STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASE DIGEST PART 2
Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. vs. IAC
[G.R. No. L-72005. May 29, 1987]
FACTS:
[P]rivate respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc.,
filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money
against Varian Industrial Corporation before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the
pendency of the suit, private respondent
succeeded in attaching some of the properties of
Varian Industrial Corporation upon the posting of
a supersedeas bond. The latter in turn posted a
counterbond in the sum of P1,400,000.00 thru
petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., so
the attached properties were released. The trial
court rendered judgment in favor of Sycwin.
Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the
decision to the respondent Court. Sycwin then
filed a petition for execution pending appeal
against the properties of Varian in respondent
Court. The respondent Court granted the petition
of Sycwin. Varian, thru its insurer and petitioner
herein, raised the issue to the Supreme Court. A
temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from enforcing the order complaint
of was issued.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an order of execution pending
appeal of any judgment maybe enforced on the
counterbond of the petitioner.
HELD:
YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit and
the restraining order dissolved with costs against
petitioner.
It is well recognized rule that where the law does
not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus. The rule, founded on logic, is a
corollary of the principle that general words and
phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded
their natural and general significance. The rule
requires that a general term or phrase should not
be reduced into parts and one part distinguished
from the other so as to justify its exclusion from
the operation of the law. In other words, there
should be no distinction in the application of a
statute where none is indicated. For courts are
not authorized to distinguish where the law
makes no distinction. They should instead
administer the law not as they think it ought to be
but as they find it and without regard to
consequences.
The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift
attachment that is issued in accordance with the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of
Court, shall be charged with the payment of any
judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers
1 | Page JUI NOTES
not only a final and executory judgment but also
the execution of a judgment pending appeal.
BDO vs. Equitable Banking Corp.
[January 30, 1988]
FACTS:
Equitable Bank drew six crossed managers check
payable to certain member establishments of
Visa Card. Subsequently, the checks were
deposited with Banco De Oro (BDO) to the credit
of its depositor. Following normal procedures and
after stamping at the back of the checks the
usual endorsements, BDO sent the checks for
clearing through the Philippine Clearing House
Corporation (PCHC). Accordingly, Equitable
Banking paid the checks; its clearing account was
debited for the value of the checks and BDOs
clearing account was credited for the same
amount. Thereafter, Equitable Banking discovered
that the endorsements appearing at the back of
the checks and purporting to be that of the
payees were forged and/or unauthorized or
otherwise belong to persons other than the
payees. Equitable Banking presented the checks
directly to BDO for the purpose of claiming
reimbursement from the latter. However, BDO
refused to accept such direct presentation and to
reimburse Equitable Banking for the value of the
checks.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether or not BDO is estopped from claiming
that checks under consideration are non-
negotiable instruments.
(b) Whether or not BDO can escape liability by
reasons of forgery.
(c) Whether or not only negotiable checks are
within the jurisdiction of PCHC.
RULING:
(a) YES. BDO having stamped its guarantee of all
prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsements
is now estopped from claiming that the checks
under consideration are not negotiable
instruments. The checks were accepted for
deposit by the petitioner stamping thereon its
guarantee, in order that it can clear the said
checks with the respondent bank. By such
deliberate and positive attitude of the petitioner it
has for all legal intents and purposes treated the
said cheeks as negotiable instruments and
accordingly assumed the warranty of the
endorser when it stamped its guarantee of prior
endorsements at the back of the checks. It led
the said respondent to believe that it was acting
as endorser of the checks and on the strength of
this guarantee said respondent cleared the
checks in question and credited the account of
the petitioner. Petitioner is now barred from
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASE DIGEST PART 2
taking an opposite posture by claiming that the
disputed checks are not negotiable instrument.
(b) NO. A commercial bank cannot escape the
liability of an endorser of a check and which may
turn out to be a forged endorsement. Whenever
any bank treats the signature at the back of the
checks as endorsements and thus logically
guarantees the same as such there can be no
doubt said bank has considered the checks as
negotiable. The collecting bank or last endorser
generally suffers the loss because it has the duty
to ascertain the genuineness of all prior
endorsements considering that the act of
presenting the check for payment to the drawee
is an assertion that the party making the
presentment has done its duty to ascertain the
genuineness of the endorsements.
(c) NO. PCHCs jurisdiction is not limited to
negotiable checks only. The term check as used in
the said Articles of Incorporation of PCHC can
only connote checks in general use in commercial
and business activities. Thus, no distinction. Ubi
lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere
debemus. Checks are used between banks and
bankers and their customers, and are designed to
facilitate banking operations. It is of the essence
to be payable on demand, because the contract
between the banker and the customer is that the
money is needed on demand.
Ramos v. Court of Appeals
[G.R. No. L-53766, October 30, 1981]
FACTS:
The Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, availed of
the services of the law firm of Cruz Durian
&Academia (now Cruz Durian Agabin Atienza &
Alday) in a case for land recovery against MariaC.
Ramos et al. Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan and
Municipal Attorney of Hagonoy entered their
appearance as supervising counsel in the case for
land recovery Ramos moved to disqualify Cruz
law firm from serving as counsel for the
municipality Trial court denied motion to
disqualify since it found that private counsel only
wanted to serve his native town Ramos assailed
said order by a petition for certoriari with the
Court of Appeals, who sustained the ruling of the
trial court, thus the case is appealed to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
WON the finding of the CA that it is legal for a
private counsel to represent LGU is correct.
HELD:
Overturned. As Justice Moreland observes,
2 | Page JUI NOTES
Where language is plain, subtle refinements
which tinge words so as to give them the color of
a particular judicial theory are not only
unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which
has caused so much confusion in the law, which
has made it so difficult for the public to
understand and know what the law is with
respect to a given matter, is inconsiderable
measure the unwarranted interference by judicial
tribunals with the English language as found in
statutes and contracts, cutting out words here
and inserting them there, making them fit
personal Ideas of what the legislature ought to
have done or what parties should have agreed
upon, giving them meanings which they do not
ordinarily have, cutting, trimming, fitting,
changing and coloring until lawyers themselves
are unable to advise their clients as to the
meaning of a given statute or contract until it has
been submitted to some court for its
'interpretation and construction
.There are two specific laws prohibiting private
counsels representing the government- Sec. 1683
of the Revised Administrative Code states "the
provincial fiscal shall represent the province and
any municipality or municipal district thereof in
any court, except in cases whereof original
jurisdiction Is vested in the Supreme Court or in
cases where the municipality or municipal district
in question is a party adverse to the provincial
government or to some other municipality or
municipal district in the same province. When the
interests of a provincial government and of any
political division thereof are opposed, the
provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the
province. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified
to serve any municipality or other political
subdivision of a province, a special attorney may
be employed by its council. Another is Sec. 3 of
Local Autonomy Act, Republic Act No. 2264, which
provides that the municipal attorney, as the head
of the legal division or office of a municipality,
"shall act as legal counsel of the municipality and
perform such duties and exercise such powers as
may be assigned to him by the council".
People v. Nazario
[August 31, 1988]
FACTS:
Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of
refusal and failure to pay his municipal taxes
amounting to Php 362.62 because of his fishpond
operation provided under Ordinance 4, Series of
1955, as amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa
Manila and just leases a fishpond located at
Pagbilao, Quezon with the Philippine Fisheries
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASE DIGEST PART 2
Commission. The years in question of failure to
pay was for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did
not pay because he was not sure if he was
covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty
thus this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as
amended null and void for being ambiguous and
uncertain
2. Whether or not the ordinance was
unconstitutional for being ex post facto
HELD:
1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him
as the actual operator of the fishpond thus he
comes with the term Manager. He was the one
who spent money in developing and maintaining
it, so despite only leasing it from the national
government, the latter does not get any profit as
it goes only to Nazario. The dates of payment are
also clearly stated Beginning and taking effect
from 1964 if the fishpond started operating in
1964.
2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was
enacted in 1955 so it cant be that the
amendment under Ordinance 12 is being made to
apply retroactively. Also, the act of non-payment
has been made punishable since 1955 so it
means Ordinance 12 is not imposing a retroactive
penalty
Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and
Protective Order of the Elks vs. Court of
Appeals
[September 30, 1976]
FACTS:
The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306
which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a
portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to
form part of the Luneta extension. The act
provided that the reclaimed area shall be the
property of the City of Manila, and the city is
authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed
land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the
same. Later, the City of Manila conveyed a
portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Then
Petitioner sold the land, together with all the
improvements, to the Tarlac Development
Corporation (TDC).
ISSUE:
W/N the subject property was patrimonial
property of the City of Manila.
HELD:
The petitions were denied for lack of merit. The
court found it necessary to analyze all the
3 | Page JUI NOTES
provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended, in order
to unravel the legislative intent. The grant made
by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City
of Manila is a grant of a public nature. Such
grants have always been strictly construed
against the grantee because it is a gratuitous
donation of public money or resources, which
resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. In
the case at bar, the area reclaimed would be
filled at the expense of the Insular Government
and without cost to the City of Manila. Hence, the
letter of the statute should be narrowed to
exclude matters which, if included, would defeat
the policy of legislation.
Baranda v. Gustilo
[G.R. No. 81163, September 26, 1988]
FACTS:
A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the
Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered
by original certificate of title no. 6406 is the land
subject of the dispute between petitioner
(Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and
respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria Gotera and
Susan Silao). Both parties claimed ownership and
possession over the said land. However during
the trial, it was found that the transfer certificate
of title held by respondents was fraudulently
acquired. So the transfer certificate of title was
ordered to be put in the name of petitioners. In
compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting
Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the
order declaring TCT T-25772 null and void,
cancelled the same and issued new certificate of
titles in the name of petitioners. However, by
reason of a separate case pending in the Court of
Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was annotated in
the new certificate of title. This prompted the
petitioners to move for the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens in the new certificates.
Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting
Register of Deeds for the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens but the Acting Register of
Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration invoking
Sec 77 of PD 1529.
ISSUE:
What is the nature of the duty of a Register of
Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis
pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
HELD:
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states
that "It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds
to immediately register an instrument presented
for registration dealing with real or personal
property which complies with all the requisites for
registration. ... If the instrument is not registrable,
he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and

inform the presentor of such denial in writing,
stating the ground or reasons therefore, and
advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in
accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of
Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step
to be taken or memoranda to be made in
pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other
instrument presented to him for registration or
where any party in interest does not agree with
the action taken by the Register of Deeds with
reference to any such instrument, the question
shall be submitted to the Commission of Land
Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the
party in interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."
The function of ROD is ministerial in nature
The function of a Register of Deeds with reference
to the registration of deeds encumbrances,
instruments and the like is ministerial in nature.
The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not
have any legal standing to file a motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order
directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens
annotated in the certificates of titles of the
petitioners over the subject parcel of land.
In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken
in pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument
presented to him, he should have asked the
opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration
now, the Administrator of the National Land Title
and Deeds Registration Administration in
accordance with Section 117 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529.
No room for construction for the laws on
functions of ROD. The elementary rule in
statutory construction is that when the words and
phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal,
their meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be
taken to mean exactly what it says. The statute
concerning the function of the Register of Deeds
to register instruments in a torrens certificate of
title is clear and leaves no room for construction.
Taada v. Tuvera
[146 SCRA 446, December 29, 1986]
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the
decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
otherwise as when the decrees themselves
4 | Page JUI NOTES
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASE DIGEST PART 2
declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between
laws of general applicability and laws which are
not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in
publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers
to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or in any other date,
without its previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to
those of general application, for strictly speaking,
all laws relate to the people in general albeit
there are some that do not apply to them directly.
A law without any bearing on the public would be
invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest eve if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15
days after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at
all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that
publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for
their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called
upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to
repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at
least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light
of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication

intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut
unless the naked blade is drawn.
Caltex v. Palomar
[G.R. No. L-19650, September 29, 1966]
FACTS:
In 1960, Caltex launched their "Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest", which called for participants to
estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas
pump at each Caltex station will dispense during
a specified period. Participants were not required
consideration nor pay a fee. No purchase of
Caltex products were also required to be made.
Entry forms were to be made available upon
request at each Caltex station where a sealed can
would be provided for the deposit of
accomplished entry stubs.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not
only as amongst the media for publicizing the
contest but also for the transmission of
communications relative thereto, representations
were made by Caltex with the postal authorities
for the contest to be cleared in advance for
mailing, having in view the Anti-lottery provisions
of the Revised Administrative Code. Postmaster
General Enrico Palomar denied the request,
arguing that the said contest violated the
provisions of the law on subject. CALTEX sought
judicial intervention wherein the trial court ruled
in its favor. Respondent Palomar appealed, posing
the same argument that the said contest violated
the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest" fell on the purview of the prohibitive
provisions of the Postal Law.
HELD:
The Postal Law does not allow any lottery, gift
enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money, or of any real or personal property by lot,
chance, or drawing of any kind".
The Court held that the "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest" by CALTEX is not a lottery nor a gift
enterprise but rather a gratuitous distribution of
property by chance, which the law does not
prohibit. The term "lottery" extends to all
schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance,
such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize
concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms
of gambling. The three essential elements of a
lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize;
5 | Page JUI NOTES
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASE DIGEST PART 2
and third, chance. The contest in question,
lacking the element of consideration, cannot be
deemed al lottery. The rules of the contest made
no mention of a valuable consideration of some
kind being paid directly or indirectly for the
chance to draw a prize. The term gift enterprise
also could not embrace the scheme at bar. As
already noted, there is no sale of anything to
which the chance offered is attached as an
inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open
to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether
or not they buy the appellee's products.
By virtue of noscitur a sociis which Opinion
217 aforesaid also relied upon although only
insofar as the element of chance is concerned
it is only logical that the term under a
construction should be accorded no other
meaning than that which is consistent with the
nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if
lottery is prohibited only if it involves a
consideration, so also must the term "gift
enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is
not in the law the slightest indication of any
intent to eliminate that element of consideration
from the "gift enterprise" therein included.
Mutuc v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. L-32717, November 26, 1970]
FACTS:
Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to
the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special
civil action against the respondent COMELEC
when the latter informed him through a telegram
that his certificate of candidacy was given due
course but he was prohibited from using jingles in
his mobile units equipped with sound systems
and loud speakers. The petitioner accorded the
order to be violative of his constitutional right to
freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its
prohibition on the premise that the Constitutional
Convention act provided that it is unlawful for the
candidates to purchase, produce, request or
distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda
gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever
nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or
foreign origin. COMELEC contended that the
jingle or the recorded or taped voice of the singer
used by petitioner was a tangible propaganda
material and was, under the above statute,
subject to confiscation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the
petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by
the COMELEC.

HELD:
The Court held that the general words following
any enumeration being applicable only to things
of the same kind or class as those specifically
referred to. The COMELECs contention that a
candidates jingle form part of the prohibition,
categorized under the phrase and the like,
could not merit the courts approval by principle
of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what
was contemplated in the Act was the distribution
of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the
candidate responsible for its distribution.
Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe
construction of the statute which should be in
consonance to the express terms of the
constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the
prohibition may be laudable but it should not be
sought at the cost of the candidates
constitutional rights.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v.
Social Security Commission
[G.R. No. L-15045, January 20, 1961]
FACTS:
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru
counsel, filed a request with the respondent
Social Security Commission a request that they
be exempted from coverage of RA No. 1161,
otherwise known as the Social Security Law of
1954 because said act is a labor law and does not
cover religious and charitable institutions.
Appellant contends that the term "employer" as
defined in the law should following the principle
of ejusdem generis be limited to those who
carry on "undertakings or activities which have
the element of profit or gain, or which are
pursued for profit or gain," because the phrase,
activity of any kind" in the definition is preceded
by the words "any trade, business, industry,
undertaking." Respondent denied the request and
the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Act provides:
in the System shall be compulsory upon all
members between the age of sixteen and sixty
years inclusive, if they have been for at least six
months at the service of an employer who is a
member of the System, Provided, that the
Commission may not compel any employer to
become member of the System unless he shall
have been in operation for at least two years and
has at the time of admission, if admitted for
membership during the first year of the System's
operation at least fifty employees, and if
6 | Page JUI NOTES
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASE DIGEST PART 2
admitted for membership the following year of
operation and t hereafter, at least six employees
Employer is any person, natural or juridical,
domestic or foreign, who carries in the Philippines
any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or
activity of any kind and uses the services of
another person who is under his orders as
regards the employment, except the Government
and any of its political subdivisions, branches or
instrumentalities, including corporations owned
or controlled by the Government"
Employee is any person who performs services
for an 'employer' in which either or both mental
and physicalefforts are used and who receives
compensation for such services"
Employment covers any service performed by
an employer except those expressly enumerated
thereunder,like employment under the
Government, or any of its political subdivisions,
branches or instrumentalitiesincluding
corporations owned and controlled by the
Government, domestic service in a private
home,employment purely casual, etc. (
ISSUE:
Whether or not the term employer following the
principle of ejusdem generis be limited to those
who carry on activities for gain.
HELD:
ejusdem generis applies only where there is
uncertainty
It is not controlling where the plain purpose and
intent of the Legislature would thereby be
hindered and defeated. Contributions are
intended for the protection of said employees
against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age
and death in line with the constitutional mandate
to promote social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of all the people. The law
explicitly states those which are not covered by
the contribution and the petitioner is not among
those cited. Significant to note that when
Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted, services
performed in the employ of institutions organized
for religious or charitable purposes were by
express provisions of said Act excluded from
coverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and
8). That portion of the law, however, has been
deleted by express provision of Republic Act No.
1792, which took effect in 1957. This is clear
indication that the Legislature intended to include
charitable and religious institutions within the
scope of the law.
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASE DIGEST PART 2
Augustus Ceazar Gan v. Hon. Antonio Reyes
[G.R. No. 145527, May 28, 2002]
Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget
When language of the law is clear, no explanation
of it is required
Facts:
Quite apprehensive that she would not be able to
send to school her three (3)-year old daughter
Francheska Joy S. Pondevida, Bernadette S.
Pondevida wrote petitioner Augustus Caezar R.
Gan demanding support for their "love child."
Petitioner, in his reply, denied paternity of the
child. An exasperated Bernadette thereafter
instituted in behalf of her daughter a complaint
against petitioner for support with prayer for
support pendente lite.
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action. He
argued that since Francheska' s certificate of birth
indicated her father as "UNKNOWN," there was no
legal or factual basis for the claim of support. His
motion, however, was denied by the trial court.
Now, the petitioner is ordered by the court to give
P20, 000 every month as a support to his
illegitimate child. The petitioner still is not
satisfied on the decision so he filed an appeal
concerning that the writ of execution must not be
immediate on the reason that the mother of the
child committed adultery which qualifies as a
defense against the action for support.
Issue:
Whether the appeal of the petitioner against the
immediate release of support will be honoured by
the court.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words
of a legal provision we should make no further ex
planation. Absoluta sententia expositore non
indiget. Indeed, the interpretation which
petitioner attempts to foist upon us would only
lead to absurdity, its acceptance negating the
plain meaning of the provision subject of the
petition.
The money and property adjudged for support
and education should and must be given
presently and without delay because if it had to
wait the final judgment, the children may in the
meantime have suffered because of lack of food
or have missed and lost years in school because
of lack of funds. One cannot delay the payment of
7 | Page JUI NOTES
such funds for support and education for the
reason that if paid long afterwards, however
much the accumulated amount, its payment
cannot cure the evil and repair the damage
caused. The children with such belated payment
for support and education cannot act as gluttons
and eat voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to
make up for the years of hunger and starvation.
Neither may they enrol in several classes and
schools and take up numerous subjects all at
once to make up for the years they missed in
school, due to non-payment of the funds when
needed. (De Leon v. Soriano)
People vs. Joselito del Rosario
[GR 127755, April 14, 1999]
Actus me invito factus non est meus actus
An act done by me against my will is not my act
FACTS:
The accused-appellant was convicted of the
robbery with homicide and sentenced to death.
The conviction of the accused was based on the
testimony of a tricycle driver who claimed that
the accused was the one who drove the tricycle,
which the suspects used as their get-away
vehicle. The accused was then invited by the
police for questioning and he pointed to the
location where he dropped off the suspects. When
the police arrived at the supposed hide-out, a
shooting incident ensued, resulting to the death
of some of the suspects. After the incident, the
accused was taken back to the precinct where his
statement was taken on May 14, 1996. However,
this was only subscribed on May 22, 1996 and the
accused was made to execute a waiver of
detention in the presence of Ex-Judge Talavera. It
was noted that the accused was handcuffed
through all this time upon orders of the fiscal and
based on the authorities' belief that the accused
might attempt to escape otherwise.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Miranda rights of the accused-
appellant were violated.
(2) Whether he was part of a conspiracy.
HELD:
(1) YES. It was established that the accused was
not apprised of his rights to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel in the
course of the investigation. The Court held that
the accused should always be apprised of his
Miranda rights from the moment he is arrested by
the authorities as this is deemed the start of
custodial investigation. In fact, the Court included
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASE DIGEST PART 2
invitations by police officers in the scope of
custodial investigations. It is evident in this case
that when the police invited the accused-
appellant to the station, he was already
considered as the suspect in the case. Therefore,
the questions asked of him were no longer
general inquiries into an unsolved crime, but were
intended to elicit information about his
participation in the crime. However, the Miranda
rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is
voluntary, express, in writing and made in the
presence of counsel. Unfortunately, the
prosecution failed to establish that the accused
made such a waiver.
(2) On the issue of conspiracy, the trial court
anchored del Rosarios conviction on his
participation in the orchestrated acts of Boy
Santos, Jun Marquez and Dodong Bisaya.
According to the trial court, del Rosario facilitated
the escape of the other malefactors from the
crime scene and conspiracy between accused
and his passengers was evident because while
the grappling of the bag, the chasing of the
helper of the victim and the shooting that led to
the death of Virginia Bernas were happening,
accused Joselito del Rosario was riding on his
tricycle and the engine of the motor was running;
[29] that the accused did not deny that the
tricycle driven by him and under his control was
hired and used by his co-accused in the
commission of the crime; neither did he deny his
failure to report to the authorities the incident of
robbery, killing and fleeing away from the scene
of the crime.[30]
We disagree with the trial court. A conspiracy in
the statutory language exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
The objective of the conspirators is to perform an
act or omission punishable by law. That must be
their intent. There is need for concurrence of wills
or unity of action and purpose or for common and
joint purpose and design. Its manifestation could
be shown by united and concerted action
In the instant case, while del Rosario admits that
he was at the locus criminis as he was the driver
of the getaway vehicle, he nonetheless rebuts the
imputation of guilt against him by asserting that
he had no inkling of the malevolent design of his
co-accused to rob and kill since he was not given
any briefing thereof. He was merely hired by Boy
Santos to drive to an agreed destination and he
was prevented at gunpoint from leaving the
8 | Page JUI NOTES
scene of the crime since he was ordered to help
them escape.
Sy v. Hon. Merceditas Gutierrez
[November 14, 2012]
Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea
The act itself does not make a man guilty unless
his intentions were so
Facts:
In a Complaint-Affidavit filed by, petitioner, Lily
Sy, she claimed that in the morning of December
16, 1999, respondents Benito Fernandez Go and
Glenn Ben Tiak Sy, together with "Elmo," a
security guard, went to petitioner's residence at
the 10th Floor, Fortune Wealth, 612 Elcano St.,
Binondo, Manila and forcibly opened the door,
destroyed and dismantled the door lock then
replaced it with a new one, without petitioner's
consent. She, likewise, declared that as a
diversionary ruse, respondent, Jennifer was at the
lobby of the same building who informed
petitioners helper Geralyn Juanites that the
elevator was not working. Glenn and Benitos act
of replacing the door lock appeared to be
authorized by a resolution of Fortune Wealth
Mansion Corporations Board of Directors. In the
evening of the same date, petitioner supposedly
saw Benito, Glenn, Jennifer, Merry and respondent
Berthold Lim (Berthold) took from her residence
numerous boxes containing her personal
belongings without her consent and, with intent
to gain, load them inside a family-owned
van/truck named "Wheels in Motion. The same
incident supposedly happened in January 2000
and the "stolen" boxes allegedly reached 34, the
contents of which were valued at P10,
244,196.00. Respondents Benito and Berthold
denied the accusations against them. They
explained that petitioner made the baseless
charges simply because she hated their wives
Merry and Jennifer due to irreconcilable personal
differences on how to go about the estates of
their deceased parents then pending before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 51.
They also manifested their doubts on petitioners
capability to acquire the personal belongings
allegedly stolen by them.
Issue:
Whether the respondent being a co-owner with
the petitioner of the subject property can be
charged of robbery?
Ruling:
NO. Indeed, on second look, we note that what is
involved here is a dispute between and among
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASE DIGEST PART 2
members of a family corporation, the Fortune
Wealth Mansion Corporation. Petitioner Lily Sy
and respondents Merry, Jennifer, and Glenn, all
surnamed Sy, are the owners-incorporators of
said corporation, which owns and manages the
Fortune Wealth Mansion where petitioner
allegedly resided and where the crime of robbery
was allegedly committed. As part-owners of the
entire building and of the articles allegedly stolen
from the 10th floor of said building
the very same properties that are involved
between the same parties in a pending estate
proceeding, the respondents cannot, as co-
owners, be therefore charged with robbery. The
fact of co-ownership negates any intention to
gain, as they cannot steal properties which they
claim to own.
Mapa v. Hon. Joker Arroyo
[July 5, 1989]
Ad proximum antecedens fiat relation nisi
impediatur setentia
Relative words refer to the nearest antecedents,
unless the context otherwise requires
Facts:
Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development
Corporation which are payable in ten years. Mapa
defaulted to pay the instalment dues and
continued to do so despite constant reminders by
Labrador. The latter informed Mapa that the
contracts to sell the lots were cancelled, but
Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the four contracts.
Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the
development of the lots, except those requiring
the services of a public utility company or the
government, within 3 years from the date of the
contract. Petitioner contends that P.D. 957
requires Labrador to provide the facilities,
improvements, and infrastructures for the lots,
and other forms of development if offered and
indicated in the approved subdivision plans.
Issue:
Whether or not Clause 20 of the said contracts
include and incorporate P.D. 957 through the
doctrine of last antecedent, making the
cancellation of the contracts of sale incorrect.
Ruling:
No. Labrador has every right to cancel the
contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause 7 of the said
contract for the reason of the lapse of five years
of default payment from Mapa. P.D. 957 does not
apply because it was enacted long after the
execution of the contracts involved, and, other
9 | Page JUI NOTES
than those provided in Clause 20, no further
written commitment was made by the developer.
The words which are offered and indicated in the
subdivision or condominium plans refer not only
to other forms of development but also to
facilities, improvements, and infrastructures.
The word and is not meant to separate words,
but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or a
union.
Misael Vera et al v. Hon. Jose F. Fernandez
[March 30, 1979]
Argumentum a contrario
Negative-opposite doctrine; what is expressed
puts an end to what is implied
Facts:
The BIR filed on July 29, 1969 a motion for
allowance of claim and for payment of taxes
representing the estate's tax deficiencies in 1963
to 1964 in the intestate proceedings of Luis
Tongoy. The administrator opposed arguing that
the claim was already barred by the statute of
limitation, Section 2 and Section 5 of Rule 86 of
the Rules of Court which provides that all claims
for money against the decedent, arising from
contracts, express or implied, whether the same
be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for
funeral expenses and expenses for the last
sickness of the decedent, and judgment for
money against the decedent, must be filed within
the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are
barred forever.
Issue:
Does the statute of non-claims of the Rules of
Court bar the claim of the government for unpaid
taxes?
Ruling:
No. The reason for the more liberal treatment of
claims for taxes against a decedent's estate in
the form of exception from the application of the
statute of non-claims, is not hard to find. Taxes
are the lifeblood of the Government and their
prompt and certain availability are imperious
need. (CIR vs. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105). Upon
taxation depends the Government ability to serve
the people for whose benefit taxes arecollected.
To safeguard such interest, neglect or omission of
government officials entrusted with the collection
of taxes should not be allowed to bring harm or
detriment to the people, in the same manner as
private persons may be made to suffer
individually on account of his own negligence, the
presumption being that they take good care of
their personal affairs. This should not hold true to
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASE DIGEST PART 2
government officials with respect to matters not
of their own personal concern. This is the
philosophy behind the government's exception,
as a general rule, from the operation of the
principle of estoppel.
People v. Guillermo Manantan
[July 31, 1962]
Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est
A person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally
Facts:
Guillermo Manantan is a justice of peace who
violated Section 54 of the Revised Election Code
which is about aiding of an election candidate on
the election. Manantan argued that the words
justice of peace is not included on the
enumeration on Section 54 not like on the section
449 of the Revised Administrative Code. The rule
of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is
likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee.
Under the said rule, a person, object or thing
omitted from an enumeration must be held to
have been omitted intentionally. If that rule is
applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of
the peace must be held to have been
intentionally and deliberately exempted from the
operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code.
Issue:
Whether a justice of peace included in the
prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code?
Ruling:
Yes. The rule "casus omisus pro omisso habendus
est" has no applicability to the case at bar. The
maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply
only if and when the omission has been clearly
established. In the case under consideration, it
has already been shown that the legislature did
not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging
in partisan political activities. Rather, they were
merely called by another term. In the new law, or
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices
of the peace were just called "judges."
People v. Almuete
[February 27, 1975]
Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex
When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases.
10 | P a g e J U I N O T E S
Facts:
Wenceslao Almuete, Fernando Fronda, Cipriano
Fronda and Fausto Durion were charged with a
violation of section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy
Law. It was alleged in the information that the
accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in
her riceland, without notice to her or without her
consent, pre-threshed a portion of their
respective harvests of five cavans of palay each
to her damage.
The lower court held that the information is
basically deficient because it does not describe
the circumstances under which the cavans of
palay were found in the possession of the
accused tenants; it does not specify the date
agreed upon for the threshing of the harvests,
and it does not allege that the palay found in the
tenants' possession exceeded ten percent of their
net share based on the last normal harvest.
Issue:
Whether or not the tenant's act of pre- reaping
and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord is
punishable pursuant to Section 39 of the
Agricultural Tenancy Law.
Ruling:
No. The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-
threshing found in section 39 of the Agricultural
Tenancy Law of 1954 is premised on the
existence of the rice share tenancy system. The
evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the
landholder from defrauding each other in the
division of the harvests. Thus, the legal maxim,
cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex (the reason
for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases)
applies to this case.
Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms
declared agricultural share tenancy throughout
the country as contrary to public policy and
automatically converted it to agricultural
leasehold. Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed
the entire country "as a land reform area".
The legislative intent not to punish anymore the
tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing
without notice to the landlord is inferable from
the fact that the Code of Agrarian Reforms did not
reenact section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy
Law and that it abolished share tenancy which is
the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-reaping
and pre-threshing.
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASE DIGEST PART 2
As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping
and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord,
which is an offense under the Agricultural
Tenancy Law, had ceased to be an offense under
the subsequent law, the Code of Agrarian
Reforms. To prosecute it as an offense when the
Code of Agrarian Reforms is already in force
would be repugnant or abhorrent to the policy
and spirit of that Code and would subvert the
manifest legislative intent not to punish anymore
pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to
landholder.
People v. Isabelo Puno, et. Al.
[February 17, 1993]
Contemporanea exposition est optima et
fortissimo in lege
The contemporary construction is the strongest
law
Facts:
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a
bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called
Nika Cakes and Pastries. At around 5:00 in the
afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused
Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs.
Sarmiento's husband, arrived at the bakeshop.
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in
Pasig came and so she got into the car. After the
car turned right in a corner, it stopped and then a
young man, accused Enrique Amurao, and
boarded the car beside the driver. Once inside,
Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the
front seat and went onto where Ma. Socorro was
seated at the rear. He poked a gun at her and
Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his
nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to
get money from you." She said she has money
inside her bag and they may get it just so they
will let her go. The bag contained P7, 000.00. The
two accused told her they wanted P100, 000.00
more. Socorro agreed to give them that but would
they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St.,
Makati where the money is located. Beloy asked
Socorro to issue a check for P100, 000.00.
Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in
denominations of two for P30 thousand and one
forP40 thousand. Being able to escape by
jumping out of the vehicle, Socorro upon reaching
Balintawak, reported the matter to CAPCOM.
Issue:
Whether or not the said robbery can be classified
as "highway robbery" under PD No.532 (Anti-
Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)
11 | P a g e J U I N O T E S
Ruling:
No. PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only
acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
indiscriminately against any person or persons on
Philippine highways and not acts of robbery
committed against only a predetermined or
particular victim. The mere fact that the robbery
was committed inside a car which was casually
operating on a highway does not make PD No 532
applicable to the case.
Arnel Sagana v. Richard Francisco
[October 2, 2008]
Dura lex sed lex
The law may be harsh, but that is the law.
Facts:
Petitioner filed a Complaint, before Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, to recover damages
alleging that on November 20, 1992, respondent
with intent to kill him and without justifiable
reason, shot him with a gun hitting him on the
right thigh. On January 31, 1995, Process Server
Manuel Panlasigue attempted to personally serve
summons at respondents address at No. 36
Sampaguita Street, Baesa Q.C., but was
unsuccessful. In his Servers Return, he stated that
the occupant in that house refused to give his
identity and that respondent is unknown at said
residence. The Trial Court also attempted to serve
summons to the respondents office through
registered mail, however, respondent failed to
pick up summons. The case was dismissed by the
Trial Court on account of petitioners lack of
interest to prosecute that he did not take action
since the filing of the Servers Return. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, contended that
he exerted efforts to locate the respondent, it was
confirmed that respondent indeed lived at No. 36
Sampaguita Street, Bausa, Q.C. Trial Court
granted the Motion with a condition upon the
service of summon on the respondent within 10
days from the receipt of the Order. On August 25,
1995, Process Server Jarvis Iconar tried to serve
summons at respondents address but no avail. In
his handwritten annotation, he stated that
respondents brother, Michael Francisco, told him
that respondent no longer lived at the said
address, however, Iconar left a copy of the
summons to Michael Francisco. Petitioner filed a
Motion to Declare Respondent in Default for
failure off respondent to file Answer despite the
service of summons. Trial Court declared that the
summons was validly served to respondent,
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASE DIGEST PART 2
declared that respondent in default and allowed
petitioner to present his evidence ex parte.
Michael Francisco, through his lawyer filed a
Manifestation and Motion, he denied that he
received the summons and he was authorized to
receive on behalf of his brother. He prayed his
name to be stricken off the records as having
received the copy of summons. In his Affidavit of
Merit, he asserted that he was 19 y/o, and
respondent had left the house since 1993 and
respondent would only write or call them without
informing his whereabouts. On the other hand,
petitioner attached in his Rejoinder, the Affidavit
prepared by respondent dated December 23,
1992, where declared he was a resident of No. 36
Sampaguita St. Bausa Q.C. and the lawyer who
notarized the affidavit was the same lawyer who
represented his brother. Trial Court denied the
Manifestation and Motion for lack of merit, it
rendered a judgment in favor of the petitioner,
ordered respondent to pay the damages.
Respondent received the copy of the Trial Courts
Decision, he then filed a Notice of Appeal to Court
of Appeals. The appellate court directed the
parties to file respective briefs, a copy of which
was sent by respondent at No. 36 Sampaguita St.,
Bausa, Q.C. Respondent prayed that the trial
court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the
person, despite the irregularity of the substituted
service of summons by the court Process Server
and in awarding of damages to petitioner. Court
of Appeals rendered decision granting the Appeal
of respondent and setting aside the decision of
the trial court for the irregularity of the service of
summons. Petitioner filed Petition for Review on
Certiorari to Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the substituted service of summons was
validly made upon respondent through his
brother.
Ruling:
The Petition for Review on Certiorari was granted,
Court of Appeals decision was reversed and set
aside, and the Trial Court decision was reinstated
and affirmed. Although, in general, the statutory
requirement of substituted service must be
followed strictly, faithfully and fully and that any
substituted service other than that authorized by
Rules is considered ineffective. The Supreme
Court ruled that strict application of the Rules is
not warranted to this case as it would clearly
frustrate the spirit of laws as well as do injustice
to the parties waiting almost 15 years for
resolution of this case. The respondents actively
attempt to frustrate the proper service of
12 | P a g e J U I N O T E S
summons by refusing to give their identity,
rebuffing requests to sign for or receive
documents or eluding the officers of court.
Respondent tried to avoid the service of
summons, prompting the court to declare that
sheriff must be resourceful, but sheriffs cannot be
faulted of the respondent themselves engage in
deception to thwart the orderly administration of
justice.
Liwag v. Happy Glen Loop Homeowners
Assoc.
[July 4, 2012]
Ejusdem generis
Of the same kind or specie
Facts:
In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of
Happy Glen Loop, loaned from Ernesto Marcelo,
owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The
former failed to settle its debts with the latter, so,
he assigned all his rights to Marcelo over several
parcels of land in the Subdivision including the
receivables from the lots already sold. As the
successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot
buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and
the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission
(HSRC) that a water facility is available in the
subdivision. The said water facility has been the
only source of water of the residents for thirty
(30) years. In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot
11, Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-
350099was issued to the latter. In 2003,
Hermogenes died. Petitioner, wife of
Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the
respondent Association demanding the removal
of the over headwater tank over the parcel of
land. The latter refused and filed a case before
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
against T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation,
petitioner and the surviving heirs of Hermogenes.
The HLURB ruling was in favor of the respondent
Association. One of the things it affirmed was the
existence of an easement for water
system/facility or open space on Lot 11, Block 5
of TCT No. C-350099 wherein the deep well and
overhead tank are situated. However, on appeal
before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the
Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open
space.
Issue:
Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen
Loop is considered an open space as defined in
P. D. 1216.

Ruling:
Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is
considered an open space.
The Court used the basic statutory construction
principle of ejusdem generis to determine
whether the area falls under other similar
facilities and amenities since P. D. 1216 makes
no specific mention of areas reserved for water
facilities.
Ejusdem generis - states that where a general
word or phrase follows an enumeration of
particular and specific words of the same class,
the general word or phrase is to be construed to
include or to be restricted to things akin to or
resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those
specifically mentioned. Applying that principle,
the Court found out that the enumeration refers
to areas reserved for the common welfare of the
community.
Therefore, the phrase other similar facilities and
amenities should be interpreted in like manner.
It is without a doubt that the facility was used for
the benefit of the community. Water is a basic
necessity, without which, survival in the
community would be impossible
Bough and Bough v. Cantiveros and Hanopol
[September 29, 1919]
Ex dolo malo non oritur actio
No man can be allowed to found a claim upon his
own wrongdoing
Facts:
Defendant Matilde Cantiveros is regarded as the
richest resident of Carigara, Leyte and was the
owner of various parcels of realty of the value of
thirty thousand pesos or more. In 1912, she
signed a marital contract of separation from her
husband. Petitioner Basilia Bough is the cousin of
the defendant and was married to Gustavus
Bough. Through the influence of Gustavus Bough,
who brought a story to Cantiveros that her
husband was in town and might contest the
contract for the separation of the conjugal
property, she was induced to sign a fictitious
contract of sale of all her property to Basilia
Bough. As an assurance, the spouses signed a
document donating the said properties to
Cantiveros in case of their death and their
children.
Petitioners Basilia Bough and Gustavus Bough
sought to have themselves put in possession of
13 | P a g e J U I N O T E S
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASE DIGEST PART 2
the property covered by the dead of sale quoted
in the complaint, and to require the defendant
Matilde Cantiveros to pay them damages and
costs. Cantiveros answered with a general denial
and a special defense in which she asked that
judgment be rendered declaring the contract of
sale made between herself and Basilia Bough
null. The plaintiffs, thereupon, denied under oath
the genuineness and due execution of the so-
called donation intervivos set forth in the answer.
The Court of First Instance of Leyte, therefore,
declared the deed of sale fictitious, null, and
without effect.
Issue:
WON the Dead of Sale, hereby a fictitious
document, is valid and has legal effects?
Ruling:
NO. As the maxim goes, Ex dolo malo non oritur
actio, it is well settled that a party to an illegal
contract cannot come into a court of law and ask
to have his illegal objects carried out. Where,
however, the parties to an illegal contract are not
equally guilty, and where public policy is
considered as advanced by allowing the more
excusable of the two to sue for relief against the
transaction, relief is given to him. Cases of this
character are, where they conveyance was
wrongfully induced by the grantee through
imposition or overreaching, or by false
representations, especially by one in a
confidential relation. The Court, therefore,
affirmed the decision of the trial court against the
petitioners.
Lerum v. Cruz
[November 29, 1950]
FACTS:
This is an appeal for a petition for declaratory
relief. Attys. Lerum and Fernando filed for this
petition in order to test the sufficiency and
probative value of a testimony in a bigamy case
by (former) Judge Cruz regarding the issuance of
a divorce decree. It also appears that the petition
was at first filed by City Attorney Jose F.
Fernandez, and by Attorneys Eulogio R. Lerum
and G. Viola Fernando as private prosecutors in
the bigamy case No. 962, but later, upon motion
filed by City Attorney Fernandez, his name was
stricken out from the pleadings, and so an
amended petition was filed wherein Attorneys
Lerum and Viola Fernando appeared as the only
petitioners representing the People of the
Philippines. It finally appears that Attorneys
Lerum and Viola Fernando made an attempt to
have the Solicitor General appear as counsel, but
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASE DIGEST PART 2
this attempt was again ruled out on the ground
that under the law the Solicitor General can only
be required to intervene when the validity of a
statute is involved.
ISSUE:
Can the attorneys file a petition for declaratory
relief regarding the sufficiency and probative
value of (former) Judge Cruzs testimony?
HELD:
No, the petition for declaratory relief cannot be
granted. Under Sec 1, Rule 66of the Rules of
Court, declaratory relief may only be granted to a
14 | P a g e J U I N O T E S
person whose rights are affected by a statute or
ordinance, or who is interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument. The
sufficiency and probative value of a testimony,
which is the subject matter for declaratory relief
in the instant case, is not included in the
enumeration. This means that the subject matter
must refer to a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance,
to warrant declaratory relief. Any other matter not
mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is
under the principle of expressio unius est
exclussio alterius. Thus, the assailed order is
affirmed.