San Ildefonso Lines Inc and Eduardo Javier, petitioners

Court of Appeals abs Pioneer Insurance Surety Corporation, respondents

GR 119771

FACTS:
A Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein
petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI) had a vehicular mishap at the
intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig, Metro
Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2)
passengers in the process.
A criminal case was thereafter filed charging the driver of the bus, herein petitioner
Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with
multiple physical injuries.
About four (4) months later, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety
Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages
against petitioner SILI with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the
sums it paid the assured under a motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other
damages.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Civil Proceedings grounded
onthe pendency of the criminal case against petitioner Javier in the Pasig RTC and
the failure of respondent PISC to make a reservation to file a separate damage suit
in said criminal action. This was denied by the Manila Regional Trial Court. After their
motion for reconsideration the Order was denied, petitioners elevated the matter to
this Court via petition for certiorari which was, however, referred to public
respondent Court of Appeals for disposition. A decision adverse to petitioners once
again was rendered by respondent court, upholding the assailed Manila Regional
Trial Court Order. Hence, this petition for review after a motion for reconsideration
was denied.

Issues:
1) If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based on quasi-delict
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no reservation was made in the said
criminal case?
2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an independent civil action during
the pendency of a criminal action when no reservation of the right to file an
independent civil action was made in the criminal action and despite the fact that
the private complainant is actively participating through a private prosecutor in the
aforementioned criminal case?
Held:
The Supreme Court assailed with the decision of the Court of Appeals.
On the chief issue of "reservation", there is no dispute that these so-called
"independent civil actions" based on the aforementioned Civil Code articles are the
exceptions to the primacy of the criminal action over the civil action as set forth in
Section 2 of Rule 111.
Objections were raised to the inclusion in this Rule of quasi-delicts under Article
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. However, in view of Article 2177 of the
said code which provides that the offended party may not recover twice for the
same act or omission of the accused, and in line with the policy of avoiding
multiplicity of suits, these objections were overruled. In any event, the offended
party is not precluded from filing a civil action to recover damages arising from
quasi-delict before the institution of the criminal action, or from reserving his right
to file such a separate civil action, just as he is not precluded from filing a civil
action for damages under Articles 32, 33 and 34 before the institution of the
criminal action, or from reserving his right to file such a separate civil action. It is
only in those cases where the offended party has not previously filed a civil action
or has not reserved his right to file a separate civil action that his civil action is
deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
Now that the necessity of a prior reservation is the standing rule that shall govern
the institution of the independent civil actions referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, past pronouncements that view the reservation requirement as an
"unauthorized amendment" to substantive law - i.e., the Civil Code, should no
longer be controlling. There must be a renewed adherence to the time-honored
dictum that procedural rules are designed, not to defeat, but to safeguard the ends
of substantial justice. And for this noble reason, no less than the Constitution itself
has mandated this Court to promulgate rules concerning the enforcement of rights
with the end in view of providing a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases which should not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights.[7] Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of
the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caos v. Peralta":[8]

" to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent
delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short,
the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-
litigants."

Clearly then, private respondent PISC, as subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil
Code,[9] is not exempt from the reservation requirement with respect to its
damages suit based on quasi-delict arising from the same act or omission of
petitioner Javier complained of in the criminal case. As private respondent PISC
merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota van), then
it is bound to observe the procedural requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow
had she herself instituted the civil case.
HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON- Petitioners
Elvin Chan -Respondent
GR No. 157547

FACTS:

Sometime in December 1996, Simon issued a Landbank check to Elvin Chan

amounting to PhP 336,000.00 which was dishonored upon presentation on
the ground that the account has been closed.
Elvin filed a case in violation of BP 22 against Simon before MeTC of Manila.
(Criminal case)
After more than 3 years, Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a
civil action for the collection of the principal amount of PhP 336,000.00
coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment.
He alleged that Simon employed fraud, deceit and misrepresentation when
he issued check subject to Criminal case which when presented for payment
was dishonored by the drawee bank.
Simon moved to dismissed the civil case on the ground of litis pendencia, as
a consequence of the pendency of Criminal case .
Elvin opposed the motion to dismiss, citing as bases Art. 31,32,33,34 and
2177 of the Civil Code which allows an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action and which may be brought by
the injured part during the pendency of the criminal case provided the right
to file the civil action is reserved.
The MeTC granted the motion to dismiss. The RTC affirmed the MeTC
decision.
However, the CA overturned the decision of the RTC citing that the complaint
was brought on allegation of fraud under Art. 33 of the Civil Code and
committed by the respondent in the issuance of the check which was later
bounced. It was filed before the trial courts, despite the pendency of the
criminal case for violation of BP 22 against the respondent. The CA also cited
that procedural rules may be given retroactive application since there are no
vested rights in the rules of procedures. Thus, he case remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings
Simon appealed to the Supreme Court for petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Chans civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check
(Civil Case) was an independent civil action

HELD:

NO. There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the
issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (BP 22).

This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which relevantly provides: "The
criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include
the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall
be allowed."

Supreme Court Circular 57-97 also provides that: "1. The criminal action for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately
shall be allowed or recognized."

The Supreme Court granted the petition and accordingly reverse and set aside the
CA decision thereby reinstating the decision of the MeTC.
Mary Ann Rodriiguez, Petitioner
People of the Phils and Gladys Nocom, Respondents
GR 155531-34

FACTS:
Rodriguez was charged with Estafa and violation of BP22 (bouncing checks
law)
City Prosecutor Rossana S. Morales-Montojo of Quezon CityProsecutors Office
found PROBABLE CAUSE to charge Rodriguez with ESTAFA under Article 315
paragraph 2(d) as amended by PD 818 and for Violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22
Violation of BP22 was filed in MTC of QC- docket fees were accordingly paid
byprivate complainant.
ESTAFA was filed with RTC of QC
During the hearing, respondent court noted the Formal Entry of Appearance
of Atty. Felix R. Solomon as PRIVATE prosecutor (in order to pursue Civil
Liability against Rodriguez), but this was opposed by Rodriguez
Rodriguezs contends that the private prosecutor is barred from appearing
before this Court as his appearance is limited to the civil aspect which must
be presented and asserted in B.P. 22 cases pending before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City (and not in the Regional Trial Court where his
ESTAFA case is being tried)7.
RTC held that civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged is deemed instituted, unless the offended party (1) waives
the civil action, (2) reserves the right to institute it separately, or (3)
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Considering that the
offended party had paid the corresponding filing fee for the estafa cases prior
to the filing of the BP 22 cases with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
theRTC allowed the private prosecutor to appear and intervene in the
proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a Private Prosecutor can be allowed to intervene and
participate in the proceedings of the above-entitled Estafa cases for the
 purpose of prosecuting the attached civil liability arising from the issuance of
the checks involved which is also subject matter of the pending B.P. 22 cases.

HELD:

YES. Atty. Solomon can be allowed to intervene and participate in the estafa
cases for recovery of civil liability.

Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court: Intervention of the offended party
in criminal action. Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is
instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may
intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.

The possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing
check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the
estafa case and the BP 22 violation prosecution. As both remedies are
simultaneously available to this party, there can be no forum shopping.
The private prosecutor may intervene before the RTC in the proceedings for
estafa, despite the necessary inclusion of the corresponding civil action in the
proceedings for violation of BP 22 pending before the MTC.

However, the recovery by the offended party under one remedy necessarily
bars the recovery under the other. Because the law prohibits double recovery
for the same act or omission.

Thus, the petition is Dismissed.