Sayo vs.
Chief of Police revealed that he left it at the house of his
Detainee (D) vs. Arresting Authorities (P)
GR L-2128, , May 12, 1948 (80 Phil. 859)
Summary: Two suspects of a robbery were arrested upon a
complaint of another person.
Rule of Law: Under the constitution, no person may be
deprived of his liberty except by warrant of arrest or
commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after
examination of the complainant and his witness.
Facts: Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging
Melencio Sayo (D) and Joaquin Mostero (D) with having
committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a
policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the Sayo (D) and
Mostero (D), and presented a complaint against them with the
fiscal's office of Manila. When the petition for habeas
corpus was heard, the Sayo (D) and Mostero (D) were still
detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet
released or filed charges against them with the proper courts
justice.
Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid?
Ruling: No. Under the constitution, no person may be
deprived of his liberty except by warrant of arrest or
commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after
examination of the complainant and his witness.
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person
without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party or any
other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by
law. What he or the complainant may do in such case is to file
a complaint with the city fiscal or directly with the justice of
the peace courts in municipalities and other political
subdivisions. A fortiori a police officer has no authority to
arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon
complaint of the offended party or other persons even though,
after investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged.
People v. Doria
People v. Florencio Doria [ Jun ] and Violeta
Gaddao [ Neneth ]
22 Jan 1999 / Puno / Appeal from a Pasig RTC decision
Search and seizure > Nature, scope and definition > Types >
Warrantless search and seizure > Plain view doctrine
FACTS
Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received
information that one Jun [Doria] was engaged in illegal
drug activities, so they decided to entrap and arrest him in a
buy-bust operation. He was arrested. They frisked him but did
not find the marked bills on him, and upon inquiry, he
associate Neneth [Gaddao], so he led the police team to her
house.
The team found the door open and a woman inside the
house. Jun identified her as Neneth, and she was asked
by SPO1 Badua about the marked money as PO3 Manlangit
looked over her house [he was still outside the house].
Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box
under the dining table. One of the box s flaps was open, and
inside it was something wrapped in plastic, and it appeared
similar to the marijuana earlier sold to him by Jun. His
suspicion aroused, so he entered the house and took hold of
the box. He peeked inside the box and saw 10 bricks of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. SPO1 Badua recovered
the marked bills from Neneth and they arrested her. The
bricks were examined and they were found to be dried
marijuana leaves.
Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with
violation of RA 6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972], Section
4 [Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs] in relation to Section 21
[Attempt and Conspiracy]. RTC convicted them.
ISSUE AND HOLDING
WON RTC correctly found that the box of marijuana was in
plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid. NO
RATIO
Re: warrantless arrest
Gaddao s warrantless arrest was illegal because she was
arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made
by Doria. Doria did not point to her as his associate in the drug
business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills.
This identification does not necessarily mean that Gaddao
conspired with Doria in pushing drugs. If there is no showing
that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had
knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the
perpetration of the criminal offense, the arrest is legally
objectionable.
Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the
search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of
the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an
incident to her arrest.
Plain view issue
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even
without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.
Requisites
1. The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence
has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area
2. The discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent
3. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item
he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure
An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed
to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a
closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed
package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore
cannot be seized without a warrant. If the package is such that
an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it
contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in
plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that
 the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure
that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself
checked and marked the said contents. On cross-examination,
however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to
be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the
buy-bust marijuana. Each of the ten bricks of marijuana in
the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed
inside plastic bags white, pink or blue in color. PO3
Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the
contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. He
did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to
ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. It was not
immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the
box was marijuana; hence, it was not in plain view and its
seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of
the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of the poisonous tree
and should have been excluded and never considered by the
trial court.
The fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana
was found in Gaddao s house Gaddao does not justify a
finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is
material is the submission of proof that the sale took place
between the poseur-buyer and the seller and the presentation
of the drug as evidence in court.
Prosecution established the fact that in consideration
of the P1,600.00 he received, Doria sold and delivered 970
grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer
Prosecution failed to prove that Gaddao conspired
with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug
DORIA SENTENCED TO SUFFER RECLUSION
PERPETUA + 500K FINE
GADDAO ACQUITTED
Wednesday, April 9, 2014
Case of People of the Philippines vs. Elias Lovedioro y Castro
G.R.No. 112235 29November1995 (People vs. Lovedioro 250
SCRA 389)
Case of People of the Philippines vs. Elias Lovedioro y
Castro
G.R.No. 112235 29November1995 (People vs. Lovedioro
250 SCRA 389)
Rebellion -- Art.134 of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Elias Lovedioro with 3 other companions fatally shot SPO3
Jesus Lucilo while Lucilo was walking along Burgos St. away
from Daraga, Albay Public Market. The victim died on the
same day from massive blood loss. On November 6, 1992,
Elias Lovedioro was then charged of the crime of murder, and
subsequently found guilty. Lovedioro then appealed the
decision, contesting the verdict of murder instead of rebellion.
It was confirmed by the prosecutions principal witness that
Lovedioro was a member of the New Peoples Army.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Was the RTC correct in holding Lovedioro liable for the crime
of murder, instead of rebellion?
- Yes. Because, overt acts and purpose are essential
components of the crime of rebellion, with either of these
elements wanting, the crime of rebellion does not exist.
- Political motive should be established before a person
charged with a common crime- alleging rebellion in order to
lessen the possible imposable penalty- could benefit from the
laws relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. If no
political motive is established or proved, the accused should
be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion.
- In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere
membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of
rebellion would not, by and of itself suffice.
- The killing of the victim, as observed by the Solicitor
General, offered no contribution to the achievement of the
NPAs subversive aims, in fact, there were no known acts of
the victims that can be considered as offending to the NPA.
- Evidence shows that Lovedioros allegation of membership
to the N.P.A was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty
imposable upon him.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's
decision dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of
Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto
People vs Hernandez
People vs Hernandez
G.R. No. L-6025
May 30, 1964
Facts:
This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the
judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding, in its Criminal Case No.
15841, People vs. Amado V. Hernandez, et al., and Criminal
Case No. 15479, People vs. Bayani Espiritu, et al. In Criminal
Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for Rebellion
with Multiple Murder, Arsons and Robberies. The appellants
are Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz,
Amado Racanday, Fermin Rodillas and Julian Lumanog;
Aquilino Bunsol, Adriano Samson and Andres Baisa, Jr. were
among those sentenced in the judgment appealed from, but
they have withdrawn their appeal. In Criminal Case No. 15479
(G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for rebellion with murders,
arsons and kidnappings. The accused are Bayani Espiritu
Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.; they all appealed but
Andres Balsa, Jr. withdrew his appeal.
A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the court
rendered the decision subject of the present appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants-appelants are liable for the
crime of conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or
insurrection under Art. 136 of the RPC?
Held:
The court found defendants-appellants Hernandez, member of
the Communist Party of the Philippines, President of the
Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), had close
connections with the Secretariat of the Communist Party and
held continuous communications with its leaders and its
members, and others, guilty as principal of the crime charged
against him and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with the accessories provided by law, and
to pay the proportionate amount of the costs.
In the testimonies shown in court, it further appears that Taruc
and other CPP leaders used to send notes to appellant
Hernandez, who in turn issued press releases for which he
found space in the local papers. His acts in this respect belong
to the category of propaganda, to which he appears to have
limited his actions as a Communist.
However, in their appeal, defendants-appellants Amado V.
Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Amado Racanday and Genaro de la
Cruz are absolved from the charges contained in the
information, with their proportionate share of the costs de
oficio.
But other defendants-appellants, namely, Julian Lumanog and
Fermin Rodillas, Bayani Espiritu and Teopista Valerio were
found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, as
defined and punished in Article 136 of the Revised Penal
Code, and each and everyone of them is hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment for five years, four months and twenty-
one days of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of
P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay their proportional share of the costs.
Advocacy of Communism put into Action
The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and
principle is not to be considered as a criminal act of
conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy
of action. In the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a
theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist
advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual
agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an agreement
forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the working
class to overthrow constituted authority and seize the reins of
Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or
intended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist,
merely holding belief in the supremacy of the proletariat a
Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of
Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet
actually considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to
punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action and
actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of
conspiracy to commit rebellion.
Legal considerations on the Appeal of the defendant-
appellants
All the other defendants were found guilty as accomplices in
the crime of rebellion as charged in the information and were
each sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and one day of
prision mayor, with the accessories provided by law, and to
pay their proportionate share of the costs.
Legal Considerations Before proceeding to consider the
appeals of the other defendants, it is believed useful if not
necessary to lay dawn the circumstances or facts that may be
determinative of their criminal responsibility or the existence
or nature thereof. To begin with, as We have exhaustively
discussed in relation to the appeal of Hernandez, we do not
believe that mere membership in the Communist Party or in
the CLO renders the member liable, either of rebellion or of
conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere membership
and nothing more merely implies advocacy of abstract theory
or principle without any action being induced thereby; and that
such advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with
action or advocacy of action, namely, actual rebellion or
conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto or
evincing the same. On the other hand, membership in the
HMB (Hukbalahap) implies participation in an actual uprising
or rebellion to secure, as the Huks pretend, the liberation of
the peasants and laboring class from thraldom. By
membership in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and
the use of force, and by such membership he agrees or
conspires that force be used to secure the ends of the party.
Such membership, therefore, even if there is nothing more,
renders the member guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion
punishable by law.
Juan Ponce Enrile vs Jaime Salazar
November 6, 2010
186 SCRA 217 Political Law Separation of Powers SC
Cannot Change Law
Statutory Construction The Court Can Only Interpret Laws
Criminal Law Complex Crimes Compound Crimes
Rebellion Absorbs Common Crimes
Remedial Law Criminal Procedure Bail; When available
Constitutional Law Warrant of Arrest Judge Should
Personally Determine Probable Cause
In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for
the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder. The warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Jaime
Salazar. Said crime arose from the failed coup attempts against
then president Corazon Aquino. There was no bail set for
Enrile due to the seriousness of the crime charged against him.
Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed a
petition for habeas corpus questioning his detention and
alleging that the crime being charged against him is
nonexistent. He insists that there is no such crime as rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Enrile
invoked the ruling in the landmark case of People vs
Hernandez where it was ruled that rebellion cannot be
complexed with common crimes such as murder; as such, the
proper crime that should have been charged against him
is simple rebellion which is bailable.
Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the
warrant of arrest against him. He claimed that it only took
Judge Salazar one hour and twenty minutes (from the raffling
of the case to him) to issue the warrant. Enrile claimed that
such period is so short that it was impossible for the judge to
have been able to examine the voluminous record of the case
from the prosecutions office that being, the constitutional
provision that a judge may only issue a warrant of arrest after
personally determining the existence of probable cause has not
been complied with.
For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that
the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned and that it should
be ruled that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes like
murder.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned.
2. Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined
probable cause in the case at bar.
HELD:
1. No, the said case is still good law. The Supreme Court also
noted that there was actually a previous law (P.D. 942) which
sought to abandon the Hernandez doctrine. The said law
provided that graver crimes may not be complexed with
rebellion. However, President Corazon Aquino repealed said
law (by virtue of the power granted to her by the 1986
Freedom Constitution). That being, the Hernandez doctrine,
which reflects the rebellion law under the Revised Penal Code,
still stands. The courts cannot change this because courts can
only interpret laws. Only Congress can change the rebellion
law (which the SC suggested in order to strengthen the
rebellion law). But as it stands, Enrile is correct, there is no
such crime as rebellion with murder. Common crimes such as
murder are absorbed. He can only be charged with rebellion
which is bailable.
2. Yes. There is nothing irregular on the fact that Judge Salazar
only took an hour and twenty minutes to issue the warrant
from the time the case was raffled to him despite the fact that
the prosecution transmitted quite a voluminous record from
the preliminary investigation it conducted. It is sufficient
that the judge follows established procedure by personally
evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the prosecutor. Just because Judge Salazar had what some
might consider only a relatively brief period within which to
comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had
not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single
circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.
People vs Umali
People vs Umali
G.R. No. L-5803
November 29, 1954
Facts:
The complex crime of which appellants Narciso Umali, et. al
were found guilty was said to have been committed during the
raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and
9:00 in the evening of November 14, 1951, by armed men.
The raid took place resulting in the burning down and
complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan
including its content valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin
Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the
death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente
Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of
Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians.
During and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders
engaged in looting, robbing one house and two Chinese stores;
and that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the
town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led
by Captain Alzate.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellants are liable of the charges
against them of complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery?
Held:
Yes. The appellants were guilty of sedition, multiple murder,
arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries. For the crime of
sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of
prision correctional and to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the
three murders, each of the appellants is sentenced to life
imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the
sum of P6,000; and for the arson, for which we impose the
maximum penalty provided in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the
Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the raiders in setting
fire to the buildings, particularly the house of Punzalan they
knew that it was then occupied by one or more persons,
because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother of
Punzalan, at the window, and in view of the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, each of the appellants is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and to pay the indemnities mentioned in
the decision of the lower court. It shall be understood,
however, the pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code the duration of all penalties shall not
exceed 40 years. In view of the heavy penalties already
imposed and their long duration, the court finds it unnecessary
to fix and impose the prison sentences corresponding to
frustrated murder and physical injuries; however, the sums
awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia
and Lector), by the court below will stand. With these
modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs.
Primicias v Fugoso 80 PHIL 71 (1948)
Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal
of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public
meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the
government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his
defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable
ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon
the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing
groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be
delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the
people in their government, and in the duly constituted
authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a
disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the
delegated police power to local government. Stating as well
Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against
public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any
public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the
peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body
or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any
congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included
herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.
Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.
Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119,
said section provides for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of
the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to
grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful
assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and
other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the
Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or
specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to
prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of
the streets and public places by others, and to provide
adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder.
The court favored the second construction. First construction
tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the
streets. Under our democratic system of government no such
unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the
government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency.
The Mayors first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury
cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly.
It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of
irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there
must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result
if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must
be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is
a serious one. The fact that speech is likely to result in some
violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify
its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury
to the state.