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EVIDENCE: CASE DIGEST

Submitted by:
Joanne Rhea D. Alvarina
BL-3

To:
Judge Ritchie B. Reyes
Professor

PEOPLE V ERGUIZA

G.R. No. 171348, November 26, 2008


AUSTRIA-MARNEZ, J.:

FACTS:

The lower courts charged Larry Erguiza with rape. According to the
victim, a 13-year-old girl, she was at the mango orchard with her friends Joy
and Ricky Agbuya, siblings, at around 5:00 in the afternoon when her shorts
got hooked on the fence. She claims that her friends left her, which gave the
accused to rape and threaten her to silence. The victim got pregnant and
upon discovery, she was compelled to tell the story to her parents. The
family of the accused allegedly offered the family of the victim a
compromise settlement of one million pesos so that the latter will not file a
case against the accused. On the other hand, the family of the accused denied
the allegation and claims that it is the family of the victim who asked for
settlement which they were unable to comply with because they could not
afford it.

The accused presented the alibi that he was at the house of the
victims family at around 5:00 in the afternoon doing some repairs.
Moreover, when he arrived home, he was requested to fetch the hilot Juanita
Angeles to help with the delivery of his child. Angeles testified that he never
left the side of his wife when she gave birth at 3:00 am the next day.
The victims friend Joy Agbuya testified also that she never brought
her brother Ricky along with them to the mango orchard and that she and the
victim usually goes there at around 1:00 in the afternoon. She also says that
she did not leave her friend that day when the latters shorts got hooked on
the fence. During that day, Joy claims that they parted ways along their Aunt
Beths house. When asked by the court about their relationship, the witness
told that they were no longer friends because they were quarrelling since the
victims mother instructed her to tell another story to the court that she left
her friend behind that day.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove guilt beyond


reasonable doubt.

RULING:

The SC ruled in favour of the accused and ordered his release.

Based on the foregoing, the conflicting testimonies of witness Joy


Agbuya and the complainant, as well as the testimonies of Juanita Angeles
that established the appellants alibi poses some doubt and bar the court from
the conviction of rape with moral certainty. Following the equipoise rule
were evidence seems equally balanced, the court is compelled to rule in
favour of the accused. Furthermore, it would have been the duty of the
prosecution to present its case with such a manner that conviction is
inevitable result such that the court will not be burdened of the thought that
an innocent man will be imprisoned the rest of his life.

It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with


clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and
inevitable conclusion. Upon the prosecutions failure to meet this test,
acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the Court.

Wherefore, the Decision of the CA is reversed and set aside.

METROBANK V TOBIAS III


G.R. NO. 177780, January 25, 2012
BENSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

Tobias opened an account with METROBANK under the name of his


frozen meat business Adam Merchandising. Six months later, Tobias III
applied for a business loan from METROBANK, which in due course
conducted trade and credit verification and resulted in negative findings. As
collateral, the property consisted of four parcels of land located in Malabon
City, Metro Manila was submitted as a security for the loan.

His loan was restructured to 5 years upon his request. Yet, after two
months, he again defaulted. Thus, the mortgage was foreclosed and the
property was sold to METROBANK as the lone bidder.

When the Certificate of Sale was presented for registration to the


Registry of Deeds of Malabon, no corresponding original copy of TCT No.
M-16751 was found in the registry vault. PACTF concluded that TCT No.
M-16751 and the tax declarations submitted by Tobias were fictitious, thus
recommended the filing against Tobias of a criminal complaint for estafa
through falsification of public documents under paragraph 2 (a) of Article
315, in relation to Articles 172 (1) and 171 (7) of the Revised Penal Code.

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged


Tobias III with estafa through falsification of public documents. Tobias filed
a motion for reinvestigation, which was granted. Nonetheless, on December
27, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Malabon still found probable cause against
Tobias, and recommended his being charged with the same offense.
Tobias appealed to the DOJ and then Acting Secretary of Justice
issued a resolution directing the withdrawal of the information filed against
Tobias. On November 18, 2005, Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales denied
METROBANKs motion for reconsideration. Hence, METROBANK
challenged the adverse resolutions. METROBANK maintains that what the
Secretary of Justice did was to determine the innocence of the accused,
which should not be done during preliminary investigation; and the CA
disregarded such lapse.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing METROBANKs petition.

RULING:

The SC affirmed the Decision of the CA.

Under the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, the courts have no right


to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government.

The settled policy is that courts will not interfere with the executive
determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing information, in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility.

In this regard, we stress that preliminary investigation for the purpose


of determining the existence of probable cause is not part of the trial. At a
preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of
Justice only determines whether the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offence charged. Probable cause refers to facts and
circumstances that engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof.

The court does not lose sight of the fact that METROBANK, a
commercial bank dealing in real property, had the duty to observe due
diligence to ascertain the existence and condition of the realty as well as the
validity and integrity of the documents bearing on the realty. Its duty
included the responsibility of dispatching its comptetent and experienced
representatives to the realty to assess its actual location and condition, and of
investigating who was its real owner. Yet, it is evident that METROBANK
did not diligently perform a thorough check on Tobias and the circumstances
surrounding the realty he has offered as collateral. As such, it had no one to
blame but itself. Verily, banks are expected to exercise greater care and
prudence than others in their dealings because their business is impressed
with public interest. Their failure to do so constitutes negligence on its part.

Petition denied.

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