Republic of the Philippines BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed

SUPREME COURT BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and
Manila MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC.,
petitioners,
EN BANC vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and
THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA,
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and
ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed
FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA
FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents
SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all DAVIDE, JR., J.:
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and
MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and
parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts
represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it
CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to
JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued
JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and rape of Mother Earth."
CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA.
ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before
by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN,
Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital
MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all
represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO
minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an
and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by
additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-
their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA
stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in
MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO
concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural
and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed
resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His
CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed
substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala,
OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA
was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2
OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed
was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all
QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT,

1
citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin
tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate
that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4
Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago
of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is
endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique
species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic,
biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time
immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of
fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a
host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying
up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks
and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of
salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu
and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential
loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded
estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately
the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of
the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and
2
dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's
indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential
destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine
resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by
the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the
absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising
from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and
shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for
the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of
electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon
dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as
the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued
and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same
may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they
expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary,
photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16)
million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the
country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no
more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent
(4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of
virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land
mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have
granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations
to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial
logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is
hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares
per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of
forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and
irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the
plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are
evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental
damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt,
experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their
successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this
rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the
benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the
defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon
defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the
country.
3
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto
attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing
TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of
plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the
TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff
minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare,
barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine
Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the
policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which
man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony
with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present
and future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June
1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of
the State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and
wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)."
(Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
 c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and
resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
(Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of
humankind the natural law and violative of plaintiffs' right to
self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law
other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of
the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no
cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political
question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2)
the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves
the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned
motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the
complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question
sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief
prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal
order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent
their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
4
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply
thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of
action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations),
Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation
embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave
abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more
areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment
clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs
are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered
protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the
State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their
complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any
relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous
allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the
petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such
allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then
reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the
country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive
or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners'
resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the
passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for
cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains the generations to come.
effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its
effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now
found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or proceed to the merits of the petition.
other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration
requirements of due process.
and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do
not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We
hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the
xxx xxx xxx
complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of
the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We
Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we
likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough
believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic)
to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for
fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal
the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal
are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but
wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
an incident to the former.
RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete
with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that
data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint
they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no
against the herein defendant.
difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and
for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it,
the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
being impressed with political color and involving a matter of public
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.
three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
9
Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how
resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

5
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege
with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong
committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these
conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional
history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the
preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does
not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact,
these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed
to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless
the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state
policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance
and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect
and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost
not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which
stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
6
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of
the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange
transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo
Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide
sanctions against all forms of pollution air, water
and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)
environment necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing the same and,
therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment
of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be
irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the
right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning
the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13
then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14
Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral,
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the
public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos."
Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of
the State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management,
renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-
shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection
and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable
access of the different segments of the population to the
development and the use of the country's natural resources, not
only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It
is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value
system including social and environmental cost implications relative
to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, 15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the
benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development
as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the exploration,
development and utilization of such natural resources equitably
accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future
generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system
that takes into account social and environmental cost implications
relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of
the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR;
7
however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to
law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural
Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of
the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of
carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives
which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers
and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental
right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code)
were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create,
develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic
and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to
insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of
dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each
generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations."
17
The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue
of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987
to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners
maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse
of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or
rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the
plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission
of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that
the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court
for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No
other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said
allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged
facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the
prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the
rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in
passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of
action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and
deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively
nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements
under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments
under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima
facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be
granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that
insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as
party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question.
Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of
Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in
legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine
is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
8
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22
Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of
judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review
what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the
political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly
the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their
acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of
"grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can
expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23
Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even
less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,
we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases,
even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution
clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-
impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared
that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how
we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by
such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did
not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment
clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the
Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to
strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless
of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware
that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be
read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the
President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted
herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive
action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due
process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this
Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case.
9
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would
be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create
a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held
that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G.
7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy
Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest
in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be
validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not
deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law
clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548,
October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be
passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the
instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the
cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment
clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has
actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still
be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their
very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned
of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people timber license agreements.
to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the
general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler No pronouncement as to costs.
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
SO ORDERED.
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not
meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public
Quiason, JJ., concur.
health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.
the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29
quoted in
Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making
of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public
concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental Separate Opinions
interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use
his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom
of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private FELICIANO, J., concurring
right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment
clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses
for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other
instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a
matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED,
and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J.,
31
in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this
Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are
likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and
management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the
natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to
clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to
sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus
standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a
class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff

10
must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code,"
concept of "class" here involved membership in this "class" appears to embrace is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment
everyone living in the country whether now or in the management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas"
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested
with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing (a) air quality management;
a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against
both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or
(b) water quality management;
entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such
beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or
(c) land use management;
whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental
agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is
not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an (d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
appropriate case.
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one
specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (ii) wild life;
(Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But (iii) forestry and soil conservation;
although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it
cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. (iv) flood control and natural calamities;
It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and
generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list
(v) energy development;
of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely
open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and (vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories,
mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open (vii) mineral resources
land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or
open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor
reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the
other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which
fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code
3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the
1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code
basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private
ecology") and 15 ("the right to health"). persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.

11
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal
right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect
saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-
executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of
this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too
large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more
specific legal right a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of
generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be violated by the
actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that
the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed
for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more
specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective
opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to
dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a
cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right
claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational
terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and
effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or
applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall
back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of
Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)
12
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and
healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial
standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted,
to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy
making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms
and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments
the legislative and executive departments must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards,
and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose
concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should
cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if
petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of
breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions
of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will
those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to
dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as
the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and
the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative
agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies
demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment,
including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country.
The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be
subjected to closer examination.
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open
in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or
Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral
likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and
management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of
natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section
clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying. 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of
sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful
standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff
must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code,"
concept of "class" here involved membership in this "class" appears to embrace is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment
everyone living in the country whether now or in the management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas"
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested
with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing (a) air quality management;
a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against
both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or
(b) water quality management;
entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such
beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or
(c) land use management;
whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental
agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is
not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an (d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
appropriate case.
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one
specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (ii) wild life;
(Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But (iii) forestry and soil conservation;
although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it
cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. (iv) flood control and natural calamities;
It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and
generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list
(v) energy development;
of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely
open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and (vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories,

13
 (vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor
the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the
Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which
petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code
identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the
headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code
does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private
persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal
right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect
saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-
executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of
this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too
large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more
specific legal right a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of
generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be violated by the
actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that
the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed
for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more
specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective
opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to
dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a
cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right
claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational
terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and
effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
14
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or
applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall
back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of
Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and
healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial
standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted,
to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy
making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms
and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments
the legislative and executive departments must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards,
and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose
concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should
cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if
petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of
breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions
of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will
those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to
dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as
the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and
the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative
agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies
demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment,
including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country.
The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be
subjected to closer examination.
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes
are deserving of the privilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well as an
inestimable acquisition,"1 that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by
those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.

Republic of the Philippines Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of
SUPREME COURT profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to
Manila challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of
the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is
Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for
EN BANC the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?

G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004 The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American
colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no
vs. less than distinctly Filipino.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents. Antecedent Case Settings

x-----------------------------x On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004 President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
vs. stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent. 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.

x-----------------------------x Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition
G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004
docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
vs. by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier,
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and
KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents. his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
DECISION citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being
an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the

15
illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a
prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and,
second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie
Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004,
petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a
copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit
executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for
bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after
discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of
the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F.
Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and
Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National
Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before
1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of
the National Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in
the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the
more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San
Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives
Division of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of
Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald
Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration
No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a
copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage
contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by
the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of
birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally
destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit.
Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration.
The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10
February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court
conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a
16
temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution
that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R.
No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and
Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC
deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged
misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before
the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false"
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the
Omnibus Election Code -
"Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In
addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution,
the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose
of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections" -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would
authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel
the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court per Rule 642 in an action for certiorari under Rule 65 3 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted
for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial
power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law which power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly
elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view
could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed,
and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the
highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634,
invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution
in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-
003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly
instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
17
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935
and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of
presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in
Lopez vs. Roxas,4 as "not (being) justiciable" controversies or disputes involving
contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact
Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral
Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-
Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of
Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal.
Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under
the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the
statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election
scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto
which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to
dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12,
Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,"
promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this
premise -
"Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President of the Philippines.
"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-
President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A
petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or
for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest
number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-
President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of
the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo
warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. 5 In such
context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule
14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third
highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a
post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section
4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought
before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-
presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs.
Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez
vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for
want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical
background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared
in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office. 6 Aristotle saw its
significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described
as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a
self-sufficient existence.7 The concept grew to include one who would both govern
and be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could
be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one
hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other.8 In its ideal setting, a citizen
was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to
the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th
century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established
the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal
liberty and justice.9 Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include
18
political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of
political power.10 The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social
citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being
and social security.11 The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern
welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of
development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the
internationalization of citizenship.12
The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but
"subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."13 In church records, the natives were
called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish
laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer
number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these
citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands
except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.14
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion,
promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to
the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts; 15
however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the
Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841, 16 the Royal Decree of 23
August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine
Islands,17 and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was
expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870. 18
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands
because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions
of the Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by
special laws.19
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18
December 1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were
Spanish citizens. -
"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside
of Spain,
 "(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy."20
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of
decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to
an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international
law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all
political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain
virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the
United States.21 Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of
the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be
determined by its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over
which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may
remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event
all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such
property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on
their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof
to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the
territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by
making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the
exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to
preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held
to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in
which they reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the
territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress."22
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States
Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be
Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however,
19
also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports
describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the
United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the
Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of
1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on
the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein,
who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided
in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight." 23
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant
of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day of April 1899. The term
"inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who
was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers
on or before 11 April 1899.24
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April
1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at
the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the
principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those
born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period. 25 More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following
amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by
law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the
United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein." 26
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens"
had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft,
the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of
it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy
Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine
Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some
other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for,
is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the
United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be
a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11
April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a
citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a
mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such
link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood
relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the
Philippines -
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution
20
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing
civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose
their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in
discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting
their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children
of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status
of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the
provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -
"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her
Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under
the law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution,
except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation
generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for
at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship."27
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the
regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring
citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis 28 had been in
vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs 29
(1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the
reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor 30 (1947), jus sanguinis or blood
relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
21
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou,
married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of
Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however,
identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years
old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the
father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol
father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by
petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage
of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan
F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September
1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old,
unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old,
unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that
he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old,
married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the
entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his
parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty
from the documents would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84
years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a
natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are
documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have
been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings
before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for
respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted
as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted
by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in
evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the
facts which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the
date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to
the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all
admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his argument.
All three documents were certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
"Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
"x x x xxx xxx
"(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is
recorded in a public office."
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute
prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court
provides:
"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated."
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made
therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the
statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3)
the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of
record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have
occurred.31
22
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September
1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed
that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still
a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines
during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no
existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office.
Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place
during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was
stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of
a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be
extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had
complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil
status of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status
of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate
son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08
December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the
Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or
paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or
compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the
putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a
will, or a public document.32 Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or
the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -
"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and
sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the
father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or
reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge
the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be
identified."
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or
sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless
as being an authoritative document of recognition. 33 In Mendoza vs. Mella, 34 the
Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the
question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which
is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as
sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance,
in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both
parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to
its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have
happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to
be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth
certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary
recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same
Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear
statement in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her
own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the
document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently
executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the
only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public
document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,35 this Court defined what could constitute such a
document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents,
those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by
notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their
office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means
by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to
be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full
blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially
declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in
cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an
23
action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and
might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the
presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic
writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition,
simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would
include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other
competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and
Article 175 provide:
"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
"(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or
"(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during
his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die
during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have
a period of five years within which to institute the action.
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding
the death of either or both of the parties.
"x x x xxx x x x.
 "Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent."
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code
reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws."
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,36 the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should
be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article
2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child
shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the
effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article
278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional
idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the
family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are
intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is
little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual
would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State.
While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such
provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil law;
particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the
organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been]
defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations
of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and
24
those which exist among members of a society for the protection of private
interests."37
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,38 the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign
country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those
dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of
the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of
their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of
conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for
divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general,
the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of
the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law
of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional
provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships
found in different parts of the Civil Code,39 such as on successional rights and family
relations.40 In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child
of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but
such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law 41 and not his
political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory
attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while
defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided
distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial
set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly
according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by
foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish
Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code
became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however,
remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or
impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status
should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that
prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof
of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters
alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and
should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded
from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
`pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death,
the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names
of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected
with pedigree."
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already
dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the
declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d)
declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the
relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question
must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie
Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove
the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living
together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one
house, and as one family -
25
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing
in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do
hereby declare that:
"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe,
more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's
Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
"x x x xxx xxx
"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while
they were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also
introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children,
Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our
mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate
until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months between
1943-1944.
"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4)
more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
"x x x xxx xxx
"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew,
Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child
of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing
is most convincing; he states -
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or
would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained
from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead
parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In
Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, 42 this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA
testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University
of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat
(STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has
two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts
should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that
courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on
July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his
subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate
child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence
introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of
respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on
20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to
each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would
make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ
so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing
his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,43 citing Chiongbian vs. de
Leo44 and Serra vs. Republic.45
26
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ,
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of
them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis
mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under
the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis
mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum
which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely
into these cases.
"First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a
Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the
child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the
stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus
sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized
stepfather.
"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate
son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had
become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution
pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was
illegitimate here.
"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a
Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino
because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing
there about invidious jus sanguinis.
"Finally, Paa vs. Chan.46 This is a more complicated case. The case was
about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan.
Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got
his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that
there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina
mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If
Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was
not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
 "The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter
dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were
Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This
statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was
absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and
simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual
foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child,
and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the
illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother.
"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long
ago by People vs. Cayat.47 I would grant that the distinction between
legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x
But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real
differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another
purpose.
"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public
service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an
illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the
child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness
of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child
from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion
of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is
neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction
transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated."
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this
Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have
expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on
pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of
its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality
27
for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the
mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support
her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate
against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the
1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of
birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither
conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the
Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is
no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are
none provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses
jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824
assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has
prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the
position of President in the 10 th May 2004 national elections on the
contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate
of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the
petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly
elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution.
Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only
after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion
has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter
of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would
have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not
the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the
Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that
 having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born SO ORDERED.
sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule,
and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in Davide, Jr., C.J., see separate opinion, concurring.
1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place Puno, J., on leave but was allowed to vote; see separate opinion.
of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from Panganiban, J., on official leave; allowed to vote but did not send his vote on the
the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. matter.
That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his Quisumbing, J., joins the dissent of Justices Tinga and Morales; case should have
son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during been remanded.
which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all Ynares-Santiago, J., concurs and also with J. Punos separate opinion.
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., concurs, please see separate opinion.
children are legitimate or illegitimate. Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., concurs, please see separate opinion.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that Corona, J., joins the dissenting opinion of Justice Morales.
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on Carpio-Morales, J., see dissenting opinion.
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be Callejo, Sr., J., please see concurring opinion.
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of Azcuna, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Tinga, J., dissents per separate opinion.
Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case
before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties
to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there
has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-
SEPARATE OPINION
Marcos vs. COMELEC,48 must not only be material, but also deliberate and
willful.
DAVIDE, JR. C.J.:
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
The procedural and factual antecedents of these consolidated cases are as follows:
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan On 9 January 2004, petitioner Victorino X. Fornier filed with public respondent
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to disqualify private respondent
Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) and to deny due course to or cancel his certificate of
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., candidacy for the position of President in the forthcoming 10 May 2004 presidential
Respondent," for want of jurisdiction. elections. As a ground therefore, he averred that FPJ committed falsity in a material
representation in his certificate of candidacy in declaring that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth and in fact he is not, since he is the illegitimate son of
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, and Allan Poe, a Spanish national. The case was
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
docketed as COMELEC Case SPA No. 04-003 and assigned to the COMELECs First
Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part
Division.
of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No.
04-003.
At the hearing before the First Division of the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier offered
FPJs record of birth to prove that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to Bessie Kelley,
No Costs.
an American citizen, and Allan Poe, who was then married to Paulita Gomez. Upon

28
the other hand, FPJ tried to establish that his father was a Filipino citizen whose
parents, although Spanish nationals, were Filipino citizens. He adduced in evidence
a copy of the marriage contract of Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley, showing that they
were married on 16 September 1940 in Manila.
In its Resolution of 23 January 2004, the First Division of the COMELEC dismissed
COMELEC Case SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. It declared that COMELECs
jurisdiction is limited to all matters relating to election, returns and qualifications of
all elective regional, provincial and city officials, but not those of national officials
like the President. It has, however, jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of citizenship
of national officials under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code on petitions to
deny due course or cancel certificates of candidacy on the ground that any material
representation contained therein is false. It found that the evidence adduced by
petitioner Fornier is not substantial, and that FPJ did not commit any falsehood in
material representation when he stated in his certificate of candidacy that he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
His motion for reconsideration filed before the COMELEC en banc having been
denied, petitioner Fornier filed a petition with this Court, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 161824.
Meanwhile, petitioners Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. came to
this Court via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 161434, to challenge the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the
issue of the citizenship of FPJ. They assert that only this Court has jurisdiction over
the issue in light of the last paragraph of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution,
which provides:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
On 29 January 2004 petitioner Velez filed a similar petition, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 161634.
The core issues in these consolidated cases, as defined by the Court during the oral
argument, are as follows:
(1) Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions to deny due course
to or cancel certificates of candidacy of Presidential candidates;
29
(2) Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petitions of (a)
Tecson, et al., (b) Velez, and (c) Fornier; and
(3) Whether respondent FPJ is a Filipino citizen, and if so, whether he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
These consolidated petitions must be dismissed.
Both the petitions of Tecson and Velez invoke the jurisdiction of this Court as
provided for in the last paragraph of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, and
raise the issue of the ineligibility of a candidate for President on the ground that he
is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. The actions contemplated in the said
provision of the Constitution are post-election remedies, namely, regular election
contests and quo warranto. The petitioner should have, instead, resorted to pre-
election remedies, such as those prescribed in Section 68 (Disqualifications), in
relation to Section 72; Section 69 (Nuisance candidates); and Section 78 (Petition to
deny course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy), in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code, which are implemented in Rules 23, 24 and 25 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. These pre-election remedies or actions do not,
however, fall within the original jurisdiction of this Court.
Under the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
COMELEC has the original jurisdiction to determine in an appropriate proceeding
whether a candidate for an elective office is eligible for the office for which he filed
his certificate of candidacy or is disqualified to be a candidate or to continue such
candidacy because of any of the recognized grounds for disqualification. Its
jurisdiction over COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 is, therefore, beyond question.
Upon the other hand, this Court has jurisdiction over Forniers petition (G.R. No.
161824) under Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by
this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This Court can also take cognizance of the issue of whether the COMELEC advanced by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, one of the amici curiae. Since paternity or filiation
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in is in fact admitted by petitioner Fornier, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of
issuing the challenged resolution in COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 by virtue of Section 1 discretion in holding that FPJ is a Filipino citizen, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section
of Article VIII of the Constitution, which reads as follows: 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, which reads:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of nay branch or instrumentality of the
I agree with the amici curiae that this provision makes no distinction between
Government.
legitimate and illegitimate children of Filipino fathers. It is enough that filiation is
established or that the child is acknowledged or recognized by the father.
On the issue of whether private respondent FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen, the
following facts have been established by a weighty preponderance of evidence either
DISSENTING OPINION
in the pleadings and the documents attached thereto or from the admissions of the
parties, through their counsels, during the oral arguments:
CARPIO, J.:
1. FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 in Manila, Philippines.
I dissent from the majority opinion.
2. FPJ was born to Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley.
The Antecedent Proceedings
3. Bessie Kelley and Allan Poe were married on 16 September 1940.
Petitioner Fornier filed before the Commission on Elections ("Comelec") a "Petition
for Disqualification of Presidential Candidate Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando
4. Allan Poe was a Filipino because his father, Lorenzo Poe, albeit a Spanish
Poe, Jr." on the ground that Fernando Poe, Jr. ("FPJ") is not a natural-born Philippine
subject, was not shown to have declared his allegiance to Spain by virtue of
citizen. The Comelec First Division dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioner
the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902.
failed to present substantial evidence that FPJ committed "any material
misrepresentation when he stated in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is a
From the foregoing it is clear that respondent FPJ was born before the marriage of natural-born citizen." On motion for reconsideration, the Comelec En Banc affirmed
his parents. Thus, pursuant to the Civil Code then in force, he could either be (a) a the ruling of the First Division. Petitioner Fornier now assails the Comelec En Banc
natural child if both his parents had no legal impediments to marry each other; or resolution under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
(b) an illegitimate child if, indeed, Allan Poe was married to another woman who was
still alive at the time FPJ was born.
The Undisputed Facts

Petitioner Fornier never alleged that Allan Poe was not the father of FPJ. By
The undisputed facts are based on two documents and the admission of FPJ. The
revolving his case around the illegitimacy of FPJ, Fornier effectively conceded
first document is the Birth Certificate of FPJ, showing he was born on 20 August
paternity or filiation as a non-issue. For purposes of the citizenship of an illegitimate
1939. The Birth Certificate is an evidence of FPJ.[1] The second document is the
child whose father is a Filipino and whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or
Marriage Certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, showing that their marriage
filiation is enough for the child to follow the citizenship of his putative father, as

30
took place on 16 September 1940. The Marriage Certificate is also an evidence of
FPJ.[2] Moreover, FPJ admits that his mother Bessie Kelley was an American citizen.
[3]
Based on these two documents and admission, the undisputed facts are: (1) FPJ
was born out of wedlock and therefore illegitimate,[4] and (2) the mother of FPJ
was an American citizen.
The Issues
The issues raised in Forniers petition are:
(a) Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the petition to disqualify FPJ as a
candidate for President on the ground that FPJ is not a natural-born
Philippine citizen;
(b) Whether FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Jurisdiction
The Comelec has jurisdiction to determine initially the qualifications of all
candidates. Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Comelec has
the power and function to "[E]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election." The initial determination of who are qualified to file
certificates of candidacies with the Comelec clearly falls within this all-encompassing
constitutional mandate of the Comelec. The conduct of an election necessarily
includes the initial determination of who are qualified under existing laws to run for
public office in an election. Otherwise, the Comelecs certified list of candidates will
be cluttered with unqualified candidates making the conduct of elections
unmanageable. For this reason, the Comelec weeds out every presidential election
dozens of candidates for president who are deemed nuisance candidates by the
Comelec.[5]
Section 2(3), Article IX-C of the Constitution also empowers the Comelec to
"[D]ecide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections x
x x." The power to decide "all questions affecting elections" necessarily includes the
power to decide whether a candidate possesses the qualifications required by law for
election to public office. This broad constitutional power and function vested in the
Comelec is designed precisely to avoid any situation where a dispute affecting
elections is left without any legal remedy. If one who is obviously not a natural-born
31
Philippine citizen, like Arnold Schwarzenneger, runs for President, the Comelec is
certainly not powerless to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate.
There is no need to wait until after the elections before such candidate may be
disqualified.
Under Rule 25 on "Disqualification of Candidates" of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, a voter may question before the Comelec the qualifications of any
candidate for public office. Thus, Rule 25 provides:
Section 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all
the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing
law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may
be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
Section 2. Who May File Petition for Disqualification. Any citizen of voting age, or
duly registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties may file
with the Law Department of the Commission a petition to disqualify a candidate on
grounds provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The Comelec adopted its Rules of Procedure pursuant to its constitutional power to
promulgate its own rules of procedure[6] to expedite the disposition of cases or
controversies falling within its jurisdiction.
The Comelec has ruled upon the qualifications of candidates, even if the Constitution
provides that some other body shall be the "sole judge" of the qualifications of the
holders of the public offices involved. The Court has upheld the jurisdiction of
Comelec to issue such rulings,[7] even when the issue is the citizenship of a
candidate.[8] Thus, the Comelec has jurisdiction to determine initially if FPJ meets
the citizenship qualification to run for President.
However, the Comelec En Banc, in its scanty resolution, failed to state the factual
bases of its ruling. The Comelec En Banc also failed to rule conclusively on the issue
presented whether FPJ is a natural-born Philippine citizen. The Comelec En Banc
affirmed the First Division ruling that "[W]e feel we are not at liberty to finally
declare whether or not the respondent is a natural-born citizen." In short, the
Comelec En Banc allowed a candidate for President to run in the coming elections
without being convinced that the candidate is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Clearly, the Comelec En Banc acted with grave abuse of discretion. Under Section 1,
Article VIII, as well as Section 5, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the Court has
jurisdiction to hear and decide the issue in a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65.
To hold that the Court acquires jurisdiction to determine the qualification of a
candidate for President only after the elections would lead to an absurd situation.
The Court would have to wait for an alien to be elected on election day before he
could be disqualified to run for President. If the case is not decided immediately
after the election, an alien who wins the election may even assume office as
President before he is finally disqualified. Certainly, this is not what the Constitution
says when it provides that "[N]o person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines."[9] The clear and specific language of the
Constitution prohibits the election of one who is not a natural-born citizen. Thus, the
issue of whether a candidate for President is a natural-born Philippine citizen must
be decided before the election.
Governing Laws
Since FPJ was born on 20 August 1939, his citizenship at the time of his birth
depends on the Constitution and statutes in force at the time of his birth.[10] FPJs
citizenship at the time of his birth in 1939, applying the laws in force in 1939,
determines whether he is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Natural-born Philippine citizens are "those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship."[11] If a person has to perform an act, such as proving in an
administrative or judicial proceeding, that an event subsequent to his birth
transpired thus entitling him to Philippine citizenship, such person is not a natural
born citizen.[12]
The 1935 Constitution and the Spanish Civil Code, the laws in force in 1939, are the
governing laws that determine whether a person born in 1939 is a Philippine citizen
at the time of his birth in 1939. Any subsequent legislation cannot change the
citizenship at birth of a person born in 1939 because such legislation would violate
the constitutional definition of a natural-born citizen as one who is a Philippine
citizen from birth. In short, one who is not a Philippine citizen at birth in 1939
cannot be declared by subsequent legislation a natural-born citizen.
General Principles
A legitimate child of a Filipino father follows the citizenship of the father. A child
born within wedlock is presumed to be the son of the father[13] and thus carries the
blood of the father. Under the doctrine of jus sanguinis, as provided for in Section
1(3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, by the fact of legitimacy,
automatically follows the citizenship of the Filipino father.
32
An illegitimate child, however, enjoys no presumption at birth of blood relation to
any father unless the father acknowledges the child at birth.[14] The law has always
required that "in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly
proved."[15] The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of
illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who conclusively carries the blood of the
mother. Thus, unless the father acknowledges the illegitimate child at birth, the
illegitimate child can only acquire the citizenship of the only legally known parent -
the mother.
However, if the Filipino father is legally known because the filiation (blood relation of
illegitimate child to the father) of the child to the Filipino father is established in
accordance with law, the child follows the citizenship of the Filipino father. This gives
effect, without discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children, to the
provision of the 1935 Constitution that "[T]hose whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines"[16] are Philippine citizens.
Nature of Citizenship
If the Filipino father acknowledges the illegitimate child at birth, the child is a
natural-born Philippine citizen because no other act after his birth is required to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. The child possesses all the qualifications
to be a Philippine citizen at birth.
If the Filipino father acknowledges the child after birth, the child is a Philippine
citizen as of the time of the acknowledgment. In this case, the child does not
possess all the qualifications to be a Philippine citizen at birth because an act - the
acknowledgement of the Filipino father - is required for the child to acquire or
perfect his Philippine citizenship. Statutory provisions on retroactivity of
acknowledgment cannot be given effect because they would be contrary to the
constitutional definition of natural- born citizens as those who are Philippine citizens
at birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship.
If the illegitimacy of a child is established, there is no presumption that the child has
the blood of any man who is supposed to be the father. There is only a conclusive
presumption that the child has the blood of the mother. If an illegitimate child claims
to have the blood of a man who is supposed to be the childs father, such blood
relation must be established in accordance with proof of filiation as required by law.
Where the illegitimate child of an alien mother claims to follow the citizenship of the
putative father, the burden is on the illegitimate child to establish a blood relation to
the putative Filipino father since there is no presumption that an illegitimate child
has the blood of the putative father. Even if the putative father admits paternity
after the birth of the illegitimate child, there must be an administrative or judicial
approval that such blood relation exists upon proof of paternity as required by law.
Citizenship, being a matter of public and State interest, cannot be conferred on an
illegitimate child of an alien mother on the mere say so of the putative Filipino
father. The State has a right to examine the veracity of the claim of paternity.
Otherwise, the grant of Philippine citizenship to an illegitimate child of an alien
mother is left to the sole discretion of the putative Filipino father. For example, a
Philippine citizen of Chinese descent can simply claim that he has several illegitimate
children in China. The State cannot be required to grant Philippine passports to
these supposed illegitimate children born in China of Chinese mothers just because
the putative Filipino father acknowledges paternity of these illegitimate children.
There must be either an administrative or judicial determination that the claim of
the putative Filipino father is true.
The case of the illegitimate Vietnamese children, born in Vietnam of Vietnamese
mothers and allegedly of Filipino fathers, is illustrative. These children grew up in
Vietnam, many of them studying there until high school. These children grew up
knowing they were Vietnamese citizens. In 1975, a Philippine Navy vessel brought
them, together with their Vietnamese mothers, to the Philippines as Saigon fell to
the communists. The mothers of these children became stateless when the Republic
of (South) Vietnam ceased to exist in 1975. The Department of Justice rendered
Opinion No. 49 dated 3 May 1995 that being children of Filipino fathers, these
Vietnamese children, even if illegitimate, are Philippine citizens under Section 1(3),
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1(2), Article III of the 1973
Constitution. This Opinion is cited by FPJ as basis for his claim of being a natural-
born Philippine citizen.[17] However, this Opinion categorically stated that before
the illegitimate Vietnamese children may be considered Filipino citizens "it is
necessary in every case referred to that such paternity be established by sufficient
and convincing documentary evidence."[18]
In short, the illegitimate child must prove to the proper administrative or judicial
authority the paternity of the alleged Filipino father by "sufficient and convincing
documentary evidence." Clearly, an administrative or judicial act is necessary to
confer on the illegitimate Vietnamese children Philippine citizenship. The mere claim
of the illegitimate child of filiation to a Filipino father, or the mere acknowledgment
of the alleged Filipino father, does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship on
the child. The State must be convinced of the veracity of such claim and approve
the same. Since the illegitimate Vietnamese children need to perform an act to
33
acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship, they are not natural-born Philippine citizens.
They become Philippine citizens only from the moment the proper administrative or
judicial authority approve and recognize their filiation to their alleged Filipino
fathers.
The rationale behind requiring that only natural-born citizens may hold certain high
public offices[19] is to insure that the holders of these high public offices grew up
knowing they were at birth citizens of the Philippines. In their formative years they
knew they owed from birth their allegiance to the Philippines. In case any other
country claims their allegiance, they would be faithful and loyal to the Philippines of
which they were citizens from birth. This is particularly true to the President who is
the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.[20] The President of the Philippines
must owe, from birth, allegiance to the Philippines and must have grown up
knowing that he was a citizen of the Philippines at birth. The constitutional definition
of a natural-born Philippine citizen would lose its meaning and efficacy if one who
was at birth recognized by law as an alien were declared forty years later[21] a
natural-born Philippine citizen just because his alleged Filipino father subsequently
admitted his paternity.
Proof of Filiation
Article 131[22] of the Spanish Civil Code, the law in force in 1939, recognized only
the following as proof of filiation of a natural child:
a. acknowledgment in a record of birth;
b. acknowledgment in a will;
c. acknowledgment in some other public document.
To establish his Philippine citizenship at birth, FPJ must present either an
acknowledgement in a record of birth, or an acknowledgment in some other public
document executed at the time of his birth. An acknowledgment executed after birth
does not make one a citizen at birth but a citizen from the time of such
acknowledgment since the acknowledgment is an act done after birth to acquire or
perfect Philippine citizenship.
After the birth of one who is not a natural-born Philippine citizen, a subsequent
legislation liberalizing proof of filiation cannot apply to such person to make him a
natural-born citizen. A natural-born Philippine citizen is expressly defined in the
Constitution as one who is a citizen at birth. If a person is not a citizen at birth, no
subsequent legislation can retroactively declare him a citizen at birth since it would
violate the constitutional definition of a natural-born citizen.
Burden of Proof
Any person who claims to be a citizen of the Philippines has the burden of proving
his Philippine citizenship. Any person who claims to be qualified to run for President
because he is, among others, a natural-born Philippine citizen, has the burden of
proving he is a natural-born citizen. Any doubt whether or not he is natural-born
citizen is resolved against him. The constitutional requirement of a natural-born
citizen, being an express qualification for election as President, must be complied
with strictly as defined in the Constitution. As the Court ruled in Paa v. Chan: [23]
It is incumbent upon a person who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the
satisfaction of the Court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged
in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship
must be resolved in favor of the State.
Since the undisputed facts show that FPJ is an illegitimate child, having been born
out of wedlock, the burden is on FPJ to prove his blood relation to his alleged Filipino
father. An illegitimate child enjoys no presumption of blood relation to any father.
Such blood relationship must be established in the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with law.
Private party litigants cannot stipulate on the Philippine citizenship of a person
because citizenship is not a private right or property, but a matter of public and
State interest. Even if petitioner Fornier admits that FPJ, although illegitimate, is the
son of Allan F. Poe, such admission cannot bind the State for the purpose of
conferring on FPJ the status of a natural-born Philippine citizen or even of a
naturalized citizen. Certainly, the Court will not recognize a person as a natural-born
Philippine citizen just because the private party litigants have admitted or stipulated
on such a status. In the present case, the Solicitor General, as representative of the
Government, is strongly disputing the status of FPJ as a natural-born Philippine
citizen.
Legitimation
Under Article 123[24] of the Spanish Civil Code, legitimation took effect as of the
date of marriage. There was no retroactivity of the effects of legitimation on the
34
rights of the legitimated child. Thus, a legitimated child acquired the rights of a
legitimate child only as of the date of marriage of the natural parents. Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelley were married on 16 September 1940 while FPJ was born more
than one year earlier on 20 August 1939. Assuming that Allan F. Poe was FPJs
natural father, the effects of legitimation did not retroact to the birth of FPJ on 20
August 1939.
Besides, legitimation vests only civil, not political rights, to the legitimated child. As
the Court held in Ching Leng:[25]
The framers of the Civil Code had no intention whatsoever to regulate therein
political questions. Hence, apart from reproducing the provisions of the Constitution
on citizenship, the Code contains no precept thereon except that which refers all
matters of "naturalization", as well as those related to the "loss and reacquisition of
citizenship" to "special laws." Consistently with this policy, our Civil Code does not
include therein any rule analogous to Articles 18 to 28 of the Civil Code of Spain,
regulating citizenship. (Underscoring in the original)
Clearly, even assuming that the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
legitimated FPJ, such legitimation did not vest retroactively any civil or political
rights to FPJ.
Treaty of Paris of 1898 and Philippine Bill of 1902
FPJ admits that his grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was a Spanish citizen who came to the
Philippines from Spain.[26] To benefit from the mass naturalization under the Treaty
of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902, FPJ must prove that Lorenzo Pou
was an inhabitant and resident of the Philippines on 11 April 1899. Once it is
established that Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant and resident of the Philippines on 11
April 1899, then he is presumed to have acquired Philippine citizenship under the
Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902.[27] Being an inhabitant and
resident of the Philippines on 11 April 1899 is the determinative fact to fall under
the coverage of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902.[28]
There is, however, no evidence on record that Lorenzo Pou was a Philippine
inhabitant and resident on 11 April 1899. The date of arrival of Lorenzo Pou in the
Philippines is not known. If he arrived in the Philippines after 11 April 1899, then he
could not benefit from the mass naturalization under the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and
the Philippine Bill of 1902. There is also no evidence that Lorenzo Pou was
naturalized as a Philippine citizen after 11 April 1899. Thus, there can be no
presumption that Lorenzo Pou was a Philippine citizen.
There is also no evidence on record that Allan F. Poe, the son of Lorenzo Pou and the
alleged father of FPJ, was naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Thus, based on the
evidence adduced there is no legal basis for claiming that Allan F. Poe is a Philippine
citizen. Nevertheless, there is no need to delve further into this issue since the Court
can decide this case without determining the citizenship of Lorenzo Pou and Allan F.
Poe. Whether or not Lorenzo Pou and Allan F. Poe were Philippine citizens is not
material in resolving whether FPJ is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Convention on the Rights of the Child
The Philippines signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 26 January 1990
and ratified the same on 21 August 1990. The Convention defines a child to mean
"every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law
applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier." Obviously, FPJ cannot invoke the
Convention since he is not a child as defined in the Convention, and he was born
half a century before the Convention came into existence. FPJs citizenship at birth
in 1939 could not in any way be affected by the Convention which entered into force
only on 2 September 1990.
The Convention has the status of a municipal law[29] and its ratification by the
Philippines could not have amended the express requirement in the Constitution
that only natural-born citizens of Philippines are qualified to be President. While the
Constitution apparently favors natural-born citizens over those who are not, that is
the explicit requirement of the Constitution which neither the Executive Department
nor the Legislature, in ratifying a treaty, could amend. In short, the Convention
cannot amend the definition in the Constitution that natural-born citizens are "those
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
In any event, the Convention guarantees a child "the right to acquire a
nationality,"[30] and requires States Parties to "ensure the implementation" of this
right, "in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless."[31] Thus, as far
as nationality or citizenship is concerned, the Convention guarantees the right of the
child to acquire a nationality so that he may not be stateless. The Convention does
not guarantee a child a citizenship at birth, but merely "the right to acquire a
nationality" in accordance with municipal law. When FPJ was born in 1939, he was
apparently under United States law an American citizen at birth.[32] After his birth
FPJ also had the right to acquire Philippine citizenship by proving his filiation to his
alleged Filipino father in accordance with Philippine law. At no point in time was FPJ
in danger of being stateless. Clearly, FPJ cannot invoke the Convention to claim he is
a natural-born Philippine citizen.
35
The Doctrine in Ching Leng v. Galang
The prevailing doctrine today is that an illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an
alien mother follows the citizenship of the alien mother as the only legally known
parent. The illegitimate child, even if acknowledged and legally adopted by the
Filipino father, cannot acquire the citizenship of the father. The Court made this
definitive doctrinal ruling in Ching Leng v. Galang,[33] which involved the
illegitimate minor children of a naturalized Filipino of Chinese descent with a Chinese
woman, Sy An. The illegitimate children were later on jointly adopted by the
naturalized Filipino and his legal wife, So Buan Ty.
The facts in Ching Leng as quoted by the Court from the trial courts decision are as
follows:
After the petitioner Ching Leng Alias Ching Ban Lee obtained judgment in this Court
dated May 2, 1950 granting his petition for naturalization, he together with his wife
So Buan Ty filed another petition also in this Court in Special Proc. No. 1216 for the
adoption of Ching Tiong Seng, Ching Liong Ding, Victoria Ching Liong Yam, Sydney
Ching and Ching Tiong An, all minors and admittedly the illegitimate children of
petitioner Ching Leng with one Sy An, a Chinese citizen. Finding the petition for
adoption proper, this Court granted the same in a decision dated September 12,
1950, declaring the said minors free from all legal obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to their mother Sy An and to all legal intents and
purposes the children of the adopter Ching Leng alias Ching Ban Lee and So Buan Ty
with all the legal rights and obligations provided by law.
On September 29, 1955, Ching Leng took his oath of allegiance and became
therefore a full pledge (sic) Filipino citizen. Believing now that his adopted
illegitimate children became Filipino citizens by virtue of his naturalization, petitioner
Ching Leng addressed a communication to the respondent Commissioner of
Immigration requesting that the alien certificate of registration of the said minors be
cancelled. (Bold underscoring supplied)
In Ching Leng, the Court made a definitive ruling on the meaning of "minor child or
children" in Section 15 of the Naturalization Law,[34] as well as the meaning of
children "whose parents are citizens of the Philippines" under the Constitution. The
Court categorically ruled that these children refer to legitimate children only, and
not to illegitimate children. Thus, the Court held:
It is claimed that the phrases "minor children" and "minor child", used in these
provisions, include adopted children. The argument is predicated upon the theory
that an adopted child is, for all intents and purposes, a legitimate child. Whenever,
the word "children" or "child" is used in statutes, it is generally understood,
however, to refer to legitimate children, unless the context of the law and its spirit
indicate clearly the contrary. Thus, for instance, when the Constitution provides that
"those whose parents are citizens of the Philippines, "and "those whose mothers are
citizens of the Philippines," who shall elect Philippine citizenship "upon reaching the
age of majority", are citizens of the Philippines (Article IV, Section 1, subdivisions 3
and 4), our fundamental law clearly refers to legitimate children (Chiong Bian vs. De
Leon, 46 Off. Gaz., 3652-3654; Serra v. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952).
Similarly, the children alluded to in said section 15 are those begotten in lawful
wedlock, when the adopter, at least is the father. In fact, illegitimate children are
under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality, not that of the
illegitimate father (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332, 335-336; Santos Co vs. Govt
of the Philippines, 52 Phil. 543, 544; Serra v. Republic, supra; Gallofin v. Ordoez,
70 Phil. 287; Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953). Although, adoption
gives "to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate
child of the adopter", pursuant to said Article 341 of our Civil Code, we have already
seen that the rights therein alluded to are merely those enumerated in Article 264,
and do not include the acquisition of the nationality of the adopter.
Moreover, as used in said section 15 of the Naturalization Law, the term "children"
could not possibly refer to those whose relation to the naturalized person is one
created by legal fiction, as, for instance, by adoption, for, otherwise, the place and
time of birth of the child would be immaterial. The fact that the adopted persons
involved in the case at bar are illegitimate children of appellant Ching Leng does not
affect substantially the legal situation before us, for, by legal fiction, they are now
being sought to be given the status of legitimate children of said appellant, despite
the circumstance that the Civil Code of the Philippine does not permit their
legitimation. (Bold underscoring supplied)
Ching Leng, penned by Justice Roberto Concepcion in October 1958, was a
unanimous decision of the Court En Banc. Subsequent Court decisions, including Paa
v. Chan[35] and Morano et al. v. Vivo,[36] have cited the doctrine laid down in
Ching Leng that the provision in the 1935 Constitution stating "those whose fathers
are citizens of the Philippines" refers only to legitimate children. When the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions were drafted, the framers did not attempt to change the intent
of this provision, even as they were presumably aware of the Ching Leng doctrine.
Nevertheless, I believe that it is now time to abandon the Ching Leng doctrine. The
inexorable direction of the law, both international and domestic in the last 100
36
years, is to eliminate all forms of discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate
children. Where the Constitution does not distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate children, we should not also distinguish, especially when private rights
are not involved as in questions of citizenship. Abandoning the Ching Leng doctrine
upholds the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Abandoning the Ching Leng
doctrine is also in compliance with our treaty obligation under the Covenant on the
Rights of Children mandating States Parties to eliminate all forms of discrimination
based on the status of children, save of course those distinctions prescribed in the
Constitution itself like the reservation of certain high public offices to natural-born
citizens.
Abandoning the Ching Leng doctrine does not mean, however, that an illegitimate
child of a Filipino father and an alien mother automatically becomes a Philippine
citizen at birth. We have repeatedly ruled that an illegitimate child does not enjoy
any presumption of blood relation to the alleged father until filiation or blood
relation is proved as provided by law.[37] Article 887 of the Civil Code expressly
provides that "[I]n all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly
proved." The illegitimate child becomes a Philippine citizen only from the time he
establishes his blood relation to the Filipino father. If the blood relation is
established after the birth of the illegitimate child, then the child is not a natural-
born Philippine citizen since an act is required after birth to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.
Conclusion
In conclusion, private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is not a natural-born Philippine
citizen since there is no showing that his alleged Filipino father Allan F. Poe
acknowledged him at birth. The Constitution defines a natural-born citizen as a
Philippine citizen "from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect" his Philippine citizenship. Private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. does not
meet this citizenship qualification.
Therefore, I vote to grant the petition of Victorino X. Fornier. However, I vote to
dismiss the petitions of Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. and Zoilo
Antonio Velez on the ground that their direct petitions invoking the jurisdiction of
the Court under Section 4, paragraph 7, Article VII of the Constitution are
premature, there being no election contest in this case.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR.,
respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes
are deserving of the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well as an
inestimable acquisition,1[1] that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either
by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of
profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to
1 executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having
37
challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of
the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is
Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for
the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American
colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law
traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no
less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be
20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition
docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon
the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier,
his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and
his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being
an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the
illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a
prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and,
second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie
Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004,
petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a
copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit
filed a case for
bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after
discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of
the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F.
Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and
Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National
Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before
1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of
the National Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in
the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the
more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San
Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives
Division of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of
Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald
Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration
No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a
copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage
contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by
the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of
birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally
destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit.
Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration.
The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10
February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court
conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a
temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution
that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R.
No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and
Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII,
38
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC
deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged
misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before
the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the
Omnibus Election Code -
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the
powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall
have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest
elections -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize
"any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court per Rule 64 2[2] in an action for certiorari under Rule 653[3] of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also
reads
2
3
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by
the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided
by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial
power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law which power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly
elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view
could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed,
and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the
highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634,
invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution
in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-
003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly
instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935
and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of
presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in
39
Lopez vs. Roxas,4[4] as not (being) justiciable controversies or disputes involving
contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact
Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral
Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-
Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of
Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal.
Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under
the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the
statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election
scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto
which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to
dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12,
Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,"
promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this
premise -
Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the
Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An
election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo
warranto shall not include an election protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-
President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of
votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case
may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of
the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo
warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. 5[5] In such
context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule
14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third
highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a
post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section
4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought
before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-
presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs.
Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez
vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for
want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical
background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared
in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office. 6[6] Aristotle saw its
significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described
as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a
self-sufficient existence.7[7] The concept grew to include one who would both
govern and be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and
loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements,
on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other.8[8] In its ideal
5 11
6 12
7 13
40
setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his
private interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th
century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established
the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal
liberty and justice.9[9] Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include
political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of
political power.10[10] The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of
social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-
being and social security.11[11] The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the
modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final
stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well
be the internationalization of citizenship.12[12]
The Local Setting - from Spanish
Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but
"subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects." 13[13] In church records, the natives were
called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish
laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer
number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these
8
9
10
citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands
except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.14[14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion,
promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to
the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts; 15[15]
however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the
Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,16[16] the Royal Decree of
23 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the
Philippine Islands,17[17] and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870,
which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13
July 1870.18[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands
because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions
of the Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by
special laws.19[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18
December 1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were
Spanish citizens. -
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
14
15
16
17
18
19
41
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born
outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy.20[20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of
decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to
an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international
law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all
political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain
virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the
United States.21[21] Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status
of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be
determined by its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which
Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in
such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of
property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds;
and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and
professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to
foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date
of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to
preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have
renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they
reside.
Thus
20
21
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby
ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress." 22[22]
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States
Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be
Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however,
also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports
describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the
United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the
Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of
1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on
the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who
were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the
United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and
ninety eight."23[23]
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of
the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day of April 1899. The term
inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who
was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers
on or before 11 April 1899.24[24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April
1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at
22
23
24
42
the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the
principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those
born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period. 25[25] More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following
amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands
who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular
possession of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the
United States, if residing therein."26[26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens"
had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft,
the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of
it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy
Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine
Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such
others as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the
Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do
not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of
the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are
citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States
under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
25
26
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 Constitution.
April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a
citizen of some other country. (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a
mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such
link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood
relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that
-

"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have
this Constitution
renounced her citizenship."

(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution,
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation
Islands.
generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Constitution.

Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose
their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in
discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting (3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the
provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns - The Case Of FPJ

Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
Philippines:

43
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age
on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship."27[27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the
regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring
citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis28[28] had been in
vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs29[29] (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution
and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor 30[30] (1947), jus
sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship
by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou,
married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of
Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however,
identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years
old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the
father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol
father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by
petitioner was an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage
of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan
F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September
1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old,
27
28
29
30
44
unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old,
unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that
he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old,
married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the
entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his
parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty
from the documents would be that -
1.The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84
years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a
natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are
documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have
been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings
before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for
respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted
as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted
by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in
evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the
facts which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the
date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to
the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all
admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his argument.
All three documents were certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had
complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.

xxx xxx xxx Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil
status of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate
recorded in a public office. son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.

Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute
prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court
provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08
December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the
Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or
paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or
compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the
putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a
will, or a public document. 32[32] Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753
or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made
jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In
therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the
the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the
statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3)
name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of
information by which such father could be identified.
record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have
occurred.31[31]
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September
sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless
1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed
as being an authoritative document of recognition. 33[33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,34[34]
that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still
the Court ruled -
a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines
during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no
existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office.
Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place
during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was
32
stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of 33
a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be

31 34

45
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question
here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a
certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his
having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be
placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that
they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of
Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of
them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that
in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein
voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same
Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the
document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the
document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently
executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the
only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public
document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,35[35] this Court defined what could constitute such
a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those
executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries,
and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office. The public
document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may
be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to
be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full
blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially
declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in
cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an
action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and
might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the
presumed parent.
35
46
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic
writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition,
simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would
include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other
competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and
Article 175 provide:
Art. 172.The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during
his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five
years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death
of either or both of the parties.
xxx xxx x x x.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code
reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,36[36] the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be
decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that
Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place
according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body
of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive
effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional
idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the
family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are
intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is
little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual
would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State.
While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such
provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil law;
particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of
the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of
precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and
obedience among members of a family, and those which exist among members of a
society for the protection of private interests."37[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,38[38] the Court has held:
36
37
47
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons,
govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence,
'all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the
matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between
them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital
authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal
causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in
general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of
the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the
husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional
provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships
found in different parts of the Civil Code, 39[39] such as on successional rights and
family relations.40[40] In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be
considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their
legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil
law41[41] and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory
attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while
defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided
distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial
38
39
40
41
set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly "I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in
according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby
foreign blood was paramount. declare that:

These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish 1.I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code
became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, 2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or
impinge on the domain of political law.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan
Poe, more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr.,
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status or `FPJ.
should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that
prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof
4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's
of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters
Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and
should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded
from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions. xxx xxx xxx

Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides - 7.
Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth
or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy,
and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such 8.
act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth,
marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the 9.
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected
with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already
dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the
declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) 10.
declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the
relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question
must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged
while they were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936.
I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same
year.
Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children,
Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together
with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge
Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for
some months between 1943-1944.
Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4)
more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
xxx xxx xxx

Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie 18.
Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove
the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living
together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one
house, and as one family -
I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew,
Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the
legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.

48
 Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or
would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained
from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead
parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In
Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,42[42] this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of
DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University
of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat
(STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has
two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts
should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that
courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on
July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his
subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate
child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence
introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of
respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on
20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to
each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would
make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ
so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing
his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,43[43] citing Chiongbian vs.
de Leon44[44] and Serra vs. Republic.45[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ,
is most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the
pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the
pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare
decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement
would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I
therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino
father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese
mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the
naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did
not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a
Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by
election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section
1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino
father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The
43
44

42 45

49
issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still
needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.46[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about the
citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed
that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father.
But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact
the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not
Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore
was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum.
The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin
would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin,
based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x
x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in
Morano vs. Vivo.
xxx xxx xxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in
the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a
legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate
distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child
of a Filipino mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by
People vs. Cayat.47[47] I would grant that the distinction between legitimate
children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences
alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for
one purpose but not for another purpose.
46
47
50
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service?
What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from
becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit
liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his
own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to
punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality
in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the
distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this
Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have
expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on
pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of
its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality
for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the
mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support
her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate
against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of
respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions
nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines
are those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There utterly is no cogent
justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none
provided.
In Sum
(1)The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction
over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the
COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the
petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent
FPJ from running for the position of President in the 10 th May 2004 national elections
on the contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate
of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the
petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to
this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and
vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary
jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections
are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has
been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether
or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether
or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino
citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent
prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been
born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and
In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, courts become the unfeeling pillars of the status
quo. Ligle do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our way by their
framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day.
The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:
a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued restraining the respondents
from applying and enforcing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960;
b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered:
1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners and respondents;
2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution, hence void; because its provision that "Foreign currency deposits shall be
exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever

that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before i.) has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of
defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization rendered in petitioners' favor in violation of substantive due process
that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if guaranteed by the Constitution;
acquired, would thereby extend Republic of the Philippines
ii.) has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class
privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution;

SUPREME COURT iii.) has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent
Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for
Manila their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign
currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account with an
authorized bank.
EN BANC
The antecedent facts:
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997
On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion,
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and Spouses then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or
FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners, up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5,
vs. 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.)
NORTHCOTT, respondents. Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-
108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.)
Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the
complainant.

TORRES, JR., J.:

51
On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case No. The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar accounts within the country's banking system
801 for Serious Illegal Detention and Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805 for four (4) counts of Rape. On which would help in the development of the economy. There is no intention to render futile the
the same day, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with basic rights of a person as was suggested in your subject letter. The law may be harsh as
preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24, 1989, the day there was a scheduled hearing for some perceive it, but it is still the law. Compliance is, therefore, enjoined.
Bartelli's petition for bail the latter escaped from jail.
Very truly yours,
On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscal's Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest
and Hold Departure Order. Pending the arrest of the accused Greg Bartelli y Northcott, the criminal cases were
(SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDO
archived in an Order dated February 28, 1989. 1
Director

Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order dated February 22, 1989 granting the application
of herein petitioners, for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. After petitioners gave Bond No. JCL (4) Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioners' motion for leave to
1981 by FGU Insurance Corporation in the amount of P100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued by
serve summons by publication in the Civil Case No. 89-3214 entitled "Karen Salvacion,
the trial court on February 28, 1989.
et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott." Summons with the complaint was a published in
On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking Corporation. In a
the Manila Times once a week for three consecutive weeks. Greg Bartelli failed to file
letter dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation invoked Republic Act No. his answer to the complaint and was declared in default on August 7, 1989. After
1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati Armando hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners on March
de Guzman sent his reply to China Banking Corporation saying that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy of
bank deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a
29, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:
court order which has placed the subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer to this letter of the Deputy Sheriff of
Makati, China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and
No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits or defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment,
or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body, against defendant, ordering the latter:
whatsoever.
1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 as
This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank in a letter dated April 25, 1989 on
moral damages;
whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or whether said section has been repealed or
amended since said section has rendered nugatory the substantive right of the plaintiff to have the claim sought to
be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted to the plaintiff under 2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N. Salvacion, Jr.,
Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Central Bank responded as follows:
and Evelina E. Salvacion the amount of P150,000.00 each or a total of
P300,000.00 for both of them;
May 26, 1989

Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino 3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and

12 Pres. Osmena Avenue
South Admiral Village
Paranaque, Metro Manila
4. To pay attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to 25% of the total
amount of damages herein awarded;
Dear Ms. Carolino:
5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus
This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989 regarding your inquiry on Section 113, CB
Circular No. 960 (1983).
6. Costs of the suit.
The cited provision is absolute in application. It does not admit of any exception, nor has the
same been repealed nor amended. SO ORDERED.

52
The heinous acts of respondent Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the award were
related in graphic detail by the trial court in its decision as follows:
The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal jail
of Makati but was able to escape therefrom on February 24, 1989 as
per report of the Jail Warden of Makati to the Presiding Judge,
Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 136, where he was charged with four counts of Rape and
Serious Illegal Detention (Crim. Cases Nos. 802 to 805). Accordingly,
upon motion of plaintiffs, through counsel, summons was served upon
defendant by publication in the Manila Times, a newspaper of general
circulation as attested by the Advertising Manager of the Metro Media
Times, Inc., the publisher of the said newspaper. Defendant, however,
failed to file his answer to the complaint despite the lapse of the period
of sixty (60) days from the last publication; hence, upon motion of the
plaintiffs, through counsel, defendant was declared in default and
plaintiffs were authorized to present their evidence ex parte.
In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as witnesses the minor
Karen E. Salvacion, her father, Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., a certain
Joseph Aguilar and a certain Liberato Madulio, who gave the following
testimony:
Karen took her first year high school in St. Mary's Academy in Pasay
City but has recently transferred to Arellano University for her second
year.
In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair
Makati Cinema Square, with her friend Edna Tangile whiling away her
free time. At about 3:30 p.m. while she was finishing her snack on a
concrete bench in front of Plaza Fair, an American approached her.
She was then alone because Edna Tangile had already left, and she
was about to go home. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 2 to 5)
The American asked her name and introduced himself as Greg
Bartelli. He sat beside her when he talked to her. He said he was a
Math teacher and told her that he has a sister who is a nurse in New
53
York. His sister allegedly has a daughter who is about Karen's age and
who was with him in his house along Kalayaan Avenue. (TSN, Aug. 15,
1989, pp. 4-5)
The American asked Karen what was her favorite subject and she told
him it's Pilipino. He then invited her to go with him to his house where
she could teach Pilipino to his niece. He even gave her a stuffed toy to
persuade her to teach his niece. (Id., pp. 5-6)
They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning right to
reach the defendant's house along Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p. 6)
When they reached the apartment house, Karen noticed that
defendant's alleged niece was not outside the house but defendant
told her maybe his niece was inside. When Karen did not see the
alleged niece inside the house, defendant told her maybe his niece
was upstairs, and invited Karen to go upstairs. (Id., p. 7)
Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked the door.
Karen became nervous because his niece was not there. Defendant
got a piece of cotton cord and tied Karen's hands with it, and then he
undressed her. Karen cried for help but defendant strangled her. He
took a packing tape and he covered her mouth with it and he circled it
around her head. (Id., p. 7)
Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed which was
just near the door. He tied her feet and hands spread apart to the bed
posts. He knelt in front of her and inserted his finger in her sex organ.
She felt severe pain. She tried to shout but no sound could come out
because there were tapes on her mouth. When defendant withdrew
his finger it was full of blood and Karen felt more pain after the
withdrawal of the finger. (Id., p. 8)
He then got a Johnson's Baby Oil and he applied it to his sex organ as
well as to her sex organ. After that he forced his sex organ into her but
he was not able to do so. While he was doing it, Karen found it difficult
to breathe and she perspired a lot while feeling severe pain. She
merely presumed that he was able to insert his sex organ a little,
because she could not see. Karen could not recall how long the
defendant was in that position. (Id. pp. 8-9)
After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He also told
Karen to take a shower and he untied her hands. Karen could only
hear the sound of the water while the defendant, she presumed, was
in the bathroom washing his sex organ. When she took a shower more
blood came out from her. In the meantime, defendant changed the
mattress because it was full of blood. After the shower, Karen was
allowed by defendant to sleep. She fell asleep because she got tired
crying. The incident happened at about 4:00 p.m. Karen had no way of
determining the exact time because defendant removed her watch.
Defendant did not care to give her food before she went to sleep.
Karen woke up at about 8:00 o'clock the following morning. (Id., pp. 9-
10)
The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after a breakfast of
biscuit and coke at about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. defendant raped Karen
while she was still bleeding. For lunch, they also took biscuit and coke.
She was raped for the second time at about 12:00 to 2:00 p.m. In the
evening, they had rice for dinner which defendant had stored
downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice that is why it looks like
"lugaw". For the third time, Karen was raped again during the night.
During those three times defendant succeeded in inserting his sex
organ but she could not say whether the organ was inserted wholly.
Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The defendant
did not tie her hands and feet nor put a tape on her mouth anymore
but she did not cry for help for fear that she might be killed; besides, all
the windows and doors were closed. And even if she shouted for help,
nobody would hear her. She was so afraid that if somebody would
hear her and would be able to call the police, it was still possible that
as she was still inside the house, defendant might kill her. Besides, the
defendant did not leave that Sunday, ruling out her chance to call for
help. At nighttime he slept with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 12-
14)
54
On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times, once in
the morning for thirty minutes after a breakfast of biscuits; again in the
afternoon; and again in the evening. At first, Karen did not know that
there was a window because everything was covered by a carpet, until
defendant opened the window for around fifteen minutes or less to let
some air in, and she found that the window was covered by styrofoam
and plywood. After that, he again closed the window with a hammer
and he put the styrofoam, plywood, and carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15)
That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for help, although
defendant left but kept the door closed. She went to the bathroom and
saw a small window covered by styrofoam and she also spotted a
small hole. She stepped on the bowl and she cried for help through the
hole. She cried: "Maawa no po kayo so akin. Tulungan n'yo akong
makalabas dito. Kinidnap ako!" Somebody heard her. It was a woman,
probably a neighbor, but she got angry and said she was "istorbo".
Karen pleaded for help and the woman told her to sleep and she will
call the police. She finally fell asleep but no policeman came. (TSN,
Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-16)
She woke up at 6:00 o'clock the following morning, and she saw
defendant in bed, this time sleeping. She waited for him to wake up.
When he woke up, he again got some food but he always kept the
door locked. As usual, she was merely fed with biscuit and coke. On
that day, February 7, 1989, she was again raped three times. The first
at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about 8:30 9:00, and the
third was after lunch at 12:00 noon. After he had raped her for the
second time he left but only for a short while. Upon his return, he
caught her shouting for help but he did not understand what she was
shouting about. After she was raped the third time, he left the house.
(TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 16-17) She again went to the bathroom and
shouted for help. After shouting for about five minutes, she heard
many voices. The voices were asking for her name and she gave her
name as Karen Salvacion. After a while, she heard a voice of a woman
saying they will just call the police. They were also telling her to
change her clothes. She went from the bathroom to the room but she
did not change her clothes being afraid that should the neighbors call
for the police and the defendant see her in different clothes, he might
kill her. At that time she was wearing a T-shirt of the American because
the latter washed her dress. (Id., p. 16)
Afterwards, defendant arrived and he opened the door. He asked her if
she had asked for help because there were many policemen outside
and she denied it. He told her to change her clothes, and she did
change to the one she was wearing on Saturday. He instructed her to
tell the police that she left home and willingly; then he went downstairs
but he locked the door. She could hear people conversing but she
could not understand what they were saying. (Id., p. 19)
When she heard the voices of many people who were conversing
downstairs, she knocked repeatedly at the door as hard as she could.
She heard somebody going upstairs and when the door was opened,
she saw a policeman. The policeman asked her name and the reason
why she was there. She told him she was kidnapped. Downstairs, he
saw about five policemen in uniform and the defendant was talking to
them. "Nakikipag-areglo po sa mga pulis," Karen added. "The
policeman told him to just explain at the precinct. (Id., p. 20)
At the headquarters, she was asked several questions by the
investigator. The written statement she gave to the police was marked
as Exhibit A. Then they proceeded to the National Bureau of
Investigation together with the investigator and her parents. At the NBI,
a doctor, a medico-legal officer, examined her private parts. It was
already 3:00 in the early morning of the following day when they
reached the NBI. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 22) The findings of the
medico-legal officer has been marked as Exhibit B.
She was studying at the St. Mary's Academy in Pasay City at the time
of the incident but she subsequently transferred to Apolinario Mabini,
Arellano University, situated along Taft Avenue, because she was
ashamed to be the subject of conversation in the school. She first
applied for transfer to Jose Abad Santos, Arellano University along Taft
Avenue near the Light Rail Transit Station but she was denied
admission after she told the school the true reason for her transfer.
The reason for their denial was that they might be implicated in the
case. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 46)
xxx xxx xxx

They went out of the house and she saw some of her neighbors in
front of the house. They rode the car of a certain person she called
Kuya Boy together with defendant, the policeman, and two of her
neighbors whom she called Kuya Bong Lacson and one Ate Nita. They
were brought to Sub-Station I and there she was investigated by a
policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her father arrived, followed by her
mother together with some of their neighbors. Then they were brought
to the second floor of the police headquarters. (Id., p. 21)
After the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does not play with her
brother and sister anymore, and she is always in a state of shock; she
has been absent-minded and is ashamed even to go out of the house.
(TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10) She appears to be restless or sad, (Id., p.
11) The father prays for P500,000.00 moral damages for Karen for this
shocking experience which probably, she would always recall until she
reaches old age, and he is not sure if she could ever recover from this
experience. (TSN, Sept. 24, 1989, pp. 10-11)

Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was
published in the Manila Bulletin once a week for three consecutive weeks. After the
lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of the last publication of the notice of judgment
and the decision of the trial court had become final, petitioners tried to execute on
Bartelli's dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the bank invoked
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960.

55
Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.
The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to two:
May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction in
petitions for declaratory relief rests with the lower court? Should Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246,
otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign
transient?
Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
providing that "Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever." should be adjudged as
unconstitutional on the grounds that: 1.) it has taken away the right of petitioners to
have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the
judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in violation of substantive due process
guaranteed by the Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign currency depositors an undue
favor or a class privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution;
3.) it has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y
Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely
converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency
deposit account with an authorized bank; and 4.) The Monetary Board, in issuing
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 has exceeded its delegated quasi-
legislative power when it took away: a.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have the claim
sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary
attachment as granted by Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court; b.) the plaintiffs
substantive right to have the judgment credit satisfied by way of the writ of execution
out of the bank deposit of the judgment debtor as granted to the judgment creditor by
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is beyond its power to do so.
On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in its Comment alleges that the Monetary
Board in issuing Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 did not exceed its power or
authority because the subject Section is copied verbatim from a portion of R.A. No.
6426 as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that grants
exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign currency deposits, but the law
(R.A. 6426 as amended) itself; that it does not violate the substantive due process
56
guaranteed by the Constitution because a.) it was based on a law; b.) the law seems to
be reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and d.) it
applies to all members of a class.
Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the foreign currency
deposits from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court, is to
assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System
and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines; that another reason is to
encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions thereby
placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to loans and
investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic development
of the country; that the subject section is being enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure; and that it applies to all foreign currency deposits made by any
person and therefore does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is needed to
promote the public interest and the general welfare; that the State cannot just stand
idly by while a considerable segment of the society suffers from economic distress; that
the State had to take some measures to encourage economic development; and that in
so doing persons and property may be subjected to some kinds of restraints or
burdens to secure the general welfare or public interest. Respondent Central Bank also
alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that some
properties are exempted from execution/attachment especially provided by law and
R.A. No. 6426 as amended is such a law, in that it specifically provides, among others,
that foreign currency deposits shall be exempted from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.
For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons similar
to that of respondent Central Bank, also stated that respondent China Bank is not
unmindful of the inhuman sufferings experienced by the minor Karen E. Salvacion from
the beastly hands of Greg Bartelli; that it is only too willing to release the dollar deposit
of Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the sufferings petitioner has undergone;
but it is restrained from doing so in view of R.A. No. 6426 and Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960; and that despite the harsh effect of these laws on petitioners,
CBC has no other alternative but to follow the same.
This Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.
Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this
petition for declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition for
mandamus to require respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution in
Civil Case No. 89-3214.
This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory
relief. 2 However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the
petition has far-reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it
may be treated as one for mandamus. 3
Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans are good and in
her gesture of kindness by teaching his alleged niece the Filipino language as
requested by the American, trustingly went with said stranger to his apartment, and
there she was raped by said American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times.
She was detained therein for four (4) days. This American tourist was able to escape
from the jail and avoid punishment. On the other hand, the child, having received a
favorable judgment in the Civil Case for damages in the amount of more than
P1,000,000.00, which amount could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched
reputation she had suffered and may continue to suffer for a long, long time; and
knowing that this person who had wronged her has the money, could not, however get
the award of damages because of this unreasonable law. This questioned law,
therefore makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that she and her
parents fully deserve. As stated by the trial court in its decision,
Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes that it
was undoubtedly a shocking and traumatic experience she had
undergone which could haunt her mind for a long, long time, the mere
recall of which could make her feel so humiliated, as in fact she had
been actually humiliated once when she was refused admission at the
Abad Santos High School, Arellano University, where she sought to
transfer from another school, simply because the school authorities of
the said High School learned about what happened to her and
allegedly feared that they might be implicated in the case.
xxx xxx xxx
57
The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to
the wanton and bestial manner defendant had committed the acts of
rape during a period of serious illegal detention of his hapless victim,
the minor Karen Salvacion whose only fault was in her being so naive
and credulous to believe easily that defendant, an American national,
could not have such a bestial desire on her nor capable of committing
such a heinous crime. Being only 12 years old when that unfortunate
incident happened, she has never heard of an old Filipino adage that
in every forest there is a
4
snake, . . . .
If Karen's sad fate had happened to anybody's own kin, it would be difficult for him to
fathom how the incentive for foreign currency deposit could be more important than his
child's rights to said award of damages; in this case, the victim's claim for damages
from this alien who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a country where he
is a mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the questioned provisions.
It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the
country's economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and
presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the
present times show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not, the
questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable
and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The
law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality
such as the case before us.
It has thus been said that
But I also know, 5 that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with
the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed,
more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths are
disclosed and manners and opinions change with the change of
circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the
times. . . We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which
fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the
regimen of their barbarous ancestors.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:
The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a
national to obtain redress for a wrong committed by an alien who takes
refuge under a law and regulation promulgated for a purpose which
does not contemplate the application thereof envisaged by the alien.
More specifically, the petition raises the question whether the
protection against attachment, garnishment or other court process
accorded to foreign currency deposits by PD No. 1246 and CB
Circular No. 960 applies when the deposit does not come from a
lender or investor but from a mere transient or tourist who is not
expected to maintain the deposit in the bank for long.
The resolution of this question is important for the protection of
nationals who are victimized in the forum by foreigners who are merely
passing through.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the
Philippines refused to honor the writ of execution issued in Civil Case
No. 89-3214 on the strength of the following provision of Central Bank
Circular No. 960:
Sec. 113. Exemption from attachment. Foreign
currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.
Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 6426:
Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. The Monetary Board
of the Central Bank shall promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act which shall take effect after the
58
publication of such rules and regulations in the Official
Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for
at least once a week for three consecutive weeks. In
case the Central Bank promulgates new rules and
regulations decreasing the rights of depositors, the
rules and regulations at the time the deposit was
made shall govern.
The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act
NO. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, thus:
Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. All
foreign currency deposits authorized under this Act, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as
foreign currency deposits authorized under
Presidential Decree No. 1034, are hereby declared as
and considered of an absolutely confidential nature
and, except upon the written permission of the
depositor, in no instance shall such foreign currency
deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any
person, government official, bureau or office whether
judicial or administrative or legislative or any other
entity whether public or private: Provided, however,
that said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection against attachment,
garnishment and other court process to foreign currency deposits is
stated in its whereases, viz.:
WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 6426, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, certain
Philippine banking institutions and branches of foreign
banks are authorized to accept deposits in foreign
currency;
 WHEREAS, under the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1034 authorizing the establishment of an
offshore banking system in the Philippines, offshore
banking units are also authorized to receive foreign
currency deposits in certain cases;
WHEREAS, in order to assure the development and
speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit
System and the Offshore Banking System in the
Philippines, certain incentives were provided for under
the two Systems such as confidentiality of deposits
subject to certain exceptions and tax exemptions on
the interest income of depositors who are
nonresidents and are not engaged in trade or
business in the Philippines;
WHEREAS, making absolute the protective cloak of
confidentiality over such foreign currency deposits,
exempting such deposits from tax, and guaranteeing
the vested rights of depositors would better encourage
the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking
institutions authorized to accept such deposits in the
Philippines thereby placing such institutions more in a
position to properly channel the same to loans and
investments in the Philippines, thus directly
contributing to the economic development of the
country;
Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection accorded to
foreign currency deposits is "to assure the development and speedy
growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit system and the Offshore
Banking in the Philippines" (3rd Whereas).
The Offshore Banking System was established by PD No. 1034. In
turn, the purposes of PD No. 1034 are as follows:
59
WHEREAS, conditions conducive to the establishment
of an offshore banking system, such as political
stability, a growing economy and adequate
communication facilities, among others, exist in the
Philippines;
WHEREAS, it is in the interest of developing countries
to have as wide access as possible to the sources of
capital funds for economic development;
WHEREAS, an offshore banking system based in the
Philippines will be advantageous and beneficial to the
country by increasing our links with foreign lenders,
facilitating the flow of desired investments into the
Philippines, creating employment opportunities and
expertise in international finance, and contributing to
the national development effort.
WHEREAS, the geographical location, physical and
human resources, and other positive factors provide
the Philippines with the clear potential to develop as
another financial center in Asia;
On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit system was created
by PD. No. 1035. Its purposes are as follows:
WHEREAS, the establishment of an offshore banking
system in the Philippines has been authorized under a
separate decree;
WHEREAS, a number of local commercial banks, as
depository bank under the Foreign Currency Deposit
Act (RA No. 6426), have the resources and
managerial competence to more actively engage in
foreign exchange transactions and participate in the
grant of foreign currency loans to resident
corporations and firms;
 WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the foreign currency
lending authority of the said depository banks under
RA 6426 and apply to their transactions the same
taxes as would be applicable to transaction of the
proposed offshore banking units;
It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore
Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were
designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors (Vide
second Whereas of PD No. 1034; third Whereas of PD No. 1035). It is
these deposits that are induced by the two laws and given protection
and incentives by them.
Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist
is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and
given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor
stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his
deposit in the bank only for a short time.
Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He
deposited his dollars with respondent China Banking Corporation only
for safekeeping during his temporary stay in the Philippines.
For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus submits that
the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the
protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No.
1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes. 6
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we
rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a
foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign
guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code
which provides that "in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non
deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the statute
60
is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to
the vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960
would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing,
acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.
Call it what it may but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso?
Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower court against the Central Bank
Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a
transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This
situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny.
We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the
ends of justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No.
1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are
hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-
3214, "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC
Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y
Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
SO ORDERED.
to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during
which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate
or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation
of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has
utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample
opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove
whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,48[48] must not only be material, but also
deliberate and willful.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS

1.G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
"Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634,
entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a.
Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.

2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.

Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

48

61