A.M. No.

RTJ-90-483 September 25, 1998 A judge will be held administratively liable for rendering an unjust judgment one which is contrary
to law or jurisprudence or is not supported by evidence when he acts in bad faith, malice, revenge
ATTY. ANTONIO T. GUERRERO, complainant, vs. HON. ADRIANO VILLAMOR, respondent. or some other similar motive.

A.M. No. RTJ-90-617 September 25, 1998 From the record before us we agree with the finding of the investigating Justice that respondent, in
issuing his erroneous contempt order, was not moved by ill-will or by an impulse to do an injustice. To
GEORGE CARLOS, complainant, vs. HON. ADRIANO VILLAMOR, respondent.
be sure, complainants have not presented evidence or offered logical arguments tending to show that
In a sworn letter-complaint 1 addressed to this Court through the Court Administrator, dated March 8, bad faith accompanied the issuance of the contempt order. In all, the assailed act of the respondent
1990, Atty. Antonio Guerrero charges Judge Adriano Villamor of the Regional Trial Court at Naval, judge appears to be a case of error of judgment not subject to disciplinary action.
Sub-Province of Biliran, Leyte, Branch 16, with serious misconduct, ignorance of the law, knowingly
At most, the order of direct contempt which we nullified may only be considered as error of judgment
rendering an unjust judgment, misfeasance, malfeasance and neglect of duty for issuing an
for, which Judge Villamor may not be held criminally or civilly liable to the respondents [herein
Order 2 dated December 11, 1987 declaring the complainant and one George Carlos guilty of direct
complainants].
contempt.
[A] judge may not be administratively charged for mere errors of judgment in the absence of showing
Atty. Guerrero was the legal counsel of George Carlos, who previously filed an
of any bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. 26
administrative case against the respondent for having issued an illegal order and unjust
decision in civil case decided by the respondent. Moreover, it is settled that judges cannot be held to account criminally, civilly, or administratively for
Dissatisfied with the outcome of his administrative case, Carlos, and Atty. Antonio Guerrero, an erroneous decision rendered by them in good faith. 27
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu a civil action for damages against Judge Villamor.
Carlos alleged that Judge Villamor knowingly rendered an unjust judgment when he WHEREFORE, herein administrative complaints against Judge Adriano Villamor are hereby
dismissed the five criminal cases against Naval and her co-accused. DISMISSED.
Judge Villamor issued in Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989 to 0993 an order declaring Carlos and
his lawyer, Antonio Guerrero guilty of direct contempt for "degrading the respect and dignity
of the court through the use of derogatory and contemptuous language before the court," 9 In
full, the contempt order reads:
Carlos and Atty. Guerrero afterwards went to this Court on a petition for certiorari with a
prayer for preliminary injunction against Judge Villamor. On November 13, 1989, this Court,
in G.R. No. 82238-42, promulgated a decision annulling the contempt order 10.
In his comment, respondent submits that the various reverses encountered by the
complainants before his court and the appellate courts impelled them to institute their
complaint as a measure of harassment. 14 He, however, anchors his defense on the following
terse line: What happened was an error in judgment.
At most, the order of direct contempt which we nullified may only be considered an error of
judgment for which Judge Villamor may not be held criminally or civilly liable to the
respondents.
Investigating Justice Garcia recommends the dismissal of the complaints against respondent
judge. This Court agrees with this recommendation.

Use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular judge in pleadings presented in

another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in
the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.
A.C. No. 3923. March 30, 1993.
CONCORDIA B. GARCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO, respondent.
In a sworn complaint filed with the Court on October 6, 1992, Concordia B. Garcia seeks the
disbarment of Atty. Crisanto L. Francisco.
On March 9, 1964, Concordia B. Garcia and her husband Godofredo, the Dionisio spouses, and Felisa
and Magdalena Baetiong leashed a parcel of land to Sotero Baluyot Lee for a period of 25 years
beginning May 1, 1964. Despite repeated verbal and written demands, Lee refused to vacate after the
expiration of the lease. Lee claimed that he had an option to extend the lease for another 5 years and
the right of pre-emption over the property.
In this disbarment case, the complainant claims that Lee's counsel, respondent Francisco, commenced
various suits before different courts to thwart Garcia's right to regain her property and that all these
proceedings were decided against Lee. The proceedings stemmed from the said lease contract and
involved the same issues and parties, thus violating the proscription against forum-shopping.
Respondent, in his comment, says that he inserted in defense of his client's right only such remedies as
were authorized by law.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the administration
of justice.
The cause of the respondent's client in obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this fact
when he willfully resorted to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that was
consistently denied, as he should have expected. He thereby added to the already clogged dockets of
the courts and wasted their valuable time. He also caused much inconvenience and expense to the
complainant, who was obliged to defend herself against his every move.
By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been
repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or
proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defense only as he believes to be honestly debatable
under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the
name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of trust reposed in him by law as an
officer of the Court.
Atty. Crisanto l. Francisco took his oath as a lawyer on March 2, 1956. Considering his age and
experience in the practice of the laws, he should have known better than to trifle with it and to use it as
an instrument for harassment of the complainant and the misuse of judicial processes.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the
enjoyment of all the rights and privileges appurtenant to membership in the Philippine bar.
A.C. No. 6273 March 15, 2010
ATTY. ILUMINADA M. VAFLOR-FABROA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. OSCAR PAGUINTO, Respondent.
An Information for Estafa1 was filed on June 21, 2001 against Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa
(complainant) along with others based on a joint affidavit-complaint which Atty. Oscar Paguinto
(respondent) prepared and notarized. As the joint affidavit-complaint did not indicate the involvement
of complainant, complainant filed a Motion to Quash the Information which the trial court
granted.2 Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the quashal of the Information was denied3
Respondent also filed six other criminal complaints against complainant for violation of Article 31 of
Republic Act No. 6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines) before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, but he eventually filed a Motion to Withdraw them.4
The CDA Acting Regional Director (RD), by Resolution of February 21, 2002, declared the questioned
general assembly null and void for having been conducted in violation of GEMASCOs By-Laws and
the Cooperative Code of the Philippines.8 The RDs Resolution of February 21, 2002 was later vacated
for lack of jurisdiction9 of CDA.
In her present complainant10 against respondent for disbarment, complainant alleged that respondent:
X X X PROMOTED OR SUED A GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR UNLAWFUL SUIT, AND GAVE AID
AND CONSENT TO THE SAME11
X X X DISOBEYED LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE[D] DISRESPECT FOR LAW AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION12
X X X DID NOT CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD
HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUE AND ENGAGED IN HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST
OPPOSING COUNSEL13
Despite the Courts grant,16 on respondents motion,17 of extension of time to file Comment, respondent
never filed any comment. The Court thus required him to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with,18 but just the same he failed to comply.19
Respondents counsel who represented him during the conference proposed the issue of whether, on
the basis of the allegations of the complaint, misconduct was committed by respondent. 22
After the conclusion of the conference, both parties were ordered to submit position
papers.23 Complainant filed hers,24 but respondent, despite grant, on his motion, of extension of time,
did not file any position paper.
In her Report and Recommendation,25 Investigating Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing found
respondent guilty of violating the Lawyers Oath as well as Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Noting that respondent had already been previously suspended for
six months, the Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for two years.
The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking over the Board of Directors and the
GEMASCO facilities, respondent violated the provisions of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines
and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violated the Lawyers Oath, which provides that a lawyer shall
support the Constitution and obey the laws.
When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against complainant, he violated the
Lawyers Oath that a lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."
When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the complaint, respondent failed to file
any and ignored this Courts subsequent show cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that "A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to
file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so." Sebastian v. Bajar28 teaches:
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondents deference is underscored
by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt
but to disciplinary sanctions as well.
The Court notes that respondent had previously been suspended from the practice of law for six
months for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,30 he having been found to have
received an acceptance fee and misled the client into believing that he had filed a case for her when he
had not.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto, is SUSPENDED for two years from the practice
of law for violation of Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Lawyers Oath, effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33037-42 August 17, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant
vs.
DEMETRIO JARDIN, accused-appellee.
The criminal prosecutions originated from a letter complaint of the Provincial Auditor of Quezon
requesting the Provincial Fiscal to file the necessary criminal action under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code against Demetrio Jardin for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public
documents on six counts.
The cases were assigned to Assistant Fiscal Meliton V. Angeles who set them for preliminary
investigation. The accused moved to postpone the investigation twice. On the third time that the
investigation was re-set, the accused and his counsel failed to appear.
On the fourth resetting, the accused and his counsel again failed to appear. Inspire of their absence, the
preliminary investigation was conducted and shortly afterwards, six informations were filed against the
accused before the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II,
When the arraignment of the accused was called on September 5, 1967, counsel for the accused
verbally moved for reinvestigation on the ground that the accused was not given the opportunity to
present his defense during the preliminary investigation.
A series of postponements was again filed by the accused causing further. delays of the reinvestigation.
Invoking his client's constitutional right to speedy trial and seizing the opportunity to take advantage of
the prosecution's failure to appear on that day, the defense counsel moved for the dismissal of the
cases. The respondent court granted the oral motion for dismissal "for reasons of constitutional rights
of the accused Demetrio Jardin. "
The respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the cases and in basing the
dismissal on the constitutional right of the accused to speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial means
that the accused is free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being
to assure that an innocent person may be free from anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if
otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the
presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. (See Andres v.
Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216)
All the postponements of proceedings were made at his instance and for his behalf. Hence, the filing multiple petitions or complaints for a cause that has been previously rejected in the false
constitutional right to a speedy trial afforded to an accused by our Constitution cannot be invoked. It expectation of getting favorable action.
would, therefore, be a mockery of the criminal justice system if the accused would be allowed to
benefit from his own wrongdoings or tactical maneuvers intended to frustrate the administration of
justice. By his own deliberate acts, he is deemed to have waived or abandoned his right to a speedy
trial. G.R. No. L-38377 October 15, 1975

In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to the benefit of an accused, the
following requisites must be present in the first prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a
competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
(Rule 117, Section 9, Rules of Court; People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77). The last requisite assumes a
valid acquittal and a valid acquittal presupposes a valid judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Since in the instant cases, the dismissal was void for having been issued without legal basis, it follows
that the acquittal brought about by the dismissal is also void. Hence, no jeopardy can attach from such
acquittal. The act of respondent judge in discussing the cases amounted to lack of jurisdiction which
would prevent double jeopardy from attaching.
Even as we rule that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion, we also rebuke the attorneys
for both the defense and the prosecution and to a certain extent, the court itself because of the breach of
duties to the courts and to the administration of justice apparent in this case.
The dilatory tactics of the defense counsel and the failure of both the judge and the fiscal to take
effective counter measures to obviate the delaying acts constitute obstruction of justice.
CAPT. CONRADO M. CABAGUI, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS THIRD DIVISION, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents, EUGENIO M. MILLADO, respondent.
The Court finds, Attorney Eugenio M. Millado, guilty of gross negligence in not having complied with
a "show cause" resolution and of abusing the right of recourse to the Court by filing multiple petitions
for the same cause in the false expectation of getting favorable action from one division as against the
adverse action of the other division. The Court deems his suspension from the practice of law since
February, 1975 as sufficient penalty and now lifts his suspension with the warning that the commission
in the future by respondent of the same or other infractions shall be dealt with severely.
Under its Resolution of November 20, 1974, the Court, acting on a third petition for review of a Court
of Appeals decision affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of malversation of public funds, as,
ordered that said petition be deleted from the records and required "Atty. Eugenio Millado to SHOW
CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice hereof why disciplinary action should not be taken against
him for trifling with the Court by filing this third petition despite previous resolutions of this Court."

As aptly stared: The Court therein reiterated its warning to litigants and counsels against the filing of multiple petitions
for the same cause in the false expectation of getting favorable action from one division as against the
An attorney as an officer of the court is called upon to assist in the due administration of justice. Like adverse action of the other division, since "such conduct would tend to trifle with the Court and
the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. For this reason, any act on the part of a lawyer impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice,"
that obstructs, perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies
disciplinary action against him. For failure on the part of respondent to submit the explanation required under the Court's Resolution of
November 20, 1974, notwithstanding the lapse on January 3, 1975 of the period therein given him, the
Acts which amount to obstruction in the administration of justice may take many forms such as: Court per its Resolution of February 7, 1975 resolved to suspend respondent from the practice of law
effective immediately and until further action in the premises.
instructing a complaining witness in a criminal action not to appear at the scheduled hearing
so that the case against the client, the accused, would be dismissed
asking a client to plead guilty to a crime which the lawyer knows his client did not commit,
advising a client who is detained for a crime to escape from prison,
employing dilatory tactics to frustrate satisfaction of clearly valid claims,
prosecuting clearly frivolous cases or appeals to drain the resources of the other party and
compel him to submit out of exhaustion
On April 14, 1975, respondent filed his "Petition for Relief from Resolutions and Compliance"
pleading inter alia "mistake and/or excusable negligence" for his failure to take note of and attend to
the filing of the explanation required in the Court's Resolution of November 20, 1974 and that he was
seeking to render "optimum legal service" to petitioner and "to exhaust all remaining legal remedies."
He added with reference to the third petition that "if, however, there is any portion thereof that can
suggest that its filing trifles with this Honorable Court, he respectfully begs the indulgence and
tolerance thereof, and he condescendingly (sic) APOLOGIZES therefor, respectfully assuring that he
will be more cautious hereafter." 3

The Court set the petition for relief for hearing on June 2,1975 on which date it heard respondent and
further granted him time to submit his memorandum.

The Court thus finds that respondent was grossly negligent, to say the least, in failing to comply within
the required period with the Court's Resolution requiring him to show cause why disciplinary action
should not be taken against him for filing multiple petitions for the same cause notwithstanding the
Court's previous adverse resolutions. His original period to file the required explanation expired on
January 3, 1975 and more than a month elapsed thereafter without his having done anything until the
Court took note thereof on February 7, 1975 and ordered his suspension. As already indicated, the
Court also finds respondent's explanation for his having filed multiple petitions one after the other to
be unsatisfactory and untenable.
Considering, however, that respondent has been under suspension since the Court's Resolution of
February 7, 1975, since after respondent filed his belated compliance, the Court as per its Resolution of
April 21, 1975 ordered that respondent remain under suspension until it could hear the matter on the
merits, the Court is inclined to view with liberality respondent's plea that "he has been sufficiently
punished" and that "his suspension ... is substantial enough as to make him improve his professional
service to his client and duties to the bench ..." The Court will thus consider the suspension so far
served by respondent as sufficient penalty for the serious infractions committed by him..
ACCORDINGLY, respondent's suspension from the practice of law with the warning that the
commission in the future by respondent of the same infractions or other violations of his duties as a
lawyer shall be dealt with severely.
A.C. No. 7199 July 22, 2009
FOODSPHERE, INC., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a business of meat processing and manufacture and distribution of
"CDO," filed a Verified Complaint1 for disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as
"Batas Mauricio" (respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2)
violation of lawyers oath and (3) disrespect to the courts and to investigating prosecutors.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery a can of
CDO Liver spread and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can.
Corderos wife thus filed a complaint with the (BFAD). Laboratory examination confirmed the
presence of parasites in the Liver spread.
The spouses Cordero demanded P150,000 as damages from complainant. Complainant refused to heed
the demand. Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by
the Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down. And the
Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the media.

Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 of which would go to the Corderos
and P35,000 to his Batas Foundation. And respondent directed complainant to place paid
advertisements in the tabloids and television program.

The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN3 seeking the withdrawal of their complaint before
the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint.4 Respondent, who affixed his signature to the
KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the
document.
On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract 5 asking complainant to
advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues at P15,000 per issue or a
total amount of P360,000, and a Program Profile6 of the television program KAKAMPI MO ANG
BATAS also asking complainant to place spot advertisements.
As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements in the tabloid and
three spots of 30-second TVC in the television program. Acting on complainants offer, respondent
relayed to it that he and his Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer and threatened to
proceed with the publication of the articles/columns.7
On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- Batas ng Bayan at radio station
DZBB, announced the holding of a supposed contest sponsored by said program,
Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod?
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant in bad light.
"KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD!" "IBA PANG PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN!"9 "DAPAT
BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO."10
Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and
Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaints
were pending at he time of the filing of the present administrative complaint
Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service, that is, to expose the defects of
complainants products to the consuming public. Complainant claims that there is a baser motive to the
actions of respondent. Complainant avers that respondent retaliated for complainants failure to give in
to respondents "request" that complainant advertise in the tabloids and television programs of
respondent. Complainants explanation is more credible. respondent consciously violated the spirit
behind the "Kasunduan" which he himself prepared and signed
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act and
comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession,37 which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member
of the bar.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking
advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest to obtain funds for his Batas
Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates:
A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse
public opinion for or against a party.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order
restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the
complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products.
At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates lawyers to "uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes." For he defied said status quo order, despite his (respondents) oath as a member
of the legal profession to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities."
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong
language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does
not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities
for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.1awphi1
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.39 (Underscoring supplied)
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal profession,
respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to
"at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession."401avvph!1
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated. In Dalisay v.
Mauricio, Jr.,41 the therein complainant engaged therein-herein respondents services as "she was
impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a media personality,"42 only to later
find out that after he demanded and the therein complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no action was taken
nor any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was suspended for six months.
On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio and
watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent, have affected
the sales of complainant.
Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondents motion for reconsideration, took
note of the fact that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness when he filed falsification charges
against the therein complainant.43
To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is, in the premises,
sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyers oath and breach of ethics of
the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three years effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR Present:
Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of Surigao
City, Branch 30. In an Order dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence
of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove
the crime of homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense filed a
Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State
Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the
original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail under Sec. 4,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.[1]
In an Order dated August 30, 2002,[2] Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the case
because of the harsh insinuation of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he lacks the cold
neutrality of an impartial magistrate, by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount
of bail bond by counsel for the accused.
The case was transferred to Branch 29 Judge Tan favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount of
Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond at P40,000.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied for lack of merit respondent appealed to
the Court of Appeals (CA).
Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an article
regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold
Star Daily. The article, entitled Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect
to bail out,
Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan.
This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there who are displaying judicial
arrogance. he said.[3]
In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed respondent and the
writer of the article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to appear in court on September
20, 2003 to explain why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the publication of
the article which degraded the court and its presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentation.
The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge Buyser described the
evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused only for
homicide. Moreover, it was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear
reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30, 2002, declared in open court in the presence of
respondent that he was inhibiting himself from the case due to the harsh insinuation of respondent that
he lacked the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to answer whether
he made the statements in the article until after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss. For his refusal
to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court.[6] The Courts Order dated September 30, 2003 reads:
Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law. He appealed the
indirect contempt order to the CA.
Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for interviews in
Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial courts disposition in
the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.
In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required respondent to
explain and to show cause within five days from receipt thereof why he should not be held in contempt
for his media interviews that degraded the court and the presiding judge, and why he should not be
suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically
Rule 11.05 of Canon 11[8] and Rule 13.02 of Canon 13.[9]
In those radio interviews, respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a judge who does not know the law, a
liar, and a dictator who does not accord due process to the people.
The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on December 4, 2003.
On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer to
Contempt alleging that he was saddled with work of equal importance and needed ample time to
answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of particulars in order to properly prepare for his defense.
 In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. It stated that a bill of
particulars is not applicable in contempt proceedings, and that respondents actions and statements are
detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.
On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent neither appeared in court nor informed the
court of his absence. The trial court issued an Order dated December 4, 2003 cancelling the hearing to
give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances he asks for, and ordered him to appear on January 12, 2004
to explain in writing or orally why he should not be cited in contempt of court pursuant to the facts
stated in the Order dated October 20, 2003.However, respondent did not appear in the scheduled
hearing of January 12, 2004.
On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondents Answer dated January 8, 2004. Respondent
denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio station DXKS. He, however, stated that
right after the hearing of September 30, 2003, he was approached by someone who asked him to
comment on the Order issued in open court, and that his comment does not fall within the concept of
indirect contempt of court. He also admitted that he was interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing, at
the latters instance. He justified his response during the interview as a simple exercise of his
constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and was
without malice.
On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor Bagabuyo has grossly violated the
Canons of the legal profession and [is] guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law.
The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an officer of the court, is duty
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, and should not promote distrust in the
administration of justice.
The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the practice of law under Sec.
28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court[12] for any of the causes mentioned in Sec. 27[13] of the same
Rule. Respondent was given the opportunity to be heard, but he opted to be silent. Thus, it held that the
requirement of due process has been duly satisfied.
In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29,[14] Rule 138 and Sec. 9,[15] Rule 139 of the Rules of Court,
the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Statement of
Facts of respondents suspension from the practice of law, dated July 14, 2005, together with the order
of suspension and other relevant documents.
In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the article in the
August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned the integrity and
independence of the court and its officers, and respondents criticism of the trial courts Order dated
November 12, 2002, which was aired in radio station DXKS, both in connection with Crim. Case No.
5144, constitute grave violation of oath of office by respondent. It stated that the requirement of due
process was complied with when respondent was given an opportunity to be heard, but respondent
chose to remain silent.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial courts order of
suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
year, with a stern warning that the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. It has been reiterated
in Gonzagav. Villanueva, Jr.[16] that:
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties,
or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct;
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of
impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer
must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his
entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and
upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
[17]
Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.[18] Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.05 of Canon 11
states that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.
Respondent also violated the Lawyers Oath, as he has sworn to conduct [himself] as a lawyer
according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
[his] clients.
The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly provide
for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the institution must
always be maintained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating Rule
11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and of violating
the Lawyers Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective
upon finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall
be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
[A.C. NO. 6155 : March 14, 2006]
MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M.
JOAQUIN, Complainants, v. ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL, Respondent.
Complainants filed before this Court against Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal (respondent) for violation
of the Lawyer's Oath, gross misconduct, and gross negligence. Complainants are related to petitioners
in G.R. No. 152621-23 entitled SPO1 Ernest C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M.
Joaquin v. People of the Philippines, in whose behalf respondent filed the Petition for Review
on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) in the case.
The facts are as follows:
On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin
(eventually petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23, collectively referred to herein as the accused) were
involved in a shooting incident which resulted in the death of two individuals and the serious injury of
another. As a result, Informations were filed against them before the Sandiganbayan for murder and
frustrated murder. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. After due trial, the
Sandiganbayan2found the accused guilty of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted
homicide.
At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of herein respondent for the accused. Respondent
then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was denied in a Resolution
dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the denial, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File
Second Motion for Reconsideration, with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration.3 Pending
resolution by the Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed with this Court a Petition for Review
on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) on 3 May 2002.
Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent telephone calls they
made to his office. When respondent did not return their phone inquiries, complainants went to
respondent's last known address only to find out that he had moved out without any forwarding
address.
More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to personally verify the
status of the ad cautelam petition as they had neither news from respondent about the case nor
knowledge of his whereabouts. They were shocked to discover that the Court had already issued a
Resolution4 dated 3 July 2002, denying the petition for late filing and non-payment of docket fees.
Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained finality and warrants of arrest 5 had
already been issued against the accused because respondent, whose whereabouts remained unknown,
did nothing to prevent the reglementary period for seeking reconsideration from lapsing.
In his Comment,6 respondent states that it is of vital significance that the Court notes that he was not
the original counsel of the accused. He only met the accused during the promulgation of the
Sandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted
homicide. He was merely requested by the original counsel to be on hand, assist the accused, and be
present at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision.
Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement undertaken by the parties. But only because
of his sincere effort and in true spirit of the Lawyer's Oath did he file the Motion for Reconsideration.
Though admitting its highly irregular character, respondent also made informal but urgent and personal
representation with the members of the Division of the Sandiganbayan who promulgated the decision
of conviction. He asserts that because of all the efforts he put into the case of the accused, his other
professional obligations were neglected and that all these were done without proper and adequate
remuneration.
As to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it was filed on time. He stresses that the last
day of filing of the petition was on 3 April 2002 and on that very day, he filed with this Court a Motion
for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review,7 seeking an additional thirty (30) days to file the
petition. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he filed the petition by registered mail and paid the
corresponding docket fees. Hence, so he concludes, it was filed within the reglementary period.
Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the "herculean" efforts he made in assisting the accused for
almost a year after the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He considered the fact that it was
a case he had just inherited from the original counsel; the effect of his handling the case on his other
equally important professional obligations; the lack of adequate financial consideration for handling
the case; and his plans to travel to the United States to explore further professional opportunities. He
then decided to formally withdraw as counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to PO3 Rolando
Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as the contact person between respondent and complainants,
explaining his decision to withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the Notice to Withdraw which
respondent instructed the accused to sign and file with the Court. He sent the letter through registered
mail but unfortunately, he could not locate the registry receipt issued for the letter.
Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be discharged from the case and endorsed the
Notice of Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the Court. Unfortunately, PO3 Joaquin
did not do so, as he was keenly aware that it would be difficult to find a new counsel who would be as
equally accommodating as respondent. Respondent suggests this might have been the reason for the
several calls complainants made to his office.
The case was assigned to Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner
Villadolid) who sent notices of hearing to the parties but of the three complainants, only complainant
Carlos Joaquin appeared. Thus, in the mandatory conference held, the other two complainants were
declared as having waived their rights to further participate in the IBP proceedings.8
10
On 12 November 2005, the Board of Directors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve
Commissioner Villadolid's recommendation to find respondent guilty and specifically to recommend
his suspension for six (6) months as penalty.
The only issue to be resolved in the case at bar is, considering all the facts presented, whether
respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling G.R. No. 152621-23, which
eventually led to the ad cautelam petition's dismissal with finality.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds the suspension recommended by
the IBP proper.
At the onset, the Court takes notice that the ad cautelam petition was actually filed out of time. Though
respondent filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for
As to respondent's conduct in dealing with the accused and complainants, he definitely fell short of the
high standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the rights of his clients. As
aptly observed by Commissioner Villadolid, respondent had not been quite candid in his dealings with
the accused or complainants. The Court notes that though respondent represented to the accused that he
had changed his office address, still, from the examination of the pleadings 14 he filed, it can be gleaned
that all of the pleadings have the same mailing address as that known to complainants. Presumably, at
some point, respondent's office would have received the Court's Resolution dismissing the petition. Of
course, the prudent step to take in that situation was to at least inform the client of the adverse
resolution since they had constantly called respondent's office to check the status of the case. Even
when he knew that complainants had been calling his office, he opted not to return their calls.
Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a lawyer who is
presumably steeped in court procedures and practices, should have filed the notice of withdrawal
himself instead of the accused. In not so doing, he was negligent in handling the case of the accused.
Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the Notice to Withdraw
and not the accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the accused and gave them instructions
on how to go about respondent's withdrawal from the case defies credulity. It should have been
respondent who undertook the appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of his representation.
He should not have relied on his client to do it for him if such was truly the case. Without the
presentation of the alleged registry receipt (or the return card, which confirms the receipt of the mail by
the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to PO3 Joaquin, the Court cannot lend credence to
respondent's naked claim, especially so that complainants have been resolute in their stand that they
did not hear from respondent after the latter had filed the ad cautelam petition. He could relieve
himself of his responsibility as counsel only first by securing the written conformity of the accused and
filing it with the court pursuant to Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court.15
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client
relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation
other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of
ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry
it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyer's right to
withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client's written consent or from
a good cause.16
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that the dismissal of the ad cautelam petition was primarily
due to the gross negligence of respondent.
Respondent has time and again stated that he did all the endeavors he enumerated without adequate or
proper remuneration. However, complainants have sufficiently disputed such claim when they attached
in their position paper filed before the IBP a machine validated deposit slip in the amount
of P15,500.00 for the Metro Bank savings account of one Jaime Portugal with account number
7186509273.19 Respondent has neither admitted nor denied having claimed the deposited amount.
The Court also rejects respondent's claim that there was no formal engagement between the parties and
that he made all his efforts for the case without adequate and proper consideration. In the words of then
Justice Panganiban (presently Chief Justice) in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta: 20
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if
the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a
profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration.21
Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to defend, his obligation
embodied in the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility still remains unwavering.
The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should neither diminish nor cease just because of
his perceived insufficiency of remuneration.
Lastly, the Court does not appreciate the offensive appellation respondent called the shooting incident
that the accused was engaged in. He described the incident, thus: "the accused police officers who had
been convicted of [h]omicide for the 'salvage' of Froilan G. Cabiling and Jose M. Chua and [a]ttempted
[h]omicide of Mario C. Macato."23 Rule 14.0124 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly
directs lawyers not to discriminate clients as to their belief of the guilt of the latter. It is ironic that it is
the defense counsel that actually branded his own clients as being the culprits that "salvaged" the
victims. Though he might think of his clients as that, still it is unprofessional to be labeling an event as
such when even the Sandiganbayan had not done so.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) months.
A.C. No. 6174 November 16, 2011
LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO T. GALING, Respondent.
Complaint2 for disbarment filed by Lydia Castro-Justo against Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing.
Complainant Justo alleged that sometime in April 2003, she engaged the services of respondent Atty.
Galing in connection with dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor. After she paid his
professional fees, the respondent drafted and sent a letter to Ms. Koa demanding payment of the
checks.3Respondent advised complainant to wait for the lapse of the period indicated in the demand
letter before filing her complaint.
On 10 July 2003, complainant filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Koa for estafa and violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. 4
On 27 July 2003, she received a copy of a Motion for Consolidation5 filed by respondent for and on
behalf of Ms. Koa, the accused in the criminal cases, and the latters daughter Karen Torralba (Ms.
Torralba). Further, on 8 August 2003, respondent appeared as counsel for Ms. Koa before the
prosecutor of Manila.
Complainant submits that by representing conflicting interests, respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In his Comment,6 respondent denied the allegations against him. He admitted that he drafted a demand
letter for complainant but argued that it was made only in deference to their long standing friendship
and not by reason of a professional engagement as professed by complainant. He denied receiving any
professional fee for the services he rendered.
To bolster this claim, respondent pointed out that the complaint filed by complainant against Ms. Koa
for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was based not on the demand letter he drafted but on the
demand letter prepared by Atty. Manuel A. Ao.
Respondent contended that he is a close friend of the opposing parties in the criminal cases. He further
contended that complainant Justo and Ms. Koa are likewise long time friends, as in fact, they are
"comares" for more than 30 years since complainant is the godmother of Ms. Torralba.7
He insisted that his actions were merely motivated by an intention to help the parties achieve an out of
court settlement and possible reconciliation. He reported that his efforts proved fruitful insofar as he
had caused Ms. Koa to pay complainant the amount of P50,000.00 in settlement of one of the two
checks subject of I.S. No. 03G-19484-86.
Respondent averred that the failure of Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba to make good the other checks caused
a lot of consternation on the part of complainant. This allegedly led her to vent her ire on respondent
and file the instant administrative case for conflict of interest.
In a resolution dated 19 October 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved with
modification the findings of its Investigating Commissioner. They found respondent guilty of violating
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by representing conflicting interests
and for his daring audacity and for the pronounced malignancy of his act. It was recommended that he
be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.8
We agree with the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,9 as adopted by the
Board of Governors of the IBP.
It was established that in April 2003, respondent was approached by complainant regarding the
dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor Koa.
It was also established that on 25 July 2003, a Motion for Consolidation was filed by respondent in I.S.
No. 03G-19484-86 entitled "Lydia Justo vs. Arlene Koa" and I.S. No. 03G-19582-84 entitled "Lani C.
Justo vs. Karen Torralba". Respondent stated that the movants in these cases are mother and daughter
while complainants are likewise mother and daughter and that these cases arose out from the same
transaction. Thus, movants and complainants will be adducing the same sets of evidence and witnesses.
Respondent argued that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and complainant because
there was no professional fee paid for the services he rendered.
We are not persuaded. A lawyer-client relationship can exist notwithstanding the close friendship
between complainant and respondent. The relationship was established the moment complainant
sought legal advice from respondent regarding the dishonored checks. By drafting the demand letter
respondent further affirmed such relationship. The fact that the demand letter was not utilized in the
criminal complaint filed and that respondent was not eventually engaged by complainant to represent SO ORDERED.
her in the criminal cases is of no moment. As observed by the Investigating Commissioner, by
referring to complainant Justo as "my client" in the demand letter sent to the defaulting debtor 10,
respondent admitted the existence of the lawyer-client relationship. Such admission effectively
estopped him from claiming otherwise.

Likewise, the non-payment of professional fee will not exculpate respondent from liability. Absence of
monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from complying with the prohibition against pursuing
cases with conflicting interests. The prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-client
relationship is established and extends beyond the duration of the professional relationship. 11 We held
in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta12 that it is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised or charged;
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service ERLINDA ABRAGAN, MILA GINA JAVIER, REYNALDO MERCADO, PATERNO TORRES,
had been sought.13 BENIGNA ANTIBO, ELEISER SALVADOR, EDNA SAPON, JULIANA CUENCA,
ESPERANZA BUENAFE, VICENTE BARNAGA, MARTHA SAPON, JOSEFINA OPEA,
Under Rule 15.03, Respondent was therefore bound to refrain from representing parties with PUREZA WABE, RONULFO LOPEZ, DOMINADOR HERNANDEZ, FELIPA EMBATE,
conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing so, without showing any proof that he had obtained the ROQUE CATIIL, JERRY SAPON, CONCEPCION MATANOG, and PABLO
written consent of the conflicting parties, respondent should be sanctioned. SALOMON, complainants, vs. Atty. MAXIMO G. RODRIGUEZ, respondent.

The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of public policy and
good taste.14 In the course of the lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns of the facts connected
with the clients case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of the relationship
is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.15
It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 16
Lawyers violate their oath of office when they represent conflicting interests. They taint not only their
own professional practice, but the entire legal profession itself.
A petition for the disbarment of Atty. Maximo G. Rodriguez because of alleged illegal and unethical
acts. The Petition relevantly reads as follows:
The petitioners hired the services of the respondent and the latter, represented the former in the case for
Forcible Entry with Petition for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages

The excuse proffered by respondent that it was not him but Atty. Ao who was eventually engaged by 3. That after the Case was finally won, and a Writ of Execution was issued by the Honorable Municipal
complainant will not exonerate him from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Trial Court in Cities of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 3, the same respondent lawyer represented the
Responsibility. The take- over of a clients cause of action by another lawyer does not give the former petitioners herein;
lawyer the right to represent the opposing party. It is not only malpractice but also constitutes a
4. That when respondent counsel surreptitiously selling some rights to other persons without the
violation of the confidence resulting from the attorney-client relationship.
consent of the petitioners herein, they decided to sever their client-lawyer relationship;
Considering that this is respondents first infraction, the disbarment sought in the complaint is deemed
6. That petitioners filed an indirect contempt charge under Civil Case No. 11204 against Sheriff
to be too severe. As recommended by the Board of Governors of the IBP, the suspension from the
Fernando Loncion et al., on August 2, 1991 engaging the services of Atty. LORETO O. SALVA, SR.,
practice of law for one (1) year is warranted.
an alleged former student of law of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez, 1
Accordingly, the Court resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing from the practice of law for one
7. The respondent lawyer REPRESENTED and actively took up the defense of FERNANDO
(1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe
LONCION
penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is
directed to append a copy of this Decision to respondents record as member of the Bar.
8. That the records will bear the petitioners out that their counsel, Atty. SALVA SR. later on withdrew
the case of Indirect Contempt upon the suggestion of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez; and instead, filed the
Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution;
9.The respondent, without consulting the herein Petitioners, filed in behalf of the plaintiffs (which
include the herein Petitioners) in Civil Case No. 11204, a Motion to Withdraw Plaintiffs Exhibits,
This Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, but hold that the
penalty should be six-month suspension as recommended by the investigating commissioner.
Administrative Liability of Respondent

10. That the illegal and unethical actions of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez are most obnoxious,
condemnable, and highly immoral, to say the least,
11. That the records of Civil Case No. 11204 which are voluminous will bear the petitioners allegations
against the herein respondent, who, after representing them initially, then transferring allegiance and
services to the adverse parties (Lonchion, Palacio and NHA Manager), came back to represent the
herein petitioners without any regard [for] the rules of law and the Canons of Professional Ethics,
which is highly contemptible and a clear violation of his oath as a lawyer and an officer of the courts of
law;
14.respondent Atty. Rodriguez eventually fenced an area consisting of about 10, 200 square meters the
subject matter in Civil Case No. 11204 without the consent of the herein petitioners. He even openly
and publicly proclaimed his possession and ownership thereof, which fact is again and also under NBI
investigation;
15. That all the foregoing acts of respondent lawyer plus his continuing and ongoing illegal and
unethical maneuvers have deprived the herein petitioners of their vested rights to possess and
eventually own the land they have for decades possessed, and declared as such by final judgment in
In his Comment,[2] respondent flatly denied the accusations of petitioners. He explained that the
withdrawal of the exhibits, having been approved by the trial court, was not illegal, obnoxious,
undesirable and highly immoral. He added that he took over the 8,000 square meters of land only after
it had been given to him as attorneys fees.
The respondent falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers. They
are expected to uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times. The trust and confidence clients
repose in them require a high standard and appreciation of the latters duty to the former, the legal
profession, the courts and the public. Indeed, the bar must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency
as well as of honesty and fair dealings. To this end, lawyers should refrain from doing anything that
might tend to lessen the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their
profession.[7]
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or
confidence forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters
adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.
[9]
(Italics in the original)
Because of his divided allegiance, respondent has eroded, rather than enhanced, the public perception
of the legal profession. His divided loyalty constitutes malpractice for which he may be suspended,
following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
WHEREFORE, Maximo G. Rodriguez is found guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDEDfor six (6) months from the practice
of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.

Thereafter, petitioners filed a Reply[4] in which they reiterated their allegations against respondent and
added that the latter likewise violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and/or decision.
[5]

From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that respondent represented conflicting interest considering that
the complainants were the same plaintiffs in both cases and were duly specified in the pleadings
particularly in the caption of the cases.

It is very unfortunate that in his desire to render service to his client, respondent overlooked the fact
that he already violated Rule 15.03 of [C]anon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,

LETICIA GONZALES, A.C. No. 6836
Complainant,
ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA,
Respondent. January 23, 2006
Before this Court is a complaint filed by Leticia Gonzales (Gonzales) praying that Atty. Marcelino
Cabucana, (respondent) be disbarred for representing conflicting interests.
Gonzales alleged that she was the complainant in a case for sum of money and damages where Atty.
Edmar Cabucana handling the case
A decision was rendered in the civil case ordering the losing party to pay Gonzales the amount
of P17,310.00 with interest and P6,000.00 as attorneys fees;
Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed to fully implement the writ of execution issued in connection with the
judgment which prompted Gonzales to file a complaint against the said sheriff with this Court;
in September 2003, Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife went to the house of Gonzales; they harassed
Gonzales and asked her to execute an affidavit of desistance regarding her complaint before this Court;
Gonzales thereafter filed against the Gatchecos criminal cases for trespass, grave threats, grave oral
defamation, simple coercion and unjust vexation;
notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Case No. 1-567, where respondents law firm was still
representing Gonzales, herein respondent represented the Gatchecos in the cases filed by Gonzales
against the said spouses;
respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law since respondents acceptance of the cases of
the Gatchecos violates the lawyer-client relationship between complainant and respondents law firm
and renders respondent liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility
respondent averred: He never appeared and represented complainant in Civil Case since it was his
brother, Atty. Edmar Cabucana who appeared and represented Gonzales in said case. He admitted that
he is representing Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife in the cases filed against them but claimed that his
appearance is pro bono and that the spouses pleaded with him as no other counsel was willing to take
their case. He entered his appearance in good faith and opted to represent the spouses rather than leave
them defenseless.
When the Gatchecos asked for his assistance, the spouses said that the cases filed against them by
Gonzales were merely instigated by a high ranking official who wanted to get even with them for their
refusal to testify in favor of the said official in another case.
respondent has his own agenda in offering his services to the spouses and she filed the said cases out of
her own free will not because of high officials
Complainant filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions and added that respondent prepared
and notarized counter-affidavits of the Gatcheco spouses; that the high-ranking official referred to by
respondent is Judge Ruben Plata and the accusations of respondent against the said judge is an attack
against a brother in the profession which is a violation of the CPR; and that respondent continues to
use the name of De Guzman in their law firm despite the fact that said partner has already been
appointed as Assistant Prosecutor of Santiago City, again in violation of the CPR.[13]
Respondent filed his Position Paper restating his allegations in his Answer.[14]
On On the said date, only respondent appeared[16] presenting a sworn affidavit executed by Gonzales
withdrawing her complaint against respondent. It reads:
Commissioner Reyes issued an Order dated October 28, 2004 requiring Gonzales to appear before him
on November 25, 2004, to affirm her statements and to be subject to clarificatory questioning.
[18]
However, none of the parties appeared.[19] On February 17, 2005, only respondent was present.
Commissioner Reyes then considered the case as submitted for resolution.[20]
Atty. Cabucana is reminded to be more careful in the acceptance of cases as conflict of interests might
Before going to the merits, let it be clarified that contrary to the report of Commissioner Reyes,
respondent did not only represent the Gatcheco spouses in the administrative case filed by Gonzales
against them. As respondent himself narrated in his Position Paper, he likewise acted as their counsel in
the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against them.[23]
With that settled, we find respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:
It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.[24] Such prohibition is founded on
principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.[25] Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the clients
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants
be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.[26]

The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests in this case, as the civil case handled by
their law firm where Gonzales is the complainant and the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against the A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
Gatcheco spouses are not related, has no merit. The representation of opposing clients in said cases,
though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion of double- RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,
dealing which this Court cannot allow.[30] vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with honest intention will also not exculpate
him as such claim does not render the prohibition inoperative.[33] This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while
.[34] Granting also that there really was no other lawyer who could handle the spouses case other than working as government prosecutor.
him, still he should have observed the requirements laid down by the rules by conferring with the
prospective client to ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with The Facts
another client then seek the written consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts.[35] These
Ruthie Lim-Santiago is the daughter former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2
respondent failed to do thus exposing himself to the charge of double-dealing.
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
We shall consider however as mitigating circumstances the fact that he is representing the Gatcheco
Taggat Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao,
spouses pro bono and that it was his firm and not respondent personally, which handled the civil case
Cagayan in 1992. 4
of Gonzales.
Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber
Thus, for violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and taking into
concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered it
consideration the aforementioned mitigating circumstances, we impose the penalty of fine
sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in 1997. 6
of P2,000.00.
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint
SO ORDERED.
alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the death of her
father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July
1997. 8
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary
investigation. 9 He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651
Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines. 13
Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being
the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very
well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed
by Taggat employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the
cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the
complaint. 15
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while
working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent
received money as retainers fee
Respondent refutes complainants allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by
the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation. 19
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat
for more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to
Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary
investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when he
performed his duty. 23
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat
employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor.
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer
fees from complainant but claims that it was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in
1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were paid for his consultancy services and not for
representation. Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as representation and that
rendering consultancy services is not prohibited. 31
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240.
Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. While
the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities in that
case are very much familiar with Respondent.
A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the
duty to "maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will
injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him"
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any
interest except justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a
former client with respect to matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case,
matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as
Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor
Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-
related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is,
I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.
While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S.
No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the very
personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while
being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are
prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda,
1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a
legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are
characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former
clients interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a
government prosecutor. 40
The Ruling of the Court
The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent
committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct."
Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage
in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions." 47

Complainants evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting
interests

In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One
test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client
any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. 49 In essence,
what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from
doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented
him. 50

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary A.C. No. 167 March 9, 1999
investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal
ATTY. PRUDENCIO S. PENTICOSTES, complainant,
complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly,
vs.
respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in
PROSECUTOR DIOSDADO S. IBAEZ, respondent.
1992.
Sometime in 1989, Encarnacion Pascual, the sister-in-law of Atty. Prudencio S. Penticostes (herein
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus,
complainant) was sued for non-remittance of SSS payments.
respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
The complaint assigned to Prosecutor Diosdado S. Ibaez for preliminary investigation. In the course
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01,
of the investigation, Encarnacion Pascual gave P1,804.00 to respondent as payment of her Social
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty.
Security System (SSS) contributions in arrears. Respondent, however, did not remit the amount to the
Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
system. The fact of non-payment was certified to by the SSS on October 2, 1989.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents
On November 16, 1990, complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac a complaint for
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
professional misconduct against Ibaez due to the latter's failure to remit the SSS contributions of his
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
sister-in-law. The complaint alleged that respondent's misappropriation of Encarnacion Pascual's SSS
SO ORDERED. contributions amounted to a violation of his oath as a lawyer. Seven days later, respondent paid
P1,804.00 to the SSS on behalf of Encarnacion Pascual.

In his defense, respondent claimed that his act of accommodating Encarnacion Pascual's request to
make payments to the SSS did not amount to professional misconduct but was rather an act of
Christian charity. Furthermore, he claimed that the action was moot and academic, the amount of
P1,804.00 having already been paid by him to the SSS. Lastly, he disclaimed liability on the ground
that the acts complained of were not done by him in his capacity as a practicing lawyer but on account
of his office as a prosecutor.
This Court finds respondent guilty of professional misconduct. While there is no doubt that payment of
the contested amount had been effected to the SSS on November 23, 1990, it is clear, however, that the
same was made only after a complaint had been filed against respondent. Furthermore, the duties of a
provincial prosecutor do not include receiving money from persons with official transactions with his
office.

It is glaringly clear that respondent's non-remittance for over one year of the funds coming from
Encarnacion Pascual constitutes conduct in gross violation of the Canon 1. The belated payment of the
same to the SSS does not excuse his misconduct. While Pascual may not strictly be considered a client
of respondent, the rules relating to a lawyer's handling of funds of a client is applicable. In Daroy v.
Legaspi, 1 this court held that "(t)he relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in
nature... [thus] lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on
behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct." The failure of
respondent to immediately remit the amount to the SSS gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use. This is a gross violation of general morality as well as professional A.C. No. 7021 February 21, 2007
ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. 2
MELVIN D. SMALL, Complainant,
Respondent's claim that he may not be held liable because he committed such acts, not in his capacity vs.
as a private lawyer, but as a prosecutor is unavailing. Canon 6 of the Code of Professional ATTY. JERRY BANARES, Respondent.
Responsibility provides:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Melvin D. Small (complainant) against Atty. Jerry
These canons shall apply to lawyers in government services in the discharge of their official tasks. Banares1 (respondent) for failure to render legal services and to return the money received for his legal
services.
As stated by the IBP Committee that drafted the Code, "a lawyer does not shed his professional
obligations upon assuming public office. In fact, his public office should make him more sensitive to On 30 August 2001, complainant engaged the services of respondent and paid respondent P20,000 as
his professional obligations because a lawyer's disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in acceptance fee.2
the public's eye. 3 Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a
responsible public office. 4 On 4 September 2001, complainant gave respondent P60,000 as filing fees.3Respondent then wrote a
demand letter for Amar and talked to Amar on the phone. Respondent also informed complainant that
ACCORDINGLY, this Court REPRIMANDS respondent with a STERN WARNING that the he would be preparing the documents for the cases. Complainant consistently communicated with
commission of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely in the future. respondent regarding the status of the cases. But respondent repeatedly told complainant to wait as
respondent was still preparing the documents.

On 5 January 2002, complainant required respondent to present all the documents respondent had
prepared for the cases against Amar. Respondent was not able to present any document. This prompted
complainant to demand for a full refund of the fees he had paid respondent.4 Complainant even hired
the services of Atty. Rizalino Simbillo to recover the money from respondent. But respondent failed to
return the money.

The Courts Ruling

We sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

The Code provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. 9 The Code states
that a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the clients request for information.10
The records show that after receiving P80,000 respondent was never heard from again. Respondent
failed to give complainant an update on the status of the cases. Moreover, it appears that respondent
failed to file the appropriate cases against Amar. Respondents failure to communicate with
complainant was an unjustified denial of complainants right to be fully informed of the status of the
cases. When respondent agreed to be complainants counsel, respondent undertook to take all the
necessary steps to safeguard complainants interests.11 By his inaction, respondent disregarded his
duties as a lawyer.
The Code also mandates that every lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys of his client that may come
into his possession.12 Furthermore, a lawyer shall account for all money received from the client and
shall deliver the funds of the client upon demand.13
In Meneses v. Macalino,14 the Court ruled that:
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render
an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently,
if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the
money to the client.15
Respondent specifically received P80,000 for his legal services and the filing fees for the cases against
Amar. Since respondent failed to render any legal service to complainant and he failed to file a case
against Amar, respondent should have promptly accounted for and returned the money to complainant.
But even after demand, respondent did not return the money. Respondents failure to return the money
to complainant upon demand is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of
integrity.16
Moreover, respondents misconduct is aggravated by his failure to file an answer to the complaint and
his refusal to appear at the mandatory conference. The IBP rescheduled the mandatory conference
twice to give respondent a chance to answer the complaint. Still, respondent failed to appear, exhibiting
his lack of respect for the IBP and its proceedings.17
The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary, requiring utmost good faith, loyalty, and fidelity
on the part of the attorney. In this case, respondent clearly fell short of the demands required of him as
a member of the Bar.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Jerry Banares GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and 18 and
Rules 16.01, 16.03, and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for two years effective upon finality of this
Decision. We ORDER respondent to RETURN, within 30 days from notice of this decision,
complainants P80,000, with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of this decision
until full payment. We DIRECT respondent to submit to the Court proof of payment within fifteen
days from payment of the full amount.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents
personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.