TSAI vs.

CA
366 SCRA 324
October 2, 2001

FACTS:
Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained loan from Philippine Bank
of Communications (PBCom), secured by a deed of Real and Chattel
Mortgage over the lot where its factory stands, and the chattels located
therein as enumerated in a schedule attached to the mortgage contract.
PBCom again granted a second loan to EVERTEX which was secured by a
Chattel Mortgage over personal properties enumerated in a list attached
thereto. These listed properties were similar to those listed in the first
mortgage deed. After the date of the execution of the second mortgage
mentioned above, EVERTEX purchased various machines and equipments.
Upon EVERTEX's failure to meet its obligation to PBCom, the latter
commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against EVERTEX under Act
3135 and Act 1506 or "The Chattel Mortgage Law". PBCom then
consolidated its ownership over the lot and all the properties in it. It leased
the entire factory premises to Ruby Tsai and sold to the same the factory,
lock, stock and barrel including the contested machineries.
EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and
damages against PBCom, alleging inter alia that the extrajudicial foreclosure
of subject mortgage was not valid, and that PBCom, without any legal or
factual basis, appropriated the contested properties which were not included
in the Real and Chattel Mortgage of the first mortgage contract nor in the
second contract which is a Chattel Mortgage, and neither were those
properties included in the Notice of Sheriff's Sale.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or Not the contested properties are personal or movable
properties?
2) Whether or Not the sale of these properties to a third person (Tsai) by the
bank through an irregular foreclosure sale is valid?
HELD:
1) Nature of the Properties and Intent of the Parties
The nature of the disputed machineries, i.e., that they were heavy, bolted or
cemented on the real property mortgaged does not make them ipso facto
immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil Code. While it is
true that the properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of
Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties herein reveal their
intent, that is - to treat machinery and equipment as chattels.
In the first mortgage contract, reflective of the true intention of PBCOM and
EVERTEX was the typing in capital letters, immediately following the printed
caption of mortgage, of the phrase "real and chattel." So also, the
"machineries and equipment" in the printed form of the bank had to be
inserted in the blank space of the printed contract and connected with the
word "building" by typewritten slash marks. Now, then, if the machineries in
question were contemplated to be included in the real estate mortgage,
there would have been no necessity to ink a chattel mortgage specifically
mentioning as part III of Schedule A a listing of the machineries covered
thereby. It would have sufficed to list them as immovables in the Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage of the land and building involved. As regards the
second contract, the intention of the parties is clear and beyond question. It
refers solely to chattels. The inventory list of the mortgaged properties is an
itemization of 63 individually described machineries while the schedule listed
only machines and 2,996,880.50 worth of finished cotton fabrics and natural
cotton fabrics.
UNDER PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL.
Assuming arguendo that the properties in question are immovable by nature,
nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an
obligation under the principle of estoppel. As far back as Navarro v. Pineda,
an immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulation
as when it is used as security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel
mortgage is executed over it.

2) Sale of the Properties Not Included in the Subject of Chattel Mortgage is

Not Valid
The auction sale of the subject properties to PBCom is void. Inasmuch as the
subject mortgages were intended by the parties to involve chattels, insofar
as equipment and machinery were concerned, the Chattel Mortgage Law
applies. Section 7 provides thereof that: "a chattel mortgage shall be
deemed to cover only the property described therein and not like or
substituted property thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and placed in the
same depository as the property originally mortgaged, anything in the
mortgage to the contrary notwithstanding." Since the disputed machineries
were acquired later after the two mortgage contracts were executed, it was
consequently an error on the part of the Sheriff to include subject
machineries with the properties enumerated in said chattel mortgages.
As the lease and sale of said personal properties were irregular and illegal
because they were not duly foreclosed nor sold at the auction, no valid title
passed in its favor. Consequently, the sale thereof to Ruby Tsai is also a
nullity under the elementary principle of nemo dat quod non habet, one
cannot give what one does not have.

Submitted by: EMILY B. UNSON

TECSON VS. COMELEC

424 SCRA 277
G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004

Facts:
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC
to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when
in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie
Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting,
petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate
birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior
marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and,
second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married
Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
Issue:
Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.
Held:
It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ
is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the
father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen
and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent
prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father.
Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn
from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was
under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence
upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have
well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would
have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby
extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively
that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot
be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate
of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code.

Submitted by: EMILY B. UNSON