People vs velasquez

This case is about the appeal of the accused of the decision of the RTC convicting
him of the crime of qualified rape. He contended that he should be acquitted since
the information charge him of the crime of Rape and not the crime he was
convicted.
Facts:
The complainant Remedios Domingo was a housemaid of Cecilia Velasquez in the
latter's house in Licab Nueva Ecija. Cecilia, a sister of the appellant, is a public
school teacher married to a dentist. The appellant, who was unmarried, was staying
in the house of said spouses in the ground floor of which he had a radio repair shop.
Remedios, at the time of the alleged rape committed on February 9, 1966, was 15
years, 2 months and 27 days old, she having been born on November 12, 1950.
In the evening of February 9, 1966, while she was sleeping in a room in the house of
her employer, she felt someone embracing her. Awakened, she saw the appellant by
her side, threatening her with death if she would make an outcry. The appellant held
a bladed weapon which he pressed to her breast. Overcome with fear, the
complainant did not shout. The appellant then proceeding to raise her blouse and
touched her breast. Despite her struggle, the appellant persisted in his erotic
advances. He held her hands and removed her panties after snapping its garter. The
appellant then inserted his penis into her private parts and succeeded in
consummating his carnal desire. The complainant simply cried her heart out. In the
next two succeeding days, February 10 and 11, 1966, the appellant again satisfied
his lust by having sexual intercourse with the complainant.
Sometime later, the complainant told her employer that she wanted to leave, but
the latter refused to let her go until a replacement for her could be secured. The
complainant decided to write to her mother to take her home. On May 4, 1966, the
mother of the complainant took her from the house of Cecilia Velasquez and
brought her home to barrio Linao, Licab Nueva Ecija. Sometime in August 1966, the
mother of the complainant noticed that she was not menstruating and that her
abdomen was showing signs of pregnancy. The complainant had to tell her mother
as to what happened to her while she was working as a housemaid in the house of
Cecilia Velasquez
She then filed a case of Rape.
Issue:
WON the accused should be held guilty of Rape.
Ruling:
The accused should be acquitted.
It is Our considered opinion that the trial court committed error in holding the
appellant guilty of the crime of qualified seduction. Assuming it to be a fact that the
appellant may be considered a "domestic" within the meaning of Art. 337 of the
Revised Penal Code a point disputed by the appellant who claimed that he was
not staying in the house of his sister but only operated a radio repair shop in the
ground floor of said house - still, no conviction for qualified seduction may be
decreed against the appellant. This is because there is no allegation in the
information filed against him of two of the essential elements of the crime of
qualified seduction, to wit: virginity of the offended party, and that the latter is over
12 but under 18 years of age. In the event of a variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved or established by the
evidence, the accused may only be convicted of the offense proved included in that
which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved.
(Section 4, Rule 120, Rules of Court.) "An offense charged necessarily includes that
which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter." The
view that conviction for qualified seduction may not be had on a charge of rape had
already been expounded by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in People vs. Ramirez,
69 SCRA 144.
For similar reasons, neither may the appellant be validly convicted of the crime of
simple seduction. As may be note from the information filed against the appellant,
there is likewise no allegation therein of the elements of the good reputation of the
offended party and of the latter being over 12 but under 18 years of age, which are
essential for the commission of the crime of simple seduction. (Art. 332, Revised
Penal Code.)
The criminal responsibility of the appellant may only be predicated on his having
committed the crime of rape should it appear from the evidence on record that he
had, indeed, obtained carnal knowledge of the complainant against her will and
consent by means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a bladed
instrument, as alleged in the information. We have meticulously examined the
record of this case, particularly the testimony of complainant Remedios Domingo, in
an effort to find adequate confirmation of her claim that the appellant succeeded in
making her submit to his sexual desire by threatening her with death by means of a
bladed weapon should she refuse to do so, or should she cry out for help. Sadly
enough, Our earnest endeavor and desire to render justice to the aggrieved party
had failed to dissipate persistent doubts in Our minds as to the credibility of her
assertion that the appellant coerced and threatened her with death into submitting
to his carnal demand in the evening of February 9, 1966.
The only testimony in the record as to how the alleged rape was committed is that
of the complainant herself. Her declaration suffers not only from lack of
corroboration, but also from inherent improbabilities that effectively impair its
credibility. While it may be true that the complainant manifested initial reluctance to
the appellant's erotic demand, We are not convinced that her resistance was
sufficient to make the appellant resort to force and intimidation in accomplishing his
desire. There appears to be no sincere struggle as the complainant had claimed, or
a determined effort on her part to preserve her virtue. Neither the complainant nor
the appellant sustained injuries of any kind whatsoever. Not a single piece of
complainant's apparel was torn or damaged, except a snapped garter of her panty
which could easily be attributed to the eagerness of the appellant as readily as to a
refusal of the complainant to take her panty off. Not a single outcry came from her
mouth, even as of the moment she was suddenly awakened with the appellant lying
beside her. There was no claim that the appellant pressed his hands against her
mouth or covered the same elsewhere so as to prevent her from shouting for help.
No commotion was created as could have aroused the other occupants in the house
into coming to her aid. Complainant had testified that her employers were sleeping
in a room only six meters away from hers. It is a fact that despite the alleged
struggle, not one of the occupants in the said house had been awakened during the
entire incident that allegedly transpired in the complainant's room in the evening of
February 9, 1966.

People vs Jumawan
This case is about the automatic review of the SC of the decision rendered by the
CA, affirming the judgment of the RTc finding the accused guilty of the crime of
rape, under RA 8353. He contended that with regard to the sex they have
commited, it was consensual, and impliedly, since they were husband and wife.

Facts:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one
of the laborers. They got married after a year of courtship. When their first child,
MMM, was born, KKK and the accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store. Later on,
they engaged in several other businesses -trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK
managed the businesses except for the rice mill, which, ideally, was under the
accused-appellant's supervision with the help of a trusted employee. In reality,
however, he merely assisted in the rice mill business by occasionally driving one of
the trucks to haul goods.
Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as
KKK's dedication. Even the daughters observed the disproportionate labors of their
parents. He would drive the trucks sometimes but KKK was the one who actively
managed the businesses.
She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the other hand,
did not acquiesce with that objective.
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa
Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Three of the children transferred residence
therein while KKK, the accused-appellant and one of their sons stayed in
Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She shuttled between the two places regularly and
sometimes he accompanied her. In 1998, KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City
most of the days of the week. On Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to
procure supplies for the family store and then returned to Cagayan de Oro City on
the same day.
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the
accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well
and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997,
he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans
any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was
physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would
threaten her into submission.
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his
complaint that she failed to attend to him. She was preoccupied with financial
problems in their businesses and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home
because "a woman must stay in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She
disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal of providing a good future for the
children.
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the
accused-appellant slept together in Cebu City where the graduation rites of their
eldest daughter were held. By October 14, 1998, the three of them were already
back in Cagayan de Oro City.
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went
about their nightly routine. The family store in their residence was closed at about
9:00 p.m. before supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the
girls' bedroom at the mezzanine of the house to pray the rosary while the accused-
appellant watched television in the living room. OOO and MMM then prepared their
beds. Soon after, the accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him
to their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK complied.
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but
she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in
a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are
you lying on the c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order: "You transfer here [to] our
bed."
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal
pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he
got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing
KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow
and transferred to the bed.
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his
desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined
by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to
resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on
the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster, stretched her legs apart and rested
his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and
succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK
continued to protest by desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me because I'm
not feeling well."
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other
enclosing the spouses' bedroom, KKK's pleas were audible in the children's bedroom
where MMM lay awake.
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to
me, have pity on me," MMM woke up 000 who prodded her to go to their parents'
room. MMM hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her
parents' bedroom and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is crying?"The accused-
appellant then quickly put on his briefs and shirt, partly opened the door and said:
"[D]on 't interfere because this is a family trouble," before closing it again. Since she
heard her mother continue to cry, MMM ignored his father's admonition, knocked at
the bedroom door again, and then kicked it. A furious accused-appellant opened the
door wider and rebuked MMM once more: "Don't interfere us. Go downstairs
because this is family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK crouching and crying on top of the
bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached her mother and asked: "Ma, why
are you crying?" before asking her father: "Pa, what happened to Mama why is it
that her underwear is torn[?]"
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother
get up in order to bring her to the girls' bedroom. KKK then picked up her tom
underwear and covered herself with a blanket. However, their breakout from the
room was not easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-appellant blocked the
doorway by extending his arm towards the knob. He commanded KKK to "[S]tay
here, you sleep in our room," when the trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to
go out." He then held KKK's hands but she pulled them back. Determined to get
away, MMM leaned against door and embraced her mother tightly as they pushed
their way out.
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to
what happened. KKK relayed: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to
have sex with him when I'm not feeling well." The girls then locked the door and let
her rest."
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the
family store on October 17, 1998, KKK and the children took their supper. The
accused-appellant did not join them since, according to him, he already ate dinner
elsewhere. After resting for a short while, KKK and the children proceeded to the
girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK decided to spend the night in the room's
small bed and the girls were already fixing the beddings when the accused-
appellant entered.
"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded
that she preferred to sleep with the children. He then scoffed: "Its alright if you will
not go with me, anyway, there are women that could be paid [P] 1,000.00." She
dismissed his comment by turning her head away after retorting: "So be it." After
that, he left the room.
He returned 15 minutes later and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became
infuriated. He lifted her from the bed and attempted to carry her out of the room as
he exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?] Lets go to our bedroom." When she
defied him, he grabbed her short pants causing them to tear apart. At this point,
MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama because we are in front of you."
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who
yelled, "[E]ven in front of you, I can have sex of your mother [sic J because I'm the
head of the family." He then ordered his daughters to leave the room. Frightened,
the girls obliged and went to the staircase where they subsequently heard the pleas
of their helpless mother resonate with the creaking bed.
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly
pulled KKK's short pants and panties. He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on 't do
that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you
wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand sex."
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands,
mounted her and forced himself inside her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant
put on his short pants and briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing as he
conceitedly uttered: "[I]t s nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or
fond of sex." He then retreated to the masters' bedroom.
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried
upstairs but found the door locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her
arm, reached for the doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the
room, MMM and OOO found their mother crouched on the bed with her hair
disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma, what happened to you, why are you crying?" KKK
replied: "[Y}our father is a beast and animal, he again forced me to have sex with
him even if I don't feel well. "
Issue:
WON the accused should be held guilty of Rape
Ruling:
The SC ruled that the accused should be held guilty of Rape.
It is true that the Family Code, obligates the spouses to love one another but this
rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both
spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or
coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and
wife excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense
of spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each
other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in
deepening marital relationship. When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital
union in order to advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or
intimidation, the Court will step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and
protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his
indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may
legally seek the court's intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill an essential marital obligation. But he cannot and should not demand sexual
intimacy from her coercively or violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in
terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof,
infringes on the equal protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection
of the laws ordains that similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to
give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others; no person or
class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by
other persons or other classes in like circumstances.
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to:
(a) rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that
where the victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three
forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish between rape committed
in wedlock and those committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords
protection to women raped by their husband and those raped by any other man
alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against
married rape victims over unmarried rape victims because it withholds from married
women raped by their husbands the penal redress equally granted by law to all rape
victims.
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting
the argument akin to those raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage license
should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with
impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an
unmarried woman. She can give or withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse
with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case
she refuses.

People vs Climaco
This case is about the appeal of the accused in this case after being found guilty of
violation of RA 9165 because of illegal possession and illegal sale of illegal drugs. He
contended that since the chain of custody of the drugs was broken, he must be
acquitted.
Facts
PO1 Ignacio testified that he is a member of the Philippine National Police since 15
October 1999 and was assigned at Intelligence Division, San Pedro Municipal Police
Station. As member of the Intelligence Division, he was tasked to conduct
surveillance operation and apprehend persons engaged in illegal drug activity. On 7
September 2004, he was on 24-hour duty at PAC base located at United Bayanihan,
San Pedro, Laguna. At around 6:00 in the evening of the same day, PO1 Ignacio,
SPO3 Samson, SPO4 Balverde, some members of the Laguna Special Operation
Team, Members of the Provincial Intelligence and Investigation Division conducted a
briefing regarding a drug operation against a certain Gomer Climaco, No. 5 in the
drug watch list in San Pedro, Laguna. During the briefing, PO1 Ignacio was tasked to
act as the poseur-buyer and SPO4 Almeda as the overall team leader. The buy-bust
money was prepared, which consist of P500.00 bill and some boodle money. The
team was also armed with a Warrant of Arrest for illegal drugs issued by Judge
Pao. After the briefing, the team proceeded to the target area. When they arrived,
PO1 Ignacio saw the suspect standing in front of his house. The other members of
the team strategically positioned themselves. Since PO1 Ignacio already knew the
suspect, PO1 Ignacio just told Gomer that he would buy shabu. Gomer entered his
house and took something. When he came out, Gomer showed to PO1 Ignacio the
shabu. PO1 Ignacio scratched his head to signal the team that item was shown to
him and he would execute the buying of the shabu. After Gomer asked for the
money and PO1 Ignacio gave it to him, SPO3 Samson and the rest of the team
immediately moved in to effect the arrest of the suspect. Since he was caught in the
act, Gomer did not resist anymore. The team likewise showed Gomer his warrant of
arrest. PO1 Ignacio saw SPO3 Samson frisk and ask Gomer to empty his
pockets. SPO3 Samson was able to recover another plastic sachet, which was
inserted between Gomers fingers. The plastic sachet, which was the product of the
buy-bust, and the one recovered from Gomer were turned over to SPO4 Teofilo
Royena, who turned them over to the Office of the Special Operation Group located
at Brgy. Tubigan, Bian, Laguna. The plastic sachet product of the buy-bust was
marked TR-B, which means Teofilo Royena and the letter B means Bust. While the
plastic sachet recovered from Gomer was marked TR-R, which means Teofilo Royena
and the letter R means Recovered. PO1 Ignacio identified the accused Gomer
Climaco in open court. He likewise identified his sworn statement. During the cross-
examination, PO1 Ignacio admitted that he learned of the warrant of arrest on 7
September 2004 only. It was SPO4 Valverde who instructed PO Ignacio to conduct
surveillance operation against Gomer, who was engaged in rampant selling of
shabu.

Issue
WON the accused should be held guilty of the violation of RA 9165
Ruling:
The elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu are: (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Similarly, it is essential that the
transaction or sale be proved to have actually taken place coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti which means the actual
commission by someone of the particular crime charged. The corpus delicti in cases
involving dangerous drugs is the presentation of the dangerous drug itself.

On the other hand, to successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of

dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug.

Based on the testimony of PO1 Ignacio, the substances retrieved from Climaco and
submitted to the court were contained in two (2) plastic sachets with the markings
TR-R and TR-B. However, according to the Chemistry Report executed by Forensic
Chemist Donna Villa P. Huelgas on 8 September 2004, the plastic sachets submitted
for examination carried the markings GSC-1 and GSC-2, different from the plastic
sachets marked TR-R and TR-B containing the drugs retrieved from Climaco.

As held in Malillin v. People, to establish guilt of the accused beyond reasonable

doubt in cases involving dangerous drugs, it is important that the substance illegally
possessed in the first place be the same substance offered in court as exhibit. This
chain of custody requirement ensures that unnecessary doubts are removed
concerning the identity of the evidence. When the identity of the dangerous drug
recovered from the accused is not the same dangerous drug presented to the
forensic chemist for review and examination, nor the same dangerous drug
presented to the court, the identity of the dangerous drug is not preserved due to
the broken chain of custody. With this, an element in the criminal cases for illegal
sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the corpus delicti, is not proven, and
the accused must then be acquitted based on reasonable doubt. For this reason,
Climaco must be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt due to the broken
chain of custody over the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from him.

People vs Malinao
This case is about the automatic review of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
convicting appellant Johnny Malinao of Illegal Possession of Firearm in its
aggravated form under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearm Law) and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of
death. He contended that this appeal is only his conviction for illegal possession of
firearm because the trial court had dismissed the Information for murder.
Facts:
Appellant and victim Nestor Otanguin were neighbors in Barangay 10, Muoz Estate,
Catbalogan, Samar. In the afternoon of November 9, 1994, the car in which Nestor,
his wife Teresita and his brother-in-law were riding, driven by one Rodante Abarcar
who was maneuvering it out of the garage gate of the Otanguin residence,
accidentally hit and injured the fighting cock of appellant that was tied near said
gate. Teresita immediately told appellant of the incident and promised to talk it over
with him later as they were in a hurry to catch up with a plane flight to Tacloban
City. Appellant did not say anything and just smiled. Nestor and family left for the
airport.
At 4:30 in the afternoon of November 14, 1994, appellant, armed with a .38 caliber
revolver, was drinking with some friends at a table on a sidewalk near his house at
the corner of McKinley Street, a narrow alley. 9-year old Rey Abarcar, 12-year old
Allan Federio, 11-year old Jay-ar Federio and 6-year old Danelle Ian Malindog were
playing nearby. At 6:00 in the evening, Nestor was on his way home from work and
passed by the place where appellant was drinking with some friends. As Nestor was
approaching, appellant fired his gun and invited Nestor to join them and offered him
a drink which Nestor accepted. Then Nestor excused himself for home but appellant
offered him another drink, which he politely refused. Enraged at the refusal,
appellant drew his revolver from his waist and shot Nestor on the chest. When
Nestor fell, appellant shot him again at the back of the head, resulting in his
immediate death.
On November 15, 1994, Dr. Frederick Beda C. Alli, Municipal Health Officer,
conducted the autopsy on Nestor. From the autopsy report, it appears that Nestor
died of cardio-respiratory arrest due to gunshot wounds on the head and chest. On
the same day, Forensic Analyst Nicandro Canaleja, conducted a paraffin test on the
hands of appellant. The test gave a positive result for the presence of gunpowder
residue. Meanwhile, Ireneo Ordiano, Jr., a ballistics expert of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), conducted a ballistics examination on the two bullets recovered
from the body of Nestor. The ballistics report revealed that the bullets were fired
from the barrel of a caliber .38 firearm. A certification from the Philippine National
Police (PNP) proved that appellant is neither a firearm holder nor a licensee of any
firearm of whatever caliber.
Appellant admits having killed Nestor but claims self-defense. He testified that on
the day of the incident, Nestor, armed with a .38 caliber handgun, drew his weapon
to fire at appellant but appellant grappled with Nestor for possession of the gun and
in the struggle, the gun exploded. He further stated that after he succeeded in
wrestling the gun from Nestor, Nestor fought back and held his legs so he fired at
Nestor. Thereafter, he left and went to the house of his brother in law. Later, he met
Fiscal Wayne Villarin and they went to the Catbalogan Police Station where he
surrendered to the police.

Issue:
WON the accused should be held guilty of Illegal possession of Fire arm and Murder
Ruling:
The accused cannot be held guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms because
under R.A. No. 8294, the use of an unlicensed firearm in a murder or homicide case
is considered simply as a special aggravating circumstance in the crime of homicide
or murder and no longer treated as a separate offense in its aggravated form. It
should be noted however that in either case, whether for illegal use of firearm in its
aggravated form under P.D. No. 1866 as discussed in the Barros case or whether
Murder or Homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the
imposable penalty is death.
The use of the unlicensed firearm by appellant in killing Nestor may not be used
against appellant as a special aggravating circumstance because there is no
allegation in Criminal Case No. 3998 that the crime of Murder was committed with
the use of an unlicensed firearm, as mandated by Section 8 of Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; in much the same way as in Criminal Case No.
4039, it is not alleged in the Information that the use of illegal firearm caused
murder or homicide.
In fine, appellant may be held liable only for murder which is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by R.A. No. 7659.

Villanueva vs People
This case is about the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the
Court Appeals which affirmed the conviction of Cedric Sayco y Villanueva(petitioner)
for violation of Section 1, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294.
Facts:
PO3 Mariano Labe testified on January 17, 2002. He declared that on or about 3:35
in the afternoon of January 3, 1999, while they were at the Police Station, they
received a telephone call from a concerned citizen from Tavera Street, Bais City,
informing them that one unidentified person was inside Abueva's Repair Shop
located at Tavera Street, tucking a handgun on his waist. They immediately went to
the aforementioned place, and upon their arrival thereat, they saw one unidentified
person tucking a handgun on his right side waistline. They approached the
unidentified person and asked him if he had a license to possess said firearm, but
the answer was in the negative. At this juncture, they immediately effected the
arrest, and confiscated from his possession and custody a Caliber 9MM marked
"SIGSAUER P299" with 14 live ammunitions with Serial No. AE 25171. The arrested
person was identified as Zedric Sayco y Villanueva, a resident of Binalbagan, Negros
Occidental.
For his defense, petitioner does not deny that he was in possession of the subject
firearm and ammunitions when he was apprehended on January 3, 1999 in Bais
City, but he insists that he had the requisite permits to carry the same.
The RTC and MTCC gave no significance to the foregoing documents. The MTCC held
that the Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order do not constitute the license
required by law because "they were not issued by the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Firearms and Explosives Unit, but by the Commanding Officer of the Philippine
Army who is not authorized by law to issue licenses to civilians to possess firearms
and ammunitions
Issue:
WON the accused should be held guilty of illegal possession of firearms
Ruling:
The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack
of license or permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not
prohibited by law. To establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of
proving that the firearm exists and that the accused who owned or possessed it
does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same.
There is no dispute over these key facts: first, that the subject firearm and
ammunitions exist; second, that petitioner had possession thereof at the time of his
apprehension; third, that petitioner is a confidential agent of the ISG-AFP; fourth,
that petitioner lacks a license issued by the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the PNP;
and fifth, that petitioner holds a Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order covering
the subject firearm and ammunitions. Thus, the issue to be resolved is confined to
whether petitioner's Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order constitute sufficient
authority for him to possess the subject firearm and ammunitions and carry the
same outside of his residence, without violating P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A.
No. 8294.
As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, it is a settled jurisprudence that a
memorandum receipt and mission order cannot take the place of a duly issued
firearms license, and an accused who relies on said documents cannot invoke good
faith as a defense against a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms, as this is
a malum prohibitum. Petitioner interposed no new argument that would convince
this Court to abandon a deep-rooted jurisprudence.
He should be convicted.
First, special or confidential civilian agents who are not included in the
regular plantilla of any government agency involved in law enforcement or receiving
regular compensation for services rendered are not exempt from the requirements
under P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, of a regular license to possess
firearms and a permit to carry the same outside of residence;
Second, said special or confidential civilian agents are not qualified to receive,
obtain and possess government-owned firearms. Their ineligibility will not be cured
by the issuance of a memorandum receipt for equipment covering said government-
owned firearms. Neither will they qualify for exemption from the requirements of a
regular firearms license and a permit to carry firearms by the mere issuance to
them of a government-owned firearms covered by a memorandum receipt; and
Third, said special or confidential civilian agents do not qualify for mission orders to
carry firearms (whether private-owned or government-owned) outside of their
residence.
The foregoing rules do not apply to special or confidential civilian agents in
possession of or bearing private-owned firearms that are duly licensed and covered
by permits to carry the same outside of residence.
Set against the foregoing rules, it is clear that petitioner is not authorized to possess
and carry the subject firearm and ammunition, notwithstanding the memorandum
receipt and mission order which were illegally issued to him. Petitioner is a
planter who was recruited to assist in the counter-insurgency campaign of the AFP.
However, as he offered no evidence that he is in the regular plantilla of the AFP or
that he is receiving regular compensation from said agency, he cannot be
considered a regular civilian agent but a mere confidential civilian agent as defined
under Section 6(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866. As
such, he was not authorized to receive the subject government-owned firearm and
ammunitions. The memorandum receipt he signed to account for said government
properties did not legitimize his possession thereof.
Neither was petitioner authorized to bear the subject firearm and ammunitions
outside of his residence. The mission order issued to petitioner was illegal, given
that he is not a regular civilian agent but a mere confidential civilian agent. Worse,
petitioner was not even acting as such confidential civilian agent at the time he was
carrying the subject firearm and ammunitions. Petitioner testified that at that time,
he was not on an official mission in Bais City but had merely visited the place to
attend to a family emergency.

Artillero vs Ombudsman
This case is about the appeal of the accused in this case after finding him
administratively guilty of arresting and detaining the complainant of this case of
violation of Illegal Possession of Firearm. He contended that he performed such
function in good faith and after seeing him carrying an unlicensed fire arm.

Facts:
Petitioner is the Chief of Police of the Municipal Station of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) in Ajuy, Iloilo. According to him, on 6 August 2008, at about 6:45 in the
evening, the municipal station received information that successive gun fires had
been heard in Barangay Lanjagan, Ajuy Iloilo. Thus, petitioner, together with Police
Inspector Idel Hermoso (Hermoso), and Senior Police Officer (SPO1) Arial Lanaque
(Lanaque), immediately went to the area to investigate.
Upon arriving, they saw Paquito Panisales, Jr. (Paquito) standing beside the road,
wearing a black sweat shirt with a Barangay Tanod print. They asked Paquito if he
had heard the alleged gunshots, but he answered in the negative.
Petitioner, Hermoso, and Lanaque decided to investigate further, but before they
could proceed, they saw that Paquito had turned his back from us that seems like
bragging his firearm to us flagrantly displayed/tucked in his waist whom we
observed to be under the influence of intoxicating odor. Then, they frisked him to
verify the firearm and its supporting documents. Paquito then presented his Firearm
License Card and a Permit to Carry Firearm Outside Residence (PTCFOR).
Thereafter, they spotted two persons walking towards them, wobbling and visibly
drunk. They further noticed that one of them, Aguillon, was openly carrying a rifle,
and that its barrel touched the concrete road at times. Petitioner and Hermoso
disarmed Aguillon. The rifle was a Caliber 5.56 M16 rifle with Serial Number 101365
and with 20 live ammunitions in its magazine.
According to petitioner and Hermoso, although Aguillon was able to present his
Firearm License Card, he was not able to present a PTCFOR.
Petitioner arrested Paquito, Aguillon and his companion Aldan Padilla, and brought
them to the Ajuy Municipal Police Station.
Paquito was released on the same night, because he was deemed to have been able
to comply with the requirements to possess and carry firearm. Thereafter, Aguillon
was detained at the police station, but was released from custody the next day, 7
August 2008, after he posted a cash bond in the amount of 80,000. The present
Petition does not state under what circumstances or when Padilla was released.
On 12 August 2008, petitioner and Hermoso executed a Joint Affidavit alleging the
foregoing facts in support of the filing of a case for illegal possession of firearm
against Aguillon. Petitioner also endorsed the filing of a Complaint against Aguillon
through a letter sent to the Provincial Prosecutor on 12 August 2008.
For his part, Aguillon executed an Affidavit swearing that petitioner had unlawfully
arrested and detained him for illegal possession of firearm, even though the former
had every right to carry the rifle as evidenced by the license he had surrendered to
petitioner. Aguillon further claims that he was duly authorized by law to carry his
firearm within his barangay.
Issue:
WON the accused should be held guilty for unlawfully arresting and detaining the
complainant in this case
Ruling:
It is true therefore, that, as petitioner claims, a barangay captain is not one of those
authorized to carry firearms outside their residences unless armed with the
appropriate PTCFOR under the Guidelines.
However, we find merit in respondents contention that the authority of Aguillon to
carry his firearm outside his residence was not based on the IRR or the guidelines of
P.D. 1866 but, rather, was rooted in the authority given to him by Local Government
Code (LGC).
Moreover, the dissent contends that probable cause was already established by
facts of this case, which show that Aguillon was found carrying a licensed firearm
outside his residence without a PTCFOR. However, even though Aguillon did not
possess a PTCFOR, he had the legal authority to carry his firearm outside his
residence, as required by P.D. 1866 as amended by R.A. 8294. This authority was
granted to him by Section 389 (b) of the LGC of 1991, which specifically carved out
an exception to P.D. 1866.
Following the suggestion of the Dissent, prosecutors have the authority to disregard
existing exemptions, as long as the requirements of the general rule apply. This
should not be the case. Although the Dissent correctly declared that the prosecutor
cannot peremptorily apply a statutory exception without weighing it against the
facts and evidence before him, we find that the facts of the case prove that there is
no probable cause to charge Aguillon with the crime of illegal possession of firearm.
In interpreting Section 389 (b) of the LGC of 1991, the Dissent found that the factual
circumstances of the present case show that the conditions set forth in the law have
not been met. Thus, the exemption should not apply.
Contrary to the allegation of the dissent, there is no question as to the fact that
Aguillon was within his territorial jurisdiction when he was found in possession of his
rifle.
The authority of punong barangays to possess the necessary firearm within their
territorial jurisdiction is necessary to enforce their duty to maintain peace and order
within the barangays. Owing to the similar functions, that is, to keep peace and
order, this Court deems that, like police officers, punong barangays have a duty as a
peace officer that must be discharged 24 hours a day. As a peace officer,
a barangay captain may be called by his constituents, at any time, to assist in
maintaining the peace and security of his barangay. As long as Aguillon is within
his barangay, he cannot be separated from his duty as a punong barangayto
maintain peace and order.