CHAVEZ v.
PEA terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and
Facts: On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim
land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve,
acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then
President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the
"lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special
Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so
reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand
eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April
9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering
the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the
southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City.
PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public
bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No.
1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos,
through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate
Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions
of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI
under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not
classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2)
the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the
JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential
Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on
the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The
members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel, and the Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal
Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached
by the Senate Committees.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a
taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner
contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of
the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the
Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President,
petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the
renegotiated contract be declared null and void."
Issues: The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as follows:
1. Whether the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because of
subsequent events;
2. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to observe the
principle of governing the heirarchy of courts;
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies;
4. Whether petitioner has locus standi;
5. Whether the constitutional right to information includes information on
on-going neogtiations BEFORE a final agreement;
6. Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the
transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate
the 1987 Constitution; and
7. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether the amended
JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government
Held: 1. We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI
and its approval by the President cannot operate to moot the petition and
divest the Court of its jurisdiction.
PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to
enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily
includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have
signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in
assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of the Section 3, Article XII
of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating lands of
the public domain to private corporations. The Amended JVA is not an ordinary
commercial contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to
367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a
single private corporation.
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression being a wholly
government owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary
functions. All previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution,
covered agricultural lands sold to private corporations which acquired the lands
from private parties.
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised
in this petition because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of
title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA,
PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate
share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses, The Amended JVA
even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise
financing for the reclamation project.
2. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental
importance to the public. The Court can resolve this case without determining
any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for
mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section
5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction
over the instant case.
3. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms
and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA make this public
disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to
make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA,
was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering
that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and
was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct
judicial intervention.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when
the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question. The principal
issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA
in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public
domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition
seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two
constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information
on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional
provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the
public domain among Filipino Citizens.
The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution,
compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
4. Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions
questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or
instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if
they 'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of the
people.'
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the
enforcement of constitutional rights to information and to the equitable
diffusion of natural resources matters of transcendental public importance,
the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
5. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public
interest reinforces the people's right to information on matters of public
concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the
Constitution, thus: Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest."
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986
Constitutional Commission understood that the right to information
"contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the
exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise
the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be
too late for the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the
contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even
illegal, becomes a fait accompli.
However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34
The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means
the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must
copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the
right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the
public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules
specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying.
6. Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion
as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads,
and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general
public use, is employed in some public service, or in the development of the
national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of
the territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals.
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the
public. In contrast, property devoted to public service referred to property used
for some specific public service and open only to those authorized to use the
property.Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to
public use, but also to property not so used but employed to develop the
national wealth. This class of property constituted property of public dominion
although employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the
national wealth.
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public
use or to the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the private
property of the State." This provision, however, was not self-executing. The
legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law, must declare the
property no longer needed for public use or territorial defense before the
government could lease or alienate the property to private parties.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither
timber nor mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes
or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than
agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be
disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their
inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the
government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to
private parties. The State always reserved these lands for some future public
service.
However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to
classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be leased and
not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution
banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private
corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As
in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to
private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the
public domain is still CA No. 141.
Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the
maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up
corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as
many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide
his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the
corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the
public domain.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special
patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation
classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed
Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of
the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the public
domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified
private parties. All other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are
"waters . . . owned by the State" forming part of the public domain, and are
inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of
areas under water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the
physical reclamation of areas under water whether directly or through private
contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On the
other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands
of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or
submerged areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the
mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA
does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for
PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and
administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525
declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA."
PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire,
administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands . . . owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government."
87 (Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA
to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain.
PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the
PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on
private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does
not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the
Government Auditing Code, the government is required to sell valuable
government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445
mandates that:... "In the event that the public auction fails, the property may
be sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same committee
or body concerned and approved by the Commission."
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the
Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also
granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA,
a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. The
failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares,
is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double
the area publicly auctioned.
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the
certificate of title the alienable land of the public domain automatically
becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with
Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the
public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the
public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to
government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands
can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will
become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or
patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of
public lands.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be
transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. This scheme can even be applied to alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can "acquire . . . any and all
kinds of lands."
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands,
now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of
the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may
not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.
7. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no
necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not the trier of facts,
and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and
Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED
from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby
declared NULL and VOID ab initio.