Association of Small Landholders of the Philippines vs Secretary of

Agrarian Reform
Facts:

These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e.,
Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a
call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State
shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive
a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27
was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private
lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O.
No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27
and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree
as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No.
229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131s) implementation, was also
enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the
earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect
insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
Petitioners wanted to be exempted from agrarian reform program because
they claim to belong to a different class.
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27,
EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands
for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must be
determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred
that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only
courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due
process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation.
Issue: Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must
be in terms of cash.
Held: No.

Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept

in traditional exercise of eminent domain.
The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain.
The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to
be made in cash if everything is in cash, then the government will not have
sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks,
may be used for just compensation.
NAPOCOR vs Chiong
Facts:

Petitioner is a government owned and controlled corporation, created and

existing pursuant to Republic Act No. 6395, [3] as amended, for the purpose of
undertaking the development of hydroelectric power,
o They are empowered with eminent domain
It sought the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way and certain portions
of agricultural lands owned by Igmedio and Liwayway Chiong and the Heirs of
Agrifina[4] Angeles
Respondents pointed out that NPC had already entered and taken possession
of a portion of their realty with an area of 4,000 square meters, more or less
(Lot A) and wanted to occupy another 4,000 square meters of the adjacent
property (Lot B)
CA held that full market value should be paid and not the easement fees

Issue: Whether or not the just compensation is the full market value
Held: It is the full market value

The elements of due process are well established, viz:

o (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to
hear and determine the matter before it;
o (2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant or property which is the subject of the proceedings;
o (3) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
o (4) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
The duty of the court in considering the commissioners report is to satisfy
itself that just compensation will be made to the defendant by its final
judgment in the matter, and in order to fulfill its duty in this respect, the court
will be obliged to exercise its discretion in dealing with the report as the
particular circumstances of the case may require.
Trial court may accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make
such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the
property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the
defendant just compensation for the property so taken
In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the
just compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled to is
the market value.[22] Market value is that sum of money which a person
desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to
sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor
o The rule is modified, where only a part of a certain property is
expropriated. In such a case the owner is not restricted to
 compensation for the portion actually taken. In addition to the market
value of the portion taken, he is also entitled to recover for the
consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property. At
the same time, from the total compensation must be deducted the
value of the consequential benefits.
In fixing the valuation at P500.00 per square meter, the Court of Appeals
noted that the trial court had considered the reports of the commissioners
and the proofs submitted by the parties. This included the fair market value
of P1,100.00 per square meter proffered by the respondents.[25] This valuation
by owners of the property may not be binding upon the petitioner or the
court, although it should at least set a ceiling price for the compensation to
be awarded.[26]
The trial court found that the parcels of land sought to be expropriated are
agricultural land, with minimal improvements.
It is the nature and character of the land at the time of its taking that is the
principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner.
Hence, the trial court accepted not the owners valuation of P1,100 per square
meter but only P500 as recommended in the majority report of the
commissioners.
In finding that the trial court did not abuse its authority in evaluating the
evidence and the reports placed before it nor did it misapply the rules
governing fair valuation, the Court of Appeals found the majority reports
valuation of P500 per square meter to be fair.
Said factual finding of the Court of Appeals, absent any showing that the
valuation is exorbitant or otherwise unjustified, is binding on the parties as
well as this Court.
LBP vs Banal
Facts:

Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners
of 19.3422 hectares of agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud,
Camarines Norte
A part of their land was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657.
Valued the property at 173K.
Respondents rejected the above valuation.
the trial court computed the just compensation for the coconut land
at P657,137.00 and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00,
which is beyond respondents valuation of P623,000.00. The court further
awarded compounded interest at P79,732.00 in cash
CA upheld Trial Court

Issue: Whether or not the valuation is correct

Held: NO. Petition Granted.

under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405 (1990), the Landbank is charged
primarily with the determination of the land valuation and compensation for
all private lands suitable for agriculture under the Voluntary Offer to Sell or
Compulsory Acquisition arrangement For its part, the DAR relies on the
determination of the land valuation and compensation by the Landbank.
Based on the Landbanks valuation of the land, the DAR makes an offer to the
landowner.[13] If the landowner accepts the offer, the Landbank shall pay him
the purchase price of the land after he executes and delivers a deed of
transfer and surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the government. [14] In
case the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR
 adjudicator[15] conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine
the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the Landbank and
other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for
the land.[
Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the
fundamental requirements in determining just compensation for the property.
Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and merely ordered the parties to
submit their respective memoranda
Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents property
is P703,137.00, merely took judicial notice of the average production
figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it and applied the same to
this case without conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or
consent of the parties,
Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive
Order (EO) No. 228[26] and R.A. No. 3844,[27] as amended, in determining the
valuation of the property; and in granting compounded interest pursuant to
DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994.[
o It must be stressed that EO No. 228 covers private agricultural
lands primarily devoted to rice and corn, while R.A. 3844
governs agricultural leasehold relation between the person who
furnishes the landholding and the one cultivating the land
Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its
implementing rules and regulations.
LBP vs Rufino
Facts:

Respondents Jose Marie M. Rufino (Rufino), Nilo M. Resurreccion

(Resureccion), Arnel M. Atanacio (Atanacio), and Suzette G. Mateo (Suzette)
are the registered owners in equal share of a parcel of agricultural land
situated in Barangay San Benon, Irosin, Sorsogon, with an area of 239.7113
hectares
o they voluntarily offered the aforesaid property to the government for
CARP coverage at P120,000 per hectare.
petitioner Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued a Notice of Land
Valuation and Acquisition dated October 21, 1996 declaring that out of the
total area indicated in the title, 138.4018 hectares was subject to immediate
acquisition at a valuation of P8,736,270.40 based on the assessment of
petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).
Respondents having found the valuation unacceptable, the matter was
referred by the provincial agrarian reform officer of Sorsogon to the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the conduct of summary administrative
proceedings to determine just compensation
Respondents contended that LBPs valuation was not the full and fair
equivalent of the property at the time of its taking, the same having been
offered in 1989 at P120,000 per hectare.[6]
 LBP countered that the property was acquired by the DAR for CARP coverage
in 1993 by compulsory acquisition and not by respondents voluntary offer to
sell; and that it determined the valuation thereof in accordance with RA 6657
and pertinent DAR regulations.
Issue: whether the appellate court correctly upheld the valuation by the trial court
of the property on the basis of the market data approach, in disregard of the
formula prescribed by DAR AO 6-92, as amended.
Held: NO. Petition Partly meritorious

While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function

which is vested in the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court, the Court ,
in LBP v. Banal,[20] LBP v. Celada,[21] and LBP v. Lim,[22] nonetheless
disregarded the RTCs determination thereof when, as in the present case, the
judge did not fully consider the factors specifically identified by law and
implementing rules.
The factors to determine just compensation
o LV = Land Value
o CNI = Capitalized Net Income
o CS = Comparable Sales
o MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The formula
o LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
In fixing the just compensation in the present case, the trial court, adopting
the market data approach merely put premium on the location of the
property and the crops planted thereon which are not among the factors
enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657.
Not only did Commissioner Chua not consider Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR
AO 6-92, as amended, in his appraisal of the property.
His conclusion that the market data approach conformed with statutory and
regulatory requirements is bereft of basis.
Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AO 6-92, as amended, are mandatory and not
mere guides that the RTC may disregard.
Commissioner Empleo testified[33] that his computations were based on DAR
Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998. [34] This Administrative Order took
effect only on May 11, 1998, however, hence, the applicable valuation rules
in this case remain to be those prescribed by DAR AO 6-92, as amended by
DAR AO 11-94.
Finally, as reflected earlier, Commissioner Empleo did not consider in his
computation the secondary crops planted on the property
Hacienda Luisita vs PARC
Facts:

At the core of the case is Hacienda Luisita de Tarlac (Hacienda Luisita), once a
6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential expanse straddling
several municipalities of Tarlac and owned by Compaia General de Tabacos
de Filipinas (Tabacalera)
That the lots comprising the Hacienda Luisita shall be subdivided by the
applicant-corporation and sold at cost to the tenants, should there be any,
and whenever conditions should exist warranting such action under the
provisions of the Land Tenure Act;2
Tadecos preferred option, for, on August 23, 1988, 28 it organized a spin-off
corporation, HLI, as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmworkers.
For this purpose, Tadeco assigned and conveyed to HLI the agricultural land
 portion (4,915.75 hectares) and other farm-related properties of Hacienda
Luisita in exchange for HLI shares of stock. 29
Pedro Cojuangco, Josephine C. Reyes, Teresita C. Lopa, Jose Cojuangco, Jr.,
and Paz C. Teopaco were the incorporators of HLI

In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at redistributing public
and private agricultural lands to farmers and farmworkers who are landless. One of the lands
covered by this law is the Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-
residential expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac. Hacienda Luisita was bought
in 1958 from the Spanish owners by the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), which
is owned and/or controlled by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law
administration filed an expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the
then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR) so that the land can be distributed to the
farmers at cost. The RTC rendered judgment ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda
Luisita to the MAR.

In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the governments case against TADECO. The CA
dismissed it, but the dismissal was subject to the condition that TADECO shall obtain the
approval of FWB (farm worker beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock Distribution Plan) and to
ensure its implementation.

Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two alternative
modes in distributing land ownership to the FWBs. Since the stock distribution scheme is the
preferred option of TADECO, it organized a spin-off corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc.
(HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers.

After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock Distribution
Option Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC), led by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI
through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.

From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the farmworkers.
Such claim was subsequently contested by two groups representing the interests of the
farmers the HLI Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. In 2003, each of them wrote letter
petitions before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation of the SDOA.
They claimed that they havent actually received those benefits in full, that HLI violated the
terms, and that their lives havent really improved contrary to the promise and rationale of the
SDOA.
 The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review the terms of the
SDOA and the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the report and the recommendations of the Task
Force, the DAR Sec recommended to the PARC (1) the revocation of Resolution 89-
12-2 and (2) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through compulsory
acquisition scheme. Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and
subjected those lands covered by the SDP to the mandated land acquisition scheme under
the CARP law. These acts of the PARC was assailed by HLI via Rule 65.

On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657,
insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock
transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer. For FARM, this modality of distribution is
an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform
ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not there is just compensation entitled to HLI

Held: YES

HLI shall be paid just compensation for the remaining agricultural land
that will be transferred to DAR for land distribution to the FWBs. We find
that the date of the "taking" is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved
HLIs SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2. DAR shall coordinate with LBP
for the determination of just compensation. We cannot use May 11, 1989
when the SDOA was executed, since it was the SDP, not the SDOA, that
was approved by PARC.
HLI is entitled to just compensation for the agricultural land that will be
transferred to DAR to be reckoned from November 21, 1989 per PARC
Resolution No. 89-12-2. DAR and LBP are ordered to determine the
compensation due to HLI.

Separate opinion of Sereno

In my Separate Opinion to the 22 November 2011 Resolution, I lament the

fact that Congress did not choose a revolutionary form of taking for agrarian
reform by allowing effective partial confiscation by not requiring payment to
the landowners at fair market value.
 The FWBs of Hacienda Luisita deserve the full benefits of agrarian reform. But
with the Supreme Court consistently requiring that payment to landowners be
pegged at fair market value for all kinds of expropriation, and in the case of
agrarian reform, pegging it at the time of the notice of coverage, this same
Court is required to be fair and observe the same rule by not unduly
discriminating against petitioner HLI.
petitioner HLI, as any other landowner, is entitled to just compensation for
their farmlands to be reckoned at the time of the actual taking of the
expropriated property.
Hence, the remand of the determination of the just compensation
due to petitioner HLI should not in any way hinder the immediate
distribution of the farmlands in Hacienda Luisita

LBP vs Celada
Facts:
 Respondent Leonila P. Celada owns 22.3167 hectares of agricultural land
situated in Calatrava, Carmen, Bohol registered under TCT No. 16436, [1] of
which 14.1939 hectares was identified in 1998 by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) as suitable for compulsory acquisition under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
LBP valued respondents land at P2.1105517 per square meter for an
aggregate value of P299,569.61.[2] The DAR offered the same amount to
respondent as just compensation, but it was rejected.
Issue: Whether or not there is just compensation based on the computation of
Petitioner
Held: YES. Petition granted. Property valued at 300K.

the SAC based its valuation solely on the observation that there was a patent
disparity between the price given to respondent and the other landowners.
We note that it did not apply the DAR valuation formula since according to
the SAC, it is Section 17 of RA No. 6657 that should be the principal basis of
computation as it is the law governing the matter.
Accordingly, petitioner applied the formula under A1 above since the
comparable sales factor (CS factor) was not present. As observed by the SAC
itself, respondent refused to cooperate with the local valuation office of
petitioner and did not provide the necessary data to arrive at a proper CS
factor.
In the case at bar, while respondent attempted to prove during the hearings
before the SAC, comparable sales transactions, the acquisition cost of the
property as well as its mortgage value, she failed to submit adequate
documentary evidence to support the same.
Consequently, there was nothing from which the CS factor could be
determined.
In contrast, petitioner arrived at its valuation by using available factors culled
from the Department of Agriculture and Philippine Coconut Authority, [35] and
by computing the same in accordance with the formula provided,
Under the circumstances, we find the explanation and computation of
petitioner to be sufficient and in accordance with applicable laws. Petitioners
valuation must thus be upheld.
LBP vs Soriano
Facts:

Domingo and Mamerto Soriano (respondents) are the registered owners of

several parcels of rice land situated in Oas, Albay. Out of the 18.9163
hectares of land[3] owned by the respondents, 18.2820 hectares were placed
under the Operations Land Transfer and the CARP pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 27[4] and Republic Act No. 6657
The LBP[6] pegged the value of 18.0491 hectares of land at P482,363.95
Not satisfied with the valuation, respondents, on 23 November 2000,
instituted a Complaint[9] for judicial determination of just compensation with
the Regional Trial Court of LegazpiCity,[1
Respondents alleged that they are entitled to an amount of not less
than P4,500,000.00 as just compensation
The SAC applied the formula prescribed under Executive Order No. 228 in
determining the valuation of the property, i.e., Land value = Average Gross
Production x 2.5 x Government Support Price. It likewise granted
compounded interest pursuant to Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1994, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 2, series of 2004.
Both parties disagreed with the trial courts valuation, prompting them to file
their respective appeals with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court,
however, affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
LBP assails the imposition of 6% interest rate on the 18.0491 hectares of lot
valued at P133,751.65. It avers that the incremental interest due to the
respondents should be computed from the date of taking on 21 October
1972, not up to full payment of just compensation but up to the time LBP
approved the payment of their just compensation claim and a
corresponding deposit of the compensation proceeds was made by
the bank
Issue: Whether or not there is just compensation
Whether or not the interest is until payment of just compensation or until deposit is
made
Held: YES. CA affirmed

The fixing of just compensation should therefore be based on the parameters

set out in Republic Act No. 6657, with Presidential Decree No. 27 and
Executive Order No. 228 having only suppletory effect
In the instant case, while the subject lands were acquired under Presidential
Decree No. 27, the complaint for just compensation was only lodged before
the court on 23 November 2000 or long after the passage of Republic Act No.
6657 in 1988. Therefore, Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 should be the
principal basis of the computation for just compensation
we cannot subscribe to the arguments of LBP. (regarding interest)
 The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also
payment within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is
made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land
while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope with his loss.
Therefore, to expedite the payment of just compensation, it is logical to
conclude that the 6% interest rate be imposed from the time of taking up to
the time of full payment of just compensation.

Apo Fruits vs Land Bank

Facts:

Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI), together also
referred to as petitioners, were registered owners of vast tracks of land; AFC
owned 640.3483 hectares, while HPI owned 805.5308 hectares.
 AFC and HPI received separate notices of land acquisition and valuation of
their properties from the DARs Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). At
the assessed valuation of P165,484.47 per hectare, AFCs land was
valued at P86,900,925.88, while HPIs property was valued
at P164,478,178.14. HPI and AFC rejected these valuations for being very low.
the RTC resolved the consolidated cases, fixing the just compensation for the
petitioners 1,338.6027 hectares of land[1] at P1,383,179,000.00, with interest
on this amount at the prevailing market interest rates, computed from the
taking of the properties on December 9, 1996 until fully paid, minus the
amounts the petitioners already received under the initial valuation. The RTC
also awarded attorneys fees.
The interest was placed at 12%.
Petitioner now wants to recover the interest

Issue: Whether or not petitioner can recover the interest

Held: YES. LBP failed to pay for 12 years. Kaya Malaki na talaga babayaran nila.

Second, on the merits, the petitioners are not entitled to recover interest on
the just compensation and attorneys fees because they caused the delay in
the payment of the just compensation due them;
o they erroneously filed their complaints with the DARAB when they
should have directly filed these with the RTC acting as an agrarian
court. Furthermore, the Court found it significant that the LBP
deposited the pertinent amounts in the petitioners favor within
fourteen months after the petitions were filed with the RTC.
Under these circumstances, the Court found no unreasonable delay on the
part of LBP to warrant the award of 12% interest.
While Justice Chico-Nazario admitted that the petitioners were entitled to the
12% interest, she saw it appropriate to equitably reduce the interest charges
from P1,331,124,223.05 to P400,000,000.00
While we have equitably reduced the amount of interest awarded in
numerous cases in the past, those cases involved interest that was
essentially consensual in nature, i.e., interest stipulated in signed agreements
between the contracting parties. In contrast, the interest involved in the
present case runs as a matter of law and follows as a matter of course from
the right of the landowner to be placed in as good a position as money can
accomplish, as of the date of taking.
Furthermore, the allegedly considerable payments made by the LBP to the
petitioners cannot be a proper premise in denying the landowners the
interest due them under the law and established jurisprudence. If the just
compensation for the landholdings is considerable, this
compensation is not undue because the landholdings the owners
gave up in exchange are also similarly considerable AFC gave up an
aggregate landholding of 640.3483 hectares, while HPIs gave up
805.5308 hectares
 The incomes due from these properties, expressed as interest, are what the
government should return to the petitioners after the government took over
their lands without full payment of just compensation.
In other words, the value of the landholdings themselves should be
equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation due;
interest is due and should be paid to compensate for the unpaid
balance of this principal sum after taking has been completed. This is
the compensation arrangement that should prevail if such compensation is to
satisfy the constitutional standard of being just.
That the legal interest due is now almost equivalent to the principal to be
paid is not per se an inequitable or unconscionable situation, considering the
length of time the interest has remained unpaid almost twelve long years.
Moreover, the interest, however enormous it may be, cannot be
inequitable and unconscionable because it resulted directly from the
application of law and jurisprudence standards that have taken into
account fairness and equity in setting the interest rates due for the use or
forebearance of money.
If the LBP sees the total interest due to be immense, it only has itself to
blame, as this interest piled up because it unreasonably acted in its valuation
of the landholdings and consequently failed to promptly pay the petitioners.
Greater public interest would be served if it can contribute to the
credibility of the governments land reform program through the
conscientious handling of its part of this program.
DAR vs Cuenca
Facts:

All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal
or constitutional in nature. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR,
since the law has granted it special and original authority to hear and
adjudicate agrarian matters.
Private respondent Roberto J. Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of
land containing an area of 81.76 hectares
Noe Fortunado, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of La Carlota City
issued and sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent Cuenca
placing the above-described landholding under the compulsory coverage of
R.A. 6657
private respondent Cuenca filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, La
Carlota City, a complaint against Noe Fortunado and Land Bank of the
Philippines for Annulment of Notice of Coverage and Declaration of
Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405
Cuenca alleged that the implementation of CARP in his landholding is no
longer with authority of law
Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null and void ab
initio and Executive Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990 be declared
unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether or not the issue of exclusion of land from coverage from CARP is an
agrarian reform matter
Held: Petition has merit
In its bare essentials, petitioners argument is that private respondent, in his
Complaint for Annulment of the Notice of Coverage, is asking for the
exclusion of his landholding from the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
According to the DAR, the issue involves the implementation of agrarian
reform, a matter over which the DAR has original and exclusive jurisdiction,
pursuant to Section 50 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657).
On the other hand, private respondent maintains that his Complaint assails
mainly the constitutionality of EO 405. He contends that since the Complaint
raises a purely legal issue, it thus falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
We do not agree with Private respondent

Two basic rules have guided this Court in determining jurisdiction in these
cases. First, jurisdiction is conferred by law. [8] And second, the nature of the
 action and the issue of jurisdiction are shaped by the material averments of
the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
Clearly, the main thrust of the allegations is the propriety of the Notice of
Coverage
Plainly then, the propriety of the Notice relates to the implementation of the
CARP, which is under the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the DAR.
Thus, the DAR could not be ousted from its authority by the simple
expediency of appending an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an
issue that is clearly agrarian.
Cabral vs CA
Facts:
On January 16, 1990, petitioner Victoria Cabral filed a petition before the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) for the cancellation of the
Emancipation Patents and Torrens Titles issued in favor of private
respondents
Petitioner sought the cancellation of the TCTs on the grounds that:
o petitioner had a pending application for conversion and
reclassification;
o the lots covered by the emancipation patents included areas not
actually tilled by private respondents;
o private respondents had illegally transferred their rights over the
parcels of land covered by the emancipation patents;
o private respondents are deemed to have abandoned their rights over
the properties; and
o the subject property was taken without just compensation.
On February 11, 1990, Regional Director Eligio Pacis issued an order
dismissing the petition[2] for cancellation of Emancipation Patents
Petitioner contended before the Court of Appeals that jurisdiction over the
case pertained to the Department of Agrarian Reform Agrarian Board
(DARAB), not the Regional Director. Addressing this argument, the Court of
Appeals held in its Decision:
CA held that the jurisdiction of the case is with the Regional Director
Issue: Whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction
Held: NO.
Petitioner is correct. Whatever jurisdiction the Regional Director may have
had over the cancellation of emancipation patents, it lost with the passage of
subsequent laws.
The foregoing provisions were already in effect when petitioner filed her
petition in the BARC in 1990. And it is amply clear from these provisions that
the function of the Regional Office concerns the implementation of agrarian
reform laws while that of the DARAB/RARAD/PARAD is the adjudication of
agrarian reform cases.
o The first is essentially executive. It pertains to the enforcement and
administration of the laws, carrying them into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance.[14] Thus, the Regional Director is
primarily tasked with implementing laws, policies, rules and regulations
within the responsibility of the agency, as well as the agency program
in the region
 o The second is judicial in nature, involving as it does the determination
of rights and obligations of the parties. To aid the DARAB in the
exercise of this function, the Rules grant the Board and Adjudicators
the powers to issue subpoenas [16] and injunctions,[17] to cite and punish
for contempt, and to order the execution of its orders and decision,
[19]
among other powers.
The Court of Appeals has underscored the fact that Section 13 of E.O. No.
129-A authorizes the DARAB to delegate its powers and functions to the
regional office in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by
the Board.

Morta vs Occidental
Facts:
petitioners Jaime Morta, Sr. and Purificacion Padilla filed two (2) cases [4] for
damages with preliminary injunction, with the Municipal Trial Court,
Guinobatan, Albay, against respondents
petitioners alleged that respondents gathered pilinuts, anahaw leaves, and
coconuts from their respective land, delivered the produce to Atty. Mariano
Baranda, Jr., and destroyed their banana and pineapple plants.
In their answer, respondents claimed that petitioners were not the owners of
the land in question
o contended that he was a bona fide tenant of Josefina Opiana-Baraclan
MTC ruled in favor of petitioners
RTC and CA reversed MTC and ruled in favor of respondent ( both saying MTC
has no jurisdiction)
Petitioners claim that Morta is not a tenant of either Jaime Occidental or
Josefina Opiana-Baraclan, as shown by the MARO certification. They argue
that the civil actions for damages are not tenancy-related, and, hence, are
properly cognizable by the trial court, not the DARAB.
Issue: Whether or not this case is cognizable by the MTC
Held: YES.
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which
court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought.
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy
relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take
hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable
elements,
RTC relied on the findings in DARAB Case No. 2413 that Josefina Opiana-
Baraclan appears to be the lawful owner of the land and Jaime Occidental was
her recognized tenant.
 o However, petitioner Morta claimed that he is the owner of the land.
o Thus, there is even a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the
land, Josefina Opiana-Baraclan or petitioner Morta.
The issue of ownership cannot be settled by the DARAB since it is definitely
outside its jurisdiction. Whatever findings made by the DARAB regarding the
ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the matter.
The issue of ownership shall be resolved in a separate proceeding before the
appropriate trial court between the claimants thereof.
At any rate, whoever is declared to be the rightful owner of the land, the case
can not be considered as tenancy-related for it still fails to comply with the
other requirements
o Assuming arguendo that Josefina Opiana-Baraclan is the owner, then
the case is not between the landowner and tenant.
o If, however, Morta is the landowner, Occidental can not claim that
there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship between him and
Morta.
Thus, for failure to comply with the above requisites, we conclude that the
issue involved is not tenancy-related cognizable by the DARAB.

Padunan vs DARAB
Facts:
landholdings subject of the present controversy consist of three parcels of
agricultural land with an area of sixteen thousand two hundred twenty-seven
(16,227), six thousand five hundred eighty-seven (6,587) and nine thousand
nine (9,009) square meters,.
Angelina Rodriguez waived her rights over the said landholdings in favor of
private respondent Marcos Rodriguez by virtue of the Sinumpaang
Salaysay duly executed and thumbmarked by her
private respondent Marcos Rodriguez obtained a loan from herein petitioner,
Graciano Padunan, for P50,000 with the subject landholdings as collateral
covered by a Kasunduan
Emancipation Patents (EP, for brevity) Nos. 414430, 414440 and 414448
covering the subject three parcels of land were issued to Angelina Rodriguez,
even though she had already waived her rights over the said land in favor of
private respondent
Angelina Rodriguez executed, for the second time, a waiver of rights by way
of sale, this time in favor of petitioner Graciano Padunan
o Claiming ownership, petitioner Graciano Padunan started constructing
thereon a house and a warehouse
Private respondent filed with the PARAD a case for injunction against
petitioner
Provincial Adjudicator Romeo Bello decided in favor of private respondent
Marcos Rodriguez,
Issue: Whether or not the PARAD and DARAB has jurisdiction over the case in
cancelling the EPs
Held: NO as far as the jurisdiction to cancel the unregistered emancipation patents.
This belongs to the Secretary of DAR
jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law.
it is therefore incorrect for the private respondent Marcos Rodriguez to argue
that the DARAB derives its jurisdiction from the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
The DARAB derives its jurisdiction from RA 6657 or popularly known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988.
To implement this particular provision of RA 6657 regarding the adjudication
of agrarian reform matters, the DAR adopted the DARAB New Rules of
Procedure, issued on May 30, 1994
Thus, rightly so, the DARAB New Rules of Procedure provide that DARAB has
exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of registered EPs.
However this case involves unregistered Eps
The answer can be found in Administrative Order No. 06-00, issued on August
30, 2000, which provides for the Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law
Implementation (ALI) Cases.
Administrative Order No. 06-00 govern the administrative function of the
DAR.
Under the said Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI)
Cases, the Agrarian Reform Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over the
issuance, recall or cancellation of EPs/CLOAs that are not yet registered with
the Register of Deeds
Clearly, the cancellation of EPs that are not yet registered with the Register of
Deeds falls within the authority of the Agrarian Reform Secretary or DAR
officials[35] duly designated by him, in the exercise of his/their administrative
functions.
o And since, in the case at bar, the erroneously issued EPs in the name of
Angelina Rodriguez were unregistered, it is the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform who has the authority to cancel the same.
Republic vs CA
Facts:
Private respondent Acil Corporation owned several hectares of land in Linoan,
Montevista, Davao del Norte, which the government took pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657).
Private respondent's certificates of title were cancelled and new ones were
issued and distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.
Lands valued at P439,105.39
Private respondent rejected the government's offer, pointing out that nearby
lands planted to the same crops were valued at the higher price of
P24,717.40 per hectare.
private respondent filed a Petition for Just Compensation in the Regional Trial
Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte
 the RTC dismissed its petition on the ground that private respondent should
have appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB)
CA reversed RTC. Siding with Private respondent na dapat sa RTC dinala. Sila
may jurisdiction
Issue: Whether or not a petition for just compensation lies with the DARAB
Held: NO. It lies with the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court ( SAC)
it is noteworthy that the New Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, which was
adopted on May 30, 1994, now provide that in the event a landowner is not
satisfied with a decision of an agrarian adjudicator, the landowner can bring
the matter directly to the Regional Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian
Court.
Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the
initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land
reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking.
a summary administrative proceeding is held 7 and afterward the provincial
(PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case
may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the
land.
If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter
to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court
o This in essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation
cases under R.A. No. 6657.
the private respondent's case was properly brought by it in the RTC, and it
was error for the latter court to have dismissed the case.
the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners.
Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the
original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary
to 57 and therefore would be void
What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary
manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to
the courts the ultimate power to decide this question.

LBP vs Bellista
Facts:
spouses Pablo Ralla and Carmen Munoz Ralla had donated their eight (8)
parcels of lot located in Ligao, Albay to their daughter, Rene Ralla Belista, the
herein private respondent.
The eight (8) parcels of lot were placed by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR, for brevity) under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228).
 Consequently, private respondent claimed payment of just compensation
over said agricultural lands.
It further appears that the DAR's evaluation of the subject farms was
only P227,582.58, while petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP, for
brevity) assessed the same at P317,259.31.
Private respondent, on 11 November 2002, filed a Petition for Valuation and
Payment of Just Compensation against petitioning bank before the DARAB-
Regional Adjudicator for Region V
Petitioner contends that the petition for valuation and payment of just
compensation was filed with the DARAB- Regional Adjudicator for Region V
(RARAD) on November 11, 2002, long before the effectivity of the 2003 Rules
of Procedure;
o that under the transitory provision of the 2003 DARAB Rules, all cases
pending with the Board and the adjudicators prior to the date of the
Rules' effectivity shall be governed by the DARAB Rules prevailing at
the time of their filing;
o that clear from the transitory provision that it is the proceeding of the
DARAB which is governed by the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure,
o thus, it is the date of filing of the petition with the DARAB or any of its
adjudicators which is the reckoning date of the applicability of the 2003
DARAB Rules and not the date of filing with the SAC;
o that under the 1994 DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of the filing of
the respondent's claim for just compensation
, respondent claims that petitioner's petition with the RTC is an original action
and, since the case was filed at a time when appeal to the DARAB Central
Office was already provided in the 2003 DARAB Rules before resorting to
judicial action, the RTC correctly dismissed the petition, which was correctly
affirmed by the CA.
Issue: whether it is necessary that in cases involving claims for just compensation
under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 that the decision of the Adjudicator must first be
appealed to the DARAB before a party can resort to the RTC sitting as SAC.
Held: NO.
Further exception to the DAR's original and exclusive jurisdiction are all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657, which are within the
jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court.
Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA
No. 6657 is vested in the courts.
Although Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides
that the land valuation cases decided by the adjudicator are now appealable
to the Board, such rule could not change the clear import of Section 57 of RA
No. 6657 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just
compensation is in the RTC.
Thus, Section 57 authorizes direct resort to the SAC in cases involving
petitions for the determination of just compensation. [
petitioner properly filed the petition before the RTC and, hence, the RTC erred
in dismissing the case