G.R. No.

110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON.
MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF
CALOOCAN,respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose off the 350 tons of garbage it
collects daily and the growing concern and sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the residents of Barangay
Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of this controversy
elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.

The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA
for short) docketed as G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November 10, 1992, this Court
referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision 1 promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that the LLDA has no power
and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate,
Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.

On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City,
filed a letter-complaint 2 with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare
open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the
residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.

On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the
leachate 3 that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal
and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the
Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential
Decree No. 1586, 4 and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, 5 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. 6

After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint of Task Force Camarin
Dumpsite, found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams could considerably affect the
quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have
contaminated the sample during collection or handling. 7 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist
Order 8 ordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities,
to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin
dumpsite.

The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However, sometime in August
1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting held in July 1992 among the City Government of Caloocan,
the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of Environmental Management Bureau
Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the problem.

After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992, the LLDA issued another order
reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City Government of
Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin area.

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On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias Cease and
Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a
dumpsite.

Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with the LLDA, the City
Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration of nullity of
the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its
complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the
health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial
jurisdiction. 9

On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order. Subsequently, the case was raffled to
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which, at the time, was presided over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, the pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.

The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that under Republic
Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control Law, the cease
and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts
of the case by the Court of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court. 10

On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil Case No. C-15598 with Civil Case No.
C-15580, an earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite entitled "Fr. John Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario
Asistio." The LLDA, however, maintained during the trial that the foregoing cases, being independent of each other,
should have been treated separately.

On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the consolidated cases
an order 11 denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order
which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of this
case and/or until further orders of the court.

On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for restraining
order with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to nullify the aforesaid order dated October 16,
1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan City denying its motion to dismiss.

The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution 12 on November 10, 1992 referring the case to the Court of
Appeals for proper disposition and at the same time, without giving due course to the petition, required the
respondents to comment on the petition and file the same with the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from notice.
In the meantime, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further
orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1) Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
127, Caloocan City to cease and desist from exercising jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity of the cease
and desist order issued by the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the
City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City.

Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on November 12, 1992 a motion for
reconsideration and/or to quash/recall the temporary restraining order and an urgent motion for reconsideration
alleging that ". . . in view of the calamitous situation that would arise if the respondent city government fails to collect
350 tons of garbage daily for lack of dumpsite (i)t is therefore, imperative that the issue be resolved with dispatch or
with sufficient leeway to allow the respondents to find alternative solutions to this garbage problem."

On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution 13 directing the Court of Appeals to immediately set the case for
hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not the temporary restraining order issued by the Court should be

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lifted and what conditions, if any, may be required if it is to be so lifted or whether the restraining order should be
maintained or converted into a preliminary injunction.

The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the morning at the Hearing Room,
3rd Floor, New Building, Court of Appeals. 14 After the oral argument, a conference was set on December 8, 1992 at
10:00 o'clock in the morning where the Mayor of Caloocan City, the General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR
or his duly authorized representative and the Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized representative were required to
appear.

It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish its study and review of
respondent's technical plan with respect to the dumping of its garbage and in the event of a rejection of respondent's
technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties will submit within 10 days from notice their respective memoranda
on the merits of the case, after which the petition shall be deemed submitted for resolution. 15 Notwithstanding such
efforts, the parties failed to settle the dispute.

On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order, including the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is
within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order
under its enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.

The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction issued in the said case was
set aside; the cease and desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside and the temporary restraining order enjoining the
City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the
Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the condition that any future dumping of
garbage in said area, shall be in conformity with the procedure and protective works contained in the proposal
attached to the records of this case and found on pages 152-160 of the Rollo, which was thereby adopted by reference
and made an integral part of the decision, until the corresponding restraining and/or injunctive relief is granted by the
proper Court upon LLDA's institution of the necessary legal proceedings.

Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, now docketed as G.R.
No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary restraining order lifted by the Court of Appeals be re-issued until after final
determination by this Court of the issue on the proper interpretation of the powers and authority of the LLDA under its
enabling law.

On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order 16 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the
City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City, effective as of this date and containing until otherwise ordered by the Court.

It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to protect the environment and to
maintain the ecological balance of the surrounding areas of the Camarin open dumpsite, the question as to which
agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter remains highly open to question.

The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit, pursuant to the general
welfare provision of the Local Government Code, 17 to determine the effects of the operation of the dumpsite on the
ecological balance and to see that such balance is maintained. On the basis of said contention, it questioned, from the
inception of the dispute before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power and authority of the LLDA to issue a
cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which the City Government of
Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory that Section 7 of Presidential Decree
No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control law, authorizing the defunct National Pollution Control Commission

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to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order was not incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive Order
No. 927, series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, the LLDA is
instead required "to institute the necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or
continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance
from the Authority."

The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court of Appeals, contending that,
as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic Act No.
4850 and its amendatory laws, Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested
with the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of
Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus:

Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Executive Order and its
implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing.

(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and
the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished.

(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be reasonable, for the
prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the
installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts thereof.

(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or modify any permit issued
under this Order whenever the same is necessary to prevent or abate pollution.

(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or instrumentalities

for the purpose of enforcing this Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations and the
orders and decisions of the Authority.

The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the above provisions of
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which granted administrative quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution
abatement cases.

In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in this case, and the corresponding
overlapping jurisdiction of government agencies implementing these laws, the resolution of the issue of whether or not
the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect was injunctive, necessarily
requires a determination of the threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake Development Authority, under its Charter
and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open
dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering the
health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation and quality of the water in the area brought
about by exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite?

The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires control, if not prohibition,
of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB)
of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987, 18 has assumed the powers and
functio

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ns of the defunct National Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive
Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and
functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases. 19

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB),
except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA,
as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws
to carry out and make effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting and accelerating the development and
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San
Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of
undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the
LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake
region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.
In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or
disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public
corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of
the LLDA for the development of the region. 22

In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction under its charter was validly
invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation that the open dumpsite project of the City Government of
Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as required under Section 4, par.
(d), of Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is also an
allegation that the said project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was recognized by the
Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at the meeting among the
representatives of the City Government of Caloocan, Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to
discuss the possibility of
re-opening the open dumpsite.

Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following issue: Does the LLDA have
the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on
the basis of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City.

The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.

The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage
in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended, and other relevant environment laws, 23 cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of
injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No.
927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or
pollution." 24(Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be
necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease and desist order" in a
language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National
Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and
E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of
the power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance
of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.

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Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly conferred by law, there is
jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily be express. 25 While it is a
fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is
likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of
its express powers. 26 In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-
judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and
desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.

In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al., 27 the Court ruled
that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order when there
is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the
country. Theponente, Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here
presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents
into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted
litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including
multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several
years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and
promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and
general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly
designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here
involved, through the exercise of police power. . . .

The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives vitality to the
statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II,
Section 16 which provides:

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in
consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them." 28 It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human
right. 29

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under the
circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws.
Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in
the first instance, no further legal steps would have been necessary.

The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA the means of directly
enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute "necessary legal proceeding against
any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the
Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA."

Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of all projects
initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or the private sector, insofar as the implementation of
these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal with cases which might possibly arise where decisions or orders
issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe
objective. To meet such contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power of the
LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper courts.

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Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region and its surrounding provinces,
cities and towns are concerned, the Court will not dwell further on the related issues raised which are more
appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with the special knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 19, 1993 enjoining
the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

[G.R. No. 110249. August 21, 1997]

ALFREDO TANO, BALDOMERO TANO, DANILO TANO, ROMUALDO TANO, TEOCENES MIDELLO, ANGEL DE
MESA, EULOGIO TREMOCHA, FELIPE ONGONION, JR., ANDRES LINIJAN, ROBERT LIM, VIRGINIA LIM,
FELIMON DE MESA, GENEROSO ARAGON, TEODORICO ANDRE, ROMULO DEL ROSARIO, CHOLITO
ANDRE, ERICK MONTANO, ANDRES OLIVA, VITTORIO SALVADOR, LEOPOLDO ARAGON, RAFAEL RIBA,
ALEJANDRO LEONILA, JOSE DAMACINTO, RAMIRO MANAEG, RUBEN MARGATE, ROBERTO REYES,
DANILO PANGARUTAN, NOE GOLPAN,ESTANISLAO ROMERO, NICANOR DOMINGO, ROLDAN TABANG,
PANGANIBAN, ADRIANO TABANG, FREDDIE SACAMAY, MIGUEL TRIMOCHA, PACENCIO LABABIT,
PABLO H. OMPAD, CELESTINO A. ABANO, ALLAN ALMODAL, BILLY D. BARTOLAY, ALBINO D. LIQUE,
MELCHOR J. LAYSON, MELANI AMANTE, CLARO E. YATOC, MERGELDO B. BALDEO, EDGAR M.
ALMASET A., JOSELITO MANAEG, LIBERATO ANDRADA, JR., ROBERTO BERRY, RONALD VILLANUEVA,
EDUARDO VALMORIA, WILDREDO MENDOZA, NAPOLEON BABANGA, ROBERTO TADEPA, RUBEN
ASINGUA, SILVERIO GABO, JERRY ROMERO, DAVID PANGAGARUTAN, DANIEL PANGGARUTAN,
ROMEO AGAWIN, FERNANDO EQUIZ, DITO LEQUIZ, RONILO ODERABLE, BENEDICTO TORRES,
ROSITO A. VALDEZ, CRESENCIO A. SAYANG, NICOMEDES S. ACOSTA, ERENEO A. SEGARINO, JR.,
WILDREDO A. RAUTO, DIOSDADO A. ACOSTA, BONIFACIO G. SISMO, TACIO ALUBA, DANIEL B.
BATERZAL, ELISEO YBAEZ, DIOSDADO E. HANCHIC, EDDIE ESCALICAS, ELEAZAR
B. BATERZAL, DOMINADOR HALICHIC, ROOSEVELT RISMO-AN, ROBERT C. MERCADER, TIRSO
ARESGADO, DANIEL CHAVEZ, DANILO CHAVEZ, VICTOR VILLAROEL, ERNESTO C. YABANEZ,
ARMANDO T. SANTILLAN, RUDY S. SANTILLAN, JODJEN ILUSTRISIMO, NESTOR SALANGRON,
ALBERTO SALANGRON, ROGER L. ROXAS, FRANCISCO T. ANTICANO, PASTOR SALANGRON,
BIENVENIDO SANTILLAN, GILBUENA LADDY, FIDEL BENJAMIN JOVELITO BELGANO, HONEY PARIOL,
ANTONIO SALANGRON, NICASIO SALANGRON, & AIRLINE SHIPPERS ASSOCIATION OF
PALAWAN, petitioners, vs. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, MEMBERS OF SANGGUNIAN
PANLALAWIGAN OF PALAWAN, namely, VICE-GOVERNOR JOEL T. REYES, JOSE D. ZABALA, ROSALINO
R. ACOSTA, JOSELITO A. CADLAON, ANDRES R. BAACO, NELSON P. PENEYRA, CIPRIANO C.
BARROMA, CLARO E. ORDINARIO, ERNESTO A. LLACUN, RODOLFO C. FLORDELIZA, GILBERT S.
BAACO, WINSTON G. ARZAGA, NAPOLEON F. ORDONEZ and GIL P. ACOSTA, CITY MAYOR EDWARD
HAGEDORN, MEMBERS OF SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG PUERTO PRINCESA, ALL MEMBERS OF
BANTAY DAGAT, MEMBERS OF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE OF PALAWAN, PROVINCIAL AND CITY
PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN and PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, and ALL JUDGES OF PALAWAN,
REGIONAL, MUNICIPAL AND METROPOLITAN, respondents.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Petitioners caption their petition as one for Certiorari, Injunction With Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,with Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order and pray that this Court: (1) declare as unconstitutional: (a) Ordinance No. 15-92,

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dated 15 December 1992, of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa; (b) Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993,
dated 22 January 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and (c) Resolution No. 33,
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, dated 19 February 1993, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan; (2) enjoin the
enforcement thereof; and (3) restrain respondents Provincial and City Prosecutors of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City
and Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts [1] and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Palawan from
assuming jurisdiction over and hearing cases concerning the violation of the Ordinances and of the Office Order.

More appropriately, the petition is, and shall be treated as, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.

The following is petitioners summary of the factual antecedents giving rise to the petition:

1. On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which
took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER
OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS,
PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF, the full text of which reads as follows:

Section 1. Title of the Ordinance. - This Ordinance is entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE
FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING
EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF.

Section 2. Purpose, Scope and Coverage. - To effectively free our City Sea Waters from Cyanide and other Obnoxious
substance, and shall cover all persons and/or entities operating within and outside the City of Puerto Princesa who is
are [sic] directly or indirectly in the business or shipment of live fish and lobster outside the City.

Section 3. Definition of terms. - For purpose of this Ordinance the following are hereby defined:

A. SEA BASS - A kind of fish under the family of Centropomidae, better known as APAHAP;

B. CATFISH - A kind of fish under the family of Plotosidae, better known as HITO-HITO;

C. MUDFISH - A kind of fish under the family of Orphicaphalisae better known as DALAG

D. ALL LIVE FISH - All alive, breathing not necessarily moving of all specie[s] use for food and for aquarium purposes.

E. LIVE LOBSTER - Several relatively, large marine crustaceans of the genus Homarus that are alive and breathing not
necessarily moving.

Section 4. It shall be unlawful [for] any person or any business enterprise or company to ship out from Puerto Princesa
City to any point of destination either via aircraft or seacraft of any live fish and lobster except SEA BASS, CATFISH,
MUDFISH, AND MILKFISH FRIES.

Section 5. Penalty Clause. - Any person/s and or business entity violating this Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine
of not more than P5,000.00 or imprisonment of not more than twelve (12) months, cancellation of their permit to do
business in the City of Puerto Princesa or all of the herein stated penalties, upon the discretion of the court.

Section 6. If the owner and/or operator of the establishment found vilating the provisions of this ordinance is a
corporation or a partnership, the penalty prescribed in Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon its president and/or
General Manager or Managing Partner and/or Manager, as the case maybe [sic].

Section 7. Any existing ordinance or any provision of any ordinance inconsistent to [sic] this ordinance is deemed
repealed.

Section 8. This Ordinance shall take effect on January 1, 1993.

Page 8 of 55
SO ORDAINED.

xxx

2. To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993
dated January 22, 1993 which reads as follows:

In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74, otherwise known as AN
ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION,
CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED
TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYORS PERMIT and City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE
SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,
1998, you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live
fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within the
jurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations [sic] either via aircraft or seacraft.

The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required Mayors Permit issued by this
Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources and as to compliance with all other existing rules and regulations on the matter.

Any cargo containing live fish and lobster without the required documents as stated herein must be held for proper
disposition.

In the pursuit of this Order, you are hereby authorized to coordinate with the PAL Manager, the PPA Manager, the local
PNP Station and other offices concerned for the needed support and cooperation.Further, that the usual courtesy and
diplomacy must be observed at all times in the conduct of the inspection.

Please be guided accordingly.

xxx

3. On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33
entitled: A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF
LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS
FASCIATUS(SUNO). CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS AND
SPAWNING, TRADACNA GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA(MOTHER PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND
OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR
GREEN GROUPER) AND FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND
COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS, the full text of which reads as follows:

WHEREAS, scientific and factual researches [sic] and studies disclose that only five (5) percent of the corals of our
province remain to be in excellent condition as [a] habitat of marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms;

WHEREAS, it cannot be gainsaid that the destruction and devastation of the corals of our province were principally due
to illegal fishing activities like dynamite fishing, sodium cyanide fishing, use of other obnoxious substances and other
related activities;

WHEREAS, there is an imperative and urgent need to protect and preserve the existence of the remaining excellent
corals and allow the devastated ones to reinvigorate and regenerate themselves into vitality within the span of five (5)
years;

Page 9 of 55
WHEREAS, Sec. 468, Par. 1, Sub-Par. VI of the [sic] R.A. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
empowers the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties [upon] acts
which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, among others.

NOW, THEREFORE, on motion by Kagawad Nelson P. Peneyra and upon unanimous decision of all the members
present;

Be it resolved as it is hereby resolved, to approve Resolution No. 33, Series of 1993 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
and to enact Ordinance No. 2 for the purpose, to wit:

ORDINANCE NO. 2

Series of 1993

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN IN SESSION ASSEMBLED:

Section 1. TITLE - This Ordinance shall be known as an Ordinance Prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing,
buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: 1.Family: Scaridae (Mameng), 2.
Epinephelus Fasciatus (Suno), 3. Cromileptes altivelis (Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and spawning),
4. Tridacna Gigas (Taklobo), 5. Pinctada Margaretefera (Mother Pearl, Oysters, Giant Clams and other species), 6.
Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn-breeder size or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green Grouper) and 8. Family:
Balistidae (Topical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of five (5) years in and coming from Palawan Waters.

Section II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

1. Sec. 2-A (Rep. Act 7160). It is hereby declared, the policy of the state that the territorial and political subdivisions of
the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the
State shall provide for [a] more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.

2. Sec. 5-A (R.A. 7160). Any provision on a power of [a] local Government Unit shall be liberaly interpreted in its favor,
and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower
government units. Any fair and reasonable doubts as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the
Local Government Unit concerned.

3. Sec. 5-C (R.A. 7160). The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to
local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the
community.

4. Sec. 16 (R.A. 7160). General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance; and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.

Section III. DECLARATION OF POLICY. - It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Province of Palawan to protect and
conserve the marine resources of Palawan not only for the greatest good of the majority of the present generation but
with [the] proper perspective and consideration of [sic] their prosperity, and to attain this end, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan henceforth declares that is [sic] shall be unlawful for any person or any business entity to engage in
catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms as
enumerated in Section 1 hereof in and coming out of Palawan Waters for a period of five (5) years;

Section IV. PENALTY CLAUSE. - Any person and/or business entity violating this Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine
of not more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, and/or imprisonment of six (6) months to

Page 10 of 55
twelve (12) months and confiscation and forfeiture of paraphernalias [sic] and equipment in favor of the government
at the discretion of the Court;

Section V. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE. - If for any reason, a Section or provision of this Ordinance shall be held as
unconditional [sic] or invalid, it shall not affect the other provisions hereof.

Section VI. REPEALING CLAUSE. - Any existing Ordinance or a provision of any ordinance inconsistent herewith is
deemed modified, amended or repealed.

Section VII. EFFECTIVITY. - This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication.

SO ORDAINED.

xxx

4. The respondents implemented the said ordinances, Annexes A and C hereof thereby depriving all the fishermen of
the whole province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and the petitioners
Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and
trade;

5. Petitioners Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, and Felipe Ongonion,
Jr. were even charged criminally under criminal case no. 93-05-C in the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Cuyo-
Agutaya-Magsaysay, an original carbon copy of the criminal complaint dated April 12, 1993 is hereto attached as
Annex D; while xerox copies are attached as Annex D to the copies of the petition;

6. Petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, on the other hand, were charged by the respondent PNP with the
respondent City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City, a xerox copy of the complaint is hereto attached as Annex E;

Without seeking redress from the concerned local government units, prosecutors office and courts, petitioners
directly invoked our original jurisdiction by filing this petition on 4 June 1993. In sum, petitioners contend that:

First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the
practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayors permit could be
granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit.

Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession,
buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or
gathered through lawful fishing method, the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their
livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were
unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential
to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion.

Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void, the criminal cases based thereon
against petitioners Tano and the others have to be dismissed.

In the Resolution of 15 June 1993 we required respondents to comment on the petition, and furnished the Office of
the Solicitor General with a copy thereof.

In their comment filed on 13 August 1993, public respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No.2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of
the Provincial Governments power under the general welfare clause (Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991

Page 11 of 55
[hereafter, LGC]), and its specific power to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which
endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing under Section 447 (a) (1)
(vi), Section 458 (a) (1) (vi), and Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the LGC. They claimed that in the exercise of such powers,
the Province of Palawan had the right and responsibilty to insure that the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells [sic],
within its territory remain healthy for the future generation. The Ordinance, they further asserted, covered onlylive
marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms which were enumerated in the ordinance and excluded other kinds of live
marine aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral reefs; besides the prohibition was for only five (5) years to protect and
preserve the pristine coral and allow those damaged to regenerate.

Aforementioned respondents likewise maintained that there was no violation of due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution. As to the former, public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance
which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable means; while as to the latter, a substantial
distinction existed between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of selling it live, and a fisherman who
catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it live, i.e., the former uses sodium cyanide while the latter does not.
Further, the Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to one class.

On 25 October 1993 petitioners filed an Urgent Plea for the Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
claiming that despite the pendency of this case, Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan was bent on
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 11223 against petitioners Danilo Tano, Alfredo Tano, Eulogio Tremocha, Romualdo
Tano, Baldomero Tano, Andres Lemihan and Angel de Mesa for violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan. Acting on said plea, we issued on 11 November 1993 a temporary restraining order directing
Judge Angel Miclat of said court to cease and desist from proceeding with the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal
Case No. 11223.

On 12 July 1994, we excused the Office of the Solicitor General from filing a comment, considering that as claimed
by said office in its Manifestation of 28 June 1994, respondents were already represented by counsel.

The rest of the respondents did not file any comment on the petition.

In the resolution of 15 September 1994, we resolved to consider the comment on the petition as the Answer, gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. [2]

On 22 April 1997 we ordered impleaded as party respondents the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and required the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on their behalf. But in light
of the latters motion of 9 July 1997 for an extension of time to file the comment which would only result in further
delay, we dispensed with said comment.

After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolved to dismiss this petition for want of merit, on 22 July
1997, and assigned it to the ponente for the writing of the opinion of the Court.

There are actually two sets of petitioners in this case. The first is composed of Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano,
Danilo Tano, Romualdo Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Andres Linijan,
and Felimon de Mesa, who were criminally charged with violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 33 and
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan, in Criminal Case No. 93-05-C of the 1 st Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) of Palawan;[3] and Robert Lim and Virginia Lim who were charged with violating City Ordinance No.
15-92 of Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa. [4] All of them, with the exception of Teocenes Midello, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Felimon
de Mesa, Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, are likewise the accused in Criminal Case No. 11223 for the violation of
Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan, pending before Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan.[5]

Page 12 of 55
 The second set of petitioners is composed of the rest of the petitioners numbering seventy-seven (77), all of
whom, except the Airline Shippers Association of Palawan -- an alleged private association of several marine
merchants -- are natural persons who claim to be fishermen.

The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is, of course, to prevent the prosecution, trial and determination
of the criminal cases until the constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have been
resolved. The second set of petitioners merely claim that they being fishermen or marine merchants, they would be
adversely affected by the ordinances.

As to the first set of petitioners, this special civil for certiorari must fail on the ground of prematurity amounting to
a lack of cause of action. There is no showing that the said petitioners, as the accused in the criminal cases, have filed
motions to quash the informations therein and that the same were denied. The ground available for such motions is
that the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense because the ordinances in question are unconstitutional.
[6]
It cannot then be said that the lower courts acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion to justify recourse to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition. It must further be stressed that
even if the petitioners did file motions to quash, the denial thereof would not forthwith give rise to a cause of action
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The general rule is that where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy therefrom
is notcertiorari, but for the party aggrieved thereby to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating special defenses
involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the merits of adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the
manner authorized by law.[7] And , even where in an exceptional circumstance such denial may be the subject of a
special civil action for certiorari, a motion for reconsideration must have to be filed to allow the court concerned an
opportunity to correct its errors, unless such motion may be dispensed with because of existing exceptional
circumstances.[8] Finally, even if a motion for reconsideration has been filed and denied, the remedy under Rule 65 is
still unavailable absent any showing of the grounds provided for in Section 1 thereof. [9] For obvious reasons, the
petition at bar does not, and could not have , alleged any of such grounds.

As to the second set of petitioners, the instant petition is obviously one for DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e., for a
declaration that the Ordinances in question are a nullity ... for being unconstitutional. [10] As such, their petition must
likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only
questions of law are involved, [11] it being settled that the Court merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such
petitions.[12]

II

Even granting arguendo that the first set of petitioners have a cause of action ripe for the extraordinary writ
of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no special and important reason or
exceptional or compelling circumstance has been adduced why direct recourse to us should be allowed. While we have
concurrent jurisdiction with Regional Trial courts and with the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, so we held in People v. Cuaresma:[13]

This concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with
the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.

The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict adherence thereto in the light of what
it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called

Page 13 of 55
extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the
highest tribunal of the land.

In Santiago v. Vasquez,[14] this Court forcefully expressed that the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard
the hierarchy of courts must be put to a halt, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court,
but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which
often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court, the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We reiterated the judicial policy that this Court will
not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of [its]
primary jurisdiction.

III

Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural obstacles against the first set of petitioners, we opt to resolve this case
on its merits considering that the lifetime of the challenged Ordinances is about to end. Ordinance No. 15-92 of the
City of Puerto Princesa is effective only up to 1 January 1998, while Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan,
enacted on 19 February 1993, is effective for only five (5) years. Besides, these Ordinances were undoubtedly enacted
in the exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the environment and are
thus novel and of paramount importance. No further delay then may be allowed in the resolution of the issues raised.

It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality.[15] To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt.[16] Where doubt exists, even if well founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To
doubt is to sustain.[17]

After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to have been
violated, we find petitioners contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from any infirmity, both
under the Constitution and applicable laws.

Petitioners specifically point to Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution as having
been transgressed by the Ordinances.

The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article XII reads:

SEC. 2. x x x

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative
fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide:

Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on
freedom of initiative and self-reliance.

xxx

SEC. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential
use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen

Page 14 of 55
through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other
services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore
fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their
labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. In
their petition, petitioner Airline Shippers Association of Palawan is described as a private association composed of
Marine Merchants; petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, as merchants; while the rest of the petitioners claim to be
fishermen, without any qualification, however, as to their status.

Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms subsistence or marginal fishermen,
[18]
they should be construed in their general and ordinary sense. Amarginal fisherman is an individual engaged in
fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient
to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish, [19] while a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but
the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. [20] Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or
fisherman as an individual engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or
exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate family. It bears repeating that
nothing in the record supports a finding that any petitioner falls within these definitions.

Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress
on the duty of the State to protect the nations marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is that the State
may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes,
bays, and lagoons. Our survey of the statute books reveals that the only provision of law which speaks of the
preferential right of marginal fishermen is Section 149 of the LGC of 1991 which pertinently provides:

SEC. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. -- x x x

(b) The sangguniang bayan may:

(1) Grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a
definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it: Provided, however, That duly registered organizations and
cooperatives of marginal fishermen shall have preferential right to such fishery privileges ....

In a Joint Administrative Order No. 3, dated 25 April 1996, the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and the
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government prescribed the guidelines on the preferential treatment
of small fisherfolk relative to the fishery right mentioned in Section 149. This case, however, does not involve such
fishery right.

Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing resources, but of their
protection, development, and conservation. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question are meant precisely to
protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their enjoyment by the people may be guaranteed not only
for the present generation, but also for the generations to come.

The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all
absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their exploration, development and utilization ... shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. Moreover, their mandated protection, development, and conservation as
necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution, imply certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment
there may be in favor of anyone. Thus, as to the curtailment of the preferential treatment of marginal fisherman, the
following exchange between Commissioner Francisco Rodrigo and Commissioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., took place at
the plenary session of the Constitutional Commission:

MR. RODRIGO:

Page 15 of 55
 Let us discuss the implementation of this because I would not raise the hopes of our people, and afterwards
fail in the implementation. How will this be implemented? Will there be a licensing or giving of permits so
that government officials will know that one is really a marginal fisherman? Or if policeman say that a person
is not a marginal fisherman, he can show his permit, to prove that indeed he is one.

MR. BENGZON:

Certainly, there will be some mode of licensing insofar as this is concerned and this particular question could
be tackled when we discuss the Article on Local Governments -- whether we will leave to the local
governments or to Congress on how these things will be implemented. But certainly, I think our
Congressmen and our local officials will not be bereft of ideas on how to implement this mandate.

xxx

MR. RODRIGO:

So, once one is licensed as a marginal fisherman, he can go anywhere in the Philippines and fish in any
fishing grounds.

MR. BENGZON:

Subject to whatever rules and regulations and local laws that may be passed, may be existing or will be
passed.[21] (underscoring supplied for emphasis).

What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding the duty of the
State to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.[22] On this score, in Oposa v. Factoran,[23] this Court declared:

While the right to balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles the State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less
than self-preservation and self-perpetuation - aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners - the advancement of which
may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even
be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
protect and advance the second , the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present
generation, but also for those to come - generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment ...

The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood to the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, the General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this right:

SEC. 16. General Welfare.-- Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance,
and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions,
local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture,
promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance

Page 16 of 55
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (underscoring supplied).

Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to the local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading
the quality of life for the people of the community.

The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and to impose rentals,
fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous
substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the
provisions of applicable fishery laws.[24] Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and
the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that [p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties
for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing ... and such
other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance. [25]

Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization [26] as expressly mandated by the Constitution.
Indispensable thereto is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that [a]ny provision on a power of a local
[27]

government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved
in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned, [28]Devolution refers to the
act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to
perform specific functions and responsibilities.[29]

One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery
laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. [30] This necessarily includes enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.

The term municipal waters, in turn, include not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality, not
being the subject of private ownership and not comprised within the national parks, public forest, timber lands, forest
reserves, or fishery reserves, but also marine waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the general
coastline from points where the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line
parallel with the general coastline and fifteen kilometers from it. [31] Under P.D. No. 704, the marine waters included in
municipal waters is limited to three nautical miles from the general coastline using the above perpendicular lines and a
third parallel line.

These fishery laws which local government units may enforce under Section 17(b), (2), (i) in municipal waters
include: (1) P.D. No. 704; (2) P.D. No. 1015 which, inter alia, authorizes the establishment of a closed season in any
Philippine water if necessary for conservation or ecological purposes; (3) P.D. No. 1219 which provides for the
exploration, exploitation, utilization, and conservation of coral resources; (4) R.A. No. 5474, as amended by B.P. Blg.
58, which makes it unlawful for any person, association, or corporation to catch or cause to be caught, sell, offer to
sell, purchase, or have in possession any of the fish specie called gobiidae or ipon during closed season; and (5) R.A.
No. 6451 which prohibits and punishes electrofishing, as well as various issuances of the BFAR.

To those specifically devolved insofar as the control and regulation of fishing in municipal waters and the
protection of its marine environment are concerned, must be added the following:

1. Issuance of permits to construct fish cages within municipal waters;

2. Issuance of permits to gather aquarium fishes within municipal waters;

3. Issuance of permits to gather kapis shells within municipal waters;

4. Issuance of permits to gather/culture shelled mollusks within municipal waters;

Page 17 of 55
 5. Issuance of licenses to establish seaweed farms within municipal waters;

6. Issuance of licenses to establish culture pearls within municipal waters;

7. Issuance of auxiliary invoice to transport fish and fishery products; and

8. Establishment of closed season in municipal waters.

These functions are covered in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture
and the Department of Interior and Local Government.

In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted to
local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi), 458 (a)
(1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
Ordinances cannot be doubted.

Parenthetically, we wish to add that these Ordinances find full support under R.A. No. 7611, otherwise known as
the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act, approved on 19 July 1992. This statute adopts a
comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the
natural resources and endangered environment of the province, which shall serve to guide the local government of
Palawan and the government agencies concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs and
projects affecting said province.[32]

At this time then, it would be appropriate to determine the relation between the assailed Ordinances and the
aforesaid powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
the Province of Palawan to protect the environment. To begin, we ascertain the purpose of the Ordinances as set forth
in the statement of purposes or declaration of policies quoted earlier.

It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a closed
season for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years, and (2) to protect the corals
of the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal
fishing activities.

The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal
waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment of closed seasons. The devolution of such power has
been expressly confirmed in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture
and the Department of Interior and Local Government.

The realization of the second objective falls within both the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express
mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts
which endanger the environment.[33]

The destruction of the coral reefs results in serious, if not irreparable, ecological imbalance, for coral reefs are
among the natures life-support systems.[34] They collect, retain, and recycle nutrients for adjacent nearshore areas
such as mangroves, seagrass beds, and reef flats; provide food for marine plants and animals; and serve as a
protective shelter for aquatic organisms. [35] It is said that [e]cologically, the reefs are to the oceans what forests are to
continents: they are shelter and breeding grounds for fish and plant species that will disappear without them. [36]

The prohibition against catching live fish stems, in part, from the modern phenomenon of live-fish trade which
entails the catching of so-called exotic tropical species of fish not only for aquarium use in the West, but also for the
market for live banquet fish [which] is virtually insatiable in ever more affluent Asia. [37] These exotic species are coral-
dwellers, and fishermen catch them by diving in shallow water with corraline habitats and squirting sodium cyanide
poison at passing fish directly or onto coral crevices; once affected the fish are immobilized [merely stunned] and then

Page 18 of 55
scooped by hand.[38] The diver then surfaces and dumps his catch into a submerged net attached to the skiff . Twenty
minutes later, the fish can swim normally.Back on shore, they are placed in holding pens, and within a few weeks, they
expel the cyanide from their system and are ready to be hauled. Then they are placed in saltwater tanks or packaged
in plastic bags filled with seawater for shipment by air freight to major markets for live food fish. [39] While the fish are
meant to survive, the opposite holds true for their former home as [a]fter the fisherman squirts the cyanide, the first
thing to perish is the reef algae, on which fish feed. Days later, the living coral starts to expire. Soon the reef loses its
function as habitat for the fish, which eat both the algae and invertebrates that cling to the coral. The reef becomes an
underwater graveyard, its skeletal remains brittle, bleached of all color and vulnerable to erosion from the pounding of
the waves.[40] It has been found that cyanide fishing kills most hard and soft corals within three months of repeated
application.[41]

The nexus then between the activities barred by Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa and the
prohibited acts provided in Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993 of the Province of Palawan, on one hand, and the use of
sodium cyanide, on the other, is painfully obvious. In sum, the public purpose and reasonableness of the Ordinances
may not then be controverted.

As to Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of the City of Puerto
Princesa, we find nothing therein violative of any constitutional or statutory provision. The Order refers to the
implementation of the challenged ordinance and is not the Mayors Permit.

The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo relies upon the lack of authority on the part of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa to enact Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1992, on the theory that the
subject thereof is within the jurisdiction and responsibility of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR)
under P.D. No. 704, otherwise known as the Fisheries Decree of 1975; and that, in any event, the Ordinance is
unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), likewise in
accordance with P.D. No. 704.

The majority is unable to accommodate this view. The jurisdiction and responsibility of the BFAR under P. D. no.
704, over the management, conservation, development, protection, utilization and disposition of all fishery and
aquatic resources of the country is not all-encompassing. First, Section 4 thereof excludes from such jurisdiction and
responsibility municipal waters, which shall be under the municipal or city government concerned, except insofar as
fishpens and seaweed culture in municipal in municipal centers are concerned. This section provides, however, that all
municipal or city ordinances and resolutions affecting fishing and fisheries and any disposition thereunder shall be
submitted to the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources for appropriate action and shall have full force and
effect only upon his approval.[42]

Second, it must at once be pointed out that the BFAR is no longer under the Department of Natural Resources
(now Department of Environment and Natural Resources). Executive Order No. 967 of 30 June 1984 transferred the
BFAR from the control and supervision of the Minister (formerly Secretary) of Natural Resources to the Ministry of
Agriculture and Food (MAF) and converted it into a mere staff agency thereof, integrating its functions with the
regional offices of the MAF.

In Executive Order No. 116 of 30 January 1987, which reorganized the MAF, the BFAR was retained as an attached
agency of the MAF. And under the Administrative Code of 1987, [43]the BFAR is placed under the Title concerning the
Department of Agriculture.[44]

Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of Puerto Princesa is invalid or
unenforceable because it was not approved by the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should be sought
would be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances affecting fishing
and fisheries in municipal waters has been dispensed with in view of the following reasons:

(1) Section 534 (Repealing Clause) of the LGC expressly repeals or amends Section 16 and 29 of P.D. No.
704[45] insofar that they are inconsistent with the provisions of the LGC.

Page 19 of 55
 (2) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the
power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically
vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges
therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances,
electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute other methods of fishing; and to
prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishing laws. [46] Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang
bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to [p]rotect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and
other forms of destructive fishing and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of
rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance.[47]

In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan for exercising the requisite political will to enact urgently needed legislation to
protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby sharing in the herculean task of arresting the tide of ecological
destruction. We hope that other local government units shall now be roused from their lethargy and adopt a more
vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our legacy to future generations. At this time, the repercussions
of any further delay in their response may prove disastrous, if not, irreversible.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the temporary restraining order issued on
11 November 1993 is LIFTED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by
their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her
parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES,
minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V.
PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor,
represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor,
represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS
IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents
ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed
KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE
VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA
ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO
and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by
their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH,
STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX
and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL,
minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE
ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of

Page 20 of 55
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the
RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational
justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital
life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners,
are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the
Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose
of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The
original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class
suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was
filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they
"represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be
rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of
thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and
unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool
which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and
flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful
ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover
and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such
as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of
rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water,
incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c)
massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded
estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the
disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures,

Page 21 of 55
(f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire
country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of
lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and
shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for
domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process
carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global
warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable
of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding,
they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in
the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left,
barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements
('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial
logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per
hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest
resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are
evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in
paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff
adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest
stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their
successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource
treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource
property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

Page 22 of 55
 15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled
to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights
of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare,
barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had
been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy
enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of
the State

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos
and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-
being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to
the Constitutional policy of the State to

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and
efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article
XIV,id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural law and
violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two
(2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a
political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990

Page 23 of 55
Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of
action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse
of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order,
not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a
political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result
in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this
Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but
have also joined the latter in this case. 8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the
petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient
allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human
Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of
man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on
the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that
the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be
considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public
interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but
vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the
"protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country
is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government.
They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for
the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State
without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five
(25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after
due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the
requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777
as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless,
We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and

Page 24 of 55
general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so
numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise
declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to
a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that
right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised
and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent
Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell
short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and
protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC).
Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague
conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint
against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color
and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing
violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the
Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant
the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored
(sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a
specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

Page 25 of 55
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which,
for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less
than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not
even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first
and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present
generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who
sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution
air, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with
it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be
provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other
related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which
expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and
natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and
watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as

Page 26 of 55
may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable
use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-
shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of
the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development
and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future
generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system
including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in
Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full
exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration,
development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of
the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing
the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of
the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority.
Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy
formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid
special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a
continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements
of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as
trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave
flesh to the said policy.

Page 27 of 55
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the
DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with
grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of
the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause
of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside
the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is:
admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 InMilitante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost
care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action]
lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the
law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands
in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to
show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or
partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned,
there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally
involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22

Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished
member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to
rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their

Page 28 of 55
 acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch,
of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand
or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23

Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that
now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution
clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found
in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant
the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored
(sic) by the fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In
the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-
impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing
undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound
the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in
policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners,
into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J.
168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area
and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the

Page 29 of 55
 Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or
even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-
impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment
clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the
police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health,
moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations
of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29
quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co.
vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist
if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate
it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the
prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with
respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 148622. September 12, 2002

Page 30 of 55
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, in his capacity as Secretary
of the DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CLARENCE L. BAGUILAT,
in his capacity as the Regional Executive Director of DENR-Region XI and ENGR. BIENVENIDO L.
LIPAYON, in his capacity as the Regional Director of the DENR-ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
BUREAU (DENR-EMB), Region XI, petitioners, vs. THE CITY OF DAVAO, represented by BENJAMIN C.
DE GUZMAN, City Mayor, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review [1] on certiorari assailing the decision [2] dated May 28, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, Branch 33, which granted the writ of mandamus and injunction in favor of respondent, the City of
Davao, and against petitioner, the Republic, represented by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). The trial court also directed petitioner to issue a Certificate of Non-Coverage in favor of respondent.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On August 11, 2000, respondent filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed
project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), Region XI. Attached to
the application were the required documents for its issuance, namely, a) detailed location map of the project site; b)
brief project description; and c) a certification from the City Planning and Development Office that the project is not
located in an environmentally critical area (ECA). The EMB Region XI denied the application after finding that the
proposed project was within an environmentally critical area and ruled that, pursuant to Section 2, Presidential Decree
No. 1586, otherwise known as the Environmental Impact Statement System, in relation to Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No, 1151, also known as the Philippine Environment Policy, the City of Davao must undergo the environmental
impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), before it can proceed with
the construction of its project.

Believing that it was entitled to a Certificate of Non-Coverage, respondent filed a petition for mandamus and
injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Davao, docketed as Civil Case No. 28,133-2000. It alleged that its proposed
project was neither an environmentally critical project nor within an environmentally critical area; thus it was outside
the scope of the EIS system. Hence, it was the ministerial duty of the DENR, through the EMB-Region XI, to issue a CNC
in favor of respondent upon submission of the required documents.

The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, judgment granting the writ of mandamus and injunction is hereby
rendered in favor of the petitioner City of Davao and against respondents Department of Environment and Natural
Resources and the other respondents by:

1) directing the respondents to issue in favor of the petitioner City of Davao a Certificate of Non-Coverage, pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1586 and related laws, in connection with the construction by the City of Davao of the Artica
Sports Dome;

2) making the preliminary injunction issued on December 12, 2000 permanent.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Page 31 of 55
 The trial court ratiocinated that there is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151 and Letter of Instruction No.
1179 (prescribing guidelines for compliance with the EIA system), which requires local government units (LGUs) to
comply with the EIS law. Only agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including government owned
or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities are mandated to go through the EIA
process for their proposed projects which have significant effect on the quality of the environment. A local government
unit, not being an agency or instrumentality of the National Government, is deemed excluded under the principle
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

The trial court also declared, based on the certifications of the DENR-Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO)-West, and the data gathered from the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology
(PHIVOLCS), that the site for the Artica Sports Dome was not within an environmentally critical area. Neither was the
project an environmentally critical one. It therefore becomes mandatory for the DENR, through the EMB Region XI, to
approve respondents application for CNC after it has satisfied all the requirements for its issuance. Accordingly,
petitioner can be compelled by a writ of mandamus to issue the CNC, if it refuses to do so.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied. Hence, the instant petition for
review.

With the supervening change of administration, respondent, in lieu of a comment, filed a manifestation expressing
its agreement with petitioner that, indeed, it needs to secure an ECC for its proposed project. It thus rendered the
instant petition moot and academic. However, for the guidance of the implementors of the EIS law and pursuant to our
symbolic function to educate the bench and bar,[4] we are inclined to address the issue raised in this petition.

Section 15 of Republic Act 7160,[5] otherwise known as the Local Government Code, defines a local government
unit as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it
performs dual functions, governmental and proprietary. Governmental functions are those that concern the health,
safety and the advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the public generally. [6] Proprietary functions are
those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage and
benefit.[7] When exercising governmental powers and performing governmental duties, an LGU is an agency of the
national government.[8] When engaged in corporate activities, it acts as an agent of the community in the
administration of local affairs.[9]

Found in Section 16 of the Local Government Code is the duty of the LGUs to promote the peoples right to a
balanced ecology.[10] Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the City of Davao, can not claim exemption from the coverage of PD
1586. As a body politic endowed with governmental functions, an LGU has the duty to ensure the quality of the
environment, which is the very same objective of PD 1586.

Further, it is a rule of statutory construction that every part of a statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e., that every part must be considered with other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
enactment.[11] The trial court, in declaring local government units as exempt from the coverage of the EIS law, failed to
relate Section 2 of PD 1586[12] to the following provisions of the same law:

WHEREAS, the pursuit of a comprehensive and integrated environmental protection program necessitates the
establishment and institutionalization of a system whereby the exigencies of socio-economic undertakings can be
reconciled with the requirements of environmental quality; x x x.

Section 1. Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to attain and maintain a rational and orderly balance
between socio-economic growth and environmental protection.

xxxxxxxxx

Section 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. The President of the Philippines
may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the National Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation
declare certain projects, undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or

Page 32 of 55
corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing
an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative. For the proper
management of said critical project or area, the President may by his proclamation reorganize such government
offices, agencies, institutions, corporations or instrumentalities including the realignment of government personnel,
and their specific functions and responsibilities.

Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such
declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued
by the President or his duly authorized representative. [13] The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical.
The state and its political subdivisions, i.e., the local government units [14] are juridical persons.[15] Undoubtedly
therefore, local government units are not excluded from the coverage of PD 1586.

Lastly, very clear in Section 1 of PD 1586 that said law intends to implement the policy of the state to achieve a
balance between socio-economic development and environmental protection, which are the twin goals of sustainable
development. The above-quoted first paragraph of the Whereas clause stresses that this can only be possible if we
adopt a comprehensive and integrated environmental protection program where all the sectors of the community are
involved, i.e., the government and the private sectors. The local government units, as part of the machinery of the
government, cannot therefore be deemed as outside the scope of the EIS system. [16]

The foregoing arguments, however, presuppose that a project, for which an Environmental Compliance Certificate
is necessary, is environmentally critical or within an environmentally critical area. In the case at bar, respondent has
sufficiently shown that the Artica Sports Dome will not have a significant negative environmental impact because it is
not an environmentally critical project and it is not located in an environmentally critical area. In support of this
contention, respondent submitted the following:

1. Certification from the City Planning and Development Office that the project is not located in an environmentally
critical area;

2. Certification from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO-West) that the project area is
within the 18-30% slope, is outside the scope of the NIPAS (R.A. 7586), and not within a declared watershed area; and

3. Certification from PHILVOCS that the project site is thirty-seven (37) kilometers southeast of the southernmost
extension of the Davao River Fault and forty-five (45) kilometers west of the Eastern Mindanao Fault; and is outside the
required minimum buffer zone of five (5) meters from a fault zone.

The trial court, after a consideration of the evidence, found that the Artica Sports Dome is not within an
environmentally critical area. Neither is it an environmentally critical project. It is axiomatic that factual findings of the
trial court, when fully supported by the evidence on record, are binding upon this Court and will not be disturbed on
appeal.[17] This Court is not a trier of facts.[18]

There are exceptional instances when this Court may disregard factual findings of the trial court, namely: a) when
the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; b) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; c) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; d) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; f) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; h) when the findings
of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; i) when the finding of fact of the
Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and
j) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. [19] None of these exceptions, however, obtain in this case.

The Environmental Impact Statement System, which ensures environmental protection and regulates certain
government activities affecting the environment, was established by Presidential Decree No. 1586. Section 2 thereof
states:

Page 33 of 55
There is hereby established an Environmental Impact Statement System founded and based on the environmental
impact statement required under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1151, of all agencies and instrumentalities of the
national government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms
and entities, for every proposed project and undertaking which significantly affect the quality of the environment.

Section 4 of PD 1151, on the other hand, provides:

Environmental Impact Statements. Pursuant to the above enunciated policies and goals, all agencies and
instrumentalities of the national government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as
private corporations, firms and entities shall prepare, file and include in every action, project or undertaking which
significantly affects the quality of the environment a detailed statement on

(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or undertaking

(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented

(c) alternative to the proposed action

(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the environment are consistent with the maintenance
and enhancement of the long-term productivity of the same; and

(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or nonrenewable resources, a finding must be made that such
use and commitment are warranted.

Before an environmental impact statement is issued by a lead agency, all agencies having jurisdiction over, or special
expertise on, the subject matter involved shall comment on the draft environmental impact statement made by the
lead agency within thirty (30) days from receipt of the same.

Under Article II, Section 1, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 1586, the declaration of certain projects
or areas as environmentally critical, and which shall fall within the scope of the Environmental Impact Statement
System, shall be by Presidential Proclamation, in accordance with Section 4 of PD 1586 quoted above.

Pursuant thereto, Proclamation No. 2146 was issued on December 14, 1981, proclaiming the following areas and
types of projects as environmentally critical and within the scope of the Environmental Impact Statement System
established under PD 1586:

A. Environmentally Critical Projects

I. Heavy Industries

a. Non-ferrous metal industries

b. Iron and steel mills

c. Petroleum and petro-chemical industries including oil and gas

d. Smelting plants

II. Resource Extractive Industries

a. Major mining and quarrying projects

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b. Forestry projects

1. Logging

2. Major wood processing projects

3. Introduction of fauna (exotic-animals) in public/private forests

4. Forest occupancy

5. Extraction of mangrove products

6. Grazing

c. Fishery Projects

1. Dikes for/and fishpond development projects

III. Infrastructure Projects

a. Major dams

b. Major power plants (fossil-fueled, nuclear fueled, hydroelectric or geothermal)

c. Major reclamation projects

d. Major roads and bridges

B. Environmentally Critical Areas

1. All areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves, wildlife preserves and sanctuaries;

2. Areas set aside as aesthetic potential tourist spots;

3. Areas which constitute the habitat for any endangered or threatened species of indigenous Philippine
Wildlife (flora and fauna);

4. Areas of unique historic, archaeological, or scientific interests;

5. Areas which are traditionally occupied by cultural communities or tribes;

6. Areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities (geologic hazards, floods, typhoons,
volcanic activity, etc.);

7. Areas with critical slopes;

8. Areas classified as prime agricultural lands;

9. Recharged areas of aquifers;

10. Water bodies characterized by one or any combination of the following conditions;

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 a. tapped for domestic purposes

b. within the controlled and/or protected areas declared by appropriate authorities

c. which support wildlife and fishery activities

11. Mangrove areas characterized by one or any combination of the following conditions:

a. with primary pristine and dense young growth;

b. adjoining mouth of major river systems;

c. near or adjacent to traditional productive fry or fishing grounds;

d. which act as natural buffers against shore erosion, strong winds and storm floods;

e. on which people are dependent for their livelihood.

12. Coral reefs, characterized by one or any combinations of the following conditions:

a. with 50% and above live coralline cover;

b. spawning and nursery grounds for fish;

c. which act as natural breakwater of coastlines.

In this connection, Section 5 of PD 1586 expressly states:

Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. All other projects, undertakings and areas not declared by the President as
environmentally critical shall be considered as non-critical and shall not be required to submit an environmental
impact statement. The National Environmental Protection Council, thru the Ministry of Human Settlements may
however require non-critical projects and undertakings to provide additional environmental safeguards as it may deem
necessary.

The Artica Sports Dome in Langub does not come close to any of the projects or areas enumerated above. Neither
is it analogous to any of them. It is clear, therefore, that the said project is not classified as environmentally critical, or
within an environmentally critical area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice but to issue the Certificate of Non-
Coverage. It becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of which can be compelled by writ of mandamus, such as
that issued by the trial court in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Branch 33, in Civil Case No. 28,133-2000, granting the writ of mandamus and directing the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to issue in favor of the City of Davao a Certificate of Non-Coverage, pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1586 and related laws, in connection with the construction of the Artica Sports Dome, is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-41958 July 20, 1982

Page 36 of 55
 DONALD MEAD, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL A. ARGEL in his capacity as Presiding Judge in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXXV and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon & Reyes & Associates for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Acting Solicitor General Hugo Gutierrez, Jr., Asst. Solicitor General Octavio R.
Ramirez and Solicitor Mariano M. Martinez for respondents.

VASQUEZ, J.:

The issue posed for determination in this case is whether or not a Provincial Fiscal has the authority to file an
information for a violation of Republic Act No. 3931, entitled "An Act Creating a National Water and Air Pollution Control
Commission."

On March 11, 1975, petitioner Donald Mead and a certain Isaac Arivas were charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal
with a violation of Section 9, in relation to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3931, under an information reading as
follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of August, 1972, and for some time prior and subsequent thereto, in the
municipality of Malabon, province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then the president and the general manager, respectively, of
the Insular Oil Refinery Co. (INSOIL) a corporation duly organized in accordance with existing laws,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise dispose into the highway canal and/or
cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow to seep into such waterway the industrial and other waste
matters discharged due to the operation of the said Insular Oil Refinery Co. so managed and operated
by them, thereby causing pollution of such waterway with the resulting damage and/or destruction to
the living plants in the vicinity and providing hazard to health and property in the same vicinity.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-5984-75 and it was subsequently assigned to Branch XXXV of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal (Caloocan City) presided over by the respondent Judge.

On August 11, 1975, petitioner Donald Mead, one of the accused in the criminal case, filed a motion to quash on the
grounds that the trial court has no jurisdiction and that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal has no legal personality to file the
above-quoted information. The motion to quash was denied by the respondent Judge in an Order dated September 5,
1975. A Motion For Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was also denied by the respondent Judge in his Order of
November 10, 1965. Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul the said orders of the
respondent Judge who allegedly acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in issuing the same.

In Our Resolution dated November 28, 1975, the respondents were required to comment on the petition and a
temporary restraining order was issued to enjoin the respondent Judge from enforcing his questioned orders until
otherwise directed by this Court.

It is the principal contention of the petitioner that the National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission (hereinafter
referred to as the "Commission") as created under Republic Act No. 3931 has the exclusive authority to determine the
existence of "pollution" before a criminal case can be filed for a violation of the said law; and that it has the exclusive
authority to prosecute violations of the same. Petitioner further avers that the Commission not having finally ruled that
the petitioner has violated Republic Act No. 3931, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal lacks the authority to prosecute the
petitioner for a violation of said law.

The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that while Republic Act No. 3931 grants the power and duty to the
Commission to investigate and prosecute violations of Republic Act No. 3931, such grant of power and authority is not

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exclusive, and does not deprive fiscals and other public prosecutors of their authority to investigate and prosecute
violations of the said law committed within their respective jurisdictions.

Before discussing the main issue on its merits, We deem it necessary to resolve a procedural question raised by the
respondents in support of their prayer that the instant petition should not be entertained. Respondents advert to the
rule that when a motion to quash filed by an accused in a criminal case shall be denied, the remedy of the accused-
movant is not to file a petition for certiorari or mandamus or prohibition, the proper recourse being to go to trial,
without prejudice to his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to quash if an adverse judgment is
rendered against him, in the appeal that he may take therefrom in the manner authorized by law. (Mill vs. People, et
al., 101 Phil. 599; Echarol us. Purisima, et al, 13 SCRA 309.)

There is no disputing the validity and wisdom of the rule invoked by the respondents. However, it is also recognized
that, under certain situations, recourse to the extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus to
question the denial of a motion to quash is considered proper in the interest of "more enlightened and substantial
justice", as was so declared in "Yap vs. Lutero", G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1969, 105 Phil. 3007:

However, were we to require adherence to this pretense, the case at bar would have to be dismissed
and petitioner required to go through the inconvenience, not to say the mental agony and torture, of
submitting himself to trial on the merits in Case No. 16443, apart from the expenses incidental thereto,
despite the fact that his trial and conviction therein would violate one of this constitutional rights, and
that, an appeal to this Court, we would, therefore, have to set aside the judgment of conviction of the
lower court. This would, obviously, be most unfair and unjust. Under the circumstances obtaining in the
present case, the flaw in the procedure followed by petitioner herein may be overlooked, in the interest
of a more enlightened and substantial justice.

To the same effect is the pronouncement in "Pineda and Ampil Manufacturing Co., vs. Bartolome, et al.," 95 Phil.,
930938, expressed as follows:

While a denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was held not to be a proper basis for a
petition for certiorari [Nico vs. Blanco, 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. (1) 88; 81 Phil., 2131, or an appeal not
certiorari is the proper remedy for correcting an error which a lower court may commit in denying a
motion to set aside a judgment, or in setting aside an order of dismissal, [Rios vs. Ros et al., 45 Off.
Gaz. (No. 3), 1265; 79 Phil. 243; Santos vs. Pecson, 45 Off. Gaz. (No. 3), 1278; 79 Phil.754] however, in
some instances, the Supreme Court has departed from the general rule and has entertained the writ
notwithstanding the existence of an appeal. Thus, in one case the Supreme Court took cognizance of a
petition for certiorari notwithstanding the fact that the accused could have appealed in due time when
it found that the action was necessary to promote public welfare and public policy (People vs. Zulueta,
89 Phil. 880). In another case, a petition for certiorari to annul an order of the trial judge admitting an
amended information was entertained although the accused had an adequate remedy by appeal
"inasmuch as the Surplus Property cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to
proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof. (People vs, Zulueta, supra. Citing Arevalo vs.
Nepomuceno, 63 Phil., 627.) And still in another case, the writ was entertained where the appeal was
found not to be adequate remedy, as where the order which is sought to be reviewed is merely of
interlocutory or peremptory character, and the appeal therefrom can be interposed only after final
judgment and may therefore be of no avail. (Rocha vs. Crossfield, 6 Phil., 355; Leung Ben vs. O'Brien,
38 Phil., 182. See also Mendoza vs. Parungao, 49 Phil., 271; Dais vs. Court of First Instance, 51 Phil.,
36).

For analogous reasons it may be said that the petition for certiorari interposed by the accused against
the order of the court a quo denying the motion to quash may be entertained, not only because it was
rendered in a criminal case, but because it was rendered, as claimed, with grave abuse of discretion,
as found by the Court of Appeals, it would be indeed unfair and unjust, if not derogatory of their
constitutional right, to force the accused to go to trial under an information which, in their opinion, as
was found, accuses them of multiple offenses in contravention of law. And so, in our opinion, the

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 respondent court did not err in entertaining the petition for certiorari instead of dismissing it, as
claimed.

The motion to quash filed by the accused in Yap vs. Lutero was on the ground of double jeopardy. In Pineda vs.
Bartolome, the ground invoked was duplicity of offenses charged in the information. In the case at bar, the petitioner
assails the very jurisdiction of the court wherein the criminal case was filed, Certainly, there is a more compelling
reason that such issue be resolved soonest, in order to avoid the court's spending precious time and energy
unnecessarily in trying and deciding the case, and to spare the accused from the inconvenience, anxiety and
embarrassment, let alone the expenditure of effort and money, in undergoing trial for a case the proceedings in which
could possibly be annuled for want of jurisdiction. Even in civil actions, We have counselled that when the court's
jurisdiction is attacked in a motion to dismiss, it is the duty of the court to resolve the same as soon as possible in
order to avoid the unwholesome consequences mentioned above.

It is also advanced that the present petition is premature, since respondent court has not definitely
ruled on the motion to dismiss, nor held that it has jurisdiction, but only argument is untenable. The
motion to dismiss was predicated on the respondent court's lack of jurisdiction to entertain the action,
and the rulings of this Court are that writs of certiorari or prohibition, or both, may issue in case of a
denial or deferment of action on such a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

If the question of jurisdiction were not the main ground for this petition for review by certiorari, it
would be premature because it seeks to have a review of an interlocutory order. But as it would be
useless and futile to go ahead with the proceedings if the court below had no jurisdiction this petition
was given due course.' (San Beda vs. CIA 51 O.G. 6636, 5638).

While it is true that action on a motion to dismiss may be deferred until the trial and an order to that
effect is interlocutory, still where it clearly appears that the trial judge or court is proceeding in excess
or outside of its jurisdiction, the remedy of prohibition would lie since it would be useless and a waste
of time to go ahead with the proceedings. (Philippine International Fair, Inc., et al., vs. Ibanez, et al,50
Off. Gaz. 1036; Enrique vs. Macadaeg, et all 47 Off. Gaz. 1207; see also San Beda College vs. CIR, 51
Off. Gaz. 5636.) (University of Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, L-13748, 30 October 1959.) (Time, Inc. vs.
Reyes, 39 SCRA, pp. 315-316.)

An additional factor that induced Us to entertain the instant petition is the obvious merit We find in the same. Our
reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3931 has convinced Us that the clear legislative intention is to vest in the
Commission the exclusive authority to determine the existence of "pollution" penalized thereunder and to prosecute
violations of said law.

The information filed against the herein petitioner charges him with a violation of Section 9, in relation to Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 3931. More specifically, it alleges that the petitioner, with his co-accused Isaac Arivas, "willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise dispose into the highway canal and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained
or allow to seep into such waterway the industrial and other waste matters discharged due to the operation of the said
Insular Oil Refinery Co. so managed and operated by them, thereby causing pollution of such waterway with the
resulting damage and/or destruction to the arriving plants in the vicinity and providing hazard to health and property
in the same vicinity."

Section 9 in its first paragraph, supposedly the criminal act being imputed to the petitioner, reads as follows:

SEC. 9. Prohibitions. No person shall throw, run, drain, or otherwise dispose into any of the water
and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines, or cause, permit, suffer to be thrown, run, drain, allow to see
or otherwise dispose into such waters or atmospheric air, any organic or inorganic matter or any
substance in gaseous or liquid form that shall cause pollution of such waters or atmospheric air.

It will be noted from the above-quoted provision that the prohibited act is to throw, run, drain or otherwise dispose into
any of the water and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines, any organic or inorganic matter or substance "that shall

Page 39 of 55
cause pollution of such waters or atmospheric air." Stated in simpler terms, the offense allegedly committed by the
petitioner was the act of causing pollution of a waterway (highway canal).

The term "pollution" as used in the law is not to be taken in its ordinary signification. In Section 2, paragraph (a), of
Republic Act No. 3931, "pollution" is defined in these words:

(a) Pollution' means such alteration of the physical, chemical and/or biological properties of any water
and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines, or any such discharge of any liquid, gaseous or solid
substance into any of the waters and/or atmospheric air of the country as will or is likely to create or
render such waters and/or atmospheric air harmful or detrimental or injurious to public health, safety
or welfare, or to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational or other legitimate uses, or
to livestock, wild animals, birds, fish or of her aquatic life.

The power to determine the existence of pollution is vested by the law in the Commission. Section 6, among others,
gives the Commission the authority to "determine whether a pollution exists in any of the waters and/or atmospheric
air of the Philippines." (Section 6(a), No. 1); to "hold public hearings, ... make findings of facts and determinations all
with respect to the violations of this Act or orders issued by the Commission." ( Ibid., No. 3); to "institute or cause to be
instituted in the court of competent jurisdiction legal proceedings to compel compliance with the provisions of this Act"
(Ibid, No. 5); and, "after due notice and hearing, revoke, suspend or modify any permit issued under this Act whenever
modifications are necessary to prevent or abate pollution of any water and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines."
(Ibid., No. 7.) Section 8 contains explicit provisions as to the authority of the Commission to determine the existence of
pollution and to take appropriate court actions to abate or prevent the same. It provides:

SEC. 8. Proceedings before the Commission . The Commission may, on its own motion, or upon the
request of any person, investigate or may inquire, in a manner to be determined by it, as to any
alleged act of pollution or the omission or failure to comply with any provisions of this Act or any order
of this Commission.

Whenever it appears to the Commission, after investigation, that there has been a violation of any of
the provisions of this Act or any order of the Commission, it may order whoever causes such violation
to show cause before said Commission why such discharge of industrial wastes or any waste should
not be discontinued. A notice shall be served on the offending party directing him or it to show cause
before the Commission, on a date specified in such notice, why an order should not be made directing
the discontinuance of such violation. Such notice shall specify the time and the place where a public
hearing will be held by the Commission or its authorized representatives, and notice of such hearing
shall be served personally or by registered mail, at least ten days before said hearing; and in the case
of a municipality or corporation such notice shall be served upon the major or president thereof. The
Commission shall take evidence with reference to said matter and may issue an order to the party
responsible for such violation, directing that within a specified period of time thereafter, such violation
be discontinued unless adequate sewage works or industrial wastes disposal system be properly
operated to prevent further damage or pollution.

No investigation being conducted or ruling made by the Commission shall prejudice any action which
may be filed in court by any person in accordance with the provisions of the New Civil Code on
nuisance. On matters, however, not related to nuisance, no court action shall be initiated until the
Commission shall have finally ruled thereon and no order of the Commission discontinuing the
discharge of waste shall be stayed by the filing of said court action, unless the court issues an
injunction as provided for in the Rules of Court.

The last paragraph of the above-quoted provision delineates the authority to be exercised by the Commission and by
the ordinary courts in respect of preventing or remedying the pollution of the waters or atmospheric air of the
Philippines. The provision excludes from the authority of the Commission only the determination of and the filing of
court actions involving violations of the New Civil Code on nuisance. It is expressly directed that on matters not related
to nuisance "no court action shall be initiated until the Commission shall have finally ruled thereon." This provision

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leaves little room for doubt that a court action involving the determination of the existence of pollution may not be
initiated until and unless the Commission has so determined the existence of what in the law is considered pollution.

It may not be argued that the above-cited provision refers only to the filing of civil actions, and not to criminal cases as
is the one herein involved, there being no basis either in the context in law nor from a consideration of the purpose
behind the enactment of the same upon which such a distinction may be made. Indeed, respondents do not seriously
question that the court action contemplated in the last paragraph of Section 8 includes criminal proceedings.
Respondents merely aver that the aforementioned grant of authority to the Commission is not exclusive of the power
of Fiscals to file criminal actions for a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3931.

We are likewise not in accord with the view that the law intended to give concurrent authority to the Commission and
Fiscals to prosecute violations of Republic Act No. 3931. It is true that there is no provision expressly declaring that the
authority vested in the Commission to prosecute violations of Republic Act No. 3931 is exclusive. Using the same logic,
there is neither a provision declaring such authority to be concurrent or may be exercised jointly with Fiscals. The
absence of an explicit declaration as to the exclusive authority of the Commission to prosecute violations of the
subject law does not detract from the clear intention to make it so, as gathered from the philosophy of the law itself
and as gleaned from several provisions of the same. It is clearly deducible from the provision of Section 8 expressly
declaring that no court action shall be initiated, except those related to nuisance, until the Commission shall have
finally ruled on the alleged act of pollution; and also from Section 6(a), No. 5, which authorizes the Commission to
"initiate or cause to be instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction legal proceedings to compel compliance with the
provisions of this Act."

As may be seen from the law, the determination of the existence of pollution requires investigation, public hearings
and the collection of various information relating to water and atmospheric pollution. (Sections 6, 7, and 8.) The
definition of the term "pollution" in itself connotes that the determination of its existence requires specialized
knowledge of technical and scientific matters which are not ordinarily within the competence of Fiscals or of those
sitting in a court of justice. It is undoubtedly in recognition of this fact that in Section 4 of the law, it is provided that
"the basic personnel necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be engineers, chemists, biochemists,
physicists, and other technicians"; and required in Section 3 that the Chairman of the Commission shall be the
Chairman of the National Science Development Board, one of the part-time commissioners shall be a recommendee of
the Philippine Council of Science and Technology, and one of the two full-time commissioner shall be a sanitary
engineer.

The vesting of authority in an administrative body to determine when to institute a criminal action for a violation of the
law entrusted to it for administration or enforcement, to the exclusion of the regular prosecution service of the
government, is not new in this jurisdiction. It is recognized in Yao Lit vs. Geraldez et al., 106 Phil. 545 which upheld the
exclusive authority of the Commissioner of Immigration' to investigate and impose administrative fines upon violators
of the provisions of Republic Act No. 751 for the reason that said official "has better facilities than the prosecuting
officials to carry out the provisions of the said Act, the former official being the keeper of the records pertaining to
aliens." The same principle has been recognized with respect to the prosecutions of violations of the Anti-Dummy Law
(Republic Act No. 1131.) In holding that the City Fiscal of Manila has no authority to prosecute such violations
independently of the Anti-Dummy Board, it was said:

Were the city fiscal or the provincial fiscals who have the power or right to prosecute violations of all
laws and ordinances allowed to prosecute violations of the Anti- Dummy Board, there would be no
order, concert, cooperation, and coordination between the said agencies of the government. The
function of coordination which is entrusted to the Anti-Dummy Board is evident from all the above-
quoted provisions of Republic Act No. 1130. There can be no coordination as envisioned in the law
unless the Anti-Dummy Board be given the power to direct and control the city fiscal in the
prosecutions of the violations of the Anti-Dummy Law. (Rollo, p. 118; 5 SCRA 428,433.)

In R. B. Industrial Development Co., Ltd. vs. Enage (24 SCRA 365) involving the authority of the Bureau of Forestry over
the management and use of public forests and the transfer of licenses for the taking of forest products, this Court has
made this pronouncement:

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 A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in an administrative office the power to
determine particular questions or matters, upon the facts to be presented, the jurisdiction of such
office shall prevail over the courts. (p. 124, Rollo.)

It is our considered view that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal lacked the authority to file the information charging the
petitioner with a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3931 there being no prior finding or determination by
the Commission that the act of the petitioner had caused pollution in any water or atmospheric air of the Philippines. It
is not to be understood, however, that a fiscal or public prosecutor may not file an information for a violation of the
said law at all. He may do so if the Commission had made a finding or determination that the law or any of its orders
had been violated. In the criminal case presently considered, there had been no prior determination by the
Commission that the supposed acts of the petitioner had caused pollution to any water of the Philippines. The filing of
the information for the violation of Section 9 of the law is, therefore, premature and unauthorized. Concommittantly,
the respondent Judge is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense charged therein.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the questioned Orders of the respondent Judge are hereby annuled
and set aside. The respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Criminal Case No. 5984-75 for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 131442 July 10, 2003

BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK, DIWATA MAGBUHOS, ANGELITA BINAY, ELMA GARCIA, VIRGILIO PANGUIO,
ARSENIO CASTILLO, ARIEL PANGUIO, ANTONIO PANGUIO, ANTONIO BUNQUIN, GENEROSO BUNQUIN,
CHARLIE DIMAYACYAC, RENATO PANGUIO, ATILANO BUNQUIN, CARLOS CHAVEZ, JUAN DIMAYACYAC,
FILEMON BUNQUIN, MARIO MAGBUHOS, MAURO MAGBUHOS, NORA MAGBUHOS, JEOVILYN, GENALYN and
JORVAN QUIMUEL, minors, represented by their parents FELICIANA and SABINO QUIMUEL, MARICAR
MAGBUHOS, minor, represented by her parents CARMELITA and ANTONIO MAGBUHOS, MARLO BINAY,
minor, represented by his parents EFRENITA and CHARLITO BINAY, and the BANGUS, BANGUS FRY and
other MARINE LIFE OF MINOLO COVE, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ENRICO LANZANAS as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch VII, THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES Region IV, represented by its Regional
Executive Director and its Regional Director for Environment, THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,
ORIENTAL MINDORO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ORIENTAL MINDORO, herein
represented by GOVERNOR RODOLFO VALENCIA, PUERTO GALERA MAYOR GREGORIO DELGADO, VICE
MAYOR ARISTEO ATIENZA, and MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF PUERTO GALERA, JUAN ASCAN,
JR., RAFAEL ROMEY, CENON SALCEDO, JERRY DALISAY, SIMON BALITAAN, RENATO CATAQUIS, MARCELINO
BANAAG, DANIEL ENRIQUEZ, AMELYN MARCO, GABRIEL ILAGAN, MUNICIPAL ENGINEER RODEL RUBIO, and
MUNICIPAL PLANNING and DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR WILHELMINA LINESES, respondents.

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review 1 of the Order2 dated 7 November 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7
("Manila RTC"), dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.

The Facts

On 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe ("RED Principe") of Region IV, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR"), issued an Environmental Clearance Certificate ("ECC") in favor of
respondent National Power Corporation ("NAPOCOR"). The ECC authorized NAPOCOR to construct a temporary mooring

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facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay San Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The Sangguniang Bayan of
Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone. 3

The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of NAPOCOR's power barge, which, due to turbulent
waters at its former mooring site in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, required relocation to a safer site like Minolo Cove. The
14.4 megawatts power barge would provide the main source of power for the entire province of Oriental Mindoro
pending the construction of a land-based power plant in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The ECC for the mooring facility
was valid for two years counted from its date of issuance or until 30 June 1999. 4

Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto Galera, 5 sought reconsideration of the ECC
issuance. RED Principe, however, denied petitioners' plea on 15 July 1997. On 21 July 1997, petitioners filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of the ECC and for the issuance of a
writ of injunction to stop the construction of the mooring facility. Impleaded as defendants were the following: (1)
NAPOCOR, (2) RED Principe, (3) DENR Region IV Technical Director for Environment Oscar Dominguez, (4) Oriental
Mindoro Electric Cooperative ("ORMECO"), which is engaged in the distribution of electricity in Oriental Mindoro, and
(5) certain officials of Puerto Galera. 6 Petitioners subsequently amended their complaint to include as additional
defendants the elective officials of Oriental Mindoro represented by then Governor Rodolfo G. Valencia. Petitioners
further prayed for the demolition of mooring structures that respondents had already built.

On 28 July 1997, prior to the filing of the amended complaint, the trial court issued a 20-day temporary restraining
order enjoining the construction of the mooring facility. However, the trial court lifted the same on 6 August 1997 on
NAPOCOR's manifestation that the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro was the one undertaking the
construction of the mooring facility. 7

On 28 August 1997, before filing their answers, respondents ORMECO and the provincial officials of Oriental Mindoro
moved to dismiss the complaint. These respondents claimed that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative
remedies, rendering the complaint without cause of action. They also asserted that the Manila RTC has no jurisdiction
to enjoin the construction of the mooring facility in Oriental Mindoro, which lies outside the Manila RTC's territorial
jurisdiction.

Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies. They
argued that the issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of Presidential Decree No. 1605, 8 Sections 26 and 27 of
Republic Act No. 7160,9 and the provisions of DENR Department Administrative Order No. 96-37 ("DAO 96-37") on the
documentation of ECC applications. Petitioners also claimed that the implementation of the ECC was in patent violation
of its terms.

In its order of 7 November 1997, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed petitioners' complaint.

Hence, this petition.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court's order dismissing the complaint reads in part:

After careful evaluation and analysis, this Court finds the Motion to Dismiss tenable and meritorious.

Petitioners have clearly failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before taking this legal action in Court x x
x.

It is x x x worth mentioning that the decision of the Regional Director may still be x x x elevated to the Office of
the Secretary of the DENR to fully comply with the process of exhaustion of administrative remedies. And well
settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that before bringing an action in or resorting to the Courts of Justice, all
remedies of administrative character affecting or determinative of the controversy at that level should first be

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 exhausted by the aggrieved party (Pestanas vs. Dyogi, L-25786, February 27, 1978). And petitioners' failure to
exhaust administrative remedies renders his [sic] petition dismissible (Chia vs. Acting Collector of Customs,
177 SCRA 755). And a dismissal on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is tantamount to a
dismissal based on lack of cause of action (Baguiro vs. Basa, Jr., 214 SCRA 437; Pineda vs. CFI of Davao, 111
Phil. 643; Sarabia vs. Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources, L-16002, May 23, 1961; Gone, et al. vs.
District Engineer, et. al., L-22782, August 29, 1975; Abe-Abe, et al. vs. Manta, et. al., L-4827, May 31, 1979)
although it does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter (Mun. of La Trinidad, et al. vs.
CFI of Baguio-Benguet, et al., L-33889, June 28, 1983).

Moreover, this Court finds the Opposition of the Petitioners highly untenable and bereft of merits that the
controverted act in question is patently illegal and there was an immediate need for judicial intervention.

The ECC in question was issued by the Regional Office of the DENR which has jurisdiction and authority over
the same . . .. And corollary to this, the issue as to whether or not the Minolo Cove is within the enclosed coves
and waters embraced by Puerto Galera bay and protected by Medio island is a clear question of fact which the
DENR may appropriately resolve before resorting to [the] Court[s].

This Court is likewise aware and cognizant of its territorial jurisdiction in the enforcement of Writ of Injunction.
That truly, [a] writ of injunction can only be enforced within [the] territorial jurisdiction of this Court but not for
acts which are being or about to be committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. Thus, inPhilippine National
Bank vs. Pineda, 197 SCRA 1, the Honorable Supreme Court ruled: "Regional Trial Courts can only enforce their
writs of injunction within their respective designated territories. Furthermore, we find the issuance of the
preliminary injunction directed against the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental a jurisdictional paux [sic] pas
(from Black Dictionary means jurisdictional falsity) as the Courts of First Instance now Regional Trial Court[s],
can only enforce their writs of injunction within their respective designated territories.

And finally, this Court is not unmindful of the relevant and square application in the case at bar of Presidential
Decree No. 1818, Executive Order No. 380 dated November 27, 1989, and Circular No. 2-91 of the Supreme
Court that the National Power Corporation (NPC) is a public utility, created under special legislation, engaged in
the generation and distribution of electric power and energy. The mooring site of NPC in Puerto Galera, Oriental
Mindoro is one of its infrastructure projects falling within the mantle of Executive Order No. 380, November 27,
1989 x x x.

And as held by the Supreme Court in the case of National Power Corporation vs. Honorable Abraham P. Vera, et
al., 170 SCRA 721, courts are without jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against [the] National Power
Corporation. The latter enjoys the protective mantle of P.D. 1818, (Circular No. 2-91).

xxx xxx xxx

Injunction in this case is not a mere ancillary [sic] writ but the main action itself together with the Annulment
of the Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC). Even assuming arguendo that the court [can] annul the ECC
how can the latter enforce the same against the Provincial Government of Oriental Mindoro which was
impleaded by the petitioners as a necessary party together with the Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative and
the government officials of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, whose acts and functions are being performed
outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court? x x x Indisputably, the injunction and annulment of ECC as
prayed for in the petition are inseparable x x x.

The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that petitioners have failed to exhaust all the available administrative
remedies and this Court has no jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ prayed for in the Amended
[Complaint].10

The Issue

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The issue is whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of cause action and lack of
jurisdiction.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

Jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over the Case

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in
the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought. 11

A perusal of the allegations in the complaint shows that petitioners' principal cause of action is the alleged illegality of
the issuance of the ECC. The violation of laws on environmental protection and on local government participation in
the implementation of environmentally critical projects is an issue that involves the validity of NAPOCOR's ECC. If the
ECC is void, then as a necessary consequence, NAPOCOR or the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro could not
construct the mooring facility. The subsidiary issue of non-compliance with pertinent local ordinances in the
construction of the mooring facility becomes immaterial for purposes of granting petitioners' main prayer, which is the
annulment of the ECC. Thus, if the court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, then it
has jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioners' complaint.

Petitioners' complaint is one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It falls within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts under Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7691. The question of whether petitioners should file their complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Manila or
Oriental Mindoro then becomes a matter of venue, to be determined by the residence of the parties. 12

Petitioners' main prayer is the annulment of the ECC. The principal respondent, DENR Region IV, has its main office at
the L & S Building, Roxas Boulevard, Manila. Regional Executive Director Principe of the DENR Region IV, who issued
the ECC, holds office there. Plainly, the principal respondent resides in Manila, which is within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Manila RTC. Thus, petitioners filed their complaint in the proper venue.

On the other hand, the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive writs is limited to acts committed or
about to be committed within their judicial region. 13 Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 1818 ("PD No. 1818")
prohibited14 courts from issuing injunctive writs against government infrastructure projects like the mooring facility in
the present case. Republic Act No. 8975 ("RA No. 8975"), which took effect on 26 November 2000, superseded PD No.
1818 and delineates more clearly the coverage of the prohibition, reserves the power to issue such writs exclusively
with this Court, and provides penalties for its violation. 15 Obviously, neither the Manila RTC nor the Oriental Mindoro
RTC can issue an injunctive writ to stop the construction of the mooring facility. Only this Court can do so under PD No.
1818 and later under RA No. 8975. Thus, the question of whether the Manila RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint
considering that its injunctive writ is not enforceable in Oriental Mindoro is academic.

Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, although it could not issue
an injunctive writ against the DENR or NAPOCOR. However, since the construction of the mooring facility could not
proceed without a valid ECC, the validity of the ECC remains the determinative issue in resolving petitioners'
complaint.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The settled rule is before a party may seek the intervention of the courts, he should first avail of all the means afforded
by administrative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure
prescribed pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide the controversy, a party should first exhaust such
remedy before resorting to the courts. The premature invocation of a court's intervention renders the complaint
without cause of action and dismissible on such ground. 16

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RED Principe of the DENR Region IV Office issued the ECC based on (1) Presidential Decree No. 1586 ("PD No. 1586")
and its implementing rules establishing the Environmental Impact Statement System, (2) DAO 96-37 17 and (3) the
Procedural Manual of DAO 96-37. Section 418 of PD No. 1586 requires a proponent of an environmentally critical
project, or a project located within an environmentally critical area as declared by the President, to secure an ECC prior
to the project's operation.19 NAPOCOR thus secured the ECC because the mooring facility in Minolo Cove, while not an
environmentally critical project, is located within an environmentally critical area under Presidential Proclamation No.
2146, issued on 14 December 1981.20

The rules on administrative appeals from rulings of the DENR Regional Directors on the implementation of PD No. 1586
are found in Article VI of DAO 96-37, which provides:

SECTION 1.0. Appeal to the Office of the Secretary. Any party aggrieved by the final decision of the RED
may, within 15 days from receipt of such decision, file an appeal with the Office of the Secretary. The decision
of the Secretary shall be immediately executory.

SECTION 2.0. Grounds for Appeal. The grounds for appeal shall be limited to grave abuse of discretion and
serious errors in the findings of fact which would cause grave or irreparable injury to the aggrieved party.
Frivolous appeals shall not be countenanced.

SECTION 3.0. Who May Appeal. The proponent or any stakeholder, including but not limited to, the LGUs
concerned and affected communities, may file an appeal.

The DENR Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 explains these provisions thus:

Final decisions of the RED may be appealed. These decisions include those relating to the issuance or non-
issuance of an ECC, and the imposition of fines and penalties. By inference, the decision of the Secretary on
the issuance or non-issuance of the ECC may also be appealed based on this provision. Resort to courts prior to
availing of this remedy would make the appellant's action dismissible on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

The right to appeal must be exercised within 15 days from receipt by the aggrieved party of such decision.
Failure to file such appeal within the requisite period will result in the finality of the RED's or Secretary's
decision(s), which can no longer be disturbed.

An appeal shall not stay the effectivity of the RED's decision, unless the Secretary directs otherwise.

The right to appeal does not prevent the aggrieved party from first resorting to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration with the RED, to give the RED an opportunity to re-evaluate his decision. (Emphasis added)

Instead of following the foregoing procedure, petitioners bypassed the DENR Secretary and immediately filed their
complaint with the Manila RTC, depriving the DENR Secretary the opportunity to review the decision of his subordinate,
RED Principe. Under the Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 and applicable jurisprudence, petitioners' omission renders
their complaint dismissible for lack of cause of action. 21 Consequently, the Manila RTC did not err in dismissing
petitioners' complaint for lack of cause of action.

On the Alleged Patent Illegality of the ECC

Petitioners nevertheless contend that they are exempt from filing an appeal with the DENR Secretary because the
issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of existing laws and regulations. These are (1) Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1605, as amended, (2) Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), and
(3) the provisions of DAO 96-37 on the documentary requirements for the zoning permit and social acceptability of the
mooring facility.

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Petitioners' contention is without merit. While the patent illegality of an act exempts a party from complying with the
rule on exhaustion Of administrative remedies,22 this does not apply in the present case.

Presidential Decree No. 1605

Presidential Decree No. 1605 ("PD No. 1605"), 23 as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1605-A and 1805, declares
as ecologically threatened zone "the coves and waters embraced by Puerto Galera Bay as protected by Medio Island."
This decree provides in part:

Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the construction of marinas, hotels,
restaurants, other commercial structures; commercial or semi-commercial wharfs [sic]; commercial docking
within the enclosed coves of Puerto Galera; the destruction of its mangrove stands; the devastation of its
corals and coastline by large barges, motorboats, tugboat propellers, and any form of destruction by other
human activities are hereby prohibited.

Section 2. x x x

No permit for the construction of any wharf, marina, hotel, restaurants and other commercial structures in
Puerto Galera shall be issued without prior approval of the Office of the President upon the recommendation of
the Philippine Tourism Authority. (Emphasis supplied)

NAPOCOR claims that since Minolo Cove lies outside of "Puerto Galera Bay as protected by Medio Island", 24 PD No.
1605 does not apply to this case. However, petitioners assert that Minolo Cove is one of the "enclosed coves of Puerto
Galera"25 and thus protected under PD No. 1605. This is a question of fact that the DENR Secretary should have first
resolved. In any event, there is no dispute that NAPOCOR will use the mooring facility for its power barge that will
supply 14.4 megawatts of electricity to the entire province of Oriental Mindoro, including Puerto Galera. The mooring
facility is obviously a government-owned public infrastructure intended to serve a basic need of the people of Oriental
Mindoro. The mooring facility is not a "commercial structure; commercial or semi-commercial wharf or commercial
docking" as contemplated in Section 1 of PD No. 1605. Therefore, the issuance of the ECC does not violate PD No.
1605 which applies only to commercial structures like wharves, marinas, hotels and restaurants.

Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160

Congress introduced Sections 26 and 27 in the Local Government Code to emphasize the legislative concern "for the
maintenance of a sound ecology and clean environment." 26 These provisions require every national government
agency or government-owned and controlled corporation to hold prior consultations with the local government unit
concerned and to secure the prior approval of its sanggunian before implementing "any project or program that may
cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover
and extinction of animal or plant species." Sections 26 and 27 respectively provide:

Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. It shall be the
duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorized or involved in the
planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of
non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal or plant
species, to consult with the local government units, non-governmental organizations, and other sectors
concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the
community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to
prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.

Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be implemented by government
authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Section . . . 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval
of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to be
implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution.

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In Lina, Jr. v. Pao,27 the Court interpreted these provisions in this manner:

Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof x x x.

Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and
programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Sections 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause
pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4)
may result in loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species;
and (6) other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the
locality where these will be implemented.

Again, Sections 26 and 27 do not apply to this case because as petitioners admit, 28 the mooring facility itself is not
environmentally critical and hence does not belong to any of the six types of projects mentioned in the law. There is no
statutory requirement for the concerned sanggunian to approve the construction of the mooring facility. It is another
matter if the operation of the power barge is at issue. As an environmentally critical project that causes pollution, the
operation of the power barge needs the prior approval of the concerned sanggunian. However, what is before this
Court is only the construction of the mooring facility, not the operation of the power barge. Thus, the issuance of the
ECC does not violate Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160.

Documentary Requirements for ECC Applications

Under DAO 96-37, an ECC applicant for a project located within an environmentally critical area is required to submit
an Initial Environment Examination, which must contain a brief description of the environmental setting and a
documentation of the consultative process undertaken, when appropriate. 29 As part of the description of the
environmental setting, the ECC applicant must submit a certificate of locational clearance or zoning certificate.

Petitioners further contend that NAPOCOR, in applying for the ECC, did not submit to the DENR Region IV Office the
documents proving the holding of consultations and the issuance of a locational clearance or zoning certificate.
Petitioners assert that this omission renders the issuance of the ECC patently illegal.

The contention is also without merit. While such documents are part of the submissions required from a project
proponent, their mere absence does not render the issuance of the ECC patently illegal. To justify non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies due to the patent illegality of the ECC, the public officer must have issued the ECC "[without
any] semblance of compliance, or even an attempt to comply, with the pertinent laws; when manifestly, the officer has
acted without jurisdiction or has exceeded his jurisdiction, or has committed a grave abuse of discretion; or when his
act is clearly and obviously devoid of any color of authority."30

RED Principe, as chief of DENR Region IV, is the officer duly authorized under DAO 96-37 31 to issue ECCs for projects
located within environmentally critical areas. RED Principe issued the ECC on the recommendation of Amelia Supetran,
the Director of the Environmental Management Bureau. Thus, RED Principe acted with full authority pursuant to DENR
regulations. Moreover, the legal presumption is that he acted with the requisite authority. 32 This clothes RED Principe's
acts with presumptive validity and negates any claim that his actions are patently illegal or that he gravely abused his
discretion. While petitioners may present proof to the contrary, they must do so before the proper administrative
forum before resorting to judicial remedies.

On the Alleged Non-Compliance with the Terms of the ECC

Lastly, petitioners claim that they are justified in immediately seeking judicial recourse because NAPOCOR is guilty of
violating the conditions of the ECC, which requires it to secure a separate ECC for the operation of the power barge.
The ECC also mandates NAPOCOR to secure the usual local government permits, like zoning and building permits, from
the municipal government of Puerto Galera.

The contention is similarly without merit. The fact that NAPOCOR's ECC is subject to cancellation for non-compliance
with its conditions does not justify petitioners' conduct in ignoring the procedure prescribed in DAO 96-37 on appeals

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from the decision of the DENR Executive Director. Petitioners vigorously insist that NAPOCOR should comply with the
requirements of consultation and locational clearance prescribed in DAO 96-37. Ironically, petitioners themselves
refuse to abide with the procedure for filing complaints and appealing decisions laid down in DAO 96-37.

DAO 96-37 provides for a separate administrative proceeding to address complaints for the cancellation of an ECC.
Under Article IX of DAO 96-37, complaints to nullify an ECC must undergo an administrative investigation, after which
the hearing officer will submit his report to the EMB Director or the Regional Executive Director, who will then render
his decision. The aggrieved party may file an appeal to the DENR Secretary, who has authority to issue cease and
desist orders. Article IX also classifies the types of violations covered under DAO 96-37, including projects operating
without an ECC or violating the conditions of the ECC. This is the applicable procedure to address petitioners'
complaint on NAPOCOR's alleged violations and not the filing of the instant case in court.

A Final Word

The Court commends petitioners for their courageous efforts to safeguard and maintain the ecological balance of
Minolo Cove. This Court recognizes the utmost importance of protecting the environment. 33 Indeed, we have called for
the vigorous prosecution of violators of environmental laws. 34 Legal actions to achieve this end, however, must be
done in accordance with established rules of procedure that were intended, in the first place, to achieve orderly and
efficient administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 93891 March 11, 1991w3es

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, petitioner

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION, respondents.

Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner.

Leonardo A. Aurelio for respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corp.
FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board ("Board") asks us to review the Decision and Resolution promulgated on 7
February 1990 and 10 May 1990, respectively, by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G R. No. SP 18821 entitled "Solar Textile
Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board." In that Decision and Resolution, the Court of Appeals reversed
an order of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-89-2287 dismissing private respondent
Solar Textile Finishing Corporation's ("Solar") petition for certiorari and remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.

On 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist
from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a
canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The Order signed by Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., as Board
Chairman, reads in full as follows:

Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation with plant and place of business at 999 General Pascual
Avenue, Malabon, Metro Manila is involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater of about
30 gpm. being directly discharged untreated into the sewer. Based on findings in the Inspections conducted on
05 November 1986 and 15 November 1986, the volume of untreated wastewater discharged in the final out
fall outside of the plant's compound was even greater. The result of inspection conducted on 06 September
1988 showed that respondent's Wastewater Treatment Plant was noted unoperational and the combined
wastewater generated from its operation was about 30 gallons per minute and 80% of the wastewater was
being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River by means of a by-pass
and the remaining 20% was channelled into the plant's existing Wastewater Treatment Plant (WTP). Result of

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 the analyses of the sample taken from the by-pass showed that the wastewater is highly pollutive in terms of
Color units, BOD and Suspended Solids, among others. These acts of respondent in spite of directives to
comply with the requirements are clearly in violation of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section
103 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 7 of P.D. 984 and Section 38 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations,
respondent is hereby ordered to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installation and
discharging its untreated wastewater directly into the canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River effective
immediately upon receipt hereof and until such time when it has fully complied with all the requirements and
until further orders from this Board.

SO ORDERED.1

We note that the above Order was based on findings of several inspections of Solar's plant:

a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12 November 1986 by the National Pollution Control
Commission ("NPCC"), the predecessor of the Board ;2 and

b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
("DENR").

The findings of these two (2) inspections were that Solar's wastewater treatment plant was non-operational and that
its plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of wastewater, 80% of which was being directly discharged into a
drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The remaining 20% of the wastewater was being channeled
through Solar's non-operational wastewater treatment plant. Chemical analysis of samples of Solar's effluents showed
the presence of pollutants on a level in excess of what was permissible under P.D. No. 984 and its Implementing
Regulations.

A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 September 1988. A Writ of Execution issued by the Board was
received by Solar on 31 March 1989.

Meantime, Solar filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with prayer for stay of execution of the Order dated 22
September 1988. Acting on this motion, the Board issued an Order dated 24 April 1989 allowing Solar to operate
temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment
facilities. In the same Order, the Board directed the Regional Executive Director of the DENR/ NCR to conduct the
inspection and evaluation within thirty (30) days.

On 21 April 1989, however, Solar went to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, on petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction against the Board, the petition being docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2287.

On 21 July 1989, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Solar's petition upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not
certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the
Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic.

Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in the Decision here assailed, reversed the Order of
dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of
Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the Court of Appeals said in the dispositive
portion of its Decision that:

. . .. Still and all, this decision is without prejudice to whatever action the appellee [Board] may take relative to
the projected 'inspection and evaluation' of appellant's [Solar's] water treatment facilities. 3

The Court of Appeals, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may
result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues"
demanded that the question of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without success.

The Board is now before us on a Petition for Review basically arguing that:

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 1. its ex parte Order dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance with law
and were not violative of the requirements of due process; and

2. the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari.

The only issue before us at this time is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the
ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board.

Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend
the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents
or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the
Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the
Tullahan-Tinejeros River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code.

Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only
if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant
life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's
wastewater discharged posed such a threat.

The Court is not persuaded by Solar's contention. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex
parte cease and desist orders under the following circumstances:

P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides:

(a) Public Hearing. . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the
discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or
plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an ex-parte
order directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the
establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior public hearing. The
said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and shall remain in force until said establishment or person
prevents or abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or modified or nullified by a competent
court. (Emphasis supplied)

We note that under the above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and desist order may
be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed "the
allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate
threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and desist
order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set
by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by the Commission,
the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is prima facieevidence of an establishment
exceeding such allowable standards. Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been the subject
matter of allowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board may act on an ex parte basis when it finds at
least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involved presents an "immediate threat to life, public health,
safety or welfare or to animal or plant life." Since the applicable standards set by the Commission existing at any given
time may well not cover every possible or imaginable kind of effluent or waste discharge, the general standard of an
"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life" remains necessary.

Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant allowable standards have been set by the Commission or
Board precisely in order to avoid or neutralize an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to
animal or plant life.''

Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 4 sets out the maximum permissible levels of physical and chemical
substances which effluents from domestic wastewater treatment plants and industrial plants" must not exceed "when
discharged into bodies of water classified as Class A, B, C, D, SB and SC in accordance with the 1978 NPCC Rules and
Regulations." The waters of Tullahan-Tinejeros River are classified as inland waters Class D under Section 68 of the
1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations 5 which in part provides that:

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 Sec. 68. Water Usage and Classification. The quality of Philippine waters shall be maintained in a safe and
satisfactory condition according to their best usages. For this purpose, all water shall be classified according to
the following beneficial usages:

(a) Fresh Surface Water

Classification Best usage

xxx xxx xxx

Class D
For agriculture, irrigation, livestock watering
and industrial cooling and processing.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphases supplied)

The reports on the inspections carried on Solar's wastewater treatment facilities on 5 and 12 November 1986 and 6
September 1988 set forth the following Identical finding:

a. For legal action in [view of] implementing rules and regulations of P.D. No. 984 and Section 5 of the Effluent
Regulations of 1982. 6

Placing the maximum allowable standards set in Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 alongside the findings of
the November 1986 and September 1988 inspection reports, we get the following results:

"Inland November September

Waters 1986 1988
(Class C & D7 Report8 Report9
Station 1 Station 1
a) Color in 100 a) Color units 250 125
platinum (Apparent
cobalt Color)
units
b) pH 6-8.5 b) pH 9.3 8.7
c) Tempera- 40 c) Temperature
ture in C (C)
d) Phenols in 0.1 d) Phenols in
mg.1 mg./1.
e) Suspended 75 e) Suspended 340 80
solids in solids in
mg./1. mg./1.
f) BOD in 80 f) BOD (5-day) 1,100 152
mg./1. mg./1
g) oil/Grease 10 g) Oil/Grease
in mg./1. mg./1.
h) Detergents 5 h) Detergents 2.93
mg./1." mg./1. MBAS
i) Dissolved 0
oxygen, mg./1.
j) Settleable 0.4 1.5
Matter, mg./1.
k) Total Dis 800 610

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 solved Solids
mg./1.
l) Total Solids 1,400 690
m) Turbidity NTU / ppm, SiO3 70

The November 1986 inspections report concluded that:

Records of the Commission show that the plant under its previous owner, Fine Touch Finishing Corporation, was
issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing same to cease and desist from conducting dyeing
operation until such time the waste treatment plant is already completed and operational. The new owner
Solar Textile Corporation informed the Commission of the plant acquisition thru its letter dated March 1986
(sic).

The new owner was summoned to a hearing held on 13 October 1986 based on the adverse findings during
the inspection/water sampling test conducted on 08 August 1986. As per instruction of the Legal Division a re-
inspection/sampling text should be conducted first before an appropriate legal action is instituted; hence, this
inspection.

Based on the above findings, it is clear that the new owner continuously violates the directive of the
Commission by undertaking dyeing operation without completing first and operating its existing WTP. The
analysis of results on water samples taken showed that the untreated wastewater from the firm pollutes our
water resources. In this connection, it is recommended that appropriate legal action be instituted immediately
against the firm. . . .10

The September 1988 inspection report's conclusions were:

1. The plant was undertaking dyeing, bleaching and rinsing operations during the inspection. The combined
wastewater generated from the said operations was estimated at about 30 gallons per minute. About 80% of
the wastewater was traced directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros river by
means of a bypass. The remaining 20% was channeled into the plant's existing wastewater treatment plant
(WTP).

2. The WTP was noted not yet fully operational- some accessories were not yet installed.1wphi1 Only the
sump pit and the holding/collecting tank are functional but appeared seldom used. The wastewater mentioned
channeled was noted held indefinitely into the collection tank for primary treatment. There was no effluent
discharge [from such collection tank].

3. A sample from the bypass wastewater was collected for laboratory analyses. Result of the analyses show
that the bypass wastewater is polluted in terms of color units, BOD and suspended solids, among others .
(Please see attached laboratory resul .)11

From the foregoing reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that
the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical
substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist
order issued by the Board. It is also well to note that the previous owner of the plant facility Fine Touch Finishing
Corporation had been issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing it to cease and refrain from carrying
out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant was completed and operational. Solar, the new owner, informed
the NPCC of the acquisition of the plant on March 1986. Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a hearing on 13 October
1986 based on the results of the sampling test conducted by the NPCC on 8 August 1986. Petitioner Board refrained
from issuing an ex parte cease and desist order until after the November 1986 and September 1988 re-inspections
were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was confirmed. In other words, petitioner Board appears to
have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other
hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the Tullahan- Tinerejos
River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating
condition.

In this connection, we note that in Technology Developers, Inc. v. Court of appeals, et al., 12 the Court very recently
upheld the summary closure ordered by the Acting Mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, of a pollution-causing establishment,
after finding that the records showed that:

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 1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a
pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially
addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the
Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be
recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by
virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close
the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of
the community from the emission in the operation of the business.

2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February l6, 1989, called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted
by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health
of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was
required to bring the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit. (Annex A-2,
petition)

3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels (Annex A-B, petition).. . .

4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who
in her report of December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to
the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed. (Annex A-9, petition)

xxx xxx xxx

6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control
Commission on December 15,1987, the permit was good only up to May 25,1988 (Annex A-12, petition).
Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control
the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community."

In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local government official but by the
Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the
effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and
regulatory provisions.

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely
because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters
of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such
orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of
course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and
promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and
comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is
a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. The Board's ex
parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of course, have compelled Solar temporarily to stop its plant operations, a
state of affairs Solar could in any case have avoided by simply absorbing the bother and burden of putting its WTP on
an operational basis. Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their capitals costs and
operating expenses and to increase their profits by imposing upon the public threats and risks to its safety, health,
general welfare and comfort, by disregarding the requirements of anti- pollution statutes and their implementing
regulations.

It should perhaps be made clear the Court is not here saying that the correctness of the ex parte Order and Writ of
Execution may not be contested by Solar in a hearing before the Board itself. Where the establishment affected by
an ex parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must
hold a public hearing where such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex
parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process clause
of the Constitution in situations like that we have here. The Board's decision rendered after the public hearing may

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then be tested judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and
Section 42 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations. A subsequent public hearing is precisely what Solar should
have sought instead of going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution and instead of
appealing to the Court of Appeals. It will be recalled the at the Board in fact gave Solar authority temporarily to
continue operations until still another inspection of its wastewater treatment facilities and then another analysis of
effluent samples could be taken and evaluated.

Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as the questioned Order and Writ of Execution
issued by the Board were patent nullities. Since we have concluded that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely
within the lawful authority of petitioner Board, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari.
It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7 February
1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order of petitioner
Board dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court dated 21 July 1989,
are hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's
Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.

Page 55 of 55