GORAMPA ON THE OBJECTS OF

NEGATION: ARGUMENTS FOR

NEGATING CONVENTIONAL TRUTHS

Sonam Thakchoe
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In this paper I explore Gorampas conception of the objects of negation. My primary aim
is to show that, in Gorampas conception of the objects of negation, negating the
extreme existent (bhava/yod pa)the first of the tetralemma (catuskoti/mtha bzhi)
_ _
entails negating the conventional realities qua truths themselves. The paper first
identifies Gorampas notions of the objects of negation soteriogically and epistemically,
and second it considers Gorampas arguments defending his treatment of truths (bden
pa) as the objects of negation. The chief arguments Gorampa employs for negating the
truths (by way of eliminating the extreme of existence) can be summarised as follows:
that all things are conceptually reified elaborations (spros pa), the Prasangika _ is
committed to the transcendent of all spros pa; that all entities are false as they all fail to
reveal their reality when they are subjected to logical analysis; that an enlightened
consciousness does not verify the existence of truths; that there is no commonly agreed
appearance that can be taken as a common basis for the debate between the Buddhist
_
reificationist and the Prasangika Madhyamikas; that truths are the catalysts for driving
ignorance through conceptual graspings to truths; that grasping to truths obstructs a
seeker from attaining the enlightenment; and finally that seeing things as dependently
arisen amounts to seeing nothing at all.

Introduction
Gorampa (Go rams pa Bsod nams Seng ge, 1429 1489 CE) is indeed one of
Tibets most recognisable figures. As a monk philosopher he tenaciously defended
the Sakya tradition to which he belonged, and as a polemicist he was unrelenting
in his criticisms against his opponents. Like his other polemical works, Gorampa, in
his Lta bai shen byed theg mchog gnad kyi zla zer (Freedom From Extremes:
Distinguishing The Views) (Cabezon and Dargyay 2007) is critical of Tsongkhapa
(Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa, 1357 1419), the founder of Dge lugs pa school,
and Dolpopa (Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal tshan, 1292(1361), the founder of the
Jonang school. In this text he regards Tsongkhapa as nihilist and Dolpopa as an
eternalist (rtag mtha smra ba), and regards only his view as being legitimately

Contemporary Buddhism, Vol. 9, No. 2, November 2008

ISSN 1463-9947 print/1476-7953 online/08/020265-280
q 2008 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14639940802556594
 266 SONAM THAKCHOE

representative of the Madhyamika (dbu mar smra ba). Indeed Gorampa has other
concerns in his critique of Tsongkhapa and Dolpopa. Nevertheless, the question of
what is to be negated as dgag bya object of negation plays a critical role in his
critiques. The stakes are very highfailure or success in correctly identifying the
objects of negation will, literally, determine whether one is considered a
Madhyamika or not. In spite of the fact that objects of negation are a central issue,
the Lta bai shen byed does not offer us a detailed and systematic account of
Gorampas own treatment of the subject matter. So the aim of this paper is to
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critically engage with Gorampas other works1 on the Madhyamikathe Nges don
rab gsal (Illuminating the Definitive Meaning) (Gorams pa Bsod nams Senge, 1969a,
2002),2 the Lta bai od zer (Illuminating the View) (1969c) and the Lta ba ngan sel
(Eliminating the Erroneous View) (2001)3which provide us plenty of textual
resources on this subject, and allow us to reconstruct a systematic conceptual
framework of Gorampas treatment of the object of negation. This task can best be
achieved in my view by way of appropriating Gorampas own approach to deal
with this subject. As we will see shortly, Gorampa deals with the objects of
negation by way of dealing with the four extremes (catuskoti/mtha bzhi)
_ _
existent, non-existent, both and neither. And given the scope and the negative
implications that each of these so-called extremes have on his overall
philosophical and soteriological agenda, Gorampas strategy is to negate them
sequentially one after the other.
Taking this same approach I will devote two papers to Gorampas treatment
of the objects of negation. This paper will examine first of the four
extremes/tetralema (catuskoti/mtha bzhi) exclusively; that is, the existent (yod
_ _
pa) with reference to Gorampas arguments. It will be shown that by extreme
existent Gorampa means truth(s) (bden pa), truly established (bden par grub pa),
inherently established (ngo bo nyid kyis grub pa); and so by negation of the
extreme of existent, the first lema Gorampa actually means the repudiation of
truths or real phenomena.
The discussion in the paper unfolds in two parts. In the first part I look at a
broader spectrum of Gorampas account of the objects of negation. Here I will
consider one of Gorampas most revealing passages on the subject, and this offers
us an excellent conceptual framework of what is to be soteriologically and
_
epistemically negated in Gorampas system of the Prasangika. In the second part I
will consider Gorampas arguments defending his treatment of truths (bden pa)
as the objects of negation.

Identifying the objects of negation

Let us begin with perhaps the most important, concise and illuminating of all
statements Gorampa makes regarding objects of negation. The Lta ba ngan sel
reads:Identifying the objects of negation: (1) Soteric object of negation comprised of all
false appearances. (2) Object to be negated by means of rational analysis and
authoritative scripture (lung) is comprised of (2.1) objects (yul) and (2.2) subjects
 GORAMPA ON THE OBJECTS OF NEGATION 267

(yul can). The former (2.1) has two types: (2.1.1) objects reified by conceptual
misconception (kun btags kyi ma rig pas btags pa) and (2.1.2) objects reified by
innate misconception (lhan skyis kyi ma rig pas btags pa). The first (2.1.1) is the
reificationists (dngos por smra ba) conceptions [of metaphysics and ethics] based
on the justifications of invalid arguments and scriptures. This is of twofold:
(2.1.1.1) absolutism, the extreme of existence (yod pa sgro dogs kyi matha) and
(2.1.1.2) nihilism, the extreme of nonexistence (med pa skur debs kyi mtha). The
former (2.1.1.1) has twofold: (2.1.1.1.1) self of person and (2.1.1.1.2) self of
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phenomena. The former (2.1.1.1.1) is constituted by (2.1.1.1.1.1) the non-

buddhistss conception of self as being distinct from the aggregates and
(2.1.1.1.1.2) the Buddhist Sammityas conception of selfone that is identified
with the aggregates or considered inexpressible. Second (2.1.1.1.2) [self of
phenomena] is constituted by forms etc., or things that are reified by the Trthikas
upto the Vijnanavadas as truly established (bden par grub pa). Second (2.1.1.2)
nihilism, the extreme of nonexistence (med pa skur debs kyi mtha) refers to
Carvakas/Lokayatas denial of the causal efficacy of the present lifes wholesome
or unwholesome karmic deeds and effects of the pleasant and unpleasant
experiences in the future. Second, (2.1.2) objects reified by innate misconception
(lhan skyis kyi ma rig pas btags pa) is one that is common to all beingsbe they
are philosophers or non-philosophersfor it is posited as person and
phenomena, wherein both are seen as the bases for the objectification of
person and phenomena. The objectified truth through this misconception is thus
posited as self of person (gang zag kyi bdag) and self of phenomena (chos kyi
bdag). Second, (2.2) subjective (yul can) [objects of negation] includes all
cognitions objectifying this object and that object and all distorted views.
(1969b, 595f; 2001, 101102)4

Gorampa identifies two forms of objects of negation: the soteriological object of

negation (lam gyi dgag bya), and the epistemic object of negation (lung dang rigs
pai dgag bya). The former, according to Gorampa, is comprised of all false
appearances (1969b, 595f; 2001, 101102).5 By false appearance, as we shall
see later, Gorampa means anything that appears to our mind, so in effect all
conventional phenomena are false appearances. His contention is that
appearance exists entirely due to our conceptual reification; where conceptual
reification ceases, false appearance also ceases to exist. Thus, by definition, they
are false. While false appearance proliferates as ones conceptual reification
increases, false appearance ceases as ones insight into reality improves. An insight
into reality puts an end to the conceptual reification. For this reason Gorampa
insists that the Madhyamikas should aim to develop a correct understanding of
both illusory-like conventional truth (kun rdzob sgyu ma lta bu) and ultimate
freedom from conceptual elaboration (don dam spros dral) (1969b, 594; 2001,
101).6 Thus for the Madhyamika the first priority should be the negation of the
truth of appearances through establishing the truthlessness of their appearances
(1969b, 594595).7 The soteriological object of negation is thus a type of
 268 SONAM THAKCHOE

negendum that is to be negated gradually and progressively as one develops

along ones spiritual pathways (lam) and as one passes through the various levels
(sa) of spiritual maturity. An essential condition for the elimination of the
soteriological object of negation is ones progressive purging of nave and false
view of things.
The second major category is the epistemic object of negation (lung dang
rigs pai dgag bya). This form of the objects of negation, in Gorampas view, is
constituted by objects that are to be negated through rational analysis (rigs pa)
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and authoritative scriptures (lung). Again Gorampa classifies the epistemic object
of negation further into(2.1) objective (yul) objects of negation and (2.2) subjective
(yul can) objects of negation. The former (2.1) is comprised of (2.1.1) conceptual
or philosophical misconception (kun rtags gyi ma rig pa) and (2.1.2) innate
misconceptions (lhan skyes kyi ma rig pa). Of the objective objects of negation, we
turn first to (2.1.1). By philosophical misconception, Gorampa here means
reificationists (dngos por smra ba) conceptions [of metaphysics and ethics] based
on the justifications of invalid arguments and scriptures, which he believes ether
commits oneself to absolutism, the extreme of existence (yod pa sgro dogs kyi
matha) or nihilism, the extreme of nonexistence (med pa skur debs kyi mtha)
(1969b, 595f).8 Again by absolutism Gorampa is referring to the view of:
self of person and self of phenomenathe former is constituted by the non-
buddhistss conception of self as being distinct from the aggregates and the
Buddhist Sammatyas conception of self as being one that is identical with the
aggregates or it is inexpressible. (1969b, 595f)9

The self of phenomena is, on the other hand, constituted by forms etc., or things
that are reified by the Trthikas up to the Vijnanavadas as truly established (bden
par grub pa) (1969b, 595f).10 By nihilism, Gorampa specifically means ethical
nihilism of the Carvakas/Lokayatas denial of the causal efficacy of the present
lifes wholesome or unwholesome karmic deeds and the effects of the pleasant
and unpleasant experiences in the future (1969b, 595f).11
According to Gorampa, (2.1.2) Innate misconception (lhan skyes kyi ma rig
pa) entails non-philosophical reifying tendencies of the innate ignorance of the
reality. Philosophical misconception is, Gorampa maintains, a predicament limited
to the circles of philosophers who are susceptible to conceptually reifying
their problematic views while non-philosophical innate misconceptions of reality
are a problem not limited to philosophers. This is because reification through
ones innate misconception is one that is common to all beingsbe they are
philosophers or non-philosophersfor it is, in Gorampas view, the positing of
person and phenomena, or the objectifications of person and phenomena where
the objectified truths are misconceived through this ignorance as either the
self of person (gang zag kyi bdag) or the self of phenomena (chos kyi bdag)
(1969b, 595f).12 Gorampas point is essentially this. That non-philosophers do not
entertain themselves with metaphysical speculations, so they are not susceptible
to philosophical misconceptions. They are, however, susceptible to the inherent
 GORAMPA ON THE OBJECTS OF NEGATION 269

misconception that objectifies the fundamental nature of person and phenomena

as having as reified self of person13 and reified self of phenomenon.14
The subjective (yul can) objects of negation (2.2) is the second division of the
epistemic object of negation: Including in it, says Gorampa, cognitions
conceptualising objects as this or that and all erroneous views (1969b, 596f).15
Gorampas distinction between the subjective and the objective objects of negation
is crucial in understanding his account of a coherent non-dual knowledge. A dual
knowledge, for Gorampa is always incoherent and erroneous. A dual knowledge,
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according to Gorampa, inevitably reifies the dichotomy between the subject and the
object. All empirical or conventional knowledge is dualistic. They are constituted by
apprehending subjects and apprehended objects as they are two fundament
components of all empirical claims, judgements or knowledge. By assigning the
subjective/objective distinction to the objects of negation while treating both of
them an epistemic objects of negation, Gorampa is able to undermine the authority
of empirical/conventional knowledge in favour of a non-dual ultimate knowledge.41
Gorampas ascent to a non-dual and transcendent Prasangika _ view is also
made possible by his broader division of the objects of negation into
soteriological and epistemic categories. Particularly, the soteriological object of
negation allows him to argue for eschewing any thing that appears to the mind
since all appearances are consigned to objects that must be negated in order to
achieve the soteriological end.
It is quite obvious that the scope of objects of negation, on Gorampas
account, is quite extensive. But how extensive is it really? A full answer to this
question will become clearer as we continue to examine Gorampas arguments.
However, we can anticipate Gorampas response to this question through an
understanding of his synthesis of spros pa (conceptual elaboration) with the
objects of negation, and then with his identification of the extent of spros pa with
the tetra lemma (catuskoti/mtha bzhi)existent, non-existent, both and neither
_ _
(1969a, 371b).16 Any notion based on the conceptions of these four are regarded
as inadmissible metaphysical propositions (catuskoti/mtha) in that they are the
_ _
hallmarks of spros pa, triggers for discursive thoughts and conceptualisations
THAT are utterly unacceptable to the Gorampas Madhyamika since spros pa
undermines the position of spros draltranscendent of the conceptual
elaborationto which the Madhyamika is fully committed soteriologically. This
follows because: The Madhyamika view is, Gorampa explains, one that free from
the four extremes: existent, nonexistent, both and neither (1994, 23).17 Gorampas
claim that the objects of negation are identical with spros pa, and spros pas with
the catuskotithat is, that which comprises the four problematic metaphysical
_ _
propositionsis a critical move in his philosophical strategy. This allows him to
argue for the negation of existent, non-existent, both and neither. But the
question at issue is: why should these propositions be negated? So far, except
Gorampas broad categorical divisions of the objects of negation, we have not
seen any specific argument defending his position. The arguments will be
forthcoming.
 270 SONAM THAKCHOE

Given that the catuskoti for Gorampa is comprised of four metaphysical

_ _
positionsexistent, non-existent, both and neither, each representing a slightly
dissimilar level of the objects of negation, the latter ones subtler than the
formertheir negation, Gorampa claims, necessarily entails four inter-related
steps or approaches18 where the earlier ones progressively pave the pathways for
the latter negating the latter ones. In this paper, I will consider only the first
approachnamely, the negation of existent, or the negation of the first
extremeand provide an analysis what this negation involves. Discussion on the
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three later movesthe negations of non-existent, both and neitherwill be

undertaken elsewhere in a separate project.
There are several reasons why it is necessary to only focus on the first
approach. The first reason is a practical consideration: while it is important that
Gorampas treatment of the objects of negation is explored fully and
comprehensively, the scope of this paper simply does not allow for the space
to deal with all four approaches and their philosophical implications in any
satisfactory manner. The second reason is that the first approach is, according to
Gorampa, the most critical of all of the four steps of negation in the development
_
of a correct Prasangika view. Such a view, Gorampa claims, is transcendent of the
objects of negated. The first extreme is the coarser object to be negated (dgag by
rags pa) as compared with the latter subtler ones (dgag bya phra ba) on the
ground that while the former is easier to negate if it is not negated it becomes
_ ric suffering, on the other hand the latter ones are more
causal drive for the samsa
difficult to negate, and if they are not negated, they, according to Gorampa,
obstruct the attainment of the Mahayanas enlightenment, not just obstructing
_
the nirvanathe freedom from the samsa _ ric suffering (2002, 39).19

But what is the extreme of existence (yod mtha), the object to be negated
in the first step? In Gorampas view, there is no doubt that the first extreme
comprises, as his Nges don rab gsal confirms, all [positive] phenomena. This is on
the ground that they are the key provokers of the conceptual grasping to truths
(bden dzin) (1969a, 389a; 2002, 164).20 The text further affirms:
Basically all phenomena [comes under the first extreme, the extreme of
existence]. For there is no phenomenon whatsoever that does not come under
the rubric of the twenty objective bases of emptiness (stong gzhi chos chen),
[moreover] One needs to negate truths of all these [twenty bases of emptiness]
and subsequently establish them as transcendent of spros pa of all four extreme.
(1969a, 389a; 2002, 164)21

Gorampa does admit however that the Madhyamika texts often only ask to
negate truths of some specific objects. The fact that that the Madhyamika texts
primarily negate truths of produced phenomena (dus byas), things (dngos po), and
appearance (snang ba), according to Gorampa, suggests that these are the
principle objects which trigger grasping to truths (bden dzin) and by negating
truths of these [objects], truths of other [phenomena] are thereby negated
(1969a, 389a; 2002, 164).22 In the Lta bai shen byed, Gorampa makes this point
 GORAMPA ON THE OBJECTS OF NEGATION 271

ever clearer: Without negating the truths (bden pa)the object of the grasping
to truthit is not possible to negate the latter extreme graspings (mtha dzin)
(1994, 23).23 Therefore, in the Lta bai shen byed Gorampa asserts first of all:
All external and internal objects must be established as truthless (bden med)
through the force of the arguments such as freedom from the one and the many
(gcig dang du dral) (1994, 23).24
So what is evident here is that the extreme of existence refers to bden pa,
truths/real things. This means that negating the extreme of existence entails the
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negation of conventional truths. Further analysis reveals that, for Gorampa, to

negate bden pa is to actually negating ontologically existent entities, truths or real
phenomena, not just mere conceptions. This point is made clearer in the light of
Gorampas treatment of bden pa truths as one and the same with existent (yod
pa), true existence (bden grub) or extreme existence (yod mtha)they all point
to the same reified thing. To rephrase the point, Gorampas claim is that the first
phase of negation necessarily entails the negation of the existents/truths/or real
phenomena, not just concepts or abstract phenomena.

Arguments
Gorampa advances several arguments that clarify the scope of the negation
of the first extreme. The first is the argument from the rational analysis. In the Nges
do rab gsal, Gorampa writes:
In negating the first extreme, the very basis of the debate (rtsod gzhi) analysing
whether it is real or unreal itself must be one that is subjected to negation (gog
gzhi). (1969a, 388d; 2002, 163 164)25

Gorampa confirms this in the Nges don rab gsal:

All phenomena which are apprehended as positive entities with characteristics
of truly established (bden par grub pa), ultimately established (don dam par
grub pa), really established (yang dag par grub pa), intrinsically established
(ngo bo nyid kyi grub pa), inherently established (rang bzhin gyi grub pa),
established through self-defining characteristics (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub
pa), truly produced (bden pai skye ba), mere existence of true entities (bden
pai dngos po yod pa tsam) etc. This is because none of these are affirmatively
established as positive phenomena when these bases of negation are subjected
_
to both Prasangika and Svatantrika forms of logical analyses. (1969a, 389a b;
2002, 164 165)26

According to Gorampas argument from rational analysis, the Prasangika _

Madhyamikas objects of negation (as part of negating the first lemma) entail all
positive entities because they are undermined by the Prasangikas _ rational
analysis. This must follow because, first, suggesting that there are signs of positive
entity (sgrub pas chos) is, in Gorampas view, tantamount to reifying
truthless/unreal entities as having objective truths/reals established by virtue of
 272 SONAM THAKCHOE

their self-defining characteristic. Moreover, all positive entities do not reveal such
reified ontological status when they are subjected to critical analysis implying that
these entities themselves are negated through the power of logical examination.
After all: all conceived objects of thoughts must be established as truthless by way
of subjecting them to the ultimate analysis of the reasoning consciousness
(1969a, 392b c; 2002, 177178).27 This follows, argues Gorampa, from the fact
that the Madhyamikas investigation over whether certain things are true (bden
pa), existent (yod pa), truly established (bden grub), and so forth, pertains to real
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phenomena rather than conceptually constructed/reified entities, and that a

failure to find the truth/reality of things under such analysis must mean, in
Gorampas view, that the positing of conventional truth is erroneous. Gorampa
provides us with, perhaps, the clearest defence of his first argument yet. When his
imagined interlocutor asks Gorampa this question:

If indeed that is the case, for you even the conventional truths would become
the objects of negation from the purview of the ultimate analysis of the
reasoning consciousness?

Gorampas reply is:

Yes, absolutely. Since [conventional truths] are not found at all when subjected
to ultimate analysis of the reasoning consciousness. (1969a, 392c; 2002, 178)28

The fact that conventional truths fail to stand up to the test of logical analyses is, in
Gorampas view, indication that conventional truths are metaphysically eliminated
by the rational cognition.
Gorampas second argument is drawn from the chos chen mthun snang
concordantly appearing subjectdebate between the Buddhist reificationist and
_
the Prasangika. _
Gorampa claims that the Prasangika Madhyamika rejects the
reality of all existent objects because it rejects the objects having any ontological
status as it denies the existence of any common object that can be a basis of
philosophical debate between the Abhidharmika and the Prasangika. _ This follows,
Gorampa claims, since the former is committed to reality of things as it holds
things as existent whereas the latter wholly rejects things existence; hence there
is no commonly agreed subject that can be considered a basis of the debate
_
between the two. If the Prasangikas negation of the truths or reality of things
does not entail negating things themselves, as Tsongkhapa would have argued,
then, in Gorampas view, there will be commonly perceived subject as the basis of
the debate. The only reason that there is no such commonly agreed subject is the
_
Prasangika does not admit the existence of anything, not even mere appearance.

If that is not the case, when appearance is considered as the subject of the
debate whether it has or has not truth, for both the proponent and the
opponent (rgol phyi rgol gnyis ka) there has to be established a commonly
observed subject. If, in this context, one is committed to simply negate mere
 GORAMPA ON THE OBJECTS OF NEGATION 273

truth of appearance but not the appearance itself, one risks falling off from the
_
Prasangika position. (1969a, 392c; 2002, 178)29

This passage is partly a critique of Tsongkhapas position, which does not treat
appearance itself (snang ba tsam) as an object to be refuted, but only conceptually
reified epistemic errors imposed upon the appearance. In contrast to
Tsongkhapas view of the Prasangika, _ Gorampas claim is that the Prasangika_

does not posit any form of appearance as an ontological basiseven so-called

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mere appearance (snang ba tsam) as this would render the Prasangikas _

positionless stance implausible. Any ontological commitment to any form of

appearance is, argues Gorampa, tantamount to accepting the truth of appearance,
the truth of reified conceptualisationthe position that Gorampa attributes to the
Buddhist reificationist.
_
According to the view of Prasangika view held by Tsongkhapa, the existence of
mere appearance is an ontological fact, and is thus not refuted. What is refuted
is only truly established appearance (bden grub kyi snang ba), which is purely
conceptually reified error superimposed on the existence of mere appearance.
However, for Gorampa, Tsongkhapas distinction between mere appearance (snang
ba tsam) and truly established appearance makes no sense whatsoever. As indicated
earlier, on Gorampas account, whether something is described as truly established
or mere established, essentially both imply one and the same ontological
commitment. In Gorampas view therefore, if the Prasangika _ is ontologically
committed to even the existence of mere appearance, the Prasangikas _ position
will be reduced to the level of the reificationist. This follows, argues Gorampa,
because any commitment to appearance is an ontological commitmentequivalent
to accepting of the reality or truth of appearance. If this were the case then the
_
Prasangikas and the reificationists positions would not be different, at least
ontologically, and thus appearance would exist as a commonly agreed ontological
_
subject of debate. Nevertheless, the standard Prasangika line of argument is that
there is no such commonly agreed subject that can be treated as the basis of the
debate between the two schools. And the central reason for this is that the
_
Prasangika is ontologically uncommitted while the reificationist is ontologically
committed. Thus, in Gorampas view, the Prasangika _ must negate phenomena
themselves in order to refute their appearances.
Gorampas three final arguments are soteriological in character. The first
argument is this: the negation of the extreme of existence is equivalent to the
negation of all positive phenomena (sgrub pa)/existents (yod pa) because they are,
in Gorampas view, the catalysts for the grasping to the truth of phenomena (chos
kyi bden dzin), which is the root of all sufferings. Since the ultimate aim of the
_
Prasangika is to attain freedom from suffering, refutation of grasping to the truth
of phenomena is critical soteriological agenda as it is the root that breeds suffering
and stress. This follows, argues Gorampa, on the ground that: If there is grasping
to the truth of the five aggregates, it will surely directly result in grasping to the
truth of person (gang zag kyi bden dzin) which is itself the primal
 274 SONAM THAKCHOE

delusion/ignorance, the first among the twelve factors. And from this [delusion],
Gorampa maintains, arise all latter factors. Thus the root of [samsa_ ric] suffering

is grasping to the truth of phenomena (chos kyi bden dzin). (1969a, 389b c;
2002, 165)30
Moreover the Prasangika_ rejects all metaphysical commitments as it
advocates the transcendentalist (spros dral) and positionless theses (dam bca med
pa). For this reason Gorampa views an ontological commitment to the five
aggregates ( phung po lnga/panca-skandha)form, feeling, perception, compo-
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sitional volitional factors, and consciousnessas being identical to grasping to

the truth of phenomena (chos kyi bden dzin). This is tantamount, Gorampa claims,
to making an ontological commitment to realities of unfounded and reified
phenomena. From the ontological commitment arise deluded ignorance (ma rig
pa/avidya)grasping to the truth of person (gang zag kyi bden dzin)a
commitment to reified person that is the catalyst for the operation of the 12
factors31 of the subjective/internal interdependent arising (nang gi rten brel). Thus
the engine that runs the samsa_ ric suffering, according to Gorampa, is the ignorant

grasping to the truth of phenomena and person. Therefore the only feasible way
out from suffering is to terminate the continuity of this vicious cycle by getting
rid of conceptual grasping to the truth of phenomena and self. Nevertheless,
grasping to the truths of things does not go away as long as there are things
around. Therefore things themselves must be eliminated to stop the grasping to
realities as this will put an end to the vicious cycle of suffering.
The next argument is from Gorampas conception of enlightenment (byang
chub). It argues that realities must be negated on the soteriological ground in
order achieve three types of enlightenment (byang chub). The Nges don rab gsal
gives us three reasons to negate realities depending on the nature of
enlightenment sought:
Those who seek to achieve enlightenment must negate realities: seekers of the
enlightenment of the sravakas must negate truth of the five appropriated
aggregates; seekers of the enlightenment of the pratyekabuddha must, in
addition to the former, negate truth of the external objects and of afflictive
defiled dharmas; and seekers of the enlightenment of the Mahayana must
negate conceptual elaborations (spros pa) of all four extremes. (1969a, 389c d;
2002, 166 167)32

Realities must be negated, according to Gorampa, for they are the obstructive to
enlightenment, and the scope of reality to be negated is dependent upon the
type of enlightenment that one seeks. This argument not only highlights
the soteriological import of negating realities, it also provides a dimension to the
hierarchy of realities to be negated progressively. For the sravakas enlightenment
a seeker must negate realities of the five aggregates and realise their
unreality/truthlessness (bden med) since it is the grasping to the truth of the
five aggregates that obstruct them from attaining their goal. In addition to
negating realities of the five aggregates, a seeker of the pratyekabuddhas
 GORAMPA ON THE OBJECTS OF NEGATION 275

enlightenment has to negate realities of the external objects and of afflictive

defiled dharmas and realise their truthlessness. This follows since it is the grasping
to the truths of these phenomena that a seeker is obstructed from attaining the
pratyekabuddhas enlightenment. Finally, all truths must be negated for attaining
the Mahayanas (or bodhisattvas) enlightenment of complete buddhahood. For
the reason that buddhahood is a transcendent of all conceptual graspings to
truths, thus even the slightest conceptual operation is an impediment to
achieving this goal.
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The final soteriological argument gives us a glimpse of Gorampas top-down

perspective of enlightenment. The argument he advances runs as follows: realities
are objects to be negated because their being/existence is not verified by the
enlightened gnosis of buddhas. From this perspective, as it is stated in the Yang
dag lta bai od zer dependently arisen things are the objects of negation (1969c,
292a).33 This must follow because dependently arisen realities are deceptive, false
and illusion-like, whereas enlightened gnosis is transcendent, non-deceptive,
unconditioned and non-illusory. In the Nges don rab gsal under the section called
Analysis of Whether or Not the Two Truths Exist at the Level of Buddhahood,
Gorampa is more direct:
Conventional truths enunciated in the contexts [of Nagarjunas
Mulamadhyamakarika 24: 810 and Candrakrtis Madhyamakavatara 6: 2324]
are nonexistent [at the level of buddhahood] because where there is no erroneous
apprehending subject, its corresponding object[conventional truth]cannot
exist. (1969a, 446b; 2002, 399)34

This argument is also premised upon the identity of dependent arising and
emptiness. Since seeing emptiness, in Gorampas view, is not seeing anything,
seeing things as dependently arisen amounts to not seeing them at alljust as no
positive phenomenon whatsoever is seen when one sees emptiness directly, so no
positive entity whatsoever is perceived when things are perceived as dependently
arisen. It implies therefore that conventional realities are negated through the
enlightened gnosis.
Finally, the most pervasive of all arguments is without any doubt the spros
dral (transcendent) argument. On this argument the Madhyamika must relegate
spros pa of conventional realities as the objects of negation to ascend to the
transcendent state of the conceptual elaboration (spros dral) since spros dral
means the ultimate truth, and spros dral is the [only] model of the ultimate (1969a,
371a).35 This follows on Gorampas account on four counts: First, Gorampa
identifies spros pa and conventional realities in the Nges don rab gsal:
In short spros pa consists of the eight entities such as arising, cessation etc.,
addressed in the homage verse of the Mulamadhyamakarika, the twenty seven
entitiesbeginning with conditions up to viewsexamined in the twenty
seven chapters [of the Mulamadhyamakarika] as well as, contained in spros pa
are all frameworks of linguistic and conventional practices. (1969a, 447c)36
 276 SONAM THAKCHOE

Given that spros pa are to be repudiated to achieve the transcendent truth,

and given that spros pas and conventional realities are identified, the latter too
must be negated to ascend to the transcendent truth. Second, according to his
analysis of the term in the Nges don rab gsal, Gorampa treats spros pa as having a
very broad span. He argues: Spros pa is not merely truly established (bden grub)
or non-affirming negatives (ma yin dgag) [such as emptiness], it rather
incorporate all signs of dharmasbe they are affirmative or negativethat
provokes discursive mental activities (1969a, 371a).37 So what is contained in spros
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pa is literally everything there isboth negative and positive phenomena that

have potential to provoke ideas, thoughts, concepts, images, representations in
the mind and potential to stimulate conceptual tendencies to grasping the truths
of things, especially to trigger innate beliefs in the reality of things. And since
Gorampa insists on negating all spros pa, and given that in it is contained every
reality there is, it must follow that conventional reality is negated. Third,
transcendent truth is necessarily the non-dual ultimate truth, hence it must not be
bound up by metaphysics (spros pas) of conventional realitiesWhile spros pa is
substantially grounded, tathagatas38 are not substantially grounded. Spros pas
and tathagatas are not coextensive as [the latter] is transcendent of spros pa
(1969a, 371a b).39 Fourth, At the stage of buddhahood one directly realises
dharmadhatu of all phenomena as having a unified taste within a span of single
moment of wisdom, and thus At this point spros pas are not seen. Yet it is not
contradictory to describe [not-seeing of spros pas ] itself a correct knowing (1969a,
447c).40 Therefore the highest goal, buddhahood, according to Gorampa, cannot
be achieved as long one fails to transcend, and therefore negate, all spros pas of
conventional reality.

Conclusion
Therefore, it is abundantly clear that the negation of the first extreme (the
extreme of existence) on Gorampas account entails actually negating the
conventional truths, as it eschews real ontological structures in order to ascend to
transcendent truth. Despite the fact that the scope of objects of negation outlined
in Gorampas Lta ba ngan sel passage strikes us to be exceedingly broad, his
arguments adduced to justify his position convincingly affirms his conceptual
commitment.
Briefly, Gorampa claims that all conventional realities must be negated on
the ground that they are conceptually reified elaborations (spros pa), that the
_
Prasangika is committed to the transcendent of all spros pa, that things do not
reveal any reality when they are subjected to logical analysis, that an enlightened
consciousness does not verify the existence of conventional truths, that there is no
commonly agreed subject of debate between the Buddhist reificationist and the
_
Prasangika, that truths are the catalysts for conceptual graspings to self and
phenomena, that grasping to truths obstructs a seeker from attaining the
 GORAMPA ON THE OBJECTS OF NEGATION 277

enlightenment, and finally that the seeing of things as dependently arisen

amounts to seeing nothing at all.

NOTES

1. References to these Tibetan texts in the notes appear in three formats. First, if
the source of the reference is in book form, the Tibetan text is documented with
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its title and page numbers, with other bibliographic details appearing in the
bibliography. Second, if the source is in the traditional loose-leaf format, folio
numbers are given. Third, if the text is a combinationfolios compiled into a
book formthen the format is a page number followed by a letter that refers to
the folio; for example, 110a.
2. Unless other author names are cited, the text citations throughout the text refer
to the relevant Gorams pa Bsod nams Seng reference in the reference list.
3. This text has been translated into English by Ven. Dr Tashi Tsering and Jurgen
Stoter Tillmann (2005) as Removal of Wrong Views: A General Synopsis of the
Introduction to the Middle and Analysis of the Difficult Points of Each of Its
Subjects. Taipei, Taiwan: The Corporate of the Buddha Educational Foundation.
4. Dgag bya ngos bzung ba . . . Lam gyi dgag bya ni khrul pai snang ba mtha dag
yin la / dir lung rigs kyi dgag bya ni yul dang yul can gnyis las / dang po la yang kun
btags kyi ma rig pas btags pa dang / lhan skyes kyi ma rig pas btags pa gnyis las /
dang po ni dngos por smra ba dag gis lung rigs ltar snang gi thad pa la brten nas
rtog pas sbyar ba dag ste / de la yod pa sgro dogs kyi mtha dang/med pa skur
debs kyi mtha gnyis / dang po la gang zag gi bdag dang chos kyi bdag gnyis/dang
po ni / phyi rol pas btags pai phung po las don gzhan pai gang zag dang / rang
sde mang pos bkur bas btags pai phung po dang ngo bo gcig pai gang zag dang
brjod du med pai gang zag rnams so /gnyis pa ni/phyi rol mu stegs byed nas sems
tsam pai bar gyis gzugs sogs kyi dngos po bden grub tu btags pa rnams so/gnyis pa
ni/mu stegs rgyang phen pas / rgyu las dge sdeg dang / dras bu tshe phyi mai bde
sdug sogs med par btags pas rnams so/gnyis pa ni/lhan skyis kyi ma rig pas btags
pa ni grub mthar la zhugs ma zhugs thams cad la thun mong du yod pai gang zag
tu dzin pa dang / chos su dzin pa gnyis kyi dmigs yul gang zag dang chos job la /
dzin stangs kyi gzhung bya bden pa ni gang zag gi bdag dang / chos kyi bdag tu
job poo/gnyis pa yul can ni yul de dang der rtog pai blo dang lta ba ngan pa
thams cad yin te . . . / /
5. Lam gyi dgag bya ni khrul pai snang ba mtha dag yin na /
6. Bsgrub bya ni kun rdzob sgyu ma lta bu dang / don dam spros dral gnyis yin la /
7. de gnyis ka la yang thog mar snang ba la bden pa dgag dgos pas snang ba bden
med bsgrub byai gtso bo yin no/
8. Dngos por smra ba dag gis lung rigs ltar snang gi thad pa la brten nas rtog pas
sbyar ba dag ste / de la yod pa sgro dogs kyi mtha dang / med pa skur debs kyi
mtha gnyis /
 278 SONAM THAKCHOE

9. Phyi rol pas btags pai phung po las don gzhan pai gang zag dang / rang sde mang
pos bkur bas btags pai phung po dang ngo bo gcig pai gang zag dang brjod du
med pai gang zag rnams so/
10. Phi rol mu stegs byed nas sems tsam pai bar gyis gzugs sogs kyi dngos po bden
grub tu btags pa rnams so/
11. Mu stegs rgyang phen pas / rgyu las dge sdeg dang / dras bu tshe phyi mai bde
sdug sogs med par btags pas rnams so /
12. Lhan skyis kyi ma rig pas btags pa ni grub mthar la zhugs ma zhugs thams cad la
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thun mong du yod pai gang zag tu dzin pa dang / chos su dzin pa gnyis kyi dmigs
yul gang zag dang chos job la / dzin stangs kyi gzhung bya bden pa ni gang zag gi
bdag dang / chos kyi bdag tu job poo /
13. According to Gorampa, if the self of person exists at all, it must exist essentially.
The self of person cannot in any way exist without being an essentially existent
self. So, from Gorampas perspective, an essential self of person or a mere self
of person mean the same thing. For example: Sonam as a person and Sonam
as an essential person both mean the same thing. If Sonam exists at all, he must
exist essentially; and if an essentially existent Sonam does not exist, even a mere
Sonam does not exist.
14. Essential self of phenomenon should be understood in the same way as
essential self of person. If phenomena exists at all, it must exist essentially. If an
essential self of phenomena ceases to exist, phenomena ceases to exist. For
example: a table and an essential table both mean the same thing. If table exists
at all, it must exist as an essential table; and if an essentially existent table ceases
to exist, a mere table also ceases to exist.
15. Yul can ni yul de dang der rtog pai blo dang lta ba ngan pa thams cad yin te /
16. Spros pai ngos dzin bzhi tsam byung ba rnams ni mtha bzhi char spros pa las ma
das /
17. Dbu mai don ni yod med dang yin min la sogs pai mtha thams cad dang dral ba
yin . . .
18. In traditional Buddhist terminology, these are called four extremes: existence,
non-existence, both, and neither. Some traditionalist Gorampa admirers like
Dr Wangchuk Dorjee Negi, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Higher Studies,
argue that for Gorampa the first two approaches serves the whole purpose. Two
later approaches are rhetorical. They are not separate approaches as such, and
they do not have any special application. However, Gorampa himself is very clear
that all four approaches are four separate moves; each is seen to operate
effectively to negate specific object to be negated.
19. de la dgag by phra rags su jog pa ni snga ma dgag sla zhing ma bkag na khor bai
sdug bsngal gyi rgyur gyur ba yin la/phyi ma dgag dka zhing ma bkag na theg pa
chen poi byang chub la gegs byed pa yin gyi khor bai sdug bsngal spangs pai
myang das tsam la gegs mi byed pao /
20. Bden dzin zhugs pa gtso che bai dbang du byas na dgnos po thams cad yin . . . /
 GORAMPA ON THE OBJECTS OF NEGATION 279

21. Spyir chos thams cad yin te/stong gzhii chos can nyi shus ma bsdus pai chos ci
yang med cing/de dag laang thog mar bden pa bkag nas mthar bzhi char gyi spros
dral du bya dgos pai phyir ro /
22. on kang gzhung las/dus byas dang /dngos po dang/snang ba rnams la bden pa
gog pa gtso bor gsungs pa ni bden dzin jug pai gzhi yin pas de dag la bden pa
bkag pas gzhan rnams la bden pa khegs pa don gyis grub pa la dgongs te /
23. Thog mar bden par dzin pai yul gyi bden pa ma bkag na mthar dzin phyi ma
rnams dgag tu med pas /
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24. Gcig dang du dral la sogs pai rigs pa rnams kyis phyi nang gi dngos po thams cad
bden med du gtan la dbabs par bya dgos/
25. De na mtha dang po gang la gog pai gzhi ni gang zhig bden par yod med rtsod
pai rtsod gzhi de nyid yin te /
26. Gzhi de dag gi steng du bden par grub pa/don dam par grub pa/yang dag par grub
ba/ngno bo nyid kyis grub pa/rang bzhin gyis grub pa/rang gi mtshan nyid kyis
grub pa/bden pai skye ba/bden pai dgnos po yod pa tsam la sogs pa sgrub pai
sgo nas gzung bai chos thams cad gog ste thal rang gnyis char gyis dgag gzhi de
dag la rigs pas dpad pai tshe yongs gcod du grub pai chos ce yang med par dod
pai phyir ro/
27. Rnam rtog gis gang du zhen pai yul thams cad mthar thug dpyod pai rigs pas
dpyad nas bden med du btan la dbabs dgos pai phyir ro /
28. o na kun rdzob bden paang mthar thug dpyod pai rigs ngor dgag byar gyur ro zhe
na shin tu ang dod de/mthar thug dpyod pai rigs pas brtsal bai tshe mi ryned pai
phyir ro/
29. De lta ma yin na snang bai steng du bden par yod med rtsod pai tshe rgol phyi rgol
gnyis ka la mthun sang du grub pai chos can snang ba yod par gyur te/dei tshe
sang bai steng du bden pa tsam gog gi snang ba me gog par khas blangs pai
phyir dod na thal gyur bai lugs las nyams so/
30. Chos phung po la bden par dzin pai bden dzin yod na dngos dras gang zag gi
bden dzin nges par byung/de nyid yan lag bcu gnyis kyi thog mai ma rig pa yin
zing/de las yan lag phyi ma rnams byung bas sdug bsngal gyi rgyu gtso bo ni chos
la bden par dzin pai bden dzin yin te/
31. From ignorance arises volitional actions, arises consciousness, arises name and
form, arises the 12 sources, arises contact, arises sensation, arises craving, arises
grasping, arises existence or becoming, arises birth and, finally, arises old age
and death.
32. Byang chub thob par dod pa dag gis bden pa dgag dgos te/nyan thos kyi byang
chub thob pa la nyer len gyi phung poi steng du bden pa dgag dgos/rang rgyal gyi
byang chub thob pa la dei steng du gzung ba phyi rol gyi don dang kun nas nyon
mongs kyi chos sogs la bden pa dgag dgos/theg chen gyi byang chub thob pa la
mtha bzhi char gyi spros pa dgag dgos pai phyir ro/
33. Blo dei ngor rten brel de nyid dgag bya de dag zhi bai rang bzhin du gnas pas rten
drel de nyid la yang zhi ba zhes bya o/
34. Zhes pai skabs nas bstan pai kun rdzob bden pa ni med de/yul can mthong ba
brdzun pa med pas/dei yul med pai phyir ro//.
 280 SONAM THAKCHOE

35. Spros dral de mthar thug pai don do bsgrub pa dang / spros dral don dam pai
mtshan gzhir bsnyad pa /
36. Mdor na rtsa ba shes rab kyi mchod brjod kyi skabs kyi skye gag la sogs pa brgyad
dang / rab byed nyi shu rtsa bdun gyis dpyad par bya bai rkyen nas lta bai bar nyi
shu rtsa bdun dang / des mtshon nas kun rdzob tha snyad kyi rnam gzhag thams
cad spros pa yin . . . /
37. Spros pa zhes pa bden pai dngos poam ma yin dgag kho na ma yin gyi gang la blo
jug cing phro ba dgag sgrub kyi chos kyi mtshan ma thams cad yin te /
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38. Tathagata is a Sanskrit word that literally means thus gone beyound. It is an
epithet of Buddha. Gorampa identities it with ultimate truth.
39. Spros pa ni dngos poi rgu mtshan can yin na de bzhin gshegs pa dngos po med pa
la/spros pa rnams jug pa ga la yod de/dei phyir de bzhin gshegs pa spros pa las
das pa yin no /
40. Sangs rgyas kyi sar chos kyi dbyings su ro gcig par yeshe skad cig ma gcig gis
mngon du gyur pai tshe spros pa de dag mi snang yang de dag rtogs zhes pai tha
snyad ni mi gal . . . /
41. See Thakchoe (2007: 101 131) for a detailed discussion on Gorampas nondual
epistemology.

REFERENCES
CABEZON, JOSE IGNACIO, and GESHE LOBSANG DARGYAY. 2007. Freedom from extremes:
Gorampas Distingushing The Views and the polemics of emptiness. Boston:
Wisdom Publications.
GORAMS PA BSOD NAMS SENGE. 1969a. Dbu ma spyi don nges don rab gsal. In The complete
works of the sakya scholars, vol. 12: 348 451. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko.
GORAMS PA BSOD NAMS SENGE. 1969b. Lta ba ngen sel. In The complete works of the sakya
scholars, vol. 13: 110 215. Tokyo: Toyo Bunk.
GORAMS PA BSOD NAMS SENGE. 1969c. Yang dag lta bai od zer. In The complete works of the
sakya scholors, vol. 12: 285 347. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko.
GORAMS PA BSOD NAMS SENGE. 1994. Lta bai shen byed theg mchog gnad gyi zla zer.
Sarnath: Sakya Students Union, CIHTS.
GORAMS PA BSOD NAMS SENGE. 2001. Lta ba ngen sel. Sarnath: Sakya Students Union,
CIHTS.
GORAMS PA BSOD NAMS SENGE. 2002. Dbu ma spyi don nges don rab gsal. Sarnath: Sakya
Students Union.
THAKCHOE, SONAM. 2007. The two truths debate: Tsongkhapa and Gorampa on the middle
way. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

Sonam Thakchoe , School of Philosophy, University of Tasmania, Private Bag 41,

Tasmania 7001, Australia. Tel: 61 3 6226 1776; Fax: 61 3 6226 7846;
E-mail: sonam.thakchoe@utas.edu.au