Inventory of Cases for Legal Ethics

Case Facts
Cayetano vs. provides for the modern definition of practice On April 25, 1991, Atty. Christian Monsod was
Monsod of law appointed by then Pres. Aquino as Chairman
of Comelec.
Practice of law any activity, in our out of Rene Cayetano opposed such according to
court, which requires the application of law, him, Monsod allegedly does not possess the
legal procedure, knowledge, training and required qualification of having been engaged
experience. To engage in the practice of law in the practice of law for at least 10 years
is to perform those acts which are which is required by Article IX-C Sec. 1(1) of
characteristics of the profession. the Philippine Constitution
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Padilla, Commission on Elections chairman shall be
the following criteria were enumerated: members of the Philippine Bar who have
1. Habituality been engaged in the practice of law for at
Practice is more than isolated least 10 years.
appearance, for it consists in frequent
or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind; a frequent
habitual exercise.
2. Compensation
Practice of law implies that one must
have presented himself in the active
practice and that his professional
services are available to the public for
compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his
services.
3. Application of law
Application of legal principle, practice,
or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is
within the term practice of law.
4. Attorney-client relationship
When a lawyer undertakes an activity
which requires the knowledge of law
but involves no attorney-client
relationship, such as teaching law or
writing law books or articles, he
cannot be said to be engaged in
practice of his profession as a lawyer
NOT considered as Practice of Law:
Gratuitous furnishing of legal aid to the poor
and unfortunates who are in pursuit of any
civil remedy
Mere records of realty to ascertain what they
may disclose without giving any opinion or
advice as to legal effects of what they may
be found
Ordinary preparation and drafting of legal
instruments which does not involve the
determination by a trained legal mind of the
effects and conditions
If works involve clerical labor of filling in the
blanks or a mere mechanical act of copying
from a file copy or finished document which
involved no legal thing.

Ulep vs. The Legal The practice of law covers a wide range of Ulep prays the Supreme Court to order the
Clinic activities in and out of court; Activities of Legal Clinic to cease, issuing advertisement
RESPO constitute practice of law Legal Clinic admits the facts of publication of
Law practice is not limited to merely giving said advertisement that claims that it is not
 Inventory of Cases for Legal Ethics
legal advice, contract drafting and so forth. engage in the practice of law but in the
What is important is that it is engaged in the rendering of legal support services through
practice of law by virtue of the nature of the paralegals with the use of modern computers
services it renders and electronic machine.
In the absence of constitutional or statutory
authority, a person who has not been
admitted as an attorney cannot practice law
for the proper administration of justice
The best advertising possible for a lawyer is
a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be
earned as the outcome of character and
conduct
Not all types of advertising are prohibited,
EXCEPT:
o Publication in reputable law lists of
brief biographical and informative data
o A lawyer may not properly publish in
daily paper or magazines, or in a law
list which will likely deceive or injure
the public, or the Bar.
o The use of an ordinary simple
professional card is permitted
o He may likewise have his name listed
in a telephone directory but not under
a designation of special branch of law

Maniago vs. De It must be remembered that the practice of law is Facts:

Dios A.C. 7472 not a right but a mere privilege and, as such, must The instant case arose from an Affidavit-
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Complaint dated April 2, 2007 filed by
Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public Ligaya Maniago, seeking the disbarment
responsibilities.3 Whenever it is made to appear that of Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios for engaging in
an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and the practice of law despite having been
confidence of his clients and of the public, it becomes suspended by the Court.
not only the right but also the duty of the Supreme Complainant alleged that she filed a
Court, which made him one of its officers and gave criminal case against Hiroshi Miyata, a
him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to Japanese national, before the Regional
withdraw that privilege.4 However, as much as the Trial Court (RTC), Olongapo City, Branch
Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer, it 73, for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 603, docketed as Criminal Case No.
should, at the same time, also ensure that a lawyer
699-2002;
may not be deprived of the freedom and right to
Complainant then learned from the RTC
exercise his profession unreasonably.
staff that Atty. De Dios had an
outstanding suspension order from the
Supreme Court since 2001, and was,
Guidelines for lifting a suspension of a lawyer from the therefore, prohibited from appearing in
practice of law: court.
After a finding that respondent lawyer must be In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted
suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall that there were cases filed against her
render a decision imposing the penalty; client, Miyata. She, however, denied that
she was under suspension when she
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the appeared as his counsel in the cases;
decision is immediately executory upon receipt Respondent explained that an
thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a administrative case was indeed filed
motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said against her by Diana de Guzman,
motion shall render the decision final and executory; docketed as A.C. No. 4943, where she
3) Upon the expiration of the period of was meted the penalty of 6-month
suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement suspension. She served the
with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, suspension immediately upon receipt
stating therein that he or she has desisted from the of the Courts Resolution on May 16,
2001 up to November 16, 2001. In a
 Inventory of Cases for Legal Ethics
practice of law and has not appeared in any court
during the period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be
furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has
pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where
he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as
proof of respondents compliance with the order of
suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the
statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a
ground for the imposition of a more severe
punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
Held:
However, on November 18, 2008 the OBC submitted
its memorandum for the Courts consideration stating
Manifestation filed on October 19,
2001, respondent formally informed
the Court that she was resuming her
practice of law on November 17, 2001,
which she actually did.
A problem arose when Judge Josefina
Farrales, in her capacity as Acting
Executive Judge of the RTC, Olongapo
City, erroneously issued a directive on
March 15, 2007, ordering respondent to
desist from practicing law and revoking
her notarial commission for the years
2007 and 2008.
Knowing that the directive was rather
questionable, respondent, nonetheless,
desisted from law practice in due
deference to the court order.
Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for
Clarification with the Supreme Court on
account of Judge Farrales letters to all
courts in Olongapo City and to some
municipalities in Zambales, which gave
the impression that Atty. De Dios is not
yet allowed to resume her practice of law
and that her notarial commission for the
years 2007 and 2008 is revoked. Acting
on the said motion, on April 23, 2007 the
Court issued a resolution stating that the
Respondent has deemed to have served
the six months of suspension;
Respondent averred that for the period
stated in the affidavit of complainant
Maniago, during which she allegedly
practiced law, she was neither suspended
nor in any way prohibited from practice.
The complaint, she added, was baseless
and malicious, and should be dismissed
outright.
In the Resolution dated September 12,
2007, the Court referred the matter to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
Initially, the OBC directed the complainant
to file a supplemental affidavit, stating
therein the exact period of appearances
of Atty. De Dios and the particular courts
where respondent appeared as counsel;
A Supplemental Comment was thereafter
filed by respondent, stating that there
were no new matters raised in the
Supplemental Affidavit, and asserting that
the opinion of Bar Confidant, Atty. Ma.
Cristina B. Layusa, as contained in her
letter dated 12 February 2007, cannot
supersede the Resolution dated April 23,
2007 of this Honorable Court.;
 Inventory of Cases for Legal Ethics
Letter of Atty. Membership in the IBP is not based on the actual
Cecilio practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included
in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be
a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a
member is the payment of annual dues as determined
by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by
the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and
10, Rule 139A of the Rules of Court.
the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance
with the lawyers public responsibilities.
that the letter adverted to by complainant in her
affidavit was the OBCs reply to an inquiry made by the
Office of the Court Administrator regarding the status
of Atty. De Dios, the OBC made it clear that the lifting
of the suspension was NOT automatic, following its
basis its pronouncement in the preceding case of J.K.
Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. and
Spouses Jesus and Rosario K. Mercado,
complainants v. Atty. Eduardo de Vera and Jose
Rongkales Bandalan, et al. and Atty. Eduardo C. de
Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G. Encanto, et al., which states:
The Statement of the Court that his suspension
stands until he would have satisfactorily shown his
compliance with the Courts resolution is a caveat that
his suspension could thereby extend for more than six
months. The lifting of a lawyers suspension is not
automatic upon the end of the period stated in the
Courts decision, and an order from the Court lifting
the suspension at the end of the period is necessary in
order to enable [him] to resume the practice of his
profession.2
submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and from the Executive Judge that he
has indeed desisted from the practice of law during the
period of suspension
. Thereafter, the Court, after evaluation, and upon
a favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue
a resolution lifting the order of suspension and thus
allow him to resume the practice of law.
Facts:
In his letter, dated 22 September 2004,
petitioner sought exemption from payment of
IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as
alleged unpaid accountability for the years
1977-2005.
He alleged that after being admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the
Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until
1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the
USA in December 1986 until his retirement in
the year 2003.
He maintained that he cannot be assessed
IBP dues for the years that he was working in
the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil
Service law prohibits the practice of ones
profession while in government service, and
neither can he be assessed for the years
when he was working in the USA.
Held:
The supreme court held that the payment of dues is a
necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of
which no one is exempt. This means that the
compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as
 Inventory of Cases for Legal Ethics
long as ones membership in the IBP remains
regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of
practice, the member is engaged in.

There is nothing in the law or rules which allows

exemption from payment of membership dues. At
most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have
informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his
intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case,
his membership in the IBP could have been terminated
and his obligation to pay dues could have been
discontinued.

Phil Lawyers It is reasonable to hold that a member of the
Assn. vs. Agrava bar, because of his legal knowledge and
training, and good standing, should be
allowed to practice before the Patent Office,
without further examination or other
qualification, for the reason that much of the
business in Patent Office involves the
interpretation and determination of the scope
and application of the Patent Law and other
laws applicable.
Lawyers are licensed to practice law in all
offices of government without taking a
qualifying exam
In 1957, Director Agrava of the Philippine
Patent Office issued a circular announcing
that he had scheduled an examination for the
purpose of determining who are qualified to
practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office.
The Philippine Lawyers Association (PLA)
opposed the circular and claims that one who
has passed the bar examinations, licensed by
the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines and who is in good standing, is
duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office.

Agrava maintains that the prosecution of

patent cases does not involve entirely or
purely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technical
knowledge and training, so much so that, as
a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of
patent cases may be handled not only by
lawyers.

Pineda vs. De Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional
Jesus Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid
controversies with clients concerning their
compensation and to resort to judicial action
only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
Suits tocollect fees should be avoided and
should be filed only when circumstances
force lawyers to resort to it.
A lawyer may enforce his rights to his fees by
filing the necessary petition as an incident of
the main action in which his services were
rendered or in an independent suit against
his client.
Principle of quantum meruit which means "as much as
the lawyer deserves."
- The recovery of attorneys fees on this basis
is permitted, where there is no express
agreement for the payment of attorneys
fees.
Attys de jesus, ambrosia, mariano
represented the petitioner for an action of
nullity of marriage.
Throughout the proceedings, respondents
counsels were well- compensated.
The lawyers billed the petitioner and
additional legal fees amounting 16 million
Petitioner refused to pay although issued
them several checks totaling 1.12 million as
full payment for settlement.
Respondent filed a motion for payment of
lawyers fee for 50 million
RTC ordered the petitioner to pay 5 million
The CA modified such decision to the
reduction of the amount total of 2 million.
The respondent sought to collect the 10% of
the value of the properties awarded to the
petitioner.
The respondents were demanding for
additional payment for legal services
rendered.
 Inventory of Cases for Legal Ethics
- a legal mechanism which prevents an
unscrupulous client from running away with
the fruits of the legal services of counsel
without paying for it.
The practice of law is a decent profession and not a
Moneymaking trade. Compensation should be but a
mere incident.
Lawyers are officers of the court and they participate
in the fundamental function of administering justice.
When they took their oath, they submitted themselves
to the authority of the court and subjected their
professional fees to judicial control.
Bach vs. Ongkiko Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Kalaw Responsibility enumerates the following factors which
should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:
1. (a)the time spent and extent of services
rendered or required;
2. (b)the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved;
3. (c)the importance of the subject matter;
4. (d)the skill demanded;
5. (e)the probability of losing other employment
as a result of the acceptance of the
proffered case;
6. (f)the customary charges for similar services
and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter
to which he belongs;
7. (g)the amount involved in the controversy
and the benefits resulting to the client from
the service;
8. (h)the contingency or certainty
compensation;
9. (i)the character of the employment, whether
occasional or established; and
10. (j)the professional standing of the lawyer.
We have held that lawyering is not a
The sc found that respondents motion for
payment of their lawyers fees was not meant
to collect what was justly due them, they had
already been adequately paid.
An act of unconscionable greed
The claim for additional legal fees was not
justified. They could not charge the petitioner
fees based on percentage, absent an express
agreement to that effect.
The payments to them in cash, checks, free
products and services from petitioners
business all of which were not denied by
respondents more than sufficed for the
work they did. The "full payment for
settlement" should have discharged
petitioners obligation to them.
The SC partially affirmed the decision of the
CA with the modification of deleting the
additional attorneys fees
Facts:
On 7 November 1994, petitioner Guenter
Bach engaged the services of respondent law
firm Ongkiko Kalaw Manhit & Accorda Law
Offices to represent him in a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City;
The parties agreed on the compensation for
the legal services to be rendered by the
respondent. Accordingly, the parties signed a
Fee Agreement with regards to this;
However, on 5 December 1995, respondent
withdrew its appearance as counsel of
petitioner, due to policy differences. On 18
December 1995, respondent sent the
termination billing3 for the services they
rendered and billed petitioner the total
amount of P1,000,000.00 plus 2% interest for
every month of delay in payment, based on
the provision for termination of services
stated in their Fee Agreement;
On 7 March 1996, respondent filed with the
RTC a Notice5 of Charging Lien over the
properties of the spouses Bach. On February
5, 1997, the RTC issued the order directing
the annotation of the charging lien of
P1,000,000 in all the properties of spouses
Bach;
of Despite respondents demands for his legal
fees, petitioner failed and refused to pay.
Thus, respondent filed a Complaint8 for a sum
of money also before the RTC of Makati,
Branch 148, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-
514.
Respondent prayed for the payment of the
following:
a. P1,000,000.00 as the latters lawful fees
for services rendered in Civil Case No.
95-224,
 Inventory of Cases for Legal Ethics
moneymaking venture and lawyers are not
merchants.43 Law advocacy, it has been
stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The
returns it births are simple rewards for a job
done or service rendered. It is a calling that,
unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a
greater deal of freedom from governmental
interference, is impressed with a public
interest, for which it is subject to State
regulation.
A lawyer is not merely the defender of his
clients cause and a trustee of his clients
cause of action and assets; he is also, and
first and foremost, an officer of the court and
participates in the fundamental function of
administering justice in society.45 It follows
that a lawyers compensation for professional
services rendered are subject to the
supervision of the court, not just to guarantee
that the fees he charges and receives remain
reasonable and commensurate with the
services rendered, but also to maintain the
dignity and integrity of the legal profession to
which he belongs. Upon taking his attorneys
oath as an officer of the court, a lawyer
submits himself to the authority of the courts
to regulate his right to charge professional
fees.
b. plus 2% interest from date of final
demand until paid;
c. P250,000.00 as exemplary damages;
d. P200,000.00 representing billable time
spent in prosecuting the case,
e. plus, another P150,000.00 for any
appeal taken; and
f. P50,000.00 as litigation expenses and
the cost of suit.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that respondents claim has already
been paid. This occurred prior to
respondents withdrawal as counsel of the
Petitioner in the civil case. Accordingly, the
Petitioner paid the respondent the fees worth
P200,000;
On 9 August 1999, the Motion to Dismiss was
denied10 by the RTC for lack of merit. On
January 24, 2002, the RTC rendered its
judgment in favor of the respondent;
The judgment of the RTC ordered the
Petitioner to pay the following:
a. P750,000 as respondents lawful fees for
services rendered, plus interest at 2%;
b. P700,000 billable time;
c. P50,0000 as litigation expense;
d. Cost of suit;
The Petitioner appealed to the CA and
consequently the latter modified the decision
of the RTC by deleting the P700,000 billable
time;

Held:
The case is now raised in the SC to determine whether
the P750,000 plus interest clause is under the
quantum meruit and the P50,000 clauses for litigation
expenses and cost of suit has legal basis.

Legal fees

Petitioner contends that the P750,000 by way of

quantum meruit and corresponding interest is
excessive. Thus, the former wants to reduce the same.

GR: The Supreme Court is NOT the trier of facts. It

leaves such to the lower courts. Therefore, the SC
relies on the regularity of the decision of the CA when
it comes to the facts of the case;
XPN: However, there are exceptions wherein the SC is
placed in a situation to try the facts of the case. Two
evident reasons applicable to the case are the
following: when the judgment is based on the
misapprehension of facts and when the CA manifestly
overlooks certain relevant facts NOT disputed by the
parties;

The SC relies on Rule 20.1 Canon 20 of the Code of

Professional responsibility to determine the reasonable
fee based on quantum meruit for the respondent;
 Inventory of Cases for Legal Ethics
IN RE CUNANAN RA 972 is unconstitutional.
Portions stricken out were due to the
following reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the candidates
for admission who flunked the bar from
1946 to 1952 had inadequate
preparation due to the fact that this was
very close to the end of World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking
the resolution of the court on the
petitions of the said candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the
Courts primary prerogative to determine
who may be admitted to practice of law
and, therefore, in excess of legislative
power to repeal, alter and supplement
It is undisputed that respondent firm had rendered
services as counsel for the petitioners in Civil Case
No. 95-244.
In sum, the services rendered by the respondent as
enumerated above and as admitted39 by Atty. Mario
Ongkiko during the ex parte hearing, consist of
annotating notice of lis pendens on the conjugal
properties of petitioner and his wife; filing the Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; preparing and
filing various pleadings and documents relevant to the
case; obtaining a freeze order of petitioners funds in
the UCPB; attending hearings in Civil Case No. 05-
224, and sending notices to petitioner updating the
latter of the status of the case.
Nothing in Civil Case No. 95-224 so far appears
complicated and no extraordinary skill was needed
for lawyers of respondent Law Firm to accomplish
what they had done in the case before they
withdrew their appearance.
These are simply the normal duties of a lawyer that he
is bound by law to render to his clients with utmost
fidelity for which his client must not be burdened to pay
an extra price.
It bears stressing that at the time respondent firm
withdrew their appearance due to policy differences
with petitioner, the case was still in its initial stage.
Guided by the above yardstick and so much of the
pertinent data as are extant in the records of this case
and in the exercise of our sound discretion, we hold
that the amount of P500,000.00 is a reasonable and
fair compensation for the legal services rendered by
respondent to the petitioner.
The imposition of legal interest on the amount
payable to private respondent as attorneys fees is
unwarranted.
This is the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 case.
As per the Rules of Court. A bar candidate
must have a general average of 75% in all
subjects without failing below 50% in any
subject.
In spite of this, the court passed and admitted to the
bar those candidates who had obtained an average of
only:
72% in 1946
69% in 1947
70% in 1948
74% in 1949
In 1950 to 53, the 74% was raised to 75%
A few candidates who missed the above
 Inventory of Cases for Legal Ethics
the Rules of Court. The rules laid down
by Congress under this power are only
minimum norms, not designed to
substitute the judgment of the court on
who can practice law; and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary
and amounts to class legislation.
IN RE EDILLON Section 10 of the Court Rule
SEC. 10. Effect of nonpayment
of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of
this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for
six months shall warrant suspension of membership
in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the
name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in
the following words of the Court Rule: SEC. 9.
Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated
Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of
Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court.
The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his
annual dues and it is not in violation of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration
does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not the meeting of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which
he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court in order to further the States
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost
of the regulatory program the lawyers.
marks set by the courts approached
Congress.
Congress made a bill, which was allowed by
the president to become a law without his
signature. This is RA 972.
FACTS:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly
licensed practicing Attorney in the
Philippines.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended
to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues
assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court
139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section
24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining
to the organization of IBP, payment of
membership fee and suspension for failure to
pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled
as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of
the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to
which he is admitted personally antagonistic,
he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and properly guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes the above provisions of the Court
Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of
no legal force and effect.
HELD:
The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which
every lawyer must be a member of as distinguished
from bar associations in which membership is merely
optional and voluntary.
All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar including
payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the
requirements.
The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual
dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional
freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel
the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order
 Inventory of Cases for Legal Ethics
to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional legal services, may require that
the cost of the regulatory program the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the

police power of the State. The right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary.

Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of

admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement
of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent
judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court
may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay
their annual dues.
IN RE SYCIP The Civil Code provides that names in a firm Two separate Petitions were filed before this
name of a partnership must either be those Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty.
of living partners and, in the case of non- Alexander Sycip, and 2) by the surviving
partners, should be living persons who can partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, praying
be subjected to liability. that they be allowed to continue using, in the
o Neither the widow nor the heirs can be held names of their firms, the names of partners
liable for transactions entered into after the who had passed away.
death of their lawyer-predecessor.
A partnership for the practice of law cannot be Petitioners base their petitions on the
likened to partnerships formed by other following arguments:
professionals or for business. 1. A partnership is not prohibited from
Profession - a group of men pursuing a continuing its business under a firm name
learned art as a common calling in the spirit of which includes the name of a deceased
public service partner as under Art 1840 of the Civil Code.
The right to practice law is not a natural or 2. In regulating other professions, such as
constitutional right but is in the nature of a accountancy and engineering, the legislature
privilege or franchise. has authorized the adoption of firm names
It is limited to persons of good moral character without any restriction as to the use, in such
The right does not only presupposes in its firm name, of the name of a deceased partner
possessor integrity, legal standing and 3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not
attainment, but also the exercise of a special transgressed by the continued use of the
privilege, highly personal and partaking of the name of a deceased partner in the firm name
nature of a public trust. of a law partnership. Canon 33: The
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly continued use of the name of a deceased or
related to the administration of justice and former partner when permissible by local
should not be considered like an ordinary custom, is not unethical but care should be
money-making trade. taken that no imposition or deception is
The spirit of public service in which the practiced through this use
4. No possibility of imposition or deception
profession of law is and ought to be exercised
because the deaths of their respective
is a prerequisite of sound administration of
deceased partners were well-publicized in all
justice according to law
newspapers of general circulation for several
[by sir] Now, rule is amended; Already allowed
days
but a + should be placed beside the deceased 5. No local custom prohibits the continued use
partners name of a deceased partners name in a
professional firms name
6. Continued use of a deceased partners name
in the firm name of law partnerships has been
consistently allowed by U.S. Courts