GR. No.
L-12986 March 31, 1966 waived their right to cross-examine him although
THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and
SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the HEIRS OF
DOMINGA ONG,petitioners-appellants,
vs.
CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN
and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
Their owners, among them petitioners
here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and
Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of
the station and the second as its agent in charge
of operation. Negligence on the part of both of
them was attributed as the cause of the fire.
On the second point, although Detective
Capacillo did take the witness stand, he was not
examined and he did not testify as to the facts
mentioned in his alleged report (signed by
Detective Zapanta). All he said was that he was
one of those who investigated "the location of
the fire and, if possible, gather witnesses as to
the occurrence, and that he brought the report
with him. There was nothing, therefore, on which
he need be cross-examined; and the contents of
the report, as to which he did not testify, did not
thereby become competent evidence. And even
if he had testified, his testimony would still have
been objectionable as far as information
gathered by him from third persons was
concerned.
1. Police Department report:
Investigation disclosed that at about
4:00 P.M. March 18, 1948, while Leandro Flores
was transferring gasoline from a tank truck, plate
No. T-5292 into the underground tank of the
Caltex Gasoline Station located at the corner of
Rizal Avenue and Antipolo Street, this City, an
unknown Filipino lighted a cigarette and threw
the burning match stick near the main valve of
the said underground tank. Due to the gasoline
fumes, fire suddenly blazed. Quick action of
Leandro Flores in pulling off the gasoline hose
connecting the truck with the underground tank
prevented a terrific explosion. However, the
flames scattered due to the hose from which the
gasoline was spouting. It burned the truck and
the following accessorias and residences
ISSUE:
The foregoing reports were ruled out as
"double hearsay" by the Court of Appeals
and hence inadmissible. This ruling is now
assigned as error. It is contended: first, that said
reports were admitted by the trial court without
objection on the part of respondents; secondly,
that with respect to the police report (Exhibit V-
Africa) which appears signed by a Detective
Zapanta allegedly "for Salvador Capacillo," the
latter was presented as witness but respondents
they had the opportunity to do so; and thirdly,
that in any event the said reports are admissible
as an exception to the hearsay rule under
section 35 of Rule 123, now Rule 130.
Petitioners maintain, however, that the
reports in themselves, that is, without further
testimonial evidence on their contents, fall
within the scope of section 35, Rule 123,
which provides that "entries in official
records made in the performance of his duty
by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
There are three requisites for
admissibility under the rule just mentioned:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or
by another person specially enjoined by law to
do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer
in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public
officer or other person had sufficient knowledge
of the facts by him stated, which must have
been acquired by him personally or through
official information (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1957] p. 398).
Of the three requisites just stated, only
the last need be considered here. Obviously the
material facts recited in the reports as to the
cause and circumstances of the fire were not
within the personal knowledge of the officers
who conducted the investigation. Was
knowledge of such facts, however, acquired
by them through official information? As to
some facts the sources thereof are not even
identified. Others are attributed to Leopoldo
Medina, referred to as an employee at the gas
station were the fire occurred; to Leandro Flores,
driver of the tank truck from which gasoline was
being transferred at the time to the underground
tank of the station; and to respondent Mateo
Boquiren, who could not, according to Exhibit V-
Africa, give any reason as to the origin of the
fire. To qualify their statements as "official
information" acquired by the officers who
prepared the reports, the persons who made the
statements not only must have personal
knowledge of the facts stated but must have the
duty to give such statements for record.1
The reports in question do not
constitute an exception to the hearsay rule;
the facts stated therein were not acquired by
the reporting officers through official
information, not having been given by the
informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
NOTE:
(THE THING SPEAKS FOR ITSELF) the
principle that the occurrence of an
accident implies negligence.Predicated on
these circumstances and the further
circumstance of defendant's failure to explain
the cause of the fire or to show its lack of
knowledge of the cause, plaintiff has evoked the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. There are many
cases in which the doctrine may be successfully
invoked and this, we think, is one of them
In the report submitted by Captain Leoncio
Mariano of the Manila Police Department
(Exh. X-1 Africa) the following appears:
"Investigation of the basic complaint disclosed
that the Caltex Gasoline Station complained of
occupies a lot approximately 10 m x 10 m at the
southwest corner of Rizal Avenue and Antipolo.
The location is within a very busy business
district near the Obrero Market, a railroad
crossing and very thickly populated
neighborhood where a great number of people
mill around throughout the day until late at night.
The circumstances put the gasoline station in a
situation primarily prejudicial to its operation
because the passersby, those waiting for buses
or transportation, those waiting to cross the
streets and others loafing around have to
occupy not only the sidewalks but also portion of
the gasoline station itself. Whatever be the
activities of these people smoking or lighting a
cigarette cannot be excluded and this constitute
a secondary hazard to its operation which in turn
endangers the entire neighborhood to
conflagration.
Furthermore, aside from precautions
already taken by its operator the concrete walls
south and west adjoining the neighbourhood are
only 2-1/2 meters high at most and cannot avoid
the flames from leaping over it in case of fire.
Records show that there have been two cases
of fire which caused not only material damages
but desperation and also panic in the
neighbourhood.
Although the soft drinks stand had been
eliminated, this gasoline service station is also
used by its operator as a garage and repair shop
for his fleet of taxicabs numbering ten or more,
adding another risk to the possible outbreak of
fire at this already small but crowded gasoline
station.
The foregoing report, having been
submitted by a police officer in the
performance of his duties on the basis of his
own personal observation of the facts
reported, may properly be considered as an
exception to the hearsay rule. These facts,
descriptive of the location and objective
circumstances surrounding the operation of the
gasoline station in question, strengthen the
presumption of negligence under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, since on their face they called
for more stringent measures of caution than
those which would satisfy the standard of due
diligence under ordinary circumstances. There is
no more eloquent demonstration of this than the
statement of Leandro Flores before the police
investigator. Flores was the driver of the
gasoline tank wagon who, alone and without
assistance, was transferring the contents thereof
into the underground storage when the fire
broke out. He said: "Before loading the
underground tank there were no people, but
while the loading was going on, there were
people who went to drink coca-cola (at the coca-
cola stand) which is about a meter from the hole
leading to the underground tank." He added that
when the tank was almost filled he went to the
tank truck to close the valve, and while he had
his back turned to the "manhole" he, heard
someone shout "fire."
Even then the fire possibly would not
have spread to the neighboring houses were it
not for another negligent omission on the part of
defendants, namely, their failure to provide a
concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames
from leaping over it. As it was the concrete wall
was only 2-1/2 meters high, and beyond that
height it consisted merely of galvanized iron
sheets, which would predictably crumple and
melt when subjected to intense heat.
Defendants' negligence, therefore, was not
only with respect to the cause of the fire but
also with respect to the spread thereof to the
neighboring houses.
 G.R. No. L-9105 November 22, 1915
In re ESTATE OF APOLINIA REMIGIO.
GORGONIA REMIGIO, petitioner-appellants,
vs.
SANTIAGO ORTIGA, EDUARDO ORTIGA, and
ALFONSO ORTIGA, respondents-appellees.
Chicote and Miranda and Gabriel La O for
appellant.
Rohde and Wright and Jose M.a de Marcaida
for appellees
Apolinia Remigio y Capati, widow of
Pablo Ortiga Chan Chioc, died, in Manila, and
the will executed by her on August 12, 1911,
was duly probated in the Court of First Instance
of the said city. On January 7, 1913, Gorgonia
Remigio y Pea came into said court and filed a
petition in which she stated that she was the
person that in the fifteenth paragraph of said will
was instituted as the universal heir of all the
property, rights and action of the testatrix that
had not been specially devised; she asked the
court to order that said remainder of all the
property belonging to the estate, after all the
debts and obligations, donations, legacies,
expenses of administration, and other charges
were paid in accordance with the will, be
delivered to her by the administrator, as required
by law.
Santiago Ortiga, Eduardo Ortiga, and
Alfonso Ortiga also entered their appearances
and prayed that such part of Apolonia Remigio's
estate as pertained to them, as the sole children
and forced heirs of said decedent, be distributed
among them.
In the will executed, as aforesaid, by Apolinia
Remigio on August 12, 1911, the following
clause appear:
First. I declared that I was married in first and
only wedlock to D. Pablo Ortiga Chan Chioc, a
native of China, a resident of Manila and a
Christian, with whom I contracted a canonical
marriage.
Second. I declare that from my marriage with
said Pablo Ortiga I have had two children, a boy
and a girl, who were baptized in the parish
church of Binondo, Manila, with the names of
Candido and Doretea; that they died a short
while after birth all of which facts are shown
in the respective baptismal and burial entries
recorded in the archives of the parish of
Binondo, Manila. I further declare that at the
present time I have neither ascendents nor
descendents of any kind, and although in the will
executed by my husband on April 7, 1902, and
subsequently probated, he recorded that the
parties named Santiago, Eduardo, and Alfonso
were issue of his marriage with me, the testatrix,
the truth is that that statement is not true, as
may be proved by the means which I leave in
the hands of the persons whom I hereby institute
as my heir.
Fifteenth. As to the residue of all my property,
rights and actions of whatever kind they may
be, I institute as my sole and universal heir my
niece Doa Gorgonia Remigio y Pea, in order
that, as the exclusive owner of my said property,
rights and actions, without other limitations than
those I have hereinabove imposed, she may
hold, possess and enjoy them and exercise all
other ownership rights thereto pertaining.
In the will executed by Pablo Ortiga
Chan Chioc on April 7, 1902 (Exhibit A), no
statement whatever was made by Apolonia
Remigio to the effect that Santiago, Eduardo and
Alfonso Ortiga were her children. The
declaration in clause 3 of the will, that up to that
time the testator had had by his marriage (he
undoubtedly referred to that mentioned in the
same clause) to Apolonia Remigio three children
named Santiago, Eduardo and Alfonso, was
made solely by the testator himself, Pablo
Ortiga.
As said will of Apolonia Remigio was
probated by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, it is, of course, a proven fact that the
testatrix was sane and had the full and complete
use of her faculties when she made that
declaration which is an express and definite
rectification of the acknowledgment that might
be implied by those acts and the statements
which, in connection with them, Apolonia
Remigio had previously made, whereby she
gave it to be understood that she acknowledged
Santiago, Eduardo, and Alfonso Ortiga as her
children a rectification intended, as stated
by the testatrix herself, to set forth the truth,
not to deprive these three parties of the
property which had already been awarded to
them as the lawful heirs of the deceased
Pablo Ortiga, as shown by the fact of her
having, in the fourth clause of her will,
requested, recommended and ordered that her
testamentary executors should not bring any
action whatever against her husband's children
by reason of the property which was unduly
awarded to the latter by their appearing to be
her said deceased husband's legitimate children
a recommendation and order which she also
made to heir and legatees, repeating, in the
fifteenth clause of her will, to the first, that she
was not to question the alleged filiation of
Santiago Mora Ortiga, Alfonso Ortiga, and
Eduardo Ortiga, nor bring any action whatever
against them or their heirs on account of the
property and businesses which they had unduly
received out of the estate of Pablo Ortiga Chan
Chioc, for, out of respect for the latter's memory,
she had always desired then and would always
desire that there be peace. But she also stated
in the same will that, should these three persons
or any of them institute any legal proceedings to
attack her will or should they commence any
legal action, either on account of the will or of
her property, the request, recommendation
and command aforementioned were
forthwith withdrawn and annulled and her
heir and testamentary executors should have
liberty of action in that respect.
Two questions, then, have been
raised by that rectification and by the appeal
interposed in these proceedings by Apolonia
Remigio's heir.
ISSUE:
The first one is whether, in view of
these acts of Apolonia Remigio and granted that
they must be considered as an acknowledgment
on her part that the respondents Santiago,
Eduardo, and Alfonso Ortiga are her children,
such rectification should be admitted.
So that the rectification made by
Apolonia Remigio in her said will, of the
acknowledgment that might be implied form the
acts, previously mentioned, some of them
positive and others of tolerance, performed by
her in respect to the said Santiago, Eduardo,
and Alfonso should be allowed, in accordance
with said decision of the supreme court of Spain,
of January 5, 1900 quoted by respondents'
counsel.
Said rectification being allowed, THE
SECOND AND ONLY QUESTION LEFT to be
decide is whether it was proven in the course of
these proceedings that Santiago, Eduardo, and
Alfonso Ortiga are really children of the testatrix
Apolonia Remigio, or, what amounts to the same
thing, whether they issued from her womb.
The means established by law to oblige
the mother to acknowledge the natural child, that
is, the child who claims really to be her own, are
the same as those prescribed to oblige the
father to make such acknowledgment. (Civ.
Code, arts. 135, 136.) But, with respect to the
mother, another means is provided in paragraph
2 of the second of the articles cited, and is
applicable "when the fact of the birth and the
identity of the child are duly proven." The
reasons why the law provides this last means of
proof with respect to the mother is, undoubtedly,
because the mother is always known, and, as a
French jurist has said, "in regard to the
investigation of maternity, it is not a question
of penetrating nature's mysteries; childbirth
and the identity of the child are two positive
facts which can be proven."
HELD:
However, after a careful examination of
the evidence adduced by respondents none is
found, as we have seen before, that refers
specially and categorically to the fact of any of
them having been born of the womb of Apolonia
Remigio, or in other wombs, that she gave birth
to any of them.
As, according to rules of law repeatedly
affirmed, a baptismal certificate attest the fact
which gave rise to its execution, as well as the
date of the latter, that is, it is an attestation of the
administration of the sacrament on the date
mentioned therein, but not of the veracity of
the statements therein contained with
respect to the relationship of the person
baptized, the one exhibited by respondents
(Exhibit E), relative to Eduardo Ortiga, does not
prove that the latter is a legitimate son of
Apolonia Ortiga and Pablo Ortiga, as recorded in
said document, and so much the less credence
should be placed in said certificate, with respect
to this particular matter of the relationship of
Eduardo with Pablo Ortiga and Apolonia
Remigio, since it is also set forth in the
baptismal certificate, petitioner's Exhibit 7, that
Pablo Dalmacio Ortiga is the legitimate son of
these same spouses Pablo Ortiga and Apolonia
Remigio, whereas it was proven that the child
known under that name, that is, Pablito, was
also one of the children born of Vicentica
Lopez while she lived in the home of those
spouses on Calle Dasmarias, and this child
was born, not in that house, but, on account of
some trouble Pablo Ortiga then had with his
wife, Apolonia Remigio, in another house which
Pablo had in Paco.
In conclusion, respondents have not
proved that they are the children of Apolonia
Remigio, or, in other words, that they were born
of her womb; the presumption that they were,
based upon her various acts, some of them
positive and others of tolerance, on the
assumption that such acts constituted an
acknowledgment of such filiation, has been
completely negative by the evidence
adduced by petitioner that one of the
respondents, Santiago Ortiga, was bought in
China by the spouses Pablo Ortiga and Apolonia
Remigio, he being the son of pagan parents,
natives of Chincang, China, and that the other
two appellees, Eduardo Ortiga and Alfonso
Ortiga, were born of a woman other than said
Apolonia Remigio. The presumed
acknowledgment, therefore, has no force or
value for the object sought by the
respondents in these proceedings.
 NOTE:
This the supreme court of Spain, in the
decision just cited, recognized in holding, also in
the finding which follows the one hereinabove
transcribed, that:
When such a status exists, the
investigation of the paternity of a person who
has a child that enjoys such status does not
appear to be allowed, unless it is pursued in
order clearly to show that the legitimatized
child does not reunite the relative conditions that
the law requires in order that he may be so
legitimatized, or has not the absolute condition
of his not being the child of the person who
acknowledged him, or because such person
could not have begotten him, or because the
child is the child of a third person, for
otherwise, in view of the mystery
surrounding paternity and the alleged
presumption of its certainty, established in
law by the ground of the acknowledgment or the
possession of the status of acknowledged child,
against such presumption no other can lawfully
prevail, however strong it may appear.
And this is precisely the point in
question in this case. Apolonia Remigio, widow
of Pablo Ortiga, during the life of her husband
consented that the three respondents, Santiago,
Eduardo, and Alfonso, should bear her
husband's surname and live with her and her
husband under the same roof; and while there
she considered them and treated them as
members of the family, and even as her children.
When they were instituted the heirs of her
husband, Pablo Ortiga, in the will executed by
the latter on April 7, 1902, and when this testator
declared therein that the said Santiago,
Eduardo, and Alfonso were his children had in
his marriage with the petitioner, the latter made
no opposition to that statement and consented
that they, as such alleged children of the
deceased Pablo Ortiga, should share in the
latter's estate, in accordance with the mandates
of his will, and she joined with them in the
partition of the estate left by the said deceased,
out of which she received for herself, by reason
of said partition and the previous agreement she
had with said alleged children, the part of the
estate that pertained to her as community
property. This property would certainly have
fallen to her and she could not have been
deprived of it, even though the deceased Pablo
Ortiga had not made in his will the statement
aforementioned that the said Santiago, Eduardo,
and Alfonso were legitimate children of his had
by her, and although they had not been his
instituted heirs.
 G.R. No. L-22378 June 29, 1968
CLEMENTE FORTUS, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO NOVERO and JULIA T.
FORTUS, respondents.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for
petitioners.
Suanes and Gualberto for respondents
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of
the Court of Appeals in G.R. L-22378, affirming
the one rendered by the Court of First Instance
of Lipa City in its Special Proceedings No. 610.
In connection with all the foregoing, the
following facts are either undisputed or fully
borne by the evidence.
Ciriaca Angelo was the owner of the
parcel of land located in barrio Alpaye, Rosario,
Batangas, with an area of approximately 20,102
sq.m., subject of the petition for summary
settlement mentioned at the beginning of this
decision. It was registered in her name under
Original Certificate of Title No. 370. She had
only one child, a daughter by the name of
Crisanta Ilagan, married to Fermin Fortus. This
couple had an only son, the deceased Victorino
Fortus. As Crisanta Ilagan predeceased her
mother, Ciriaca Angelo, who died intestate
sometime in the year 1930, the property
aforesaid passed on to Victorino Fortus as the
lone surviving heir of his grandmother. It is a
fact, however, that he never caused the
original certificate of title covering the
property to be cancelled and to have another
issued in his name.
It is not disputed that Victorino Fortus
and Julia T. Fortus were husband and wife and
that up to Victorino's death on January 8, 1954
they were childless. It is similarly admitted that
at the time of his death, Victorino had been
estranged from his wife for a number of years
and had been living maritally with another
woman named Felicidad Gonzales Pena. Out
of this illicit relation, however, no issue was
begotten.
That the property is now covered by
transfer certificate of title No. 6831 issued by the
Registrar of Deeds of Batangas is due to the fact
that upon Victorino's death, his widow, Julia T.
Fortus, executed the required affidavit of extra-
judicial summary settlement and had it
registered in accordance with law. By reason
thereof, original certificate of title No. 370 was
cancelled and the transfer certificate of title
already referred to was issued in Julia's name.
The proceedings for the summary
settlement of the intestate estate of the late
Ciriaca Angelo, who died sometime in the year
1930 in the municipality of Rosario, province of
Batangas, were commenced by Rosario
Novero who claimed to be an illegitimate child
of the deceased Victorino Fortus (Ciriaca's
grandson), born on April 4, 1922 out of
Victorino's alleged illicit relations with Patricia
Novero. Her claim was opposed, on the one
hand, by Julia T. Fortus, the surviving widow of
Victorino, and on the other, by Clemente, Zoilo,
Faustina, Catalino, Pio, Demetria, Francisca and
Roman, all surnamed Fortus, hereinafter
referred to as the Fortuses, who claimed to be
half brothers and sisters of said deceased. After
the required notice by publication and
subsequent trial the aforesaid Court of First
Instance rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing the claims of petitioner and the
Fortus brothers and sisters to succeed to the
estate left by Victorino Fortus, and declaring
Julia T. Fortus as the sole heir and the absolute
owner of all the properties left by Victorino
Fortus. Julia T. Fortus is hereby ordered to
reimburse Felicidad Pea Gonzales the amount
of P1,303.04. No pronouncement as to cost is
hereby made.
Rosario Novero and the Fortuses
appealed to the Court of Appeals who in due
time rendered the appealed decision. As the first
did not appeal, said decision must now be
deemed final, as far as she is concerned. The
Fortuses, however, interposed the present
appeal by certiorari and urge Us to reverse the
appealed decision claiming that the Court of
Appeals committed the following errors:
The above assignment of errors make it
obvious that the only issue involved in this
appeal is one of fact: whether or not Fermin
Fortus and Jacoba Aguil were legally
married. Indeed, at page 8 (last paragraph) of
their brief the Fortuses openly admit that "the
sole question in this case" is "whether
petitioners' mother, Jacoba Aguil, was legally
married to Fermin Fortus". The Court of Appeals'
(1) holding that the legal presumption of
marriage was overcome by Exhibit 5 and by the
testimony of Clemente Barbosa"; (2) said court's
"construing the certification Exhibit 5 without
reference to Act No. 3022 and the explanatory
testimony of David de Jesus, Jr., of the Bureau
of Public Libraries"; (3) its "Holding that Exhibits
2, 4, 9-B and 9-C did not constitute a proof of
marriage between Fermin Fortus and Jacoba
Aguil, much less a proof of the legitimacy of the
oppositors Fortuses" involve nothing more than
evaluation of evidence and are but the reasons
that led said court to declare as a fact that
Fermin and Jacoba were never married. The
evaluation made by the Court of all or part of the
evidence of record; its finding of fact that the
persons just named were never legally married
, even if wrong, may not now be reviewed by
Us, the present being an appeal by certiorari.
We have held in a long line of cases that in
appeals of this nature We pass upon and
decide only questions of law (Cabrera vs.
Lopez, 84 Phil. 834-5; Pacheco vs. Arro, 85 Phil.
505-15; Celesto vs. People, G.R. L-3935, Dec.
21, 1951; Traders, etc. vs. Golangco G.R. L-
6442, Sept. 21, 1954). In the recent case of
Jesusa Lacson Vda. de Arroyo vs. Beaterio etc.,
we held.
In this connection it is a matter
removed from dispute that We can review
decisions of the Court of Appeals only on
errors of law, its findings of fact being
conclusive.
A question of law has been declared as
one not calling for the examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties (Goduco vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
(G.R. No. L-17647, February 28, 1964; Air
France etc. vs. Carrascoso, et al., G.R. No. L-
21438, September 28, 1966). Moran's
Comments on the subject (Rules of Court,
Volume II, 1963 Edition, p. 412) are to the effect
that "For a question to be one of law, it must
involve no examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them
In a case similar to the one at bar (Lim vs.
Calaguas, G.R. No. L-2031, May 30, 1949, 40
O.G., 11 Supp. 247, 83 Phil, 796) We held:
Our review should be confined to the
facts and circumstances found by the Court of
Appeals. And we agree that such facts and
circumstances in this case do not sustain the
theory of the appellant. Indeed it is seriously to
be doubted whether we could reverse the
conclusion of the appellate court to the effect
that those facts and circumstances are not
"enough evidence" to show clearly and
beyond doubt that the parties intended the
contract to be a mortgage instead of a
conditional conveyance. That conclusion is
obviously ONE OF FACT, not a bit different from
the verdict of a jury in a murder trial that the
circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution has proved, or has not proved that
the accused had killed the deceased.
Considering that the foregoing finding is
a question of fact which involves an evaluation
of the evidence and the same is now assigned
as error, we are of the opinion that this case
comes within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals.
We have also held, however, that, in
extreme cases calling for the exercise of our
supervisory jurisdiction, We may disturb or
reverse any particular finding of fact of the
Court of Appeals should We find it to be
arbitrary or whimsical or entirely outside the
issues raised by the parties in their
respective pleadings.
ISSUE:
In De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15,
answering our own question: "When may the
Supreme Court review such deduction of
fact based on uncontroverted or plain
evidence?", We said:
... Only when reasonable men readily
agree that the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible. If however,
fair-minded men may differ on whether or
not the main conclusion of fact is rightly
drawn from the undisputed evidence, the
Supreme Court should not, as a rule, inquire
into the discretion exercised by the Courts of
Appeals. The instant case is of the latter
category, because the findings of the Court of
Appeals that there has been no deceit may or
may not be persuasive, according to one's own
reasoning after reading the decision and
resolution of that court. It cannot be said that
fairminded men will not differ in this case on the
existence of fraud.
HELD:
In connection with the vital question of fact
involved, His Honor's decision says:
Are the Fortuses legitimate half-brothers and
sisters of Victorino Fortus? The property
involved in this proceeding came from Ciriaca
Angelo, and passed to Victorino Fortus through
his mother Crisanta Ilagan, daughter of the
former. The Fortus brothers and sisters are
children of Fermin Fortus, father of Victorino
Fortus, and a certain woman by the name of
Jacoba Aguil. The Fortuses maintained that the
petitioner not being an illegitimate daughter of
Victorino Fortus, they are entitled to inherit the
one-half portion of the property left by their
deceased brother, Victorino Fortus. Their
right is based upon their assertion that their
father Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil were
legally married.
The Fortuses brothers and sisters failed
to present a valid document of marriage
between Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil. They
maintained that it was lost during the last global
war. In many cases it has been observed by this
Court that a party who is claiming a right by
virtue of a document usually finds it convenient
to allege that the said document was lost during
the last global war, when in fact and in truth
there was no such document. The instant case
is one of the many cases wherein a party allege
to have lost a document which never existed.
Attempts were made by the Fortuses
brothers to lay the basis for the introduction of
a secondary evidence as to the existence of
a marriage contract and/or celebration
thereof, but said evidence did not satisfy the
requisites required by law. Section 51, Rule 123
of the Rules of Court, provides that when the
original writing has been lost or destroyed, upon
proof of its execution and loss or destruction, its
contents may be proved by a copy or by a recital
of its contents in some authentic document, or
by collection of witnesses. The question at issue
now is, were the oppositors Fortuses able to
prove the due execution of the alleged marriage
contract between Fermin Fortus and Jacoba
Aguil or to present satisfactory secondary
evidence to that effect.
The testimony of David de Jesus, Jr. of
the Division of Archives, National Library, Manila,
who identified Exhibit "5" clearly established that
there existed no records of such marriage. This
statement was corroborated by Clemente
Barbosa, a clerk in the office of the Municipal
Treasurer of Rosario, Batangas that there were
no records of such marriage from 1902 to 1922
of the Municipality of Rosario, Batangas. So that
the conclusion is now inevitable that when the
pre-war records were burned as per Exhibit "7",
the imaginary record of marriage of Fermin
Fortus and Jacoba Aguil could not have been
included, as it never existed at all.
. What the law then required only as
to the proof of the celebration of marriage
was a certificate of the parish priest or the
justice of the peace or judge containing the
full names of the parties, their residence,
ages and the consent of the father and
mother or guardian and nothing else. It was
only the father who signed a form giving consent
to his or her child of minor age to the contract of
marriage. Nothing more was necessary. On this
score that Court believes that the witnesses for
the Fortuses brothers and sisters and the
Fortuses themselves made a story which was of
their own concoction. In the light of these
findings and observations the Court was of the
considered opinion that Fermin Fortus and
Jacoba Aguil were not legally married. And if
they were not legally married, the Fortuses
brothers and sisters were illegitimate children
and have no right to succeed to the properties of
either Ciriaca Angelo or that of Victorino Fortus.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides
that an illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relative of his father and
mother, nor such children or relative inherit
in the same manner from the illegitimate
children.
Exhibit "2" is not an evidence of
legitimacy much less of marriage between
Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil. It is a
baptismal certificate and it does not serve as
proof of relationship of or filiation of the
child baptized. "The record of baptism as a
general rule, in all documents, attests to the
fact which gives rise to its issue, and the
date thereof, to wit, the fact of the
administration of the sacrament on the date
stated, but not the truth of the statements
therein made as to the parentage of the child
baptized." (Basa, et al. vs. Arquiza, et al., 5
Phil. 187.) "The aforementioned canonical
certificate is conclusive proof only of the
baptism administered, in conformity with the
rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who
baptized the child but it does not prove the
veracity of the declarations and statements
contained in the said certificate that concern
the relationship of the person baptized. Such
declarations and statements, in order that their
truth may be admitted, must indispensably be
shown by some of the kinds of proof recognized
by law." (Adriano vs. de Jesus, 23 Phil. 353)
Further, in their vain attempt to prove
the contractual marriage between Fermin Fortus
and Jacoba Aguil, the Fortuses adduced
secondary evidence consisting of Exhibits "2", 4,
9-B and 9-C. All these exhibits, however, do not
clearly show nor the same constitute as a proof
of marriage between Fermin Fortus and Jacoba
Aguil, much less a proof of the legitimacy of the
oppositors Fortuses. The court below correctly
ruled that Exhibit "2" is not an evidence of
legitimacy much less of marriage between
Fortus and Jacoba Aguil. For it is merely a
true copy of a baptismal certificate of
oppositor appellant Roman Fortus. The rule is
settled that the record of baptism attests to the
fact of the administration of the sacrament on
the date stated therein, but certainly not the truth
of the statements therein made as to the
parentage of the child baptized. As held by the
Supreme Court: "Neither are the baptismal
certificates (Exhibits C and D) public documents
or public writings, because the parochial records
of baptisms are not public or official records, as
they are not kept by public officers, and are not
proof of relationship or filiation of the child
baptized." (Adriano vs. de Jesus, 23 Phil. 353;
Pareja vs. Paraiso, et al., G.R. No. L-5624, May
31, 1954). As regards Exhibit '4', the court below
in declaring the same not a proof of marriage
nor could it be a prima facie evidence of
legitimacy of Roman Fortus, who is the eight
child of Jacoba Aguil which she had with Fermin
Fortus, reasoned out, to which we subscribe.
It is obvious from the foregoing
quotations that the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, relying upon similar if not identical
reasons, found that Victorino Fortus and Jacoba
Aguil were never married. We do not believe
anyone can say that "reasonable men (will)
readily agree" that such finding of fact is
"manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible"
(De Luna vs. Linatoc, supra). To the contrary,
we are of the opinion that fair minded men
may differ on whether or not such finding of
fact is right, or "is rightly drawn from the
undisputed evidence" (idem). Consequently,
the present case is not one calling for the
exercise of either our appellate or supervisor
jurisdiction for the purpose of reversing the
finding of fact aforesaid made by the Court of
Appeals and, before it, by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby
affirmed, with costs.