Dela Puerta vs CA

The basic issue involved in this case is the filiation of private respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, who claims
successional lights to the estate of her alleged grandmother.

Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with a will leaving her properties to her three
surviving children, namely, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all surnamed de la Puerta. Isabel was given the free
portion in addition to her legitime and was appointed executrix of the will. 1

The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was opposed by her brothers, who averred that their
mother was already senile at the time of the execution of the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning.
Moreover, some of the properties listed in the inventory of her estate belonged to them exclusively. 2

Meantime, Isabel was appointed special administratrix by the probate court. 3 Alfredo subsequently died,
leaving Vicente the lone oppositor. 4

On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon a petition to adopt
Carmelita de la Puerta. After hearing, the petition was granted. 5 However, the decision was appealed by
Isabel to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, Vicente died, prompting her to move
for the dismissal of the case 6

On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in the probate proceedings, filed a motion
for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la Puerta. 7 At
the hearing on her motion, Carmelita presented evidence to prove her claimed status to which Isabel was
allowed to submit counter-evidence.

On November 12,1982, the probate court granted the motion, declaring that it was satisfied from the evidence
at hand that Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta and was entitled to the amounts claimed for
her support. The court added that "the evidence presented by the petitioner against it (was) too weak to
discredit the same. 8

Ruling:The presumption of marriage between Juanito and Gloria having been destroyed, it became necessary
for the petitioner to submit additional proof to show that the two were legally married. She did not.

Turning now to the evidence required to prove the private respondent's filiation, we reject the petitioner's
contention that Article 278 of the Civil Code is not available to Carmelita. It is error to contend that as she is not
a natural child but a spurious child (if at all) she cannot prove her status by the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or any authentic writing. On the contrary, it has long been settled that:

The so-called spurious children or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonly
known as bastards, include adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married
woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a
woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights (Art. 287,
CC). But their filiation must be duly proven.(Ibid, Art. 887)

How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of
the paternity or maternity of spurious children under the circumstances specified in Articles
 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of
natural children are applicable to spurious children.

Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof of
filiation of natural children or the rule on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for
natural children may be applied to spurious children. 16

This being so, we need not rule now on the admissibility of the private respondent's certificate of birth as proof
of her filiation. That status was sufficiently established by the sworn testimony of Vicente de la Puerta at the
hearing of the petition for adoption on September 6, 1976, where he categorically declared as follows:

Q What relation if any do you have with Carmelita de la Puerta?

A She is my daughter. 17

Finally, we move to the most crucial question, to wit: May Carmelita de la Puerta claim support and
successional rights to the estate of Dominga Revuelta?

According to Article 970 of the Civil Code:

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires
the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.

The answer to the question posed must be in the negative. The first reason is that Vicente de la Puerta did not
predecease his mother; and the second is that Carmelita is a spurious child.

It is settled that

In testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place only in the following
cases: first, when the person represented dies before the testator; second, when the person
represented is incapable of succeeding the testator; and third, when the person represented is
disinherited by the testator. In all of these cases, since there is a vacancy in the inheritance,
the law calls the children or descendants of the person represented to succeed by right of
representation. 18

xxx xxx xxx

The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives of a deceased person try to
succeed him in his rights which he would have had if still living. In the present case, however,
said deceased had already succeeded his aunt, the testatrix herein. . . . It is a fact that at the
time of the death of the testatrix, Reynaldo Cuison was still alive. He died two months after
her (testatrix's) death. And upon his death, he transmitted to his heirs, the petitioners herein
Elisa Cuison et al., the legacy or the right to succeed to the legacy. . . . In other words, the
herein petitioners-appellants are not trying to succeed to the right to the property of the
testatrix, but rather to the right of the legatee Reynaldo Cuison in said property. 19

Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right to inherit from her directly or in his
own right. No right of representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita upon her father's death,
which came after his own mother's death. It would have been different if Vicente was already dead when
Dominga Revuelta died. Carmelita could then have inherited from her in representation of her father Vicente,
assuming the private respondent was a lawful heir.

But herein lies the crux, for she is not. As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from
Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the legitimate and
illegitimate families. This article provides quite clearly:

Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.

Applying this rule in Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court declared:

. . . even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of
representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering
that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the
fact that when he was born, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and
what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would
be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes.

The reason for this rule was explained in the recent case of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 21 thus:

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of
blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former in turn
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish
broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of
resentment. 22

Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from inheriting from Dominga Revuelta for
there would be no natural kindred ties between them and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either. As
aptly pointed out by Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino:

If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the latter cannot represent the
former in the inheritance from the parents or ascendants of the adopter. The adopted child is
not related to the deceased in that case, because the filiation created by fiction of law is
exclusively between the adopter and the adopted. "By adoption, the adopters can make for
themselves an heir, but they cannot thus make one for their kindred. 23

The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta, has successional rights to the
intestate estate of her father but not to the estate of Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance
should therefore be filed in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father's
estate 24 and cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga Revuelta's Will.
BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA
MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and
NUMERIANA MANUEL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan,
MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who
died intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant.

Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During his
marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan
Manuel was born. Several years passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz, and his mistress Ursula finally
crossed the bar on, respectively, 06 August 1960, 05 February 1981 and 04 November 1976.

Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a
donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 square meters, covered by Original
Certificate of Title ("OCT") No. P-20594 was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two
other parcels of land, covered by OCT P-19902 and Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. 41134, were later
bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire
to have one impelled the spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so
raised her as their own "daughter".

On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de
Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land covered by TCT No. 41134.
Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba
also passed away.

On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
claiming for herself the three parcels of land

Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate (while the other half would
pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code,
providing thusly:

Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or her
surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate.

If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or he shall
inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of the Civil Code,
which reads:

Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the
"principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects
succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate
relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is
predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.

This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is explained by a noted
civilist. 2 His thesis:

What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or
intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a
barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that
by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when
the law speaks of "brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it
refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of
such brothers and sisters. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain", firstly, in the early case of Grey v. Fabie 3 and,
then, in the relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court 4 and De la Puerta v. Court of
Appeals. 5 In Diaz, we have said:

Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article
992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the
legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn,
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in
life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.

The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. Thus, it has ruled that
where the illegitimate child had
half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's inheritance; 6 that the legitimate
collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; 7 that a natural child cannot
represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; 8 that the natural
daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural
father; 9 and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father. 10 Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus
no part should be rendered inoperative 11 by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other part as
to produce a harmonious whole. 12

In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference and concurrence in intestacy
expressed in Article 978 through
Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz.:

Order of Preference Order of Concurrence

(a) Legitimate Children and (a) Legitimate Children and

 Descendants Descendants, Illegitimate

Children and Descendants,

and Surviving Spouse

(b) Legitimate Parents and (b) Legitimate Parents and

Ascendants Ascendants Illegitimate

Children and Descendants,

and Surviving Spouse

(c) Illegitimate Children and (c) Illegitimate Children and

Descendants (in the absence Descendants and Surviving

of ICDs and LPAs, the Spouse

Illegitimate Parents)

(d) Surviving Spouse (d) Surviving Spouse and

Illegitimate Parents

(e) Brothers and Sisters/ (e) Brothers and Sisters/

Nephews and Nephews and Nieces

 Nieces and Surviving Spouse

(f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone

(within the fifth civil degree)

(g) State (g) Alone

In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate heir of
Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a
compulsory nor a legal heir. 13

We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of
Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court.
Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" 14 in the case, had neither the standing nor the
cause of action to initiate the complaint.

The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. An adverse result of a suit in law does
not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against
the actor. 15

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 37) is
AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's
fees and litigation expenses, in favor of private respondents, which portion is hereby DELETED. No
special pronouncement on costs.

ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO,
and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, r

Does the term "relatives" in Article 992 of the New Civil Code which reads:

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children or relatives
of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.

include the legitimate parents of the father or mother of the illegitimate children? Invited to discuss as amici
curiae during the hearing were the following: Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno,
Dr. Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and Professor Ruben Balane.

The facts of the case, as synthesized in the assailed decision, are as follows:
 It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses
Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their
union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4)
that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and
Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his
mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with
Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
(pp. 1-2, Decision; pp. 190-191, Rollo)

Briefly stated, the real issue in the instant case is this who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?

Let Us take a closer look at the above-cited provisions.

Art.902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted
upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.

Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation and
if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall
be divided among the latter in equal portions. (933)

Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive descendants of
another illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall succeed in their own right and the latter
by right of representation. (940a)

Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles to illegitimate children
shall be transmitted upon their death to their descendants, who shall inherit by right
of representation from their deceased grandparent. (941a) Emphasis supplied).

Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are
transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may
inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should
not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named
provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants
of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners,
that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article
982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation."
Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate
parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is
inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state
that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.

"The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children ... are transmitted upon their death to
their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the
end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother."' (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12)

"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the
legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment." (7 Manresa 110 cited in Grey v.
Fable 40 OG (First S) No. 3, p. 196).

According to petitioners, the commentaries of Manresa as above- quoted are based on Articles 939 to 944 of
the old Civil Code and are therefore inapplicable to the New Civil Code and to the case at bar. Petitioners
further argue that the consistent doctrine adopted by this Court in the cases of Llorente vs. Rodriguez, et al., 10
Phil., 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322, and Oyao vs. Oyao, 94 Phil. 204, cited by former Justice Minister
Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa, and Prof. Balane, which identically held that an illegitimate child has no right to
succeed ab intestato the legitimate father or mother of his natural parent (also a legitimate child himself is
already abrogated by the amendments made by the Now Civil Code and thus cannot be made to apply to the
instant case.

Once more, We decline to agree with petitioner. We are fully aware of certain substantial changes in our law of
succcession, but there is no change whatsoever with respect to the provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise, by the said substantial change, Article 992, which was a reproduction f Article 943 of the Civil Code
of Spain, should have been suppressed or at least modified to clarify the matters which are now the subject of
the present controversy. While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate
children, those articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being
exercised where the person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the determining factor is
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate
child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be
represented is legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only
his legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier imposed Article
992. In this wise, the commentaries of Manresa on the matter in issue, even though based on the old Civil
Code, are still very much applicable to the New Civil Code because the amendment, although substantial, did
not consist of giving illegitimate children the right to represent their natural parents (legitimate) in the intestate
succession of their grandparents (legitimate). It is with the same line of reasoning that the three aforecited
cases may be said to be still applicable to the instant case.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to
comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of.

In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at least amended to clarify the
term "relatives" there is no other alternative but to apply the law literally. Thus, We hereby reiterate the decision
of June 17, 1987 and declare Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners.