Criminal Law Review (5th Assignment)
ARTICLES 16 - 20 Facts:
81. People v. Dulay (2012)
Facts:
Accused Dina Dulay was introduced to AAA, a 12-
year-old girl, as someone who was nice. One day,
Dulay convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake. But
instead of going to the wake, Dulay brought AAA to a
kubuhan at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port in
Paranaque, telling her that she was looking for her
boyfriend. AAA was brought to a room with a man
called Speed. She saw Speed giving money to Dulay,
and thereafter, she was raped by Speed. AAA later on
reported the incident to her sister and her mother.
Dulay was charged with rape in conspiracy with
Speed whose true name and whereabouts was
unknown.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted Dulay of
rape as co-principal by indispensable cooperation. The
CA said that common will or purpose does not
necessarily mean previous understanding for it can be
explained or inferred from the circumstances of each
case. Based from the facts, the CA ruled that Dulay
cooperated in the rape without which the crime would
not have been consummated, since she prepared the
way for the perpetration thereof.
Issue: Whether or not Dulay was guilty of rape as co-
principal by indispensable cooperation.
Held: No. Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused
may be considered a principal by direct participation,
by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be
a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must
participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or
unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the
commission of the offense by performing another act
without which it would not have been accomplished.
Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution
does it show that the acts committed by appellant are
indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape.
The events narrated by the CA, from the time appellant
convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received
money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not
indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have
accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in
exchange for money and AAA could still have been
raped. Even AAA could have offered her own services
in exchange for monetary consideration and still end
up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable
aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be
remembered that in the Information, as well as in the
testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a
fee by appellant, thereafter, she was raped by "Speed."
The Supreme Court convicted Dulay instead of
violation of Sec. 5(a), Article III RA 7610 or Child
Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. The act of
apellant in convincing AAA, who was 12 years old at
that time, to go with her and thereafter, offer her for
sex to a man in exchange for money makes her liable
under the above-mentioned law.
82. People v. Gambao, et al. (2013)
Lucia Chan was fish dealer based in Manila. One
afternoon, two persons went to her inquiring about a
certain passport alleged to have been mistakenly
placed inside a box of fishes to be delivered to her. But
no passport was found. The two men returned the next
morning, but Chan was out. When they returned in the
evening of the same day, they kidnapped Chan. Her
son, Levy, tried to help his mother, but one of the men
pointed a gun at him. Chan was forced to board a
Tamaraw FX and was brought to a resort in Pansol,
Laguna. While Chan was held inside a room, she saw a
woman named Thian Perpenian chatting with the other
kidnappers. Meanwhile, Levy was coordinating with the
police. Levy was asked for a P400,000 ransom which
he delivered to the kidnappers in Chowking Restaurant
at Buendia Avenue at around. The police was able to
intercept and arrest the men who took the ransom
money. On the same day, the police assaulted the
cottage in the resort where Chan was being held
leading to Chans rescue and the arrest of her other
abductors.
The kidnappers, 11 of them, were charged with
kidnapping for ransom.
The RTC and CA convicted them as charged.
One of the accused, Thian Perpenian, contended
that she just came to the resort thinking it was a
swimming party, hence she should not be criminally
liable.
Issue: Whether or not Perpenian is criminally liable.
Held: Yes, but not as a principal. The prosecution was
not able to proffer sufficient evidence to hold her
responsible as a principal. Seeing that the only
evidence the prosecution had was the testimony of
Chan to the effect that on 13 August 1998 Perpenian
entered the room where the victim was detained and
conversed with Evad and Ronas regarding stories
unrelated to the kidnapping, this Court opines that
Perpenian should not be held liable as a co-principal,
but rather only as an accomplice to the crime.
Jurisprudence is instructive of the elements
required, in accordance with Article 18 of the Revised
Penal Code, in order that a person may be considered
an accomplice, namely, (1) that there be community of
design; that is knowing the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation, he concurs with the
latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the
execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid in the
execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3)
that there be a relation between the acts done by the
principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice.
Assuming arguendo that she just came to the
resort thinking it was a swimming party, it was
inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the criminal
design of the principals when she saw Chan being
guarded in the room. A rational person would have
suspected something was wrong and would have
reported such incident to the police. Perpenian,
however, chose to keep quiet; and to add to that, she
 Criminal Law Review (5th Assignment)
even spent the night at the cottage. It has been held
before that being present and giving moral support
when a crime is being committed will make a person
responsible as an accomplice in the crime committed.
It should be noted that the accused-appellants
presence and company were not indispensable and
essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping for
ransom; hence, she is only liable as an accomplice.
Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People v.
Clemente, et al., where it was stressed that in case of
doubt, the participation of the offender will be
considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of
a principal.
83. Ong v. People (2013)
Facts:
The private complainant was the owner of 44
Firestone truck tires which he bought for P223,401.81.
After selling 6 tires, 38 remained inside his warehouse.
But later on, the warehouse was robbed and all 38 tires
were stolen. Private complainant reported the incident
to the police. Pending investigation, he canvassed from
numerous business establishments in an attempt to
locate the stolen tire. And he actually found 13 of his
tires at a store owned by accused Jaime Ong. A buy-
bust team conducted a raid and arrested Ong.
Ong was charged with violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law.
The RTC and the CA convicted Ong as charged.
Ong, who had been engaged in the business of
buying and selling tires for 24 years, denied that he
had any knowledge that he was selling stolen tires. He
claimed that a certain Ramon Go sold him the 13 tires
allegedly from Caloocan City for P3,500 each. Ong
bought all the tires for P45,500 for which he was issued
a Sales Invoice with the letter head Gold Link
Hardware & General Merchandise.
Issue: Whether or not Ong is guilty of violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law.
Held: Yes. Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D.
1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain
for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess,
keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy
and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item,
object or anything of value which he knows, or should
be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are
as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been
committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or
on accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells,
or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or
anything of value, which has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the
accused knew or should have known that the said
article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused,
intent to gain for oneself or for another.
With respect to the third element, the accused
knew or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words
"should know" denote the fact that a person of
reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain
the fact in performance of his duty to another or would
govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists. Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of
tires for the past twenty-four (24) years, ought to have
known the ordinary course of business in purchasing
from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached
Ong and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he
did not even ask for proof of ownership of the tires. The
entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the
delivery of tires happened in just one day. His
experience from the business should have given him
doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires
considering that it was his first time to transact with Go
and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling
the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.
Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in
selling second hand tires. Section 6 of P.D. 1612
requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in
the buying and selling of any good, article, item, object
or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed
dealer or supplier thereof to secure the necessary
clearance or permit from the station commander of the
Integrated National Police in the town or city where
that store, establishment or entity is located before
offering the item for sale to the public. In fact, Ong has
practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances from
the police station for some used tires he wanted to
resell but, in this particular transaction, he was remiss
in his duty as a diligent businessman who should have
exercised prudence.
In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the
receipt issued to him by Go. Logically, and for all
practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or
receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction and may be
raised as a defense in the charge of fencing; however,
that defense is disputable. In this case, the validity of
the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the
prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its
address were fictitious. Ong failed to overcome the
evidence presented by the prosecution and to prove
the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was unable
to rebut the prima facie presumption under Section 5
of P.D. 1612.
84. Dimat v. People (2012)
Facts:
Jose Mantequilla was the owner of a Nissan Safari
which he mortgaged to RCBC. It was carnapped and
was allegedly sold to accused Mel Dimat, who, in turn,
sold it to Sonia Delgado for P850,000.00 two years
later. The police spotted the car on E. Rodriquez
Avenue and noticed that the plate number was
suspicious. Upon inspection, they discovered that the
engine and chassis numbers appearing in the car was
actually altered, and that it was in fact the same
Nissan Safari which was reported stolen a few years
ago.
 Criminal Law Review (5th Assignment)
Dimat was charged with violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law.
The RTC and the CA convicted Dimat as charged.
Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequeilla
and that he bought the car in good faith and for value
from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale
that gave its engine number as TD42-126134 and its
chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553 (The engine
number was actually TD42-119136 and its chassis
number CRGY60-YO3111).
Issue: Whether or not Dimats defense is meritorious.
Held: No. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from
him, when stopped on the road and inspected by the
police, turned out to have the engine and chassis
numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla.
This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the
correct numbers of the vehicles engine and chassis.
First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him,
when stopped on Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal
intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree
1612 is a special law and, therefore, its violation is
regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of
criminal intent. Of course, the prosecution must still
prove that Dimat knew or should have known that the
Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado
was derived from theft or robbery and that he intended
to obtain some gain out of his acts. road and inspected
by the police, turned out to have the engine and
chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from
Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not
reflect the correct numbers of the vehicles engine and
chassis.
Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday
Inn Casino where the latter gave the Nissan Safari to
him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly
showed him the old certificate of registration and
official receipt of the vehicle and even promised to give
him a new certificate of registration and official receipt
already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on this
promise. Dimat insists that Tolentinos failure to deliver
the documents should not prejudice him in any way.
Delgado himself could not produce any certificate of
registration or official receipt.
Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that
the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly
documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old
certificate of registration and official receipt. But this
certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having
been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show.
That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise
to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to
Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit
source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado
who apparently made no effort to check the papers
covering her purchase. That she might herself be liable
for fencing is of no moment since she did not stand
accused in the case.
ARTICLES 21 - 88
85. People v. Arrojado (2001)
Facts:
Accused Salvador Arrojado, was living with his
cousin, Mary Ann Arrojado and the latters father who
was already sickly after surviving a stroke. Salvador
helped care for Mary Anns father. One day, Salvador
went to the house of another cousin, and reported that
Mary Ann committed suicide. The doctors found that
Mary Ann suffered 10 stab wounds. It turned out the
relationship between Salvador and Mary Ann had long
been strained.
Salvador was charged with murder.
The RTC convicted Salvador of murder and
sentenced him to imprisonment of 30 years of
reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC was correct in imposing
the penalty of 30 years of reclusion perpetua.
Held: No. The penalty of reclusion perpetua remains
indivisible despite the fixing of its duration from 20
years and 1 day to 40 years. Salvador should suffer the
entire extent of 40 years of reclusion perpetua.
86. People v. Nelmida (2012)
Facts:
Mayor Tawan-tawan of Salvador, Lanao del Norte,
together with his security escorts composed of some
members of the AFP, PNP and civilian aids, were on
board a yellow pick-up service vehicle en route to
Salvador. A group of men ambushed the vehicle and
opened fire at it causing the death of two aides. The
others sustained injuries.
The assailants were charged with double murder
with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted
murder.
The RTC and the CA convicted them as charged.
Issue: Whether the conviction of the accused must be
for: (A) the separate crimes of 2 counts of murder and
7 counts of attempted murder or (B) for the complex
crime of double murder with multiple frustrated and
double attempted murder.
Held: (A). In a complex crime, two or more crimes are
actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law
and in the conscience of the offender they constitute
only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed.
There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is
known as compound crime, or when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
while the other is known as complex crime proper, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other. The classic example of the first kind is when
a single bullet results in the death of two or more
persons. A different rule governs where separate and
distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is
the doctrine that when various victims expire from
separate shots, such acts constitute separate and
distinct crimes.
From its factual backdrop, it can easily be gleaned
that the killing and wounding of the victims were not
the result of a single discharge of firearms by the
appellants and their co-accused. To note, appellants
and their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets on
 Criminal Law Review (5th Assignment)
the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his
group. As a result, two security escorts died while five
(5) of them were wounded and injured. The victims
sustained gunshot wounds in different parts of their
bodies. Therefrom, it cannot be gainsaid that more
than one bullet had hit the victims. Moreover, more
than one gunman fired at the vehicle of the victims. As
held in People v. Valdez, each act by each gunman
pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming
each particular moment at different persons constitute
distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a
complex crime.82 Obviously, appellants and their co-
accused performed not only a single act but several
individual and distinct acts in the commission of the
crime. Thus, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code would
not apply for it speaks only of a "single act."
The Supreme Court discussed the case of People v.
Lawas (Lawas Doctrine) where the members of the
Home Guard simultaneously and successively fired at
several victims resulting in the death of 50 people. It
was held in Lawas that if the act or acts complained of
resulted from a single criminal impulse, it constitutes a
single offense. However, "single criminal impulse" was
not the only consideration in applying Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code in the said case because there was
therein no evidence at all showing the identity or
number of persons killed by each accused. There was
also no conspiracy to perpetuate the killing, thus,
collective criminal responsibility could not be imputed
upon the accused. Since it was impossible to ascertain
the number of persons killed by each of them, this
Court was "forced" to find all the accused guilty of only
one offense of multiple homicide instead of holding
each of them responsible for 50 deaths.
Notably, conspiracy was not proven in Lawas. Thus,
the Lawas doctrine is more of an exception than the
general rule.
In Lawas, this Court was merely forced to apply
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code because of the
impossibility of ascertaining the number of persons
killed by each accused. Since conspiracy was not
proven therein, joint criminal responsibility could not
be attributed to the accused. Each accused could not
be held liable for separate crimes because of lack of
clear evidence showing the number of persons actually
killed by each of them.
Our repeated ruling is that in conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all. It is as though each one performed
the act of each one of the conspirators. Each one is
criminally responsible for each one of the deaths and
injuries of the several victims. The severalty of the acts
prevents the application of Article 48. The applicability
of Article 48 depends upon the singularity of the act,
thus the definitional phrase "a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies." This is not
an original reading of the law. In People v. Hon. Pineda,
the Court already recognized the "deeply rooted x x x
doctrine that when various victims expire from
separate shots, such acts constitute separate and
distinct crimes." As we observed in People v. Tabaco,
clarifying the applicability of Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, this Court further stated in Hon. Pineda
that "to apply the first half of Article 48, x x x there
must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of
criminal impulse is not written into the law." With all
the foregoing, this Court holds appellants liable for the
separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven
(7) counts of attempted murder.
87. People v. Punzalan (2012)
Facts:
A group of navy personnel were having a drinking
session at a videoke bar. One of them, Evelio Bacosa,
suggested that the flickering light bulb be turned off.
Accused Arturo Punzalan, Jr. misinterpreted what
Bacosa said, thinking that Bacosa wanted to kill him.
They eventually decided to leave the bar and return to
their camp. Soon after the navy personnel passed by
the sentry gate, the sentries flagged down a rushing
and zigzagging maroon Nissan van. The sentries
approached the van and recognized Punzalan, who was
reeking of liquor, as the driver. Even before he was
given the go signal to proceed, Punzalan shifted gears
and sped away and hit the group of the walking navy
personnel. This resulted in the death of two navy
personnel and injuries of others.
Punzalan was charged with the complex crime of
double murder, frustrated murder and attempted
murder.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted him with
the complex crime of double murder and attempted
murder.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly convicted
Punzalan of a complex crime.
Held: Yes. Appellant was animated by a single
purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a
single act of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to
the right side of the road ramming through the navy
personnel, causing the death of SN1 Andal and SN1
Duclayna and, at the same time, constituting an
attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang
and SN1 Domingo. The crimes of murder and
attempted murder are both grave felonies as the law
attaches an afflictive penalty to capital punishment
(reclusion perpetua to death) for murder while
attempted murder is punished by prision mayor, an
afflictive penalty.
88. People v. Dulay (2014)
Facts:
Orlando, Sr. and Orlando Jr. (Junior) were at their
yard when accused Dante Dulay, Juniors uncle, threw
a grenade at them. When the grenade exploded, Junior
was hurt in his pelvic area, while his father was fatally
hit by shrapnel causing his death.
Dulay was charged with the complex crime of
murder with frustrated murder.
The RTC, convicted Dulay of the complex crime of
murder with attempted murder.
The CA modified the RTCs ruling by reverting to
the original charge of frustrated murder with respect to
the crime committed against Junior.
 Criminal Law Review (5th Assignment)
Issue: Whether or not the CA is correct.
Held: Yes. The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1)
that the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony; and (2) that
the felony is not produced due to causes independent
of the perpetrators will. Applying the foregoing to the
case at bar, Dulay has performed all acts of execution
in throwing the grenade which could have caused
Juniors death as a consequence, but because of
immediate medical assistance, a cause independent of
Dulays will, Junior survived.
89. Santiago v. Garchitorena (1993)
Facts:
In 1991, Miriam Defensor Santiago was charged
with violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act for allegedly favoring
unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien
Legalization Program. Santiago filed a motion for a bill
of particulars, saying that while the information alleged
that she had approved the application or legalization of
aliens and gave them indirect benefits and advantages,
it lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to
Santiago, unless she was furnished with the names and
identities of the aliens, she could not properly plead
and prepare for trial. At the hearing on the motion, the
prosecution said that they would file one amended
information against Santiago. However, the
prosecution filed a motion to admit 32 amended
informations, which the Sandiganbayan granted. Thus,
Santiago filed a petition for certiorari, contending that
the prosecution had split the original information.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of 32 amended
informations was proper.
Held: No. We find that, technically, there was only one
crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and
hence, there should only be one information to be file
against her. The 32 Amended Informations charge what
is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and
sometimes referred to as "continuous crime."
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to
exist there should be a plurality of acts performed
during a period of time; unity of penal provision
violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which
means that two or more violations of the same penal
provisions are united in one and same instant or
resolution leading to the perpetration of the same
criminal purpose or aim. According to Guevarra, in
appearance, a delito continuado consists of several
crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind
of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal
Code. Padilla views such offense as consisting of a
series of acts arising from one criminal intent or
resolution.
The concept of delito continuado, although an
outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to
crimes penalized under special laws. Under Article 10
of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be
supplementary to special laws, unless the latter
provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed
from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under
special laws.
The question of whether a series of criminal acts
over a period of time creates a single offense or
separate offenses has troubled also American Criminal
Law and perplexed American courts as shown by the
several theories that have evolved in theft cases. The
trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single
larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking of several things,
whether belonging to the same or different owners, at
the same time and place constitutes but one larceny.
Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny
doctrine," under which there is a distinct larceny as to
the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the
doctrine that the government has the discretion to
prosecute the accused or one offense or for as many
distinct offenses as there are victims.
In the case at bench, the original information
charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act
that of her approving the application for legalization
of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such
privilege. The original information also averred that the
criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in
violation of a law Executive Order No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one
offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on
a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The 32
Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the
allegation of the original information, except that
instead of the word "aliens" in the original information
each amended information states the name of the
individual whose stay was legalized.
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the
offenses were committed on the same period of time,
i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong
probability even exists that the approval of the
application or the legalization of the stay of the 32
aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when
the approval was embodied in the same document.
Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the
hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the
Government suffered a single harm or injury. The
Sandiganbayan in its Order dated November 13, 1992
stated as follows: Equally, the prosecution has stated
that insofar as the damage and prejudice to the
government is concerned, the same is represented not
only by the very fact of the violation of the law itself
but because of the adverse effect on the stability and
security of the country in granting citizenship to those
not qualified (Rollo, p. 59).
90. People v. Quiachon (2006)
Facts:
2001 Roberto Quiachon was charged with
qualified rape for raping his eight-year-old daughter
who was also deaf and mute. The rape was witnessed
by Quiachons son.
The RTC convicted Quiachon as charged and
sentenced him to death. The case was automatically
elevated to the Supreme Court, but pursuant to the
ruling in People v. Mateo, it was referred to the CA,
which also affirmed the RTCs decision.
 Criminal Law Review (5th Assignment)
Issue: Whether or not Quiachon should be sentenced
to death.
Held: No. In view of the enactment of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9346 on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be
meted on appellant is reclusion perpetua in accordance
with Section 2 thereof. The aforequoted provision of
R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the
principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda
adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to
accused are given retroactive effect. However,
appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9346 provides that persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by
reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole.
91. People v. Salome (2006)
Facts:
1997 Sally Idanan, a 13-year-old girl, was
sleeping with her three-year-old brother inside their
house when accused Nicanor Salome entered their
house. Salome poked Sally with a knife, and then raped
her. Thereafter, Salome threatened Sally that he would
kill her and her family if she told anybody of what
happened. Fearful for her life and for her familys
safety, she did not inform anyone of the incident. She
left her province to work as a domestic helper in the
house of a police officer in San Juan City. Later on, Sally
found out that she was pregnant. This prompted her to
report the rape incident to the police.
Salome was charged with rape.
The RTC convicted Salome as changed and
sentenced him to death. The case was automatically
elevated to the Supreme Court, but pursuant to the
ruling in People v. Mateo, it was referred to the CA,
which also affirmed the RTCs decision.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC was correct in imposing
death penalty.
Held: Yes. The above ruling is in accordance with
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater
penalty shall be applied when an aggravating
circumstance, such as dwelling in this case, is present
in the commission of the offense. The Court, therefore,
has no recourse but to apply the law and affirm the
trial courts imposition of the death penalty. In light,
however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346,
entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines, which was signed into law
by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on June 24, 2006,
the imposition of the death penalty has been
prohibited.
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits
the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty
provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death
and the offense is still heinous. Consequently, the civil
indemnity for the victim is still P75,000. On the other
hand, the automatic appeal in cases when the trial
court imposes the death penalty will henceforth not
apply, since its imposition is now prohibited, so that
there is a need to perfect an appeal, if appeal is
desired, from a judgment of conviction for an offense
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua in lieu
of the death penalty pursuant to the new law
prohibiting its imposition.
92. Colinares v. People (2011)
Facts:
Rufino Buena and his companion were walking
down the road one night when the accused Arnel
Colinares appeared out of nowhere and struck Rufino
twice on the head with a huge stone causing him to fall
unconscious.
Colinares was charged with frustrated homicide.
The RTC convicted him as charged and sentenced
him to imprisonment of 2 years and 4 months of prision
correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of
prision mayor as maximum. Since the maximum
probationable imprisonment was only up to 6 years,
Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the CA, seeking conviction for
the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the
consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him.
The CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, it was
held that Arnel was only guilty of attempted homicide
as the injuries sustained by Rufino were not life-
threatening.
Issue: Whether or not Arnel may still apply for
probation after appealing his conviction, despite the
fact that the Probation Law disqualifies an accused who
appeals from a judgment of conviction from availing of
probation.
Held: Yes. Firstly, while it is true that probation is a
mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right
to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he
has is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court
finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years
and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for
probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up
to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him
the privilege of probation, taking into account the full
circumstances of his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the
accused who appeals "from the judgment of
conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the
benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two
judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel:
one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the
regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a
conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme
Court. If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting
opinions hard position, it will apply the probation law
on Arnel based on the trial courts annulled judgment
against him. He will not be entitled to probation
because of the severe penalty that such judgment
imposed on him. More, the Supreme Courts judgment
of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty
will also have to bend over to the trial courts judgment
even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel
 Criminal Law Review (5th Assignment)
will now also be made to pay for the trial courts
erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to
apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang
hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao
gets the whip). Where is justice there?
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco,
requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail himself of probation.
This requirement "outlaws the element of speculation
on the part of the accusedto wager on the result of
his appealthat when his conviction is finally affirmed
on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and
the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies
for probation as an escape hatch thus rendering
nugatory the appellate courts affirmance of his
conviction." Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a
judgment that would have allowed him to apply for
probation. He did not have a choice between appeal
and probation. He was not in a position to say, "By
taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation."
The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him
denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow
Arnel to now seek probation under this Courts greatly
diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in
Francisco1. It remains that those who will appeal from
judgments of conviction, when they have the option to
try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that
privilege.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of
correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He claimed
that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only
for attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime
called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore,
Arnel sought from the beginning to bring down the
penalty to the level where the law would allow him to
apply for probation. In a real sense, the Courts finding
that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but
only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction
that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it
would have found him guilty of the correct offense and
imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four
months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the
right to apply for probation.
93 - 94. Villareal v. People (2014) and People v.
CA (2014)
Facts:
This is the continuation of the case Respondents
Tecson et al., filed their respective motions pertaining
to G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). They
essentially seek a clarification as to the effect of our
1 In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati
found the accused guilty of grave oral defamation and
sentenced him to a prison term of one year and one day to
one year and eight months of prision correccional, a clearly
probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still, he chose
to appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right
to apply for probation. When the acquittal did not come, he
wanted probation. The Court would not of course let him. It
served him right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it
too. He certainly could not have both appeal and probation.
Decision insofar as their criminal liability and service of
sentence are concerned. According to respondents,
they immediately applied for probation after the CA
rendered its Decision (CA-G.R. No. 15520) lowering
their criminal liability from the crime of homicide,
which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight
physical injuries, which carries a probationable
sentence. Tecson et al. contend that, as a result, they
have already been discharged from their criminal
liability and the cases against them closed and
terminated. This outcome was supposedly by virtue of
their Applications for Probation on various dates in
January 2002 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 968,
as amended, otherwise known as the Probation Law.
They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional
Trial Court (RTC) had already granted their respective
Applications for Probation on 11 October 2002 and,
upon their completion of the terms and conditions
thereof, discharged them from probation and declared
the criminal case against them terminated on various
dates in April 2003.
It turned out, however, that when they applied for
probation with the RTC, the CAs decision lowering their
criminal liability to slight physical injuries has not yet
attained finality.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the RTCs order granting
the application for probation of Tecson et al.; (2)
Whether or not probation extinguishes the criminal
liability of Tecson et al.; and (3) Whether or not Tecson
et al. may still reapply for probation.
Held:
(1) No. In the first place, Tecson should have
applied for probation with RTC Branch 121, the court
that convicted them, and not Branch 130. Second, the
records of the case were still with the CA when the RTC
granted the probation applications.
According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code,
[n]o penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a
final judgment. A judgment of a court convicting or
acquitting the accused of the offense charged becomes
final under any of the following conditions among
others: after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal; when the accused waives the right to appeal;
upon the grant of a withdrawal of an appeal; when the
sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied
or served; or when the accused applies for probation.
When the decision attains finality, the judgment or final
order is entered in the book of entries of judgments. If
the case was previously appealed to the CA, a certified
true copy of the judgment or final order must be
attached to the original record, which shall then be
remanded to the clerk of the court from which the
appeal was taken. The court of origin then reacquires
jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action. It is
during this time that the court of origin may settle the
matter of the execution of penalty or the suspension of
the execution thereof, including the convicts
applications for probation.
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA
had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction over the case
when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of
the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. It shows
 Criminal Law Review (5th Assignment)
that the accused filed their respective applications
while a motion for reconsideration was still pending
before the CA and the records were still with that court.
The CA settled the motion only upon issuing the
Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about
seven months after Tecson et al. had filed their
applications with the trial court. In September 2002, or
almost a month before the promulgation of the RTC
Order dated 11 October 2002 granting the probation
applications, the OSG had filed Manifestations of Intent
to File Petition for Certiorari with the CA and this Court.
Ultimately, the OSG assailed the CA judgments by filing
before this Court a Petition for Certiorari on 25
November 2002. We noted the petition and then
required respondents to file a comment thereon. After
their submission of further pleadings and motions, we
eventually required all parties to file their consolidated
memoranda.56 The records of the case remained with
the CA until they were elevated to this Court in 2008.
In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek
probation at the time they applied for it. Note that they
already appealed from the judgment convicting them
of homicide, and note that at that time they applied for
probation in 2002, the Supreme Court had not yet
promulgated its decision in Colinares v. People (2011).
Hence, the old rule applied, that is an appeal, even for
the purpose of lowering the penalty, amounts to a
waiver.
(2) No. Probation is not one those enumerated
under Art. 89 which extinguish criminal liability. Neither
can it be considered as tantamount to service of
sentence. Probation is in effect a suspension of the
imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is
rather an interlocutory judgment in the nature of a
conditional order placing the convicted defendant
under the supervision of the court for his reformation,
to be followed by a final judgment of discharged, if the
conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a
final judgment of sentence if the conditions are
violated.
(3) Yes. This time, the Supreme Court applied the
doctrine laid down in Colinares and held that Tecson et
al. may reapply for probation: While we cannot
recognize the validity of the Orders of RTC Branch 130,
which granted the Applications for Probation, we
cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have
fulfilled the terms and conditions of their previous
probation program and have eventually been
discharged therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for
probation, the trial court may, at its discretion,
consider their antecedent probation service in
resolving whether to place them under probation at
this time and in determining the terms, conditions, and
period thereof.
95. Suyan v. People (2014)
Facts:
Neil Suyan was convicted of violation of Sec. 16,
Article II of RA 6425 and was granted probation. But
while on probation, Suyan again violated the same
crime twice. Two Informations were filed against him.
Meanwhile, the Chief Probation and Parol Officer filed a
motion to revoke the probation which the RTC granted.
Suyan filed a petition for certiorari against the RTCs
order which the CA granted on the ground that the RTC
had not complies with the procedural requisites for the
revocation of probation. To be specific, no Violation
Report was submitted by the Probation Office. Upon
hearing, the RTC again revoked Suyans probation to
which the latter filed an appeal with the CA. This time,
the CA affirmed the RTCs order revoking the probation.
Issue: Whether or not Suyans probation was validly
revoked.
Held: Yes. We adopt the ruling of the CA inthat
petitioner squandered his own opportunity when,
instead of rebutting the allegations mentioned in the
Violation Report, he merely questioned the absence of
any such report when his probation was first revoked.
On substantive grounds, we believe that there was
sufficient justification for the revocation of his
probation. Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has
been convicted, and that he has served out his
sentence for another offense while on probation.
Consequently, his commission of another offense is a
direct violation of Condition No. 9 of his Probation
Order, and the effects are clearly outlined in Section 11
of the Probation Law which provides: A probation order
shall take effect upon its issuance, at which time the
court shall inform the offender of the consequences
thereof and explain that upon his failure to comply with
any of the conditions prescribed in the said order or his
commission of another offense, he shall serve the
penalty imposed for the offense under which he was
placed on probation.
Based on the foregoing, the CA was correct in
revoking the probation of petitioner and ordering him
to serve the penalty for the offense for which he was
placed on probation. As probation is a mere
discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to observe
full obedience to the terms and conditions pertaining to
the probation order or run the risk of revocation of this
privilege. Regrettably, petitioner wasted the
opportunity granted him by the RTC to remain outside
prison bars, and must now suffer the consequences of
his violation. The Court's discretion to grant probation
is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized
society and only incidentally for the benefit of the
accused. Having the power to grant probation, it
follows that the trial court also has the power to order
its revocation in a proper case and under appropriate
circumstances.
96. Almero v. People (2014)
Facts:
Enrique Almero was convicted by the MTC of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and multiple
physical injuries. The decision was promulgated on Jan.
8, 2007 but Almero applied for probation only on Sept.
7, 2007, claiming that he was informed of his
conviction only upon being serve the warrant for his
arrest. The MTC denied the application, prompting him
to file a petition for certiorari with the RTC. While his
first petition raised the sole issue of the denial of his
application for probation, he filed a supplemental
petition which assailed the validity of the promulgation
 Criminal Law Review (5th Assignment)
of judgment. He also impleaded the private
complainants in his petition.
The RTC granted Almeros petition, finding that the
MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering
judgment without first ruling on Almeros formal offer
of exhibits since, technically, he had not yet rested his
case. It also ruled that the promulgation of judgment
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion, because
Almero was not present.
The private complainants appealed to the CA,
which reversed the RTCs ruling. According to the CA,
the RTC should have confined itself to determining
whether or not the MTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying Almeros application for
probation.
Issues: (1) Whether or not private complainants had
the right to appeal from the RTCs ruling; and (2)
Whether or not Almero is entitled to probation.
Held:
(1) Yes. Petitioner (Almero) contended that in
criminal cases, the offended party is the State, and
that private complainants interest is limited to the civil
liability arising therefrom. Petitioner's application for
probation purportedly did not involve the civil aspect of
the case. The OSG, on the other hand, argued that
what petitioner filed with the RTC was a petition for
certiorari, which is a special civil action. It cannot be
considered an appeal in a criminal case over which
only the State has an interest, but an appeal in a civil
action from which private persons can appeal in the
event of an adverse outcome.
The Supreme Court agreed with the OSG. While the
present petition originated from a criminal proceeding,
what petitioner filed with the RTC was a special civil
action, in which he himself impleaded private
respondents. He cannot now belatedly change his
stance to the prejudice of private respondents, who
would otherwise be deprived of recourse in a civil
action they did not initiate. In any case, this Court has
consistently ruled that private parties may be clothed
with sufficient personality if the facts show that the
ends of substantial justice would be better served, and
if the issues in the action could be determined in a
more just, speedy and inexpensive manner.
(2) No. The law expressly requires that an accused
must not have appealed his conviction before he can
avail of probation. This outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accused to wager on
the result of his appeal that when his conviction is
finally affirmed on appeal he now applies for
probation as an "escape hatch" thus rendering
nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his
conviction.
In this case, petitioner cannot make up his mind
whether to question the judgment, or apply for
probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his
right to appeal. While he did not file an appeal before
applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the
conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly
assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he
attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by
P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation
mutually exclusive remedies.
The assignment of errors in the Petition before us
reflects the diametrically opposed positions taken by
accused petitioner. On the one hand, he bewails the
defects committed by the trial court during the
promulgation of the judgment, thus casting doubt on
the judgment itself. Yet in the same breath, he persists
in his application for probation, despite the waiver and
admission of guilt implicit in any procedure for
probation precisely the unhealthy wager the law
seeks to prevent. Petitioner applied for probation
beyond the reglementary period, yet the trial court still
allowed the filing before ultimately denying it for lack
of merit.
97. Moreno v. Comelec (2006)
Facts:
A petition was filed to disqualify Urbano Moreno
from running for Punong Baranagay on the ground that
he was convicted by final judgment of the crime of
Arrbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months by the RTC. Moreno contended that he was not
disqualified, because he was already granted
probation, which had the effect of suspending the
imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as
the accessory penalties pursuant to Baclayon v. Mutia.
The Comelec division and en banc disqualified
Moreno, because of Sec. 40 (a) of the Local
Government, which provides that those sentenced by
final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude
or for an offense punishable by 1 year or more of
imprisonment, within 2 years after serving sentence,
are disqualified from running for any elective local
position. According to the Comelec en banc, the
provisions of the Local Government Code take
precedence over the case of Baclayon v. Mutia cited by
Moreno and the Probation Law, because the Local
Government Code is a much latter enactment and a
special law setting forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of elective officials.
In its comment, the OSG argued that a conviction
for an offense involving moral turpitude stands even if
the candidate was granted probation, pursuant to Dela
Torre v. Comelec.
Issue: Whether or not Moreno should be disqualified
from running for Punong Barangay.
Held: No. Dela Torre v. Comelec is not squarely
applicable. Our pronouncement therein that the grant
of probation does not affect the disqualification under
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code was based
primarily on the finding that the crime of fencing of
which petitioner was convicted involves moral
turpitude, a circumstance which does not obtain in this
case. At any rate, the phrase within two (2) years after
serving sentence should have been interpreted and
understood to apply both to those who have been
sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude and to those who have been sentenced
by final judgment for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment. The placing of the
 Criminal Law Review (5th Assignment)
comma (,) in the provision means that the phrase
modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an
order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence
but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition
of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to
petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal
penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory
penalties of suspension from public office and from the
right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting
probation the paragraph which required that petitioner
refrain from continuing with her teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the
accessory penalties of suspension from public office,
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that
of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly
suspended upon the grant of probation. It appears then
that during the period of probation, the probationer is
not even disqualified from running for a public office
because the accessory penalty of suspension from
public office is put on hold for the duration of the
probation. Clearly, the period within which a person is
under probation cannot be equated with service of the
sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law
specifically provides that the grant of probation
suspends the execution of the sentence. During the
period of probation, the probationer does not serve the
penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely
required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in
the probation order.
It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG
have misapprehended the real issue in this case. They
focused on the fact that Morenos judgment of
conviction attained finality upon his application for
probation instead of the question of whether his
sentence had been served. The Comelec could have
correctly resolved this case by simply applying the law
to the letter. Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
unequivocally disqualifies only those who have been
sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable
by imprisonment of one (1) year or more, within two
(2) years after serving sentence. It is unfortunate that
the deliberations on the Local Government Code afford
us no clue as to the intended meaning of the phrase
service of sentence, i.e., whether the legislature also
meant to disqualify those who have been granted
probation. The Courts function, in the face of this
seeming dissonance, is to interpret and harmonize the
Probation Law and the Local Government
Code.Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est
optimus interpretandi.
Further, it should be mentioned that the present
Local Government Code was enacted in 1991, some
seven (7) years after Baclayon v. Mutia was decided.
When the legislature approved the enumerated
disqualifications under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code, it is presumed to have knowledge of
our ruling in Baclayon v. Mutia on the effect of
probation on the disqualification from holding public
office. That it chose not to include probationers within
the purview of the provision is a clear expression of the
legislative will not to disqualify probationers. On this
score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law
should be construed as an exception to the Local
Government Code. While the Local Government Code is
a later law which sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation
Law is a special legislation which applies only to
probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction
that a later statute, general in its terms and not
expressly repealing a prior special statute, will
ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such
earlier statute.