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C a r l S d in iitt: P olitics a n d T h e o r y
P a u l Ed w a rd G ottfrie d
T h e L e v ia th a n in the State T h e o r y o f T h o m a s H o b b e s : M e a n i n g a n d
F a ilu re o f a S y m b o l
C a rl S ch m itt
T ra nslated hy George Schxuab a n d E r n a lE dfstein
S e le c te d W o rk s o f Juan D o n o s o C o rt s
J u a n D on oso Corts
Transbiled , edited, a n d in trod u ced by JeJfrey P. J oh n so n
T h e L a t e r S ecurity C o n fe d e ra t io n s : T h e A m e r ic a n , N e w Swiss, a n d
G e r m a n U n io n s
Frederick K. L is te r
Carl Schmitt
Translated by Joseph W. Bendersky
C o n t r i b u t i o n s in P o lit ic a l S c ie n c e , N n n i b c r 397
G l o b a l P e r s p e c t iv e s in H is t o r y a n d P o litic s
0) ^ Westport, Connecticut
London
Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Piiblicatioii Data
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Latest ed itio n U itc r d ie di ci A rte n des red itsw isseu sch aftlieh en D en ken s, Ity Car]
Schm itt, D n n ek er & H n m ltlo t, 1993. T h e o iig in a l v e is io ii o f this b o o k was p rin ted
in G erm a n .
teacher, fr ie n d , g u a r d ia n
Contents
.\( kiiowledgments ix
(in c lu s io n 97
viii C ontents
Notes 101
Bibliography 115
In dex 121
Acknowledgments
IIISTORIOGRAPHICAL TRENDS
|)i ()fessional career. This was the new m ilieu in which Schmitt
had been cautiously feeling his uncertain way since the spring o f
1933.
( lO N C E PT S A N D L A N G U A G E : S C H M IT T S
( O N C E S S IO N S T O N A Z IS M
th e re a re p e o p le w h o w ith o u t territory,
as the o n ly r e a s o n a b le le g a l th o u gh t. '*
IMF LEGACY
a g a i n s t a c a p r i c i o u s a n d a r b i t r a r y a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e la w a n d e n -
siii e f a i r n e s s a n d d u e p r o c e s s ?
It is j u s t s u c h q u e s t i o n s t h a t h a v e g r e a t l y c o n c e r n e d c u r r e n t
( I ilic s w h o f e a r t h e i n s i d i o u s i n f l u x o f c o n c r e t e - o r d e r t h i n k i n g
a n d g e n e r a l c la u s e s i n t o l e g a l a n d s o c ia l t h e o r y as w e l l a s in t o
la w a n d p u b l i c p o lic y . W h e t h e r t h e i r a p p r e h e n s i o n a b o u t s u c h
s u b t le t r e n d s i n G e r m a n s o c ie t y a n d l a w is w e l l f o u n d e d is y e t to
he d e te r m in e d .
I n a n y e v e n t , t h e p l a c e o f O n th e T h re e Types o f J u r is tic T h o u g h t
III th e b r o a d e r c o n t e x t o f S c h m it t s o e u v r e w i ll n o t r e s t p r i m a r i ly
o n ih is o u t c o m e . F o r th is w o r k o f f e r s f a r m o r e t h a n a n i n t r o d u c -
lio n o f t h e c o n c e p t o f c o n c r e t e - o r d e r t h i n k i n g . I t c o n t a in s a m a
im a d ju s t m e n t t o th e d e c i s i o n i s m s o i n e x t r i c a b ly i d e n t i f i e d w it h
S( h m it t s n a m e a n d le g a l t h e o r y a n d w h i c h p e r v a d e d s o m u c h
o f h is m a j o r w r it in g . M o r e o v e r , it o f f e r s p e r h a p s S c h m it t s c l e a r -
< si a n d m o s t e l a b o r a t e c r i t i q u e o f n o r m a t i v i s m a n d p o s it iv is m .
11le s e r e a s o n s a l o n e m a k e it e s s e n t ia l r e a d i n g f o r a n y s t u d y o f
S( lim ilt .
NOTES
>. F o r a rec en t discussion o f the Schm itt ren aissan ce, see the in tro-
d III lion in A n d r e a s K o e n e n , D e r F u ll C a rl Sch m itt: Sein A u fstieg zu m K ro n -
Sch m itt studies, see W illia m R asch, C o n flic t as V o c atio n : C a rl Schm itt
a n d the Possibility o f Politics, in Theory, C u ltu re & Society: E x p lora tio n s in
W e im a r D e m o c ra c y , T h e A m e riea n J o u r n a l o f J u risp ru d en ce 39 (1 9 9 4 ):
m a n in C e n tra l E u ro p e a n H is to ry 3 4 , n o . 1 (2 0 0 1 ); 1 1 6 -1 2 0 .
Sty'irr (B e r lin , 1 9 8 8 ), 3 1 9 -3 4 0 .
no. I (J a n u a r y 1 9 9 7 ); 125-140.
10. S e e S p e c ia l Issue, C a rl Schm itt; E n e m y o r Foe? Telos: A Q iin r-
h dy p m r n a l o f C r itic a l T h o u g h t 72 (S u m m e r 1 9 8 7 ), a n d m o st issues o f
(he 1990s.
I 1. K o e n e n , D e r F a ll C a r l Schm itt, 4 4 9 -5 0 5 .
150-151, 1 5 9 -1 6 1 .
15. S ee C a ld w e ll, C e rm a n C o n s titu tio n a l La w , passim .
I VW, 4 0 -5 1 .
34 O n Ihe Three Types o f J u ris tic T h o u g h t
a rism u s,'' x x x v i.
18. K m e rs o n , Stale a n d Sovereignty, 1 5 9 -1 6 7 , 2 0 7 -2 0 8 ; Ro.scoe P o u n d ,
245; C a ld w e ll, 4 2 -4 4 .
1 9 . Ib id .
20. C a rl Schm itt, V h er Sch u ld u n d Schuldat-ien: E in e term in ologisch e U n
ters u ch u n g (B r e s la u , 1910).
21. C a rl Schm itt, Gesetz u n d U rte il: E in e U n te rs u c h u n g zu m Problem der
14.5-154.
27. C a r l Schm itt, D e r H t e r der V erfassung ( T b i n g e n , 1 9 3 1 ).
IM VerfassungsreehtlicheAufstze, 1 4 0-1 7 3 .
m a n C o n s e n a tis m (P r in c e t o n , 1 9 6 6 ), 2 5 9 -2 7 6 .
(T b i n g e n , 1 9 1 4 ), 83.
39. G e o r g e S c h w a b has o fl'e r e d s o m e in sigh t o n this q u e stio n . A c
ic iu 'w e d ch arge s that ScVimill was an anti-Sem ite, these notes a n d the
l.M'witness A cc o u n ts ( N e w Y o rk , 1 9 83 ), 1: 14.
1.5. H e r e , too, a sim ilar am bigtiity in m e a n in g existed in Sch m itts c h o
49. Riilhens, Entartetes Recht, 54, 66, 73; Neum ann, Behemoth,
N a c h la s s, R W 26.5-6269, H au p tslaatsarch iv , D s s e ld o r f.
2 7 2 -2 7 5 .
I iih ix lu r tio n 39
I 1 .37.
M a x W e b e ru n d C a rl S ch m itt (W e in h e im , 1 9 9 1 ), 430-4.37.
(' crn e in s c h a ft. Just as in the w ord and concept com bination
hVcte-order both distinctive concepts mutually determ ine
R echt a n d order, so too is N o m o s m the juxtaposition N o m o s - k i n g "
already thought oi as a concrete order o f life and community in
so far as the word king is supposed to have a m eaning here at
all. Likewise, king is a legalistic concept o f order, which must
he brought into conform ity { g le ic h g e a r ie t) with N om os, i f the n o
lion o f N o m o s -\ d n g " is supposed to be m ore than a superficial
word combination and denote a genuine classification. Just as
N em os is king, so is king N om os, and we thereby find ourselves
already again in concrete decisions and institutions instead o f
abstract norms and general rules. Even if one endeavors to des
ignate a ju d ge as a pure organ o f the pure norm, who is only de
pendent upon the norm and only subject to the law, and in this
manner perm it only the norm to govern, one still proceeds
along orders and a hierarchical sequence o f authorities and sub
jects oneself not to a pure norm but to a concrete order.
For a law cannot apply, administer, or en force itself. It can
neither interpret, nor define, nor sanction itself; it cannot
wilhout ceasing to be a norm even designate or appoint the
Ioncrcte men who are supposed to interpret and administer it.
Fvcn the independent ju d ge, subject only to the law, is not a
normativistic but rather an order concept, indicating a compe-
k-nt authority and m em ber o f an order system o f officials and
authorities. That this very concrete person is the duly appointed
judge, results not from rules and norms, but from a concrete ju
dicial organization and concrete personal appointments and
nominations. Thus, it remains forever correct, what H ld erlin '"
said in a note to his translation o f the aforem entioned passage
from Pindars N o m o s b c is ile u y N Nom os, the law, is here disci
pline { Z u c h t), in so far as it is the form within which man en
counters him self and God. It is the church and the law o f the
land and inherited rules that, m ore firmly than art, em body the
living relations within which a people encounters others and
ilsclf in tim e.
52 O n the Three Types o f J u ris tic T h o u g h t
fro m the will o f the legislator, through the will o f the law, to the
law itself. It is natural to surmise from this an intrinsically consis
tent developm ent from will to norm, from decision to regula
tion, from decisionism to normativism. But instead o f growing
out o f the intrinsic consistency o f a specific m ode o f thought,
this sequence has only becom e possible through the peculiar
combination o f decisionism and normativism in the form o f pos
itivism. D epending upon the situation at hand, it permits posi
tivism to be sometimes decisionist and sometimes normativist in
order to satisfy the sole authoritative positivist requirem ent fo r
certainty and calculability. That positivity always lies in the inter
est o f the real certainty, firmness, and calculability o f that which
is actually realizable, whether that be the decision o f the legisla
tor or whether it be the statute emanating from his decision and
the legally calculable decision emanating from that statute. That
positive value o f law is distinct from other kinds o f value in that
it is neces.sarily always something real and factually realizable di
rectly through human power.
Now a fact, a pure fact, is naturally not a source o f law. Th e
jurisprudential question focuses on how this solely factual
point will o f the law or the m om ent o f the realized value to
which the positivist adheres, is to be com prehended juristically,
whether as norm or as decision or as part o f an order. T h e posi
tivist will be inclined to dismiss this question as to the beginning
o f the positive value o f the norm as in itself no lon ger a juristic
question. But he cannot also escape the jurisprudential neces
sity, already at the point at which he initiates his jurisprudential
activity, to include the stttirces o f Recht o r the foundation o f
value in a jurisprudential category. H e will, therefore, explain
every real factual m om ent in which the positive value begins, ei
ther normatively or decisionistically. From the normativist side,
a nineteenth-century positivist, G eorg Jellinek, had coined the
typical expression: normative power o f the factual. Because
he proceeds from the normative motivating power o f law,
facts and data, which undoubtedly exercise a particularly strong
D is tin ctio n s a m o n g J u r is tic Ways o f T h in k in g 69
punishm ent in the years 1872 and 1873, and the Im perial
d ecree regarding hon or courts o f May 2. 1874, these adver
saries w ere hound to clash publicly with each other. L eader
ship and the power o f com m and, supreme com m and, supreme
comm ander-in-chief, and supreme legal authority, could not be
torn apart from each other without destroying the Prussian
Army. T h e leadership necessary in every concrete-order unit
and community showed here its intrinsic connection with the
coticcpts o f discipline and honor.
For normativistic-constitutional legal thought, however, it was
juristically self-evident that every jurisdiction, as a I'unction
stringently bound to norm , had to be separated from leader
ship. A dom inating kind o f legal thought based on the com
plete antithesis o f norm and comm and. Lex and Rex cannot at
all legally grasp leadership thinking {Fhrergedanken). It de
mands, therefore, an oath to the constitution, to a norm, instead
o f to a leader {Fhrer) Its doctrine o f separation o f powers,
separates justice and administration and makes necessary an
even sharper separation o f military jurisdiction, disciplinary ju
risdiction, and military leadership. For the Prussian king, how
ever, every individual verdict o f the honor court and every
appointm ent o f a military ju d g e was as much a discharge o f his
military leadership as a general order regarding hon or courts
and their principles. That it would also be legally impermissible
and impossible to tear military leadership, application o f disci
pline, qualifications o f officers, and disciplinary legal affairs
from each other, must simply be understood in itself as the legal
sentiment o f a Prussian king who thinks entirely in terms o f the
concrete ord er o f the Prussian Aimy.
Ibday, after concrete-order thinking has again been revived
with a new communal life {Gemeinschaftsleben), the legal axiom
that truth, discipline, and honor cannot be separated from lead
ership, is better understood by us than the liberal-constitutional,
power-separating, norm ativistic way o f thinking o f a bygone
individualism . ' Since the political m ovem ent {slaatslragende
C la ssifica tion o f J u ris tic Ways o f T h in k in g 83
crim inal law does not begin with a general part, but with the
specific punishable offense. The detaclim ent o f general con
cepts like guilt, aiding and abetting, and attempt, from con
crete crimes like treason, theft, or arson, appears to us today no
lon ger as a conceptual clarification or as a guarantee o f greater
legal certainty and precision, but m ore as an artificial and non
sensical abstraction tearing apart the natural and actually exist
ing relationships o f life.
Also in tax law, whose definitiveness shares the same funda
m ental significance fo r legal thought, other legal concepts
directly related to econ om ic and social reality replace the
elaborate, seem inglyjuristically firm concepts taken over fro m
civil law. This is, therefore, o f symptomatic significance beyond
the narrower sphere o f tax law, because tax law, analogcxus to
budget law in constitutional life, was a kind o f holy shrine o f
liberal-constitutional positivism. Th e only jurisprudential system
o f tax law to em erge since 1919, that is, since the developm ent o f
Germany as a reparations and taxation state, systematically devel
oped the doctrine o f the matter-of-factness o f the public right
o f taxation deliberately analogfxus to criminal law."" But precisely
in tax law it has above all becom e obvious that a just and mean
ingful regulation cannot be accomplished with the help o f the in
creasingly irrelevant concepts o f a pure positivism. In the Reich
tax code o f Decem ber 13, 1919, the groundbreaking clause o f
paragraph 4 already establishes that in the interpretation o f tax
legislation its purpose, its econom ic significance, and unfolding
circumstances are to be taken into account. With this, cxxllapses
the foundation o f positivist certainty, the autarchy o f the self-
contained, definite contents o f the statute. In the developm ent o f
German sales-tax legislation from the law o f July 26, 1918, to the
additional laws o f May 8, 1926, w4iat had at first gained accep
tance in the tax area, also found a systematic jurisprudential ex
pression. German sales-tax legislation intentionally broke with
the inherited tyjjcs o f legal transactions and contracts conceived
C la ssifica tion o f J u ris tic Ways o f T h in k in g 93
such as marriage, family, Stand, and state, and dem and an opin
ion on fundamental principles.*'"
W h ile this disintegration o f positivistic rules and statute
thinking is occurring in the developm ent o f crim inal and tax
law, numerous new orders have em erged in other areas o f pub
lic law, which com pletely shun the nineteenth-century way o f
thinking. Th e new constitutional and administrative law has re
alized the leadership principle and with it concepts like loyalty,
followers, discipline, and hon or that could only be under
stood in terms o f a concrete order and Gemeinschaft/'' Political
unity is form ed by the tripartite order state, m ovem ent, p eo
ple. T h e construction o stndischen Einrichtungen (institutions)
will even m ore fo rcefu lly realize the idea o f the inseparable
connection o f leadership, discipline, and honcxr and thereby
overcom e a norm ativism erected on the earlier principle o f
separation o f powers. W ithin a .stanch'icA-organized Volk, a ma
jo rity o f cxrders always governs, each o f whom must form fo r it
self the jurisdiction cjf its tw n Stand so many Stnde, so many
benches. *
However, the National Socialist lawgiver has expressed most
clearly the new ord er thinking in its Law fo r the Organization
o f National La b or o f January 20, 1934. I f one recalls the above-
m entioned (p. 81) failed attempt in labor law to overcom e the
private contractual notion with the help o f the concept o f agree
ment, at least fo r the area o f wage agreements, then this new
law fo r the ord er o f national labor appears as a forceful step.
With one stroke it leaves behind an entire world o f individualis
tic thinking o f contractual and legal relationships. Th at law
speaks intentionally no lon ger o f employers and employees;
in the place o f wage agreements steps a wage order. Entrepre
neurs, employees, and workers are leaders and followers {Eiihrer
und Gefolgschaft) o f a firm , working together fo r the advance
m ent o f the firm s aims and fo r the com m on g o o d o f Volk and
state; botfi appear as members o f a com m on order, a com m u
nity with a public-legal character. The Social H o n o r Court is a
C la s s ijic a lio n o f f u r i s t k Ways o f T h in k in g 95
inanifesled the essential course o f the new order and form ation
thinking^
To the traditional positivist type o f thinker, the undeniable
advance o f the new juristic way o f thinking appears, o f course,
only as a corrective to his old m ethod, like the earlier Free-Law
M ovem ents similar loosening o f rigidity as a m ere adjustment
to a new condition fo r the purpose o f continuing and preserv
ing the previous type. But the change in the jurisprudential way
o f thinking is today linked with a change in the entire fram e
work o f the state. A ll transformations o f a juristic type o f think
ing stand, as was shown ahove, in the great historical and
systematic relationship that the m om entary situation o f the po
litical life o f the community places them. Th e decisionism o f
Hobhes in the seventeenth century belongs to the age o f perva
sive princely absolutism, and the rational-law normativism to
the eighteenth centtiry. So too, the combination o f decisionism
and normativism, which since the nineteenth century rep re
sents the dom inance o f legal positivism, is explained in terms o f
a specific dualistic relationship o f state and civil society, and by
the dualistic structure o f the political unit o f that time, which,
in a disintegrating state and society, alternated between the
state-of-exception and legality. As soon as this dualistic struc
ture o f state and state-free society ceases, the jurisprudential
type o f thinking belon gin g to it must also collapse.
Th e state o f the present is no lon ger a dualistic one separated
into state and society, but one built upon the tripartite order o f
state, movement, people. T h e state, as a special part o f the or
der within the political unit, no longer has a m onopoly on the
political, but is only one organ o f the Fhrer o i the movement.
T h e previous decisionistic or normativistic or positivistic legal
thinking com bined o f both is no lon ger adequate fo r a political
unit constructed in this way. Now a concrete order and form a
tion thinking is required that will measure up to the numerous
new tasks o f the governm ental, vlkisch, econom ic, and id e o lo g
ical conditions and to the new form o f community. T h erefore,
C o n c lu s io n 99
C hallenge o f the E x cep tion : A n In tro d u ctio n to the P o litic a l Ideas o f C a rl Schm itt
o f a p e o p l e ) as e x p re s s e d in historical cu stom s.
an cien t G r e e k h a r m o n y o f b o d y a n d m in d .
le g a l o r d e r . O i t o M a ye r, Deutsches VerwaUungsrechl, 2 n d e d . (M u n i c h
o n its h e a d . H o w e v e r, it c o u ld o n ly b e r e fu t e d o n g r o u n d s o f p ra c tic a l
19.33), 36.
20. [T r .] G o d is u n fe t t e r e d fr o m law. H e h im s e lf is L a w u n to H i m
w h ic h co n ta in s an in fo r m a t iv e c h a p t e r o n p o litic al th e o lo g y .
the f o u n d i n g fa th ers o f ju r is p r u d e n c e .
23. [T r.] M u c h o f S ch m itts o w n w o rk h a d b e e n sig n ific an tly in flu
(C h ic a g o , 1 9 96 ), 61.
27. J. B o n n e c a s e , L cole de Texgse (P a ris , 1 9 2 4 ).
D ritte n R eich (M u n ic h , 1 9 8 8 ), 3 6 -4 1 .
29. T h e m o st ra d ic a l re p re se n tativ e o f positivist le g a l certainty is J e
to h a ve m e a s u r a b le a n d d e t e r m in a b le content, in w h ic h la w a n d the
fect clarity.
m a n b e h a v io r a n d an e m p ir ic a l ju r is p r u d e n c e m o d e le d o n the e x p e r
im e n ta l m e t h o d . A ls o o f im p o rt a n c e f o r S ch m itt w as that B e n t h a m
r e m a in e d a relen tless critic o f c o m m o n law.
33. A llg em ein e Slaalslehre, 3 r d e d ., 341, 360, 371 (th e first e d itio n a p
p e a r e d in 1 9 0 0 ); the b asic n o rm ativ ist thesis is p r e s e n te d o n p. 355:
m o d e le d them selves.
York, 1 9 58 ), 4 1 8 -4 2 7 .
37. W e im a r issue 391, p. 10
38. [T r .] S a m u e l P u f e n d o r f (1 6 3 2 -1 6 9 4 ) m a r k e d a t u rn in g p o in t in
fe r e d a c o m p r e h e n s iv e system o f n a t u r a l la w that in c lu d e d in te rn a
tio n al law. S ee C a r l j. F rie d ric h , T h e P h ilosop h y o f l.a w in H is to r ic a l
Perspective (C h ic a g o , 1 9 5 8 ), 1 1 2 -1 2 1 .
39. P a rtic u la rly ch aracteristic is the d e riv a tio n o f the authority o f f a
m a r r ia g e a n d fa m ily e v e n m o r e a s to u n d in g .
1 9 68 ), 25, 4 7 -6 9 .
42. [T r .] O n e o f G e r m a n y s greatest p h ilo s o p h e r s , J o h a n n G o t t lie b
s o m e o th e r fo r c e , if it is in c o r p o r a t e d by o th e rs striv in g to d e v e lo p
b u t a m o n g p e o p le s , w h o s e g e n e r a l f r e e d o m a n d that o f e v e r y o n e is
g iv e n o v e r to e v e ry o n e p e rs o n a lly w ith o u t re p r e s e n t a t io n .
fie ld o f G e r m a n i c le g a l history. A m o n g h is c o r e id e a s w e r e th a t la w
G e rm a n y . G ie r k e e x e rc is e d a g r e a t d e a l o f in flu e n c e o n his s tu d e n t
1 9 5 8 ),
w ee k s b e f o r e h e in t r o d u c e d his id e a s o n c o n c r e t e -o r d e r th in k in g ,
S ch m itt h a d d e liv e re d a p u b lic le c tu re a l the U n iv e rsity o f B e r lin o n
( H a m b u r g , 1 9 3 4 ). A c c o r d i n g to G e o r g e S c h w a b , S ch m itt w as a ttem p t
in g to create a fr a m e w o rk in w h ic h the arm y w o u ld b e a m a jo r p a rt o f
o a t h b o u n d th e m to o b e d i e n c e to H itle r, w h ile o th e rs u s e d it as a
in g its m o s t m u r d e r o u s a n d b a r b a r o u s stages. N o a k e s a n d P r id h a m ,
N a z ism , 6.35-6.36.
w e ll as B o n n e c a s e s c o m m e n ts (p . 2 6 2 ) a re o f sp ec ia l interest o n this
p o in t.
112 N oies
55. It h as le ft b e h in d , in the th re e v o lu m e s e d it e d by A . H a u r io u in
h is c o lle c t e d a n n o ta tio n s lo the d e cisio n s o f th e C onseil d E la t a n d the
(P aris, 1 930); L in stitu tio n , fon d em en t d u n e ren ova tion de Tordre social
(P a iis , 1 9 33 ); see also the article by Iv o r J e n n in g s , T h e Institutional
T h e o r y , in M o d e rn 'Theories o f L a w (L o n d o n , 1 933), 6 8 -8 5 .
59. [Tr.J A c c o r d i n g to Franz, N e u m a n n , it w as to av o id an y associa
( T b i n g e n , 1 9 33 ).
62. G . D a h m , a n d F r e ih e r r S c h a ffs le in , L ib era les oder autoritres
S tra frech (H a m b u r g , 1 9 3 3 ); H . H e n k e l, S tra frich te r u n d Gesetz im neuen
Sta a t ( H a m b u r g , 1 9 3 4 ). [T r .] T h e s e ju r is t s w e r e a m o n g the le a d in g
T h in k in g in c o n c re te o r d e r s . S ee Behemoth, 4 5 3 -4 5 8 .
N otes 113
ism tran sfo rm s the p lan t into a social com m unity. T h e en terp rise b e
co m es a social o rg a n iz a tio n a n d the jo in t-sto ck c o m p a n y ch a n g e s fr o m
o r d e r th in k in g in ju r is p r u d e n c e in a m a n n e r a n a lo g o u s to h o w the in
g r o u p s a p p e a rs to b e the o p t im u m p r in c ip le o f v o lu n ta ry a n d o r d e r ly
n o . 3 (1 9 3 8 ): 3 5 0 -3 7 1 .
73. [T r .] T h e term Sachgestcdtung in v e n ted by the N a z is c o n n o t e s a
type t)f t h in k in g a n d u ltim ately le g a l p rac tic e s h a p e d by the n e e d s o f
(P r in c e t o n , 1 9 83 ), 2 J 1 -2 1 2 , 2 3 0 -2 3 9 .
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K e lse n , H a n s ; n o rm ativ ism ; n o rm ativ ism
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R e n a rd , G e o r g e , 4, 112 Verfassungslehre, 14
F ra n k , H a n s state o f e x c e p tio n . S ee
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N a z is m , 6, 2.3-29;
R k h s v e r fa s s u n g , \4-, Gesetz u n d 1 3 -1 4 , 6 4 -6 6 ,7 1 ,1 0 3 ,