QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER
101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners
TAXICAB OPERATORS v. BOT
FACTS:
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a
domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are
grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate
taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in
Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT)
issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated
Taxis (which are 6 years older).
The law is set to be immediately implemented in Metro Manila
first before it would be implemented elsewhere. Pursuant to
this, the Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation issued
Circ 52 which is the IRR of the law in the NCR.
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT,
docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42
or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and
operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model
1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out,
provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy
and fit for operation.
TOMMI also assailed the constitutionality of the law. It avers,
among other things, that the Circular in question violates their
right to equal protection of the law because the same is being
enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the
taxi industry.
ISSUES:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum
circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential
Decree No.
constitutional right to procedural due process?
B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the
procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No.
101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed
memorandum circulars violate the petitioners constitutional
rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification
and standard?
RULING:
The SC held that Circ 77-42 is valid. BOTs reason for enforcing
the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city,
compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier
traffic pressure and more constant use. Thus is of common
knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same
in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that
infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be
successfully claimed.
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other
transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled
that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same
treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or
persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of
classification of the object or subject of the law provided
classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction,
which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally
to each member of the class. What is required under the equal
protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so
that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would
be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and
the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the
foregoing criteria.
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT
Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort
1

of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and
dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power,
can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can
prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of
society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando the necessities imposed by
public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
US v. PANLILIO
DOCTRINE: The orders, rules and regulations of an
administrative officers or body issued pursuant to a statute
havethe force of law but are not penal in nature and a violation
of such orders is not a offense punishable by law unless the
statute expressly penalizes such violation.
FACTS:
On or about the 22nd day of February, 1913, all of the carabaos
belonging to the above-named accused having been exposed to
disease known as rinderpest, were, in accordance with an order
of duly-authorized agent of the Director of Agriculture, duly
quarantined in a corral in the barrio of Masamat, Pampanga, P.
I.; that, on said place, the said accused, Adriano Panlilio,
illegally and voluntarily and without being authorized so to do,
and while the quarantine against said carabaos was still in
force, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the
corral in which they were then quarantined and conducted from
one place to another; that by virtue of said orders of the
accused, his servants and agents took the said carabaos from
the said corral and drove them from one place to another for
the purpose of working them.
the defendant was notified in writing on February 22, 1913, by a
duly authorized agent of the Director of agriculture, that all of
his carabaos in Pampanga, had been exposed to a disease
called RINDERPEST and thus quarantined and were ordered
kept in a corral designated by an agent of the Bureau of
Agriculture and were to remain there until released by further
order of the Director of Agriculture.
The carabaos are not to be removed from the quarantine but
the carabaos was taken from the corral by the command of the
accused were used as work animals as if they are not
quarantined.
ISSUE: Whether or not the facts alleged in the information and
proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760
or any portion thereof.
HELD:
We are forced to agree with this contention.
The original information against the accused charged a violation
of section 6 of Act No. 1760 committed by the accused in that
he ordered and permitted his carabaos, which, at the time, were
in quarantine, to be taken from quarantine and moved from one
place to another on his hacienda. An amended information was
filed. It failed, however, to specify that section of Act No. 1760
alleged to have been violated, evidently leaving that to be
ascertained by the court on the trial.
There is no question here of importation and there is no charge
or proof that the animals in question were suffering from a
dangerous communicable disease or that the Secretary of the
Interior had made the declaration provided for in section 5 or
that the accused had driven or taken said animals from one
island, province, municipality, township or settlement to
another. They had not been in highway nor moved from one
municipality or settlement to another. They were left upon
defendant's hacienda, where they were quarantined, and there
worked by the servants of the accused.
the law nowhere makes it a penal offense to refuse to comply
with the provisions of section 7, nor is the section itself so
phrased as to warrant the conclusion that it was intended to be
a penal section. The section provides the means by which the
refusal of the owner to comply therewith shall be overcome and
the punishment, if we may call it punishment, which he shall
receive by reason of that refusal. It has none of the aspects of a
penal provision or the form or substance of such provision. It
does not prohibit any act. It does not compel an act nor does it
really punish or impose a criminal penalty. The other sections of
the law under which punishments may be inflicted are so
2

phrased as to make the prohibited act unlawful, and section 8
provides the punishment for any act declared unlawful by the
law.
Nowhere in the law, however, is the violation of the orders of
the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is
there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders.
Section 8 provides that "any person violating any of the
provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a
fine of not more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment
for not more than six months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, for each offense." A
violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as
authorized by paragraph (c), is not a violation of the provision of
the Act. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may
possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and
particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is
not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a
violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No.
1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture
made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way
therein.
It is contended by the Government that if the offense stated in
the information and proved upon the trial does not constitute a
violation of any of the provisions of Act No. 1760, it does
constitute a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal
Code. It provides:
A fine of not less than fifteen and not more than seventy
pesetas and censure shall be imposed upon: . . .
2. Any person who shall violate the regulations, ordinances, or
proclamations issued with reference to any epidemic disease
among animals, the extermination of locusts, or any other
similar plague.
Wherefore, the accused is accordingly convicted of a violation of
article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, and is sentenced to
pay a fine of seventy pesetas (P14) and censure, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs of this
appeal. So ordered.
HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v. DEFENSOR
FACTS:
The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No.
9207, otherwise known as the "National Government Center
(NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003." Petitioner Holy
Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a
homeowners association from the West Side of the NGC.
Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the National
Government Center Administration Committee (Committee). At
the filing of the instant petition, the Committee was composed
of Secretary Michael Defensor, Chairman of the Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), Atty.
Edgardo Pamintuan, General Manager of the National Housing
Authority (NHA), Mr. Percival Chavez, Chairman of the
Presidential Commission for Urban Poor (PCUP), Mayor Feliciano
Belmonte of Quezon City, Secretary Elisea Gozun of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and
Secretary Florante Soriquez of the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH).
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No.
9207. In accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the
Committee formulated the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of R.A. No. 9207 on June 29, 2004. Petitioners
subsequently filed the instant petition questioning its validity.
The OSG claims that the instant petition for prohibition is an
improper remedy because the writ of prohibition does not lie
against the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Since in
issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was
not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function,
which is the scope of a petition for prohibition under Section 2,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the instant
prohibition should be dismissed outright, the OSG contends. For
their part, respondent Mayor of Quezon City and respondent
NHA contend that petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts in filing the instant petition with this Court and not
3

with the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction
over a petition for prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for prohibition is not the
proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-
legislative function.
RULING:
Yes. The court ruled that a petition for prohibition is also not the
proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-
legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed
against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further
proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of
said entitys or persons jurisdiction or are accompanied with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but
not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally,
the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court
within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the
administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the
proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction
or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of
jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the
inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the
law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the
ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.
Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR,
petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification
which falls under the RTC.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-
making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to
make rules and regulations which results in delegated
legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and
the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not
exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This
principle, however, applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its
quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained
to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative
power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207.
The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR
issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not
germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to
implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative
function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the
same.
Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the
exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to
assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Although the courts have concurrent jurisdiction in the issuance
of writ of certiorari, habeas corpus, etc., such concurrence does
not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum.
True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take
cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so
warrant. A direct invocation of the courts original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special
and important reasons therefore, clearly and specifically set out
in the petition.
OPLE v. TORRES
FACTS:
4

Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System," was issued by
President Fidel Ramos On December 12, 1996.
Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition seeking to invalidate A.O.
No. 308 on several grounds. One of them is that: The
establishment of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System requires a legislative act. The issuance of
A.O. No.308 by the President is an unconstitutional usurpation
of the legislative powers of congress. Petitioner claims that A.O.
No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence,
beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O.
No.308 establishes a system of identification that is all-
encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every
Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly,
violates their right to privacy.
On this point, respondents counter-argue that: A.O. No. 308 was
issued within the executive and administrative powers of the
president without encroaching on the legislative powers of
congress.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an
unconstitutional usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate.
RULING:
Legislative power is the authority to make laws, and to alter and
repeal them. The Constitution has vested this power in the
Congress. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad,
general, and comprehensive. Any power deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by
Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.
The executive power, on the other hand, is vested in the
President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance. As head
of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief
Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees
to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of
his department. He has control over the executive department,
bureaus and offices. Corollary to the power of control, the
President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of
laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order.
Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and
offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official
conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative
orders, rules and regulations.
From these precepts, the Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves
a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order.
The Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.Acts of the President which
relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in
pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President
which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation
of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should
be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying
out the legislative policy. The Court rejects the argument that
A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the
Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and
incorporates in a unified document the major structural,
functional and procedural principles of governance and
embodies changes in administrative structure and procedures
designed to serve the people.
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely
implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for
the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference
System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies
The primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest
against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies,
5

etc. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of
some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as
the line that separates the administrative power of the
President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it
ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be
covered by law.
Petition is granted and A.O. No. 308 is declared null and void for
being unconstitutional.
PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION
v. DE JESUS
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the Governance of
Basic Education Act 2001, became a law on August 11, 2001,
in accordance with Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
Under Section 14 of the law, the DepEd Secretary is mandated
to promulgate the implementing rules and regulations within
ninety (90) days after the approval of the Act, provided that the
principle of shared governance shall be fully implemented
within two (2) years after such approval.
On March 13, 2003, the PSDSA, the national organization of
about 1,800 public school district supervisors of the DepEd, in
behalf of its officers and members, filed the instant petition for
prohibition and mandamus, alleging that:
I. THE ACT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IN REMOVING
PETITIONERS ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS AND ITS PRINCIPALS (SCHOOL HEADS)
WITHIN HIS/HER DISTRICT AND CONVERTING HIS/HER
ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION TO THAT OF PERFORMING STAFF
FUNCTION FOR THE DIVISION OFFICE PER SECTION 5.1 RULE V
OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC
ACT 9155 (DEPED ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2003) IS A GROSS
VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 THE GOVERNANCE OF
BASIC EDUCATION ACT OF 2001.
II. THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATION OF REPUBLIC
ACT 9155 AS PROMULGATED UNDER DEPED ORDER NO. 1,
SERIES OF 2003 EXPANDED THE LAW AND INCLUDED
PROVISIONS WHICH ARE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO THE
LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE SUBJECT LAW.
III. THE DOWNGRADING OF SALARY GRADE LEVEL OF THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT SUPERVISOR OR THE NEGLECT OR
REFUSAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT TO UPGRADE THE
SALARY GRADE LEVEL OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT TO A
RESPECTABLE LEVEL OF SALARY GRADE HIGHER THAN THAT OF
THE PRINCIPALS DESPITE CLEAR INTENTION OF R.A. 9155 TO
RETAIN THE POSITION OF PSDS IN THE HIERARCHY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGERS AND OFFICERS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
ILLEGAL.
Issues:
1) Whether or not District Supervisor shall not exercise
administrative supervision over the Elementary School
Principals (ESPs) and Secondary School Principals (SSPs).
2) Whether or not Rule IV, Section 4.3; Rule V, Sections 5.1 and
the second paragraph of Section 5.2; and Rule VI, Section 6.2,
paragraph 11 of Department of Education Order No. 1, Series of
2003 are constitutional.
Rulings:
1) A plain reading of the law will show that the schools district
supervisors have no administrative supervision over the school
heads; their responsibility is limited to those enumerated in
Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, to wit:
(1) Providing professional and instructional advice and support
to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and
learning centers in the district or cluster thereof;
(2) Curricula supervision; and
(3) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by
proper authorities.
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express
mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all
others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is
6

expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have
made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention
been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to
those expressly mentioned.
2) The court reviewed the IRR and found that Section 4.3 of
Rule IV, and Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of Rule V are valid. The
provisions merely reiterate and implement the related
provisions of R.A. No. 9155. Under the law, a division
superintendent has the authority and responsibility to hire,
place, and evaluate all division supervisors and district
supervisors as well as all employees in the division, both
teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school heads. A
school head is a person responsible for the administrative and
instructional supervision of the schools or cluster of schools.
The division superintendent, on the other hand, supervises the
operation of all public and private elementary, secondary, and
integrated schools and learning centers.
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
SYQUIA v. BOARD OF POWER AND WATER WORKS
(Private respondents: RUIZ, ENRIQUEZ, AND MOSES)
FACTS:
Private respondents filed three separate complaints with
respondent Board of Power and Waterworks charging petitioner
as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments at Malate,
Manila with the offense of selling electricity without permit or
franchise issued by respondent board, in that petitioner billed
respondents-complainants various specified amounts for their
electricity consumption at their respective apartments for the
months of May to September, 1974 in excess of the Meralco
rates authorized by respondent board.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied. Answer was
filed questioning the jurisdiction of the respondent, since she is
not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes to
the apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric
current bills in accordance with their lease contracts, and their
relationship is contractual in nature.
The board ruled: It is the considered opinion of this Board, that
since the tenants (complainants) are already paying rentals for
the use of their rooms and for the cost of their electricity within
their rooms, they should no longer be required to pay for the
extra cost of electricity in common areas such as the elevator
and the servants' quarters, for it is only fair and equitable that
the cost of electricity for common areas such as the elevator
and servants' quarters be shouldered alone by the owner of the
building as part of the cost for the rentals being paid by the
tenants (complainants). ...
ISSUE: Whether or not the board has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
NO, it doesnt have jurisdiction over the case.
The Court resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action
and to grant the petition. Under the reorganization plan effected
by Presidential Decree No. 1 as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 458, jurisdiction, supervision and control over public service
related to electric light, power and waterworks utilities formerly
vested in the Public Service Act were transferred to respondent
board.
Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded
its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the
complaints filed by respondents against petitioner.
Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's
contractual relations with respondents-complainants as her
tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor
in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise.
Respondents' complaints against being charged he additional
cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants (in
addition to those registered in their respective apartment
meters) give rise to a question that is purely civil in character
that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the
Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the

respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by
the regular courts of general jurisdiction.
Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside as
null and void.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned orders of respondent board are
annulled and the complaints of private respondents are ordered
dismissed.
With costs against private respondents.
GLOBE WIRELESS v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
DOCTRINE:
Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence
is the rule that the jurisdiction and powers of administrative
agencies are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily
implied from those granted in the legislation creating such
body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void
and ineffective.
FACTS:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari is the jurisdiction of the
defunct Public Service Commission [PSC] under Section 21 of
Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, to discipline and
impose a fine upon petitioner, Globe Wireless, Ltd.
A message addressed to Maria Diaz, Monte Esquina 30, Madrid,
Spain, filed by private respondent Antonio B. Arnaiz with the
telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in
Dumaguete City was transmitted to the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Manila. It was forwarded to petitioner
Globe Wireless Ltd. for transmission to Madrid. Petitioner sent
the message to the American Cable and Radio Corporation in
New York, which, in turn, transmitted the same to the Empresa
Nacional de Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. The latter,
however, mislaid said message, resulting in its non-delivery to
the addressee.
After being informed of said fact, private respondent Arnaiz,
sent to then Public Service Commissioner Enrique Medina an
unverified letter-complaint relating the incident.
Petitioner, in its answer, questioned PSC's jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the letter-complaint, even as it denied liability
for the non-delivery of the message to the addressee.
Hearing ensued, after which the PSC issued an order finding
petitioner "responsible for the inadequate and unsatisfactory
service complained of, in violation of the Public Service Act"
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent has jurisdiction.
RULING: NO, it doesnt have jurisdiction.
Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended
otherwise known as the Public Service Act, vested in the Public
Service Commission jurisdiction, supervision and control over all
Public services and their franchises, equipment and other
properties. However, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 4630, the
legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating,
limited respondent Commission's jurisdiction over petitioner
only to the rate which petitioner may charge the Public. Thus,
Sec. 5. The Public Service Commission is hereby given
jurisdiction over the grantee only with respect to the rates
which the grantee may charge the public subject to
international commitments made or adhered to by the Republic
of the Philippines.
The act complained of consisted in petitioner having allegedly
failed to deliver the telegraphic message of private respondent
to the addressee in Madrid, Spain. Obviously, such imputed
negligence had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject
matter of the very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over
petitioner.
Moreover, under Section 21 of C.A. No. 146, as amended, the
Commission was empowered to impose an administrative fine in
cases of violation of or failure by a Public service to comply with
the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders,
decisions or regulations of the Commission. petitioner operated
under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor
conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to
violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from
the Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had
allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded.
8


PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION v. AGRAVA
FACTS:
This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyers Association for
prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his
capacity s Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 23,
1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he
had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose
of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys
before the said office. Petitioner contends that one who has
passed the bar examinations, and is in good standing, is duly
qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and
that the respondent Director's holding an examination for the
purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the
law. The respondent, in reply, maintains that the prosecution of
patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of
law but include the application of scientific and technical
knowledge and training as a matter of actual purpose so as to
include engineers and other individuals who passed the
examination can practice before the Patent Office. Furthermore,
respondent contends that he has previously conducted such
examinations and that this is the first time that he is questioned
formally.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not members of the bar should first take and pass
an examination conducted by the Patent Office before he would
be allowed to practice law in said office;
2. Whether or not appearance before the Patent Office and the
preparation of applications or patents, etc. constitutes practice
of law or is included in the practice of law; and,
3. Whether or not the Director of the Patent Office is authorized
to conduct examinations for patent attorneys.
RULING:
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power
with respect to admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines and any member of the Philippine Bar in good
standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the
Philippines. Moreover, "The practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases or litigation m court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation sendees, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do
the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind
of the legal effect of facts and conditions. As such, , the practice
of law includes such appear ance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons,
and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent
cases. Thus, under the present law, members of the Philippine
Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good
standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office,
for the reason that much of the business in said office involves
the interpretation and determination of the scope and
application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well
as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that
part of the functions of the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-
judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions
are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court. In sum, the
practice of law covers any activity in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedures, principles or
practice and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience.
And, only the Supreme Court has the exclusive and
constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of
law.
GUEVARRA v. COMELEC
FACTS:
9

Guevara was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt for having published in the
newspaper an article which tended to interfere with and
influence the COMELEC awarding the contracts for the
manufacture and supply of ballot boxes; and which article
likewise tended to degrade, bring into disrepute, and undermine
the exclusive constitutional function of this Commission and its
Chairman
Petitioner, filed a motion to quash on the following ground that
the Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the
publication of the alleged contemptuous article, as neither in
the Constitution nor in statutes is the Commission granted a
power to so punish the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the power and jurisdiction to
conduct contempt proceedings against Guevara in connection
with the publication of an article.
RULING:
Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has
resulted in controversy between several dealers, that however
merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has
performed in its administrative capacity. It only discharged a
ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such
being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for
contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently
judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said: "The power to
punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings,
and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of
courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice". We
are therefore persuaded to conclude that the Commission on
Elections has no power nor authority to submit petitioner to
contempt proceedings if its purpose is to discipline him because
of the publication of the article mentioned in the charge under
consideration.
ANG TIBAY v. CIR
FACTS:
Ang Tibay has filed an opposition for both the motion for
reconsideration of CIR and the motion for a new trial by the
National Labor Union.
Toribio claimed to have laid off workers due to the shortage of
leather soles in the Ang Tibay factory.
The Court of industrial relations forwarded a motion for recon
with the supreme court.
In pursuit of a retrial in the Court of Industrial Relations, the
national labor union, the respondent, averred:
1. The shortage of soles has no factual basis
2. The scheme was to prevent the forfeiture of his bond to cover
the breach of obligation with the Army
3. The letter he sent to the army was part of this scheme
4. The company union was an employer dominated one.
5. laborers rights to CBA is indispensable.
6. Civil code shouldnt be used to interpret a legislation of
American industrial origins.
7. Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for favoring his
union.
8. Exhibits are inaccessible to respondents.
9. The exhibits can reverse the judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled
to a new trial.
HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered
evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they attached
to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to
them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-
reaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered (said newly obtained records include books of
business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not
previously accessible but already existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR,
although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also
make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process.
For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by
observing the following:
10


(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish
the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion but the evidence must be substantial.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore,
must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION (digest 1)
FACTS:
On June 18, 199 , the Department of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note No. 0522 containing a
request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez.
Secretary of Justice then ordered a technical evaluation and
assessment of the extradition request. Pending evaluation,
private respondent (Mark Jimenez) through counsel wrote a
letter addressed to herein petitioner requesting copies of official
extradition request from the US Government. He requested
ample time to comment and for the matter to be held in
abeyance in the meantime.
Secretary of Justice denied the said request specifically invoking
our countrys responsibility to the Vienna Convention on the law
of Treaties that every treaty in force is binding upon parties to
it and must be performed by them in good faith. Extradition is
a toll of criminal law enforcement and to be effective must be
processed expeditiously. Particularly in this case is the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.
Extradition is the process by which persons charged with or
convicted of crimes against the law of a State and found in a
foreign state are returned by the latter to the former for trial or
punishment.
Pacta sunt servanda requires the parties to a treaty to keep
their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of
our countrys legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution.
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the nation.
Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law
form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action
is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
After the denial of the request letter, Mark Jimenez filed a
petition against herein Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge
Lantion favored Jimenez. Thus, this petition is now at bar.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge Lantion acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
temporary restraining order to herein petitioner in performing
his legal duties as Secretary of Justice.
11

Held:
NO. The Extradition Law provides Rules of Court shall apply,
thus extradite has the basic right of notice and hearing. The RP-
US Extradition Treaty under the Incorporation Clause in case of
conflict is not superior over a national law. International law is
given equal standing but not superior to national legislative
enactment. The principle lex posterior degorat oriori takes
effect
a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty.
In States where the constitution is the highest law of the land,
such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the
constitution. Thus, petitioner is ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers and to grant him (Jimenez) a reasonable period within
which to file his comment and supporting evidence There was
only a void on some provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty
as regards to the basic due process right of a prospective
extradite at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceeding.
RTCs decision is rendered moot and academic and herein
petition is DISMISSED.
(digest 2)
FACTS:
In accordance to "Extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America" (RP-US Extradition
Treaty), the Department of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522
containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the
United States attached with the Grand Jury Indictment, the
warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern
District of Florida, and other supporting documents on June 18,
1999. Mr. Jimenez was charged with the following:
i. 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the
United States; 2 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
ii. 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax;4 counts;
Maximum Penalty:5 years/count)
iii. 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; 2 counts;
Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
iv. 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; 6 counts;
Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
v. 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33
counts; Maximum Penalty: less than 1 year)
The Department of Justice denied Mr. Jimenez request for
extradition documents based
on the following:
i. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines
and the United States enumerates the documentary
requirements and establishes the procedures under which the
documents submitted shall be received and admitted as
evidence. Evidentiary requirements are under Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1069. Evaluation by the Department of the documents is
not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary
investigation of criminal cases. Thus, the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are
not available. It merely determines the compliance of the
Requesting Government with the procedures and requirements
under the relevant law and treaty. After the filing of the petition
for extradition, the person sought to be extradited will be
furnished by the court with copies of the petition.
ii. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the
counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests.
Furthermore, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides
that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of
the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for
extradition. Thus, it must comply with the request of the
United States Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
the subject information.
iii. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
provides that "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties
to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition
is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective,
requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted
persons must be processed expeditiously.
Mr. Jimenez filed with filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region a petition presided over by the
Honorable Ralph C. Lantion against the Secretary of Justice, the
12

Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation:
i. mandamus to compel the Department to furnish the
extradition documents
ii. certiorari to set aside Departments letter dated July 13,
1999 denying his request
iii. prohibition to restrain the Department from considering the
extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in
court
iv. enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of
the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition
v. application for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction
Honorable Ralph C. Lantion ordered the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation
to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the
acts complained of, from conducting further proceedings in
connection with the request of the United States Government,
from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court
and from performing any act directed to the extradition for a
period of 20 days from service of the order.
Hon. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines ordered Hon. Lantion to cease and desist from
enforcing the order. Due to transcendental importance, the
Court brushed aside peripheral procedural matters which
concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684 and the
TRO and proceded on the issues.
ISSUE:
i. Whether or NOT the evaluation procedure is not a
preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of
criminal cases
ii. Whether or NOT the twin basic due process rights granted
by Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court on the right to be
furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other
supporting documents and the right to submit counter-affidavits
and other supporting documents within 10 days from receipt is
dispensable
iii. Whether or NOT the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern granted under Sec. 7 of Art. III of the
1987 Constitution is violated
HELD: DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to
furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and
its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period
within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
i. NO.
Extradition Request
The Extradition Request (Sec. 4. PD 1069) is made by the
Foreign Diplomat of the
Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs has the executive authority to
conduct the evaluation process which, just like the extradition
proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself or is sui generis.
It is not a criminal investigation but it is also erroneous to say
that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such
stage, the executive authority has the power:
1) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and
sufficiency of the extradition papers in form and substance
2) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face
of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not
extraditable
3) to make a determination whether or not the request is
politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which
is not punishable under non-military penal legislation.
The process may be characterized as an investigative or
inquisitorial process (NOT an exercise of an administrative
body's quasi-judicial power) (Sec. 5. PD 1069 and Pars. 2 and 3,
Art. 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) that is indispensable to
prosecution. The power of investigation consists in gathering,
organizing and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool
in an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or
quasi-judicial functions.
In Ruperto v. Torres, the Court laid down the test of determining
whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions
or merely investigatory functions applies to an administrative
body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. If the only
purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted
before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it,
and if the agency is not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence
of judicial discretion and judgment. Thus, the role of the
13

administrative body is limited to an initial finding of whether or
not the extradition petition can be filed in court. The court has
the power to determine whether or not the extradition should
be effected. The evaluation procedure (in contrast to ordinary
investigations) may result in the deprivation of liberty of the
prospective extraditee or accused (Sec. 2[c] of PD 1069) at 2
stages:
1) provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the
submission of the request
This is because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a
contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the
person sought pending presentation of the request (Par. 1, Art.
9 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) to prevent flight but he shall
be automatically discharged after 60 days (Par. 4 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty) or 20 days (Sec. 20[d] PD 1069) if no request
is submitted. Otherwise, he can be continuously detained, or if
not, subsequently rearrested (Par. 5, Art 9, RP-US Extradition
Treaty)
2) temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the
pendency of the extradition petition in court (Sec. 6, PD 1069).
The peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation
procedure is that:
1) there is yet no extradite; BUT
2) it results in an administrative if adverse to the person
involved, may cause his immediate incarceration
The evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation. Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition
proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in
the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly
lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty. The
characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the
applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It
had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice,
information, and hearing.
In this case, the extradition request was delivered to the
Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999 (the following
day the Department of Justice received the request). Thus, the
Department of Foreign Affairs failed to discharge its duty of
evaluating the same and its accompanying documents.
Extradition Petition
After delivery of the Extradition Request by the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of Justice, the latter shall
designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge
of the case (Par. 1, Sec. 5, PD 1069). The attorney shall file a
written Extradition Petition with the proper regional trial court,
with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under
consideration (Par. 2, Sec. 5, PD 1069). The presiding judge
shall issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to
appear and to answer the petition. The judge may issue a
warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of
justice or to prevent flight (Par. 1, Sec. 6, PD 1069).
Extradition Hearing
The provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable
and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the
proceedings, shall apply during the Extradition Hearing (Par. 1,
Sec. 9, PD 1069) The attorney may represent the Requesting
state. (Sec. 8, PD 1069). The Courts decision on whether the
petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual
criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of
the RP-US Extradition Treaty or whether or not the offense for
which extradition is requested is a political one (Par. 3, Article 7
of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) shall be final and immediately
executory (Sec. 12, PD 1069) and appealable with the Court of
Appeals where the provisions of the Rules of Court governing
appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply
except for the required 15-day period to file brief (Sec. 13, PD
1069).
ii. YES.
Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the twin
rights of notice and hearing from a prospective extradite. In the
absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of
fair play. Petitioner contends that United States requested the
Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information. Such argument, however has been
overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses
to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial.
If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot
be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. The
constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for
"justice outside legality," since private respondent's due
14

process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty,
are protected by constitutional guarantees.
However in this case, with the meticulous nature of the
evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated
period of time due to its intricacies and certain problems in the
extradition papers (such as those that are in Spanish and
without the official English translation, and those that are not
properly authenticated) it cannot to be said to be urgent.
Therefore, notice and hearing requirements of administrative
due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.
iii. NO.
During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental
action of our own government has as yet been done; hence the
invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast,
records of the extradition hearing would already fall under
matters of public concern, because our government by then
shall have already made an official decision to grant the
extradition request.
JUDICIAL REVIEWS
ABEJO v. DELA CRUZ
(Another case is heard in line with this case entitled:
Pocket bell phils. V. SEC)
BERNARDO v. ABALOS
FACTS:
On April 21, 1998, petitioners Antonio M. Bernardo, Ernesto A.
Domingo, Jr. and Jesus C. Cruz filed with the COMELEC a
criminal complaint against respondents Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr.,
Benjamin C. Abalos, Jr., Dr. Eden C. Diaz, Romeo Zapanta and
Arcadio de Vera for vote buying.
Respondents sponsored, arranged and conducted an all-
expense-free transportation, food and drinks affair for the
Mandaluyong City public school teachers, registered voters of
said city, at the Tayabas Bay Beach Resort, Sariaya, Quezon
Province.
Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr. delivered a speech wherein he
offered and promised the Mandaluyong City public school
teachers and employees a hazard pay of P1,000.00 , and
increasing their allowances from P1,500.00 to P2,000.00 for
food, or with a total of P3,000.00 which they will get by the end
of the month.
The offers and promises to said public school teachers, who
are members of the Board of Election Inspectors of
Mandaluyong City and registered voters thereat, were made a
few weeks before the election to induce or unduly influence the
said teachers and the public in general (the other guests) to
vote for the candidacy of Benjamin Benhur Abalos, Jr.
On December 1, 1998, the COMELEC En Banc issued the
assailed Resolution No. 98-3208dismissing the complaint "for
insufficiency of evidence to establish prima facie case."
On February 09, 1999, petitioners, without first submitting a
motion for reconsideration, filed the instant petition with this
Court.
ISSUES:
Whether petitioners failure to submit a motion for
reconsideration was fatal to his cause of action.
HELD: YES
15

. Petitioners did not exhaust all the remedies available to them
at the COMELEC level. Specifically, they did not seek a
reconsideration of the assailed COMELEC En Banc Resolution as
required by Section1, Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
-Petitioners' failure to file the required motion for
reconsideration utterly disregarded the COMELEC Rules
intended "to achieve an orderly, just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the Commission."-Contrary to
petitioners' statement that a resort to a motion for
reconsideration is "dilatory," it bears stressing that the purpose
of the said motion is to give the COMELEC an opportunity to
correct the error imputed to it. If the error is immediately
corrected by way of a motion for reconsideration, then it is the
most expeditious and inexpensive recourse. But if the COMELEC
refuses to correct a patently erroneous act, then it commits a
grave abuse of discretion justifying recourse by the aggrieved
party to a petition for certiorari.-A petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, can
only be resorted to if "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Having failed to file the required motion for reconsideration of
the challenged Resolution, petitioners' instant petition is
certainly premature. Significantly, they have not raised any
plausible reason for their direct recourse to this Court.
WHEREFORE petition is dismissed.
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES v. CA
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
IEI was granted coal operating contract but it was later on
advised that the coal operator in the area subject of the
contract should be MMIC. IEC and MMIC executed a MOA
transferring to the latter all the formers rights and interest in
the contract. IEI filed action for rescission of MOA.
TC rescinded the MOA; CA reversed, saying that its BED, not
the TC, which has jurisdiction over the action. SC held that the
BED has jurisdiction. Under PD 1206, the powers and functions
of EDB in coal exploration and development have been
transferred to BED. Also, under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, BED has the expertise, so the court must first defer
to its determination. The case below is suspended.
FACTS:
PET IEI was granted a coal operating contract by the
Bureau of Energy Development (BED) for exploration of 2
coal blocks in Eastern Samar.
IEI was later on advised that to rationalize the countrys
coal supply
-and-demand balance, the coal operator in the area
should be the Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corp.
(MMIC)
So IEI and MMIC executed a MOA where IEI assigned and
transferred to MMIC all rights and interests in the 2 coal
blocks subject of IEIs coal operating contract.
Subsequently, IEI filed action for rescission of MOA with
damages against MMIC and Ministry of Energy before the
RTC. IEI also prayed that Energy Minister be ordered to
approve the return of coal operating contract from MMIC
to IEI.
TRIAL COURT summary judgment ordered the rescission
of MOA and ordered the reversion of 2 coal blocks
covered by the coal operating contract
CA reversed: TC had no jurisdiction over the action since
under PD 1206, it is the BED that has the power to
decide controversies relative to the exploration,
exploitation and development of coal blocks
ISSUES & HOLDING
WON the civil court has jurisdiction to hear and decide
the suit for rescission of the MOA concerning a coal
operating contract over coal blocks? Yes but court
must first defer to BED; judicial determination
suspended
16


WON CA erred in holding that it is the BED which has
jurisdiction over the action and not the civil court? NO.
RATIO:
IEIs cause of action was not merely the rescission of a contract
but the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal
blocks
BED, as the successor to the Energy Development Board (EDB)
(abolished by PD 1206), is tasked with the function of
establishing a comprehensive and integrated national program
for the exploration, exploitation and development and
extraction of fossil fuels; adopting a coal devt program;
regulating all activities relative thereto; undertaking by itself or
through service contracts such exploitation and development.
PD 1206 provides that the powers and functions of the defunct
EDB on the implementation of PD 972 on coal exploration and
devt have been transferred to BED, provided that coal operating
contracts including the transfer or assignment of interest in said
contracts shall require approval of Secretary of Energy.
Considering the foregoing, BEDs jurisdiction, in the first
instance, to pass upon any question involving the MOA between
IEI and MMIC, a coal-operating contract, should be sustained.
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction (DPJ) It may occur that the
Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case
(matter involved is also judicial). But if the determination of the
case requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of
the proper admin bodies because technical matters or intricate
questions of facts are involved, then relief must be first
obtained in an admin proceeding before a remedy will be
supplied by the courts (even though the matter is within the
proper jurisdiction of a court).
DPJ applies in this case since the question of what coal areas
should be exploited and developed and which entity should be
granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a
technical determination by the BED which has specialized
expertise to act on it. These issues preclude an initial judicial
determination.
TC does not have competence to decide matters concerning
activities on exploration, exploitation, development and
extraction of coal. BUT case is NOT dismissed, only suspended,
until after the matters within the competence of BED are
determined.
PETITION DENIED.
GSIS v. CSC
DOCTRINE: "when the law bestows upon a government body
the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific
matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive
unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with
the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have
concurrent jurisdiction over the matter."
FACTS:
In May, 1981, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
dismissed six (6) employees as being "notoriously
undersirable," they having allegedly been found to be
connected with irregularities in the canvass of supplies and
materials.
Five of these six dismissed employees appealed to the Merit
Systems Board. The Board found the dismissals to be illegal
because effected without formal charges having been filed or
an opportunity given to the employees to answer, and ordered
the remand of the cases to the GSIS for appropriate disciplinary
proceedings.
The GSIS appealed to the Civil Service Commission. By
Resolution dated October 21, 1987, the Commission ruled that
the dismissal of all five was indeed illegal.
Still unconvinced, the GSIS appealed to the Supreme Court (G.R.
Nos. 80321-22). Once more, it was rebuffed. On July 4, 1988 this
Court's Second Division promulgated a Resolution which:
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a) denied its petition for failing to show any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Civl Service Commission, the
dismissals of the employees having in truth been made without
formal charge and hearin, and
b) declared that reinstatement of said five employees was
proper, "without prejudice to the right of the GSIS to pursue
proper disciplinary action against them;"
c) MODIFIED, however, the challenged CSC Resolution of
October 21, 1987 "by elminating the payment of back salaries
to private respondents (employees) until the outcome of the
disciplinary proceedings is known, considering the gravity of the
offenses imputed to them.
CSC granted the motion for execution in an Order dated June
20, 1990. It accordingly directed the GSIS "to pay the
compulsory heirs of deceased Elizar Namuco and Eusebio
Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal separation
up to the date of their demise."
GSIS appealed to this court. It contends that the Civil Service
Commission has no pwer to execute its judgments and final
orders or resolutions, and even conceding the contrary, the writ
of execution issued on June 20, 1990 is void because it varies
this Court's Resolution of July 4, 1988.
RULING:
The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit, is a consitutional commission
invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not only with
authority to administer the civil service but also with quasi-
judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decide
administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or
brought to it on appeal. The Commission shall decide by a
majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
on certiorari by any aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof. It has the power, too, sitting en banc,
to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice
before it or before any of its offices, which rules should not
however diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
On October 9, 1989, the Civil Service Commission promulgated
Resolution No. 89-779 adopting, approving and putting into
effect simplified rules of procedure on administrative
disciplinary and protest cases, pursuant tothe authority granted
by the constitutional and statutory provisions above cited, as
well as Republic Act No. 6713.
In light of all the foregoing consitutional and statutory
provisions, it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service
Commission the power or authority or order execution of its
decisions, resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it
has been exercising through the years. It would seem quite
obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless
accompanied by the authority to see taht what has been
decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency
of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge
cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the
grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus
renders, unless the law otherwise provides.
PAAT v. CA
FACTS:
he truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized
by the DENR personnel while on its way to Bulacan because the
driver could not produce the required documents for the forest
product found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan,
CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the
owner to explain. Private respondents failed to submit required
explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio
Baggayan sustained Layugans action for confiscation and
ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents brought
the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private
respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against
petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter alia,
that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure
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to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied their
motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners
aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for
replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure
proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the
doctrine.
administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections
68-A of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for
lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents
failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been
the proper course of action by the lower court instead of
assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing
the writ ordering the return of the truck.

RULING:

The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held
that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
means of administrative processed afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before
courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation
of court intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.

The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by

the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial
settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is
violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a
legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently
illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when
there is estoppels on the part of the administrative agency
concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter
ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of
the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to
nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private
land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.

A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners

for the subject truck taken and retained by them for
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