MARCELO STEEL CORPORATION, and BENITO MACROHON, in his capacity as Sheriff of Respondents therein, Honorable Judge Walfrido de los
lfrido de los Angeles, Sheriff Benito
Quezon City, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PETRA R. FARIN and BENJAMIN FARIN, respondents.
Petition for certiorari and mandamus against the resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 49342-R, Petra Farin, et al. vs. Benito Macrohon, et al., denying the
motion of private respondents therein (herein petitioners) to dismiss the appeal of
therein petitioners (herein private respondents) upon the ground that the latter's
record on appeal does not contain any statement to the effect that an appeal bond
has been filed by them, contrary to the requirement of Section 6 of Rule 41 and the
consistent jurisprudence of this Court interpretative thereof to the effect that such
omission is a fatal jurisdictional defect.
In resolving herein petitioners' motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals held:
There is likewise no question that in her Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss appellant
herein admits that there is no mention in the Record on Appeal regarding fact that an
appeal bond was filed on time. But counsel for appellant argues that that fact
appears on the face of the record of the case, as evidenced by a certification of the
City Treasurer of Quezon City (copy attached to the opposition as Annex A) to the
effect that petitioner-appellants' cash bond was actually filed on October 30, 1970,
simultaneously with the filing of petitioners-appellants' Notice of Appeal. Appellants'
counsel further contends that "obviously, because said cash appeal bond was riled
simultaneously with the Notice of Appeal, the undersigned counsel, through
oversight, failed to state or make mention of the filing of the said cash appeal bond in
the record.
Appellant also calls attention to petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
docketed with this Court as CA-G.R. NO. 47519-R entitled Petra R. Farin, et al., vs.
Hon. Walfrido de los Angeles, et al., in which a decision was promulgated by this
Court on August 20, 1971.
One of the reasons for Section 3, Rule 41 is to appraise the appellate court whether
an appeal is seasonably filed or not. The purpose of adding the clause "together with
such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time" was "to avoid disputes
in the appellate court concerning the fact of the perfection of the appeal." (Araneta
vs. Madrigal, G.R. No. 26227-28, Oct. 25, 1966).
Now, it is to be noted that in the petition for certiorari above-mentioned the private
parties were the same as appellants and appellees herein. Paragraphs 8 and 9
thereof contained the following allegations:
"8) That on October 15, 1970, petitioner thru counsel, received a copy of the decision
of the respondent judge;
"9) That on October 30, 1970, petitioner filed their Notice of Appeal, from the said
decision, together with their Appeal Bond and Record on Appeal (Petition, dated
February 22, 1971, p. 3 emphasis supplied)
Macrohon (now Leonidas F. Villasenor) and Marcelo Steel Corporation, in par. 1 of
their Answer, averred:
Admissions
1. That, respondents admit ... the allegations in paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15, 17, 18, of the petition." (Answer dated March 1, 1971, pp. 1-2; note
italicize)
There is no specific admission of petitioner's par. 8, but neither is there any specific
denial thereof.
In consonance with the petitioner's allegations and respondents "Admissions" (above)
this Court, in its statement of the case said:
"On Oct. 30, 1970, petitioners filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on
appeal ... (p. 4, Decision, in CA-G.R. No. 47519-R)
Under the circumstances, therefore, it cannot be said that this Court has no way of
determining whether the present appeal is seasonably filed inasmuch as it has not
only been appraised thereof in the petition for certiorari but it has even made a clear,
unequivocal pronouncement based on the admissions in the pleadings in that case,
that all the requisites of a valid have been complied with. Judicial admissions
contained in pleadings bind the parties and the principle of estoppel operates. Hence,
there would be no justification to dismiss this appeal for failure to state in the Record
on Appeal a fact about which there can no longer be any dispute inasmuch as it has
already been judicially admitted in the pleadings of C.A. G.R. No. 47519-R.
Under the facts thus found by the appellate court, We are more inclined to hold that
the present petition cannot prosper. Prescinding from the other grounds discussed in
the impugned resolution, which We do not deem necessary to pass upon in this
decision, We are of the considered view that the Court of Appeals did not in anyway
abuse its discretion, but, on the contrary, acted in accordance with law in refusing to
dismiss the appeal of the Farins.
Indeed, the main purpose of the rules requiring that a record on appeal should show
on its face, by means of statements of the corresponding specific data, that the
notice of appeal, the appeal bond and the record itself have been filed on time is to
enable the appellate court to determine on the basis of the record on appeal itself
and without the need of any independent evidence, that the appeal has been made
on time. To allow the parties to indulge in a controversy regarding the timeliness of
the appeal and to present their respective conflicting evidence on that point, which
could take much of the time of the court that it could otherwise devote to the
disposition of other cases demanding its attention, is detrimental to the interests of
justice and contrary to the public policy intended to be served by the provision in
question. But, as illustrated in the circumstances of the case at bar, there could be
instances when the timeliness of an appeal is a matter which the court can take
judicial notice of and, consequently, it would be inconceivable that any controversy
between the parties in respect thereto could arise. In such instances, the court is no
longer supposed to receive any conflicting evidence. It would be bound by what it has
judicial notice of and none of the parties may be permitted to prove the contrary. In
the words of Chief Justice Moran, "Where a fact is one of which the court may
judicially take notice, no proof thereof is necessary. The maxim is "what is known
need not be proved." Judicial notice takes the place of proof and is of equal force. As
a means of establishing facts it is therefore superior to evidence. In its appropriate
field it displaces evidence since, as it stands for proof, it fulfills the object which the
evidence is designed to fulfill and makes evidence unnecessary. (Beardsley v. Irving,
81 Conn 489, 71 A., 580; State v. Main, 69 Conn., 123, L.R.A. 623.) Indeed, it is
frequently said that neither averment, nor proof or admission, will prevail against
matters which are judicially known to the court. (Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Jones
v. United States, 137 U.S. 202; Graves v. Kelly, 62 Ind. A., 164, 112 N.E. 899, 901;
Charles Boldt Co. v. Turner Bros. Co., 199 Fed. 139; Davis v. Southern Ry. Co., 170
N.C., 582, 87 S.E. 745.)." (Moran, Rules of Court Vol. 5, p. 39).

In the light of these considerations, the reason behind the subject rule is not in any
sense violated when, as in the case at bar, the appellate court relies on what it has
judicial notice of in determining whether or not appellants filed an appeal bond on
time. When a matter of fact supposed to be proven to the court is one capable of
being taken judicial notice of, being already known to the court because it has
already been proven or was undisputed or judicially admitted in a related proceeding
before it, it would be the height of absurdity and contrary to one's sense of justice
and propriety to still require the parties to reopen the issue and litigate relative to the
same matter all over again. Both upon principle and pragmatic considerations, courts
are not supposed to ignore facts that the same parties have in a related case
considered as beyond dispute or no longer subject to proof. Any other ruling would
only give occasion to the court to arrive at contradictory findings on points which the
parties themselves may not controvert without being inconsistent and unfair. In other
words, Section 6 of Rule 41 and the jurisprudence cited by petitioners have no
application to the situation obtaining in this case. The view We have taken here does
not constitute a relaxation, much less a modification of the standing rulings of this
Court invoked by petitioners.

Before closing, it is necessary to state here that this case is related somehow to the
other cases pending in this Court between the same parties, namely, G. R. Nos. L-
34317 and 34335. To avoid any misconception or misunderstanding, it is here made
clear that the result of the instant case has no bearing whatsoever on the outcome of
the case just mentioned and vise versa.

Suplico v neda
Under consideration is the Manifestation and Motion [1] dated October 26, 2007 of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) which states:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) respectfully avers that in an Indorsement dated October 24,
2007, the Legal Service of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) has informed it
of the Philippine Governments decision not to continue with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project
(see attachment[2]). That said, there is no more justiciable controversy for this Honorable Court to
resolve. WHEREFORE, public respondents respectfully pray that the present petitions be DISMISSED.
On November 13, 2007, the Court noted the OSGs manifestation and motion and required petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 178830, 179317, and 179613 to comment.
On December 6, 2007, Rolex Suplico, petitioner in G.R. No. 178830, filed his Consolidated Reply and
Opposition,[3] opposing the aforequoted OSG Manifestation and Motion, arguing that:
66. Aside from the fact that the Notes of the Meeting Between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
and Chinese President Hu Jintao held 2 October 2007 were not attached to the 26 October 2007
Manifestation and Motion thus depriving petitioners of the opportunity to comment thereon a mere verbally
requested 1st Indorsement is not sufficient basis for the conclusion that the ZTE-DOTC NBN deal has been
permanently scrapped.
67. Suffice to state, said 1st Indorsement is glaringly self-serving, especially without the Notes of
the Meeting Between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President Hu Jintao to support its
allegations or other proof of the supposed decision to cancel the ZTE-DOTC NBN deal. Public respondents
can certainly do better than that.[4]
Petitioner Suplico further argues that
79. Assuming arguendo that some aspects of the present Petition have been rendered moot (which is
vehemently denied), this Honorable Court, consistent with well-entrenched jurisprudence, may still take
cognizance thereof.[5]
Petitioner Suplico cites this Courts rulings in Gonzales v. Chavez,[6] Rufino v. Endriga,[7] and Alunan III v.
Mirasol[8] that despite their mootness, the Court nevertheless took cognizance of these cases and ruled on
the merits due to the Courts symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar by formulating guiding
and controlling principles, precepts, doctrines, and rules.
On January 31, 2008, Amsterdam Holdings, Inc. (AHI) and Nathaniel Sauz, petitioners in G.R. No. 179317,
also filed their comment expressing their sentiments, thus:
3. First of all, the present administration has never been known for candor. The present
administration has a very nasty habit of not keeping its word. It says one thing, but does another
4. This being the case, herein petitioners are unable to bring themselves to feel even a bit reassured that the
government, in the event that the above-captioned cases are dismissed, will not backtrack, re-transact, or
even resurrect the now infamous NBN-ZTE transaction. This is especially relevant since what was attached
to the OSGs Manifestation and Motion was a mere one (1) page written communication sent by the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to the OSG, allegedly relaying that the
Philippine Government has decided not to continue with the NBN project x x x due to several reasons and
constraints.
Petitioners AHI and Sauz further contend that because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised
in the petition, which among others, included the Presidents use of the power to borrow, i.e., to enter into
foreign loan agreements, this Court should take cognizance of this case despite its apparent mootness.
On January 15, 2008, the Court required the OSG to file respondents reply to petitioners comments on its
manifestation and motion.
On April 18, 2008, the OSG filed respondents reply, reiterating their position that for a court to exercise its
power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy one which involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. [9]
Respondents also insist that there is no perfected contract in this case that would prejudice the government
or public interest. Explaining the nature of the NBN Project as an executive agreement, respondents stress
that it remained in the negotiation stage. The conditions precedent[10] for the agreement to become effective
have not yet been complied with.
Respondents further oppose petitioners claim of the right to information, which they contend is not an
absolute right. They contend that the matters raised concern executive policy, a political question which the
judicial branch of government would generally hesitate to pass upon.
On July 2, 2008, the OSG filed a Supplemental Manifestation and Motion. Appended to it is the Highlights
from the Notes of Meeting between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President Hu Jintao,
held in XI Jiao Guesthouse, Shanghai, China, on October 2, 2007. In the Notes of Meeting, the Philippine
Government conveyed its decision not to continue with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project due
to several constraints. The same Notes likewise contained President Hu Jintaos expression of understanding
of the Philippine Government decision.
We resolve to grant the motion.
Firstly, the Court notes the triple petitions to be for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction. The individual
prayers in each of the three (3) consolidated petitions are:
G.R. No. 178830
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court:
1. Upon the filing of this Petition, pursuant to the second paragraph of Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court, issue forthwith an ex parte temporary restraining order enjoining respondents, their subordinates,
agents, representatives and any and all persons acting on their behalf from pursuing, entering into
indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal;
2. Compel respondents, upon Writ of Mandamus, to forthwith produce and furnish petitioner or his
undersigned counsel a certified true copy of the contract or agreement covering the NBN project as agreed
upon with ZTE Corporation;
3. Schedule Oral Arguments in the present case pursuant to Rule 49 in relation to Section 2, Rule 56 of the
revised Rules of Court; and,
4. Annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal, and compel public respondents
to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government ICT contracts
and public bidding for the NBN contract.[11] (Emphasis supplied)
G.R. No. 179317
WHEREFORE, petitioners Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and Nathaniel Sauz respectfully pray as follows:
A. upon the filing of this Petition for Mandamus and conditioned upon the posting of a bond in such
amount as the Honorable Court may fix, a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction be issued directing the Department of Transportation and Communication, the Commission on
Information and Communications Technology, all other government agencies and instrumentalities, their
officers, employees, and/or other persons acting for and on their behalf to desist during the pendency of the
instant Petition for Mandamus from entering into any other agreements and from commencing with any
kind, sort, or specie of activity in connection with the National Broadband Network Project.
B. the instant Petition for Mandamus be given due course; and,
C. after due consideration of all relevant issues, judgment be rendered directing respondents to
allow herein petitioners access to all agreements entered into with the Government of China, the ZTE
Corporation, and/or other entities, government instrumentalities, and/or individuals with regard to the
National Broadband Network Project.[12](Emphasis supplied)
G.R. No. 179613
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to:
1. Compel respondents, upon Writ of Mandamus, to forthwith produce and furnish petitioner or his
undersigned counsel a certified true copy of the contract or agreement covering the NBN project as agreed
upon with ZTE Corporation;
2. Schedule Oral Arguments in the present case pursuant to Rule 49 in relation to Section 2, Rule 56 of the
Revised Rules of Court;
3. Annul and set aside the award of the contract for the national broadband network to respondent ZTE
Corporation, upon the ground that said contract, as well as the procedures resorted to preparatory to the
execution thereof, is contrary to the Constitution, to law and to public policy;
4. Compel public respondent to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement
of government infrastructure projects, including public bidding for said contract to undertake the
construction of the national broadband network.[13] (Emphasis supplied)
On September 11, 2007, the Court issued a TRO[14] in G.R. No. 178830, enjoining the parties from
pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal
and Project as prayed for. Pertinent parts of the said Order read:
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, on 11 September 2007, adopted a resolution in the above-entitled case, to
wit
G.R. No. 178830 (Rolex Suplico vs. National Economic and Development Authority, represented by NEDA
Secretary Romulo L. Neri, and the NEDA Investment Coordination Committee, Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), represented by DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza,
including the Commission on Information and Communications Technology, headed by its Chairman,
Ramon P. Sales, The Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for Information and Communications
Technology Committee (ICT), headed by DOTC Assistant Secretary Elmer A. Soneja as Chairman, and The
Technical Working Group for ICT, and DOTC Assistant Secretary Lorenzo Formoso, and All Other
Operating Units of the DOTC for Information and Communications Technology, and ZTE Corporation,
Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and ARESCOM, Inc.Acting on the instant petition with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court Resolved, without giving due course to the
petition, to
xxxx
(d) Issue a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further
orders from this Court, enjoining the (i) National Economic and Development Authority, (ii) NEDA-
Investment Coordination Committee, (iii) Department of Transportation and Communications, Commission
on Information and Communications Technology, (iv) Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for
Information and Communications Technology Committee (ICT), (v) Technical Working Group for ICT, and
all other Operating Units of the DOTC for Information and Communications Technology, (vi) ZTE
Corporation; (vii) Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and (viii) ARESCOM, Inc., and any and all persons acting on
their behalf from pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC
Broadband Deal and Project as prayed for.
NOW THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You,
Respondents (i) National Economic and Development Authority, (ii) NEDA-Investment Coordination
Committee, (iii) Department of Transportation and Communications, Commission on Information and
Communications Technology, (iv) Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for Information and
Communications Technology Committee (ICT), (v) Technical Working Group for ICT, and all other
Operating Units of the DOTC for Information and Communications Technology, (vi) ZTE Corporation;
(vii) Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and (viii) ARESCOM, Inc., and any and all persons acting on their behalf
are hereby ENJOINED from pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the
ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and Project as prayed for.[15] (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 178830 and 179613 pray that they be furnished certified true copies of the contract
or agreement covering the NBN project as agreed upon with ZTE Corporation. It appears that during one of
the Senate hearings on the NBN project, copies of the supply contract [16] were readily made available to
petitioners.[17] Evidently, the said prayer has been complied with and is, thus, mooted.
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, acting in her official capacity during the meeting held
on October 2, 2007 in China, informed Chinas President Hu Jintao that the Philippine Government had
decided not to continue with the ZTE-National Broadband Network (ZTE-NBN) Project due to several
reasons and constraints, there is no doubt that all the other principal prayers in the three petitions (to annul,
set aside, and enjoin the implementation of the ZTE-NBN Project) had also become moot.
Contrary to petitioners contentions that these declarations made by officials belonging to the executive
branch on the Philippine Governments decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project are self-serving,
hence, inadmissible, the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of this official act of the
President of the Philippines.
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Judicial Notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the rules, it is mandatory and the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official
acts of the President of the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our government. It is further
provided in the above-quoted rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the foregoing facts without
introduction of evidence. Since we consider the act of cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the
proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the meeting of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President in China as
an official act of the executive department, the Court must take judicial notice of such official act without
need of evidence.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[18] We took judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the
President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5.
In Estrada v. Desierto,[19] the Court also resorted to judicial notice in resolving the factual ingredient of the
petition.
Moreover, under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the official duty of the
executive officials[20] of informing this Court of the governments decision not to continue with the ZTE-
NBN Project is also presumed to have been regularly performed, absent proof to the contrary. Other than
petitioner AHIs unsavory insinuation in its comment, the Court finds no factual or legal basis to disregard
this disputable presumption in the present instance.
Concomitant to its fundamental task as the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy is the judiciarys role of
strengthening political stability indispensable to progress and national development. Pontificating on issues
which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy will do more harm than good to the
nation as a whole. Wise exercise of judicial discretion militates against resolving the academic issues, as
petitioners want this Court to do. This is especially true where, as will be further discussed, the legal issues
raised cannot be resolved without previously establishing the factual basis or antecedents.
Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. In the absence of actual
justiciable controversies or disputes, the Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where
there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or make
any pronouncement.
Kapag wala nang buhay na kaso, wala nang dahilan para magdesisyon ang Husgado.
In Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. v. Santiago,[21] the lone issue tackled by the Court of
Appeals (CA) was whether the Securities Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD) and Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) en banc committed reversible error in issuing and upholding, respectively,
the writ of preliminary injunction. The writ enjoined the execution of the questioned agreements between
Qualcomm, Inc. and Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. (RETELCOM). The implementation of
the agreements was restrained through the assailed orders of the SICD and the SEC en banc which,
however, were nullified by the CA decision. Thus, RETELCOM elevated the matter to this Court praying
for the reinstatement of the writ of preliminary injunction of the SICD and the SEC en banc. However,
before the matter was finally resolved, Qualcomm, Inc. withdrew from the negotiating table. Its withdrawal
had thwarted the execution and enforcement of the contracts. Thus, the resolution of whether the
implementation of said agreements should be enjoined became no longer necessary.
Equally applicable to the present case is the Court ruling in the above-cited Republic
Telecommunications. There We held, thus:
Indeed, the instant petition, insofar as it assails the Court of Appeals Decision nullifying the orders of
the SEC en banc and the SICD, has been rendered moot and academic. To rule, one way or the other, on the
correctness of the questioned orders of the SEC en banc and the SICD will be indulging in a theoretical
exercise that has no practical worth in view of the supervening event.
The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or
controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible
of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there
is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or value as courts do
not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging.
In the ultimate analysis, petitioners are seeking the reinstatement of the writ of injunction to prevent the
concerned parties from pushing through with transactions with Qualcomm, Inc. Given that Qualcomm, Inc.
is no longer interested in pursuing the contracts, there is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners
would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
The Court likewise finds it unnecessary to rule whether the assailed Court of Appeals Decision had the
effect of overruling the Courts Resolution dated 29 January 1999, which set aside the TRO issued by the
appellate court.
A ruling on the matter practically partakes of a mere advisory opinion, which falls beyond the realm of
judicial review. The exercise of the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies.
Courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or
feigned problems.
While there were occasions when the Court passed upon issues although supervening events had rendered
those petitions moot and academic, the instant case does not fall under the exceptional cases. In those cases,
the Court was persuaded to resolve moot and academic issues to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules for future guidance of both bench and bar.
In the case at bar, the resolution of whether a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to prevent the
implementation of the assailed contracts calls for an appraisal of factual considerations which are peculiar
only to the transactions and parties involved in this controversy. Except for the determination of whether
petitioners are entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction which is now moot, the issues raised in this
petition do not call for a clarification of any constitutional principle or the interpretation of any statutory
provision.[22]
Secondly, even assuming that the Court will choose to disregard the foregoing considerations and brush
aside mootness, the Court cannot completely rule on the merits of the case because the resolution of the
three petitions involves settling factual issues which definitely requires reception of evidence. There is not
an iota of doubt that this may not be done by this Court in the first instance because, as has been stated
often enough, this Court is not a trier of facts.
Ang pagpapasiya sa tatlong petisyon ay nangangailangan ng paglilitis na hindi gawain ng Hukumang ito.
Respondent ZTE, in its Comment in G.R. No. 178830, [23] correctly pointed out that since petitioner Suplico
filed his petition directly with this Court, without prior factual findings made by any lower court, a
determination of pertinent and relevant facts is needed. ZTE enumerated some of these factual issues, to
wit:
(1) Whether an executive agreement has been reached between the Philippine and Chinese
governments over the NBN Project;
(2) Whether the ZTE Supply Contract was entered into by the Republic of the Philippines, through
the DOTC, and ZTE International pursuant to, and as an integral part of, the executive agreement;
(3) Whether a loan agreement for the NBN Project has actually been executed;
(4) Whether the Philippine government required that the NBN Project be completed under a Build-
Operate-and-Transfer Scheme;
(5) Whether the AHI proposal complied with the requirements for an unsolicited proposal under
the BOT Law;
(6) Whether the Philippine government has actually earmarked public finds for disbursement
under the ZTE Supply Contract; and
(7) Whether the coverage of the NBN Project to be supplied under the ZTE Supply Contract is
more extensive than that under the AHI proposal or such other proposal submitted therefor.[24]
Definitely, some very specific reliefs prayed for in both G.R. Nos. 178830 and 179613 require prior
determination of facts before pertinent legal issues could be resolved and specific reliefs granted.
In G.R. No. 178830, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal
and compel public respondents to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement
of government ICT contracts and public bidding for the NBN contract.
In G.R. No. 179613, petitioners also pray that the Court annul and set aside the award of the contract for the
national broadband network to respondent ZTE Corporation, upon the ground that said contract, as well as
the procedures resorted to preparatory to the execution thereof, is contrary to the Constitution, to law and to
public policy. They also ask the Court to compel public respondent to forthwith comply with pertinent
provisions of law regarding procurement of government infrastructure projects, including public bidding for
said contract to undertake the construction of the national broadband network.
It is simply impossible for this Court to annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband
Deal without any evidence to support a prior factual finding pointing to any violation of law that could lead
to such annulment order. For sure, the Supreme Court is not the proper venue for this factual matter to be
threshed out.
Thirdly, petitioner Suplico in G.R. No. 178830 prayed that this Court order public respondents
to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government ICT contracts
and public bidding for the NBN contract. [25] It would be too presumptuous on the part of the Court to
summarily compel public respondents to comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of
government infrastructure projects without any factual basis or prior determination of very particular
violations committed by specific government officials of the executive branch. For the Court to do so
would amount to a breach of the norms of comity among co-equal branches of government. A perceived
error cannot be corrected by committing another error. Without proper evidence, the Court cannot just
presume that the executive did not comply with procurement laws. Should the Court allow itself to fall into
this trap, it would plainly commit grave error itself.
Magiging kapangahasan sa Hukumang ito na pilitin ang mga pinipetisyon na tumalima sa batas sa
pangongontrata ng pamahalaan kung wala pang pagtitiyak o angkop na ebidensiya ng nagawang
paglabag dito.
Let it be clarified that the Senate investigation in aid of legislation cannot be the basis of Our decision
which requires a judicial finding of facts.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio takes the view that the National Broadband Network Project should be declared
null and void. The foregoing threefold reasons would suffice to address the concern of Our esteemed
colleague.
The Court is, therefore, constrained to dismiss the petitions and deny them due course because of mootness
and because their resolution requires reception of evidence which cannot be done in an original petition
brought before the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on September 11,
2007 is DISSOLVED.

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner, vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-
LEE, Respondent.
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 and
Resolution2 regarding the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate
of Orlando B. Catalan.
The facts are as follows:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a
divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second
marriage with petitioner herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case was
docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A.
Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar
petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis
pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was
already pending.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an
interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent
alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner before Branch 54
of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner
contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio
Bristol on 12 December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. 3 The trial court ruled
that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was
not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner
was not valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action
with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and
petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining
the guilt of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married
to Eusebio Bristol.
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition
for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of
private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held
that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting
when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal
in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that
petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration.4
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance
of letters of administration.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have
been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a
petition for letters of administration may have been filed by an "uninterested
person," the defect was cured by the appearance of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she
insisted that, to determine who has a better right to administer the decedents
properties, the RTC should have first required the parties to present their evidence
before it ruled on the matter.
On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that
petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. She should have instead filed a petition for
review rather than a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition for
Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petition for
review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed the Petition and continued to decide
on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis
pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of
the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
acts, and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which
may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the other. A petition for letters of administration is a special proceeding. A
special proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a
party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast to an ordinary civil action, a special
proceeding involves no defendant or respondent. The only party in this kind of
proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant. Considering its nature, a subsequent
petition for letters of administration can hardly be barred by a similar pending
petition involving the estate of the same decedent unless both petitions are filed by
the same person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a party to the petition
filed by the private respondent, in the same manner that the latter was not made a
party to the petition filed by the former. The first element of litis pendentia is
wanting. The contention of the petitioner must perforce fail.
Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the
provision of the Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be an
"interested party," inasmuch as any person, for that matter, regardless of whether he
has valid interest in the estate sought to be administered, could be appointed as
administrator for as long as he files his petition ahead of any other person, in
derogation of the rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of preference in
the appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of
administration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to administer
the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a marriage certificate, like any other
public document, is only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact
that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was acquitted has not been
disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a
second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been dissolved or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment
rendered in a proper proceedings. The deduction of the trial court that the acquittal of
the petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with
Orlando B. Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt
from the petitioner to deny the findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis
for us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger
to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of
administration by the trial court is in place.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision. 6 She alleged that the
reasoning of the CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted
of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando was
invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys
the presumption of validity.
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.
Hence, this Petition.
At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate
the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to
Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted
of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By
failing to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage
between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an
interested party in the estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No.
2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our
jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This
doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 7 wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,]
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx
We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 8 to wit:
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once
proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce
from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could
"very well lose her right to inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in
view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife
Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in
Garcia v. Recio,9 to wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted
in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed
the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a
written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but
only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's
qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge.
Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible
as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an
alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the
attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed
his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon
petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He
contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was
cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that
country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known
by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the
exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In
civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.
Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws.1wphi1 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian
marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by
reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative. (Emphasis supplied)
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of
Orlandos divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between
petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the
trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she
has the preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate.
Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is
undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6
of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, 10 in which we said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's
surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court
laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce
judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and
that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested
by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text
of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was
done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to
ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate
of Orlando B. Catalan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court
of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to
Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in
accordance with this Decision.
In the matter of the petition of Vicente Rosal Pardo to be admitted a citizen of the
Philippines.
VICENTE ROSAL PARDO, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Vicente Rosal Pardo, a Spanish citizen born in Spain in 1895 and residing in the
Philippines since 1905, where he married a Filipino woman and where he is at present
employed, in Manila, with an annual salary of P4,800, has been adjudged by the
Court of First Instance of Manila entitled to become a Filipino citizen. That the
appellee is unable to speak and write any of the principal Filipino languages is the
first ground of appeal by the Government.
The applicant testified that he knows enough Tagalog to be understood in that
language. Lino Gutierrez, a respectable citizen who has intimately known the
applicant for 27 years, having had business relations with him, conformed the
applicant's testimony. And the trial judge, who has heard the applicant translate into
Tagalog, "He venido residiendo en Filipinas por el periodo de 36 aos," appears to
have been satisfied with the correctness of translation (which was not transcribed).
The fact that the applicant arrived in the Philippines when he was only ten years old
and has lived here 44 years continuously except for a few months visit in Spain,
mingling and dealing by reason of his work with people who use Tagalog in their daily
intercourse, lends credence in his testimony that he has acquired a good working
knowledge of that language. At one time, according to the evidence he owned or
managed two stores successively on the Escolta, and lately he has been a foreman
and warehouseman at Soriano & Co.
The portion of the applicant's brief should not be taken isolatedly and at face value.
This testimony is obviously extravagant understatement of the reality, typifying an
extreme modesty which is thought by some to be a virtue. We do not believe that this
statement represent appellant's sincere conviction of its literal meaning.
The other assignment of error goes to the sufficiency of the evidence on whether the
laws of Spain grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens of that country.
The applicant introduced a certificate signed by the Consul General of Spain in the
Philippines, stating that in accordance with articles 17 and 225 of the Spanish Civil
Code, among other Spanish legislation, Filipinos are eligible to Spanish citizenship in
Spain. Article 17 provides that foreigners who have obtained a certificate of
naturalization and those who have not obtained such certificate but have acquired
domicile in any town of the Monarchy are Spaniards. No discrimination being made in
these provisions, they apply to persons of any nationality.
As the Spanish Civil Code has been and still is "the basic code in force of the
Philippines," articles 17 et seq. thereof may be regarded as matters known to judges
of the Philippines by reason of their judicial functions and nay be judicially recognized
by them without the introduction of proof. (Section 5, Rule 123.) Moreover, in a
number of decisions mere authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the
Chinese Consulate General of Manila has been held to be competent proof of that
law. (Yap vs. Solicitor General, L-1602, 46 Off. Gaz.[Supp. to No. 1], p. 250; 1 Leelin vs.
Republic of the Philippines, L-1761; 2 Yee Bo Mann vs. Republic of the Philippines, L-
1606, 46 Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No. 11], 201; 3 Jose Go alias Joseph Gotianuy vs. Anti
Chinese League of the Philippines and Felipe Fernandez, L-1563.) 4
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed without costs.
RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
This case is again before the court, this time on a motion for reconsideration.
In our decision we say: "As the Spanish Civil Code has been and still is "the basic
code in force in the Philippines," articles 17 et seq. thereof may be regarded as
matters known to judges of their judicial functions and may be judicially recognized
by them without the introduction of proof." (Section 5, Rule 123.)
The court is supposed to know that the Civil Code is the Code of Spain, and this is
judicial embraces all its provisions, including those which have ceased to be in
operation in the Philippines. This court has said that it is not, by reason of an opinion
expressed by an expert witness, precluded from advising itself as to the common law
of England. (Bryan vs. Eastern and Western Asso., 28 Phil., 310.) If the court may take
cognizance of the common law of England, there is perhaps at least as much reason
that it may do so of the Spanish citizenship law until Spain relinquished its
sovereignty over the Philippines and which is a part of the code that is still the major
branch of law of our country although the said part is no longer applicable here.
In the matter of the application of Rafael Roa Yrostoza for naturalization, L-1394 (46
Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No. 11]),5law which grants Filipinos the right to become
naturalized citizens of that country," and returned the case to the court of origin with
instruction to reopen the hearing and give the parties new opportunity to establish or
disprove the existence of such law. We have to confess that the remand for further
proceeding was unnecessary. Oversight is the explanation, made possible by the
failure of either party to direct our attention to the articles of the Civil Code of which
we have been, in the present case, apprised by the applicant.
In the decision sought to be reconsidered we also say that in a number of decisions,
which we cite, mere authentication of the Chinese naturalization law by the Chinese
Consulate general in Manila has been taken as competent proof of that law. The
Solicitor General takes exception to this passage, in the following observation:
With regard to the second question under consideration as to whether the
certification of the supposed naturalization laws of Spain made by the Spanish Consul
General constitutes competent proof of that law, this court cites in the support of its
opinion the cases of Jose Leelin vs. Republic of the Philippines,6 G. R. No. L-
1761; Bienvenido Yap vs. The Solicitor General7 G.R. No. L-1602; Yee Boo Mann vs.
Republic of the Philippines,8 G.R. No. L-1606; and Jose Go alias Joseph Gotianuy vs.
Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines and Felipe Fernandez,9 G.R. No. L01563. We
have carefully gone over these cases and we beg leave to point out that in each of
them this court did not rule that the mere authentication of the Chinese
Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of manila constitute competent
proof of that law, but that the question as to whether or not the copy of the Chinese
Nationality Law presented in said cases were properly authenticated and admissible
in evidence to prove reciprocity, as required in section 4 (h) of the Revised
Naturalization Law, has become academic because of the admission made by counsel
for the oppositor (Republic of the Philippines) to the effect that in another case, there
has been presented a copy of the Naturalization Laws of China duly authenticated in
accordance with the Rules of the Court.
The decisions referred to seem to have been misread. In Yap vs. Solicitor General, L-
1602 (46 Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No. 1], p. 250),2 the document admitted , EXHIBIT E,
purported to be "a copy of the Chinese law of citizenship, where it appears that
Filipinos can acquire Chinese Citizenship by naturalization." There was nothing in that
decision which would show that the certificate or authentication was made by a
Philippine diplomatic or consular representative in China. In Jose Leelin vs. Republic
of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-1761, we said that "in previous cases, a translation of
the Chinese Naturalization Law, made and certified to be correct by the Chinese
Consulate General in Manila, was admitted and considered efficient evidence to
establish that the laws of China permit Filipinos to become citizens of that country."
In Yee Boo Mann vs. Republic of the Philippines, L-1606 (46 Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No.
11 ], 201, the petitioner introduced in evidence a translation of the Chinese
Naturalization Law, certified to be correct by the Chinese Consul General in Manila.
The court held in that case that the objection to the evidence "is of no moment, since
this court has already accepted it as fact in previous naturalization cases that the
laws of China permit Filipinos to naturalize in that country." And the court disposed
of Lock Ben Ping vs. Republic of the Philippines, L-1675 (47 Off. Gaz., 176), 10 on the
strength of the pronouncement, just quoted, in the Yee Boo Mann decision.
If it be true, as the Solicitor General notes, that in the Yap case the ratio
decidendi was that "there has been presented a copy of the Naturalization Laws of
China duly authenticated in accordance with the Rules of the Court," then the
decision recognized as a fact the existence of a law of China under which Filipinos
may be naturalized. Of this fact the court properly assumed judicial knowledge in the
cases that came up before it soon after.11
We realize that a copy of a foreign law certified only by the local consul of the
applicant's country does not conform to the requirement concerning the certification
and authentication of such law (sec. 41, Rule 123). But the case at bar and the cases
cited therein as precedents are not governed by the Rules of the Court. Rule 1342,
entitled "Applicability of the Rules," provides that "These rules shall not apply to land
registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings,
and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenience. By reason of this provision,
literal adherence to the Rules of Court, which include rules of evidence, is not
obligatory in a proceeding like that under the Philippine law is judicial in character,
and strict compliance with the process prescribed by statute, if there were one, would
be essential, yet when, as here, no specific procedure is indicated in the premises, it
is only necessary that the merits of the petition be passed on and a decision reached
on a far consideration of the evidence on satisfactory proof. Accordingly, evidence of
the law of a foreign country or reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship,
although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice by section 41 of Rule 123, may
be allowed and used as basis for a favorable action if, in the light of all
circumstances, the court is satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered.
The motion for reconsideration is therefore denied.
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners, vs. AIDA SY-
GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was
then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines
worth P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a
petition for the grant of letters of administration docketed as Special Proceedings
Case No. C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan
City. In said petition they alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the
deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they
do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him;
and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the
intestate estate of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen
who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on
January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the
deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is
competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat
[Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p. 107.] After hearing, the probate court, finding
among others that:
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27; Rollo, pp. 49-64;]
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate children of Yao
Kee with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the
acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego [CFI decision,
pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64- 65.]
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the
administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo,
pp. 105-106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate
court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is hereby MODIFIED and
SET ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy- Bernabe and
Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion
Gillego, an unmarried woman with whom he lived as husband and wife without
benefit of marriage for many years:
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao Kee,
also known as Yui Yip, since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao Kee
in China had not been proven to be valid to the laws of the Chinese People's Republic
of China (sic);
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7, 1976 in favor of
Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit "G") of the Avenue Tractor and
Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and accordingly, said property should be excluded
from the estate of the deceased Sy Kiat; and
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as judicial
administratrix of the estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 36-
37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was however
denied by respondent court. They thus interposed their respective appeals to this
Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045
entitled "Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court of
Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen" questioning
paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision.
The Supreme Court however resolved to deny the petition and the motion for
reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of judgment was made in G.R. No.
56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the
dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition was initially
denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the
Court in a resolution dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and decided
to give due course to this petition. Herein petitioners assign the following as errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID IN ACCORDANCE
WITH LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING AIDA SY-
GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS NATURAL
CHILDREN OF SY KIAT WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.]
I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with
Chinese law and custom was conclusively proven. To buttress this argument they rely
on the following testimonial and documentary evidence.
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien,
China; that she does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during that
time was for elders to agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her case, her
elder brother was the one who contracted or entered into [an] agreement with the
parents of her husband; that the agreement was that she and Sy Mat would be
married, the wedding date was set, and invitations were sent out; that the said
agreement was complied with; that she has five children with Sy Kiat, but two of
them died; that those who are alive are Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sze Chun
Yen, the eldest being Sze Sook Wah who is already 38 years old; that Sze Sook Wah
was born on November 7, 1939; that she and her husband, Sy Mat, have been living
in FooKien, China before he went to the Philippines on several occasions; that the
practice during the time of her marriage was a written document [is exchanged] just
between the parents of the bride and the parents of the groom, or any elder for that
matter; that in China, the custom is that there is a go- between, a sort of marriage
broker who is known to both parties who would talk to the parents of the bride-to-be;
that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be their son in-law,
then they agree on a date as an engagement day; that on engagement day, the
parents of the groom would bring some pieces of jewelry to the parents of the bride-
to-be, and then one month after that, a date would be set for the wedding, which in
her case, the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on January 19, 1931; that during the
wedding the bridegroom brings with him a couch (sic) where the bride would ride and
on that same day, the parents of the bride would give the dowry for her daughter and
then the document would be signed by the parties but there is no solemnizing officer
as is known in the Philippines; that during the wedding day, the document is signed
only by the parents of the bridegroom as well as by the parents of the bride; that the
parties themselves do not sign the document; that the bride would then be placed in
a carriage where she would be brought to the town of the bridegroom and before
departure the bride would be covered with a sort of a veil; that upon reaching the
town of the bridegroom, the bridegroom takes away the veil; that during her wedding
to Sy Kiat (according to said Chinese custom), there were many persons present; that
after Sy Kiat opened the door of the carriage, two old ladies helped her go down the
carriage and brought her inside the house of Sy Mat; that during her wedding, Sy
Chick, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the document with her mother; that as to
the whereabouts of that document, she and Sy Mat were married for 46 years
already and the document was left in China and she doubt if that document can still
be found now; that it was left in the possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she
does not know the whereabouts of that document because of the lapse of many
years and because they left it in a certain place and it was already eaten by the
termites; that after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately together as
husband and wife, and from then on, they lived together; that Sy Kiat went to the
Philippines sometime in March or April in the same year they were married; that she
went to the Philippines in 1970, and then came back to China; that again she went
back to the Philippines and lived with Sy Mat as husband and wife; that she begot her
children with Sy Kiat during the several trips by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI
decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that he
was among the many people who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and
that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document signed
by the parents or elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-16; Rollo,
pp.
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial
court to the effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese
custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he
married according to Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on October
3, 1972 where the following entries are found: "Marital statusMarried"; "If married
give name of spousesYao Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of marriage1931"; and
"Place of marriageChina" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968
where the following entries are likewise found: "Civil statusMarried"; and, 'If
married, state name and address of spouseYao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4".]
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of
the People's Republic of China to the effect that "according to the information
available at the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip
also Chinese were married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic of
China" [Exhibit "5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy
Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in
accordance with Chinese law or custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly
observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" [In the Matter of
the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de
Leon, Mabanta and Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno,
Outline of Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a custom
must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.]
On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right
can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established
by competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395
(1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a
foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states
that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were performed and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as
determined by Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign
marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a
question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong
v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect
to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is
admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also printed
and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132
section 25, thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by
a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is
in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the
testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law [Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and
Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the
law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot
be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they
are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are
competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or
custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or
custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty
bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken
by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and
proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915);
Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign
marriage presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters
mutually exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for a
marriage to be considered duly solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which
as found by the Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese
marriage, what was left to be decided was the issue of whether or not the fact of
marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven [Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy
Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken
judicial notice of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners
however have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the
time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the
alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years
later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as
being applicable to the instant case. They aver that the judicial pronouncement in the
Memoracion case, that the testimony of one of the contracting parties is competent
evidence to show the fact of marriage, holds true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case did
not concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the oral
testimony of a spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a
complaint for adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be
presumed that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076,
March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that
there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56,
Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14;
Rollo, p. 51], it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]
II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:
(1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are entered:
"Children if any: give number of childrenFour"; and, "NameAll living in China"
[Exhibit "SS-1";]
(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five children with
Sy Kiat, only three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze
Chin Yan [TSN, December 12, 1977, pp. 9-11;] and,
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation to the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila to support Sze Sook Wah's application for a marriage license,
wherein Sy Kiat expressly stated that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he
has three daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whomSook Wah and Sze Kai Cho
she knows, and one adopted son [TSN, December 6,1977, pp. 87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat
according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate
children but only that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural
children, it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.]
And they are acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat's recognition
of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who
are her sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural
children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25)
years without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their father's
acknowledgment, evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into by and
between their parents and approved by the Court of First Instance on February 12,
1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowleged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego
but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritance, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband and wife and
that out of such relationship, which they have likewise decided to definitely and
finally terminate effective immediately, they begot five children, namely: Aida Sy,
born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on January
28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on December 14, 1956; and Rodolfo Sy,
born on May 7, 1958.
3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS SUPPLY ... , the parties
mutually agree and covenant that
(a) The stocks and merchandize and the furniture and equipments ..., shall be divided
into two equal shares between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall own
one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion Gillego who shall transfer the
same to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.
(b) the business name and premises ... shall be retained by Sy Kiat. However, it shall
be his obligation to give to the aforenamed children an amount of One Thousand
Pesos ( Pl,000.00 ) monthly out of the rental of the two doors of the same
building now occupied by Everett Construction.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the
common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of the real estates
and properties registered and/or appearing in the name of Asuncion Gillego ... , the
parties mutually agree and covenant that the said real estates and properties shall
be transferred in equal shares to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita
Sy, and Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered by Asuncion Gillego during her lifetime ...
[Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by
which a child may be voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's marriage to
Yao Kee and the paternity and filiation of the parties should have been ventilated in
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502,
entitled "An Act Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of the
City of Caloocan', with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation of adoption, paternity
and acknowledgment;
(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations, legal separation of
spouses, and actions for support;
(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title seven, chapters one
to three of the civil code;
xxx xxx xxx
and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome reiterated in Divinagracia v.
Rovira
With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts were
abolished. Their functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional Trial
Courts [See Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-
47407, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360] hence it is no longer necessary to pass
upon the issue of jurisdiction raised by petitioners.
Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in Rep.
Act No. 5502 sec. 91-A last paragraph that:
xxx xxx xxx
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any
case pending in the ordinary court, said incident shall be determined in the main
case.
xxx xxx xxx
As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No. 4834 **** a case
involving paternity and acknowledgment may be ventilated as an incident in the
intestate or testate proceeding (See Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13,
1976). But that legal provision presupposes that such an administration proceeding is
pending or existing and has not been terminated. xxx xxx xxx
The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on
the same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court" but more importantly to prevent multiplicity of suits. Accordingly, this Court
finds no reversible error committed by respondent court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. and/or CHEMICAL BANK, petitioners, vs.
RAFAEL MA. GUERRERO, respondent.
The Case
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Court
of Appeals1 Decision of August 24, 1998 and Resolution of December 14, 1998 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 423102 affirming the trial courts denial of petitioners motion for partial
summary judgment.
The Antecedents
On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero ("Guerrero" for brevity) filed a
complaint for damages against petitioner Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or
Chemical Bank ("the Bank" for brevity) with the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("RTC"
for brevity). Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld
taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank; (2) a returned
check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems; and (3)
unauthorized conversion of his account. Guerrero amended his complaint on April 18,
1995.
On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging, inter alia, that by
stipulation Guerreros account is governed by New York law and this law does not
permit any of Guerreros claims except actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank filed
a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Guerreros claims for
consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorneys fees on the same ground alleged in its Answer. The Bank contended that
the trial should be limited to the issue of actual damages. Guerrero opposed the
motion.
The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Banks Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. Alyssa Waldens affidavit ("Walden affidavit" for brevity)
stated that Guerreros New York bank account stipulated that the governing law is
New York law and that this law bars all of Guerreros claims except actual damages.
The Philippine Consular Office in New York authenticated the Walden affidavit.
The RTC denied the Banks Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its motion for
reconsideration on March 6, 1996 and July 17, 1996, respectively. The Bank filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC
Orders. In its Decision dated August 24, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. On December 14, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the Banks motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC orders denying the motion for partial
summary judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Walden affidavit does not
serve as proof of the New York law and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support
its motion. The Court of Appeals considered the New York law and jurisprudence as
public documents defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence, as
follows:
"SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country;
x x x."
The Court of Appeals opined that the following procedure outlined in Section 24, Rule
132 should be followed in proving foreign law:
"SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office."
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the Banks argument that Section 2, Rule 34 of
the old Rules of Court allows the Bank to move with the supporting Walden affidavit
for partial summary judgment in its favor. The Court of Appeals clarified that the
Walden affidavit is not the supporting affidavit referred to in Section 2, Rule 34 that
would prove the lack of genuine issue between the parties. The Court of Appeals
concluded that even if the Walden affidavit is used for purposes of summary
judgment, the Bank must still comply with the procedure prescribed by the Rules to
prove the foreign law.
The Issues
The Bank contends that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in -
"x x x HOLDING THAT [THE BANKS] PROOF OF FACTS TO SUPPORT ITS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY NOT BE GIVEN BY AFFIDAVIT;
x x x HOLDING THAT [THE BANKS] AFFIDAVIT, WHICH PROVES FOREIGN LAW AS A
FACT, IS "HEARSAY" AND THEREBY CANNOT SERVE AS PROOF OF THE NEW YORK
LAW RELIED UPON BY PETITIONERS IN THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT x x
x."3
First, the Bank argues that in moving for partial summary judgment, it was entitled to
use the Walden affidavit to prove that the stipulated foreign law bars the claims for
consequential, moral, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages and attorneys
fees. Consequently, outright dismissal by summary judgment of these claims is
warranted.
Second, the Bank claims that the Court of Appeals mixed up the requirements of Rule
35 on summary judgments and those of a trial on the merits in considering the
Walden affidavit as "hearsay." The Bank points out that the Walden affidavit is not
hearsay since Rule 35 expressly permits the use of affidavits.
Lastly, the Bank argues that since Guerrero did not submit any opposing affidavit to
refute the facts contained in the Walden affidavit, he failed to show the need for a
trial on his claims for damages other than actual.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
The Bank filed its motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule
34 of the old Rules of Court which reads:
"Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any
time, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or
any part thereof."
A court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of
either party, there appears from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of
damages. In such event, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.4
In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised in
the pleadings genuine, sham or fictitious, as shown by affidavits, depositions or
admissions accompanying the motion?5
A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence
as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial.6
A perusal of the parties respective pleadings would show that there are genuine
issues of fact that necessitate formal trial. Guerreros complaint before the RTC
contains a statement of the ultimate facts on which he relies for his claim for
damages. He is seeking damages for what he asserts as "illegally withheld taxes
charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank, a returned check
worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems, and unauthorized
conversion of his account." In its Answer, the Bank set up its defense that the agreed
foreign law to govern their contractual relation bars the recovery of damages other
than actual. Apparently, facts are asserted in Guerreros complaint while specific
denials and affirmative defenses are set out in the Banks answer.
True, the court can determine whether there are genuine issues in a case based
merely on the affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted by the parties to the court.
However, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the Banks motion for partial
summary judgment as supported by the Walden affidavit does not demonstrate that
Guerreros claims are sham, fictitious or contrived. On the contrary, the Walden
affidavit shows that the facts and material allegations as pleaded by the parties are
disputed and there are substantial triable issues necessitating a formal trial.
There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where
material allegations of the pleadings are in dispute. 7 The resolution of whether a
foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far as
the trial court is concerned since foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
courts.8Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. 9 Like any other fact, they must
be alleged and proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether New York
law or Philippine law applies to Guerreros claims present a clear dispute on material
allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the merits.
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority
or tribunal may be proved by (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must
be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the
attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any
of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or
a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer.
Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized in Asiavest Limited v. Court of
Appeals10 which held that:
"x x x:
Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance with the above rule,
however, the Supreme Court held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v.
Muzzal, that Section 41, Rule 123 (Section 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court)
does not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the
existence of a foreign law. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the testimony
under oath of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a
section of California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time
the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the existence of
said law. Accordingly, in line with this view, the Supreme Court in the Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Fisher et al., upheld the Tax Court in considering the pertinent
law of California as proved by the respondents witness. In that case, the counsel for
respondent "testified that as an active member of the California Bar since 1951, he is
familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by
the lower court to state the pertinent California law as regards exemption of
intangible personal properties, the witness cited Article 4, Sec. 13851 (a) & (b) of the
California Internal and Revenue Code as published in Derrings California Code, a
publication of Bancroft-Whitney Co., Inc. And as part of his testimony, a full quotation
of the cited section was offered in evidence by respondents." Likewise, in several
naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign
country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting
the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable
action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the
authenticity of the written proof offered." Thus, in a number of decisions, mere
authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of
Manila was held to be competent proof of that law." (Emphasis supplied)
The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamette Iron and Steel Works v.
Muzzal or Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher to support its cause. These cases
involved attorneys testifying in open court during the trial in the Philippines and
quoting the particular foreign laws sought to be established. On the other hand, the
Walden affidavit was taken abroad ex parte and the affiant never testified in open
court.1a\^/phi1.net The Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law
on damages not only because it is self-serving but also because it does not state the
specific New York law on damages. We reproduce portions of the Walden affidavit as
follows:
"3. In New York, "[n]ominal damages are damages in name only, trivial sums such as
six cents or $1. Such damages are awarded both in tort and contract cases when the
plaintiff establishes a cause of action against the defendant, but is unable to prove"
actual damages. Dobbs, Law of Remedies, 3.32 at 294 (1993). Since Guerrero is
claiming for actual damages, he cannot ask for nominal damages.
4. There is no concept of temperate damages in New York law. I have reviewed
Dobbs, a well-respected treatise, which does not use the phrase "temperate
damages" in its index. I have also done a computerized search for the phrase in all
published New York cases, and have found no cases that use it. I have never heard
the phrase used in American law.
5. The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") governs many aspects of a Banks
relationship with its depositors. In this case, it governs Guerreros claim arising out of
the non-payment of the $18,000 check. Guerrero claims that this was a wrongful
dishonor. However, the UCC states that "justifiable refusal to pay or accept" as
opposed to dishonor, occurs when a bank refuses to pay a check for reasons such as
a missing indorsement, a missing or illegible signature or a forgery, 3-510, Official
Comment 2. .. to the Complaint, MHT returned the check because it had no
signature card on . and could not verify Guerreros signature. In my opinion,
consistent with the UCC, that is a legitimate and justifiable reason not to pay.
6. Consequential damages are not available in the ordinary case of a justifiable
refusal to pay. UCC 1-106 provides that "neither consequential or special or punitive
damages may be had except as specifically provided in the Act or by other rule of
law". UCC 4-103 further provides that consequential damages can be recovered only
where there is bad faith. This is more restrictive than the New York common law,
which may allow consequential damages in a breach of contract case (as does the
UCC where there is a wrongful dishonor).
7. Under New York law, requests for lost profits, damage to reputation and mental
distress are considered consequential damages. Kenford Co., Inc. v. Country of Erie,
(lost profits); Motif Construction Corp. v. Buffalo Savings Bank, damage to reputation);
Dobbs, Law of Remedies 12.4(1) at 63 (emotional distress).
8. As a matter of New York law, a claim for emotional distress cannot be recovered for
a breach of contract. Geler v. National Westminster Bank; Pitcherello v. Moray Homes,
Ltd., Martin v. Donald Park Acres,. Damage to reputation is also not recoverable for a
contract. Motif Construction Corp. v. Buffalo Savings Bank.
9. In cases where the issue is the breach of a contract to purchase stock, New York
courts will not take into consideration the performance of the stock after the breach.
Rather, damages will be based on the value of the stock at the time of the breach,
10. Under New York law, a party can only get consequential damages if they were
the type that would naturally arise from the breach and if they were "brought within
the contemplation of parties as the probable result of the breach at the time of or
prior to contracting."
11. Under New York law, a plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys fees unless they are
provided by contract or statute. E.g., Geler v. National Westminster Bank,; Camatron
Sewing Mach, Inc. v. F.M. Ring Assocs., Inc.,; Stanisic v. Soho Landmark Assocs.,.
There is no statute that permits attorneys fees in a case of this type.
12. Exemplary, or punitive damages are not allowed for a breach of contract, even
where the plaintiff claims the defendant acted with malice. Geler v. National
Westminster Bank,; Catalogue Service of chester11_v. Insurance Co. of North
America,; Senior v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,
13. Exemplary or punitive damages may be recovered only where it is alleged and
proven that the wrong supposedly committed by defendant amounts to a fraud
aimed at the public generally and involves a high moral culpability. Walker v. Sheldon.
14. Furthermore, it has been consistently held under New York law that exemplary
damages are not available for a mere breach of contract for in such a case, as a
matter of law, only a private wrong and not a public right is involved.
The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiants personal interpretation and
opinion of the facts of the case vis a vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence without
citing any law in particular. The citations in the Walden affidavit of various U.S. court
decisions do not constitute proof of the official records or decisions of the U.S. courts.
While the Bank attached copies of some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the
Walden affidavit, these copies do not comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of
official records or decisions of foreign courts.
The Banks intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York law and
jurisprudence. However, because of the failure to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132
on how to prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden affidavit did
not prove the current state of New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has
only alleged, but has not proved, what New York law and jurisprudence are on the
matters at issue.
Next, the Bank makes much of Guerreros failure to submit an opposing affidavit to
the Walden affidavit. However, the pertinent provision of Section 3, Rule 35 of the old
Rules of Court did not make the submission of an opposing affidavit mandatory, thus:
"SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten
(10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. After the hearing, the judgment sought
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." (Emphasis supplied)
It is axiomatic that the term "may" as used in remedial law, is only permissive and
not mandatory.13
Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Banks motion for knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits from the city.
partial summary judgment and the Walden affidavit just because he failed to file an There they lived thru the years to the present.
opposing affidavit. Guerrero opposed the motion for partial summary judgment,
although he did not present an opposing affidavit. Guerrero may not have presented In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been discovered,
an opposing affidavit, as there was no need for one, because the Walden affidavit did defendants Felicidad Miranda (Emigdio Egipto), Modesta C. Parayno, Benedicto Diaz,
not establish what the Bank intended to prove. Certainly, Guerrero did not admit, Laureano Dizo, Jose Barrientos, Elena Ramos, Estefania Nepacina, Modesta Sanchez,
expressly or impliedly, the veracity of the statements in the Walden affidavit. The Honorio Berio, Gloria Velasco, Ana Dequis Alunan and Benedicto Ofiaza (predecessor
Bank still had the burden of proving New York law and jurisprudence even if Guerrero of defendant Carandang) were given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits
did not present an opposing affidavit. As the party moving for summary judgment, each labeled "lease contract" to occupy specific areas in the property upon
the Bank has the burden of clearly demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue conditions therein set forth. Defendants Isabelo Obaob and Gerardo Garcia (in the
of fact and that any doubt as to the existence of such issue is resolved against the name of Marta A. Villanueva) received their permits from Mayor Manuel de la Fuente
movant.14 on January 29 and March 18, respectively, both of 1948. The rest of the 23
defendants exhibited none.
Moreover, it would have been redundant and pointless for Guerrero to submit an
opposing affidavit considering that what the Bank seeks to be opposed is the very For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.1wph1.t
subject matter of the complaint. Guerrero need not file an opposing affidavit to the
Walden affidavit because his complaint itself controverts the matters set forth in the Following are the rentals due as of February, 1962:
Banks motion and the Walden affidavit. A party should not be made to deny matters
already averred in his complaint. Amt. due from
Area Monthly
NAME date of delinquency
There being substantial triable issues between the parties, the courts a quo correctly in sq.m. Rental
to Feb. 1962
denied the Banks motion for partial summary judgment. There is a need to
determine by presentation of evidence in a regular trial if the Bank is guilty of any
wrongdoing and if it is liable for damages under the applicable laws. 1. Gerardo Garcia 66.00 P7.92 P1,628.97

This case has been delayed long enough by the Banks resort to a motion for partial
2. Modesta C. Parayno 87.75 10.53 379.08
summary judgment. Ironically, the Bank has successfully defeated the very purpose
for which summary judgments were devised in our rules, which is, to aid parties in
avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. 3. Juan Asperas 39.00 4.68 9.36

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 24,
1998 and the Resolution dated December 14, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 4. Maria Tabia 35.20 5.76 570.24
SP No. 42310 is AFFIRMED.
5. Aquilino Barrios
54.00 4.32 99.36
(Leonora Ruiz)

6. Laureano Dizo 35.00 2.80 22.40

7. Bernabe Ayuda 39.60 3.17 323.34

CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GARCIA, defendants-appellants. 8. Isabelo Obaob 75.52 9.06 208.38

Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area,
bordering Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, and covered by 9. Jose Barrientos 39.53 4.74 744.18
Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 and 37558. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to
1947, defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and
consent. They built houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's
10. Cecilia Manzano in Paid up to March, 1962, for the payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy and to
vacate in fifteen (15) days. Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to recover
lieu of Urbano Ramos (deceased) 46.65 5.60 Feb. 1962.
possession.2

11. Elena Ramos 34.80 2.78 186.26 The judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises; to pay the amounts
heretofore indicated opposite their respective names; and to pay their monthly
rentals from March, 1962, until they vacate the said premises, and the costs.
12. Estefania Nepacina 41.80 3.34 504.34
Defendants appealed.

13. Modesta Sanchez 33.48 2.68 444.88 1. We are called upon to rule on the forefront question of whether the trial court
properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes.

14. Marcial Lazaro 22.40 1.79 688.32 The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman,
Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That document recites that the
amount of P100,000.00 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila
15. Marciana Alano 25.80 2.06 255.44
City Budget, for the construction of an additional building of the Epifanio de los
Santos Elementary School. It is indeed correct to say that the court below, at the
16. Honorio Berio 24.00 1.92 188.16 hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in the decision under
review, the trial judge obviously revised his views. He there declared that there was
need for defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the very
17. Gloria Velasco 32.40 2.59 56.98 document, Exhibit E, aforesaid.

18. Wilarico Ricamata 45.83 3.67 739.68 It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within
its power, to make it conformable to law and justice. 3 Such was done here.
Defendants' remedy was to bring to the attention of the court its contradictory
Paid up to stance. Not having done so, this Court will not reopen the case solely for this
19. Benedicto Diaz 40.20 4.82
March 1962. purpose.4

Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit

20. Ana Dequis Alunan 64.26 7.71 30.84
defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken
because the was duty bound to take judicial notice 5 of Ordinance 4566. The reason
21. Lorenzo Carandang 45.03 5.40 437.40 being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial
notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. 6 And, Ordinance
4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00
22. Juan N. Pecayo 25.52 3.06 30.60 was set aside for the "construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los
Santos Elementary School.
23. Felicidad Miranda 48.02 5.76 132.48
Furthermore, defendants' position is vulnerable to assault from a third direction.
Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they
have permits from the mayor is at best flimsy. The permits to occupy are recoverable
on thirty days' notice. They have been asked to leave; they refused to heed. It is in
this factual background that we say that the city's need for the premises is
P7,580.69
unimportant. The city's right to throw defendants out of the area cannot be gainsaid.
The city's dominical right to possession is paramount. If error there was in the finding
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the that the city needs the land, such error is harmless and will not justify reversal of the
property. Came the need for this school's expansion; it became pressing. On judgment below.7
September 14, 1961, plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to
clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each of defendants thirty (30) days to 2. But defendants insist that they have acquired the legal status of tenants. They are
vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises. This was wrong.
followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant, made in February and
They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials thereon without the
knowledge and consent of the city. Their homes were erected without city permits.
These constructions are illegal. In a language familiar to all, defendants are
squatters:
Since the last global war, squatting on another's property in this country has become
a widespread vice. It was and is a blight. Squatters' areas pose problems of health,
sanitation. They are breeding places for crime. They constitute proof that respect for
the law and the rights of others, even those of the government, are being flouted.
Knowingly, squatters have embarked on the pernicious act of occupying property
whenever and wherever convenient to their interests without as much as leave,
and even against the will, of the owner. They are emboldened seemingly because of
their belief that they could violate the law with impunity. The pugnaciousness of some
of them has tied up the hands of legitimate owners. The latter are thus prevented
from recovering possession by peaceful means. Government lands have not been
spared by them. They know, of course, that intrusion into property, government or
private, is wrong. But, then, the mills of justice grind slow, mainly because of lawyers
who, by means, fair or foul, are quite often successful in procuring delay of the day of
reckoning. Rampancy of forcible entry into government lands particularly, is abetted
by the apathy of some public officials to enforce the government's rights. Obstinacy
of these squatters is difficult to explain unless it is spawned by official tolerance, if
not outright encouragement or protection. Said squatters have become insensible to
the difference between right and wrong. To them, violation of law means nothing.
With the result that squatting still exists, much to the detriment of public interest. It is
high time that, in this aspect, sanity and the rule of law be restored. It is in this
environment that we look into the validity of the permits granted defendants herein.
These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued by the mayors in
1947 and 1948 when the effects of the war had simmered down and when these
defendants could have very well adjusted themselves. Two decades have now
elapsed since the unlawful entry. Defendants could have, if they wanted to, located
permanent premises for their abode. And yet, usurpers that they are, they preferred
to remain on city property.
Defendants' entry as aforesaid was illegal. Their constructions are as illegal, without
permits.8 The city charter enjoins the mayor to "safeguard all the lands" of the City of
Manila.9
Surely enough, the permits granted did not "safeguard" the city's land in question. It
is our considered view that the Mayor of the City of Manila cannot legalize forcible
entry into public property by the simple expedient of giving permits, or, for that
matter, executing leases.
Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city officials
will elevate it into a lawful act. In principle, a compound of illegal entry and official
permit to stay is obnoxious to our concept of proper official norm of conduct.
Because, such permit does not serve social justice; it fosters moral decadence. It
does not promote public welfare; it abets disrespect for the law. It has its roots in
vice; so it is an infected bargain. Official approval of squatting should not, therefore,
be permitted to obtain in this country where there is an orderly form of government.
We, accordingly, rule that the Manila mayors did not have authority to give permits,
written or oral, to defendants, and that the permits herein granted are null and void.
3. Let us look into the houses and constructions planted by defendants on the
premises. They clearly hinder and impair the use of that property for school purposes.
The courts may well take judicial notice of the fact that housing school children in the
elementary grades has been and still is a perennial problem in the city. The selfish
interests of defendants must have to yield to the general good. The public purpose of
constructing the school building annex is paramount. 10
In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions aforesaid constitute
public nuisance per se. And this, for the reason that they hinder and impair the use of
the property for a badly needed school building, to the prejudice of the education of
the youth of the land.11 They shackle the hands of the government and thus obstruct
performance of its constitutionally ordained obligation to establish and maintain a
complete and adequate system of public education, and more, to "provide at least
free public primary instruction".12
Reason dictates that no further delay should be countenanced. The public nuisance
could well have been summarily abated by the city authorities themselves, even
without the aid of the courts.13
4. Defendants challenge the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila. They
say that the case should have been started in the municipal court. They prop up their
position by the averment that notice for them to vacate was only served in
September, 1961, and suit was started in July, 1962. Their legal ground is Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. We have reached the conclusion that their forcible
entry dates back to the period from 1945 to 1947. That entry was not legalized by
the permits. Their possession continued to remain illegal from incipiency. Suit was
filed long after the one-year limitation set forth in Section 1 of Rule 70. And the
Manila Court of First Instance has jurisdiction. 14
Upon the premises, we vote to affirm the judgment under review. Costs against
defendants-appellants. So ordered.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S.
TUMBOKON, Petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of
the City of Manila, Respondent.

In this original petition for mandamus,1 petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS),
Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon seek to compel respondent
Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.

The antecedents are as follows.

On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance

No. 8027.2 Respondent mayor approved the ordinance on November 28, 2001. 3 It
became effective on December 28, 2001, after its publication. 4

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local
government units, a principle described as the power inherent in a government to
enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals
and general welfare of the society. 5 This is evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof
which state:

SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health,
public safety, and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well
as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig
River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong
St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the
northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast
and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the
Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby
reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of

which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of
six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and
desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under
Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from
the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area
are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc.,
Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE)
entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU)6 with the oil companies in which
they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable
and practicable option." Under the MOU, the oil companies agreed to perform the
following:
Section 1. - Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL COMPANIES shall,
upon signing of this MOU, undertake a program to scale down the Pandacan Terminals
which shall include, among others, the immediate removal/decommissioning process
of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks starting with the LPG spheres and the commencing of
works for the creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan
Terminals. xxx
Section 2. Consistent with the scale-down program mentioned above, the OIL
COMPANIES shall establish joint operations and management, including the operation
of common, integrated and/or shared facilities, consistent with international and
domestic technical, safety, environmental and economic considerations and
standards. Consequently, the joint operations of the OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan
Terminals shall be limited to the common and integrated areas/facilities. A separate
agreement covering the commercial and operational terms and conditions of the joint
operations, shall be entered into by the OIL COMPANIES.
Section 3. - The development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer zones
mentioned therein, which shall be taken from the properties of the OIL COMPANIES
and not from the surrounding communities, shall be the sole responsibility of the OIL
COMPANIES.
The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand, committed to do the following:
Section 1. - The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this MOU for its
appropriate action with the view of implementing the spirit and intent thereof.
Section 2. - The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit and intent of
this MOU, enable the OIL COMPANIES to continuously operate in compliance with
legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and the
scale down program.
Section 3. - The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES
compliance with the provisions of this MOU.
Section 4. - The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall protect the safety
buffer and green zones and shall exert all efforts at preventing future occupation or
encroachment into these areas by illegal settlers and other unauthorized parties.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. 7 In the same
resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of
six months starting July 25, 2002. 8 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003,
the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 9 extending the validity of Resolution No.
97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits
to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the
ordinance.10
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002
praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order
the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies. 11
The issues raised by petitioners are as follows:
1. whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or
repeal Ordinance No. 8027.12
Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under Section 455
(b) (2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160), 13 to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and
order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he has
allowed them to stay.
Respondents defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU
and the resolutions.14However, he also confusingly argues that the ordinance and
MOU are not inconsistent with each other and that the latter has not amended the
former. He insists that the ordinance remains valid and in full force and effect and
that the MOU did not in any way prevent him from enforcing and implementing it. He
maintains that the MOU should be considered as a mere guideline for its full
implementation.15
Under Rule 65, Section 3 16 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel
the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the
respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right
to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of
respondent to do the act required to be done.17
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty,
which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function
of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to
adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right
but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to the relief
sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.18
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement
of the ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it is a political party registered with the
Commission on Elections and has its offices in Manila. It claims to have many
members who are residents of Manila. The other petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon,
are allegedly residents of Manila.

We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when
a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public
duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the
real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. 19 Besides, as
residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the citys
ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of petitioners to institute this
proceeding.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty,
as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
city.">20 One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has
the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by
the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. 21 He has no other choice. It is his ministerial
duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,22 we stated the reason for this:

These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might
seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.23

The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil
companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made the
respondents duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain. This
is also connected to the second issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether the MOU
and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003 of the Sanggunian can amend or
repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were
inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it
binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30,
2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.24
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the
world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of
the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect
the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in
case of a terrorist attack25 on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a
protective measure should be delayed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as
mayor of the City of Manila, is directed to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
GABRIEL BAGUIO, plaintiff-Appellant, vs. TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT, defendants-
appellees.
The specific legal question raised in this appeal from an order of dismissal by the
Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, presided by the Hon. Benjamin K. Gorospe,
one which has not as yet been the subject of a definitive ruling is whether or not on a
motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata that the cause of action is barred by a
prior judgment, a lower court may take judicial notice of such previous case decided
by him resulting in the prior judgment relied upon. Judge Gorospe answered in the
affirmative. So do we. An affirmance is thus called for.
The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed by
plaintiff, now appellant, Gabriel Baguio, on February, 14, 1966. There was on March 7,
1966 a motion to dismiss filed by defendants, now appellees, on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by a prior judgment. This was the argument advanced: "The
instant complaint or case, besides being clearly unfounded and malicious, is identical
to or the same as that Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same plaintiff and against
Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, now deceased and whose legal heirs and successors in
interest are the very defendants in the instant complaint or Civil Case No. 2639. Said
Civil Case No. 1574 was filed on October 7, 1958 for 'Recovery of Possession and
Ownership of Real Estate' and entitled Gabriel Baguio, plantiff, versus Melecio alias
Mening Jalagat, defendant, involving practically the same property and practically the
same parties as defendants are the widow and the children, respectively, thus the 2. There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant undoubtedly had
legal or forced heirs of the deceased Melecio Jalagat. That the said Case No. 1574, recourse to a remedy which under the law then in force could be availed of. It would
which is identical to or is the same case as the instant one, has already been duly have served the cause of justice better, not to mention the avoidance of needless
and finally terminated as could be clear from [an] order of this Honorable Court expense on his part and the vexation to which appellees were subjected if he did
[dated December 6, 1965]." 1 There was an opposition on the part of plaintiff made on reflect a little more on the matter. Then the valuable time of this Tribunal would not
March 26, 1966 on the ground that for prior judgment or res judicata to suffice as a have been frittered away on a useless find hopeless appeal. It has, ever been the
basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the complaint. It was then guiding principle from Alonso v. Villamor, 4 a 1910 decision, that a litigant should not
alleged that there was nothing in the complaint from which such a conclusion may be be allowed to worship at the altar of technicality. That is not to dispense justice
inferred. Then, on September 26, 1966, came the order complained of worded thus: according to law. Parties, and much more so their counsel, should ever keep such an
"Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the defendants under date of imperative of our legal system in mind. 5
March 4, 1966, anchored on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by a
prior judgement which this Court finds to be well-founded as it has already dismissed WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of September 26, 1966 is hereby affirmed. With
plaintiff's complaint in Civil Case No. 1574 against Melecio Jalagat alias Mening costs against plaintiff.
Jalagat, defendants predecessor in interest from whom they have derived their rights,
in an order dated December 6, 1965, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 17 of the new
Rules of Court, which case involved the same parcel of land as the one in the instant
case, as prayed for, Civil Case No. 2639 should be as it is hereby [dismissed]. The
Court's previous dismissal of Civil Case No. 1574 has the effect of an adjudication
upon the merits and consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded in abatement of
any subsequent action against the same parties over the same issues and the same
subject-matter by the same plaintiff. [So ordered]" 2 Hence, this appeal.

The order of dismissal, as noted at the outset, must be sustained. It is in accordance

with law.

1. The sole error assigned is that a bar by prior judgement cannot be raised in a
motion to dismiss when such ground does not appear on the face of the complaint.
What immediately calls attention in the rather sketchy and in conclusive discussion in
the six-page brief of applicant is that there was no denial as to the truth of the
statement made by Judge Gorospe that there was a previous dismissal the same
plaintiff's complaint against the predecessor-in-interest of defendants, who as
expressly admitted by appellant was the deceased husband of one of them and
father of the rest. There was no denial either of the property involved being the same
and of the finality of the decsion in the previous case which would show that
appellant's claim was devoid of any support in law. It would be therefore futile for the
court to continue with the case as there had been such a prior judgment certainly
binding on appellant. What then was there for the lower court to do? Was there any
sense in its being engaged in what was essentially a fruitless, endeavor as the
outcome was predictible?

Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of Court
would sanction such a proceeding distinguished by nothing but its futility. It ought to
be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court certainly
could take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was previously
pending and thereafter decided by it. That was all that was done by the lower court in
decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is not contrary to law. A citation from
the comments of former Chief Justice Moran is relevant. Thus: "Courts have also
taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending
is a moot one, or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under
consideration." 3
JOSE TABUENA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA,
JR., respondents.
The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent
court, for lack of basis. It is argued that the lower courts should not have taken into
account evidence not submitted by the private respondent in accordance with the
Rules of Court.
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about 440
square meters and situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action for
recovery of ownership thereof was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the
estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the herein petitioner. After trial,
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was required to
vacate the disputed lot. 1
As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 to
Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned to the
Philippines in 1934, and Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan's instruction,
conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At the same time, she requested that she be
allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life. Tabernilla agreed
provided she paid the realty taxes on the property, which she promised to do, and
did. She remained on the said land until her death, following which the petitioner, her
son and half-brother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof. The complaint was
filed when demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he
refused, claiming it as his own.
The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot, which
he inherited from his parents, who acquired it even before World War II and had been
living thereon since then and until they died. Also disbelieved was his contention that
the subject of the sale between Peralta and Tabernilla was a different piece of land
planted to coconut trees and bounded on three sides by the Makato River.
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its factual
findings, the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C",
which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. The
trial court also erred when, to resolve the ownership of the subject lot, it considered
the proceedings in another case involving the same parties but a different parcel of
land.
The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as follows:
Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following exhibits: Exh. "A", letter dated October 4,
1921 addressed in Makato, Capiz, Philippines; Exh. "A-1", paragraph 2 of the letter
indicating that the amount of P600.00the first P300.00 and then another P300.00
as interest since October 4, 1921; Exh. "A-2", is paragraph 3 of the letter; Exh. "B", a
Spanish document; Exh. "C", deed of conveyance filed by Tomasa Timtiman and
Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh. "C-1", paragraph 4 of Exh. "C".
In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to the
allegations of the appellant, the said exhibits were in fact formally submitted in
evidence as disclosed by the transcript of stenographic notes, which it quoted at
length. 2 The challenged decision also upheld the use by the trial court of testimony
given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings in the second case.
We have examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted were not the
above-described documents but Exhibits "X" and "T" and their sub-markings, which
were the last will and testament of Alfredo Tabernilla and the order of probate. It is
not at all denied that the list of exhibits does not include Exhibits "A", "B" and "C". In
fact, the trial court categorically declared that "Exhibits "A-1, "A-2", "B", "C" and "C-l,"
were not among those documents or exhibits formally offered for admission by
plaintiff-administratrix." This is a clear contradiction of the finding of the appellate
court, which seems to have confused Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" with Exhibits "X" and
"Y", the evidence mentioned in the quoted transcript.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it
has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is true that
Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at the pre-trial of the case below, but this was
only for the purpose of identifying them at that time. They were not by such marking
formally offered as exhibits. As we said in Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles, 3 "At the
trial on the merits, the party may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes
they will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the
latter event, such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given
any evidentiary value."
Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:
. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts
and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the patties at the
trial. 4
We did say in People vs. Napat-a 5 that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit,
it may still be admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified
by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself been incorporated in the records
of the case. But we do not find that these requirements have been satisfied in the
case before us. The trial court said the said exhibits could be validly considered
because, even if they had not been formally offered, one of the plaintiffs witnesses,
Cunegunda Hernandez, testified on them at the trial and was even cross-examined
by the defendant's counsel. We do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was
identify the documents. Nowhere in her testimony can we find a recital of the
contents of the exhibits.
Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:
LEGASPI: That is this Exh. "A" about ?
A The translation of the letter.
Q What is the content of this Exh. "A", the letter of the sister of Juan Peralta to Alfredo
Tabernilla?
6
Court: The best evidence is the document. Proceed.
She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.
The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error in
taking judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had previously heard which
was closely connected with the case before it. It conceded that as a general rule
"courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending
before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases
have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that
both cases may have been heard or are actually pending b before the same
judge. 7 Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:
. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court
may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives
as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the
opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in
some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record
of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the
court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a
part of the record of the case then pending. 8
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of
objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with the
consent of the parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the
records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted as part
of the record of the case then pending." These conditions have not been established
here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in
Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending
before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was
"unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.
The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly took
judicial notice of the other case, striking off all reference thereto would not be fatal to
the plaintiff's cause because "the said testimony was merely corroborative of other
evidences submitted by the plaintiff." What "other evidences"? The trouble with this
justification is that the exhibits it intends to corroborate, to wit, Exhibits "A", "B" and
"C", have themselves not been formally submitted.
Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private respondent, we feel
that the complaint should have been dismissed by the trial court for failure of the
plaintiff to substantiate its allegations. It has failed to prove that the subject lot was
the same parcel of land sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo Tabernilla and not another
property, as the petitioner contends. Even assuming it was the same lot, there is no
explanation for the sale thereof by Juan Peralta, Jr., who was only the son of Damasa
Timtiman. According to the trial court, "there is no question that before 1934 the land
in question belonged to Damasa Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have validly
conveyed title to property that did not belong to him unless he had appropriate
authorization from the owner. No such authorization has been presented.
It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as we have
held in many cases.1wphi1 However, that rule is also not absolute and yields to the
accepted and well-known exception. In the case at bar, it is not even disputed that
the petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest have possessed the disputed property
since even before World War II. In light of this uncontroverted fact, the tax
declarations in their name become weighty and compelling evidence of the
petitioner's ownership. As this Court has held:
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for
taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership they become strong
evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual
possession of the property. 9
It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual possession of the land
covered by the tax declaration that such circumstance may be material in supporting
a claim of ownership. 10
The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possession of the subject
parcels of land by the respondents and their parents before them for more than 30
years qualify them to register title to the said subject parcels of land. 11
The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase the property and
magnanimously allowed Damasa Timtiman to remain there, he did not at least
require her to pay the realty taxes in his name, not hers. The explanation given by
the trial court is that he was not much concerned with the property, being a bachelor
and fond only of the three dogs he had bought from America. That is specious
reasoning. At best, it is pure conjecture. If he were really that unconcerned, it is
curious that he should have acquired the property in the first place, even as dacion
en pago. He would have demanded another form of payment if he did not have the
intention at all of living on the land. On the other hand, if he were really interested in
the property, we do not see why he did not have it declared in his name when the
realty taxes thereon were paid by Damasa Timtiman or why he did not object when
the payments were made in her own name.
In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate that they
were the owners of the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and her forebears had
been in possession thereof for more than fifty years and, indeed, she herself stayed
there until she died. 12 She paid the realty taxes thereon in her own name. 13 Jose
Tabuena built a house of strong materials on the lot. 14 He even mortgaged the land
to the Development Bank of the Philippines and to two private persons who
acknowledged him as the owner. 15 These acts denote ownership and are not
consistent with the private respondent's claim that the petitioner was only an
overseer with mere possessory rights tolerated by Tabernilla.
It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the
courts below and even to regard them as conclusive where there is no showing that
they have been reached arbitrarily. The exception is where such findings do not
conform to the evidence on record and appear indeed to have no valid basis to
sustain their correctness. As in this case.
The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and "C",
which had not been formally offered as evidence and therefore should have been
totally disregarded, conformably to the Rules of Court. The trial court also erred when
it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case No. 1327 and took judicial notice
thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner, in violation of existing On March 11, 1986, more than ten years after the inception of the case, Judge Daniel
doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings here challenged are as an edifice built B. Bernaldez rendered the decision in Civil Case No. 2728 against Occidental Land
upon shifting sands and should not have been sustained by the respondent court. Transportation Company, Inc. and Edgardo Enerio. 5 The dispositive portion reads:

Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court, failed to
prove his claim of ownership over the disputed property with evidence properly
cognizable under our adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is substantial evidence
supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that should have persuaded the trial
judge to rule in s favor and dismiss the complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, and in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment as
follows:
1. Ordering the defendants, Occidental Land Transportation Company and Edgardo
Enerio, to pay to the plaintiffs, Trencio Almedilla and Alberto Pingkian, the following:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET For Plaintiff Almedilla:
ASIDE, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
(a) P 9,473.80 for the repair of the damaged Ford Fiera;

(b) P400.00 for hospitalization;

OCCIDENTAL LAND TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents. (c) P100.00 daily for the income of the Ford Fiera starting from November 25, 1975 to
March 10, 1986;
The legal question raised in this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, 1 affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of (d) P5,000.00 for moral damages.
Zamboanga del Norte (Branch VI Dipolog City), presided by the Hon. Daniel B.
Bernaldez 2 is whether or not the trial court can take judicial notice of the decision of For Plaintiff Pingkian:
another case involving a similar issue. The appellate and lower courts ruled in the
affirmative. (e) P5,000.00 for moral damages;

The case began with the collision of a Ford Fiera and a Carina Express No. C-24 (f) P100.00 for loss of income;
passenger bus in Bunawan, Calamba, Misamis Occidental on November 25, 1975 at
about six o'clock a.m. As a result of this, the Ford Fiera was thrown into the canal on (g) P100.00 for incidental expenses; and
the right side of the road. Its driver, Pacifico Carbajosa, Sr. was pinned under the
steering wheel, while the engine was burning, causing him to be seriously burned and (h) P1,000.00 for attorney's fees.
later die of such injuries. Trencio Almedilla, the owner of the Fiera which was
registered under Sevilla Line, and Alberto Pingkian were likewise in the Fiera and 2. Ordering the defendants aforenamed to pay to the intervenors Carbajosas the
suffered various injuries as a result of the incident. Neither the driver nor the following;
passengers of the Carina Express No. C-24 stopped to assist the victims, but rather
the bus proceeded towards Sapang Dalaga. 3 (a) P6,000.00 for hospitalization;

The owner of the Carina passenger bus, Occidental Land Transportation Company
filed a case for damages against Sevilla Line and/or William Sevilla, the registered
owner of the Ford Fiera, which case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3156 before the
Court of First Instance, Branch III, Oroquieta City. Trencio Almedilla and Alberto
Pingkian also filed a civil suit for damages against Occidental Land Transportation
Company, Inc. and the driver of the Carina bus, Edgardo Enerio. Later the heirs of
Pacifico Carbajosa filed a complaint-in-intervention. This case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 2728 before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch VI,
Dipolog City.
On July 30, 1977, Judge Rodolfo A. Ortiz of the Oroquieta court rendered a decision in
Civil Case No. 3156 finding the driver of the Carina passenger bus and not the driver
of the Ford Fiera, as negligent. 4
(b) P3,000.00 for embalming, funeral services and last prayers;
(c) P5,000.00 for moral damages;
(d) P5,000.00 for attorney's fees; and
(e) P500.00 for actual and incidental expenses.
3. Dismissing the complaint-in-intervention insofar as it concerns plaintiffs Trencio
Almedilla and Alberto Pingkian.
4. Denying the reliefs prayed for in the answer to the complaint-in-intervention of
plaintiffs Trencio Almedilla and Alberto Pingkian;
5. Denying the reliefs prayed for in the answer to the complaint-in-intervention of the
aforenamed defendants;
6. Dismissing the counterclaim of the defendants aforenamed for lack of merit; and
7. Ordering the defendants aforenamed to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 6
The facts of the case were "adopted by reference" from the decision of the then Court
of First Instance, Branch III of Oroquieta City in Civil Case No. 3156. 7
It reads as follows:
That at about 4:50 o'clock in the morning of November 25, 1975, Trencio Almedilla,
who was the real owner of the Ford Fiera, but attached to the Sevilla Lines of
defendant William Sevilla, left for Ozamis City, on board his Ford Fiera, to buy textiles,
together with Alberto Pingkian who wanted to visit his aunt at Ozamis City. Reaching
Dipolog City, Trencio Almedilla came upon Pacifico Carbajosa, who wants (sic) to load
fish in the Ford Fiera for Ozamis City. As it was an opportune occasion, Trencio agreed
to load the fish of Pacifico for a freight of P130.00. So they loaded the fish of Pacifico
at Miputak, then got gasoline at a Caltex Station and proceeded towards Ozamis City.
Trencio, was driving his Ford Fiera, was running slowly as Pacifico alias "Balodoy" told
him not to go fast so that his fish will not get destroyed. After passing Sapang Dalaga,
at Misamis Occidental, Trencio developed stomach ache. At this, "Balodoy" requested
that Trencio allow him to drive the Ford Fiera as he was an experienced driver. Trencio
agreed. And so, with "Balodoy" on the wheels of the Ford Fiera, they proceeded
slowly for fear that the fish will get damaged. Reaching Bunawan, at Calamba, and
while negotiating a curb at the descending portion of the asphalted national highway,
which was wet, as it was raining, a Carina passenger bus was running fast in an
ascent, zigzagging towards them. Because of this, the Ford Fiera went towards the
extreme right of the road with its right front and rear tires already running at (sic) the
ground shoulder, but even as the Ford Fiera tried to avoid the zigzagging Carina
Express No. C-24, the said Carina bus jerked towards the left, hitting, as a result, the
Ford Fiera at the left fender and hood, throwing it to the canal at the right side, with
engine burning. The Carina passenger bus continued to swerve towards the left until
it turn about, facing towards the direction of Ozamis City. Balodoy was pinned by the
steering wheel to his driver's seat and was seriously injured, Pingkian and Trencio
were also injured, but they were well enough to try to help to extricate Balodoy, not
until Genito Compania got a piece of wood from his house nearby, which he used as a
lever to pry out Balodoy. The driver of the Carina passenger bus, which had three (3)
passengers, at that time, did not help Balodoy. Instead it proceeded towards Sapang
Dalaga.
The accident was reported to the police authorities of Calamba, as a result of which
Acting Station Commander Arceno of Calamba Police Station, Police District No. II,
made a Police Report dated November 25, 1975 as follows:
POLICE REPORT
At about 0645 Hrs More or less 25, Nov. Sevilla Line bearing plate No. 8-B940 which
was driven by Pacifico Carbajosa y Gemillan, 40 years old, married and a resident of
398 Martines St., Dipolog City, said driver was burned and injured seriously when on
the way at Bunawan this Municipality, due to a bumping incident.
Bus Line marked Carina bearing Plate No. 939 driven by Edgardo Enerio y Paglinawan
of Sapang Dalaga, Misamis Occidental, Hit and run and surrendered to Sapang
Dalaga office of the Station Commander.
The driver of Sevilla Line with his two companions were rushed to the Calamba
Community Hospital for treatment. The scene of the incident was investigated by
F/Sgt. Pagalaran, Sr. 8
Petitioners Occidental Land Transportation Company Inc. and Edgardo Enerio
appealed from the above-quoted decision to the Court of Appeals. 9 They assigned the
following errors:
I
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE BASED ON A DECISION
RENDERED IN ANOTHER CASE.
II
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT' THE FORD FIERA WAS
EXCLUSIVELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACCIDENT.
III
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE FORD FIERA DID NOT
BELONG TO THE PLAINTIFF TRENCIO ALMEDILLA. 10
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto and disposed of the errors assigned
in the following manner:
Anent the first assigned error, such step of the trial court in taking judicial notice of
Civil Case No. 315(6) is sanctioned under Rule 129, Sec. 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Thus, as aptly put by Chief Justice Moran "Courts have also taken judicial
notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one
or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration (5
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970, ed., p. 50).
Hence, considering the previous decision in Civil Case No. 315(6) involving the same
vehicular accident had already put to rest the issue as to the negligence of
defendants, the court properly took cognizance of said decision as a matter of
convenience, as these facts are capable of unquestionable demonstration (Baguio vs.
De Jalagat 42 SCRA 337).
As to the liability of the defendants in the vehicular mishap, We concur with the
finding of the trial court in Civil Case No. 315(6) which held inter alia:
Moreover, it does not seem possible, as claimed by plaintiff's own witness, Crisanto
Andus, that while negotiating the curb, and while starting to descend, the Ford Fiera
slid towards the Carina Express No. C-24, hitting its left rear as a consequence. For
the Ford Fiera was admittedly loaded with fish and that consequently, because of the
weight of its cargo, in relation to its capacity, it will have more traction even in a
slippery wet asphalted road; and, as such, the probability of its sliding towards the
extreme left side of the road is improbable, if not remote. Not so in the case of Carina
Express No. C-24, which had only three (3) passengers at that time, or even fifteen
(15) passengers, as claimed by the plaintiff. For with this load, the said bus was
undoubtedly travelling without much traction, since its passenger load was not
enough to give it stability while running, considering its size and body weight; and
that, therefore, it must have been, as described by defendant's witnesses, that
Carina Express No. C-24, was running fast in a zigzagging manner along the slippery
wet asphalted national highway causing its left rear to jerk towards the left, with the
driver losing control, sideswiping the Ford Fiera in the process, and then continuing its
swerving towards the left until it turned about facing Ozamis City.
Correlatively, it is well-settled that the conclusions of facts of the trial court are
entitled to great respect and shall not be generally disturbed on appeal, because it is
in a better position that the appellate tribunal to examine the evidence directly and
to observe the demeanor of the witness while testifying (Hermo vs. Court of Appeals,
155 SCRA 24). 11
Hence this petition.
The errors assigned by the petitioners are almost identical to those raised before the
appellate court. They claim that it was error for the respondent court to "uphold the
decision of the trial court based on the judgment rendered in another case," and
"uphold the grant of damages for the Ford Fiera when the same did not belong to
Trencio Almedilla." 12
The petition is devoid of merit.
No error was committed by the respondent court when it upheld the findings of the
trial court in Civil Case No. 2728.
The reasons advanced by the respondent court in taking judicial notice of Civil Case
No. 3156 are valid and not contrary to law. As a general rule, "courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them,
of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried
or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may
have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge." The general rule
admits of exceptions as enumerated in Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, 13 the Court,
citing U.S. v. Claveria,14 which We quote:
. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court
may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives
as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the
opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in
some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record
of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the
court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a
part of the record of the case then pending.
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, 'in the absence of
objection,' 'with the knowledge of the opposing party,' or 'at the request or with the
consent of the parties,' the case is clearly referred to or 'the original or part of the
records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives' and 'admitted as part
of the record of the case then pending.' (Emphasis supplied).
The Court in Tabuena ruled that the conditions necessary for the exception to be
applicable were not established, such as that ". . ., (t)he petitioner was completely
unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial
court in the case then pending before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was
never taken up at the trial and was 'unfairly sprung' upon him, leaving him no
opportunity to counteract." 15
The same is not true in the instant case. Civil Case No. 3156, which the lower court in
Civil Case No. 2728 took judicial notice of, decided the issue of negligence between
the driver of the two vehicles involved in the subject collision. It was therefore a
matter of convenience, to consider the decision rendered in that case.
And unlike the factual situation in Tabuena v. CA, the decision in Civil Case No. 3156
formed part of the records of the instant case (Civil Case No. 2728) with the
knowledge of the parties and in the absence of their objection. This fact was pointed
out by the lower court, to wit:
The . . . findings of the Oroquieta Court became as conclusive upon the company and
its driver by their acquiescence and silence. . . . (Decision of lower court. p. 12;
records p. 239)
xxx xxx xxx
Returning to Exhibit "O," supra (Decision, Civil Case No. 3156, CFI, Branch III,
Oroquieta City), the Court hastens to add: Said exhibit has not been objected to nor
commented upon by the defendants Company and Enerio, through their
counsel, . . . . 16
This being the case, petitioners were aware that Exhibit "O" (Decision in Civil Case
No. 3156) had formed part of the records of the case and would thereby be
considered by the trial court in its decision.
Furthermore, upon perusal of Exhibit "O," and the decision of the lower court in the
instant case, there is no showing of any irregularity but rather a logical discussion of
the case and the evidence presented before the court. The lower court did not merely
"adopt by reference" the findings of fact of the Oroquieta court, but used it in its
discourse to obtain the conclusions pronounced in its decision.
Petitioner alleges that the Ford Fiera did not belong to Trencio Almedilla, but to its
registered owner Sevilla Lines, and therefore the grant of damages for its repair
was improperly awarded to private respondent Almedilla. This factual matter has
already been decided upon in the trial court.
The fact that the Fiera was owned by Almedilla though registered with Sevilla Line,
will not alter the conclusion arrived at by the lower court. The party who stands to
benefit or suffer from the decision is admittedly private respondent Almedilla and not
Sevilla Lines. William Sevilla admitted that the real owner of the vehicle was Trencio
Almedilla, in the case for damages by Occidental Land Transportation against Sevilla
Lines and/or William Sevilla.17 Having thus been settled in the lower court, petitioner
is now no longer in any position to question the ownership of the Fiera or the award
of damages to private respondent Almedilla.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
September 28, 1990 (CA-G.R. CV No. 10176) affirming the decision of the trial court
dated March 11, 1986, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit with costs
against the petitioners.
BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, Inc., petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and the COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE,respondents.
If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their
taxes, so must it apply the same standard against itself in refunding excess
payments. When it is undisputed that a taxpayer is entitled to a refund, the State
should not invoke technicalities to keep money not belonging to it. No one, not even
the State, should enrich oneself at the expense of another.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the March 31, 1995 Decision of the Court
of Appeals1 (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 34240, which affirmed the December 24, 1993
Decision2 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CA disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.3
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the CTA Decision affirmed by the CA
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in [view of] all the foregoing, Petitioner's claim for refund is hereby
DENIED and this Petition for Review is DISMISSED for lack of merit. 4
Also assailed is the November 8, 1995 CA Resolution 5 denying reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of this case were summarized by the CA in this wise:
This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491.00 representing
petitioner's tax withheld for the year 1989.
In its Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for the year 1989, the following items are
reflected:
Income P1,017,931,831.00
Deductions P1,026,218,791.00
Net Income (Loss) (P8,286,960.00)
Taxable Income (Loss) (P8,286,960.00)
Less:
1988 Tax Credit P185,001.00
1989 Tax Credit P112,491.00
TOTAL AMOUNT P297,492.00
REFUNDABLE
It appears from the foregoing 1989 Income Tax Return that petitioner had a total
refundable amount of P297,492 inclusive of the P112,491.00 being claimed as tax
refund in the present case. However, petitioner declared in the same 1989 Income
Tax Return that the said total refundable amount of P297,492.00 will be applied
as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year.
On October 11, 1990, petitioner filed a written claim for refund in the amount of
P112,491.00 with the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue alleging that it
did not apply the 1989 refundable amount of P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00) to
its 1990 Annual Income Tax Return or other tax liabilities due to the alleged business
losses it incurred for the same year.
Without waiting for respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on the claim
for refund, petitioner filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Tax Appeals,
seeking the refund of the amount of P112,491.00.
The respondent Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioner's petition on the ground
that petitioner failed to present as evidence its corporate Annual Income Tax Return
for 1990 to establish the fact that petitioner had not yet credited the amount of
P297,492.00 (inclusive of the amount P112,491.00 which is the subject of the present
controversy) to its 1990 income tax liability.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied by
respondent court in its Resolution dated May 6, 1994. 6
As earlier noted, the CA affirmed the CTA. Hence, this Petition. 7
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the CTA, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show proof that it has not credited to its 1990
Annual income Tax Return, the amount of P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00), so as
to refute its previous declaration in the 1989 Income Tax Return that the said amount
will be applied as a tax credit in the succeeding year of 1990. Having failed to submit
such requirement, there is no basis to grant the claim for refund. . . .
Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such, they are regarded as in
derogation of sovereign authority and to be construed strictissimi juris against the
person or entity claiming the exemption. In other words, the burden of proof rests
upon the taxpayer to establish by sufficient and competent evidence its entitlement
to the claim for refund.8
Issue
In their Memorandum, respondents identify the issue in this wise:
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the refund of
P112,491.90, representing excess creditable withholding tax paid for the taxable year
1989.9
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Petitioner Entitled to Refund
It is undisputed that petitioner had excess withholding taxes for the year 1989 and
was thus entitled to a refund amounting to P112,491. Pursuant to Section 69 10 of the
1986 Tax Code which states that a corporation entitled to a refund may opt either (1)
to obtain such refund or (2) to credit said amount for the succeeding taxable year,
petitioner indicated in its 1989 Income Tax Return that it would apply the said amount
as a tax credit for the succeeding taxable year, 1990. Subsequently, petitioner
informed the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that it would claim the amount as a
tax refund, instead of applying it as a tax credit. When no action from the BIR was
forthcoming, petitioner filed its claim with the Court of Tax Appeals.
The CTA and the CA, however, denied the claim for tax refund. Since petitioner
declared in its 1989 Income Tax Return that it would apply the excess withholding tax
as a tax credit for the following year, the Tax Court held that petitioner was presumed
to have done so. The CTA and the CA ruled that petitioner failed to overcome this
presumption because it did not present its 1990 Return, which would have shown
that the amount in dispute was not applied as a tax credit. Hence, the CA concluded
that petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals. As a rule, the factual findings of the appellate
court are binding on this Court. This rule, however, does not apply where, inter alia,
the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts, or when the appellate court
failed to notice certain relevant facts which if considered would justify a different
conclusion. 11 This case is one such exception.
In the first place, petitioner presented evidence to prove its claim that it did not apply
the amount as a tax credit. During the trial before the CTA, Ms. Yolanda Esmundo, the
manager of petitioner's accounting department, testified to this fact. It likewise
presented its claim for refund and a certification issued by Mr. Gil Lopez, petitioner's
vice-president, stating that the amount of P112,491 "has not been and/or will not be
automatically credited/offset against any succeeding quarters' income tax liabilities
for the rest of the calendar year ending December 31, 1990." Also presented were
the quarterly returns for the first two quarters of 1990.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue, for its part, failed to controvert petitioner's claim. In
fact, it presented no evidence at all. Because it ought to know the tax records of all
taxpayers, the CIR could have easily disproved petitioner's claim. To repeat, it did not
do so.
More important, a copy of the Final Adjustment Return for 1990 was attached to
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration filed before the CTA. 12 A final adjustment
return shows whether a corporation incurred a loss or gained a profit during the
taxable year. In this case, that Return clearly showed that petitioner incurred
P52,480,173 as net loss in 1990. Clearly, it could not have applied the amount in
dispute as a tax credit.
Again, the BIR did not controvert the veracity of the said return. It did not even file an
opposition to petitioner's Motion and the 1990 Final Adjustment Return attached
thereto. In denying the Motion for Reconsideration, however, the CTA ignored the said
Return. In the same vein, the CA did not pass upon that significant document.
True, strict procedural rules generally frown upon the submission of the Return after
the trial.1wphi1 The law creating the Court of Tax Appeals, however, specifically
provides that proceedings before it "shall not be governed strictly by the technical
rules of evidence." 13 The paramount consideration remains the ascertainment of
truth. Verily, the quest for orderly presentation of issues is not an absolute. It should
not bar courts from considering undisputed facts to arrive at a just determination of a
controversy.
In the present case, the Return attached to the Motion for Reconsideration clearly
showed that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990. Contrary to the holding of the CA
and the CTA, petitioner could not have applied the amount as a tax credit. In failing to
consider the said Return, as well as the other documentary evidence presented
during the trial, the appellate court committed a reversible error.
It should be stressed that the rationale of the rules of procedure is to secure a just
determination of every action. They are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. 14 But there can be no just determination of the present action if we ignore, on
grounds of strict technicality, the Return submitted before the CTA and even before
this Court. 15 To repeat, the undisputed fact is that petitioner suffered a net loss in
1990; accordingly, it incurred no tax liability to which the tax credit could be applied.
Consequently, there is no reason for the BIR and this Court to withhold the tax refund
which rightfully belongs to the petitioner.
Public respondents maintain that what was attached to petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was not the final adjustment Return, but petitioner's first two
quarterly returns for 1990. 16 This allegation is wrong. An examination of the records
shows that the 1990 Final Adjustment Return was attached to the Motion for
Reconsideration. On the other hand, the two quarterly returns for 1990 mentioned by
respondent were in fact attached to the Petition for Review filed before the CTA.
Indeed, to rebut respondents' specific contention, petitioner submitted before us its
Surrejoinder, to which was attached the Motion for Reconsideration and Exhibit "A"
thereof, the Final Adjustment Return for 1990. 17
CTA Case No. 4897
Petitioner also calls the attention of this Court, as it had done before the CTA, to a
Decision rendered by the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897, involving its claim for
refund for the year 1990. In that case, the Tax Court held that "petitioner suffered a
net loss for the taxable year 1990 . . . ." 18 Respondent, however, urges this Court not
to take judicial notice of the said case. 19
As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or
are actually pending before the same judge." 20
Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of
matters ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this case,
the Court notes that a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the
Petition for Review filed before this Court. Significantly, respondents do not claim at
all that the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even
dispute the contents of the said Decision, claiming merely that the Court cannot take
judicial notice thereof.
To our mind, respondents' reasoning underscores the weakness of their case. For if
they had really believed that petitioner is not entitled to a tax refund, they could
have easily proved that it did not suffer any loss in 1990. Indeed, it is noteworthy that
respondents opted not to assail the fact appearing therein that petitioner suffered
a net loss in 1990 in the same way that it refused to controvert the same fact
established by petitioner's other documentary exhibits.
In any event, the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole basis of petitioner's
case. It is merely one more bit of information showing the stark truth: petitioner did
not use its 1989 refund to pay its taxes for 1990.
Finally, respondents argue that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions and
are to be construed strictissimi juris against the claimant. Under the facts of this
case, we hold that petitioner has established its claim. Petitioner may have failed to
strictly comply with the rules of procedure; it may have even been negligent. These
circumstances, however, should not compel the Court to disregard this cold,
undisputed fact: that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990, and that it could not have
applied the amount claimed as tax credits.
Substantial justice, equity and fair play are on the side of petitioner. Technicalities
and legalisms, however exalted, should not be misused by the government to keep
money not belonging to it and thereby enrich itself at the expense of its law-abiding
citizens. If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying
their taxes, so must it apply the same standard against itself in refunding excess
payments of such taxes. Indeed, the State must lead by its own example of honor,
dignity and uprightness.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue is ordered to refund to petitioner the amount of P112,491 as excess
creditable taxes paid in 1989. No costs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIANO AUSTRIA alias
"ANOY", accused-appellant.

Charged with, tried, and convicted for the crime of rape, accused-appellant Mariano
Austria82 years old at the time of the commission of the offensenow comes
before us to assail the decision, dated 31 October 1995, of the Regional Trial Court of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 38, in Criminal Case No. L-5239, adjudging him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim P50,000.00 as moral damages plus
cost of the proceedings.

The information1, dated 15 January 1995, charged octogenarian accused-appellant

Mariano Austria with the rape of minor Prescila de Vera, as follows:

" That on or about the 22nd day of November 1994 at 12:00 o clock noon (sic) in
Barangay San Jose, Municipality of Aguilar, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused armed with
a scythe, taking advantage of his superior strength, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with Prescila G. de Vera against her will, to her damage and prejudice.

Contrary to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code."

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty after which trial on the
merits ensued, where the prosecution presented the testimonies of complainant
Prescila; Myrna de Vera, mother of Prescila; Nieves de Vera, aunt of Prescila; and Dr.
Cecilio Guico, Jr., the physician who conducted the medical examination on Prescila
and prepared the corresponding medical certificate thereon.

At the time of the alleged rape, Prescila was 12 years old having been born on 01
May 19822; accused-appellant claimed to be 82 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense, having been born on 12 September 1912. 3However, no
official record or document was presented or available to ascertain the actual age of
accused-appellant.4

As gleaned from the collective narration of the prosecution witnesses, the facts
unfold.
Twelve-year-old Prescila de Vera, a grade three student and only daughter of Rodolfo
de Vera and Myrna Garcia, had been staying with her grandmother Brigida at San
Jose, Aguilar Pangasinan, for a year already prior to the alleged rape. 5
As a student, Prescila attended the morning and afternoon school sessions at
Anonang Elementary School6 located around ten kilometers away from Brigidas
residence.7
On 22 November 1994, as Prescila was passing a ricefield 8 on her way home for
lunch, accused-appellant Austria, whom she refers to as "Lake Anoy," 9 suddenly
accosted her and grabbed her left wrist. Accused-appellant then drew an eight-inch
scythe and despite Prescilas resistance and protestations, dragged the girl toward a
part of the field where banana plants abound. 10
Amid the cover of vegetation, accused appellant poked his scythe on Prescilas
throat,11 removed Prescilas short pants and underwear and on pain of death forbid
her to report the incident. Accused-appellant then removed his short pants, as he was
not donning any underwear, laid Prescila down and, with his finger, fondled Prescilas
vagina,12 which bled. As accused-appellant commenced to unleash his lust, the young
lass felt pain in her vagina.
Thereafter, accused-appellant kissed Prescila, mashed her breast and probed his
finger into her vagina. Unsatisfied, accused-appellant touched himself by
masturbating his penis.13 Then, perched on top of the young girl and while in the heat
of fondling himself, accused-appellant held Prescilas hand. Prescila protested,
struggled and pushed accused-appellant away causing the latter to fall down. She
attempted to escape but accused-appellant stepped on Prescilas foot 14 thus
rendering futile her efforts to extricate from the lecherous advancement of accused-
appellant.
Insatiated, accused-appellant positioned himself on top of Prescila, inserted his penis
into her vagina and worked his way with a "push-and-pull-movement". Again, Prescila
felt pain in her vagina.
Having spent his lust, accused-appellant stood up, wore his short pants and went
away. Feeling sick, dizzy and devoid of strength, Prescila rested for a while after
which she put on her underwear and proceeded home. 15
Upon arriving home and fearing that her grandmother Brigida would whip her,
Prescila chose not to divulge immediately the traumatic event as her grandmother
was strict.16 After the passage of two weeks, however, Prescila, unable to conceal the
ordeal to herself, disclosed the rape incident to her Aunt Nieves de Vera, who
eventually reported the same to Brigida.
At the witness stand, Prescila testified that she had her menstrual period on the day
accused-appellant ravished her. Further, she described appellants penis"like a new
Peso coin," about an inch in diameter, around four inches in length and black in
color.17 Prescila categorically declared that prior to the rape incident she did not have
sexual intercourse with anyone 18 and that as a result of the rape, she stopped
attending school for fear of her life.
On 26 December 1994, Dr. Cecilio Guico, Jr., resident physician of the Mangatarem
District Hospital, physically examined Prescila, which test yielded that 19 Prescilas
hymen had old lacerations at "1,3,7 and 9 o clock" which could have been caused by
a blunt object forcibly entered into the victims vagina. 20 According to the medical
report, Prescilas vagina was negative for spermatozoa and easily admitted one
examining finger.21 No other external physical injuries were found at the time of
examination which was conducted 34 days after the alleged incident. 22
In contrast, accused-appellant principally adopted a two-pronged defense riveted on
denial and impotency. Thus, according to accused-appellants testimony, as
corroborated by defense witness Rudy Garcia, 23 around noon of 22 November 1994,
accused-appellant was busy harvesting palay in the ricefield owned by Austrias
nephew Romualdo Gondayao. As accused-appellant was conversing with Rudy Garcia,
who was then overseeing the mango trees, Prescila, accompanied by another girl,
approached24 and asked Austria for money. 25 Upon accused-appellants refusal to give
money, Prescila grabbed his wallet containing P1,600.00 26 tucked in the right back
pocket of his pants. Accused-appellant then held Prescilas right hand and recovered
the wallet from her. Thereafter, Prescila retreated and from a distance of five meters,
picked-up and threw hardened soil at accused-appellant hitting his right knee.
Beyond this, accused-appellant raised the defense of impotency. On the stand,
accused-appellant testified that since reaching the age of 60 years, his penis is not
anymore capable of erection 27 because of his rheumatic condition. Upon reaching the
age of 70, he also claimed to be afflicted with hernia; 28 he cannot anymore run fast
because his knees are already weak.29
In its bid for acquittal, the defense presented Dr. Wilma Flores-Peralta 30 who testified
that she examined accused-appellant on 11 January 1995 and found him suffering
from Epidideguio Orchites or "epidition of testicles plus the left tube". According to Dr.
Peralta, the left testicle31 of accused-appellant was "swollen, larger than the right and
tender". She added that the illness, which is different from Hernia 32 and caused by
viral or bacterial infection,33 is painful.
During trial, the court observed and noted that the forefinger, fourth finger and
thumb of the accused are severed from accused-appellants right hand. The
forefinger is about an inch in length.34
Moreover, the testimonies of SP02 Luis Padama of the PNP Aguilar Police Station, and
Magdalena Fernandez, daughter of accused-appellant were presented by the defense.
Magdalena testified that on 10 September 1994, she heard Prescila crying and
reporting to her Aunt Nieves that one Sammy Valdez, who was drunk, dragged
Prescila to his house and raped the young girl. Magdalenas recollection though was
never corroborated.
Similarly, through the testimony of Magdalena, the defense interjected an angle of
personal vendetta theorizing that the rape charge against accused-appellant could
have been filed due to Magdalenas refusal to grant Brigidas request to let the latter
transfer and occupy the formers land.35 Brigida is Prescilas grandmother.
On 31 October 1995, the trial court rendered a decision convicting accused-appellant,
the decretal portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, in the light of the considerations discussed above, the court finds and
holds the accused, Mariano Austria alias "Anoy", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and conformable thereto, pursuant to law,
hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and its
accessory penalties provided by law and to further pay the costs of the proceedings.
The court further orders the accused to indemnify the victim Prescila de Vera the sum
of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED."
Hence, the instant appeal where the defense ascribed to the trial court the following
errors:
I fantasy out of mere imagination. She does not appear to have such inventiveness. 40
The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant Mariano Austria guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code considering that:
A. The conduct of Prescila De Vera after the supposed rape belie her claim and
seriously puts her credibility in issue;
B. The delay in reporting the crime was not reasonably explained. Thus, it casts a
serious doubt on the truth of the charge for rape;
C. The prosecution failed to overcome the presumption of impotence on the part of
accused-appellant Mariano Austria who was already eighty-two (82) years old at the
time of the alleged rape;
D. The prosecution failed to prove force and intimidation as an element of the crime
of rape.
II
The trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of the defense when the
version of the prosecution is incredible failing thus to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
A. The story of the prosecution is replete with material inconsistencies and fails to
discharge its burden of proof sufficient to warrant a conviction.
As these proffered arguments are specious, the conviction of accused-appellant
Austria necessarily stands.
Beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecutions collective evidence indubitably
established not only the commission of the rape but also accused-appellants precise
degree of culpability and guilt therefor. Of equal importance is the glaring fact that
Prescila, in open court, positively identified36 accused-appellant as the defiler of her
virtue.
In an attempt to evade criminal liability, accused-appellant, in effect, assails the
credibility of Prescila by casting doubts on complainants conduct after the incident
and by interposing the issue of delay in reporting the crime. On this score, we
reiterate the long-standing rule in this specie of cases, that the lone testimony of a
rape victim, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction. 37 Courts
usually lend credence to testimonies of young girls, especially when the facts point to
their having been victims of sexual assault.38
Though insensate, the records still reveal that at the time accused-appellant ravaged
complainants budding womanhood, Prescila, despite her being twelve years old, was
still in grade three having failed grade one thrice and grade two once. 39 Given the
naivet and limited intelligence of the complainant, we do not believe that she could
have fabricated her charges against accused-appellant, weaving a tale of pure
Neither is it proper for us to judge the actions of children who have undergone
traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected under the circumstances
from mature people.41 Also, it is a matter of judicial cognizance that in rural areas in
the Philippines, young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and
prudence, and that great caution is observed so that their reputation shall remain
untainted.42
In the course of trial, the lower court observed that Prescila was sincere and frank in
answering questions propounded to her. At times, Prescila even "shed tears as she
recalled and narrated the harrowing experience and tragedy that befell upon her." Of
judicial cognizance is the fact that the crying of the victim during her testimony is
evidence of the credibility of the rape charge. 43 Likewise, the trial court recognized no
"tone of hesitancy and artificiality in her voice as she testified and narrated how the
accused deflowered her."
To our mind, Prescilas testimony is unsoiled by deceptiveness and untouched by the
vice of falsehood. Her story of defloration, woeful as it is, bears the earmarks of truth;
her narration deserves outmost credence and weight, as opposed to accused-
appellants self-serving declarations and tale of denial.
As to the alleged delay, Prescilas disclosure that she has been raped must not be
taken lightly, as it is not uncommon for a young girl to conceal for some time the
assault on her virtue because of the rapists threats on her life, fear of public
humiliation, and/or lack of courage and composure to immediately explain that she
has been sexually assaulted.44
For while a complainants act in immediately reporting the commission of rape has
been considered by the Court as a factor strengthening her credibility, delay or
vacillation in criminal accusations does not necessarily impair the complainants
credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained. 45
In the case before us, the rueful ordeal that Prescila bitterly experienced in the
vicious hands of accused-appellant, coupled with the fear of disappointing her
grandmother and the serious threats on her life arewithout doubtmore than
enough to cow a young girl from immediately articulating the bestiality that
miserably visited her at such blooming age.
To put it differently, silence is not an odd behavior of a rape victim. 46
Granting too that the delay could not be attributed to death threats and intimidation
made and exercised by the accused on the victim, such failure in making a prompt
report to the proper authorities does not destroy the truth per se of the complaint.47
Contrary to accused-appellants arguments, the prosecution clearly showed that force
and intimidation attended the commission of the crime. Thus on the stand, Prescila
narrated how "Lake Anoy", far more advanced in age than her and formidably armed
with a scythe, threatened to snuff out her life if she were not to bow down to
accused-appellants salacious desires.
In a decided case,48 this Court ruled that it is not necessary that force and violence be
employed in rape, intimidation is sufficient, and this includes the moral kind, i.e.,
threatening the victim with a knife. Moreover, if the use of a knife and the threat of
death against the victims parents was, in People vs. Pada49 deemed intimidation
sufficient to cow the victim into obedience, a fortiori, must we, in the instant case,
uphold the presence of force and intimidation, considering that accused-appellant
directed the threats against Prescilathe victim of rape herself.
Consequently, we consider the aggravating circumstance of deadly weapon 50 in the
commission of the rape, contrary to the trial courts pronouncement that the scythe "
is a necessary implement to earn a livelihood of the accused (sic) who is a farmer." As
can be seen, the scythe was used by accused-appellant as a tool to intimidate the
victim and facilitate the consummation of this deplorable offense.
Notably, jurisprudence is replete with cases that threatening the victim with bodily
injury while holding a knife or bolo constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring a
woman to submission to the lustful desires of the molester. 51
As to the alleged inconsistencies in Prescilas testimony, we consider them to be only
minor and trivial so as not to diminish, much less shatter the weight accorded to her
narration concerning the commission of the rape and the identity of the despicable
author thereofaccused-appellant Austria. Besides, Prescilas charge is fortified by
the evidence on record specifically the medical findings and testimony of Dr. Cecilio
Guico, Jr., that the lacerations found in the victims hymen could have been caused
by a blunt object forcibly entered into Prescilas vagina.52
Obviously, when the victims testimony of her violation is corroborated by the
physicians findings of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the
existence of the essential requisite of carnal knowledge. 53
Arguing on the last ditch, the defense volunteers that "the prosecution failed to
overcome the presumption of impotence on the part accused-appellant who was
already eighty-two years old at the time of the alleged rape."
This contention is dissident to settled jurisprudence.
Clearly, the presumption had always been in favor of potency. 54 Stated differently,
impotencythe physical inability to have sexual intercourseis considered an
abnormal condition and should not be presumed, thus: 55
"Impotence, in Medical JurisprudenceInability on the part of the male organ of
copulation to perform its proper function. Impotence applies only to disorders
affecting the function of the organ of copulation XXX (Dennis, System of Surgery;
Bouviers Law Dictionary, Rawles Third Revision, Vol. II, p. 1514);
"Impotence.
3. Law & Med. Incapacity for sexual intercourse." (Websters New International
Dictionary, Second Edition, Unabridged, p. 1251).
"Impotency or ImpotenceWant of power for copulation, not mere sterility. The
absence of complete power of copulation is an essential element to constitute
impotency. (31 C.J. p. 259)."
In rape cases, impotency as a defense must be proven with certainty to overcome
the presumption in favor of potency.56 Under the present circumstances, the evidence
proffered by the defense failed to discharge such burden, inasmuch as the very
testimony of Dr. Wilma Flores-Peralta repudiates the claim that accused-appellant
could not have performed the sexual act.
Although Dr. Peraltas findings prove that accused-appellant was afflicted
with "Epidideguio Orchites", such piece of evidence however does not categorically
conclude, nor even hint that Austria was sexually impotent. The evidence on this
point is wanting.
Assuming further that accused-appellant was 82 years old as he claimed he was at
the time of the commission of the crime, his advanced age does not ipso facto mean
that sexual intercourse is no longer possible, as age is not a criterion taken alone in
determining sexual interest and capability in middle-aged and older
people.57 Moreover, as in People vs. De Guzman 58, the protestations of accused-
appellant that he could not have raped the complainant because he was already old
at that time are belied by his physical condition.1avvphi1
To this end, the trial court had these words to describe accused-appellant Austria: 59
"During the trial of the case, the court had occasion to observe the movements of the
accused and found him still strong, agile and capable of committing sexual act. In
fact, it has been established during the trial that Mariano Austria could still work in
the farm and was harvesting palay at the time the incident happened. The court also
entertains serious doubts that the accused is 83 years old. His physical built,
appearance and movements strongly negate the assertion of the defense that
Mariano Austria is 83 years old."

Notwithstanding, we consider accused-appellants old age to mitigate his liability. 60

As to the proper penalty, where appellant committed the rape with the use of a
deadly weapon, the law provides that the range of penalty imposable on him shall be
the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death.61However, in view of the
mitigating circumstance of his age and pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be meted to him.

One last note. The records show that at the time of the rape, Prescila had her
menstrual period. Regardless, the presence or absence of menstruation does not
negate the crime of rape nor render its execution impossible; 62 lust, after all,
manifests no reverence for occasion, location or the victims condition.

For lechery is a beast that knows no master; it is an ogre that cradles no conscience.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION, that in
addition to the P50,000.00 awarded as moral damages, 63 he is ordered to pay the
victim the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity 64 plus costs of the proceedings.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RONNIE RULLEPA Y

GUINTO, accused-appellant.
On complaint of Cyra May Francisco Buenafe, accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y
Guinto was charged with Rape before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of November, 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously removing her parity, kissing her lips and vagina and
thereafter rubbing his penis and inserting the same to the inner portion of the vagina
of the undersigned complainant, 3 years of age, a minor, against her will and without
her consent.1
Arraigned on January 15, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. 2
From the testimonies of its witnesses, namely Cyra May, 3 her mother Gloria Francisco
Buenafe, Dr. Cristina V. Preyra, and SPO4 Catherine Borda, the prosecution
established the following facts:
On November 20, 1995, as Gloria was about to set the table for dinner at her house
in Quezon City, Cyra May, then only three and a half years old, told her, "Mama, si
kuya Ronnie lagay niya titi niya at sinaksak sa puwit at sa bibig ko."
"Kuya Ronnie" is accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa, the Buenafes' house boy, who
was sometimes left with Cyra May at home.
Gloria asked Cyra May how many times accused-appellant did those things to her, to
which she answered many times. Pursuing, Gloria asked Cyra May what else he did to
her, and Cyra May indicated the room where accused-appellant slept and pointed at
his pillow.
As on the night of November 20, 1995 accused-appellant was out with Gloria's
husband Col. Buenafe,4 she waited until their arrival at past 11:00 p.m. Gloria then
sent accused-appellant out on an errand and informed her husband about their
daughter's plaint. Buenafe thereupon talked to Cyra May who repeated what she had
earlier told her mother Gloria.
When accused-appellant returned, Buenafe and Gloria verified from him whether
what Cyra May had told them was true. Ronnie readily admitted doing those things
but only once, at 4:00 p.m. of November 17, 1995 or three days earlier. Unable to
contain her anger, Gloria slapped accused-appellant several times.
Since it was already midnight, the spouses waited until the following morning to bring
accused-appellant to Camp Karingal where he admitted the imputations against him,
on account of which he was detained. Gloria's sworn statement 5 was then taken.6
Recalling what accused-appellant did to her, Cyra May declared at the witness stand:
"Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga," thus causing her
pain and drawing her to cry. She added that accused-appellant did these to her twice
in his bedroom.
Dr. Ma. Cristina V. Preyra, the Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the Biological Science
Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory who examined Cyra May,
came up with her report dated November 21, 1995, 7containing the following findings
and conclusions:
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRA GENITAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child subject. Breasts are
undeveloped. Abdomen is flat and soft.
GENITAL:
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated
with congested and abraded labia minora presenting in between. On separating the
same is disclosed an abraded posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type intact
hymen. External vaginal orifice does not admit the tip of the examining index finger.
xxx xxx xxx
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the time of
examination.
By Dr. Preyra's explanation, the abrasions on the labia minora could have been
caused by friction with an object, perhaps an erect penis. She doubted if riding on a
bicycle had caused the injuries.8
The defense's sole witness was accused-appellant, who was 28 and single at the time
he took the witness stand on June 9, 1997. He denied having anything to do with the
abrasions found in Cyra May's genitalia, and claimed that prior to the alleged
incident, he used to be ordered to buy medicine for Cyra May who had difficulty
urinating. He further alleged that after he refused to answer Gloria's queries if her
husband Buenafe, whom he usually accompanied whenever he went out of the
house, was womanizing, Gloria would always find fault in him. He suggested that
Gloria was behind the filing of the complaint. Thus:
q According to them you caused the abrasions found in her genital?
a That is not true, sir,
q If that is not true, what is the truth?
a As I have mentioned earlier that before I started working with the family I was sent
to Crame to buy medicine for the daughter because she had difficulty in urinating.
q Did you know why the child has difficulty in urinating?
a No, I do not know, sir.
q And how about the present complaint filed against you, the complaint filed by
the mother of the victim?
a I did not do it, sir.
q What is the truth, what can you say about this present complaint filed against
you?
a As I said Mrs. Buenafe got mad at me because after I explained to her that I was
going with her gusband (sic) to the children of the husband with a former marriage. 9
Finding for the prosecution, Branch 96 of the Quezon City RTC rendered judgment,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused RONNIE RULLEPA y
GUINTO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, and he is accordingly sentenced
to death.
The accused is ordered to pay CYRA MAE BUENAFE the amount of P40,000.00 as civil
indemnity.
Costs to be paid by the accused.10 (Italics in the original.)
Hence, this automatic review, accused-appellant assigning the following errors to the
trial court:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S ADMISSION.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED ON (sic) RULING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
SILENCE DURING TRIAL AMOUNTED TO AN IMPLIED ADMISSION OF GUILT.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH
UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.11 (Emphasis supplied.)
Accused-appellant assails the crediting by the trial court, as the following portion of
its decision shows, of his admission to Gloria of having sexually assaulted Cyra May:
In addition, the mother asserted that Rullepa had admitted Cyra Ma[y]'s complaint
during the confrontation in the house. Indeed, according to the mother, the admission
was even expressly qualified by Rullepa's insistence that he had committed the
sexual assault only once, specifying the time thereof as 4:00 pm of November 17,
1995. That qualification proved that the admission was voluntary and true. An
uncoerced and truthful admission like this should be absolutely admissible and
competent.
xxx xxx xxx
Remarkably, the admission was not denied by the accused during trial despite his
freedom to deny it if untrue. Hence, the admission became conclusive upon
him.12 (Emphasis supplied.)
To accused-appellant, the statements attributed to him are inadmissible since they
were made out of fear, having been elicited only after Cyra May's parents "bullied
and questioned him." He thus submits that it was error for the trial court to take his
failure to deny the statements during the trial as an admission of guilt.
Accused-appellant's submission does not persuade. The trial court considered his
admission merely as an additional ground to convince itself of his culpability. Even if
such admission, as well as the implication of his failure to deny the same, were
disregarded, the evidence suffices to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The plain, matter-of-fact manner by which Cyra May described her abuse in the hands
of her Kuya Ronnie is an eloquent testament to the truth of her accusations. Thus she
testified on direct examination:
q Do you recall if Ronnie Rullepa did anything to you?
a Yes, sir.
q What did he do to you?
a "Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga"
q How many times did he do that to you?
a Twice, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
q Do you remember when he did these things to you?
a Opo.
q When was that?
a When my mother was asleep, he put he removed my panty and inserted his Continue
penis inside my vagina, my anus and my mouth, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
q Why were you in that room?
q After your Kuya Ronnie did those things to you what did you feel?
a Gusto nya po matulog ako sa kuwarto niya.
a "Sabi nya ganito (Witness putting her finger in her lips) Nasaktan po ako at
umiyak po ako". q When you were in that room, what did Kuya Ronnie do to you?

q Did you cry because of hurt? a "Hinubo po niya ang panty ko."

a Yes. q And after he remove your panty, what did Kuya Ronnie do, what did he do to
you?
q What part of your body hurt?
a He inserted his penis to my organ, sir.
a "Pepe ko po." When I went to the bathroom to urinate, I felt pain in my organ,
sir.13 q Why did kuya Ronnie, was kuya Ronnie already naked or he was already
wearing any clothing?
Cyra May reiterated her testimony during cross-examination, providing more
revolting details of her ordeal: a Still had his clothing on, sir.

q So, you said that Kuya Ronnie did something to you what did he do to you on q So, where did his penis, saan lumabas ang penis ni Kuya Ronnie?
November 17, 1995?
a Dito po, (Witness referring or pointing to her groin area)
a "Sinaksak nga yong titi nya". He inserted his penis to my organ and to my
mouth, sir. xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx q So, that's the and at the time, you did not cry and you did not shout for
help?
q When you said that your kuya Ronnie inserted his penis into your organ, into
your mouth, and into your anus, would you describe what his penis? a Sabi nya po, not to make any noise because my mother might be roused from
sleep.
a It is a round object, sir.
q How long was kuya Ronnie did that to you?
Court:
a Matagal po.
Is this titi of your kuya Ronnie a part of his body?
q After kuya Ronnie scrub his penis to your vagina, what other things did he do?
a Opo.
a After that he inserted his penis to my mouth, and to my anus, sir.
q Was that in the head of kuya Ronnie?
q You did not complain and you did not shout?
a No, sir.
a I cried, sir.14
q Which part of his body that titi located?
Accused-appellant draws attention to the statement of Cyra May that he was not in
(Witness pointing to her groin area) the house on November 17 (1995), as reflected in the following transcript of her
testimony:
Court:
q Is it not a fact that you said a while ago that when your father leaves the
house, he [was] usually accompanied by your kuya Ronnie?
a Opo.
q Why is it that Kuya Ronnie was in the house when your father left the house at
that time, on November 17?
a He was with Kuya Ronnie, sir.
q So, it is not correct that kuya Ronnie did something to you because your kuya
Ronnie [was] always with your Papa?
a Yes, sir.15
The above-quoted testimony of Cyra May does not indicate the time when her father
Col. Buenafe left their house on November 17, 1995 with accused-appellant and,
thus, does not preclude accused-appellant's commission of rape on the same date. In
any event, a young child is vulnerable to suggestion, hence, her affirmative response
to the defense counsel's above-quoted leading questions.
As for the variance in the claim regarding when Gloria was informed of the rape,
Gloria having testified that she learned of it on November 20, 1995 16 while Cyra May
said that immediately after the incident, she awakened her mother who was in the
adjacent room and reported it: 17 This is a minor matter that does not detract from
Cyra May's categorical, material testimony that accused-appellant inserted his penis
into her vagina.
Accused-appellant goes on to contend that Cyra May was coached, citing the
following portion of her testimony:
q "Yong sinabi mong sinira nya ang buhay mo," where did you get that phrase?
a It was the word of my Mama, sir.18
On the contrary, the foregoing testimony indicates that Cyra May was really narrating
the truth, that of hearing her mother utter "sinira niya ang buhay mo."
Accused-appellant's suggestion that Cyra May merely imagined the things of which
he is accused, perhaps getting the idea from television programs, is preposterous. It
is true that "the ordinary child is a `great weaver of romances,"' and her "imagination
may induce (her) to relate something she has heard or read in a story as personal
experience."19 But Cyra May's account is hardly the stuff of romance or fairy tales.
Neither is it normal TV fare, if at all.
This Court cannot believe that a victim of Cyra May's age could concoct a tale of
defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, and undergo the expense,
trouble, inconvenience, not to mention the trauma of public trial." 20
Besides, her testimony is corroborated by the findings of Dr. Preyra that there were
abrasions in her labia minora, which she opined, could have been caused by friction
with an erect penis.
This Court thus accords great weight to the following assessment of the trial court
regarding the competency and credibility of Cyra May as a witness:
Her very tender age notwithstanding, Cyra Ma(y) nonetheless appeared to possess
the necessary intelligence and perceptiveness sufficient to invest her with the
competence to testify about her experience. She might have been an impressionable
child as all others of her age are but her narration of Kuya Ronnie's placing his
"titi" in her "pepe" was certainly one which could not be considered as a common
child's tale. Her responses during the examination of counsel and of the Court
established her consciousness of the distinction between good and bad, which
rendered inconceivable for her to describe a "bad" act of the accused unless it really
happened to her. Needless to state, she described the act of the accused as bad. Her
demeanor as a witness manifested during trial by her unhesitant, spontaneous,
and plain responses to questions further enhanced her claim to credit and
trustworthiness.21 (Italics in the original.)
In a futile attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant claims that even before the
alleged incident Cyra May was already suffering from pain in urinating. He surmises
that she could have scratched herself which caused the abrasions. Dr. Preyra,
however, was quick to rule out this possibility. She stated categorically that that part
of the female organ is very sensitive and rubbing or scratching it is painful. 22 The
abrasions could not, therefore, have been self-inflicted.
That the Medical-Legal Officer found "no external signs of recent application of any
form of trauma at the time of the examination" does not preclude accused-
appellant's conviction since the infliction of force is immaterial in statutory rape. 23
More. That Cyra May suffered pain in her vagina but not in her anus despite her
testimony that accused-appellant inserted his penis in both orifices does not diminish
her credibility. It is possible that accused-appellant's penis failed to penetrate her
anus as deeply as it did her vagina, the former being more resistant to extreme
forces than the latter.
Accused-appellant's imputation of ill motive on the part of Gloria is puerile. No
mother in her right mind would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace and
trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape if she were not motivated solely by the
desire to incarcerate the person responsible for the child's defilement. 24 Courts are
seldom, if at all, convinced that a mother would stoop so low as to subject her
daughter to physical hardship and shame concomitant to a rape prosecution just to
assuage her own hurt feelings.25
Alternatively, accused-appellant prays that he be held liable for acts of lasciviousness
instead of rape, apparently on the basis of the following testimony of Cyra May,
quoted verbatim, that he merely "scrubbed" his penis against her vagina:
q Is it not a fact that kuya Ronnie just made some scrubbed his penis into your
vagina?
a Yes, Sir.
q And when he did not actually penetrated your vagina?
a Yes, sir.26
Dr. Preyra, however, found abrasions in the labia minora, which is "directly beneath
the labia majora,"27 proving that there was indeed penetration of the vagina, not just
a mere rubbing or "scrubbing" of the penis against its surface.
In fine, the crime committed by accused-appellant is not merely acts of
lasciviousness but statutory rape.
The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of
a woman, and (2) that the woman is below twelve years of age. 28 As shown in the
previous discussion, the first element, carnal knowledge, had been established
beyond reasonable doubt. The same is true with respect to the second element.
The victim's age is relevant in rape cases since it may constitute an element of the
offense. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659,29 provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx.
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age . . .
xxx xxx xxx.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx.
Furthermore, the victim's age may constitute a qualifying circumstance, warranting
the imposition of the death sentence. The same Article states:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity with the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim:
xxx xxx xxx.
4. when the victim is . . . a child below seven (7) years old.
xxx xxx xxx.
Because of the seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence
of the victim's age in rape cases, this Court, in the recently decided case of People v.
Pruna,30 established a set of guidelines in appreciating age as an element of the
crime or as a qualifying circumstance, to wit:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of
birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of
the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party.
The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall
not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
Applying the foregoing guidelines, this Court in the Pruna case held that the therein
accused-appellant could only be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua since:
. . . no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a baptismal
certificate of LIZETTE, was presented to prove her age. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx.
However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial court does not in any way
prove the age of LIZETTE, for there is nothing therein which even mentions her age.
Only testimonial evidence was presented to establish LIZETTE's age. Her mother,
Jacqueline, testified (that the victim was three years old at the time of the
commission of the crime).
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or almost two years after the
incident, that she was 5 years old. However, when the defense counsel asked her
how old she was on 3 January 1995, or at the time of the rape, she replied that she
was 5 years old. Upon further question as to the date she was born, she could not
answer.
For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and meted the supreme
penalty of death, it must be established with certainty that LIZETTE was below 7
years old at the time of the commission of the crime. It must be stressed that the
severity of the death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once carried
out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most
exacting rules of procedure and evidence.
In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTE's exact age, corroborative evidence such as her
birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other authentic document should be
introduced in evidence in order that the qualifying circumstance of "below seven (7)
years old" is appreciated against the appellant. The lack of objection on the part of
the defense as to her age did not excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden.
That the defense invoked LIZETTE's tender age for purposes of questioning her
competency to testify is not necessarily an admission that she was below 7 years of
age when PRUNA raped her on 3 January 1995. Such being the case, PRUNA cannot
be convicted of qualified rape, and hence the death penalty cannot be imposed on
him.
However, conformably with no. 3 (b) of the foregoing guidelines, the testimony of
LIZETTE's mother that she was 3 years old at the time of the commission of the crime
is sufficient for purposes of holding PRUNA liable for statutory rape, or rape of a girl
below 12 years of age. Under the second paragraph of Article 335, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no. 3 of the first paragraph thereof, having carnal
knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
Thus, the penalty to be imposed on PRUNA should be reclusion perpetua, and not
death penalty. (Italics in the original.)
Several cases31 suggest that courts may take "judicial notice" of the appearance of
the victim in determining her age. For example, the Court, in People v.
Tipay,32 qualified the ruling in People v. Javier,33 which required the presentation of
the birth certificate to prove the rape victim's age, with the following pronouncement:
This does not mean, however, that the presentation of the certificate of birth is at all
times necessary to prove minority. The minority of a victim of tender age who may be
below the age of ten is quite manifest and the court can take judicial notice thereof.
The crucial years pertain to the ages of fifteen to seventeen where minority may
seem to be dubitable due to one's physical appearance. In this situation, the
prosecution has the burden of proving with certainty the fact that the victim was
under 18 years of age when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition
of the death penalty under the above-cited provision. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, a handful of cases 34 holds that courts, without the requisite
hearing prescribed by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, 35 cannot take judicial
notice of the victim's age.
Judicial notice signifies that there are certain "facta probanda," or propositions in a
party's case, as to which he will not be required to offer evidence; these will be taken
for true by the tribunal without the need of evidence. 36 Judicial notice, however, is a
phrase sometimes used in a loose way to cover some other judicial action. Certain
rules of Evidence, usually known under other names, are frequently referred to in
terms of judicial notice.37
The process by which the trier of facts judges a person's age from his or her
appearance cannot be categorized as judicial notice. Judicial notice is based upon
convenience and expediency for it would certainly be superfluous, inconvenient, and
expensive both to parties and the court to require proof, in the ordinary way, of facts
which are already known to courts.38 As Tundag puts it, it "is the cognizance of certain
facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they already
know them." Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, where the provisions governing judicial
notice are found, is entitled "What Need Not Be Proved." When the trier of facts
observes the appearance of a person to ascertain his or her age, he is not taking
judicial notice of such fact; rather, he is conducting an examination of the evidence,
the evidence being the appearance of the person. Such a process militates against
the very concept of judicial notice, the object of which is to do away with the
presentation of evidence.
This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court; on the
contrary, it does. A person's appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object
evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the court. Section 1, Rule 130
provides:
SECTION 1. Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are those addressed to the
senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be
exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.
"To be sure," one author writes, "this practice of inspection by the court of objects,
things or persons relevant to the fact in dispute, has its roots in ancient judicial
procedure."39 The author proceeds to quote from another authority:
"Nothing is older or commoner in the administration of law in all countries than the
submission to the senses of the tribunal itself, whether judge or jury, of objects which
furnish evidence. The view of the land by the jury, in real actions, of a wound by the
judge where mayhem was alleged, and of the person of one alleged to be an infant,
in order to fix his age, the inspection and comparison of seals, the examination of
writings, to determine, whether they are (`)blemished,(') the implements with which
a crime was committed or of a person alleged, in a bastardy proceeding, to be the
child of another, are few illustrations of what may be found abundantly in our own
legal records and textbooks for seven centuries past." 40 (Emphasis supplied.)
A person's appearance, as evidence of age (for example, of infancy, or of being under
the age of consent to intercourse), is usually regarded as relevant; and, if so, the
tribunal may properly observe the person brought before it. 41 Experience teaches that
corporal appearances are approximately an index of the age of their bearer,
particularly for the marked extremes of old age and youth. In every case such
evidence should be accepted and weighed for what it may be in each case worth. In
particular, the outward physical appearance of an alleged minor may be considered
in judging his age; a contrary rule would for such an inference be pedantically over-
cautious.42Consequently, the jury or the court trying an issue of fact may be allowed
to judge the age of persons in court by observation of such persons. 43 The formal
offer of the person as evidence is not necessary. The examination and cross-
examination of a party before the jury are equivalent to exhibiting him before the jury
and an offer of such person as an exhibit is properly refused. 44
This Court itself has sanctioned the determination of an alien's age from his
appearance. In Braca v. Collector of Customs,45 this Court ruled that:
The customs authorities may also determine from the personal appearance of the
immigrant what his age is. The person of a Chinese alien seeking admission into the
Philippine Islands is evidence in an investigation by the board of special inquiry to
determine his right to enter; and such body may take into consideration his
appearance to determine or assist in determining his age and a finding that the
applicant is not a minor based upon such appearance is not without evidence to
support it.
This Court has also implicitly recognized the same process in a criminal case. Thus,
in United States v. Agadas,46this Court held:
Rosario Sabacahan testified that he was 17 years of age; that he had never
purchased a cedula; and that he was going to purchase a cedula the following
January. Thereupon the court asked this defendant these questions: "You are a pretty
big boy for seventeen." Answer: "I cannot tell exactly because I do not remember
when I was born, but 17 years is my guess." Court: "If you are going to take
advantage of that excuse, you had better get some positive evidence to that effect."
Answer: "I do not remember, as I already stated on what date and in what year I was
born." The court, in determining the question of the age of the defendant, Rosario
Sabacahan, said:
"The defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, testified that he thought that he was about 17
years of age, but judging by his appearance he is a youth 18 or 19 years old. He has
shown that he has no positive information on the subject and no effort was made by
the defense to prove the fact that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
article 9, paragraph 2, of the Penal code, which fact it is held to be incumbent upon
the defense to establish by satisfactory evidence in order to enable the court to give
an accused person the benefit of the mitigating circumstance."
In United States vs. Estavillo and Perez (10 Off. Gaz., 1984) Estavillo testified, when
the case was tried in the court below, that he then was only 16 years of age. There
was no other testimony in the record with reference to his age. But the trial judge
said: "The accused Estavillo, notwithstanding his testimony giving his age as 16
years, is, as a matter of fact, not less than 20." This court, in passing upon the age of
Estavillo, held:
"We presume that the trial court reached this conclusion with reference to the age of
Estavillo from the latter's personal appearance. There is no proof in the record, as we
have said, which even tends to establish the assertion that this appellant understated
his age. . . . It is true that the trial court had an opportunity to note the personal
appearance of Estavillo for the purpose of determining his age, and by so doing
reached the conclusion that he was at least 20, just two years over 18. This appellant
testified that he was only 16, and this testimony stands uncontradicted. Taking into
consideration the marked difference in the penalties to be imposed upon that age, we
must, therefore, conclude (resolving all doubts in favor of the appellants) that the
appellants' ages were 16 and 14 respectively."
While it is true that in the instant case Rosario testified that he was 17 years of age,
yet the trial court reached the conclusion, judging from the personal appearance of
Rosario, that "he is a youth 18 or 19 years old." Applying the rule enunciated in the
case just cited, we must conclude that there exists a reasonable doubt, at least, with
reference to the question whether Rosario was, in fact 18 years of age at the time the
robbery was committed. This doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant, and
he is, therefore, sentenced to six months of arresto mayor in lieu of six years ten
months and one day of presidio mayor. . . . .
There can be no question, therefore, as to the admissibility of a person's appearance
in determining his or her age. As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially
in rape cases, Pruna laid down guideline no. 3, which is again reproduced hereunder:
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of
birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.
Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the
victim is sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b) and
(c) above. In such cases, the disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is
so great that the court can easily determine from the appearance of the victim the
veracity of the testimony. The appearance corroborates the relative's testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person's
appearance, as object evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her
true age becomes greater and, following Agadas, supra, such doubt must be resolved
in favor of the accused.
This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth, the victim's mere physical
appearance is not enough to gauge her exact age. For the extreme penalty of death
to be upheld, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime must be substantiated. Verily, the minority of the victim should
be not only alleged but likewise proved with equal certainty and clearness as the
crime itself. Be it remembered that the proof of the victim's age in the present case
spells the difference between life and death.47
In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victim's certificate of live birth
or similar authentic documents in evidence. The victim and her mother, however,
testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape. Cyra May's
testimony goes:
q Your name is Cyra Mae is that correct?
a Yes, sir.
q And you are 3 years old?
a Yes, sir.48
That of her mother goes:
Q How old was your daughter when there things happened?
A 3 and years old.
Q When was she born?
A In Manila, May 10, 1992.49
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age
sought to be proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty
ascertaining the victim's age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore,
exists that the second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the victim was below
twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here,
reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken
for an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object
evidence, cannot be accorded much weight and, following Pruna, the testimony of the
mother is, by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below seven
years old at the time of the commission of the offense, accused-appellant cannot be
sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be
imposed upon him.
In line with settled jurisprudence, the civil indemnity awarded by the trial court is
increased to P50,000.00. In addition, Cyra May is entitled to an award of moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00.50
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto is
found GUILTY of Statutory Rape, defined and punished by Article 335 (3) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. He is ordered to pay private complainant, Cyra May Buenafe y Francisco,
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages
SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP, Petitioners,
vs.
ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300:1(1) reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 274, Paraaque City in Civil Case No. 04-0052; 2 and (2)
reinstating and affirming in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Branch 78, of the same city in Civil Case No. 2001-315. 3
First, we sift through the varying facts found by the different lower courts.
The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the
owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building, located at No. 158 Quirino
Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City.
On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against
petitioners, Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to
the complaint a contract of lease over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by
Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.1 a vv p h ! 1
The contract of lease reads:
CONTRACT OF LEASE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Contract of Lease is entered into by and between:
ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Filipino, of legal age, married with office at 2/F JOFERXAN (sgd.) (sgd.)
Building, F.B. Harrison St., Brgy. Baclaran, Paraaque City, and hereinafter referred to ROSALIE PALAA-CHUA MOSHIERA LATIEF
as the LESSOR, LESSOR LESSEE

- and - (sgd.)
OMAR LATIEF
OMAR LATIEF marriage to MOSHIERA LATIEF, also both Filipino, of legal age with LESSEE
address at 24 Anahan St. RGV Homes Paraaque City, and hereinafter referred to as
the LESSEES. SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

WITNESSETH (sgd.) (sgd.)

1. Daisy C. Ramos 2. Ferdinand C. Chua
1. That the LESSOR is the owner of the commercial building erected at the lot of the
Toribio G. Reyes Realty, Inc. situated at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Road, Republic of the Philippines)
Barangay Baclaran in Paraaque Ctiy; City of Manila)s.s.

2. That LESSOR hereby leases two (2) cubicles located at the 1st & 2nd Floor, of said
building with an area of 56 square meters under the following terms and conditions,
to wit:
a. That the monthly rental of the two (2) cubicles in PESOS, SIXTY THOUSAND
(P60,000.00), Philippine Currency. However, due to unstable power of the peso
LESSEES agrees to a yearly increase of ten (10%) percent of the monthly rental;
b. That any rental in-arrears shall be paid before the expiration of the contract to the
LESSOR;
c. That LESSEES agree to pay their own water and electric consumptions in the said
premises;
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila personally appeared the
following persons:
Rosalie P. Chua with CTC No. 05769706 at Paraaque City on 2/1/99; Moshiera Latief
with CTC No. 12885654 at Paraaque City on 11/11/99; Omar Latief with CTC No.
12885653 Paraaque City on Nov. 11, 1999.
known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed this instrument
consisting of two (2) pages duly signed by them and the two (2) instrumental
witnesses and acknowledged to me that the same is their free and voluntarily acts
and deeds.

d. That the LESSEES shall not sub-let or make any alteration in the cubicles without a IN FAITH AND TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my hand and Notarial
written permission from the LESSOR. Provided, however, that at the termination of Seal this ____th day of December, 1999 at the City of Manila, Philippines.
the Contract, the lessee shall return the two cubicles in its original conditions at their
expenses;
Doc. No. _____ ATTY. CALIXTRO B. RAMOS
Page No. _____ NOTARY PUBLIC
e. That the LESSEES agree to keep the cubicles in a safe and sanitary conditions, and
Book No. LXV Until December 31, 2000
shall not keep any kinds of flammable or combustible materials.
Series of 1999 PTR # 374145-1/11/99/-Mla.
IBP # 00262-Life Member4
f. That in case the LESSEES fail to pay the monthly rental every time it falls due or
violate any of the above conditions shall be enough ground to terminate this Contract
of Lease. Provided, further, that, if the LESSEES pre-terminate this Contract they shall A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip already
pay the rentals for the unused month or period by way of liquidated damages in favor occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter
of the LESSOR. demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail to do so, to vacate the
leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalies demand, she instituted
3. That this Contract of Lease is for six (6) yrs. only starting from December _____, the aforesaid complaint.
1999 or up to December ______, 2005.
In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalies claims. They averred that the lease of
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their hands this ___th day of the two (2) cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing
December, 1999 at City of Manila, Philippines. payment to Rosalie of the total amount of P2,570,000.00. The three (3) receipts, in
Rosalies handwriting, read:
1. I received the amount of P2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & located at the 1st and 2nd floors of a Roferxane Building situated at No. 158 Quirino
Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City. The [Spouses
Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[ara]aque City. ROFERLAND 5 Bldg. with the terms 6 Latip] are also ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY
yrs. Contract. THOUSAND PESOS (P720,000.00) as rent arrearages for the period of December 1999
to December 2000 and thereafter to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVENTY TWO
P2,000,000.00 (sgd.) THOUSAND PESOS (P72,000.00) per month from January 2001 to December 2002,
CHECK # 3767924 ____________________ plus ten percent (10%) increase for each and every succeeding years thereafter as
FAR EAST BANK Rosalie Chua stipulated in paragraph 2(a) of the Contract of Lease x x x, until the [Spouses Latip]
have completely vacated the leased premises subject of this lease. Finally[,] the
[Spouses Latip] are hereby ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of TWENTY
(sgd.) THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as attorneys fees and TWO THOUSAND PESOS
____________________ (P2,000.00) per [Rosalies] appearance in Court as appearance fee and to PAY the
Ferdinand Chua cost of this suit.

2. Received cash [Spouses Latips] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
P500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip SO ORDERED.7

(sgd.) In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip. The
Rosalie Chua RTC did not give credence to the contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized
12/10/99
____________________ and, in all other substantial aspects, incomplete. Further on this point, the RTC noted
Received by that the contract of lease lacked: (1) the signature of Ferdinand Chua, Rosalies
husband; (2) the signatures of Spouses Latip on the first page thereof; (3) the specific
3. Received cash dates for the term of the contract which only stated that the lease is for "six (6)
P70,000.00 from y[ea]rs only starting from December 1999 or up to December 2005"; (4) the exact
Moshiera Latip date of execution of the document, albeit the month of December and year 1999 are
indicated therein; and (5) the provision for payment of deposit or advance rental
(sgd.) which is supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts.
12-11-99 ____________________
Received by:6 The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was modified
and supplemented; and the entire lease rentals for the two (2) cubicles for six (6)
Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale years had already been paid by Spouses Latip in the amount of P2,570,000.00. As to
lease rights over two (2) cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of Rosalies claim that her receipt of P2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill payment by
goods during the Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalies offer to purchase prospective lessees to their lessor, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights,
lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under construction at the time. the RTC shot this down and pointed out that, apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie
According to Spouses Latip, the immediate payment of P2,570,000.00 would be used did not adduce evidence to substantiate this claim. On the whole, the RTC declared
to finish construction of the building giving them first priority in the occupation of the an existent lease between the parties for a period of six (6) years, and already fully
finished cubicles. paid for by Spouses Latip. Thus, Spouses Latip could not be ejected from the leased
premises until expiration of the lease period.
Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were finished, Spouses
Latip occupied them without waiting for the completion of five (5) other stalls. The RTC disposed of the appeal, viz.:
Spouses Latip averred that the contract of lease they signed had been novated by
their purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were surprised to WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed decision of the [MeTC] dated
receive a demand letter from Rosalies counsel and the subsequent filing of a January 13, 2004 is reversed as judgment is hereby rendered for the [Spouses Latip]
complaint against them. and against [Rosalie], ordering the latter to pay the former

The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, viz.: (1) the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral damages;

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [Spouses Latip] and all persons claiming (2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
rights under them are hereby ordered to VACATE the property subject of this case
(3) the sum of PhP250,000.00 plus PhP3,000.00 per court appearance as and for
attorneys fees; and
(4) costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.8
In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously mentioned, reversed the RTC and
reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract of lease, albeit
lacking the signature of Ferdinand and not notarized, remained a complete and valid
contract. As the MeTC had, the CA likewise found that the alleged defects in the
contract of lease did not render the contract ineffective. On the issue of whether the
amount of P2,570,000.00 merely constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA
took judicial notice of this common practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around
the Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate court, this judicial notice was
bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that
they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat.
Thus, ruling on Rosalies appeal, the CA disposed of the case:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED.
The assailed decision of RTC Paraaque City Branch 274 dated September 24, 2004 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the January 13, 2004 decision of the MeTC is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED en toto.
SO ORDERED.9
Not surprisingly, Spouses Latip filed the present appeal.
The singular issue for our resolution is whether Spouses Latip should be ejected from
the leased cubicles.
As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the ejectment of
Spouses Latip, took judicial notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in
the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor.
We disagree.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial
notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states,
their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of
matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro10 is instructive:
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The
power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be
taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject
should be promptly resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of
general notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying
that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be
otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious
that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere
personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is
not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of
those matters which are "commonly" known.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters
coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences
of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and
are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are
universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and
so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person.11
We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the recent
case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 12 which cited State Prosecutors:
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of
general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a
reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters
coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences
of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and
are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are
universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and
so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a
wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of
common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part,
is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no
constructive knowledge.1avvphi1
From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the
matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of
notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to
pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC,
with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of
"common knowledge" or notoriously known.
We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation,
adduced no evidence to prove her claim that the amount of P2,570,000.00 simply
constituted the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex
to her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint declaration under oath by
other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as
their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence
provide for matters that need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial
notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form of evidence on a certain
matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the parties.
However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching
documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalies appeal
before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie;
contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court What need not be
proved.
Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to
pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area. As was held in State Prosecutors, justices
and judges alike ought to be reminded that the power to take judicial notice must be
exercised with caution and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be ample
reason for the claim of judicial notice to be promptly resolved in the negative.
Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be ejected from the leased
cubicles, what remains in evidence is the documentary evidence signed by both
parties the contract of lease and the receipts evidencing payment of P2,570,000.00.
We need not be unduly detained by the issue of which documents were executed first
or if there was a novation of the contract of lease. As had been found by the RTC, the
lease contract and the receipts for the amount of P2,570,000.00 can be reconciled or
harmonized. The RTC declared:
Definitely, the parties entered into a lease agreement over two (2) cubicles of the 1st
and 2nd floors of Roferxane (Roferland) Building, a commercial building located at
158 Quirino Avenue, corner Redemptorist Road, Baclaran, Paraaque City and
belonging to [Rosalie]. The lease agreement is for a term of six (6) years commencing
in December 1999 up to December 2005. This agreement was embodied in a
Contract of Lease x x x. The terms of this lease contract, however, are modified or
supplemented by another agreement between the parties executed and or entered
into in or about the time of execution of the lease contract, which exact date of
execution of the latter is unclear.13
We agree with the RTCs holding only up to that point. There exists a lease agreement
between the parties as set forth in the contract of lease which is a complete
document. It need not be signed by Ferdinand Chua as he likewise did not sign the
other two receipts for P500,000.00 and P70,000.00, respectively, which contained
only the signature of Rosalie. Besides, it is undisputed that Rosalie owns and leases
the stalls in Roferxane Bldg.; thus, doing away with the need for her husbands
consent. The findings of the three lower courts concur on this fact.
The contract of lease has a period of six (6) years commencing in December 1999.
This fact is again buttressed by Spouses Latips admission that they occupied the
property forthwith in December 1999, bearing in mind the brisk sales during the
holiday season.
On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts amounting
to P2,570,000.00, we hold that the practice of payment of goodwill money in the
Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of judicial notice. Neither was Rosalie able to
provide sufficient evidence that, apart from the belatedly submitted Joint Affidavit of
the stallholders of Roferxane Bldg., the said amount was simply for the payment of
goodwill money, and not payment for advance rentals by Spouses Latip.
In interpreting the evidence before us, we are guided by the Civil Code provisions on
interpretation of contracts, to wit:
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be
understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from
those which the parties intended to agree.
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it
shall be understood as bearing that import which is most adequate to render it
effectual.
The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the receipts
for P2,570,000.00 modified or supplemented the contract of lease. However, it made
a quantum leap when it ruled that the amount was payment for rentals of the two (2)
cubicles for the entire six-year period. We cannot subscribe to this finding. To obviate
confusion and for clarity, the contents of the receipts, already set forth above, are
again reproduced:
1. I received the amount of P2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of
Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300 is REVERSED. The petitioners, spouses
Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[ara]que City. ROFERLAND Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Omar and Moshiera Latip, are liable to respondent Rosalie Chua for unpaid rentals
Contract. minus the amount of P2,570,000.00 already received by her as advance rentals. No
costs.
P2,000,000.00 (sgd.)
CHECK # 3767924 ____________________
FAR EAST BANK Rosalie Chua

(sgd.)
____________________
Ferdinand Chua

2. Received cash
P500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip

(sgd.)
Rosalie Chua
12/10/99
____________________
Received by

3. Received cash
P70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip

(sgd.)
12-11-99 ____________________
Received by:14

There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment and receipt
of P2,570,000.00 referred to full payment of rentals for the whole period of the lease.
All three receipts state Rosalies receipt of cash in varying amounts. The first receipt
for P2,000,000.00 did state payment for two (2) cubicles, but this cannot mean full
payment of rentals for the entire lease period when there are no words to that effect.
Further, two receipts were subsequently executed pointing to the obvious fact that
the P2,000,000.00 is not for full payment of rentals. Thus, since the contract of lease
remained operative, we find that Rosalies receipt of the monies should be considered
as advanced rentals on the leased cubicles. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact
that Rosalie demanded payment of the lease rentals only in 2000, a full year after the MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN,
commencement of the lease. ALFREDO NARCISO, TOMAS NARCISO, AMADO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO, DEMETRIA
NARCISO and ADELINA NARCISO, respondents.
Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip can be
ejected from the leased premises. They are liable to Rosalie for unpaid rentals on the This Petition for Review on Certiorari, treated as a special civil action. 1 prays that the
lease of the two (2) cubicles in accordance with the stipulations on rentals in the judgment rendered by the then Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases, CA-G.R.
Contract of Lease. However, the amount of P2,570,000.00, covering advance rentals, NO. 34998-R entitled "Macaria A. Torres, plaintiff-appellee vs. Vicente Santillan, et al.,
must be deducted from this liability of Spouses Latip to Rosalie. defendants-appellants", and CA-G.R. No. 34999-R entitled "Vicente Santillan, et al.,
plaintiffs-appellants vs. Macaria A. Bautista, et al., defendants-appellees and the
Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration and Petition for New Trial, be set
aside; and that, instead, The Order of the Court of First Instance of August 7, 1963 be
affirmed, or, in the alternative, that the case be remanded to it for new trial.
Involved in this controversy are the respective claims of petitioner and private
respondents over Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate (part of the friar
lands) in Tanza, Cavite, with an area of approximately 1,622 square meters. covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6804 issued in the name of the legal heirs of
Margarita Torres.
The facts of the case cover three generations. The propositus, Margarita Torres,
during the Spanish regime, was married to Claro Santillan. Vicente and Antonina were
begotten of this union. Claro died leaving Margarita a widow. Antonina married and
had six children, namely: Alfredo, Salud (married to Baldomero Buenaventura),
Demetria (married to Leonardo Quinto), Adelina (married to Cesario Punzalan), Tomas
and Amado all surnamed Narciso, who, together with Vicente Santillan, are the
private respondents. Antonina died before the institution of the cases while Vicente
died on June 4, 1957, 2 during the pendency of the cases in the Trial Courts, without
progeny .
After the death of her husband, Margarita Torres cohabited with Leon Arvisu Arbole,
without benefit of marriage. Out of their cohabitation, petitioner Macaria Torres (later
married to Francisco Bautista) was born on June 20, 1898, and baptized on June 26,
1898. In a Certificate of Baptism issued by the Parish Priest of Tanza, Cavite, Leon
Arvisu Arbole and Margarita Torres were named as father and mother of petitioner
whose name was listed as Macaria Arvisu", (Exhibit "C" Another Baptismal Certificate,
however, listed her name as Macaria Torres, while her father's name was left blank
(Exhibit "4"). Subsequently, or on June 7, 1909, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres
were married (Exhibit "A"). Petitioner lived with and was reared by her parents.
Margarita, the mother, died on December 20, 1931 (Exhibit "D"), while Leon, the
father, passed away on September 14, 1933 (Exhibit " E ").
Lot No. 551, an urban lot with an area of 1,622 sq. ms., more or less, had been leased
temporarily by the Government (Lease No. 17) to Margarita Torres who was the actual
occupant of the lot. The date of the lease cannot be determined with exactitude from
the records. On December 13, 1910, the Government, through the Director of Lands,
issued to Margarita Torres, Sale Certificate No. 222 (Exhibit "B") over the said lot at
the price of P428.80, payable in 20 annual installments of P20.00 each. The rental/s
previously paid of P17.40 was credited to the purchase price. Testimonial evidence is
to the effect that Leon Arbole paid the installments out of his earnings as a water
tender at the Bureau of Lands, Tanza, Cavite. The last installment, however, was paid
on December 17, 1936, or three (3) years after his death.
On August 25, 1933, twenty (20) days before his death, Leon Arbole sold and
transferred in a notarial deed all his rights and interest to the one-half (1/2) portion of
Lot No. 551 in favor of petitioner, for the sum of P300.00. 3
On June 6, 1953, Vicente Santillan executed an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot
No. 551 and asking for the issuance of title in his name, which he filed with the
Bureau of Lands. Based thereon, the Bureau of Lands issued the corresponding
patent in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres. Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-6804 was eventually issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on November 7,
1957, also in the name of said heirs.
On June 3, 1954, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for Forcible
Entry, with the Justice of the Peace Court of Tanza, Cavite, alleging that petitioner had
entered a portion of Lot No. 551 without their consent, constructed a house. and
refused to vacate upon demand. For her part, petitioner claimed that she is a co-
owner of the lot in question, being one of the daughters of Margarita Torres. The
ejectment case was decided against petitioner and the latter appealed to the then
Court of First Instance of Cavite, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 5547
(Ejectment Case).
On June 8, 1954, petitioner instituted an action for partition of Lot No. 551 before the
then Court of First Instance of Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 5505 (Partition
Case), alleging that said lot was conjugal property of the spouses Margarita Torres
and Leon Arbole, and that she is their legitimated child. Private respondents filed an
Answer alleging that the lot belonged exclusively to Margarita Torres; that they are
her only heirs, and that the complaint for partition should be dismissed.
The Ejectment Case and the Partition Case were jointly tried and decided on
November 20, 1958 with a finding that Lot No. 551 is the paraphernal property of
Margarita Torres and adjudicating to private respondents two-thirds (2/3) of the
property in equal shares, and to petitioner a one-third (1/3) portion. 4 Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, which private respondents opposed. Pending its
resolution, the Provincial Capitol of Cavite was burned, resulting in the complete
destruction of the records of the two cases, which, however, were later partially
reconstituted.
On August 7, 1963, the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch 1, issued an
Order granting reconsideration and amending the Decision of November 20, 1958.
The positive portion thereof reads as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. .5505:
(1) Declaring Macaria A. Torres as the legitimated child of the spouses Leon Arbole
and Margarita Torres;
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate is a conjugal
partnership property of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(3) Adjudicating four-sixths (4/6th of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon Estate to Macaria
Torres, and two-sixths (2/6th) in equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas, Amado, Salud,
Demetria and Adelina, all surnamed Narciso, legitimate children and heirs of the
deceased Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is already dead. The parties may
make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, subject
to confirmation by the Court. In fairness, however, to the parties, each party should
be alloted that portion of the lot where his or her house has been constructed, as far
as this is possible. In case the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the
Court shall appoint three commissioners to make the partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.
5
Without costs in both cases.
In concluding that petitioner is a legitimated child, the Trial Court opined:
It is undisputed that when Macaria A. Torres was born on June 20, 1898, her parents,
Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres, had the capacity to marry each other. There was no
legal impediment for them to marry It has also been established that Macaria A.
Torres had been taken care of, brought up and reared by her parents until they died.
The certificate of baptism (Exh. "G") also shows that Macaria Torres was given the
family name of Arvisu, which is also the family name of her father, Leon Arbole, and
that her father is Leon Arvisu and her mother is Margarita Torres. Such being the
case, Macaria A. Torres possessed the status of an acknowledged natural child. And
when her parents were married on June 7, 1909, she became the legitimated
daughter of on Arbole and Margarita Torres. 6
Private respondents appealed. On April 2, 1973, the then Court of Appeals 7 rendered
the judgment sought to be set aside herein, the decretal part of which states:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. 5505:
(1) Declaring that Macaria A. Torres is not the legitimated child of the spouses Leon
Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta Cruz de Malabon Estate is a conjugal
partnership property of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres; and
(3) Adjudicating one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon Estate to Macaria
Torres, and the other half (1/2) in equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas, Amado, Salud,
Demetria and Adelina, an surnamed Narciso, legitimate children and heirs of
Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is already dead. The parties may make the
partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, subject to
confirmation by the Court. In fairness, however, to the parties, each party should be
alloted that portion of the lot where his or her house has been constructed, as far as
this is possible. In case the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the Court
shall appoint three commissioners to make the partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases. 8
The Appellate Court was of the opinion that:
Macaria A. Torres is not a legitimated daughter of Leon Arvisu Arbole and Margarita
Torres, the former not having been legally acknowledged before or after the marriage
of her parents. As correctly pointed out by the appellants in their brief, the fact that
she was taken cared of, brought up and reared by her parents until they died, and
that the certificate of baptism (Exhibit "C") shows that she was given the family name
of Arvisu did not bestow upon her the status of an acknowledged natural child.
Under Article 121 of the old Civil Code, the governing law on the matter, children
shall be considered legitimated by subsequent marriage only when they have been
acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof, and Article 131
of the same code provides that the acknowledgement of a natural child must be in
the record of birth, in a will or in some public document. Article 131 then prescribed
the form in which the acknowledgment of a natural child should be made. The
certificate of baptism of Macaria A. Torres (Exhibit "C") is not the record of birth
referred to in Article 131. This article of the old Civil Code 'requires that unless the
acknowledgement is made in a will or other public document, it must be made in the
record of birth, or in other words, in the civil register (Samson vs. Corrales Tan, 48
PhiL 406). 9
A Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, dated April 16, 1973, was filed by
petitioner. In support thereof, petitioner submitted a typewritten Sworn Statement,
dated March 5, 1930, of spouses Leon Arvisu (Arbole) and Margarita Torres, 10 reading
in full as follows:
SWORN STATEMENT
We, Leon Arvisu and Margarita Torres husband and wife respectively, of majority age,
and residents of the Municipality of Tanza, Province of Cavite, P.I., after being duly
sworn to according to law depose and say
That Macaria de Torres is our legitimized daughter she being born out of wedlock on
the 26 th of June 1898 all Tanza, Cavite, but as stated she was legitimized by our
subsequent marriage.
That at the time of her birth or conception, we, her parents could have married
without dispensation had we desired.
That as natural child our aforesaid daughter was surnamed de Torres after that of her
mother's at the time she was baptized as per record on file in the Church.
That as a legitimized daughter she should now be surnamed Arvisu after her father's
family name.
Wherefore, it is respectfully requested to anybody concerned that proper remedy be
made for the change of the surname of said Macaria de Torres as desired.
In testimony hereof, we hereunto signed out names at Tanza, Cavite, this 5th day of
March 1930.
(Thumbmarked) (Thumbmarked)
LEON ARVISU MARGARITA TORRES
Signed in the prsence of:
(Sgd.) Illegible (Sgd.) Macaria Bautista
x----------------------------------------------------x
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) property solely to Vicente Santillan and the heirs of Antonina Santillan. (emphasis
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS ) supplied)
MUNICIPALITY OF TANZA ) ss
PROVINCE OF CAVITE ) As we understand it, petitioner has conceded, with which we concur, that, without
taking account of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930, she cannot be considered a
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of March 1930. The affiant Leon legitimated child of her parents. Continuous possession of the status of a natural
Arvisu exhibited to me no cedula certificate being exempt on account of going over child, fact of delivery by the mother, etc. will not amount to automatic recognition,
60 years of age and Margarita Torres having exhibited no cedula certificate being but an action for compulsory recognition is still necessary, which action may be
exempt on account of her sex. commenced only during the lifetime of the putative parents, subject to certain
exceptions. 12
Witness my hand and seal of office on the date and place aforesaid.
The admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of private respondents' original
CONSTANCIO T. VELASCO complaint in the Ejectment Case reading:
Notary Public, Cavite Province
Until Dec. 31, 1930. the plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria A. Bautista are the legal heirs and nearest of
kins of Margarita Torres, who died in Tanza, Cavite on December 20, 1931. (Emphasis
Not. Reg. No. 56 supplied).
P. No. 2
Book No. III Series of 1930. 11 The statement, according to petitioner, is an admission of her legitimation and is
controlling in the determination of her participation in the disputed property.
The reason given for the non-production of the notarial document during trial was
that the same was only found by petitioner's daughter, Nemensia A. Bautista, among We are not persuaded. In the Amended Complaint filed by private respondents in the
the personal belongings of private respondent, Vicente Santillan, an adverse party, same Ejectment Case, the underlined portion was deleted so that the statement
after his death and who may have attempted to suppress it. Private respondents, for simply read:
their part, argued against new trial, and contended that it is not newly discovered
evidence which could not have been produced during the trial by the exercise of due That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita Torres, who died
diligence. at Tanza, Cavite, on December 20, 1931.

The Decision of the Appellate Court was rendered by a Division of three, composed of
Justices Jesus Y. Perez, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B. Reyes, ponente. When the Motion
for Reconsideration and New Trial was considered, there was disagreement, possibly
as to whether or not new trial should be granted in respect of the sworn statement of
March 5, 1930. A Special Division of five was then formed, composed of Justices
Antonio Lucero Magno S. Gatmaitan, Lourdes P. San Diego, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis
B. Reyes (Justice Perez having retired or having disqualified himself). In a minute
resolution of August 24, 1973, the Division of five, by a vote of three or two, denied
both reconsideration and new trial.
To warrant review, petitioner, has summarized her submission based on two
assignments of error. The first was expressed as follows:
Although the Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that Macaria A. Torres is not the
legitimated child of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres, it has overlooked
to include in its findings of facts the admission made by Vicente Santillan and the
heirs of Antonina Santillan (herein respondents) that Macaria A. Torres and Vicente
Santillan and Antonina Santillan are brother and sisters with a common mother
Margarita Torres and they are the legal heirs and nearest of relatives of Margarita
Torres, and as a consequence thereof, the Court of Appeals had drawn an incorrect
conclusion in adjudicating the entire share of Margarita Torres in the conjugal
In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is
regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading.
The original complaint no longer forms part of the record. 13
If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she should have offered it in
evidence. Having been amended, the original complaint lost its character as a judicial
admission, which would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial
admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary
to petitioner's submission, therefore there can be no estoppel by extrajudicial
admission made in the original complaint, for failure to offer it in evidence. 14
It should be noted that in the Partition Case private respondents, in their Answer
(parag. 4), denied the legitimacy of petitioner.
The second error attributed to the Appellate Court has been pleaded as follows:
Also, the Court of Appeals has gravely abused its discretion when it denied the
petition for new trial, knowing as it does that the judgment is clearly erroneous in
view of the evidence which is offered and no amount of diligence on the part of the
petitioner could it be produced in court at any time before it was offered as it was
found from the personal belongings of Vicente Santillan, an adverse party, after his
death.
It is our considered opinion that new trial was warranted to prevent a possible
miscarriage of justice. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of the
Sworn Statement of March 5, 1930 is established in accordance with procedural due
process, a new trial would resolve such vital considerations as (1) whether or not said
Sworn Statement qualifies as the public document prescribed in Article 131 of the old
Civil Code; 15 (2) whether or not it conforms to an act of acknowledgment by the
parents after the celebration of their marriage as required by Article 121 of the same
code; 16 and (3) whether or not petitioner's signature as a witness to said document
was the equivalent of the consent necessary for acknowledgment of an adult person
under Article 133 of that Code. 17 Affirmative answers would confer upon petitioner
the status of a legitimated child of her parents, and would entitle her to enjoy
hereditary rights to her mother's estate.

Private respondents stress that since petitioner signed as a witness to the document
she should be chargeable with knowledge of its existence, and, therefore, the Sworn
Statement was not newly discovered evidence. In our view, the document can
reasonably qualify as newly discovered evidence, which could not have been
produced during the trial even with the exercise of due diligence; specially if it really
had been in the possession of Vicente Santillan, an adverse party who, it was alleged,
suppressed the document.

In the interest of judicial expediency, the new trial can be conducted by respondent
Appellate Court, now empowered to do so under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129.

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby remanded to the now Intermediate Appellate Court
for new trial, and depending on its outcome, said Court shall also resolve the
respective participation of the parties in the disputed property, inclusive of the estate
of the deceased Vicente Santillan. No costs.

FLORENTINO ATILLO III, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AMANCOR, INC. and
MICHELL LHUILLIER, respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 3677 promulgated on August 4, 1994 affirming in toto the
decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-
9801 entitled "Florentino L. Atillo III versus Amancor, Inc. and Michell Lhuillier".
The material antecedents are as follows:
On August 15, 1985, respondent Amancor, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as AMANCOR
for brevity), a corporation then owned and controlled by petitioner Florentino L. Atillo
III , contracted a loan in the amount of P1,000,000.00 with Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company, secured by real estate properties owned by the petitioner. 1 Before
the said loan could be paid, petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
dated June 14, 1988 (Annex "A" of the Complaint) with respondent Michell Lhuillier
(hereinafter referred to as LHUILLIER for brevity) whereby the latter bought shares of
stock in AMANCOR. As a consequence of the foregoing transaction, petitioner and
LHUILLIER each became owner of 47% of the outstanding shares of stock of
AMANCOR while the officers of the corporation owned the remaining 6%. 2
In view of the urgent and immediate need for fresh capital to support the business
operations of AMANCOR, petitioner and LHUILLLER executed another Memorandum of
Agreement on February 13, 1989 (Annex "B" of the Complaint) by virtue of which
LHUILLIER undertook to invest additional capital in AMANCOR. 3 As an addendum to
the foregoing, a Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by the
petitioner and LHUILLIER on March 11, 1989. 4 Relevant to the case at bar is a
stipulation in the said Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement which provides as
follows:
4. F.L. Atillo III may dispose off (sic) his properties at P. del Rosario St., Cebu City
which may involve pre-payment of AMANCOR'S mortgage loan to the bank estimated
at P300,000.00 and while AMANCOR may not yet be in the position to re-pay said
amount to him, it shall pay the interests to him equivalent to prevailing bank rate. 5
Pursuant to this stipulation, petitioner assumed AMANCOR's outstanding loan balance
of P300,000.00 with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. After offsetting the
amount of P300,000.00 with some of the accounts that petitioner had with
AMANCOR, the amount which remained due to the petitioner was P199,888.89.
Because of the failure of AMANCOR to satisfy its obligation to repay petitioner, the
latter filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money docketed as Civil Case No.
Ceb-9801 against AMANCOR and LHUILLLER before Branch 7 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City.
At the pre-trial conference, petitioner, AMANCOR and LHUILLIER, assisted by their
respective counsels, stipulated on the following:
1. That the parties admit the due execution and genuineness of the Memorandum of
Agreement dated 14 June 1988 (Annex A), the Memorandum of Agreement dated 13
February 1989 (Annex B and Supplemental Agreement dated 11 March 1989 (Annex
C);
2. That the defendants admit that the claim of the plaintiff amounted to P199,888.89
as of October 1, 1990; 6
and submitted the following issues to be resolved by the trial court:
a. From the aforesaid Annexes A, B and C, is Michell J. Lhuillier personally liable to the
plaintiff?
b. What rate of interests shall the defendant corporation and Michell J. Lhuillier, if the
latter is liable, pay the plaintiff? 7 (Emphasis supplied.)
On the basis of the stipulation of facts and the written arguments of the parties, the
trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, ordering AMANCOR to pay
petitioner the amount of P199,888.89 with interest equivalent to the bank rate
prevailing as of March 11, 1989. LHUILLIER was, however, absolved of any personal
liability therefor. 8
It is from the trial court's conclusion of non-liability that petitioner appealed to
respondent court, arguing therein that as LHULLLIER signed the Memorandum of
Agreement without the official participation nor ratification of AMANCOR, LHUILLIER
should have been declared jointly and severally liable with AMANCOR. 9
The respondent court found petitioner's contention bereft of merit and held in part
that:
Contrary to plaintiffs-appellants (sic) allegation, the indebtedness of P199,888.89 was
incurred by defendant AMANCOR, INC., alone. A thorough study of the records shows
that plaintiff's cause of action for collection of a sum of money arose from "his
payment of the defendant corporation's outstanding loan balance of P300,000.00
with Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company" . . . Considering the allegations in the
complaint and those contained in the Memorandum of Agreement, the respondent
court properly ruled that the liability was incurred by defendant AMANCOR, INC.,
singly. We grant that if plaintiff really believes that the indebtedness was incurred by
defendant Lhuillier in his personal capacity, he should not have offsetted (sic) some
of his accounts with the defendant corporation,
. . . As it is, plaintiff could have ofted (sic) to sue defendant Lhuillier in his personal
capacity the whole amount of indebtedness and not implead the defendant
corporation as co-defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [T]he indebtedness was incurred by the defendant corporation as a legal entity to
pay the mortgage loan. Defendant Lhuillier acted only as an officer/agent of the
corporation by signing the said Memorandum of Agreement. 10
Aggrieved by the decision of respondent court, petitioner brought this instant petition
submitting the following issue for the resolution of this Court:
When a party, by his judicial admissions, has affirmed that he has personal liability in
a certain transaction, may a court rule against such an admission despite clear
indications that it was not affected by mistakes palpable or otherwise? 11
Petitioner claims that LHUILLIER made a judicial admission of his personal liability in
his Answer wherein he stated that:
3.11. In all the subject dealings, it was between plaintiff and Lhuillier personally
without the official participation of Amancor, Inc.
xxx xxx xxx
3.14. Since the board of Amancor, Inc. did not formally ratify nor acceded (sic) to the
personal agreement between plaintiff and Lhuillier through no fault of the latter, the
corporation is not bound and the actionable documents are, at most, unenforceable
insofar as the subject claim of plaintiff is concerned. 12
And on the basis of such admission, petitioner contends that the decision of the
respondent court absolving LHUILLIER of personal liability is manifest error for being
contrary to law, particularly Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which
provides that:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in
the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.
Petitioner would want to further strengthen his contention by adverting to the
consistent pronouncement of this Court that: ". . . an admission made in the
pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are
conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the
party or not . . . 13
We find petitioner's contention to be without merit and the reliance on the general
rule regarding judicial admissions enunciated by the abovementioned provision of law
and jurisprudence misplaced.
As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule that a
judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof
admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact
made. 14 The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that
he made such an admission.
For instance, if a party invokes an "admission" by an adverse party, but cites the
admission "out of context", then the one making the admission may show that he
made no "such" admission, or that his admission was taken out of context.
This may be interpreted as to mean "not in the sense in which the admission is made
to appear." That is the reason for the modifier
"such". 15 [Emphasis supplied.]
Here, petitioner appears to have taken the admissions made by LHUILLIER in
paragraph 3.11 of his Answer "out of context". Petitioner is seemingly misleading this
Court by isolating paragraph 3.11 of the said Answer from the preceding paragraphs.
A careful scrutiny of the Answer in its entirety will show that paragraph 3.11 is part of
the affirmative allegations recounting how LHUILLIER was persuaded to invest in
AMANCOR which was previously owned and managed by petitioner. 16 Paragraph 3.11
has reference to the fact that in all investments made with AMANCOR through stock
purchases, only petitioner and LHUILLIER dealt with each other. 17 It is more than
obvious that paragraph 3.11 has nothing to do with the obligation of AMANCOR to
petitioner which is the subject of the present case. Contrary to petitioner's
allegations, LHUILLIER had categorically denied personal liability for AMANCOR's
corporate debts, and in the succeeding paragraphs of the said Answer asserted the
following:
3.12. As evident in the wordings of par. 12 of the Actionable Memorandum of
Agreement dated 13 February 1989 (Annex B) and par. 4 of the actionable
Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement dated 11 March 1989 (Annex C), Lhuillier
did not engage to personally pay the corporate loans secured by plaintiff's
property as to release the property to plaintiff. On the contrary, as explicitly stated in
the aforesaid par. 4 of Annex C, ". . . while Amancor may not yet be in the position to
repay said amount to him, IT shall pay the interests to him equivalent to prevailing
bank rate."
3.13. At most, therefore, Lhuillier . . . only agreed, for the corporation to repay
plaintiff the amount of the pre-terminated corporate loans with the bank and,
pending improvement of Amancor's finances, for said corporation to pay interest at
prevailing bank rate. . . . 18 (Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore, petitioner was well aware that LHUILLIER had never admitted personal
liability for the said obligation. In fact, in delineating the issues to be resolved by the
trial court, both parties submitted for the determination of the court, the question of
whether or not LHUILLIER is personally liable for the obligation of AMANCOR to
petitioner. 19Moreover, as correctly observed by respondent court, if petitioner really
believed that the liability was incurred by LHULLLIER in his personal capacity, then he
should not have offset his accounts with those of AMANCOR's. The foregoing act of
petitioner is a clear indication that he recognized AMANCOR and not LHUILLIER as the
obligor.
Granting arguendo that LHUILLIER had in fact made the alleged admission of personal
liability in his Answer, We hold that such admission is not conclusive upon him.
Applicable by analogy is our ruling in the case of Gardner vs. Court of Appeals which
allowed a party's testimony in open court to override admissions he made in his
answer. Thus:
jointly and severally liable with AMANCOR, INC., absent an express stipulation to that
effect and sans clear and convincing evidence as to his personal liability." 21
The foregoing pronouncement is based on factual findings of the lower court which
were upheld by the respondent court, and which are thus, conclusive upon us
pursuant to the well established rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals,
supported by substantial evidence on the record, are final and conclusive and may
not be reviewed on appeal. 22
ACCORDINGLY, finding no reversible error, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED and this petition is DENIED.

The fact, however, that the allegations made by Ariosto Santos in his pleadings and
in his declarations in open court differed will not militate against the findings herein
made nor support the reversal by respondent court. As a general rule, facts alleged in
a party's pleading are deemed admissions of that party and are binding upon it, but
this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere statement of fact
which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. As ARIOSTO SANTOS
himself, in open court, had repudiated the defenses he had raised in his ANSWER and
against his own interest, his testimony is deserving of weight and credence. Both the
Trial Court and the Appellate Court believed in his credibility and we find no reason to
overturn their factual findings thereon. 20(Emphasis supplied.)

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is clear that in spite of the presence of judicial
admissions in a party's pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other
evidence presented. This rule should apply with more reason when the parties had
agreed to submit an issue for resolution of the trial court on the basis of the evidence
presented. As distinctly stated in the stipulation of facts entered into during the pre-
trial conference, the parties agreed that the determination of LHUILLIER's liability
shall be based on the Memoranda of Agreement designated as ANNEXES "A", "B" and
"C" of the Complaint. Thus, the trial court correctly relied on the provisions contained
in the said Memoranda of Agreement when it absolved LHUILLIER of personal liability
for the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner.

Furthermore, on the basis of the same evidence abovementioned, respondent court

did not err when it refused to pierce the veil of corporate fiction, thereby absolving
LHUILLIER of liability for corporate obligations and deciding the question in this wise:

The separate personality of the corporation may be disregarded, or the veil of

corporation fiction may be pierced and the individual shareholder may be personally
liable (sic) to the obligations of the corporation only when the corporation is used as
"a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, or to work an injustice, or where necessary to
achieve equity or when necessary for the protection of the creditors. This situation
does not obtain in this case. In the case at bar, plaintiff-appellant failed to show that
defendant Lhuillier acted otherwise than what is required of him as an agent of a
corporation. It does not appear either that defendant-appellee Michel (sic) Lhuillier is
 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Naga City, in Civil Case Nos. 97-3736 and
97-3750, and decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Joint Decision dated May 24, 2000 of
the RTC, Branch 61, Naga City in Civil Cases Nos. 97-3736 and 97-3750 is
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, deleting the award for nominal damages and
reducing the award of attorney's fees to Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos.

Other awards not otherwise modified or deleted stand.

SO ORDERED.3

As culled from the records by the Court of Appeals, the antecedent facts of this case
are as follows:

On January 19, 1996, petitioner Gregorio Silot, Jr. and respondent Estrella de la Rosa
entered into a contract for the construction of a dormitory-apartment building on Lot
1-A-9-D, Bagumbayan Sur, Naga City. They expressly agreed that Silot shall supply
the labor and de la Rosa shall pay 33% of the total value of the materials purchased
for the project. Upon turnover in February 1997 of the completed structure, the total
cost of materials actually purchased was P2,504,469.65, 33% of which
is P826,474.98. Silot required de la Rosa to pay a total of P1,018,000.00,
or P191,525.02 more than the amount due. Through her son-in-law, de la Rosa
confronted Silot about the overpayment but the latter refused to return the
overpayment. After her repeated demands fell on deaf ears, de la Rosa filed a suit
against Silot.

Silot, in retaliation, sued de la Rosa for insufficient payment, claiming that he was
supposed to receive P1,281,872.404 but was only paid P1,008,000.00, thus still
leaving a balance of P273,872.40.

The two cases were consolidated by the trial court.

During trial, however, Atty. San Jose, counsel for Silot, dispensed with the testimony
of Ariel Goingo, a witness for de la Rosa. Atty. San Jose admitted Goingo's proposed
testimony to the effect that in consideration of the 33% as mentioned in the contract,
all the material supplies during the making of the additional works mentioned were
already accounted for; that Silot was paid for all works that were performed as well
as all materials supplied; that the total sum was P2,504,469.65, so that 33% of which
is only P826,474.98; that de la Rosa paid the amount of P1,018,000.00; hence, there
was an excess payment of P191,525.02; and that de la Rosa never received any
demand from nor was she confronted by Silot regarding an alleged balance. 5

Consequently, after trial, the RTC ruled in favor of de la Rosa and ordered Silot to
GREGORIO SILOT, JR., petitioner, vs. ESTRELLA DE LA ROSA, respondent. return the overpaid amount, decreeing as follows:

This is a petition for review of the Decision 1 dated July 9, 2003 of the Court of Appeals Wherefore, premises considered, Civil Case No. 3736 is hereby ordered DISMISSED for
in CA-G.R. CV No. 68062 entitled "Estrella de la Rosa v. Gregorio Silot, Jr." The lack of merit; while in Civil Case No. 97-3750, defendant Gregorio Silot is hereby
appellate court had affirmed with modification the Joint Decision 2 dated May 24, 2000 ordered to return the amount of P191,525.02 to the plaintiff, Estrella de la Rosa; to
pay P100,000.00 for [a]ttorney's fees and P50,000.00 as nominal damages.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, the
instant petition wherein Silot assigned the following errors:
I.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in construing the admission ma[d]e by Atty.
San Jose on the purpose for the testimony of witness Ariel [Goingo] as admission of
evidence.
II.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in deciding and ordering petitioner-appellant to
return the amount of P191,525.02 to respondent appellee and also to pay P20,000.00
attorney[']s fees.7
Simply stated, petitioner is raising the following issues to be resolved: (1) whether
the admission by Atty. San Jose, counsel of petitioner Silot, constituted judicial
admission of respondent's evidence; and (2) whether the appellate court erred in
ruling that Silot should return the claimed amount of P191,525.02 to de la Rosa.
Petitioner Silot contends that his counsel Atty. San Jose merely admitted that the
subject of Goingo's testimony was that stated in the offer of testimony, but he did not
admit the truth or veracity of the testimony. Silot adds that Atty. San Jose could not
and should not have admitted the testimony because he had no special power of
attorney to enter into such stipulations or to compromise his client's right without the
latter's direct intervention.8
Respondent de la Rosa counters that clients are bound by the admissions as well as
the negligence of their counsel. She enumerates several Court decisions to support
her contention, among them the following cases:
(1) Ongson v. People,9 where petitioner was held bound by his unqualified admission
that he received private complainant's demand letter with notice of dishonor. The
admission binds him considering that he never denied receipt of the notice of
dishonor.
(2) Republic v. Sarabia,10 where the Court held that an admission made in the
pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are
conclusive as to him.
(3) People v. Genosa,11 Arroyo, Jr. v. Taduran,12 Carandang v. Court of Appeals,13 in
which cases the Court held that judicial admissions are conclusive upon the party
making it and may not be contradicted in the absence of prior showing that the
admission had been made through palpable mistake, or no admission was in fact
made.
(4) People v. Razul14 and Lim v. Jabalde,15 where it was held that stipulations are
recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the
parties.
Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that the client is bound by the mistakes arising
from negligence of his own counsel. 16 The only exception to this rule is, as the Court
of Appeals itself cited in its decision, when the negligence is so gross that the client is
deprived of his day in court.17
In our considered view, however, that exception does not find any application in this
case. As the records would plainly show, Silot was not deprived of his day in court.
Also, as the appellate court observed, he could have introduced evidence, testimonial
or otherwise, in order to controvert or correct the admission made by his counsel.
Said the appellate court:
As gleaned from the records, defendant-appellant Silot was not deprived of his day
in court. He was given every opportunity to be heard through his pleadings and
manifestations. He was also presented in open court to testify. As quoted earlier, Atty.
Terbio, counsel for plaintiff-appellee de la Rosa, even repeatedly asked Atty. San Jose,
defendant-appellant Silot's counsel, if he would admit the purpose for which the
witness Ariel Goingo will testify to dispense with his testimony, and Atty. San Jose
repeatedly answered that "We will admit that." And when asked by the judge if he will
admit it, he answered that they will admit P2,504,000.00.18
More importantly, Silot's counsel clearly made admissions of the content of the
testimony of witness Goingo, whose presentation was dispensed with. In People v.
Hernandez,19 we held that admissions made for the purpose of dispensing with proof
of some facts are in the nature of judicial admissions, to wit:
A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial
in open court is automatically reduced into writing and contained in the official
transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused in the form
of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: "[] an
attorney who is employed to manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit [] has prima
facie authority to make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or
written stipulation, [] which unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive." (Italics
supplied.) In fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of the
attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When
such admissions are made [] for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some
fact, [] they bind the client, whether made during, or even after, the
trial.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
Worth stressing, in this connection, judicial admissions do not require proof and may
not be contradicted in the absence of a prior showing that the admissions had been
made through palpable mistake.21
Furthermore, in the case of Toh v. Court of Appeals,22 this Court emphasized the
consequence of admitting and dispensing with the testimony of the proposed
witness, thus:
The Court sees no cogent reason why the said witness should be examined any
further since his testimony as summarized in the offer made by counsel was
expressly admitted by opposing counsel. With the said admission, the testimony of
said witness is uncontroverted and even admitted as fact by opposing counsel. 23

On the issue of insufficient payment, Silot avers that he has rendered or provided
labor for the total amount of P1,281,872.40, and that de la Rosa has benefited and
profited from these labors.24 Without the labors provided by Silot, the constructed
building would not have been painted, provided with electrical works and other works
which were additional works on the building, and that to sanction de la Rosa's claim
would be to allow unjust enrichment on the part of de la Rosa. 25 However, this claim
has been belied by the admission made by his own counsel, as plainly manifest in the
transcript:

Atty. Terbio

The purpose for which this witness will testify are the following: If admitted, we are
willing to dispense the testimony. He will testify that in consideration of the 33% as
mentioned in the contract, all the material supplies during the making of the
additional works mentioned were all considered; he will testify that Silot was paid of
all works that was performed as well as all materials supplied were considered, and RUSTICO ABAY, JR. and REYNALDO DARILAG, Petitioners,
that the sum total of which is P2,504,469.65 and 33% of which is P826,474.98, and
that De la Rosa paid the total amount of P1,018,000.00, and therefore, there is an - versus -
excess payment of P191,525.00; he will testify that De la Rosa never received the
demand or was confronted by Silot regarding an alleged balance, now, if the counsel PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
wish to admit this.

ATTY. SAN JOSE

This petition for review assails the Decision[1] dated October 27, 2003 and
We admit that. the Resolution[2] dated October 14, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
CR No. 25212. The Court of Appeals had affirmed the Decision[3] of the
ATTY. TERBIO Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, finding
petitioners guilty of the crime of Highway Robbery in Criminal Case No.
Because these are all evidentiary and this has not been adequately covered. 9045-B.

ATTY. SAN JOSE The facts are as follows:

We will admit that.26 (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, given the circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeals did not err in
ordering petitioner to return to respondent the amount of P191,525.02 overpayment.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated July
9, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68062 is AFFIRMED. Petitioner
Gregorio Silot, Jr. is hereby ordered to return the amount of P191,525.02 to
respondent Estrella de la Rosa, and to pay P20,000.00 as attorney's fees. Costs
against petitioner.
On January 13, 1995, an Information was filed charging Rustico Abay, Jr.,
Reynaldo Darilag, Ramoncito Aban, Ernesto Ricalde, Ramon Punzalan,
Ariston Reyes, Isagani Espeleta, Cesar Camacho, Leonardo Perello and
Danilo Pascual with the crime of Highway Robbery/Brigandage. Said
information reads:
xxxx
That on or about 7:30 oclock in the evening of February 17, 1994, at the
South Luzon Expressway, Municipality of Bian, Province of Laguna, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Ramoncito Aban y
Casiano, Ernesto Ricalde y Jovillano, Rustico Abay, Jr. y Serafico, Ramon
Punzalan y Carpena, Reynaldo Darilag y Apolinario, Leonardo Perello y
Esguerra and Danilo Pascual y Lagata, who are principals by direct
participation, conspiring and confederating together with Ariston Reyes y
Plaza, Isagani Espeleta y Arguelles and Cesar Camacho y Deolazo, who are
principals by indispensable cooperation and mutually helping each other,
form themselves as band of robbers and conveniently armed with handguns
and deadly bladed weapons, and while on board a Kapalaran Bus Line with
plate number DVT-527 bound for Sta. Cruz, Laguna and a semi stainless
owner type jeep with plate number PJD-599 as backup vehicle, accused with
the use of the aforesaid handguns and bladed weapons with intent to gain
and taking the passengers of the bus by surprise, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously divest and take away personalties of the
passengers and/or occupants therein, among them were:
a) Thelma Andrade y Lorenzana, P3,500.00 cash;
b) Gloria Tolentino y Pamatmat, P30,000.00 cash, $2,000.00 dollars and
eyeglasses (Perare) worth P5,000.00;
c) Lilian Ojeda y Canta, P120.00 cash;
d) Paul Masilang y Reyes, assorted used clothes of undetermined amount;
and by reason or on occasion of the said robbery, accused shot passenger
Rogelio Ronillo y Lumboy, inflicting upon him gunshot wounds on the neck,
thus, accused performed all the acts of execution that would produce the
crime of homicide, but nevertheless, did not produce by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused, that is by the timely medical
assistance rendered to Rogelio Ronillo y Lumboy, and to his damage and
prejudice and to the damages and prejudices of the following:
a) Thelma Andrade y Lorenzana in the sum of P3,500.00;
b) Gloria Tolentino y Pamatmat in the sum of P30,000.00;
c) Lilian Ojeda y Canta in the sum of P120.00
That the commission of the offense was attended with the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, by a band and with the use of motor vehicle.
With the additional aggravating circumstance that accused Isagani Espeleta
y Arguelles and Cesar Camacho y Deolazo, being prison guards, have taken
advantage of their public position by bringing out prison inmates and
equipped them with deadly weapons and were utilized in the commission of
robbery:
With the further additional aggravating circumstance on the following
accused/inmates, as follows:
1) Ramoncito Aban y Casiano with prison number 121577 as recidivist,
having been convicted by final judgment on June 15, 1984 by the RTC,
Branch VI, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 3874-M for Robbery with
Homicide;
2) Ariston Reyes y Plaza with prison number 115906-P, as recidivist, having
been convicted by final judgment on March 11, 1982 by the CFI, Manila in
Criminal Case No. 82-3001 for Robbery; having been convicted by final
judgment on September 2, 1987 by the RTC Branch 94, Quezon City, in
Criminal Case No. 37432 for Robbery; and for Reiteracion or habituality for
having served sentence for Homicide, convicted on March 25, 1991 by the
RTC, Branch 34, Quezon City;
3) Reynaldo Darilag y Apolinario with prison number 129552-P for
reiteracion or habituality for having been previously punished for an offense
of murder in Criminal Case No. 039 by the RTC, Branch 5, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan and as a recidivist for having been previously convicted by final
judgment on July 8, 1987 by the same Court in Criminal Case No. 040 for
Robbery;
4) Rustico Abay, Jr. y Serafico with prison number 132566-P as a recidivist
for having been previously convicted by final judgment on August 31, 1988
by the RTC, Branch 163 Manila, in Criminal Case No. 71060 for Theft;
5) Ramon Punzalan y Carpena with prison number 113605-P as recidivist for
having been previously convicted by final judgment by the RTC, Branch 111,
San Pablo City on the following dates, to wit:
January 8, 1981 in Criminal Case No. 2454-SP, for Robbery in Band;
December 8, 1981, in Criminal Case No. 2549 for Theft;
October 7, 1983 in Criminal Case No. 2550-SP for Carnapping; and
Having been previously convicted by final judgment by the City Court of San
Pablo City on March 30, 1981 in Criminal Case No. 17738 for simple theft;
6) Ernesto R[i]calde y Jov[i]llano with prison number N92P-2735, as a
recidivist for having been previously convicted by final judgment on August
2, 1992 by the RTC, Branch 54, Lucena City in Criminal Case No. 91-679 for
simple theft.
When arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty. However, upon motion
filed by accused Ramoncito Aban, with the conformity of the public
prosecutor and private complainants Thelma Andrade and Gloria Tolentino,
he was allowed to withdraw his earlier plea of "not guilty". Thus, on
September 11, 1997, Ramoncito Aban, with the assistance of his counsel,
pleaded "guilty" to the crime of simple robbery and on even date, the trial
court sentenced him. Meanwhile, trial proceeded with respect to the other
accused.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Thelma Andrade, Gloria
Tolentino and Ramoncito Aban.
Thelma Andrade, a conductress of the Kapalaran Bus Line, testified that in
the evening of February 17, 1994, the bus she was on was held-up. She said
that Ramoncito Aban took from her, at gunpoint, the fares she collected
from the passengers of the bus. She also identified Rustico Abay, Jr. and
Ernesto Ricalde as two of the other companions of Aban.[5]
Gloria Tolentino, a passenger of the bus, testified that someone shouted
"hold-up" and ordered them to bow their heads. She obeyed the order but
once in a while she would raise her head. According to Tolentino, the man
seated beside her, Ariston Reyes, took her money and pieces of jewelry and
handed them over to Reynaldo Darilag. She also identified Rustico Abay, Jr.
as one of the companions of the robbers.[6]
Ramoncito Aban, the last witness, testified that on February 22, 1994,
Camacho and Espeleta, who were both prison guards of the New Bilibid
Prison (NBP), took him and his companions, Ricalde, Abay, Jr., Punzalan,
Darilag, Reyes, Perello and Pascual, on board the owner-type jeepney of
Camacho to stage a hold-up. He said they held-up a Kapalaran bus and it
was Punzalan and Darilag who took the money and other belongings of the
passengers in the bus. He further testified that the February 22, 1994 hold-
up was the fourth staged by their group. According to Aban, the other hold-
ups were carried out on February 11, 13 and 17, and all four hold-ups were
staged by the same persons.[7]
The defense, for its part, presented the testimony of petitioners Rustico
Abay, Jr., and Reynaldo Darilag, the other co-accused, and Genaro Alberto.
All the accused denied participation in the robbery that happened on
February 17, 1994. Abay, Jr., Darilag, Reyes and Ricalde, who were detention
prisoners, testified that they were confined in the NBP at the time the
incident happened.[8] Pascual and Perello, both civilians, testified that they
were at home then.[9] Genaro Alberto, a prison guard at the Bureau of
Corrections, testified that during the headcount of the inmates conducted at
5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. on February 17, 1994, no inmate was found to be
missing.[10]
In a Decision dated November 29, 2000, the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna,
Branch 31 found petitioners Abay, Jr. and Darilag, as well as the other
accused guilty of the crime charged. The trial court decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby renders judgment convicting accused
Ernesto Ricalde y Jovillano, Rustico Abay, Jr. y Serafico, Ramon Punzalan y
Carpena, Reynaldo Darilag y Apolicario, Ariston Reyes y Plaza, Isagani
Espeleta y Arguelles, Cesar Camacho y Deolazo, Leonardo Perello y Esguerra
and Danilo Pascual y Lagata of the crime of highway robbery/holdup
attended by the aggravating circumstance of a band only and hereby
sentences each of them:
1) to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment [of] twelve (12)
years and one (1) day as minimum to thirteen (13) years, nine (9) months
and eleven (11) days as maximum, both of reclusion temporal in its
minimum period;
2) to indemnify Thelma Andrade, the amount of P3,500 and Gloria Tolentino,
the amount of P30,000 and US$2,000; and
3) to pay the costs.
The Court of Appeals on appeal acquitted Espeleta, Camacho and Punzalan
of the crime charged but affirmed the conviction of petitioners Abay, Jr. and
Darilag, Ricalde and Reyes. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated
October 27, 2003 states:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro,
Laguna, Branch 31, in Criminal Case No. 9045-B, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, but only insofar as accused-appellants Isagani Espeleta, Cesar
Camacho and Ramon Punzalan, are concerned, for insufficiency of evidence.
Isagani Espeleta, Cesar Camacho and Ramon Punzalan are hereby
ACQUITTED. Unless held for any other charge/charges their immediate
release is hereby ordered.
With respect to accused-appellants Rustico Abay, Jr., Ernesto Ricalde,
Reynaldo Darilag and Ariston Reyes, the said decision of the Regional Trial
Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, in Criminal Case No. 9045-B, finding
them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of highway robbery/hold-
up is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
Petitioners Abay, Jr. and Darilag moved for a reconsideration of the aforesaid
decision, but their motion was denied. Hence, they filed the instant petition
raising a single issue:
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS MAY BE CONVICTED ON THE BASIS OF THE
TESTIMONIES OF RAMONCITO ABAN, THELMA ANDRADE AND GLORIA
TOLENTINO.13
Stated simply, did the Court of Appeals err in affirming on the basis of the
testimonies of said three witnesses the conviction of petitioners Abay, Jr. and
Darilag?
In their petition,[14] petitioners Abay, Jr. and Darilag assert that their guilt
has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. They argue that Ramoncito
Aban is not a credible witness and that he testified on an incident which
happened on February 22, 1994 and not on February 17, 1994 as alleged in
the information. Petitioners also claim that no physical evidence linking
petitioners to the crime was presented. They likewise point to a related case
filed against them wherein they were acquitted. They fault the trial court
and Court of Appeals for disregarding their defense of alibi and in giving
credence to the testimonies of Andrade and Tolentino, contending that these
testimonies were incredible and unsubstantiated. They likewise contend that
the lower courts erred in relying on Abans extrajudicial confession which
was coerced.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) challenges the petition on the
ground that the petition raises a question of fact. It also maintains that Aban
is a credible witness and that petitioners defense of alibi cannot prevail over
the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.[15]
After a thorough examination of the evidence presented, we are in
agreement that the appeal lacks merit.
At the outset, we note that it was not Abans extrajudicial confession but his
court testimony reiterating his declarations in his extrajudicial admission,
pointing to petitioners as his co-participants, which was instrumental in
convicting petitioners of the crime charged. Settled is the rule that when the
extrajudicial admission of a conspirator is confirmed at the trial, it ceases to
be hearsay. It becomes instead a judicial admission, being a testimony of an
eyewitness admissible in evidence against those it implicates.[16] Here, the
extrajudicial confession of Aban was affirmed by him in open court during
the trial. Thus, such confession already partook of judicial testimony which is
admissible in evidence against the petitioners.
We likewise agree in finding without merit the petitioners argument that,
since Abans testimony is not credible as to Espeleta, Camacho and
Punzalan who were acquitted, then it should also be held not credible as to
them. But in our considered view, the petitioners are not similarly situated
as their aforementioned co-accused. Other than the testimony of Aban,
there were no other witnesses who testified on the participation of Espeleta,
Camacho and Punzalan. In contrast, anent the herein petitioners
participation in the crime, not only is their conviction based on the
testimony of Aban, but it was also established by the eyewitness testimony
of Andrade and Tolentino who identified positively the petitioners in open
court.
Petitioners further aver that Aban testified on a robbery which took place on
February 22, 1994, not February 17, 1994. Granted that Ramoncito Aban in
fact testified on the details of the robbery which happened on February 22,
1994. However, it is also worth stressing as part of the prosecution evidence
that Aban testified that malefactors used the same route and strategy in the
perpetration of the robberies which happened on four occasions -- February
11, 13, 17 and 22, 1994. What happened on February 22 was but a
replication, so to speak, of the robbery scenarios earlier perpetrated by the
same gang on three previous dates. It is very clear, however, that Aban, on
the witness stand was testifying specifically also about the offense that took
place on February 17 in the Expressway, Bian, Laguna.
Petitioners claim that no physical evidence was presented by the
prosecution linking the petitioners to the crime charged. But in this case, the
alleged failure of the prosecution to present physical evidence does not
adversely affect the over-all weight of the evidence actually presented.
Physical evidence would be merely corroborative because there are credible
witnesses who testified on the complicity of petitioners in the crime charged.
[17]
Further, petitioners assert that in a similar case filed against them, they
were acquitted by the trial court of Imus, Cavite. As correctly observed by
the OSG, there is no showing that the amount and quality of evidence in the
present case and those in the case where petitioners were allegedly
acquitted are the same. Indeed, if petitioners truly believed that the
prosecution evidence is deficient to establish their guilt, their defense could
have earlier filed a demurrer to evidence in this case. But, they did not.[18]
Additionally, petitioners claim that the trial court and the Court of Appeals
erred in disregarding their defense of alibi.[19] However, we are in
agreement with the OSG that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused in this case.
Worth stressing, this Court has consistently ruled that the defense of alibi
must be received with suspicion and caution, not only because it is
inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it can be easily fabricated.
[20] Alibi is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the
positive identification of the accused. An alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the petitioners by credible witnesses who have no
motive to testify falsely.[21]
In this case, petitioners defense of alibi rested solely upon their own self-
serving testimonies. For their defense of alibi to prosper, it should have been
clearly and indisputably demonstrated by them that it was physically
impossible for them to have been at, or near, the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission. But as the trial court correctly ruled, it was not
impossible for the petitioners to be at the scene of the crime since
petitioners place of detention is less than an hour ride from the crime
scene. Moreover, no dubious reason or improper motive was established to
render the testimonies of Andrade, Tolentino and Aban false and
unbelievable. Absent the most compelling reason, it is highly inconceivable
why Andrade, Tolentino and Aban would openly concoct a story that would
send innocent men to jail.[22]
Similarly, petitioners assert that the testimonies of Andrade and Tolentino
are incredible and unsubstantiated. They question the failure of Tolentino to
identify Punzalan in court, and stress that Andrade and Tolentino were not
able to identify all the accused. The OSG, on the other hand, maintains that
the testimonies of Andrade and Tolentino are credible since the facts
testified to by them and Aban support each other.
We find petitioners allegations untenable. The testimonies given by
Andrade, Tolentino and Aban corroborate each other. Their testimonies
agree on the essential facts and substantially corroborate a consistent and
coherent whole. The failure of Tolentino to point to Punzalan in court does
not dent her credibility as a witness. It must be noted that it took years
before Tolentino was placed on the witness stand. As to the allegation that
the testimony of Andrade and Tolentino are incredible because they were
not able to identify all the accused deserves scant consideration. During the
robbery, they were told to bow their heads and hence, they were only able
to raise their heads from time to time. It is but logical that the witnesses
would not be able to identify all of the accused.

Considering the testimonies of witnesses and the evidence presented by the

parties, we are in agreement that the crime of Highway Robbery/Brigandage
was duly proven in this case. As defined under Section 2(e) of Presidential
Decree No. 532,[23] Highway Robbery/Brigandage is the seizure of any
person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away
of the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of
person or force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any
person on any Philippine highway. Also, as held in People v. Puno:[24]

In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway

robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery,
or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants

Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or

brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately
against any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein,
and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or
particular victim[Emphasis supplied.]

The elements of the crime of Highway Robbery/Brigandage have been

clearly established in this case. First, the prosecution evidence
demonstrated with clarity that the petitioners group was organized for the
purpose of committing robbery in a highway. Next, there is no
predetermined victim. The Kapalaran bus was chosen indiscriminately by the
accused upon reaching their agreed destination -- Alabang, Muntinlupa.

All told, we rule that petitioners Rustico Abay, Jr. and Reynaldo Darilag are
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Highway
Robbery/Brigandage.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 27, 2003 and the Resolution dated
October 14, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 25212, affirming
the Decision dated November 29, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31 in Criminal Case No. 9045-B, are hereby
AFFIRMED.

PSCFC, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, , respondents.
At issue in this petition for review is whether a request for admission directed to an
adverse party under Sec. 1, Rule 26, of the Rules of Court may be answered only by
his counsel.
On 17 March 1988, petitioner PSC Financial Corporation (PSCFC) filed a complaint
against private respondent Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino)
for annulment of foreclosure proceedings and damages with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Metro Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 88-368.
Petitioner PSCFC alleges that as land developer it availed itself of the Home Financing
Plan of Banco Filipino and borrowed from the latter the amount of P6,630,690.00 as
"developer loan." As security, petitioner constituted a mortgage over several lots in
Pasay City which properties were not yet sold at that time to third parties. It was
agreed that under the Home Financing Plan, the "developer loan" would mature only
after the lots shall have been subdivided and improved and then sold to third persons
who would then be substituted as mortgagors to the extent of the loan value of the
lots and houses bought by them. However, on 25 September 1987, without the loan
having matured as none of the lots have been conveyed to buyers, such that the
latter could now take the place of petitioner as mortgagors, the mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed and a certificate of sale was executed in favor of private
respondent Banco Filipino.
In their answer of 10 June 1988, private respondents admitted the loan of
P6,630,690.00 for which petitioner had executed a promissory note secured by a real
estate mortgage on the properties described in the complaint. However, they denied
that petitioner had availed itself of Banco Filipino's Home Financing Plan, averring
instead that under the promissory note and the contract of mortgage, the subject
loan would fall due "1 year from date" or on 5 January 1986 and that upon default of
petitioner, Banco Filipino could immediately foreclose the mortgage under Act No.
3135 as in fact it did, upon compliance with the legal requirements with respect to
extrajudicial foreclosures.
On 21 June 1988, petitioner served upon Banco Filipino a written request for
admission of the truth of certain matters set forth as follows:
1. The plaintiff (PSCFC) ... was ... granted by you under BF Home Financing Plan, on
the security of mortgages constituted on the lands acquired, under the terms of
which the developer loans, despite the contents of the covering promissory notes and
security instruments, would mature only after the development of the acquired lands
into residential subdivision and the resale of the ... lots ... to interested third parties
who would then be substituted as mortgagors ...
2. ... in 1984, availing itself of your said Home Financing Plan, the plaintiff obtained
from you a loan ... of P6,630,690.00 for which it signed in your favor a promissory
note on the security of a mortgage constituted on ... lots, which were not then yet
sold to any third person ...
3. ... on September 25, 1987, without the said loan having yet matured for the reason
that none of the ... lots had yet been the subject of sale to third persons such that
substitution of the latter as mortgagors in your favor could not yet be had, a
certificate of sale was executed by the Notary Public over the ... lands in your favor. 1
On 27 June 1988, petitioner received Banco Filipino's answer to its request for
admission signed by its counsel, Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun. Counsel admitted, inter
alia, petitioner's mortgage loan as well as the fact that Banco Filipino was engaged in
land development loans. However, respondent denied that petitioner availed itself of
the Home Financing Plan, including the agreement that the maturity of the debt
would depend on the resale of the mortgaged subdivision lots.
On 8 August 1988, petitioner made a second request for admission on respondent
Banco Filipino impliedly objecting to the first reply having been made by its lawyer,
Atty. Fortun, who was not even an attorney yet when Banco Filipino inaugurated its
financing plan in February 1968 and therefore did not have personal knowledge of
the financing scheme. The second request called on Banco Filipino to admit that it did
not send a formal notice of its intention to foreclose the mortgage and that there was
no publication of the notice of foreclosure in a newspaper of general circulation.
By way of response made 26 August and 4 November 1988, respondent Banco
Filipino objected to the matters requested on the ground of irrelevancy and denied all
the rest. In its motion of 7 November 1988, petitioner asked the trial court for a ruling
that the matters sought to be admitted in its second bid for admission should be
considered as impliedly admitted when the answer was made by a lawyer who was
not qualified to do so as he had no direct and personal knowledge of the matters
sought to be admitted. In insisting that only a client could make a binding admission
in discovery proceedings, petitioner cites Koh v. IAC. 2 It even went to the extent of
quoting in its petition, found on pages 15 -16, certain paragraphs supposedly taken
therefrom which are not actually found therein, except the last paragraph which
states: "... All the parties are required to lay their cards on the table so that justice
can be rendered on the merits of the case."
In any case, the lower court was not persuaded, so that petitioner went to the Court
of Appeals maintaining that there was a tacit admission of the matters included in its
second request for admission as the answer thereto was signed only by Atty. Fortun
who had no personality to do so.
The appellate court sustained the trial court; hence, this instant recourse.

Petitioner submits that the answer to the request for admission under Rule 26 should
be made by the party himself and nobody else, not even his lawyer. Consequently,
failure of respondent Banco Filipino, upon whom the call for admission was served, to
render the required sworn statement would constitute an implied admission of the
facts sought to be admitted. Thus, it must be the part itself who must respond to the
request for admission and that a mere reply made and verified by its counsel alone is
insufficient and contrary to the Rules and the intent behind recourse to modes of
discovery.

The argument is untenable. Section 21 of Rule 138 states

Sec. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. An attorney is presumed to be properly

authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of
attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client ... 3

Petitioner has not shown that the case at bar falls under any of the recognized
exceptions as found in Art. 1878 of the Civil Code which enumerates the instances
when special powers of attorney are necessary, or in Rule 20 of the Rules of Court on
pre-trial where the parties and their attorneys are both directed to appear before the
court for a conference; so that for counsel to appear at the pre-trail in behalf of the
client, he must clothe the former with an adequate authority in the form of a special
power of attorney or corporate resolution.

Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that "(a)ttorneys have authority to bind their clients
in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking
appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure ..."

Thus, when Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the request for admission, it
should not be restrictively construed to mean that a party may not engage the
services of counsel to make the response in his behalf. Indeed, the theory of
petitioner must not be taken seriously; otherwise, it will negate the principles on
agency in the Civil Code, 4 as well as Sec. 23, Rule 138, of the Rule of Court. 5

Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun overstepped his
authority, it is only his client, respondent Banco Filipino, which has the prerogative to
impugn his acts and not petitioner, the adverse party. Interestingly, Banco Filipino has
not objected to the response made by its counsel in its behalf.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolves to: (a) DENY the instant petition for utter lack of
merit; and, (b) REQUIRE counsel for petitioner, ATTY. LUTGARDA C. BAQUIRAN-
PERALTA, of the BALGOS & PEREZ LAW OFFICE, 5th Floor, Corinthian Plaza, Paseo de
Roxas, Makati, Metro Manila, to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice hereof
why she should not be administratively dealt with for misquoting the text of the
decision in Koh v. IAC, supra, to support her position and attain a favorable judgment
for her client.

MANOLO P. FULE, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate
Court, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch
LIV, convicting petitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into
between the prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial conference in the Trial
Court. The facts stipulated upon read:
a) That this Court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of this case;
b) That the accused was an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation on or before
January 21, 1981;
c) That on January 21, 1981, the accused issued and made out check No. 26741,
dated January 24, 1981 in the sum of P2,541.05;
d) That the said check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness, Roy Nadera;
e) That the check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness in remittance of
collection;
f) That the said check was presented for payment on January 24, 1981 but the same
was dishonored for the reason that the said checking account was already closed;
g) That the accused Manolo Fule has been properly Identified as the accused party in
this case.
At the hearing of August 23, 1985, only the prosecution presented its evidence
consisting of Exhibits "A," "B" and "C." At the subsequent hearing on September 17,
1985, petitioner-appellant waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof,
submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court
convicted petitioner-appellant.
On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed
the judgment of conviction. 1
Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that:
The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals erred in the decision of the Regional Trial
Court convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the
basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the
pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his
counsel.
Finding the petition meritorious, we resolved to give due course.
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on January 1, 1985,
applicable to this case since the pre-trial was held on August 8, 1985, provides:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or
entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused
unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. (Rule 118) [Emphasis
supplied]
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction,
negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the
affirmative are merely directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]). The use of
the term "shall" further emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is
imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Bersabal vs.
Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176). And more importantly, penal
statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to
be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused
(People vs. Terrado No. L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).
The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the
accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the
Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused,
in his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect
because Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of
Facts. What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the accused did
not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, was to submit evidence to
establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed
admission of the accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without said evidence
independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed established
beyond reasonable doubt.
Consequently, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the ends of justice
require that evidence be presented to determine the culpability of the accused. When
a judgment has been entered by consent of an attorney without special authority, it
will sometimes be set aside or reopened (Natividad vs. Natividad, 51 Phil. 613
[1928]).
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case
is hereby ordered RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, for further reception of evidence.
ROMULO TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. HELEN VILLANUEVA and HONORABLE CORAZON
JULIANO AGRAVA, Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, respondents.
Petitioner prays for the nullification of the order dated July 29, 1963 of the respondent
Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila.
On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his
marriage to private respondent Helen Villanueva, alleging that his consent was
obtained through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration, he
discovered that private respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he had no
sexual relations with her prior to the marriage ceremony; and that they did not live as
husband and wife as immediately after the marriage celebration, Helen Villanueva
left his house and her whereabouts remained unknown to him until January, 1962
when he discovered that she is residing in San Francisco, Cebu. Said marriage was
solemnized by Quezon City Judge Mariano R. Virtucio on September 28, 1959. Said
case was docketed as Civil Case No, 43347 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Manila.
Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen
failed to file a responsive pleading, for which reason petitioner filed on June 13, 1962
a motion to declare her in default and to set the date for the presentation of his
evidence.
In an order dated June 28, 1962, respondent Judge declared private respondent in
default, but, pursuant to the provision of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation to
determine whether collusion exists between the parties, directing the City Fiscal to
submit his report within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof, and, in the event of a
negative finding, to represent the State at the trial of the case to prevent fabrication
of evidence; and likewise directed herein petitioner to furnish the City Fiscal with
copies of the complaint and such other documents necessary for the City Fiscal's
information and guidance.
On July 3, 1962, thru counsel, petitioner submitted to the City Fiscal only a copy of his
complaint.
Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose, assigned to the case, issued a subpoena to
petitioner's counsel requiring him to bring petitioner with him as well as copies of
other documents in connection with the annulment case on August 27, 1962 at 10:00
A.M.
Plaintiff's counsel, in a letter dated August 24, 1962, informed Assistant City Fiscal
Jose that he could not comply with the subpoena for it will unnecessarily expose his
evidence.
In a motion dated and filed on October 29, 1962, petitioner, thru counsel, prayed the
respondent Judge to set the date for the reception of his evidence on the ground that
the City Fiscal had not submitted a report of his findings despite the lapse of sixty
(60) days from July 10, 1962 when he submitted to the City Fiscal a copy of the
complaint.
On November 6, 1962, respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion of petitioner
unless he submits himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal to enable the latter to
report whether or not there is collusion between the parties.
In an order dated July 29, 1963, respondent Judge dismissed the complaint in view of
the fact that petitioner is not willing to submit himself for interrogation by the City
Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 101 of the New
Civil Code.
His motions for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied on July
29, 1963 and on April 11, 1964, petitioner now files his petition to annul said order of
July 29, 1963 and to compel the respondent Judge to receive his evidence.
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition
of a decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in case of non-
appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting
attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the
plaintiff. Thus, Articles 88 and 101 state:
ART. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the provisions of article 101, paragraph
2, shall be observed.
ART. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is
no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take
care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded the 1950 Civil Code of the Philippines,
direct that actions for the annulment of marriage or divorce shall not be decided
unless the material facts alleged in the complaint are proved (Sec. 10, Rule 35, 1940
Rules of Court). The same rule is reiterated in Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1964
Revised Rules, with "legal separation" being substituted for "divorce", obviously
because the present Civil Code does not authorize absolute divorce.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact
that the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as
much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public
have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions
against desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The
prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that
marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and for this reason,
when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the
prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and
sanctity of the marital bonds
Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the petition is without merit.
WHEREFORE, THE ORDER DATED JULY 29, 1963 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED AND THE
PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.
EPIFANIO CRUZ and EVELINA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, CALIXTRO O. ADRIATICO, RUFINO J. SANTIAGO and GODOFREDO
VALMEO, respondents.
Petitioners seek herein the review and reversal of the decision of the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. SP-06317 1 which dismissed their petition
for certiorari questioning, inter alia, the judicial foreclosure and the judicial
confirmation of the subsequent sale of their property pursuant to the judgment of the
therein respondent Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Malolos Branch VIII; 2 as well as
the resolution 3 of the herein respondent court denying their motion for
reconsideration.
The challenged decision of the respondent court provides the factual background of
this case, thus:
The relevant and undisputed facts indicate that petitioners mortgaged certain
properties to private respondents who eventually sued them for non-payment and for
the judicial foreclosure of aforementioned mortgages under Rule 68 of the Rules of
Court. In the course of the proceedings a compromise agreement was reached and
this became the basis of the Judgment on Compromise issued by the respondent
Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan.
Pertinent parts of the Agreement, as embodied in the decision, reads:
3. Upon full payment of the sums of P55,000.00 and P320,000.00 within the period
agreed upon, the plaintiff shall deliver to the defendants Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-32286 (M) of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, Meycauayan Branch, together
with all the documents submitted to the plaintiff;
4. Should the defendants fail to pay the sums agreed upon within the period
stipulated, the defendants shall pay plaintiff the entire sum of P92,149.00 under the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage attached to the complaint as Annex 'C' and an
additional sum of P44,700.00 as attorney's fees;
5. Upon failure of the defendants to pay the sums agreed upon within the period
stipulated, plaintiff shall be entitled to a writ of execution directing the foreclosure of
all the mortgages subject matter of this litigation and to the principal sum of
P300,000.00 in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage attached to the complaint as Annex
'B shall be added the sum of P44,700.00 as attorney's fees.
For failure of the petitioners to comply with certain provisions of the agreement,
private respondent moved for a writ of execution. The mortgaged properties were
foreclosed upon in an auction sale and were purchased by the private respondents as
the highest bidder. The sale was latter judicially confirmed. 4
Preliminarily, We dispose of the procedural issue raised by petitioners over the
statement of respondent court that appeal should have been their proper remedy in
said court at that juncture, since their objections to the judicial foreclosure
proceeding and the subsequent confirmation of the sale, if correct, would constitute
errors of judgment and not of jurisdiction. Petitioners' justification of their remedy,
contending that the compromise agreement was null and void and that the writ of
execution thereafter issued and enforced was invalid, as well as their arguments
thereon, are pointless at this stage. The fact remains that, obviously in the broader
interests of justice, the respondent court nevertheless proceeded to decide the
petition for certiorari and ruled on the specific points raised therein in a manner akin
to what would have been done on assignments of error in a regular appeal. The
petition therein was, therefore, disposed of on the merits and not on a dismissal due
to erroneous choice of remedies or technicalities.
Central to the controversy as the vital issue for resolution, instead, is the submission
of petitioners that the aforestated judgment on compromise was null and void ab
initio because it allegedly "denied them their equity of redemption under Sec. 2, Rule
68 of the Rules of Court, by not allowing the petitioners to pay 'into court within a
period of not less than ninety (90) days from the date of the service of said order,'
and that it is only if the petitioners default in said payment that the property should
be sold to pay the judgment debt." 5
The provision relied upon reads as follows:
Sec. 2. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or sale. If upon the trial in such action
the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall ascertain
the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation, including
interest and costs, and shall render judgment for the sum so found due and order the
same to be paid into court within a period of ninety (90) days from the date of the
service of such order, and that in default of such payment the property be sold to
realize the mortgage debt and costs.
The procedure outlined therein obviously refers to the situation where a full-blown
trial, with the introduction of evidence is entailed, such that the trial court has to
thereafter determine whether the allegations in the complaint have been proved,
then ascertain the total amount due to the plaintiff, and thereafter render judgment
for such amount with an order for the payment thereof in accordance with the
prescription of the aforequoted section, sans the agreement of the parties on those
particulars. There being no such agreement, the specified procedure has necessarily
to be followed and the minimum period of ninety (90) days for payment, also referred
to as the period for the exercise of the equity, as distinguished from the right, of
redemption has to be observed and provided for in the judgment in the foreclosure
suit. Jurisprudentially, it has also been held that the exercise of the equity of
redemption may be made beyond the 90-days period but before the foreclosure sale
is confirmed by the court. 6
It stands to reason, however, that the aforesaid procedure cannot be of substantial
application to, and can be modified by, a valid agreement of the parties, such as in
the compromise agreement subject of and constituting the basis for the judgment on
compromise rendered in Civil Case No. 7418-M of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan,
as hereinbefore stated. The dispositions of Section 2 of Rule 68 clearly cannot apply
since the parties therein had specifically agreed on the amounts to be paid, when
they should be paid and the effects of non-payment or violation of the terms of their
agreement. Thus, the petitioners undertook to pay on the obligation subject of the
compromise agreement, P55,000.00 on or before August 20, 1984 and P320,000.00
on or before September 30, 1984 7 and, in case of default on their part, the
consequences are spelled out in Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of their aforequoted
compromise agreement, 8 all of which are premised on the precise contingency of
failure by the petitioners to comply within the period stipulated.
Paragraph 5 lucidly provides that, upon the happening of the aforesaid contingency
contemplated therein, private respondent Godofredo Valmeo shall be entitled to a
writ of execution directing the foreclosure of all the mortgages subject matter of said
litigation. It is noteworthy that this particular proviso is what distinguishes this case
from other judicial foreclosure cases decided on the bases of compromise
agreements but which did not have the same specification. Ineluctably, therefore, the
petitioners herein thereby waived their so called equity of redemption and the case
was necessarily removed from the operation of Section 2, Rule 68 insofar as its
provisions are inconsistent with the judgment on compromise.
This is not an isolated proposition as it may initially appear. True, the procedural
requirement in Section 2 grants a substantive right to the mortgagor, consisting of
the so-called equity of redemption, which after the ordinary adversarial course of a
controverted trial of a case may not be omitted in the relief to be awarded in the
judgment therein. 9 The same, however, may be waived, as already demonstrated.
In the same manner, the procedural requirements for the appointment of and
proceedings by commissioners in actions for expropriation 10 and judicial
partition 11 may be said to likewise confer substantive rights on the party defendants
therein, which procedural steps may not be omitted over their objection but can
likewise be waived or dispensed with on mutual agreement. In these three special
civil actions, although dissimilar in the specific procedure in their special features,
their rationale and specific objectives are congruent in that they afford added
protection to proprietary rights, but which additional protection may be waived, as by
stipulations to that effect in compromise agreements.
It is hornbook knowledge that a judgment on compromise has the effect of res
judicata on the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or
forgery. 12 To challenge the same, a party must move in the trial court to set aside the
said judgment and also to annul the compromise agreement itself, before be can
appeal from that judgment. 13Definitely, the petitioners have ignored these remedial
avenues.
There can be no pretension that the compromise agreement as formulated and
approved is contrary to law, public policy or morals or that the same was tainted with
circumstances vitiating consent. The petitioners entered into the same duly assisted
by competent counsel and the entire judicial proceeding was under judicial scrutiny
and supervision.
Hence, as correctly observed by the respondent court:
(1) Re the 'equity of redemption'. It is true that under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court,
the debtor-mortgagor is allowed a period of 90 days within which to pay his debt, to
prevent foreclosure, but this right, to Our mind was impliedly waived when the
parties signed the compromise agreement, which was later embodied in the
Judgment. The agreement in effect says that upon breach of the same (and this fact
is not disputed), foreclosure should be resorted to. The agreement was clear that
payment had to be made within the stipulated period. It would be absurd to say that
after said stipulated period, petitioners would still be given an additional 90-day
period for the 'equity'. Had petitioners intended still an exercise in 'equity', they
should have insisted on a clarificatory provision in the agreement. 14
Petitioners next shift to the writ of execution pursuant to which the foreclosure sale
was conducted by respondent sheriff, stigmatizing it as a falsified writ of execution.
This is unwarranted and baseless.
What actually transpired was that the respondent Branch Clerk of Court issued a writ
of execution on October 9, 1984 containing the following directives:
NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to execute and make effective the
aforequoted decision of this Honorable Court dated August 20, 1984 and make a
return of this writ within sixty (60) days from receipt hereof. But if sufficient property
cannot be found thereon, then we command you that of the land and building of said
defendants you make the said sum of money. 15
This honest and inconsequential mistake on the part of the respondent clerk,
subsequently rectified by the respondent sheriff, was satisfactorily explained by the
court a quo in its order resolving several motions on May 27, 1985 16 as follows:
As to the alleged defect in the writ of execution, the mortgagors could have moved to
have the writ quashed before the confirmation of the sale, but they failed to raise
that point or any point for that matter. He alleged defect in the writ of execution is
that it differs from that quoted in the notice of sale. The writ issued by the Branch
Clerk of Court included an extra sentence which reads: 'But if sufficient personal
property cannot be found thereon, then we command you that of the land and
buildings of said defendants you make the said sum of money.' The surplusage is
understandable and excusable as these wordings are usually included in the standard
form copied by the stenographer in ordinary writs of execution. It has been held that
if the writ of execution does not conform to the judgment, the writ may be amended
so that the judgment may be properly satisfied. In fact, the slight difference between
the writ handed by the Branch Clerk and that reproduced in the notice of sale was for
the reason that the Deputy Sheriff, realizing the imperfection of the original writ,
rectified it by eliminating the surplusage to make it conform to the terms of the
judgment. Although the better step that should have been taken by the sheriff was to
inform the Branch Clerk about it for the proper amendment, the rectification done by
said sheriff, in effect, was confirmed and adopted by the court when it confirmed the
sale without any objection from the herein movants. At any rate, there is no showing
of any detriment to the interest of the mortgagee resulting from this rectification. 17
Petitioners' complaints about the supposed irregularity in the publication of the notice
of sale involve questions of fact which cannot be resolved by this Court. Furthermore,
petitioners had all the opportunity, in the several motions filed in and heard by the
trial court and especially in the hearing for the confirmation of sale, to ventilate the
alleged irregularities but they never did so.
Neither are We inclined to nor justified in disturbing the factual findings of the
respondent court debunking petitioners' claim that private respondent Valmeo had,
subsequent to the foreclosure sale of the property, agreed to allow petitioners to
redeem the property. In reliance upon the findings of the trial court in its orders of
October 8, 1984 18 and March 20, 1985, 19 the respondent court categorically
declared:
(5) Re the 'new agreement to redeem'. There was actually NO SUCH AGREEMENT.
True, petitioners had been informed in Court by private respondents' previous counsel
(Atty. Cecilio de la Merced) that he was allowing petitioners 'to redeem'. BUT this was
without any authorization from the private respondents. In fact, in due time, private
respondents were able to inform the respondent Judge of this non-authorization and
the Judge was able to rectify her previous order allowing such 'redemption'. Be it
noted that aforementioned previous counsel's services were TERMINATED by the
private respondents. 20
Petitioners close their jeremiad by an appeal for consideration on ground of equity.
However, We also recognize the principle of countervailing equity in favor of the
adverse party, opposed to that which petitioners seek to be recognized, and which
should not be subordinated because it is of equal strength and equally deserving of
consideration.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioners.