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Application The Pacific War

Legalist Paradigm
1. There exists an international society of independent states
2. This international society has a law that establishes the rights of its members
above all, the rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty.
3. Any us of force or imminent threat of force by one state against the political
sovereignty or territorial integrity of another constitutes aggression and is a
criminal act
4. Aggression justifies two kinds of violent response: a war of self-defense by
the victim and a war of law enforcement by the victim and any other member
of international society
5. Nothing but aggression can justify war.
6. Once the aggressor state has been militarily repulsed, it can also be
punished.

I. Introduction
a. Graphic Description
b. Through the application of the legalist paradigm and social contract theory, it can be
shown that the Japanese attack was unjust and that the subsequent American retaliation
was just.
II. Body
a. United States Was just in attacking Japan
i. Per legalist paradigm
1. Attacked Territorial Integrity
2. War of Self-Defense
a. Quote Sections that correspond to legalist
paradigm
3.
ii. Purposes of going to war might not have been strictly legal
1. Much more powerful
2. Balance doesnt exactly exist
iii. Principle of last resort is a little more complicated
1. Had been negotiating for nearly a year already at that
point
2. Plenty of time spent trying to pursue an alternative
a. Not like sudden war would make the negotiation
more likely to succeed.
b. Japan was not justified in going to war
1. Seems simple, but several good arguments could be
made
2. Talk about both sides being just (by proving that Japan
was unjust, it does not reinforce the idea that America
was necessarily just
ii. Preventative War
1. Quote Walzer 3
a. A manifest intent to injure;
b. A degree of active preparation that makes that
intent a positive danger
c. A general situation in which waiting, or doing
anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the
risk.
i. Conferences with other countries, would
seem to broadcast a manifest intent to
injure.
ii. Limited oil also seems intent to injure
iii. Conferences are active preparation
iv. Situation in which waitin
1. Quote oil running out
2. Aimed at reducing the cost of war in the long run
a. So they have sufficient threat, but what about when
that threat is in response to something that they
plan on doing?
3. Last Resort?
a. Loss of military strength
i. Quote Oil embargo problem things
b. Crippled power
i. Would that violate the social contract (violate
political sovereignty)
1. Quote Social Contract Waltzer (54-55)
ii. Give Permission to go to war?
1. If leaves rights of citizens
undefended?
2. Not good enough justification
iii. Lack of Self-Determination in Colonies?
1. Free from colonial powers
2. Self Determination?
a. Did they have it under the colonial powers?
b. Would the Japanese allow more?
i. Would that mean that Japan would be
justified in attacking
c.
c.
III. Conclusion
The Origins of the Pacific War

Belief on the American side that the Japanese must have been irrational to
attack the United States
Lingering concern hormephobia, the fear of shock or surprise
Systems of deterrence fail if confronted with an irrational adversary
Months leading to Pacific war
o United States embargo on oil exports to Japan
o Demanded that Japanese accept defeat in the war in China and
withdraw forces
Characterize attack as desperate but necessary operation given to a man
with a terminal disease
Best view of war is of a mutual failure of deterrence
o Japanese expand into Southeast Asia
Deter American intervention in support of European colonial
powers
o United States attempted to prevent Japanese expansion
Sought to do sso without precipitating war in the Pacific

First Steps: Expansion and Mutual Deterrent Bluffs

Japanese a new order in East Asia


Japanese hedgemony in East Asia
o Japan wondering how to take advantage of war in Europe to advance
its goal in Asia
o Japanese military state that if attacking European colonies, American
intervention must be expected
US Stop Japanese expansion using
o Threat of oil embargo
o Threat of military intervention

Keeping the Japanese Guessing

Japanese
o Put pressure on the French colonial authorities in Indocchina to permit
the Imperial Army to station troops in Tokin Provinve.
o Us scrap Metal Imbargo response
o Began negotiations with Nazi Germany tripartite pact
Secret dont really have to clause
Americans constrained by
o Public didnt want war in Pacific
o Fear of provoking rather than preventing
o After Roosevelts victory (presidential) gave more explicit warning to
japna that if Japan invaded, America would respond
o Americans entered secret talks with Brisitsh and Dutch to coordinate
contingenc plans in case the United States did enter the war.
Summer of 1941: North or South

Japan moves troops in south Indochina

The American Embargo Decision

President didnt technically embargo oil, only restricted supply


Administration dumbasses didnt allow any oil togo through.

Tokyos Reaction

Much Desperation
Consider desperate peace rather than desperate war.
Negotiation
o Tokyo wants resumption of oil and stop cuppor Chian kai-shek regime
for Japan to withdraw forces from French Indochina
o Worried America would prolong negotiations in order to strengthen
position
Clean Slate Debate

Cant Withdraw from China


Cant really negotiate strongly
Liason Conference decides on attack
o Only naval/military officiers knew about it

How could Japan Win?

Cripple the system of the people.


Make the war too expensive to be fought.
Instead, Pearl Harbour Galvanized.
o Missed this mistake was never fully mixed with the plan.

Lessons from the orgins of the pacific war

Deterrence has twin requirements


o Capability
o Credibility
o United States had both and deterrence still didnt work.
Costs of going to war were very high, but the costs of not going to war were
even higher.
The lessons of unintentional provocation and desperation

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