SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN)
vs. HON. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR BUENAVENTURA C. MAGSALIN
FACTS:
The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that the dismissal was valid. However, d
ue to humanitarian considerations, it ordered financial assistance. Petitioner a
ssailed the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator before the CA in a petition for c
ertiorari which was dismissed outright for being the wrong remedy. The CA ex
plained that Rule 43, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly
provides that the proper mode of appeal from judgments, final orders or resol
ution of voluntary arbitrators is through a Petition for Review which should be
filed within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of notice of judgment, order or re
solution of the voluntary arbitrator. Considering that petitioner intended the pet
ition to be a Petition for Certiorari, the Court hereby resolves to dismiss the pe
tition outright for being an improper mode of appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper remedy for assailing the decision of Voluntar
y Arbitrator is a petition for certiorari.
RULING:
No. Decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA
via petition for review under Rule 43. Hence, upon receipt of the Voluntary Ar
bitrators Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, petitioner
should have filed with the CA, within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period,
a petition for review, not a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner insists on a liberal interpretation of the rules but we find no cogent r
eason in this case to deviate from the general rule. Verily, rules of procedure
exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal co
nstruction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be dis
dained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenienc
e of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive ri
ghts through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules are not in
tended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation. But they help provide for a
vital system of justice where suitors may be heard following judicial procedure
and in the correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are well serve
d by a conscientious observance by the parties of the procedural rules.
PANAY RAILWAYS INC., PETITIONER, VS. HEVA MANAGEMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PAMPLONA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION, AND SPOUSES CANDELARIA DAYOT AND EDMUNDO
DAYOT, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The present Petition stems from the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Iloilo City of a Notice of Appeal for petitioner's failure to pay the
corresponding docket fees.cralaw
The facts are as follows:
On 20 April 1982, petitioner Panay Railways Inc., a government-owned and
controlled corporation, executed a Real Estate Mortgage Contract covering
several parcels of lands, including Lot No. 6153, in favor of Traders Royal
Bank (TRB) to secure P20 million worth of loan and credit accommodations.
Petitioner excluded certain portions of Lot No. 6153: that already sold to Shell
Co., Inc. referred to as 6153-B, a road referred to as 6153-C, and a squatter
area known as 6153-D.[1]
Petitioner failed to pay its obligations to TRB, prompting the bank to extra-
judicially foreclose the mortgaged properties including Lot No. 6153. On 20
January 1986, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of the bank as the
highest bidder and purchaser. Consequently, the sale of Lot No. 6153 was
registered with the Register of Deeds on 28 January 1986 and annotated at
the back of the transfer certificates of title (TCT) covering the mortgaged
properties.
Thereafter, TRB caused the consolidation of the title in its name on the basis
of a Deed of Sale and an Affidavit of Consolidation after petitioner failed to
exercise the right to redeem the properties. The corresponding TCTs were
subsequently issued in the name of the bank.
On 12 February 1990, TRB filed a Petition for Writ of Possession against
petitioner. During the proceedings, petitioner, through its duly authorized
manager and officer-in-charge and with the assistance of counsel, filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Motion for Suspension of the Petition
for the issuance of a writ of possession.[2] The pertinent portions of the
Manifestation and Motion state:
3. That after going over the records of this case and the case of Traders
Royal Bank vs. Panay Railway, Inc., Civil Case No. 18280, PRI is irrevocably
withdrawing its Motion for Suspension referred to in paragraph 1 above, and
its Motion for Reconsideration referred in paragraph 2 above and will accept
and abide by the September 21, 1990 Order denying the Motion For
Suspension;
4. That PRI recognizes and acknowledges petitioner (TRB) to be the
registered owner of Lot 1-A; Lot 3834; Lot 6153; Lot 6158; Lot 6159, and
Lot 5 covered by TCT No. T-84233; T-84234; T-84235; T-84236; T-84237,
T-84238 and T-45724 respectively, free of liens and encumbrances,
except that portion sold to Shell Co. found in Lot 5. That Petitioner
(TRB) as registered owner is entitled to peaceful ownership and
immediate physical possession of said real properties.
5. That PRI further acknowledges that the Provincial Sheriff validly
foreclosed the Real Estate Mortgage erected by PRI due to failure to pay
the loan of ?20,000,000.00. That TRB was the purchaser of these lots
mentioned in paragraph 4 above at Sheriff's Auction Sale as evidenced by the
Certificate of Sale dated January 20, 1986 and the Certificates of Titles issued
to Petitioner;
6. That PRI further manifests that it has no past, present or future
opposition to the grant of the Writ of Possession to TRB over the
parcels of land mentioned in paragraph 4 above and subject of this
Petition and even assuming "arguendo" that it has, PRI irrevocably
waives the same. That PRI will even assist TRB in securing possession
of said properties as witness against squatters, illegal occupants, and
all other possible claimants;
7. That upon execution hereof, PRI voluntarily surrenders physical
possession and control of the premises of these lots to TRB, its
successors or its assigns, together with all the buildings, warehouses,
offices, and all other permanent improvements constructed thereon and
will attest to the title and possession of petitioner over said real
properties. (Emphasis supplied)
TCT No. T-84235 mentioned in the quoted portion above is Lot No. 6153,
which is under dispute.
It was only in 1994 that petitioner realized that the extrajudicial foreclosure
included some excluded properties in the mortgage contract. Thus, on 19
August 1994, it filed a Complaint for Partial Annulment of Contract to Sell and
Deed of Absolute Sale with Addendum; Cancellation of Title No. T-89624; and
Declaration of Ownership of Real Property with Reconveyance plus
Damages.[3]
It then filed an Amended Complaint[4] on 1 January 1995 and again filed a
Second Amended Complaint[5] on 8 December 1995.
Meanwhile, respondents filed their respective Motions to Dismiss on these
grounds: (1) petitioner had no legal capacity to sue; (2) there was a waiver, an
abandonment and an extinguishment of petitioner's claim or demand; (3)
petitioner failed to state a cause of action; and (4) an indispensable party,
namely TRB, was not impleaded.
On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order[6] granting the Motion to Dismiss of
respondents. It held that the Manifestation and Motion filed by petitioner was
a judicial admission of TRB's ownership of the disputed properties. The trial
court pointed out that the Manifestation was executed by petitioner's duly
authorized representative with the assistance of counsel. This admission thus
operated as a waiver barring petitioner from claiming otherwise.
On 11 August 1997, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal without paying the
necessary docket fees. Immediately thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to
Dismiss Appeal on the ground of nonpayment of docket fees.
In its Opposition,[7] petitioner alleged that its counsel was not yet familiar with
the revisions of the Rules of Court that became effective only on 1 July 1997.
Its representative was likewise not informed by the court personnel that
docket fees needed to be paid upon the filing of the Notice of Appeal.
Furthermore, it contended that the requirement for the payment of docket fees
was not mandatory. It therefore asked the RTC for a liberal interpretation of
the procedural rules on appeals.
On 29 September 1997, the RTC issued an Order [8] dismissing the appeal
citing Sec. 4 of Rule 41[9] of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner thereafter moved for a reconsideration of the Order [10] alleging that
the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case after the former had filed the
Notice of Appeal. Petitioner also alleged that the court erred in failing to relax
procedural rules for the sake of substantial justice.
On 25 November 1997, the RTC denied the Motion. [11]
On 28 January 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 alleging that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of Appeal, and that the trial court had acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it strictly applied procedural rules.
On 29 November 2000, the CA rendered its Decision [12] on the Petition. It held
that while the failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees
within the reglementary period was a ground for the dismissal of the appeal
pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, the jurisdiction to
do so belonged to the CA and not the trial court. Thus, appellate court ruled
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal
and set aside the latter's assailed Order dated 29 September 1997.
Thereafter, respondents filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration.
It appears that prior to the promulgation of the CA's Decision, this Court
issued Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 00-2-10-SC which took effect on 1
May 2000, amending Rule 4, Sec. 7 and Sec. 13 of Rule 41 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court. The circular expressly provided that trial courts
may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss an appeal for being filed out of
time or for nonpayment of docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period. Subsequently, Circular No. 48-2000 [13] was issued on 29
August 2000 and was addressed to all lower courts.

By virtue of the amendment to Sec. 41, the CA upheld the questioned Orders
of the trial court by issuing the assailed Amended Decision [14] in the present
Petition granting respondents' Motion for Reconsideration.
The CA's action prompted petitioner to file a Motion for Reconsideration
alleging that SC Circular No. 48-2000 should not be given retroactive effect. It
also alleged that the CA should consider the case as exceptionally
meritorious. Petitioner's counsel, Atty. Rexes V. Alejano, explained that he
was yet to familiarize himself with the Revised Rules of Court, which became
effective a little over a month before he filed the Notice of Appeal. He was
thus not aware that the nonpayment of docket fees might lead to the
dismissal of the case.
On 30 May 2002, the CA issued the assailed Resolution [15] denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioner alleges that the CA erred in sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the
Notice of Appeal. Petitioner contends that the CA had exclusive jurisdiction to
dismiss the Notice of Appeal at the time of filing. Alternatively, petitioner
argues that while the appeal was dismissible for failure to pay docket fees,
substantial justice demands that procedural rules be relaxed in this case.
The Petition has no merit.
Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered
applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The
effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. This retroactive
application does not violate any right of a person adversely affected. Neither
is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has
been held that "a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a
litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or
criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure." [16] More so when,
as in this case, petitioner admits that it was not able to pay the docket fees on
time. Clearly, there were no substantive rights to speak of when the RTC
dismissed the Notice of Appeal.
The argument that the CA had the exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal
has no merit. When this Court accordingly amended Sec. 13 of Rule 41
through A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, the RTC's dismissal of the action may be
considered to have had the imprimatur of the Court. Thus, the CA committed
no reversible error when it sustained the dismissal of the appeal, taking note
of its directive on the matter prior to the promulgation of its Decision.
As early as 1932, in Lazaro v. Endencia,[17] we have held that the payment of
the full amount of the docket fees is an indispensable step for the perfection
of an appeal. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fees.[18]
Moreover, the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege, which may be exercised only in
accordance with the law.[19]
We have repeatedly stated that the term "substantial justice" is not a magic
wand that would automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules.
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may result in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all
other rules, they are required to be followed, except only for the most
persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve litigants of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of their thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed.[20]

We cannot consider counsel's failure to familiarize himself with the Revised
Rules of Court as a persuasive reason to relax the application of the Rules. It
is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This principle is
based on the rule that any act performed by lawyers within the scope of their
general or implied authority is regarded as an act of the client. Consequently,
the mistake or negligence of the counsel of petitioner may result in the
rendition of an unfavorable judgment against it. [21]cralaw
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE vs. RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 158239
January 25, 2012
BERSAMIN, J.:
Facts:
Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration of
P160,000.00 to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale two
parcels of land with areas of 3,675 and 20,936 square meters located in
Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that Javellana would pay
P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of P80,000.00
upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System (the
registration being undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period of
time); and that should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-
in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla
M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with
the application for registration.
After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita
without issue, the vendors undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being
Margaritas sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply with the
undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens
System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling
materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land into a
residential or industrial subdivision. Faced with Priscillas refusal to comply,
Javellana commenced an action for specific performance, injunction, and
damages against her in the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC).
Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the
parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registration
proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor. Priscilla filed
a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by
prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action.
The RTC initially denied Priscillas motion to dismiss. However, upon
her motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself and granted the
motion to dismiss.
Javellana moved for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of any reason to disturb its order. Accordingly,
Javellana filed a notice of appeal. Priscilla countered that the RTC order was
not appealable; that the appeal was not perfected on time; and that Javellana
was guilty of forum shopping. It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana
also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the June 24, 1999 and
June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his complaint. The CA dismissed the petition
for certiorari.
As to the notice on appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
decision and remanded the records to the RTC "for further proceedings in
accordance with law." The CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
Priscilla.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTCs decision denying of the motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal a final order and appealable;
Held:
Yes.
First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration left
nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one.
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known.
The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by
execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely
dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An
interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is
yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or
not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or
judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise,
it is final.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether
appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with
the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
to the effect that "appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable;" but the remedy from an
interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari.
DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 141524 (September 14, 2005)
N.B. I AM ACTUALLY SICK RIGHT NOW AND THIS CASE IS QUITE
DIFFICULT TO DIGEST. I RESEARCHED AND FOUND A GOOD DIGEST
(BUT STILL DIFFICULT TO INTERNALIZE COZ IT INCLUDEs DATES,
PERIODS ETC.). BUT I RESEARCHED ON SOME NOTES ON NEYPES
RULE WHICH IS AT THE END OF THIS DIGEST. KINDLY READ THAT
FIRST SO THAT YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT OF NEYPES
RULE BEFORE READING THIS CASE, JUST A SUGGESTION.- NAOMI
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC
against the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed
petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed.
Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3,
1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order
dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July
22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal
and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it
was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an
order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus
under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal
before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had
seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this
was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion
for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998,
only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period
for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled
that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3,
1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their
complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the final order
appealable under the Rules.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day
reglmentary period to appeal, the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the
complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the Motion for
Reconsideration.
(2) Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.
HELD:
(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should
be deemed as the final order. In the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,
the trial court declared petitioner non-suited and accordingly dismissed his
complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion
to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day
period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this
time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But
this was likewise dismissed for having been filed out of time. The court a
quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the
dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable
under the Rules. The SC reversed the trial court and declared that it was the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint
which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v.
Haldeman et al. where the SC again considered the order denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the
issues involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned cases, the SC
sustained petitioners view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their
motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule
shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims
to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of
the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether
full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within
the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of
notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not
inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal
shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in
the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in the above
provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from
the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which
we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion
for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129
which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the
disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18,
1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The
fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial
court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to
review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of
judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have
judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to
deliver justice fairly.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15
days from receipt of the RTCs decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of
the order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if
either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory
after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from
receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998.
Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15
days, as already discussed.
IMPORTANT NOTES:
The FRESH PERIOD RULE do not apply to Rule 64 (Review of Judgments
and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit) because Rule 64 is derived from the Constitution. It is
likewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases.
SOURCE: http://mclaw08.wordpress.com/2009/10/01/neypes-vs-court-of-
appeals/
IMPORTANT NOTES:
The Neypes Rule
STATEMENT OF THE RULE
The "Neypes Rule," otherwise known as the Fresh Period Rule, states
that a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from
receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from
receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. (Domingo Neypes versus Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 141524 September 14, 2005)
PURPOSE OF THE RULE
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants
fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration. (supra)
The raison dtre for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period
provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day
appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no
longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting
the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration or any final order or resolution. (Judith Yu versus Hon.
Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011)
THE RULE PRIOR TO NEYPES
Before the Supreme Court prmulgated Neypes, the rules mandate that the
filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupts the running of the period to
appeal; and that an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. While the period to file an appeal is
counted from the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the appellant does
not have the full fifteen (15) days. The appellant only has the remaining time
of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. Thus, some rules on
appeals are:
Sec. 39. [B.P. 129] Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases
shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution,
award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in
habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours
from the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x
SEC. 3. [Rule 41] Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed
from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of
judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial
or reconsideration shall be allowed.
SEC. 6. [Rule 122] When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken
within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of
the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be
suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until
notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused
or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.
IN WHAT CASES APPLICABLE
`Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42
on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals;
Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies31 to the Court of Appeals
and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.32 The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted
from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
(Neypes, supra)
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is
filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of
the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. (Neypes, supra)
The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file
a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial
court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to
review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of
judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have
judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to
deliver justice fairly. (Neypes, supra)
APPLICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts
pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the
period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is
based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and
in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that "[t]he period
for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of
any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the
final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no
distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction. 17
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no
substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are
concerned the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order
denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that
Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in
criminal caes cannot be similarly addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period
in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the
Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to
appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. x x x x
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review
under Rule 42.
xxxx
Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other
appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised
its appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the
same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases
under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section
6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated
differently.
Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it
applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster
and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a
better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case a situation that
gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the
accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we
favor a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation
where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double
and unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts have
recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is
not allowed in law Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non
permissum est in lege.18 (Judith Yu versus Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R.
No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011)
RETROACTIVE EFFECT
The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced
in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had
lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated. That
question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that
procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the
rules of procedure.17 Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or
remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but
only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already
existing.18
Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants
that Neypes bears the quested retroactive effect, to wit:
Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of
procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural
laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the
general rule against the retroactive operation of statues they may be given
retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.
The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15
days within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for
reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity
of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending
actions, such as the present case.
Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will
amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and
final order were issued two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to
the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It
will be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and
final orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period
rule" while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant case,
will not.19
Notably, the subject incidents in Sps. De los Santos occurred in August 2000,
at the same month as the relevant incidents at bar. There is no reason to
adopt herein a rule that is divergent from that in Sps. De los Santos. (Fil-
Estate Properties, Inc. versus Hon. Marietta Homena J. Valencia, G.R. No.
173942, 25 June 2008)
NOT INCONSISTENT WITH RULES OF COURT
This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules
which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or"
signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.33
Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of
appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15
days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to
the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
(Neypes, supra)
NEYPES RULE NOT APPLIED
Petitioner was charged with and found guilty of perjury. He was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 1 year, a period which is
considered as a correctional penalty. Under Article 9 of the Revised Penal
Code, light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which
the penalty of arresto menor (one to thirty days of imprisonment) or a fine not
exceeding two hundred pesos (P200), or both are imposable. Thus, perjury is
not a light felony or offense contemplated by Rule 120, Sec. 6. It was
therefore mandatory for petitioner to be present at the promulgation of the
judgment.
To recall, despite notice, petitioner was absent when the MTCC promulgated
its judgment on 25 August 2009. Pursuant to Rule 120, Sec. 6, it is only when
the accused is convicted of a light offense that a promulgation may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. In case the
accused failed to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation despite
notice, and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused
shall lose all the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment. One
such remedy was the Motion for Reconsideration of the judgment of the
MTCC filed by petitioner on 28 August 2009. Absent a motion for leave to
avail of the remedies against the judgment, the MTCC should not have
entertained petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, petitioner had only
15 days from 25 August 2009 or until 9 September 2009 to file his Motion for
Probation. The MTCC thus committed grave abuse of discretion when it
entertained the motion instead of immediately denying it. xxx
Petitioner, however, did not file a motion for leave to avail himself of the
remedies prior to filing his Motion for Reconsideration. The hearing on the
motion for leave would have been the proper opportunity for the parties to
allege and contest whatever cause prevented petitioner from appearing on 25
August 2009, and whether that cause was indeed justifiable. If granted,
petitioner would have been allowed to avail himself of other remedies under
the Rules of Court, including a motion for reconsideration. xxx
As a final point, while we held in Yu v. Samson-Tatad that the rule in Neypes
is also applicable to criminal cases regarding appeals from convictions in
criminal cases under Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, nevertheless, the
doctrine is not applicable to this case, considering that petitioners Motion for
Probation was filed out of time. (Anselmo de Leon Cuyo versus People of the
Phils., G.R. No. 192164 October 12, 2011)
G.R. No. L-286 March 29, 1946
FREDESVINDO S. ALVERO, petitioner,
vs.
M.L. DE LA ROSA, Judge of First Instance of Manila, JOSE R. VICTORIANO, and
MARGARITA VILLARICA, respondents.
Revilla and Palma for petitioner.
Francisco Claravall for respondents.
DE JOYA, J.:
This is an original petition for certiorari filed in this court.
The record shows that, on June 25, 1945, respondent Jose R. Victoriano had filed a
complaint, in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, against petitioner
Fredesvindo S. Alvero and one Margarita Villarica, alleging two causes of action, to wit,
(1) to declare in force the contract of sale, made on October 1, 1940, between said Jose
R. Victoriano and Margarita Villarica, of two (2) parcels of land in the Manotoc
subdivision, Balintawak, in the barrio of Calaanan, municipality of Caloocan, Province of
Rizal, with a combined area of 480 square meters, which land was subsequently sold by
said Villarica, in favor of petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, on December 31, 1944, for the
sum of P100,000 in Japanese military notes; and (2) to declare said subsequent sale null
and void.
On July 7, 1945, Margarita Villarica filed an answer to said complaint, expressly
admitting having sold said land to Fresdesvindo S. Alvero, for P100,000, in December,
1944, due to the imperative necessity of raising funds with which to provide for herself
and family, and that she did not remember the previous sale; at the same time, offering
to repurchase said land from Fredesvindo S. Alvero in the sum of P5,000, but that the
latter refused to accept the offer.
On July 13, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero, in answering said complaint, denied the
allegations made therein, and claimed exclusive ownership of the land in question, and
at the same time set up a counterclaim and crossclaim in his answer, demanding from
Jose R. Victoriano a P200-monthly rent on said property, beginning from February, 1945,
plus P2,000 as damages.
On July 21, 1945, Jose R. Victoriano filed an answer to said counterclaim, denying
Fredesvindo S. Alvero's alleged ownership over said land, and the other allegations
contained in Alvero's answer.
After the trial of the case before the Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of the City of Manila, one of the respondents in this case, on November 16,
1945, said respondent judge rendered his decision, in which it was declared that the two
(2) parcels of land in question, with a combined area of 480 square meters had been
sold by Margarita Villarica to Jose R. Victoriano, since October 1, 1940, for the sum of
P6,000, on the condition that the purchaser should make a down payment of P1,700,
and a monthly payment of P76.86 in 120 equal monthly installments; that Jose R.
Victoriano continued making said monthly payments until December, 1941, but that
owing to the war-time conditions then existing, Margarita Villarica agreed verbally to
suspend such payments until the restoration of peace; that immediately after said sale of
said land to him, Jose R. Victoriano took possession thereof and made improvements
thereon to the amount of P800, and continued occupying said property until December,
1944, when he abandoned the same to go to evacuation places, but returned thereto in
February, 1945; that Margarita Villarica, having forgotten the sale of said land to Jose R.
Victoriano, sold the same for P100,000 in Japanese military notes, on December 31,
1944, to Fredesvindo S. Alvero, but afterwards offered to repurchase said property from
him, for the sum of P8,000 in genuine Philippine currency, after liberation; that
Fredesvindo S. Alvero presented the deed of sale, executed in his favor, to the Register
of Deeds of the City of Manila, on January 3, 1945, and took possession of said property
in December, 1944, but afterwards found Jose R. Victoriano in the premises in February,
1945; that in the contract of sale executed by Margarita Villarica, in favor of Jose R.
Victoriano, it was agreed that, upon failure of the purchaser to make payments of three
(3) successive mothly installments, the vendor would be free to sell the property again,
forfeiting the payments made, except in the case of force majeure; that there was really a
verbal agreement between Margarita Villarica and Jose Victoriano, made in February,
1942, for the suspension of the payment of the monthly installments until the restoration
of peace; and that although Jose R. Victoriano had presented the deed of sale, executed
in his favor, to the Register of Deeds, in Pasig, Rizal, like Fredesvindo S. Alvero, he had
also failed to secure the transfer of title to his name. And considering that Jose R.
Victoriano's document was older than that of Fredesvindo S. Alvero, and that he had
taken possession of said property, since October 1, 1940, the respondent judge rendered
his decision in favor of Jose R. Victoriano, adjudging to him the title over the property in
question, including all the improvements existing thereon, and dismissed the
counterclaim.
On November 28, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero was notified of said decision; and on
December 27, 1945, he filed a petition for reconsideration and new trial, which was
denied on January 3, 1946; and of said order he was notified on January 7, 1946.
On January 8, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed his notice of appeal and record on
appeal simultaneously in the lower court, without filing the P60-appeal bond.
On January 14, 1946, Jose R. Victoriano filed a petition to dismiss the appeal, and at the
same time, asked for the execution of the judgment.
On January 15, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed an opposition to said motion to
dismiss, alleging that on the very same day, January 15, 1946, said appeal bond for P60
had been actually filed, and allege as an excuse, for not filing the said appeal bond, in
due time, the illness of his lawyer's wife, who died on January 10, 1946, and buried the
following day.
On January 17, 1946, the respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, ordered the
dismissal of the appeal, declaring that, although the notice of appeal and record on
appeal had been filed in due time, the P60-appeal bond was filed too late.
On January 23, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed a petition for the reconsideration of the
said order dated January 17, 1946, dismissing his appeal; and said petition for
reconsideration was denied on January 29, 1946. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
On February 11, 1946, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for certiorari,
alleging (1) that said petition is defective in form as well as in substance; (2) that there
has been no excusable negligence, on the part of the petitioner, or grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent judge, in the instant case.
As already stated, the decision rendered by the respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la
Rosa, was dated November 16, 1945, of which counsel for Fredesvindo S. Alvero was
notified on November 28, 1945; that his motion for reconsideration and new trial was filed
on December 27, 1945, and denied on January 3, 1946, and that said counsel for Alvero
was notified of said order on January 7, 1946; and that he filed his notice of appeal and
record on appeal the following day, to wit, January 8, 1946, and that the P60-appeal
bond was filed only on January 15, 1946.
According to the computation erroneously made by the court, the last day for filing and
perfecting the appeal, in this case, was January 8, 1946, or which date, Fredesvindo S.
Alvero should have filed his (1) notice of appeal, (2) record on appeal, and (3) appeal
bond. But the P60-appeal bond was filed only on January 15, 1946.
Failure to perfect the appeal, within the time prescribed by the rules of court, will cause
the judgment to become final, and the certification of the record on appeal thereafter,
cannot restore the jurisdiction which has been lost. (Roman Catholic Bishop of
Tuguegarao vs. Director of Lands, 34 Phil., 623; Estate of Cordoba and
Zarate vs. Alabado, 34 Phil., 920; and Bermudez vs. Director of Lands, 36 Phil., 774.)
The period within which the record on appeal and appeal bond should be perfected and
filed may, however, be extended by order of the court, upon application made, prior to
the expiration of the original period. (Layda vs. Legaspi, 39 Phil., 83.)
Rules of courts, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law; and
rules of court prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain
proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.
(Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333.)
Strict compliance with the rules of court has been held mandatory and imperative, so that
failure to pay the docket fee in the Supreme Court, within the period fixed for that
purpose, will cause the dismissal of the appeal. (Salaveria vs. Albindo, 39Phil., 922.) In
the same manner, on failure of the appellant in a civil case to serve his brief, within the
time prescribed by said rules, on motion of the appellee and notice to the appellant, or on
its own motion, the court may dismiss the appeal. (Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333.)
Counsel for the petitioner Fredesvindo Alvero alleges as an excuse, for his failure to
perfect and file his appeal, in due time, the illness of his wife, which ended in her death
on January 10, 1946, and by which he was greatly affected.
How little, indeed, does one realize that in life he lives in the midst of death; and that
every that passes in a step nearer towards eternity. Yet, notwithstanding the inexorable
laws of human destiny, every mortal fears death, and such fear is worse than death itself.
That is perhaps the reason why those feeling its approach, in their last moments, want to
be surrounded by the ones dearest to their heart, to hear from them words of tenderness
and eternal truth, and thus receive as balm their love and the cheering influence of the
traditional faith, and the consolation of religious hope.
The virtuous and loving wife is the peculiar gift of heaven, and Mother is the name for
God in the innocent lips and hearts of adoring children. "She looketh well to the ways of
her household, and eateth not the bread of idleness." "And her daughters arise up and
call her blessed." And when she dies in the bosom of God, her children find solace in the
contemplation of her eternal bliss, as mirrored in her tranquil beauty.
It is not, therefore, difficult to understand the state of mind of the attorney, and his intense
devotion and ardent affection towards his dying wife.
Unfortunately, counsel for petitioner has created a difficult situation. In his motion for
reconsideration and new trial, dated December 27, 1945, he did not point out specifically
the findings or conclusions in the judgment, are not supported by the evidence or which
are contrary to law, making express reference to the pertinent evidence or legal
provisions, as expressly required by Rule 37, section 2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of
Court. Motions of that kind have been considered as motions pro forma intended merely
to delay the proceeding, and, as such, they cannot and will not interrupt or suspend the
period of time for the perfection of the appeal. (Valdez vs. Jugo, 74 Phil., 49, and
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Bautista, 74 Phil., 235.) Hence, the period for perfecting
herein petitioner's appeal commenced from November 28, 1945, when he was notified of
the judgment rendered in the case, and expired on December 28, 1945; and, therefore,
his notice of appeal and record on appeal filed on January 8, 1946, were filed out of time,
and much more so his appeal bond, which was only filed on January 15, 1946.
It is futile to speak of hospitals, doctors and nurses to minister alone to the needs of the
sick and the dying, who are dearest to us, for our reasoning powers are of little avail
when sorrow or despair rages within.
But human laws are inflexible and no personal consideration should stand in the way of
performing a legal duty.
The attorney for petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero could have asked for an extension of
time, within which to file and perfect his appeal, in the court below; but he had failed to
do so, and he must bear the consequences of his act. A strict observance of the rules of
court, which have been considered indispensable to the prevention of needless delays
and to the orderly and speedy dispatch of judicial business, is an imperative necessity.
It may not be amiss to state in this connection that no irreparable damage has been
caused to the petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, as Margarita Villarica, the vendor to the
two, of the land in question, has shown readiness to repair the damage done.
No showing having been made that there had been merely excusable negligece, on the
part of the attorney for petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, and that there had been gave
abuse of sound judicial discretion, on the part of the respondent judge, the petition
for certiorari filed in this case, is, therefore, hereby dismissed, without costs. So ordered.
GSIS and Garcia vs. Villaviza, et. al, G. R. No. 190291, July 27, 2010
Facts: PGM Garcia, as President and General Manager of the GSIS, filed separate
formal charges against respondents and eventually found them guilty for Grave
Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and meting
out the penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant
thereto. The charges contained that respondent, wearing red shirt together with some
employees, marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the
Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs.
Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS
premises.
On appeal, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office
wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or
mass action proscribed above. CSC added that their actuations can be deemed an
exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA found no
cogent reason to deviate therefrom.
Issue: Whether or not the unruly mass gathering of twenty employees during office
hours, inside office premises to protest falls within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.
Ruling: Yes.
As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the
political rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity or mass
action proscribed must be coupled with the intent of effecting work stoppage or
service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession. Wearing
similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing
with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even badmouthing the guards
and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or
service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force
concession.
The limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316
are there to temper and focus the application of such prohibition. Not all collective
activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we
would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the government service of their
constitutional right to freedom of expression.
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the
land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their
rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of
expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the
members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be
reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.
Respondents freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSCs
Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action
has only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against that definition,
respondents actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass
action.