BASILIO S.

PALANG, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE MARIANO A. ZOSA, and JULIETO P. HERRERA, respondents.

This petition for certiorari and prohibition was predicated on the fear and the misgivings that the trial judge, respondent Mariano A.
Zosa, may find it difficult to live up to the ideal set forth in Gutierrez v. Santos. The due process clause requires a "hearing before an
impartial and disinterested tribunal, ... every litigant [being] entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge." 1 Briefly, the basis of the complaint was that after respondent Judge had acquitted private respondent Julieto P. Herrera of the
crime of estafa, with the statement in his opinion that the charge was nothing but a "clear concocted story" with the testimonies being"
rehearsed and rehashed therefore, maliciously presented by the [offended party, now petitioner] causing great damage and prejudice
[to Herrera's moral and social] standing and a destruction of [his] image as well as (his) character ..., 2 the aforesaid Herrera, thus
acquitted, now private respondent here, filed an action for damages against the complainant, now petitioner. It is his submission here
that considering the language used by respondent Judge, he would not be able to decide such civil case justly and impartially.

When required to comment, respondents filed an answer instead, maintaining that there is no basis for disqualification. Memoranda
was thereafter required from both parties. That was done, and the case was thus ready for decision. At that stage, there was from
private respondent Herrera a motion to withdraw opposition, wherein he alleged: "1. That respondent [Julieto P. Herrera] sincerely
believes in the early disposition and termination of the above-entitled case, that it realizes to withdraw his Opposition to herein
Petitioner's petition; 2. That, time is of the essence, and by way of his withdrawal, the above-entitled case can therefore be calendared
on the earliest possible time by the court who may eventually be assigned, thereby tried on the merits; 3. That this motion of herein
respondent [Julieto P. Herrera] is made for reason of expediency in order that early disposition of the case by way of trial on the merits
be attained." 3

Thereafter, a manifestation was filed by respondent Judge to the following effect: "The undersigned Presiding Judge of Branch V of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, formal party respondent in the above-entitled case, was furnished with a copy of the 'Motion for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction' on June 29, 1974. With the withdrawal of the opposition of
respondent Julieto P. Herrera, the undersigned finds no reason why he should not inhibit himself from trying Civil Case No. R-13620,
entitled "Julieto P. Herrera, Plaintiff v. Basilio Palang, Defendant." In view of this development, the undersigned respectfully
manifests that he voluntarily inhibits himself from conducting the trial of the said case. Therefore, the dismissal of the above-entitled
petition appears to be in order." 4

This voluntary inhibition by respondent Judge is to be commended. He has lived up to what is expected of occupants of the bench.
The public faith in the impartial administration of justice is thus reinforced. It is not enough that they decide cases without bias and
favoritism. It does not suffice that they in fact rid themselves of prepossessions. Their actuation must inspire that belief. This is an
instance where appearance is just as important as the reality. Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion.
At least, that is an ideal worth striving for. What is more, there is deference to the due process mandate. 5

WHEREFORE, the case is dismissed for being moot and academic.

RICARDO M. GUTIERREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ARSENIO SANTOS, ETC. ET AL., respondents.

On August 15, 1958 Benigno Musni and others filed a complaint with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications against
Ricardo M. Gutierrez alleging therein, enter alia, that the latter had illegally constructed dams, dikes and other obstructions across
navigable waters, waterways, rivers and communal fishing grounds. They prayed that, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
2056, the said obstructions be ordered removed or destroyed.

On December 13, 1958 Gutierrez filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the proceedings to be held before the
investigator appointed by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, would be void because Republic Act 2056 was
unconstitutional as it conferred judicial powers to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. This motion was denied and
the investigator set the case for hearing on December 19 and 20, 1958.

On December 15, 1958 Gutierrez filed with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a petition for prohibition to prevent the carrying
out of the investigation referred to above. Main contentions of petitioner were: firstly, that Act 2506 was unconstitutional because it
granted judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and secondly, that the nature and character of the
streams and waterways subject of the complaint lodged with the Department of Public Works and Communications was already res
judicata, having been the subject of an agreement between the Zobel Family former owners of petitioner's fishponds and the
Municipality of Macabebe. Said case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1520 and was assigned by lottery to Branch I of said court,
presided by the Hon. Arsenio Santos.

The Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the Department Investigator filed their answer to the petition for prohibition
alleging therein several affirmative defenses. Respondent Rogelio de la Rosa adopted said answer in toto as his own, while the other
respondents filed a separate pleading invoking virtually the same defenses pleaded by their co-parties.

On February 25, 1959 respondent de la Rosa filed a motion to disqualify the Hon. Arsenio Santos from trying and deciding the case,
upon the ground that sometime in 1948 he had acted as counsel for fishpond owners, like the petitioner Gutierrez, in an administrative
investigation in involving the same or at least similar issues and properties, and had expressed views in the course of said investigation
prejudicial or adverse to the contention of the respondents in the pending case. Petitioner Gutierrez objected to the motion aforesaid
upon the ground that there was no legal ground upon which Judge Santos could be disqualified under the provisions of Rule 125 of the
Rules of Court.

After the hearing on the matter, the respondent Judge issued an order dated April 16, 1959 disqualifying himself and endorsing the
case to the Second Branch of the court, for reasons stated as follows:

Meanwhile, the new respondent, is seeking the disqualification of the presiding judge from sitting in the instant case on the
ground that, before his appointment to the bench, he has been counsel for some fishpond owners, and that under section 1,
Rule 125 of thRules of Court, "no judge shall sit in a case in which he has been a counsel" (par. 4, some motion).

The motion is being objected to by the petitioner. A perusal of the legal provisions, invoked by said respondent, does not
show that the presiding judge is included in any of their prohibitions, because he is not pecuniarily interested in the case; he
is not related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity; he has not been an executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee, or counsel; neither has he presided in any inferior court, whose ruling or decision being the subject of
review (sec. 1, Rule 126, supra).

While it is true that presiding judge was not counsel for the petitioner, yet in his letter dated June 1, 1949, attached to the record, as
then a private law practitioner and as counsel for Manuel Borja, Roman Santos and the heirs of Proceso de Guzman, he informed the
then Secretary of Interior that the streams and rivers, intended to be leased at public caution by the municipal council of Macabebe,
Pampanga, in its Resolution No. 26. were private and not public.

In his same letter, the presiding judge even stated that copies of Resolution No. 26 were furnished the persons mentioned therein, one
of them being Ricardo Gutierrez, the herein petitioner, because the streams and rivers subject of the instant petition were among those
to be leased. In other words, the interests of Manuel Borja, Roman Santos and the heirs of Proceso de Guzman were identical to the
interests of the herein petitioner Ricardo Gutierrez, so much so that whatever may be the resolution of the Secretary of the Interior
then would benefit the interests of the said petitioner.
Under these circumstances, the presiding judge believes that he has no other recourse but to disqualify himself from sitting in this
case.

On August 22, 1959 Gutierrez commenced the present action for mandamus against the Hon. Arsenio Santos, the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, the Department Investigator and the parties who filed the complaint against him, for the purpose of
compelling the aforesaid Judge "to proceed, continue with the hearing and take cognizance of Civil Case No. 1520 of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga."

Petitioner invoking the provisions of section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, argues that the case of the respondent judge does not
fall under any one of the grounds for the disqualification of judicial officers stated therein. Assuming arguendo that a literal
interpretation of the legal provision relied upon justifies petitioner's contention to a certain degree, it should not be forgotten that, in
construing and applying said legal provision, we cannot disregard its true intention nor the real ground for the disqualification of a
judge or judicial officer, which is the impossibility of rendering an impartial judgment upon the matter before him. It has been said, in
fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to
nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge (30 Am. Jur. p. 767). Moreover, second only to the duty of rendering a just
decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the integrity of the Judge.
Consequently, we take it to be the true intention of the law stated in general terms that no judge shall preside in a case in which
he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent (30 Am. Jur. Supra) because

In the present case the respondent judge himself has candidly stated that the opinion expressed by him in a letter dated June 1, 1948
addressed by him as counsel for Manuel Borja and others to the then Secretary of the Interior, attached to the motion for
disqualification as Annex A, "might, some way or another, influence (on) his decision in the case at bar" (order of April 13, 1959).
The fear he has thus expressed of not being able to render a truly impartial judgment does not appear to be capricious and
whimsical, having in mind particularly that in his order of August 11, 1959 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, His Honor
reiterated that in the aforesaid letter he informed the Secretary of the Interior that the streams and rivers to be auctioned, for lease
purposes, by the municipal council of Macabebe, Pampanga, were private and not public streams and rivers; that the streams and
rivers subject of the petition for prohibition filed by herein petitioner were among those that he considered as private in nature; that,
therefore, the interests of Borja and his other clients "were identical to the interest of the herein petitioner etc." In view of these
circumstances, we are constrained to agree with His Honor that the opinion thus expressed by him years ago "might, some way or
another, influence his decision" in the case before him.

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus under consideration is hereby denied, without costs.

G.R. No. L-33508 May 25, 1973

LEON UMALE, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE ONOFRE VILLALUZ,

Petitioner Leon Umale impugns the validity of the order of respondent Judge Villaluz disqualifying or inhibiting himself from trying
the robbery charge.

Petitioner Leon Umale is the complainant in the said robbery case, the robbery having been allegedly committed in his warehouse
from which were assorted textile materials valued at P229,659.904. The case was filed with the Circuit Criminal Court presided by
respondent Judge Villaluz, who issued several orders for the arrest of the accused, fixing their bail bonds, allowing an accused to post
cash or surety bond for his provisional liberty, for their arraignment, or for their commitment to the provincial jail, as well as issued
subpoena duces tecum and contempt citations against certain police officers who failed to appear on the days set for hearing.

However, on April 15, 1971, without any party moving for his disqualification or inhibition, respondent Judge Onofre Villaluz
voluntarily inhibited himself from trying the case "for the peace of mind of the parties concerned and to insure an impartial
administration of justice" on the ground that before the criminal case was filed in his court, he already had personal knowledge of the
same; and directed the immediate forwarding of the records of the case to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pasig,
Rizal, for proper disposition.
OUR resolution dated May 18, 1971 required respondents to answer and authorized the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
upon posting by petitioner of a bond of P1,000. Petitioner posted the bond and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued on June 21,
1971 enjoining respondent Judge Benjamin Aquino from taking cognizance of and exercising jurisdiction over the criminal case.

Only respondent Alfonso Co, thru counsel, filed an answer.

In a motion dated September 20, 1971 and filed on September 22, 1971, private respondents Benjamin Escandor and Rolando
Samson, two of the defendants in CCC-VII-660 and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2729 on the Court of First Instance, Branch VIII,
Pasig, Rizal, prayed for the modification of the said preliminary injunction so as to allow respondent Judge Benjamin Aquino to act on
their motion for bail.

In a resolution dated September 28, 1971, petitioner was required to comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice. Petitioner
failed however to submit the required comment.

In a motion dated October 25, 1971 and filed on November 20, 1971, private respondents Benjamin Escandor and Rolando Samson
reiterated the aforesaid motion.

In a resolution dated November 25, 1971, the Court resolved to defer action thereon until the case is considered on the merits.

On November 4, 1971, petitioner filed his memorandum; while private respondent Alfonso Co filed his memorandum on November
20, 1971.

The issues posed by the petition are:

(1) whether respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz of the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, can voluntarily, inhibit himself,
without any motion therefor by the parties, on the ground of his personal knowledge of the case even before the same was filed; and

Undoubtedly, personal knowledge of the case pending before him is not one of the causes for the disqualification of a judge under the
first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court which took effect on January 1, 1964. But paragraph 2 of said
Section 1 of Rule 137 authorizes the judge, "in the exercise of his sound discretion, to disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just
or valid reason other than those mentioned" in paragraph 1.

Herein respondent Judge, because of his personal knowledge of the case, at least had conducted a careful self-examination after
hearing some incidents on the criminal case wherein petitioner is the complainant, because such personal knowledge on his part might
generate in his mind some bias or prejudice against the complaining witness or any of the accused or in an manner unconsciously
color his judgment one way or the other without the parties having the opportunity to cross-examine him as a witness. Herein
respondent Judge therefore harkened to the injunction announced by this Court in Pimentel versus Salanga 10 that when a Judge "might
be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of
inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's
faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the
back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him."

It is possible that the respondent Judge might be influenced by his personal knowledge of the case when he tries and decides the same
on the merits, which would certainly constitute a denial of due process to the party adversely affected by his judgment or decision. It is
best that, after some reflection, the respondent Judge on his own initiative disqualified himself from hearing the robbery case filed by
herein petitioner and thereby rendered himself available as witness to any of the parties and therefore maybe subject to cross-
examination.

Having thus voluntarily inhibited himself from trying the criminal case in which herein petitioner is the complainant, the respondent
Judge has the discretion likewise to transfer the case to the regular courts of first instance sitting in Pasig, Rizal where he holds court,
since the regular Court of First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Criminal Court over this case for robbery

The validity of the trial and the decision rendered in the case depends solely on the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of
the case and over the parties, to whom due process of law has been accorded.

Consequently, herein respondent Judge committed no abuse of discretion..

WHEREFORE THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.

MAYOR SALVADOR M. PEREZ, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HILARION A. SULLER, respondent.

In a sworn letter-complaint, Salvador M. Perez, Municipal Mayor accused Judge Suller of grave abuse of discretion, misconduct,
ignorance of the law and acts unbecoming of a judge relative to Criminal Case.

Complainant Mayor, father of the accused, alleged that respondent Judge conducted the preliminary investigation in said case
although the complaining witness, Cristobal Suller, Jr. is his nephew and thereafter issued the warrant of arrest against the accused on
the same day the complaint was filed without requiring the accused and their witnesses to submit their counter-affidavits; that on the
following day, a Friday, respondent judge purposely left his station to thwart any opportunity for the accused to post bail.

In his comment, respondent judge averred that he issued the warrant of arrest against the accused when he found probable cause of the
commission of the crime by them. He denied the allegation that he left his station the day after the filing of the complaint; that in a
Joint "Sworn Statement" Staff Assistant and interpreter attested that respondent judge, together with affiants reported for work on said
date and maintained a skeletal force up to noon the next day.

His comment, however, was silent as to his relationship with the complaining witness.

After an evaluation of the present complaint, we find that the resolution thereof hinges on two issues, to wit: (1) whether or not it is
necessary to first accord the accused their statutory right to submit counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses, prior to issuance of
the warrant of arrest; (2) whether or not it was proper for respondent judge to conduct the preliminary investigation and then order the
arrest of the accused when the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. SM-7962, as claimed by complainant mayor, is his nephew.

Consequently in the case before us, we rule that no taint of irregularity attended the issuance of the warrant of arrest by respondent
judge.

Respondent judge issued the warrant after complying with the provision of Section 6, Rule 112. He need not, as a condition precedent
to the issuance of the warrant of arrest require submission of the counter-affidavits of the accused and his witnesses, as insisted upon
by complainant mayor.

Respondent judge's comment, being silent on his relationship with complaining witness, Cristobal Suller, Jr., the Court deems it an
admission of the alleged relationship.

The Court finds that respondent judge should have refrained from handling the preliminary investigation since he was closely related
to the complainant, Cristobal Suller Jr., his nephew and a relative by consanguinity within the sixth degree.

The Court mandates that all judges strictly comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct 5 Rule 3.12

Rule 137 Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court which applies suppletorily provides:

While conducting preliminary investigation may not be construed strictly as "sitting in a case," the underlying reason behind
disqualification under Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 1 of Rule 137 is the same.

Clearly, respondent judge's participation in the preliminary investigation, involving his nephew is a violation of the aforequoted rules
laid down to guide members of the judiciary. The rationale for the rule on disqualification of a judge stems from the principle that no
judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. 6 A judge should not handle a
case in which he might be perceived to be susceptible to bias and partiality. 7 The rule is intended to preserve the people's faith and
confidence in the courts of justice. 8

The behavior of judges and court personnel, must at all times, not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be
above suspicion. 10 Due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to
reassure litigants of his being fair and just. 11 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, moreover, mandates that a judge should avoid,
not merely impropriety in all his acts but even the appearance of impropriety.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent judge is FINED in the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) for not having
inhibited himself in the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case Nowith a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.
CONSTANTE PIMENTEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINO C. SALANGA, respondent.

Challenged here in an original petition for certiorari and/or prohibition is the right of respondent judge of the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Sur (Branch IV) to sit in judgment in cases where petitioner, a practicing attorney, appears as counsel. Petitioner's petition
recites the facts that follow:

Petitioner is counsel of record in cases pending before respondent judge.

Petitioner's misgivings stem from the fact that he is complainant in an administrative case he himself lodged in this Court on May 12,
1967, against respondent judge upon averments of "serious misconduct, inefficiency in office, partiality, ignorance of the law and
incompetence."1 The judge's return traversed the factual averments. Whereupon, this Court, on July 13, 1967, referred the
administrative case to Mr. Justice Eulogio Serrano of the Court of Appeals "for investigation, report and recommendation." That case
is still pending.

On July 31, 1967, petitioner moved in the court below to have respondent judge disqualify himself from sitting in Civil Case 21-C,
Criminal Cases 4898 and C-5, and Election Case 2470 aforesaid. He there prayed that the records of those cases be transferred to
another sala, either at Narvacan or Vigan, both of Ilocos Sur.

On August 1, 1967, respondent judge rejected the foregoing motion. He stood his ground with the statement that the administrative
complaint against him is no cause for disqualification under the Rules of Court; that Civil Case 21-C and Electoral Case 2470 "are
now on the final stages of termination" and transfer thereof to another sala "would only delay their final disposition, make the parties
suffer [from] further efforts and expenses", and "would be violative" of Administrative Order 371 of the Department of Justice
defining the court's territorial jurisdiction; and that he is "sworn to administer justice in accordance with the law and the merits of the
cases to be heard and decided by him." Civil Case 21-C was then calendared for August 10 and 11, 1967.

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner makes his exercise along the following lines: Immediate resolution of the problem of disqualification "is a matter of
profound importance, particularly on his career and potential as a practitioner of law; his cases "may fall by the accident of raffle into
the sala of respondent Judge" and he cannot "resign from an accepted case every time it falls" therein; his clients will have "the natural
hesitation to retain as counsel one who is sort of unacceptable to the presiding judge." Petitioner winds up with a prayer that
respondent judge be stopped from further sitting in or otherwise trying or deciding the cases heretofore mentioned. He asks for the
issuance forthwith of a writ of preliminary injunction ex parte.1awphl.nt

We now resolve the petition.

Is a judge disqualified from acting in litigations in which counsel of record for one of the parties is his adversary in an administrative
case said counsel lodged against him?

The answer is to be sought within the terms of Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, 2 which reads in full:

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consaguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which be has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject
of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those
mentioned above.

Petitioner says that, arguably, his case comes within the coverage of the second paragraph of the rule just quoted. The theory
advocated is that the present (1964) rules for the first time provide a broad policy-oriented ground for disqualification of judges. It is
his submission that a judge may now be barred from the bench in specific cases for reasons other than those enumerated in the law. He
stresses that respondent judge, in the factual environment presented, did not make use of his sound discretion when he refused to
disqualify himself from acting in the cases referred to.
Before the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules, came into being, law and early jurisprudence gave no room for
a judge, on objection of a party, to disqualify himself, absent any of the specific grounds for disqualification set forth in the law. The
following from People vs. Moreno [1949], 83 Phil. 286, 294, is expressive of the rule: "To take or not to take cognizance of a case,
does not depend upon the discretion of a judge not legally disqualified to sit in a given case. It is his duty not to sit in its trial and
decision if legally disqualified; but if the judge is not disqualified, it is a matter of official duty for him to proceed with the trial and
decision of the case. He cannot shirk the responsibility without the risk of being called upon to account for his dereliction."3 Then
came Del Castillo vs. Javelona, L-16742, September 29, 1962, from which sprang the added second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137,
aforequoted. In Del Castillo, the judge inhibited himself from the case because the lawyer of the party defendant was his first
cousin.4 The judge felt that if defendant should win, his blood relationship with defendant's lawyer might cast some suspicion on his
integrity; but, if defendant be the defeated party, it might bring unpleasant consequences. Plaintiff protested the judge's posture. In
upholding the judge, we declared:

. . . Obviously, Rule 126 [of the old Rules] enumerates the grounds for disqualification of a judge upon being challenged and under
which he should disqualify himself. The rule, however, has never been interpreted to prohibit a judge from voluntarily inhibiting
himself, in the absence of any challenge by either party, due to his close blood relationship with counsel for one of said parties.
Considering the spirit of the Rule, it would seem that cases of voluntary inhibition, based on good, sound and/or ethical grounds, is a
matter of discretion on the part of the judge and the official who is empowered to act upon the request for such inhibition.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . In other words, while Rule 126 provides for disqualification, it does not include nor preclude cases and circumstances for
voluntary inhibition which depends upon the discretion of the officers concerned.5

The Del Castillo opinion made the pointed observation that the cases cited by plaintiff are instances where the judge was challenged
not cases of voluntary inhibition. Indeed, as early as 1931, clear intimation there was that voluntary inhibition upon sound grounds
may be recognized, when this Court said in one case:6". . . It is true that if Judge Garduo had abstained from trying the case at bar,
there would have been less susceptibility to suspicion. But, as a matter of law, the grounds for the motion of recusation do not
constitute a legal cause for the disqualification of a judge."

Thus, the genesis of the provision (paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 137), not to say the letter thereof, clearly illumines the course of
construction we should take. The exercise of sound discretion mentioned in the rule has reference exclusively to a situation
where a judge disqualifies himself, not when he goes forward with the case.7For, the permissive authority given a judge in the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, is only in the matter of disqualification, not otherwise. Better stated yet, when a judge does not
inhibit himself, and he is not legally disqualified by the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, the rule remains as it has been he
has to continue with the case.1awphl.nt

So it is, that the state of the law, with respect to the situation before us, is unaffected by the amendment (paragraph 2 of Section 1,
Rule 137) introduced in the 1964 Rules. And it is this: A judge cannot be disqualified by a litigant or his lawyer for grounds other than
those specified in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137.

This is not to say that all avenues of relief are closed to a party properly aggrieved. If a litigant is denied a fair and impartial trial,
induced by the judge's bias or prejudice, we will not hesitate to order a new trial, if necessary, in the interest of justice. Such was the
view taken by this Court in Dais vs. Torres, 57 Phil. 897, 902-904. In that case, we found that the filing of charges by a party against a
judge generated "resentment" or the judge's part that led to his "bias or prejudice, which is reflected in the decision." We there
discoursed on the "principle of impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness on the part of the judge" which "is as old as the history of
courts." We followed this with the pronouncement that, upon the circumstances obtaining, we did not feel assured that the trial judge's
finding were not influenced by bias or prejudice. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment and directed a new trial. 8

Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring appeal. But, we are not licensed to indulge in
unjustified assumptions, or make a speculative approach to this ideal. It ill behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or
prejudiced, simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to complain against him. As applied here, respondent judge has not as
yet crossed the line that divides partiality and impartiality. He has not thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No act or conduct of
his would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to assume what respondent judge, not otherwise legally disqualified,
will do in a case before him.9 We have had occasion to rule in a criminal case that a charge made before trial that a party "will not be
given a fair, impartial and just hearing" is "premature." 10 Prejudice is not to be presumed. Especially if weighed against a judge's legal
obligation under his oath to administer justice "without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich." 11 To disqualify
or not to disqualify himself then, as far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience.

All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a
situation where their capacity to try and decide a case fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the
parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be
induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of
inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's
faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the
back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on the part of a
judge may be generated because of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote. He
is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or
withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by
another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit
or not to sit may depend to a great extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should
resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be
interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who
forestalls miscarriage of justice.

In the end we are persuaded to say that since respondent judge is not legally under obligation to disqualify himself, we may not,
on certiorari or prohibition, prevent him from sitting, trying and rendering judgment in the cases herein mentioned. 12

Upon the premises, the petition herein for certiorari and prohibition is denied. So ordered.