ISSUE
WON Respondent violated the Coce of Responsibility
FACTS
1) Complainant filed before the BSP a Petition [2] against Surigaonon Rural
Banking Corporation (the bank) and Alfredo Tan Bonpin (Bonpin), whose
family comprises the majority stockholders of the bank, for cancellation of the
banks registration and franchise.
2) The Petition, he said, arose from the banks and/or Bonpins refusal to return
various checks and land titles, which were given to secure a loan obtained by
his (complainants) wife, despite alleged full payment of the loan and interests.
3) Respondent, in-house counsel and acting corporate secretary of the bank, filed
an Answer with Affirmative Defenses[3] to the Petition stating, inter alia,
5. That this is another in the series of blackmail suits
filed by plaintiff [herein complainant Jose C. Saberon] and his wife
to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain
x x x x.[4] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
4) Respondent made statements of the same tenor in his Rejoinder [5] to
complainants Reply.
5) Finding the aforementioned statements to be totally malicious, viscous [sic]
and bereft of any factual or legal basis, complainant filed the present
complaint.
6) Complainant contends that he filed the Petition before the BSP in the
legitimate exercise of his constitutional right to seek redress of his
grievances; and that respondent, as in-house counsel and acting corporate
secretary of the bank, was fully aware that the loan obtained by his
(complainants) wife in behalf of her children had been paid in full, hence,
there was no more reason to continue holding the collaterals.
7) Complainant adds that respondent aided and abetted the infliction of damages
upon his wife and her children who were thus deprived of the use of the
mortgaged property.
8) In his Comment[6] to the present complaint against him, respondent argues
that: (1) there was nothing abusive, offensive or otherwise improper in the way
he used the word blackmail to characterize the suit against his clients; and (2)
when a lawyer files a responsive pleading, he is not in any way aiding or
abetting the infliction of damages upon the other party.
9) By Resolution of March 16, 2005,[7] the Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
10) In his Report and Recommendation dated June 21, 2006,[8] IBP Investigating
Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa held that the word blackmail connotes
something sinister and criminal. Unless the person accused thereof is
criminally charged with extortion, he added, it would be imprudent, if not
offensive, to characterize that persons act as blackmail.
11) Commissioner Funa stressed that a counsel is expected only to present factual
arguments and to anchor his case on the legal merits of his clients claim or
defense in line with his duty under Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as follows:
A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
12) Moreover, he noted that in espousing a clients cause, respondent should not
state his personal belief as to the soundness or justice of his case pursuant to
Canon 15[9] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
13) The Investigating Commissioner also opined that by using words that were
unnecessary and irrelevant to the case, respondent went overboard and
crossed the line of professional conduct. In view thereof, he recommended
that respondent be found culpable of gross misconduct and suspended from
the practice of law for 30 days.
14) By Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 of January 18, 2007,[10] the IBP Board of
Governors disapproved the recommendation and instead dismissed the case
for lack of merit.
15) The Commission on Bar Discipline, by letter of March 26, 2007, transmitted the
records of the case to this Court.[11]
Saberon v Larong
14) Complainant appealed the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors to this
Court via a petition filed on March 7, 2007, under Section 12 (c) of Rule 139-
B[12] of the Revised Rules of Court.
15) Complainant challenges the IBP Board of Governors Resolution as illegal and
void ab initio for violating the mandatory requirements of Section 12(a) of Rule
139-B of the Revised Rules of Court that the same be reduced to writing,
clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based.
16) Finding the ruling of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent is guilty
of grave misconduct to be in accordance with the evidence, complainant
nevertheless submits that the recommended penalty of suspension should be
modified to disbarment. The offense committed by respondent, he posits,
manifests an evil motive and is therefore an infraction involving moral
turpitude.
17) In his Comment to [the] Petition for Review, respondent states that the
administrative complaint against him is a harassment suit given that it was in
his capacity as counsel for the bank and Bonpin that he filed the Answer
objected to by complainant.
18) Moreover, respondent claims that the purportedly offensive allegation was a
statement of fact which he had backed up with a narration of the chronological
incidents and suits filed by complainant and his wife against his clients. That
being the case, he contends that the allegation made in the Answer must be
considered absolutely privileged just like allegations made in any complaint or
initiatory pleading.
19) Respondent in fact counters that it was complainant himself who had made
serious imputations of wrongdoing against his clients the bank for allegedly
being engaged in some illegal activities, and Bonpin for misrepresenting
himself as a Filipino.
20) Nonetheless, respondent pleads that at the time the allegedly abusive and
offensive language was used, he was only two years into the profession, with
nary an intention of bringing dishonor to it. He admits that because of some
infelicities of language, he may have stirred up complainants indignation for
which he asked the latters and this Courts clemency.
21) In his Reply,[13] complainant counters that respondents Comment reveals the
latters propensity to deliberately state a falsehood; and that respondents claim
that the administrative complaint was a harassing act, deducible from the fact
that [it] post-dates a series of suits, none of which has prospered x x x against
the same rural bank and its owner, is bereft of factual basis.
22) Complainant goes on to argue that respondent, as counsel for Bonpin, knew of
the two criminal cases he and his wife had filed against Bonpin and, as
admitted by respondent, of the criminal charges against him for libel arising
from his imputations of blackmail, extortion or robbery against him and his
wife.
23) Finally, complainant refuses to accede to respondents entreaty for clemency.
DECISION
YES
This Court finds respondent guilty of simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should
insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language
in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.[14]
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language.[15] Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to
be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.[16]
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and
to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of
the cause with which he is charged.[17] In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language
even in his pleadings must be dignified.[18]
It is of no consequence that the allegedly malicious statements of respondent were made not before a court but
before the BSP. A similar submission that actuations of and statements made by lawyers before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are not covered by the Code of Professional Responsibility, the NLRC
not being a court, was struck down in Lubiano v. Gordolla,[19] thus:
 Respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the National Labor Relations Commission, he
nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his
client but to the administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant
of law and ethics.[20]
The observation applies with equal force to the case at bar.
Respecting respondents argument that the matters stated in the Answer he filed before the BSP were
privileged, it suffices to stress that lawyers, though they are allowed a latitude of pertinent remark or
comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of their clients, should not trench
beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety in making such remark or comment.[21]
True, utterances, petitions and motions made in the course of judicial proceedings have consistently been
considered as absolutely privileged, however false or malicious they may be, but only for so long as they are
pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry.[22] The test of relevancy has been stated, thus:
x x x. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matters privileged the
courts favor a liberal rule. The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in
relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its relevancy and
impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case material
to the issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to
the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial x x x. [23]
Granting that the proceedings before the BSP partake of the nature of judicial proceedings, the ascription of
blackmail in the Answer and Rejoinder filed by respondent is not legitimately related or pertinent to the
subject matters of inquiry before the BSP, which were Bonpins alleged alien citizenship and majority
stockholding in the bank. Those issues were amply discussed in the Answer with Affirmative Defenses
without need of the further allegation that the Petition was another in a series of blackmail suits . . . to coerce
the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain. Hence, such allegation was unnecessary and uncalled for. More so,
considering that complainant and his wife were well within their rights to file the cases against the bank
and/or Bonpin to protect their interests and seek redress of their grievances.
Saberon v Larong
Respecting the assailed Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, indeed only a Notice of Resolution was
transmitted to this Court, together with the Records of the case, which Notice simply stated that on January
18, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 in which it:
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.
Upon such Notice, it is evident that there is no compliance with the procedural requirement that the IBP
Board of Governors decision shall state clearly and distinctly the findings of facts or law on which the same is
based. Thus Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. - (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be
reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator
with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding
thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The above requirement serves a very important function not just to inform the parties of the reason for the
decision as would enable them on appeal to point out and object to the findings with which they are not in
agreement, but also to assure the parties that the Board of Governors has reached the judgment through the
process of legal reasoning.[24]
With regard to complainants plea that respondent be disbarred, this Court has consistently considered
disbarment and suspension of an attorney as the most severe forms of disciplinary action, which should be
imposed with great caution. They should be meted out only for duly proven serious administrative charges.
[25]
Thus, while respondent is guilty of using infelicitous language, such transgression is not of a grievous
character as to merit respondents disbarment. In light of respondents apologies, the Court finds it best to
temper the penalty for his infraction which, under the circumstances, is considered simple, rather than grave,
misconduct.
NOTES