purpose of systematic exp-
lanation these primitive notions are
superseded by the special categories.
For example the primitive notion 'one'
is superseded by the concept of the
unity of an actual entity ... Similarl y
the primitive notion ' many ' is superse-
ded, for the purpose of systematic ex-
planation, by the category of multip-
licities ... Again, the primitive notion
' creativity' is superseded by the ac-
count of how actual entities come into
ex istence by conscrescence . . .
". . . More generally, all that can
be said a bout creativity can be put into
systematic statements about the con-
screscences of actual entities.''' 3
Christian's reductive program has
been decisively challenged, in my judg-
WHITE/IliAD
151
 ment, by Willia m J . Garland in his
essay on "The Ultimacy of Creativ-
ity. " 14 This essay is all the more in-
teresting for our present purposes,
since it was not written with an eye to-
ward the Heideggerian problematic.
Garland s hows that the ongoingness of
the temporal world and the connected-
ness of the universe, two cardinal
Whiteheadian tenets, cannot be
adequately justified by recourse to indj-
vidua l actualities, but require an ap-
peal to an activity not itself one of these
actualities.
The fundamental issue at stake be-
tween Chris tian and Ga rland is the
scope of the ontological principle, the
analogue, as Devetterre acutely ob-
serves, to the principle of sufficient
reason.15 Whitehead writes: "This on-
tological principle means that actua l
entities are the only reasons; so that to
search for a reason is to search for one
or more actual entities. " 16 It follows
that creativity, since it is not even an
entity, let a lone an actual entity , cannot
be the reason for anything. In order to
preserve full rationality grounded in
the ontological principle, Christian thus
proposes to translate any statement
about creativity into statements about
actual entities, so that reasons can be
g iven for s uch claims.
Since creativity cannot give
reasons, it falls outside the scope of
what Garland calls "ordinary explana-
tion." NP.vP.rtheless it may be able to
explain why the ontological principle
has the central role in metaphysics that
it has. (Hence , according to Garland's
classification, creativity provides the
"ultimate explanation. ") Actual en-
tities are finally the only reasons be-
cause everything whatsoever is consti-
tuted by them, and they in turn are con-
stituted out of past actual entities as
these are appropriated by present ac-
tual entity in its process of self-con-
PHILOSOPHY TODAY
152
stitution. Thus everything that comes
about owes its existence and character
either to past ingredients or to its pre-
sent appropriation. These are the fun-
damental elements of the Category of
the Ultimate. The past forms the
"many " to be unified, while their ap-
propriation is the present exemplifica-
tion of creative unification. Moreover
each past actua lity was in its ow~
emergence the e mbodiment of creativ-
ity. Actual entities are the only reasons
because they alone are the exemplifica-
tions of creativity.
Heidegger has protested against J
"the domination of thought by a logic
built on the principle of sufficient
reason ," Devetterre tells us. 17 The ques-
tion here is surely not the principle it-
self, which is quite sound and has its
useful purposes. The question to be con-
sidered is its scope. Is the principle of
sufficient reason completely all-perva-
sive? If so, the principle must be
grounded in itself or be ungrounded , as
there would be nothing more ultimate.
It must determine the metaphysics of
beings, fo r as Whitehead's analysis
shows, this principle as expressed by
the ontological pri nciple vests all
reasons in actua l entities, beyond
which there is no appeal. But if the on-
tological principle itself requires expla-
nation by somethi ng more ultimate,
which cannot be construed as a being,
its purely metaphysical character has
been transcended.
Within the class of "ordinary expla-
nations," which in contrast to "ultimate
explanation" do exemplify the ontologi-
cal principle, Garland distinguishes two
types: the "specific explanations"
based on finite actual occasions, and
"generic explanations" based on divine
decisions. Here he is explicating such
texts as "the reasons for things are al-
ways to be found in the composite na-
ture of definite actual entities - in the
 nature of God for reasons of the highest
absoluteness, and in the nature of defi-
nite temporal actual entities for
reasons which refer to a pa rticular en-
vironment.''18 For the way in which God
contemplates and orders the pos-
sibilities "cons titutes the metaphysical
stability whereby the actua l process
exemplifies general principles of
metaphysics. " 19 Unlike the role of
creativity, the role of God is not con-
ceived by Whitehead as transcending
metaphysics, since God esta blishes the
specificity and s tability of metaphysics.
Is this an instance of the onto-theo-logy
which Heidegger rejects?
Devetterre concludes : " In a very
real sense, then, Whitehead 's meta-
physics, as mos t of the tradition before
him, is an onto-theo-logy, a metaphy-
sics of beings (actual entities) such
that their generic traits and ultimate
unity are accounted for in terms of the
highest actual entity, God. " 20 If so, this
is an onto-theo-logy which does not pre-
clude the understanding of Being as
such. E ven God 's exemplification of the
ontological principle is ultimately ex-
plained by an instantiation of creativ-
ity.
From his purely ontolog ical stance
Heidegger can be sharply critical of the
way God has been used unworthily by
modern metaphysicians. Modern phi-
l losophers have misused the concept of
God by selecting only those traits of the
tradition which arc of importance to
them in fashioning their own meta-
physics, often the tra its of a n omnipo-
tent creator. Without that notion, for
example, Leibniz could not reconcile
his vision of a bsolute privacy with ap-
parent interaction , since the pre-estab-
lished harmony which it needs could
only come into being through the unilat-
eral, creative activity of s uch a God .
Because these philosophical concepts
were not fashioned with other religious
concerns in mind , their long-term ef-
fect has often been to stifle religious
sensitivity.
Whitehead is a lso critical of many
traditional concepts of God, philosophi-
cal or otherwise, but he has not a ban-
doned the metaphysical task. He also
accepts the task of forming a n ade-
quate understanding of God. For a long
time, however, up to 1925, he felt he
could not accept this task, for a ll im-
ages of God seemed to be inextricably
bound up with the idea of a transcen-
dent creator. That notion, for him , in-
evitably abridged freedom. The con-
cept "God" was only introduced into
Whitehead 's philosophy when that con-
cept could be so revised as to protect
basic religious insights about freedom ,
tenderness, suffering, and the power of
persuasion.
While the concept of "God " must
allow for appropriate religious insights ,
Whitehead does not insist that ev ery
role God exercises must be religious .
"The secularization of the concept of
God 's functions in the world is a t leas t
as urgent a requisite of thought as is
the secularization of other elements in
experience. The concept of God is cer-
tainly one essentia l element in religious
feeling. But the converse is not true ;
the concept of religious feeling is not an
essential ele ment in the concept of
God 's fun ctions in the universe. "11Thus
God can have such non-religious fu nc-
tions as s pecifying the universe's meta-
physical s tability.
God is not in a ny simple sense the
causal ground of the world in
Whitehead 's philosophy. Devetterre re-
marks that "despite the role he gave to
creativity as the ultimate, (Whitehead )
ass igned God a definite role in the actu-
ality of the actual entity. " 22 He quotes
fro m Whitehead : "The universe ex-
hibits a creati vity with infinite free-
dom , and a realm of forms with infinite
W/1/TEIIEA IJ
153
 possibilities; but ... this creativity and with becoming, with how beings come
these forms are together impotent to to be, both center on ~reation . Both re-
achieve actuality apart from the com- pudiate any transcendent creator. J
pleted ideal harmony, which is God. " 23 Whitehead remained an atheist until he
Devetterre is intent upon showing that was able to give meaning to the concept
creativity for Whitehead is not the sole of "God" which did not entail that God
ground for actual entities. But then alone created the world. Rather each
neither is God. The efficient power actuality creates itself out of the past
whereby there is any activity produc- by means of the directing a im provided
ing being lies in the process of self-cre- by God. Heidegger avoids all use of the
ation, which instantiates creativity. But language of creation for fear that it
there can be no such self-production un- would introduce a false relationship be-
less there is something out of which the tween Being and beings, s uch as con-
actuality is made, and this is the past ceiving of Being as the cause or the )
actualities it prehends. This self-pro- ground or the source of beings. God is
duction also r equires an aim, a possibil- not repudiated , but avoided , by not giv-
ity it can realize, ultimately provided ing God a philosophical niche, either as
by God. Creation is not conceived here identical with Being or as a particular
as a unilateral act, but as requiring being.
creativity, God , the past and relevant Heidegger's approach is one way of
possibility. Such a vision transforms resolving the conflict between phi-
the traditional concept of God as losophy and theology , but it truncates
creator, a concept which has had such the philosophical quest for a ll-inclusive-
pernicious metaphysical consequences. ness. Perhaps Whitehead 's insistence
Many philosophers practicing onto- that God is a being needs to be mod-
theo-logy have accorded God a ified, and our understanding of creativ-
privileged timeless standpoint from ity differentiated. Whitehead 's under-
which to survey the whole of reality. If ' standing of creativity is both immanent
Being is fundamentally temporal, there and pluralistic, since il names the in-
can be no such stance. In past thought stances of self-creation by every actu-
the eternity of God has functioned as a ality. Heidegger's understanding of
way of ultimately pre-empting tempor- Being is likewise immanent (denying
ality from being fundamental to our any transcendent creator ), but it is
world. Time is taken to be fundamen- primarily monistic. Perhaps we need to
tally illusory since it can only be illus- differentiate between two modes of
ory to an eternal God. Whitehead 's creativity, one immanent and pluralis-
God, with its consequent nature, is tic, the other transcendent and monis-
surely not such a God. Rather, it might tic. This other mode cuulu I.H:! Gull con-
just be the God which could appear on ceived as an everlasting concrescence,
the temporal horizon of finitude. as a s heer becoming which does not ter-
It may turn out that Whitehead and minate in any being whatever. The two
Heidegger have embarked on very modes of creativity could be correlated
s imilar quests: how to discern the na- by conceiving of the divine as crea-
ture of a creation which has no trans- tively active in the future, from which
cendent creator. Heidegger 's unwilling- the ordinary pluralistic creativity of
ness to rest content with beings, seek- the present is derived. 24
ing to inquire into that from which be- In any case there are vast differ-
ings arise, and Whitehead's concern ences between Whitehead and Heideg-

P HILOSOPH Y TO D AY

154
 ger. Probably the most basic one lies in
e f{eidegger's phenomenological ap-
proach, but even here the difference
maY be exaggerated. The phenom-
e enological approach grows out of Ger-
.t man idealism's having taken the trans-
j cendental turn , while Whitehead is re-
h puted to have returned to pre-critical
t modes of thinking .:zs If the transcenden-
i tal turn is an intensification of the role
of subjectivity, such that there cannot
t be any objectivity without subjectivity,
then Whitehead has taken that turn.
.- The reformed subjectivist doctr ine
Whitehead endorses insists that there
s can be no fundamental meaning to "to-
getherness" except "togetherness in ex-
s
r ENDNOTES
f 1. "Whitehead's Me taphysics and Heidegger's
Critique, " Cross Currents 30 (1980), p. 31 I.
2. For exC!lTlple. Deveuerre places Whitehead's ac-
count of the contrast between appea rance and re
ality (pp. 317 ff.) in a more traditional K:1ntian
context, thereby divergi ng considerably from
Whitehead's own discussion o f " Appearance at~d
Reality" in chapte r 14 of Adventures of /de.1s
(New York: Macmillan 1933).
3. Ibid., p. 320.
t 4. Process and Reality (New York: l\lacmiUan
1929), pp. 32 ff. llereafter cited as PR.
5. PR. 31 ff.
( 6. PR. 31.
7. White head may well have coined this tem1
"creativity." It is not known to have any in-
stances before Whitehead's Religion in the Mak-
)
ing (New York: Macmillan 1927). See Paul Oskar
f l<risteller, " c r eativity' and Tradition."' 77Je
Journal of the History of Ideas 44 (1983). 105.
!l. PR, ll.
9. De ve tterre, p. 321. n. 15.
10. Ibid. , quoting Whi tehead, PR. 10.
11. Ibid., quoting Heidegger. On Tinw and Being.
pp. 2, 33 .
r 12. "Whitehead's Expl<tnation of the Past. " p. 98 in
Alfred Nortll Whitehead: Essays on /lis
Philosophy, edited by George L. Kline (En-
glewood Cliffs, N.j .: Pre ntice -Hall, Inc. 1963).
13. "The Concept of God as a Derivative Notion . ..
pp. 183 ff. in Process and Divinity: Philosophical
Essays Presented to Charles Hartshorne edited
Baylor University, Waco, Texas 76798
perience. " All objective unity thus de-
26
r ives from subjective experience. The
necessity of Husserl 's transcendental
subjectivity is thus accepted as epis-
temologically convincing, a lthough on-
tologically problematic. Whitehead 's
pansubjectivity may be c on ~eived as a
plura listic substitute for the monis m of
transcendental idealism which Heideg-
ger seeks to avoid in another way.
Des pite the differe nces , great as
they may be with res pect to teachings
about creativity, Whitehead and
Heidegger are to be found on the same
s ide of the ontological d ivide . Creativ-
ity may not be Being, but it is more like
Being than like beings.
by Willi<tm l.. Reese and Eugene Freeman
(L,'lsalle. Illinois: Open Court 1964).
14. Pages l l l-3H m l:.."xplorations in Whitehead's
1-'hilosophy, e di ted by Lewis S. Ford and George
1.. l<li ne (New York: Fordham Universi ty Press
1983).
I !)_ Devetterre, pp. 31 4 . 318 rf. This marks one of
the ways Whitehead is a tr<tditional metaphysician
according to Heidegger's classification.
16. PR. 37 (italics his).
17. !Jevctterre. p. 311.
18. PR. 28.
19. PH. 6-1 .
20. De vetterre. p. 3 18.
21. PR. 3 15 ff.
2l. De ve llerrc. p. 319.
23. f(e/igion in the Making. pp. 119 ff.
21. I have sought to articulate this modjfication or
Whitehead's view in "The Divine Activity of the
Future ... Process S11Jd1es ll/3 (Fall. 198ll. 169
79. and in a companion essay, "Creativity in a
Future Key," to be publis hed in an ant hology
edited by Robe rt C. Ncville on recent Ame rican
mel<tphysics. (State University of N.Y. Press. AI
bany).
l5. Sec PR. vi: "in the main the philosoph y of or
ganistn is a reCUtTence to prel<antian modes or
thought. " He re Whitehead may have conceiVed
his ctit icisms of K;mt too s weepingly, for he
primarily rejec ts it on the Humean basis upon
which Kant buil ds his philosophy.
26. PR. 288.
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