2016.8.1.CivPro Cases. Rule 3

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Baguio City
EN BANC
ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA, CONSORICIA G.R. No. 166620

O. PENSON, RADITO V. PADRIGANO,
JEAN R. DE MESA, LEAH P. DELA
CRUZ, ANDY V. MACASAQUIT,
SENEN B. CORDOBA, ALBERT
BRILLANTES, GLORIA BISDA,
JOVITA V. CONCEPCION, TERESITA
G. CARVAJAL, ROSANNA T.
MALIWANAG, RICHARD ODERON,
CECILIA ESTERNON, BENEDICTO
CABRAL, MA. VICTORIA E. LAROCO,
CESAR ANDRA, FELICISIMO
GALACIO, ELSA R. CALMA,
FILOMENA A. GALANG, JEAN PAUL
MELEGRITO, CLARO G. SANTIAGO,
JR., EDUARDO FRIAS, REYNALDO O.
ANDAL, NEPHTALIE IMPERIO, RUEL
BALAGTAS, VICTOR R. ORTIZ,
FRANCISCO P. REYES, JR., ELISEO
M. BALAGOT, JR., JOSE C.
MONSALVE, JR., ARTURO ADSUARA,
GMDPealosa III-G
Civil Procedure and Alternative Dispute Resolution
Rule 3 Cases (Full Text)
F.C. LADRERO, JR., NELSON PADUA,
MARCELA C. SAYAO, ANGELITO
MALAKAS, GLORIA RAMENTO,
JULIANA SUPLEO, MANUEL
MENDRIQUE, E. TAYLAN, CARMELA
BOBIS, DANILO VARGAS, ROY-LEO
C. PABLO, ALLAN VILLANUEVA,
VICENTE R. VELASCO, JR., IMELDA
ERENO, FLORIZA M. CATIIS, RANIEL
R. BASCO, E. JALIJALI, MARIO C.
CARAAN, DOLORES M. AVIADO,
MICHAEL P. LAPLANA, GUILLERMO
G. SORIANO, ALICE E. SOJO,
ARTHUR G. NARNE, LETICIA Present:
SORIANO, FEDERICO RAMOS, JR.,
PETERSON CAAMPUED, RODELIO L.
GOMEZ, ANTONIO D. GARCIA, JR., PUNO, C.J.,
ANTONIO GALO, A. SANCHEZ, SOL CARPIO,
E. TAMAYO, JOSEPHINE A.M. CORONA,
COCJIN, DAMIAN QUINTO, JR., CARPIO MORALES,
EDLYN MARIANO, M.A. MALANUM, VELASCO, JR.,
ALFREDO S. ESTRELLA, and JESUS NACHURA,
MEL SAYO, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
Petitioners, BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,*
VILLARAMA, JR.,
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity PEREZ, and
as Executive Secretary,THE MENDOZA, JJ.
GMDPealosa III-G
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINE INFORMATION
AGENCY and THE NATIONAL
TREASURER,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
April 20, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The present controversy arose from a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 378 dated October 25, 2004, issued by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (President Arroyo). Petitioners
GMDPealosa III-G
characterize their action as a class suit filed on their own behalf and on behalf of all their co-employees at the National
Printing Office (NPO).
The NPO was formed on July 25, 1987, during the term of former President Corazon C. Aquino (President
Aquino), by virtue of Executive Order No. 285[1]which provided, among others, the creation of the NPO from the merger of
the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA). Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 285 reads:
SECTION 6. Creation of the National Printing Office. There is hereby created a National Printing
Office out of the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the Philippine
Information Agency. The Office shall have exclusive printing jurisdiction over the following:
a. Printing, binding and distribution of all standard and accountable forms of national, provincial, city
and municipal governments, including government corporations;
b. Printing of officials ballots;
c. Printing of public documents such as the Official Gazette, General Appropriations Act,
Philippine Reports, and development information materials of the Philippine Information Agency.
The Office may also accept other government printing jobs, including government publications, aside
from those enumerated above, but not in an exclusive basis.
The details of the organization, powers, functions, authorities, and related management aspects of
the Office shall be provided in the implementing details which shall be prepared and promulgated in
accordance with Section II of this Executive Order.
GMDPealosa III-G
The Office shall be attached to the Philippine Information Agency.
On October 25, 2004, President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6
of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services
requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. The pertinent portions of Executive Order No. 378, in
turn, provide:
SECTION 1. The NPO shall continue to provide printing services to government agencies and
instrumentalities as mandated by law. However, it shall no longer enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over
the printing services requirements of the government over standard and accountable forms. It shall
have to compete with the private sector, except in the printing of election paraphernalia which could
be shared with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, upon the discretion of the Commission on Elections
consistent with the provisions of the Election Code of 1987.
SECTION 2. Government agencies/instrumentalities may source printing services outside NPO

provided that:
2.1 The printing services to be provided by the private sector is superior in quality and at a lower cost
than what is offered by the NPO; and
2.2 The private printing provider is flexible in terms of meeting the target completion time of the
government agency.
SECTION 3. In the exercise of its functions, the amount to be appropriated for the programs,
projects and activities of the NPO in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) shall be limited to its
income without additional financial support from the government. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)
GMDPealosa III-G
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their
printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the services offered by
the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order
No. 378 also limited NPOs appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income.
Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners
now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or
repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and
(2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of
the NPO.
We dismiss the petition.
Before proceeding to resolve the substantive issues, the Court must first delve into a procedural matter. Since
petitioners instituted this case as a class suit, the Court, thus, must first determine if the petition indeed qualifies as
one. In Board of Optometry v. Colet,[2] we held that [c]ourts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit,
which is the exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For while no difficulty may arise if the
decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those who were
deemed impleaded by their self-appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of due process.
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:
GMDPealosa III-G
Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest
to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court
finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may
sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his
individual interest.
From the foregoing definition, the requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of
common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can
fully protect the interests of all concerned.
In Mathay v. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company,[3] the Court held that:
An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether
the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading
initiating the class action should allege the existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the existence of a
subject matter of common interest, and the existence of a class and the number of persons in the alleged
class, in order that the court might be enabled to determine whether the members of the class are so
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, to contrast the number
appearing on the record with the number in the class and to determine whether claimants on record
adequately represent the class and the subject matter of general or common interest. (Emphases
ours.)
Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected by the assailed Executive
Order and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, who
pointed out that there were about 549 employees in the NPO.[4] The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction
GMDPealosa III-G
of the NPO employees whom they claimed to represent. Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners executed an Affidavit
of Desistance, while one signed a letter denying ever signing the petition,[5] ostensibly reducing the number of petitioners
to 34. We note that counsel for the petitioners challenged the validity of the desistance or withdrawal of some of the
petitioners and insinuated that such desistance was due to pressure from people close to the seat of power.[6]Still, even if
we were to disregard the affidavit of desistance filed by some of the petitioners, it is highly doubtful that a sufficient,
representative number of NPO employees have instituted this purported class suit. A perusal of the petition itself would
show that of the 67 petitioners who signed the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, only 20 petitioners were
in fact mentioned in the jurat as having duly subscribed the petition before the notary public. In other words, only 20
petitioners effectively instituted the present case.
Indeed, in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc.,[7] we observed that an
element of a class suit or representative suit is theadequacy of representation. In determining the question of fair and
adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest of the named party is
coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to
the total membership of the class; and (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest
of the class.
Previously, we held in Ibaes v. Roman Catholic Church[8] that where the interests of the plaintiffs and the other
members of the class they seek to represent are diametrically opposed, the class suit will not prosper.
It is worth mentioning that a Manifestation of Desistance,[9] to which the previously mentioned Affidavit of
Desistance[10] was attached, was filed by the President of the National Printing Office Workers Association
(NAPOWA). The said manifestation expressed NAPOWAs opposition to the filing of the instant petition in any court. Even
if we take into account the contention of petitioners counsel that the NAPOWA President had no legal standing to file
such manifestation, the said pleading is a clear indication that there is a divergence of opinions and views among the
GMDPealosa III-G
members of the class sought to be represented, and not all are in favor of filing the present suit. There is here an
apparent conflict between petitioners interests and those of the persons whom they claim to represent. Since it cannot be
said that petitioners sufficiently represent the interests of the entire class, the instant case cannot be properly treated as a
class suit.
As to the merits of the case, the petition raises two main grounds to assail the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 378:
First, it is contended that President Arroyo cannot amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 by the mere issuance
of another executive order (Executive Order No. 378). Petitioners maintain that former President Aquinos Executive Order
No. 285 is a legislative enactment, as the same was issued while President Aquino still had legislative powers under the
Freedom Constitution;[11] thus, only Congress through legislation can validly amend Executive Order No. 285.
Second, petitioners maintain that the issuance of Executive Order No. 378 would lead to the eventual abolition of
the NPO and would violate the security of tenure of NPO employees.
Anent the first ground raised in the petition, we find the same patently without merit.
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and
agencies in the executive department in line with the Presidents constitutionally granted power of control over executive
offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
GMDPealosa III-G
In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,[12] the Court pointed out that Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative
Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the
President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the said Code, is explicit:
Sec. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. The President, subject to
the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall
have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper,
including the immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the
Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from
other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the Presidentfrom
other Departments or agencies. (Emphases ours.)
Interpreting the foregoing provision, we held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, thus:
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or
agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the
power that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No.
292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), the President, subject to the policy in the
GMDPealosa III-G
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may
transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v.
Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization involves the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It
takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a
bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject
to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize.[13] (Emphasis ours.)
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times
has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine
Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President.[14]
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 quoted above authorizes the President
(a) to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the
President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the
Office of the President to any other Department or Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice versa.
Concomitant to such power to abolish, merge or consolidate offices in the Office of the President Proper and to
transfer functions/offices not only among the offices in the Office of President Proper but also the rest of the Office of the
President and the Executive Branch, the President implicitly has the power to effect less radical or less substantive
changes to the functional and internal structure of the Office of the President, including the modification of functions of
such executive agencies as the exigencies of the service may require.
GMDPealosa III-G
In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of its functions to be transferred
to another agency. Under the assailed Executive Order No. 378, the NPO remains the main printing arm of the
government for all kinds of government forms and publications but in the interest of greater economy and encouraging
efficiency and profitability, it must now compete with the private sector for certain government printing jobs, with the
exception of election paraphernalia which remains the exclusive responsibility of the NPO, together with the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, as the Commission on Elections may determine. At most, there was a mere alteration of the main
function of the NPO by limiting the exclusivity of its printing responsibility to election forms.[15]
There is a view that the reorganization actions that the President may take with respect to agencies in the Office of
the President are strictly limited to transfer of functions and offices as seemingly provided in Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
However, Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the same Code significantly provides:
Sec. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such
other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which
are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.
(Emphasis ours.)
Pursuant to Section 20, the power of the President to reorganize the Executive Branch under Section 31 includes
such powers and functions that may be provided for under other laws. To be sure, an inclusive and broad interpretation of
the Presidents power to reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported by specific provisions in general
appropriations laws.
GMDPealosa III-G
In the oft-cited Larin v. Executive Secretary,[16] the Court likewise adverted to certain provisions of Republic Act No.
7645, the general appropriations law for 1993, as among the statutory bases for the Presidents power to reorganize
executive agencies, to wit:
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:

Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Executive
Branch. The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed to
identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services
and which may be scaled down, phased out or abolished, subject to civil [service] rules and
regulations. x x x. Actual scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the activities shall be
effected pursuant to Circulars orOrders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President.
Said provision clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of offices only
and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating
and decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of Section 62, which provides that:
Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational changes. Unless otherwise created by law or
directed by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions
in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organization structures and
be funded from appropriations by this Act.
The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect
organizational changes including the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.
The contention of petitioner that the two provisions are riders deserves scant consideration. Well settled is
the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Unless and until a specific
provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for all intents and
purposes.[17] (Emphases ours)
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,[18] where the Court upheld as valid then President Joseph Estradas
Executive Order No. 191 deactivating the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) of the Department of
GMDPealosa III-G
Finance, hewed closely to the reasoning in Larin. The Court, among others, also traced from the General Appropriations
Act[19] the Presidents authority to effect organizational changes in the department or agency under the executive
structure, thus:
We adhere to the precedent or ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes the authority of the President to
effect organizational changes in the department or agency under the executive structure. Such a ruling further
finds support in Section 78 of Republic Act No. 8760. Under this law, the heads of departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies and other entities in the Executive Branch are directed (a) to conduct a comprehensive
review of their respective mandates, missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects, activities and
systems and procedures; (b) identify activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services
and which may be scaled down, phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will result in the
streamlined organization and improved overall performance of their respective agencies. Section 78
ends up with the mandate that the actual streamlining and productivity improvement in agency organization
and operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the
President. x x x.[20] (Emphasis ours)
Notably, in the present case, the 2003 General Appropriations Act, which was reenacted in 2004 (the year of the
issuance of Executive Order No. 378), likewise gave the President the authority to effect a wide variety of organizational
changes in any department or agency in the Executive Branch. Sections 77 and 78 of said Act provides:
Section 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the President
of the Philippines, no changes in key positions or organizational units in any department or agency shall
be authorized in their respective organizational structures and funded from appropriations provided by this
Act.
Section 78. Institutional Strengthening and Productivity Improvement in Agency Organization and
Operations and Implementation of Organization/Reorganization Mandated by Law. The Government shall
GMDPealosa III-G
adopt institutional strengthening and productivity improvement measures to improve service delivery
and enhance productivity in the government, as directed by the President of the Philippines. The heads of
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and other entities of the Executive Branch shall accordingly
conduct a comprehensive review of their respective mandates, missions, objectives, functions, programs,
projects, activities and systems and procedures; identify areas where improvements are necessary;
and implement corresponding structural, functional and operational adjustments that will result in
streamlined organization and operations and improved performance and productivity: PROVIDED,
That actual streamlining and productivity improvements in agency organization and operations, as
authorized by the President of the Philippines for the purpose, including the utilization of savings generated
from such activities, shall be in accordance with the rules and regulations to be issued by the DBM, upon
consultation with the Presidential Committee on Effective Governance: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in the
implementation of organizations/reorganizations, or specific changes in agency structure, functions
and operations as a result of institutional strengthening or as mandated by law, the appropriation,
including the functions, projects, purposes and activities of agencies concerned may be realigned
as may be necessary: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That any unexpended balances or savings in appropriations
may be made available for payment of retirement gratuities and separation benefits to affected personnel,
as authorized under existing laws. (Emphases and underscoring ours.)
Implicitly, the aforequoted provisions in the appropriations law recognize the power of the President to reorganize
even executive offices already funded by the said appropriations act, including the power to implement structural,
functional, and operational adjustments in the executive bureaucracy and, in so doing, modify or realign appropriations
of funds as may be necessary under such reorganization. Thus, insofar as petitioners protest the limitation of the NPOs
appropriations to its own income under Executive Order No. 378, the same is statutorily authorized by the above
provisions.
In the 2003 case of Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration,[21] we upheld the streamlining of the National
Tobacco Administration through a reduction of its personnel and deemed the same as included in the power of the
GMDPealosa III-G
President to reorganize executive offices granted under the laws, notwithstanding that such streamlining neither involved
an abolition nor a transfer of functions of an office. To quote the relevant portion of that decision:
In the recent case of Rosa Ligaya C. Domingo, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo D. Zamora, in his capacity as the
Executive Secretary, et al., this Court has had occasion to also delve on the Presidents power to reorganize
the Office of the President under Section 31(2) and (3) of Executive Order No. 292 and the power to
reorganize the Office of the President Proper. x x x
xxxx
The first sentence of the law is an express grant to the President of a continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. The succeeding numbered paragraphs are not in
the nature of provisos that unduly limit the aim and scope of the grant to the President of the power
to reorganize but are to be viewed in consonance therewith. Section 31(1) of Executive Order No. 292
specifically refers to the Presidents power to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the
PresidentProper, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units hereof or transferring functions from one unit
to another, while Section 31(2) and (3) concern executive offices outside the Office of the
President Proper allowing the President to transfer any function under the Office of the President to any
other Department or Agency and vice-versa, and the transfer of any agency under the Office of the
President to any other department or agency and vice-versa.
In the present instance, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of offices, the assailed
action is a mere reorganization under the general provisions of the law consisting mainly
of streamlining the NTA in the interest of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within
the authority of the President motivated and carried out, according to the findings of the appellate court, in
good faith, a factual assessment that this Court could only but accept.[22] (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)
In the more recent case of Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals,[23] which involved a
structural and functional reorganization of the Department of Health under an executive order, we reiterated the
GMDPealosa III-G
principle that the power of the President to reorganize agencies under the executive department by executive or
administrative order is constitutionally and statutorily recognized. We held in that case:
This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may, by executive or
administrative order, direct the reorganization of government entities under the Executive
Department. This is also sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: [T]he president shall
have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of
Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987 reads:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office - The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following
actions:
xxxx
In Domingo v. Zamora [445 Phil. 7 (2003)], this Court explained the rationale behind the Presidents
continuing authority under the Administrative Code to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of
the President. The law grants the President the power to reorganize the Office of the President in
recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his or her office to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. To remain effective and efficient, it must be capable of being shaped
and reshaped by the President in the manner the Chief Executive deems fit to carry out presidential
directives and policies.
The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President consists of the Office of the President
Proper and the agencies under it. The agencies under the Office of the President are identified in Section
23, Chapter 8, Title II of the Administrative Code:
GMDPealosa III-G
Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President.The agencies under the
Office of the President refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the
President, those under the supervision and control of the President, those under the
administrative supervision of the Office of the President, those attached to it for policy and
program coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order creating them under any
specific department.
xxxx
The power of the President to reorganize the executive department is likewise recognized in general
appropriations laws. x x x.
xxxx
Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of the President to issue. The
President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an
exercise of the Presidents constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported
by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently
affirmed by this Court.[24] (Emphases supplied.)
Subsequently, we ruled in Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Executive Secretary[25] that:
The Constitutions express grant of the power of control in the President justifies an executive action to carry
out reorganization measures under a broad authority of law.
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated with full knowledge of all
existing laws and jurisprudence on the subject. It is thus reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute
which places an agency under the Office of the President, it was in accordance with existing laws and
jurisprudence on the Presidents power to reorganize.
GMDPealosa III-G
In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature necessarily ordains an
executive agencys position in the scheme of administrative structure. Such determination is primary, but
subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure. As far as bureaus,
agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the power of control may justify the
President to deactivate the functions of a particular office. Or a law may expressly grant the President the
broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. The Administrative Code of 1987 is one such law.[26]
The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President Arroyo is an exercise of a delegated legislative power
granted by the aforementioned Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987, which
provides for the continuing authority of the President to reorganize the Office of the President, in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. This is a matter already well-entrenched in jurisprudence. The reorganization of such
an office through executive or administrative order is also recognized in the Administrative Code of 1987. Sections 2 and
3, Chapter 2, Title I, Book III of the said Code provide:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in
implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powersshall be promulgated
in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental
operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated
in administrative orders. (Emphases supplied.)
To reiterate, we find nothing objectionable in the provision in Executive Order No. 378 limiting the appropriation of
the NPO to its own income. Beginning withLarin and in subsequent cases, the Court has noted certain provisions in
GMDPealosa III-G
the general appropriations laws as likewise reflecting the power of the President to reorganize executive offices or
agencies even to the extent of modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose.
Petitioners contention that the issuance of Executive Order No. 378 is an invalid exercise of legislative power on
the part of the President has no legal leg to stand on.
In all, Executive Order No. 378, which purports to institute necessary reforms in government in order to improve
and upgrade efficiency in the delivery of public services by redefining the functions of the NPO and limiting its funding to
its own income and to transform it into a self-reliant agency able to compete with the private sector, is well within the
prerogative of President Arroyo under her continuing delegated legislative power to reorganize her own office. As pointed
out in the separate concurring opinion of our learned colleague, Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the objective behind
Executive Order No. 378 is wholly consistent with the state policy contained in Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government
Procurement Reform Act to encourage competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to private contracting parties who
are eligible and qualified.[27]
To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the Office of the President and the
departments, offices and agencies of the executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, the Legislature or the
constitutionally-created or mandated bodies. Moreover, it must be stressed that the exercise by the President of the
power to reorganize the executive department must be in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing
jurisprudence.
In this regard, we are mindful of the previous pronouncement of this Court in Dario v. Mison[28] that:
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in
good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy
GMDPealosa III-G
or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation
actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be
a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the abolition, which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done
for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition
takes place and whatever abolition is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid abolition as where there is
merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of
ample funds. (Emphasis ours.)
Stated alternatively, the presidential power to reorganize agencies and offices in the executive branch of
government is subject to the condition that such reorganization is carried out in good faith.
If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions, which results in loss of security of tenure of
affected government employees, would be valid.In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,[29] we even observed that there
was no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except those who hold constitutional offices, which provide for
special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right to an office or salary.[30]
This brings us to the second ground raised in the petition that Executive Order No. 378, in allowing government
agencies to secure their printing requirements from the private sector and in limiting the budget of the NPO to its income,
will purportedly lead to the gradual abolition of the NPO and the loss of security of tenure of its present employees. In
other words, petitioners avow that the reorganization of the NPO under Executive Order No. 378 is tainted with bad
faith. The basic evidentiary rule is that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it.[31]
A careful review of the records will show that petitioners utterly failed to substantiate their claim. They failed to
allege, much less prove, sufficient facts to show that the limitation of the NPOs budget to its own income would indeed
lead to the abolition of the position, or removal from office, of any employee. Neither did petitioners present any shred of
GMDPealosa III-G
proof of their assertion that the changes in the functions of the NPO were for political considerations that had nothing to
do with improving the efficiency of, or encouraging operational economy in, the said agency.
In sum, the Court finds that the petition failed to show any constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in President Arroyos issuance of Executive Order No. 378.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction is herebyDENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
GMDPealosa III-G
SECOND DIVISION
ROGER V. NAVARRO, G.R. No. 153788

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO, and
ABAD, JJ.
HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding

Judge, RTC Branch 37, Cagayan de Promulgated:
Oro City, and KAREN T. GO, doing
business under the name KARGO November 27, 2009
ENTERPRISES,
Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
GMDPealosa III-G
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] that seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[2] dated October 16, 2001 and Resolution[3] dated May 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64701. These CA rulings
affirmed the July 26, 2000[4] and March 7, 2001[5] orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de
Oro City, denying petitioner Roger V. Navarros (Navarro) motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND FACTS
On September 12, 1998, respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 98-599 (first
complaint)[6] and 98-598 (second complaint),[7] before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with damages against
Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles
in Navarros possession.
The first complaint stated:
1. That plaintiff KAREN T. GO is a Filipino, of legal age, married to GLENN O. GO, a resident of
Cagayan de Oro City and doing business under the trade name KARGO ENTERPRISES, an entity duly
registered and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, which has its
business address at Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City; that defendant ROGER NAVARRO is a Filipino, of legal
age, a resident of 62 Dolores Street, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, where he may be served with
summons and other processes of the Honorable Court; that defendant JOHN DOE whose real name and
address are at present unknown to plaintiff is hereby joined as party defendant as he may be the person in
whose possession and custody the personal property subject matter of this suit may be found if the same is
not in the possession of defendant ROGER NAVARRO;
2. That KARGO ENTERPRISES is in the business of, among others, buying and selling motor
vehicles, including hauling trucks and other heavy equipment;
GMDPealosa III-G
3. That for the cause of action against defendant ROGER NAVARRO, it is hereby stated that on
August 8, 1997, the said defendant leased [from] plaintiff a certain motor vehicle which is more particularly
described as follows
Make/Type FUSO WITH MOUNTED CRANE

Serial No. FK416K-51680
Motor No. 6D15-338735
Plate No. GHK-378
as evidenced by a LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE entered into by and

between KARGO ENTERPRISES, then represented by its Manager, the aforementioned GLENN O. GO,
and defendant ROGER NAVARRO xxx; that in accordance with the provisions of the above LEASE
AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE, defendant ROGER NAVARRO delivered unto plaintiff six (6)
post-dated checks each in the amount of SIXTY-SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE &
33/100 PESOS (P66,333.33) which were supposedly in payment of the agreed rentals; that when the fifth
and sixth checks, i.e. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS CAGAYAN DE ORO BRANCH
CHECKS NOS. 017112 and 017113, respectively dated January 8, 1998 and February 8, 1998, were
presented for payment and/or credit, the same were dishonored and/or returned by the drawee bank for the
common reason that the current deposit account against which the said checks were issued did not have
sufficient funds to cover the amounts thereof; that the total amount of the two (2) checks, i.e. the sum of
ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX & 66/100 PESOS (P132,666.66)
therefore represents the principal liability of defendant ROGER NAVARRO unto plaintiff on the basis of the
provisions of the above LEASE AGREEMENT WITH RIGHT TO PURCHASE; that demands, written and
oral, were made of defendant ROGER NAVARRO to pay the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX & 66/100 PESOS (P132,666.66), or to return the subject motor
vehicle as also provided for in the LEASE AGREEMENT WITH RIGHT TO PURCHASE, but said demands
were, and still are, in vain to the great damage and injury of herein plaintiff; xxx
4. That the aforedescribed motor vehicle has not been the subject of any tax assessment and/or fine
pursuant to law, or seized under an execution or an attachment as against herein plaintiff;
xxx
GMDPealosa III-G
8. That plaintiff hereby respectfully applies for an order of the Honorable Court for the immediate delivery of
the above-described motor vehicle from defendants unto plaintiff pending the final determination of this case
on the merits and, for that purpose, there is attached hereto an affidavit duly executed and bond double the
value of the personal property subject matter hereof to answer for damages and costs which defendants
may suffer in the event that the order for replevin prayed for may be found out to having not been properly
issued.
The second complaint contained essentially the same allegations as the first complaint, except that the Lease
Agreement with Option to Purchase involved is datedOctober 1, 1997 and the motor vehicle leased is described as
follows:
Make/Type FUSO WITH MOUNTED CRANE

Serial No. FK416K-510528
Motor No. 6D14-423403
The second complaint also alleged that Navarro delivered three post-dated checks, each for the amount of P100,000.00,
to Karen Go in payment of the agreed rentals; however, the third check was dishonored when presented for payment.[8]
On October 12, 1998[9] and October 14, 1998,[10] the RTC issued writs of replevin for both cases; as a result, the Sheriff
seized the two vehicles and delivered them to the possession of Karen Go.
In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no cause of
action, since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase (collectively, the lease
agreements) the actionable documents on which the complaints were based.
On Navarros motion, both cases were duly consolidated on December 13, 1999.
GMDPealosa III-G
In its May 8, 2000 order, the RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the complaints did not state a cause of action.
In response to the motion for reconsideration Karen Go filed dated May 26, 2000,[11] the RTC issued another order
dated July 26, 2000 setting aside the order of dismissal. Acting on the presumption that Glenn Gos leasing business is a
conjugal property, the RTC held that Karen Go had sufficient interest in his leasing business to file the action against
Navarro. However, the RTC held that Karen Go should have included her husband, Glenn Go, in the complaint based on
Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court (Rules).[12] Thus, the lower court ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the
inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff.
When the RTC denied Navarros motion for reconsideration on March 7, 2001, Navarro filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA, essentially contending that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it reconsidered the dismissal of
the case and directed Karen Go to amend her complaints by including her husband Glenn Go as co-plaintiff. According
to Navarro, a complaint which failed to state a cause of action could not be converted into one with a cause of action by
mere amendment or supplemental pleading.
On October 16, 2001, the CA denied Navarros petition and affirmed the RTCs order.[13] The CA also denied Navarros
motion for reconsideration in its resolution ofMay 29, 2002,[14] leading to the filing of the present petition.
THE PETITION
Navarro alleges that even if the lease agreements were in the name of Kargo Enterprises, since it did not have the
requisite juridical personality to sue, the actual parties to the agreement are himself and Glenn Go. Since it was Karen
Go who filed the complaints and not Glenn Go, she was not a real party-in-interest and the complaints failed to state a
cause of action.
GMDPealosa III-G
Navarro posits that the RTC erred when it ordered the amendment of the complaint to include Glenn Go as a co-
plaintiff, instead of dismissing the complaint outright because a complaint which does not state a cause of action cannot
be converted into one with a cause of action by a mere amendment or a supplemental pleading. In effect, the lower court
created a cause of action for Karen Go when there was none at the time she filed the complaints.
Even worse, according to Navarro, the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff drastically changed the theory of the
complaints, to his great prejudice. Navarro claims that the lower court gravely abused its discretion when it assumed that
the leased vehicles are part of the conjugal property of Glenn and Karen Go. Since Karen Go is the registered owner of
Kargo Enterprises, the vehicles subject of the complaint are her paraphernal properties and the RTC gravely erred when
it ordered the inclusion of Glenn Go as a co-plaintiff.
Navarro likewise faults the lower court for setting the trial of the case in the same order that required Karen Go to
amend her complaints, claiming that by issuing this order, the trial court violated Rule 10 of the Rules.
Even assuming the complaints stated a cause of action against him, Navarro maintains that the complaints were
premature because no prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease agreements before the
complaints for replevin were filed.
Lastly, Navarro posits that since the two writs of replevin were issued based on flawed complaints, the vehicles
were illegally seized from his possession and should be returned to him immediately.
Karen Go, on the other hand, claims that it is misleading for Navarro to state that she has no real interest in the
subject of the complaint, even if the lease agreements were signed only by her husband, Glenn Go; she is the owner of
GMDPealosa III-G
Kargo Enterprises and Glenn Go signed the lease agreements merely as the manager of Kargo Enterprises. Moreover,
Karen Go maintains that Navarros insistence that Kargo Enterprises is Karen Gos paraphernal property is without basis.
Based on the law and jurisprudence on the matter, all property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal
property. Finally, Karen Go insists that her complaints sufficiently established a cause of action against Navarro. Thus,
when the RTC ordered her to include her husband as co-plaintiff, this was merely to comply with the rule that spouses
should sue jointly, and was not meant to cure the complaints lack of cause of action.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Karen Go is the real party-in-interest
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.[15]
Interestingly, although Navarro admits that Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name Kargo Enterprises, he
still insists that Karen Go is not a real party-in-interest in the case. According to Navarro, while the lease contracts were
in Kargo Enterprises name, this was merely a trade name without a juridical personality, so the actual parties to the lease
agreements were Navarro and Glenn Go, to the exclusion of Karen Go.
As a corollary, Navarro contends that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the inclusion
of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff, since this in effect created a cause of action for the complaints when in truth, there was none.
GMDPealosa III-G
We do not find Navarros arguments persuasive.
The central factor in appreciating the issues presented in this case is the business name Kargo Enterprises. The
name appears in the title of the Complaint where the plaintiff was identified as KAREN T. GO doing business under the
name KARGO ENTERPRISES, and this identification was repeated in the first paragraph of the Complaint. Paragraph 2
defined the business KARGO ENTERPRISES undertakes. Paragraph 3 continued with the allegation that the defendant
leased from plaintiff a certain motor vehicle that was thereafter described. Significantly, the Complaint specifies and
attaches as its integral part the Lease Agreement that underlies the transaction between the plaintiff and the
defendant. Again, the name KARGO ENTERPRISES entered the picture as this Lease Agreement provides:
This agreement, made and entered into by and between:
GLENN O. GO, of legal age, married, with post office address at xxx, herein referred to as the
LESSOR-SELLER; representing KARGO ENTERPRISES as its Manager,
xxx
thus, expressly pointing to KARGO ENTERPRISES as the principal that Glenn O. Go represented. In other words, by the
express terms of this Lease Agreement, Glenn Go did sign the agreement only as the manager of Kargo Enterprises and
the latter is clearly the real party to the lease agreements.
As Navarro correctly points out, Kargo Enterprises is a sole proprietorship, which is neither a natural person, nor a
juridical person, as defined by Article 44 of the Civil Code:
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
GMDPealosa III-G
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
Thus, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules,[16] Kargo Enterprises cannot be a party to a civil action. This
legal reality leads to the question: who then is the proper party to file an action based on a contract in the name of Kargo
Enterprises?
We faced a similar question in Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza,[17] where we said:
Finally, there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships like petitioner to bring suit in court. The law
merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for
profit by a single individual, and requires the proprietor or owner thereof to secure licenses and permits,
register the business name, and pay taxes to the national government. It does not vest juridical or legal
personality upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action in court.
Thus, the complaint in the court below should have been filed in the name of the owner of Juasing
Hardware. The allegation in the body of the complaint would show that the suit is brought by such person
as proprietor or owner of the business conducted under the name and style Juasing Hardware. The
descriptive words doing business as Juasing Hardware may be added to the title of the case, as is
customarily done.[18] [Emphasis supplied.]
This conclusion should be read in relation with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules, which states:
GMDPealosa III-G
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by
a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarros contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally
incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease
Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises. Whether Glenn Go can legally sign the Lease
Agreement in his capacity as a manager of Kargo Enterprises, a sole proprietorship, is a question we do not decide, as
this is a matter for the trial court to consider in a trial on the merits.
Glenn Gos Role in the Case
We find it significant that the business name Kargo Enterprises is in the name of Karen T. Go,[19] who described
herself in the Complaints to be a Filipino, of legal age, married to GLENN O. GO, a resident of Cagayan de Oro City, and
doing business under the trade name KARGO ENTERPRISES.[20] That Glenn Go and Karen Go are married to each
other is a fact never brought in issue in the case. Thus, the business name KARGO ENTERPRISES is registered in the
name of a married woman, a fact material to the side issue of whether Kargo Enterprises and its properties are
paraphernal or conjugal properties. To restate the parties positions, Navarro alleges that Kargo Enterprises is Karen Gos
paraphernal property, emphasizing the fact that the business is registered solely in Karen Gos name. On the other hand,
Karen Go contends that while the business is registered in her name, it is in fact part of their conjugal property.
The registration of the trade name in the name of one person a woman does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the trade name as a property is hers alone, particularly when the woman is married. By law, all property
GMDPealosa III-G
acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name
of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.[21] Our examination of the records of
the case does not show any proof that Kargo Enterprises and the properties or contracts in its name are conjugal. If at
all, only the bare allegation of Navarro to this effect exists in the records of the case. As we emphasized in Castro v.
Miat:[22]
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. This article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds
of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired
does not appear.[23] [Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, for purposes solely of this case and of resolving the issue of whether Kargo Enterprises as a sole proprietorship is
conjugal or paraphernal property, we hold that it is conjugal property.
Article 124 of the Family Code, on the administration of the conjugal property, provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong
to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
xxx
GMDPealosa III-G
This provision, by its terms, allows either Karen or Glenn Go to speak and act with authority in managing their
conjugal property, i.e., Kargo Enterprises. No need exists, therefore, for one to obtain the consent of the other before
performing an act of administration or any act that does not dispose of or encumber their conjugal property.
Under Article 108 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on the contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their
marriage settlements. In other words, the property relations of the husband and wife shall be governed primarily by
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the spouses marriage settlement
and by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In the absence of any evidence of a marriage settlement between
the spouses Go, we look at the Civil Code provision on partnership for guidance.
A rule on partnership applicable to the spouses circumstances is Article 1811 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 1811. A partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership property.
The incidents of this co-ownership are such that:
(1) A partner, subject to the provisions of this Title and to any agreement between the partners, has an
equal right with his partners to possess specific partnership property for partnership purposes; xxx
Under this provision, Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties
registered under this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these properties. Applying Article 484
of the Civil Code, which states that in default of contracts, or special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the
provisions of this Title, we find further support in Article 487 of the Civil Code that allows any of the co-owners to bring an
action in ejectment with respect to the co-owned property.
GMDPealosa III-G
While ejectment is normally associated with actions involving real property, we find that this rule can be applied to
the circumstances of the present case, following our ruling in Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman.[24] In this case, one
spouse filed an action for the recovery of credit, a personal property considered conjugal property, without including the
other spouse in the action. In resolving the issue of whether the other spouse was required to be included as a co-
plaintiff in the action for the recovery of the credit, we said:
Milagros de Guzman, being presumed to be a co-owner of the credits allegedly extended to the
spouses Carandang, seems to be either an indispensable or a necessary party. If she is an indispensable
party, dismissal would be proper. If she is merely a necessary party, dismissal is not warranted, whether or
not there was an order for her inclusion in the complaint pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3.
Article 108 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by
the spouses in their marriage settlements.
This provision is practically the same as the Civil Code provision it superseded:
Art. 147. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter.
In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that [a] partner is a co-owner with the other
partners of specific partnership property. Taken with the presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds
used to finance the four checks used to pay for petitioners stock subscriptions, and with the presumption
that the credits themselves are part of conjugal funds, Article 1811 makes Quirino and Milagros de Guzman
co-owners of the alleged credit.
GMDPealosa III-G
Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman may separately bring an
action for the recovery thereof. In the fairly recent cases of Baloloy v. Hular and Adlawan v. Adlawan, we
held that, in a co-ownership, co-owners may bring actions for the recovery of co-owned property
without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is
presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his co-owners. In the latter case and in that of De Guia
v. Court of Appeals,we also held that Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides that any of the co-
owners may bring an action for ejectment, covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession.
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant
to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind
of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-
owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party
thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a
complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to
have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.[25] [Emphasis supplied.]
Under this ruling, either of the spouses Go may bring an action against Navarro to recover possession of the
Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which they co-own. This conclusion is consistent with Article 124 of the Family Code,
supporting as it does the position that either spouse may act on behalf of the conjugal partnership, so long as they do not
dispose of or encumber the property in question without the other spouses consent.
On this basis, we hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover
possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit, based on Section 4,
Rule 4 of the Rules, which states:
Section 4. Spouses as parties. Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.
GMDPealosa III-G
Non-joinder of indispensable parties not ground to dismiss action
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, we have held in a number of cases[26] that
the misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action. As we stated
in Macababbad v. Masirag:[27]
Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither misjoinder nor nonjoinder of parties is
a ground for the dismissal of an action, thus:
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is
ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on
motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are
just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
In Domingo v. Scheer, this Court held that the proper remedy when a party is left out is to implead
the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a
party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend his
complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff to whom the order to include the
indispensable party is directed refuses to comply with the order of the court, the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. Only upon unjustified failure or
refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed.
In these lights, the RTC Order of July 26, 2000 requiring plaintiff Karen Go to join her husband as a party plaintiff is fully
in order.
Demand not required prior
GMDPealosa III-G
to filing of replevin action
In arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of replevin is filed, Navarro apparently likens a
replevin action to an unlawful detainer.
For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60
of the Rules, which states:
Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond.
The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to
the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of detention
thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or
seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or
if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the property as
stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse party if such return be
adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the applicant in
the action.
GMDPealosa III-G
We see nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the
property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action
for a writ of replevin.
More importantly, Navarro is no longer in the position to claim that a prior demand is necessary, as he has already
admitted in his Answers that he had received the letters that Karen Go sent him, demanding that he either pay his unpaid
obligations or return the leased motor vehicles. Navarros position that a demand is necessary and has not been made is
therefore totally unmeritorious.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for review for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner
Roger V. Navarro.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
SECOND DIVISION
ROSENDO BACALSO, RODRIGO G.R. No. 173192

BACALSO, MARCILIANA B. DOBLAS,
TEROLIO BACALSO, ALIPIO BACALSO, Present:
JR., MARIO BACALSO, WILLIAM
BACALSO,ALIPIO BACALSO III and QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
GMDPealosa III-G
CRISTITA B. BAES, CARPIO MORALES,
Petitioners, TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
- versus - BRION, JJ.
MAXIMO PADIGOS, FLAVIANO

MABUYO, GAUDENCIO PADIGOS,
DOMINGO PADIGOS, VICTORIA P.
ABARQUEZ, LILIA P. GABISON, Promulgated:
TIMOTEO PADIGOS, PERFECTO April 14, 2008
PADIGOS, PRISCA SALARDA, FLORA
GUINTO, BENITA TEMPLA, SOTERO
PADIGOS, ANDRES PADIGOS, EMILIO
PADIGOS, DEMETRIO PADIGOS, JR.,
WENCESLAO PADIGOS, NELLY
PADIGOS, EXPEDITO PADIGOS, HENRY
PADIGOS and ENRIQUE P.
MALAZARTE,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------X
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The case at bar involves a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3781 (the lot) located in Inayawan, Cebu, covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2649 (0-9092)[1] in the name of the following 13 co-owners, their respective shares of
which are indicated opposite their names:
GMDPealosa III-G
Fortunata Padigos (Fortunata) 1/8
Felix Padigos (Felix) 1/8
Wenceslao Padigos (Wenceslao) 1/8
Maximiano Padigos (Maximiano) 1/8
Geronimo Padigos (Geronimo) 1/8
Macaria Padigos 1/8
Simplicio Padigos (Simplicio) 1/8
Ignacio Padigos (Ignacio) 1/48
Matilde Padigos 1/48
Marcelo Padigos 1/48
Rustica Padigos 1/48
Raymunda Padigos 1/48
Antonino Padigos 1/48
Maximo Padigos (Maximo), Flaviano Mabuyo (Flaviano), Gaudencio Padigos (Gaudencio), Domingo Padigos
(Domingo), and Victoria P. Abarquez (Victoria), who are among the herein respondents, filed on April 17, 1995, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, a Complaint,[2] docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-17326, against Rosendo
Bacalso (Rosendo) and Rodrigo Bacalso (Rodrigo) who are among the herein petitioners, for quieting of title, declaration
of nullity of documents, recovery of possession, and damages.
The therein plaintiffs-herein respondents Maximo and Flaviano claimed that they are children of the deceased co-
owner Simplicio; that respondents Gaudencio and Domingo are children of the deceased co-owner Ignacio; and that
respondent Victoria and respondent Lilia P. Gabison (Lilia) are grandchildren of the late co-owner Fortunata.[3]
GMDPealosa III-G
Respondents also alleged that the therein defendants-petitioners Rosendo and Rodrigo are heirs of Alipio Bacalso,
Sr. (Alipio, Sr.) who, during his lifetime, secured Tax Declaration Nos. L-078-02223 and L-078-02224 covering the lot
without any legal basis; that Rosendo and Rodrigo have been leasing portions of the lot to persons who built houses
thereon, and Rosendo has been living in a house built on a portion of the lot;[4] and that demands to vacate and efforts at
conciliation proved futile,[5] prompting them to file the complaint at the RTC.
In their Answer[6] to the complaint, petitioners Rosendo and Rodrigo claimed that their father Alipio, Sr. purchased
via deeds of sale the shares in the lot of Fortunata, Simplicio, Wenceslao, Geronimo, and Felix from their respective heirs,
and that Alipio, Sr. acquired the shares of the other co-owners of the lot by extraordinary acquisitive prescription through
continuous, open, peaceful, and adverse possession thereof in the concept of an owner since 1949.[7]
By way of Reply and Answer to the Defendants Counterclaim,[8] herein respondents Gaudencio, Maximo, Flaviano,
Domingo, and Victoria alleged that the deeds of sale on which Rosendo and Rodrigo base their claim of ownership of
portions of the lot are spurious, but assuming that they are not, laches had set in against Alipio, Sr.; and that the shares of
the other co-owners of the lot cannot be acquired through laches or prescription.
Gaudencio, Maximo, Flaviano, Domingo, and Victoria, with leave of court,[9] filed an Amended
Complaint[10] impleading as additional defendants Alipio, Sr.s other heirs, namely, petitioners Marceliana[11] Doblas,
Terolio Bacalso, Alipio Bacalso, Jr., Mario Bacalso, William Bacalso, Alipio Bacalso III, and Christine B. Baes.[12] Still later,
Gaudencio et al. filed a Second Amended Complaint[13] with leave of court,[14] impleading as additional plaintiffs the other
heirs of registered co-owner Maximiano, namely, herein respondents Timoteo Padigos, Perfecto Padigos,
Frisca[15] Salarda, Flora Quinto (sometimes rendered as Guinto), Benita Templa, Sotero Padigos, Andres Padigos, and
Emilio Padigos.[16]
GMDPealosa III-G
In their Answer to the Second Amended Complaint,[17] petitioners contended that the Second Amended Complaint
should be dismissed in view of the failure to implead other heirs of the other registered owners of the lot who are
indispensable parties.[18]
A Third Amended Complaint[19] was thereafter filed with leave of court[20] impleading as additional plaintiffs the heirs
of Wenceslao, namely, herein respondents Demetrio Padigos, Jr., Wenceslao Padigos, and Nelly Padigos, and the heirs
of Felix, namely, herein respondents Expedito Padigos (Expedito), Henry Padigos, and Enrique P. Malazarte.[21]
After trial, Branch 16 of the Cebu City RTC decided[22] in favor in the therein plaintiffs-herein respondents,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants.
1. Declaring the plaintiffs to be entitled to the ownership and possession of the lot in litigation;
2. Declaring as null and void the Deeds of Absolute Sale in question;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as actual and
compensatory damages[,] the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, and P10,000.00 as litigation
expenses.
4. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[23] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
GMDPealosa III-G
The defendants-herein petitioners Bacalsos appealed.[24] Meanwhile, the trial court, on respondents Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal,[25] issued a writ of execution which was implemented by, among other things, demolishing the
houses constructed on the lot.[26]
By Decision[27] of September 6, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. Their Motion for
Reconsideration[28] having been denied,[29]petitioners filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[30] faulting the
Court of Appeals:
. . . when it ruled that the Second Amended Complaint is valid and legal, even if not all indispensable
parties are impleaded or joined . . .
. . . when [it] wittingly overlooked the most potent, unescapable and indubitable fact or circumstance
which proved the continuous possession of Lot No. 3781 by the defendants and their predecessors in
interest, Alipio Bacalso [Sr.] and/or when it sanctioned impliedly the glaring arbitrary RTC order of
the demolition of the over 40 years old houses, situated on Lot No. 3781 Cebu Cad., belonging to the old
lessees, long allowed to lease or stay thereat for many years, by Alipio Bacalso [Sr.], father and
[predecessor] in interest of the defendants, now the herein Petitioners. The said lessees were not even
joined as parties in this case, much less were they given a chance to air their side before their houses were
demolished, in gross violation of the due process clause provided for in Sec. 1[,] Art. III of the Constitution . .
.
. . . in upholding as gospel truth the report and conclusion of Nimrod Vao, the supposed handwriting
expert[,] that signatures and thumb marks appearing on all documents of sale presented by the defendants
are forgeries, and not mindful that Nimrod Vao was not cross-examined thoroughly by the defense counsel
as he was prevented from doing so by the trial judge, in violation of the law more particularly Sec. 6, Rule
132, Rules of Court and/or the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings and is therefore not
admissible in evidence.
GMDPealosa III-G
. . . [when it] . . . wittingly or unwittingly, again overlooked the vital facts, the circumstances, the laws
and rulings of the Supreme Court, which are of much weight, substance and influence which, if considered
carefully, undoubtedly uphold that the defendants and their predecessors in interests, have long been in
continuous, open, peaceful and adverse, and notorious possession against the whole world of Lot No. 3781,
Cebu Cad., in concept of absolute owners for 46 years, a period more than sufficient to sustain or uphold the
defense of prescription, provided for in Art. 1137 of the Civil Code even without good faith.[31] (Emphasis and
underscoring in the original; italics supplied)
Respondents admit that Teodulfo Padigos (Teodulfo), an heir of Simplicio, was not impleaded.[32] They contend,
however, that the omission did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction because Article 487 of the Civil Code states that
[a]ny of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.[33]
Respondents contention does not lie. The action is for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of documents, recovery
of possession and ownership, and damages.Arcelona v. Court of Appeals[34] defines indispensable parties under Section
7 of Rule 3, Rules of Court as follows:
[P]arties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must
be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a
civil action requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all
indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of
judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should be
dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
Petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond . . . The fishpond is undivided; it is impossible to pinpoint

which specific portion of the property is owned by Olanday, et. al. and which portion belongs to petitioners. x
x x Indeed, petitioners should have been properly impleaded as indispensable parties. x x x
GMDPealosa III-G
x x x x[35] (Underscoring supplied)
The absence then of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of a court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent party but even as to those present.[36]
Failure to implead indispensable parties aside, the resolution of the case hinges on a determination of the
authenticity of the documents on which petitioners in part anchor their claim to ownership of the lot. The questioned
documents are:
1. Exhibit 3 a notarized Deed of Sale executed by Gaudencio, Domingo, a certain Hermenegilda Padigos, and the
heirs of Fortunata, in favor of Alipio, Sr. on June 8, 1959;
2. Exhibit 4 a notarized Deed of Sale executed on September 9, 1957 by Gavino Padigos (Gavino), alleged son of
Felix, in favor of Alipio Gadiano;
3. Exhibit 5 a private deed of sale executed in June 1957 by Macaria Bongalan, Marciano Padigos, and Dominga
Padigos, supposed heirs of Wenceslao, in favor of Alipio, Sr.;
4. Exhibit 6 a notarized deed of sale executed on September 9, 1957 by Gavino and Rodulfo Padigos, heirs of
Geronimo, in favor of Alipio Gadiano;
GMDPealosa III-G
5. Exhibit 7 a notarized deed of sale executed on March 19, 1949 by Irenea Mabuyo, Teodulfo and Maximo, heirs of
Simplicio;
6. Exhibit 8 a private deed of sale executed on May 3, 1950 by Candido Padigos, one of Simplicios children, in favor
of Alipio, Sr.; and
7. Exhibit 9 a notarized deed of sale executed on May 17, 1957 by Alipio Gadiano in favor of Alipio, Sr.
Exhibits 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8, which are notarized documents, have in their favor the presumption of regularity.[37]
Forgery, as any other mechanism of fraud, must be proved clearly and convincingly, and the burden of proof lies on
the party alleging forgery.[38]
The trial court and the Court of Appeals relied on the findings of Nimrod Bernabe Vao (Vao), expert witness for
respondents, that Gaudencios signature on Exhibit 3 (Deed of Absolute Sale covering Fortunatas share in the lot) and
Maximos thumbprint on Exhibit 7 (Deed of Sale covering Simplicios share in the lot) are spurious.[39] Vaos findings were
presented by respondents to rebut those of Wilfredo Espina (Espina), expert witness for petitioners, that Gaudencios
signature and Maximos thumbprint are genuine.[40]
Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive. They are generally regarded as purely advisory in character.[41] The
courts may place whatever weight they choose upon and may reject them, if they find them inconsistent with the facts in
the case or otherwise unreasonable.[42] When faced with conflicting expert opinions, courts give more weight and
credence to that which is more complete, thorough, and scientific.[43]
GMDPealosa III-G
The Court observes that in examining the questioned signatures of respondent Gaudencio, petitioners expert
witness Espina used as standards 15 specimen signatures which have been established to be Gaudencios,[44] and that
after identifying similarities between the questioned signatures and the standard signatures, he concluded that the
questioned signatures are genuine. On the other hand, respondents expert witness Vao used, as standards, the
questioned signatures themselves.[45]He identified characteristics of the signatures indicating that they may have been
forged. Vaos statement of the purpose of the examination is revealing:
x x x [t]o x x x discover, classify and determine the authenticity of every document that for any reason
requires examination be [sic] scrutinized in every particular that may possiblythrow any light upon its origin,
its age or upon quality element or condition that may have a bearing upons [sic] its genuineness or
spuriousness.[46] (Emphasis supplied)
The Court also notes that Vao also analyzed the signatures of the witnesses to the questioned documents, the
absence of standard specimens with which those signatures could be compared notwithstanding.[47] On the other hand,
Espina refrained from making conclusions on signatures which could not be compared with established genuine
specimens.[48]
Specifically with respect to Vaos finding that Maximos thumbprint on Exhibit 7 is spurious, the Court is not
persuaded, no comparison having been made of such thumbprint with a genuine thumbprint established to be
Maximos.[49]
Vaos testimony should be received with caution, the trial court having abruptly cut short his cross-examination
conducted by petitioners counsel,[50] thus:
COURT:
GMDPealosa III-G
You are just delaying the proceedings in this case if you are going to ask him about the documents
one by one. Just leave it to the Court to determine whether or not he is a qualified expert witness. The
Court will just go over the Report of the witness. You do not have to ask the witness one by one on
the document,[51]
thereby depriving this Court of the opportunity to determine his credibility. Espina, on the other hand, withstood thorough
cross-examination, re-direct and re-cross examination.[52]
The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is
genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection
from an unpracticed observer.[53] While differences exist between Gaudencios signatures appearing on Exhibits 3-3-D and
his signatures appearing on the affidavits accompanying the pleadings in this case,[54] the gap of more than 30 years from
the time he affixed his signatures on the questioned document to the time he affixed his signatures on the pleadings in the
case could explain the difference. Thus Espina observed:
xxxx
4. Both questioned and standard signatures exhibited the same style and form of the movement impulses in
its execution;
5. Personal habits of the writer were established in both questioned and standard signatures such as
misalignment of the whole structure of the signature, heavy penpressure [sic] of strokes from initial to the
terminal, formation of the loops and ovals, poor line quality and spacing between letters are all repeated;
GMDPealosa III-G
6. Both questioned and standard signatures [show] no radical change in the strokes and letter formation in
spite o[f] their wide difference in dates of execution considering the early writing maturity of the writer;
7. Variations in both writings questioned and standards were considered and properly evaluated.
xxxx
Fundamental similarities are observed in the following characteristics to wit:
xxxx
SIGNATURES
1. Ovals of a either rounded or angular at the base;
2. Ovals of d either narrow, rounded, or angular at the base;
3. Loop stems of d consistently tall and retraced in both specimens questioned and standards;
4. Base alignment of e and i are repeated with sameness;
5. Top of c either with a retrace, angular formation or an eyelet;
6. Terminal ending of o heavy with a short tapering formation;
7. Loop stem of P with wide space and angular;
8. Oval of P either rounded or multi-angular;
9. Base loop of g consistently short either a retrace, a blind loop or narrow space disproportionate to the
top oval;
GMDPealosa III-G
10. Angular top of s are repeated with sameness;
11. Terminal ending of s short and heavy with blind loop or retrace at the base. [55]
And Espina concluded
xxxx
[t]hat the four (4) questioned signatures over and above the typewritten name and word GAUDENCIO
PADIGOS Vendor on four copies of a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE (original and carbon) dated June 8,
1959 were written, signed, and prepared by the hand who wrote the standard specimens Exh. G and other
specimen materials collected from the records of this case that were submitted or comparison; a product of
one Mind and Brain hence GENUINE and AUTHENTIC.[56] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)
Respondents brand Maximos thumbmark on Exhibit 7 as spurious because, so they claim, Maximo did not affix his
signature thru a thumbmark, he knowing how to write.[57] Such conclusion is a non sequitur, however, for a person who
knows how to write is not precluded from signing by thumbmark.
In affirming the nullification by the trial court of Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, the Court of Appeals held:
xxxx
First of all, facts about pedigree of the registered owners and their lawful heirs were convincingly
testified to by plaintiff-appellant Gaudencio Padigos and his testimony remained uncontroverted.
GMDPealosa III-G
xxxx
Giving due weight to his testimony, we find that x x x the vendors in the aforesaid Deeds of Sale x x x
were not the legal heirs of the registered owners of the disputed land. x x x
xxxx
As for Exhibit 4, the vendor Gavino Padigos is not a legal heir of the registered owner Felix
Padigos. The latters heirs are plaintiff-appellants Expedito Padigos, Henry Padigos and Enrique P.
Malazarte. Accordingly, Exhibit 4 is a patent nullity and did not vest title of Felix Padigos share of Lot 3781 to
Alipio [Gadiano].
As for Exhibit 6, the vendors Gavino and Rodulfo Padigos are not the legal heirs of the registered
owner Geronimo Padigos. Therefore, these fictitious heirs could not validly convey ownership in favor of
Alipio [Gadiano].
xxxx
As for Exhibit 8, the vendor Candido Padigos is not a legal heir of Simplicio Padigos. Therefore, the
former could not vest title of the land to Alipio Bacalso.
As for Exhibit 3, the vendors Gaudencio Padigos, Hermenegilda Padigos and Domingo Padigos are
not the legal heirs of registered owner Fortunata Padigos. Hermenegilda Padigos is not a known heir of any
of the other registered owners of the property.
On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellants Gaudencio and Domingo Padigos are only some of the
collateral grandchildren of Fortunata Padigos. They could not by themselves dispose of the share of
Fortunata Padigos.
xxxx
GMDPealosa III-G
As for Exhibit 5, the vendors in Exhibit 5 are not the legal heirs of Wenceslao Padigos. The children of
registered owner Wenceslao Padigos are: Wenceslao Padigos, Demetrio Padigos and Nelly
Padigos. Therefore, Exhibit 5 is null and void and could not convey the shares of the registered owner
Wenceslao Padigos in favor of Alipio Bacalso.
As for Exhibit 9, the Deed of Sale executed by Alipio [Gadiano] in favor of Alipio Bacalso is also void
because the shares of the registered owners Felix and Geronimo Padigos were not validly conveyed to
Alipio [Gadiano] because Exhibit 4 and 6 were void contracts. Thus, Exhibit 9 is also null and void.[58] (Italics
in the original; underscoring supplied)
The evidence regarding the facts of pedigree of the registered owners and their heirs does not, however, satisfy this
Court. Not only is Gaudencios self-serving testimony uncorroborated; it contradicts itself on material points. For instance,
on direct examination, he testified that Ignacio is his father and Fortunata is his grandmother.[59] On cross-examination,
however, he declared that his father Ignacio is the brother of Fortunata.[60] On direct examination, he testified that his co-
plaintiffs Victoria and Lilia are already dead.[61] On cross-examination, however, he denied knowledge whether the two are
already dead.[62] Also on direct examination, he identified Expedito, Henry, and Enrique as the children of
Felix.[63] Expedito himself testified, however, that he is the son of a certain Mamerto Padigos, the son of a certain Apolonio
Padigos who is in turn the son of Felix.[64]
AT ALL EVENTS, respondents are guilty of laches the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned it or declined to assert it.[65] While,
by express provision of law, no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner may be barred from recovering
possession of property by virtue of laches.[66]
GMDPealosa III-G
Respondents insist, however, that they only learned of the deeds of sale in 1994, the year that Alipio, Sr. allegedly
commenced possession of the property.[67] The record shows, however, that although petitioners started renting out the
land in 1994, they have been tilling it since the 1950s,[68] and Rosendos house was constructed in about 1985.[69] These
acts of possession could not have escaped respondents notice given the following unassailed considerations, inter
alia: Gaudencio testified that he lived on the lot from childhood until 1985, after which he moved to a place three kilometers
away, and after he moved, a certain Vicente Debelos lived on the lot with his permission.[70] Petitioners witness Marina
Alcoseba, their employee,[71] testified that Gaudencio and Domingo used to cut kumpay planted by petitioners tenant on
the lot.[72] The tax declarations in Alipio, Sr.s name for the years 1967-1980 covering a portion of the lot indicate
Fortunatas share to be the north and east boundaries of Alipio, Sr.s;[73] hence, respondents could not have been unaware
of the acts of possession that petitioners exercised over the lot.
Upon the other hand, petitioners have been vigilant in protecting their rights over the lot, which their predecessor-in-
interest Alipio, Sr. had declared in his name for tax purposes as early as 1960, and for which he had been paying taxes
until his death in 1994, by continuing to pay the taxes thereon.[74]
Respondents having failed to establish their claim by preponderance of evidence, their action for quieting of title,
declaration of nullity of documents, recovery of possession, and damages must fail.
A final word. While petitioners attribution of error to the appellate courts implied sanction of the trial courts order for
the demolition pending appeal of the houses of their lessees is well taken, the Court may not consider any grant of relief to
them, they not being parties to the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 6, 2005 decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. CEB-17326 of Branch 16 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is DISMISSED.
GMDPealosa III-G
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
SECOND DIVISION
ANICIA VALDEZ-TALLORIN, G.R. No. 177429

Petitioner,
Present:
Carpio, J., Chairperson,
- versus - Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion,
Del Castillo, and
Abad, JJ.
HEIRS OF JUANITO TARONA,
Represented by CARLOS TARONA,
ROGELIO TARONA and Promulgated:
LOURDES TARONA,
Respondents. November 24, 2009
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
GMDPealosa III-G
This case is about a courts annulment of a tax declaration in the names of three persons, two of whom had not
been impleaded in the case, for the reason that the document was illegally issued to them.
The Facts and the Case
On February 9, 1998 respondents Carlos, Rogelio, and Lourdes Tarona (the Taronas) filed an action before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan,[1]against petitioner Anicia Valdez-Tallorin (Tallorin) for the cancellation of her and
two other womens tax declaration over a parcel of land.
The Taronas alleged in their complaint that, unknown to them, in 1981, the Assessors Office of Morong in Bataan
cancelled Tax Declaration 463 in the name of their father, Juanito Tarona (Juanito), covering 6,186 square meters of land
in Morong, Bataan. The cancellation was said to be based on an unsigned though notarized affidavit that Juanito allegedly
executed in favor of petitioner Tallorin and two others, namely, Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez,
who were not impleaded in the action. In place of the cancelled one, the Assessors Office issued Tax Declaration 6164 in
the names of the latter three persons. The old man Taronas affidavit had been missing and no copy could be found
among the records of the Assessors Office.[2]
The Taronas further alleged that, without their fathers affidavit on file, it followed that his tax declaration had been
illegally cancelled and a new one illegally issued in favor of Tallorin and the others with her. The unexplained
disappearance of the affidavit from official files, the Taronas concluded, covered-up the falsification or forgery that caused
GMDPealosa III-G
the substitution.[3] The Taronas asked the RTC to annul Tax Declaration 6164, reinstate Tax Declaration 463, and issue a
new one in the name of Juanitos heirs.
On March 6, 1998 the Taronas filed a motion to declare petitioner Tallorin in default for failing to answer their
complaint within the allowed time.[4] But, before the RTC could act on the motion, Tallorin filed a belated answer, alleging
among others that she held a copy of the supposedly missing affidavit of Juanito who was merely an agricultural tenant of
the land covered by Tax Declaration 463. He surrendered and waived in that affidavit his occupation and tenancy rights to
Tallorin and the others in consideration of P29,240.00. Tallorin also put up the affirmative defenses of non-compliance
with the requirement of conciliation proceedings and prescription.
On March 12, 1998 the RTC set Tallorins affirmative defenses for hearing[5] but the Taronas sought
reconsideration, pointing out that the trial court should have instead declared Tallorin in default based on their earlier
motion.[6] On June 2, 1998 the RTC denied the Taronas motion for reconsideration[7] for the reasons that it received
Tallorins answer before it could issue a default order and that the Taronas failed to show proof that Tallorin was notified of
the motion three days before the scheduled hearing. Although the presiding judge inhibited himself from the case on
motion of the Taronas, the new judge to whom the case was re-raffled stood by his predecessors previous orders.
By a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA),[8] however, the Taronas succeeded in
getting the latter court to annul the RTCs March 12 and June 2, 1998 orders.[9] The CA ruled that the RTC gravely abused
GMDPealosa III-G
its discretion in admitting Tallorins late answer in the absence of a motion to admit it. Even if petitioner Tallorin had
already filed her late answer, said the CA, the RTC should have heard the Taronas motion to declare Tallorin in default.
Upon remand of the case, the RTC heard the Taronas motion to declare Tallorin in default,[10] granted the same, and
directed the Taronas to present evidence ex parte.[11]
On January 30, 2002 the RTC rendered judgment, a) annulling the tax declaration in the names of Tallorin,
Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez, and Dolores Valdez; b) reinstating the tax declaration in the name of Juanito; and c)
ordering the issuance in its place of a new tax declaration in the names of Juanitos heirs. The trial court also ruled that
Juanitos affidavit authorizing the transfer of the tax declaration had no binding force since he did not sign it.
Tallorin appealed the above decision to the CA,[12] pointing out 1) that the land covered by the tax declaration in question
was titled in her name and in those of her two co-owners; 2) that Juanitos affidavit only dealt with the surrender of his
tenancy rights and did not serve as basis for canceling Tax Declaration 463 in his name; 3) that, although Juanito did not
sign the affidavit, he thumbmarked and acknowledged the same before a notary public; and 4) that the trial court erred in
not dismissing the complaint for failure to implead Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez who were
indispensable parties in the action to annul Juanitos affidavit and the tax declaration in their favor.[13]
On May 22, 2006 the CA rendered judgment, affirming the trial courts decision.[14] The CA rejected all of Tallorins
arguments. Since she did not assign as error the order declaring her in default and since she took no part at the trial, the
CA pointed out that her claims were in effect mere conjectures, not based on evidence of record.[15] Notably, the CA did
GMDPealosa III-G
not address the issue Tallorin raised regarding the Taronas failure to implead Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and
Dolores Valdez as indispensable party-defendants, their interest in the cancelled tax declarations having been affected by
the RTC judgment.
Questions Presented
The petition presents the following questions for resolution by this Court:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in failing to dismiss the Taronas complaint for not impleading
Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez in whose names, like their co-owner Tallorin, the
annulled tax declaration had been issued;
2. Whether or not the CA erred in not ruling that the Taronas complaint was barred by prescription;
and
3. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs finding that Juanitos affidavit had no legal effect
because it was unsigned; when at the hearing of the motion to declare Tallorin in default, it was shown that
the affidavit bore Juanitos thumbmark.
The Courts Rulings
GMDPealosa III-G
The first question, whether or not the CA erred in failing to dismiss the Taronas complaint for not impleading Margarita
Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez in whose names, like their co-owner Tallorin, the annulled tax declaration
had been issued, is a telling question.
The rules mandate the joinder of indispensable parties. Thus:
Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs and defendants.[16]
Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their
rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence.[17] Joining indispensable parties into an action is
mandatory, being a requirement of due process. Without their presence, the judgment of the court cannot attain real
finality.
Judgments do not bind strangers to the suit. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions
of the court null and void. Indeed, it would have no authority to act, not only as to the absent party, but as to those present
as well. And where does the responsibility for impleading all indispensable parties lie? It lies in the plaintiff.[18]
Here, the Taronas sought the annulment of the tax declaration in the names of defendant Tallorin and two others, namely,
Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez and, in its place, the reinstatement of the previous declaration in
GMDPealosa III-G
their father Juanitos name. Further, the Taronas sought to strike down as void the affidavit in which Juanito renounced his
tenancy right in favor of the same three persons. It is inevitable that any decision granting what the Taronas wanted would
necessarily affect the rights of such persons to the property covered by the tax declaration.
The Court cannot discount the importance of tax declarations to the persons in whose names they are
issued. Their cancellation adversely affects the rights and interests of such persons over the properties that the
documents cover. The reason is simple: a tax declaration is a primary evidence, if not the source, of the right to claim title
of ownership over real property, a right enforceable against another person. The Court held in Uriarte v. People[19] that,
although not conclusive, a tax declaration is a telling evidence of the declarants possession which could ripen into
ownership.
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,[20] the Court said that no one in his right mind would pay taxes for a
property that he did not have in his possession.This honest sense of obligation proves that the holder claims title over the
property against the State and other persons, putting them on notice that he would eventually seek the issuance of a
certificate of title in his name. Further, the tax declaration expresses his intent to contribute needed revenues to the
Government, a circumstance that strengthens his bona fide claim to ownership.[21]
Here, the RTC and the CA annulled Tax Declaration 6164 that belonged not only to defendant Tallorin but also to
Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez, which two persons had no opportunity to be heard as they were
never impleaded. The RTC and the CA had no authority to annul that tax declaration without seeing to it that all three
persons were impleaded in the case.
GMDPealosa III-G
But the Taronas action cannot be dismissed outright. As the Court held in Plasabas v. Court of Appeals,[22] the non-
joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal. Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the
complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative. Only if plaintiff
refuses to implead an indispensable party, despite the order of the court, may it dismiss the action.
There is a need, therefore, to remand the case to the RTC with an order to implead Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez
and Dolores Valdez as defendants so they may, if they so desire, be heard.
In view of the Courts resolution of the first question, it would serve no purpose to consider the other questions that the
petition presents. The resolution of those questions seems to depend on the complete evidence in the case. This will not
yet happen until all the indispensable party-defendants are impleaded and heard on their evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Balanga, Bataan in Civil Case 6739 dated January 30, 2002 and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
74762 dated May 22, 2006. The Court REMANDS the case to the Regional Trial Court of Balanga,Bataan which
is DIRECTED to have Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez impleaded by the plaintiffs as party-
defendants and, afterwards, to hear the case in the manner prescribed by the rules.
GMDPealosa III-G
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 196894 March 3, 2014
JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO, Petitioners,

vs.
JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the May 6, 2011 Decision1of the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 03896-MIN, which affirmed the September 27, 2010,2 October 7, 20103 and
November 9, 20104 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 14 (RTC-Br. 14), in Civil Case No. 33,551-
2010, an action for Cancellation of Lien. It is entitled "JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation v. The Registry of Deeds for the
City of Davao. Sheriff Robert Medialdea. John & Jane Does. and all persons acting under their directions.
GMDPealosa III-G
This controversy stemmed from various cases of collection for sum of money filed against So Keng Kok, the owner of
various properties including two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 292597 and 292600 (subject properties), which
were attached by various creditors including the petitioners in this case. As a result, the levies were annotated on the back
of the said titles.
Petitioners Jesus G. Crisologo and Nannette B. Crisologo (Spouses Crisologo) were the plaintiffs in two (2) collection
cases before RTC, Branch 15, Davao City (RTC-Br. 15), docketed as Civil Case Nos. 26,810-98 and 26,811-98, against
Robert Limso, So Keng Koc, et al. Respondent JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation (JEWM) was the successor-in-interest
of one Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in another collection case before RTC, Branch 8, Davao City (RTC-Br. 8), docketed as
Civil Case No. 26,513-98, against the same defendants.
On October 19, 1998, RTC-Br. 8 rendered its decision based on a compromise agreement, dated October 15, 1998,
between the parties wherein the defendants in said case were directed to transfer the subject properties in favor of Sy
Sen Ben. The latter subsequently sold the subject properties to one Nilda Lam who, in turn, sold the same to JEWM on
June 1, 2000. Thereafter, TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676 were eventually issued in the name of JEWM, both of which still
bearing the same annotations as well as the notice of lis pendens in connection with the other pending cases filed against
So Keng Kok.
A year thereafter, Spouses Crisologo prevailed in the separate collection case filed before RTC-Br. 15 against Robert Lim
So and So Keng Koc (defendants). Thus, on July 1, 1999, the said defendants were ordered to solidarily pay the Spouses
Crisologo. When this decision attained finality, they moved for execution. On June 15, 2010, a writ was eventually issued.
Acting on the same, the Branch Sheriff issued a notice of sale scheduling an auction on August 26, 2010. The notice of
sale included, among others, the subject properties covered by TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676, now, in the name of
JEWM.
In the same proceedings, JEWM immediately filed its Affidavit of Third Party Claim and the Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam. It
prayed for the exclusion of the subject properties from the notice of sale. In an order, dated August 26, 2010, however, the
motion was denied. In turn, the Spouses Crisologo posted a bond in order to proceed with the execution.
To protect its interest, JEWM filed a separate action for cancellation of lien with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction before RTC-Br. 14, docketed as Civil Case No. 33,551-2010. It prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
GMDPealosa III-G
injunction to prevent the public sale of the subject properties covered in the writ of execution issued pursuant to the ruling
of RTC-Br. 15; the cancellation of all the annotations on the back of the pertinent TCTs; and the issuance of a permanent
injunction order after trial on the merits. "The Register of Deeds of Davao City, Sheriff Robert Medialdea, John and Jane
Does and all persons acting under their direction" were impleaded as defendants.
At the scheduled hearing before RTC-Br. 14 on September 22, 2010, Spouses Crisologos counsel appeared and filed in
open court their Very Urgent Manifestation questioning the authority of the said court to restrain the execution
proceedings in RTC-Br. 15. JEWM opposed it on the ground that Spouses Crisologo were not parties in the case.
On September 24, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the denial of the application for writ or
preliminary injuction filed by JEWM and asking for their recognition as parties. No motion to intervene was, however, filed
as the Spouses Crisologo believed that it was unnecessary since they were already the John and Jane Does named in
the complaint.
In the Order, dated September 27, 2010, RTC-Br. 14 denied Spouses Crisologos Omnibus Motion and granted JEWMs
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
On October 1, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion before RTC-Br. 14 praying for
reconsideration and the setting aside of its September 27, 2010 Order. This was denied in the RTC Br.-14s October 7,
2010 Order for lack of legal standing in court considering that their counsel failed to make the written formal notice of
appearance. The copy of this order was received by Spouses Crisologo on October 22, 2010. It must be noted, however,
that on October 27, 2010, they received another order, likewise dated October 7, 2010, giving JEWM time to comment on
their Very Urgent Omnibus Motion filed on October 1, 2010. In its Order, dated November 9, 2010, however, RTC-Br. 14
again denied the Very Urgent Motion previously filed by Spouses Crisologo.
On November 12, 2010, JEWM moved to declare the "defendants" in default which was granted in an order given in open
court on November 19, 2010.
Spouses Crisologo then filed their Very Urgent Manifestation, dated November 30, 2010, arguing that they could not be
deemed as defaulting parties because they were not referred to in the pertinent motion and order of default.
GMDPealosa III-G
On November 19, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari5 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the RTC-Br. 14 orders, dated September 27, 2010, October 7, 2010 and November 9, 2010, all of which denied
their motion to be recognized as parties. They also prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
In its Resolution, dated January 6, 2011, the CA denied the application for a TRO, but directed Spouses Crisologo to
amend their petition. On January 19, 2011, the Spouses Crisologo filed their Amended Petition6 with prayers for the
issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the annulment of the aforementioned orders of RTC Br. 14, and
the issuance of an order dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued in favor of JEWM.
Pending disposition of the Amended Petition by the CA, JEWM filed a motion on December 6, 2010 before RTC-Br. 14
asking for the resolution of the case on the merits.
On January 10, 2011, RTC-Br. 14 ruled in favor of JEWM, with the dispositive portion of its Decision7 stating as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff as follows:
1. the preliminary writ of injunction issued on October 5, 2010 is hereby made permanent;
2. directing herein defendant Registry of Deeds of Davao City where the subject lands are located, to cancel all
existing liens and encumbrances on TCT No. T-325675 and T-325676 registered in the name of the plaintiff, and
pay the
3. cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.8
Spouses Crisologo then filed their Omnibus Motion Ex Abudanti ad Cautelam, asking RTC- Br. 14 to reconsider the above
decision. Because no motion for intervention was filed prior to the rendition of the judgment, a certificate, dated March 17,
2011, was issued declaring the January 10, 2011 decision final and executory.
GMDPealosa III-G
On May 6, 2011, the CA eventually denied the Amended Petition filed by Spouses Crisologo for lack of merit. It ruled that
the writ of preliminary injunction subject of the petition was already fait accompli and, as such, the issue of grave abuse of
discretion attributed to RTC-Br. 14 in granting the relief had become moot and academic. It further held that the failure of
Spouses Crisologo to file their motion to intervene under Rule 19 rendered Rule 65 inapplicable as a vehicle to ventilate
their supposed right in the case.9
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
I. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the action for Cancellation of Annotations may proceed even without
notice to and impleading the party/ies who caused the annotations, in clear contravention of the rule on joinder of
parties and basic due process.
II. The Court of Appeals erred in applying a very constrictive interpretation of the rules in holding that a motion to
intervene is the only way an otherwise real party in interest could participate.
III. The Court of Appeals erred in denying our application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a
writ of preliminary injunction.
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the issues raised by petitioners before it [had] been mooted by the
January 10, 2011 decision of RTC Branch 14.10
Spouses Crisologo submit as error the CA affirmation of the RTC- Br. 14 ruling that the action for cancellation may
proceed without them being impleaded. They allege deprivation of their right to due process when they were not
impleaded in the case before RTC-Br. 14 despite the claim that they stand, as indispensable parties, to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the action for the cancellation of annotations covering the subject properties. They cite
Gonzales v. Judge Bersamin,11 among others, as authority. In that case, the Court ruled that pursuant to Section 108 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, notice must be given to all parties in interest before the court may hear and
determine the petition for the cancellation of annotations on the certificates of title.
GMDPealosa III-G
The Spouses Crisologo also question the statement of the CA that their failure to file the motion to intervene under Rule
19 before RTC-Br. 14 barred their participation in the cancellation proceedings. They put emphasis on the courts duty to,
at the very least, suspend the proceedings before it and have such indispensable parties impleaded.
As to the ruling on the denial of their application for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction, Spouses
Crisologo claim that their adverse interest, evinced by the annotations at the back of the certificates of title, warranted the
issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction against JEWMs attempt to cancel the said annotations in violation of
their fundamental right to due process.
Lastly, Spouses Crisologo cast doubt on the CA ruling that the issues presented in their petition were mooted by the RTC-
Br. 14 Decision, dated January 10, 2011. Having been rendered without impleading indispensable parties, the said
decision was void and could not have mooted their petition.
In their Comment,12 JEWM asserts that Spouses Crisologos failure to file a motion to intervene, pleadings-in-intervention,
appeal or annulment of judgment, which were plain, speedy and adequate remedies then available to them, rendered
recourse to Rule 65 as improper; that Spouses Crisologo lacked the legal standing to file a Rule 65 petition since they
were not impleaded in the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14; and that Spouses Crisologo were not indispensable parties
since their rights over the properties had been rendered ineffective by the final and executory October 19, 1998 Decision
of RTC-Br. 8 which disposed unconditionally and absolutely the subject properties in favor of its predecessor-in-interest.
JEWM further argues that, on the assumption that Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 applies, no notice to Spouses Crisologo
was required because they were not real parties-in-interest in the case before RTC-Br. 14, or even if they were, their non-
participation in the proceedings was because of their failure to properly intervene pursuant to Rule 19; and, lastly, that the
case before RTC-Br. 14 became final and executory because Spouses Crisologos did not perfect an appeal therefrom,
thus, rendering the issues in the CA petition moot and academic.
In their Reply,13 Spouses Crisologo restate the applicability of Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 to the effect that any
cancellation of annotation of certificates of title must be carried out by giving notice to all parties-in-interest. This they
forward despite their recognition of the mootness of their assertion over the subject properties, to wit:
GMDPealosa III-G
Again, we respect JAICs position that "the claims of subsequent attaching creditors (including petitioners) have been
rendered moot and academic, and hence the entries in favor of said creditors have no more legal basis and therefore
must be cancelled." But we likewise at least ask a modicum of respect by at least being notified and heard.14
The Ruling of the Court
The crux of this controversy is whether the CA correctly ruled that RTC-Br. 14 acted without grave abuse of discretion in
failing to recognize Spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties in the case for cancellation of lien.
In this respect, the Court agrees with Spouses Crisologo.
In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at the back of a certificate of title, the persons considered as
indispensable include those whose liens appear as annotations pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529,15 to wit:
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. -No erasure, alteration or amendment shall be made upon the
registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the
Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or other person having an
interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land
Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether
vested, contingent, expectant inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not
appearing upon the certificates have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a
certificate or memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate; x x x or upon any other reasonable ground; and the
court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a
new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms
and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper.
In Southwestern University v. Laurente,16 the Court held that the cancellation of the annotation of an encumbrance cannot
be ordered without giving notice to the parties annotated in the certificate of title itself. It would, thus, be an error for a
judge to contend that no notice is required to be given to all the persons whose liens were annotated at the back of a
certificate of title.
GMDPealosa III-G
Here, undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologos liens were indeed annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 325675 and
325676. Thus, as persons with their liens annotated, they stand to be benefited or injured by any order relative to the
cancellation of annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In other words, they are as indispensable as JEWM itself in the final
disposition of the case for cancellation, being one of the many lien holders.
As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should have been joined as defendants in the case pursuant to Section 7,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had
of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.17
The reason behind this compulsory joinder of indispensable parties is the complete determination of all possible issues,
not only between the parties themselves but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment.18
In this case, RTC-Br. 14, despite repeated pleas by Spouses Crisologo to be recognized as indispensable parties, failed
to implement the mandatory import of the aforecited rule.
In fact, in Sps. Crisologo v. Judge George E. Omelio,19 a related administrative case, the Court found the trial judge guilty
of gross ignorance of the law when it disregarded the claims of Spouses Crisologo to participate. In part, the Court stated:
This is not the first time Judge Omelio has rendered a decision affecting third parties interests, without even notifying the
indispensable parties. In the first disputed case, JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Register of Deeds, Sheriff
Medialdea, John & Jane Does and all persons acting under their directions, Judge Omelio failed to cause the service of
proper summons upon the John and Jane Does impleaded in the complaint. Even when Sps. Crisologo voluntarily
appeared in court to be recognized as the John and Jane Does, Judge Omelio refused to acknowledge their appearance
and ordered the striking out of Sps. Crisologos' pleadings. For this reason, the Investigating Justice recommended
admonishing Judge Omelio for failing to recognize the Sps.Crisologo as indispensable parties in that case.
xxx xxx xxx
GMDPealosa III-G
Clearly, the cancellation of the annotation of the sale without notifying the buyers, Sps. Crisologo, is a violation of the
latters right to due process. Since this is the second time that Judge Omelio has issued an order which fails to notify or
summon the indispensable parties, we find Judge Omelio guilty of gross ignorance of the law, with a warning that
repetition of the same or similar act will merit a stiffer penalty in the future.
xxx
WHEREFORE, We find Judge George E. Omelio GUILTY of four counts of the serious charge of gross ignorance of
the law for the following acts: (a) refusing to recognize Spouses Jesus G. Crisologo and Nannette B. Crisologo as
indispensable parties; in violation of the latter's right to due process. Accordingly, we impose upon Judge George E.
Omelio the penalty of fine of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), with a warning that repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.20
The trial court should have exercised prudence in denying Spouses Crisologos pleas to be recognized as indispensable
parties. In the words of the Court, "Judge Omelio should be penalized for failing to recognize Sps. Crisologo as
indispensable parties and for requiring them to file a motion to intervene, considering that a simple perusal of the
certificates of title would show Sps. Crisologos adverse rights because their liens are annotated at the back of the
titles."21
This manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.
In State Prosecutors II Comilang and Lagman v. Judge Medel Belen,22 the Court held as inexcusable abuse of authority
the trial judges "obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or procedure." Such level of ignorance is not a
mere error of judgment. It amounts to "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law,"23 or in essence, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Needless to say, judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws.
They must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith as judicial competence requires no less.24
GMDPealosa III-G
Despite the clear existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-Br. 14, JEWM asserts technical grounds on
why the CA did not err in dismissing the petition via Rule 65. It states that:
a) The Crisologos could have used other available remedies such as intervention under Rule 19, an appeal of the
judgment, or even an annulment of judgment, which are, by all means, plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the
ordinary course of law;
b) The Crisologos lack legal standing to file the Rule 65 petition since they were not impleaded in the Branch 14
case.
The rule is that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only if there is no appeal, or any plain speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In this case, no adequate recourse, at that time, was available to Spouses Crisologo, except resorting to Rule 65.
Although Intervention under Rule 19 could have been availed of, failing to use this remedy should not prejudice Spouses
Crisologo. It is the duty of RTC-Br. 14, following the rule on joinder of indispensable parties, to simply recognize them,
with or without any motion to intervene. Through a cursory reading of the titles, the Court would have noticed the adverse
rights of Spouses Crisologo over the cancellation of any annotations in the subject TCTs.
Neither will appeal prove adequate as a remedy since only the original parties to an action can appeal.25 Here, Spouses
Crisologo were never impleaded. Hence, they could not have utilized appeal as they never possessed the required legal
standing in the first place.
And even if the Court assumes the existence of the legal standing to appeal, it must be remembered that the questioned
orders were interlocutory in character and, as such, Spouses Crisologo would have to wait, for the review by appeal, until
the rendition of the judgment on the merits, which at that time may not be coming as speedy as practicable. While waiting,
Spouses Crisologo would have to endure the denial of their right, as indispensable parties, to participate in a proceeding
in which their indispensability was obvious. Indeed, appeal cannot constitute an adequate, speedy and plain remedy.
GMDPealosa III-G
The same is also true if recourse to Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 is made since this remedy presupposes a final
judgment already rendered by a trial court.
At any rate, the remedy against an interlocutory order, not subject of an appeal, is an appropriate special civil action under
Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Only then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.26
This takes particular relevance in this case where, as previously discussed, RTC-Br. 14 acted with grave abuse of
discretion in not recognizing Spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties to the pertinent action.
Based on the above, recourse to the CA via Rule 65 would have already been proper, except for one last issue, that is,
Spouses Crisologos legal standing to file the same. JEWM cites DBP v. COA27 where the Court held:
The petition for certiorari under Rule 65, however, is not available to any person who feels injured by the decision of a
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions. The person aggrieved under Section 1 of Rule 65
who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains only to one who was a party in the proceedings before the
court a quo, or in this case before the COA. To hold otherwise would open the courts to numerous and endless litigations.
Under normal circumstances, JEWM would be correct in their averment that the lack of legal standing on the part of
Spouses Crisologo in the case before RTC-Br. 14 prevents the latters recourse via Rule 65.
This case, however, is an exception. In many instances, the Court has ruled that technical rules of procedures should be
used to promote, not frustrate the cause of justice. Rules of procedure are tools designed not to thwart but to facilitate the
attainment of justice; thus, their strict and rigid application may, for good and deserving reasons, have to give way to, and
be subordinated by, the need to aptly dispense substantial justice in the normal cause.28
Be it noted that the effect of their non-participation as indispensable parties is to preclude the judgment, orders and the
proceedings from attaining finality. Time and again, the Court has ruled that the absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even to those present. Consequently, the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14 were null and void including the assailed orders,
which may be "ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head."29
GMDPealosa III-G
To turn a blind eye to the said nullity and, in turn, rule as improper the recourse to Rule 65 by the lack of legal standing is
to prolong the denial of due process to the persons whose interests are indispensible to the final disposition of the case. It
will only result in a protracted litigation as Spouses Crisologo will be forced to rely on a petition for the annulment of
judgment before the CA (as the last remaining remedy), which may again reach this Court.1wphi1 To prevent multiplicity
of suits and to expedite the swift administration of justice, the CA should have applied liberality by striking down the
assailed orders despite the lack of legal standing on the part of Spouses Crisologo to file the Rule 65 petition before it.
Besides, this lacking requirement, of which Spouses Crisologo were not even at fault, is precisely the reason why this
controversy arose.
All told, the CA erred in dismissing the amended petition filed before it and in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the
part of RTC-Br. 14.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 6, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals is NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE. The September 27, 2010, October 7, 2010 and November 9, 2010 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14,
Davao City, are likewise NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 33,551-2010 is hereby REMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings. The respondent is ordered to implead all parties whose annotations appear at the back of
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 325675 and 325676.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186610 July 29, 2013
GMDPealosa III-G
POLICE SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT DIMAPINTO MACAWADIB, Petitioner,
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS
MANAGEMENT,Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set aside
the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated December 17, 2008 and February 25, 2009,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02120-MIN. The assailed CA judgment nullified the December 4, 2001 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi City, Branch 8, in Spl. Proc. No. 782-01, while the questioned CA Resolution denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Petitioner was a police officer with the rank of Police Senior Superintendent. On July 30, 2001, pursuant to the provisions
of Section 39 of Republic Act 6975, otherwise known as the "Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of
1990," the Chief of Directorial Staff of the Philippine National Police (PNP) issued General Order No. 1168, enumerating
the names of commissioned officers who were subject to compulsory retirement on various dates in the month of January
2002 by virtue of their attainment of the compulsory retirement age of 56. Among the names included in the said Order
was that of petitioner, who was supposed to retire on January 11, 2002, as the files of the PNP Records Management
Division indicate that he was born on January 11, 1946.
On September 3, 2001, petitioner filed an application for late registration of his birth with the Municipal Civil Registrar's
Office of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. In the said application, petitioner swore under oath that he was born on January 11,
1956. The application was, subsequently, approved.
On October 15, 2001, petitioner filed with the RTC of Marawi City, Branch 8, a Petition for Correction of Entry in the Public
Service Records Regarding the Birth Date. Pertinent portions of his allegations are as follows:
GMDPealosa III-G
xxxx
1. That herein petitioner is 45 years old, married, Filipino citizen, PNP (Police Superintendent) by occupation and
resident of Camp Bagong Amai, Pakpak, Marawi City. x x x;
2. That on January 11, 1956, herein petitioner was born in Mulondo, Lanao del Sur, x x x, copy of his live birth
certificate is attached and marked as Annex "A", for ready reference;
3. That when petitioner herein joined with (sic) the government service, particularly the local police force and later
on the Integrated National Police, he honestly entered his birth date as January 11, 1946, while in his (sic)
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS, in short) and National Police Commission, he erroneously entered
his birth date as January 11, 1946, which entry are honestly based on estimation, as Muslim (sic) in the south do
not register their marriages and births before;
4. That herein petitioner has correctly entered his true and correct birth date, January 11, 1956, in his Service
Record at the National Headquarters, Philippine National Police, Directorate for Personnel and Records
Management, Camp Crame, Quezon City, copy of which is attached and marked as Annex "B", x x x;
5. That herein petitioner is submitting Joint Affidavit of two (2) disinterested person (sic) x x x;
6. That this petition is not intended to defraud anybody but to establish the true and correct birth date of herein
petitioner.
x x x x4
The petition was docketed as Spl. Proc. No. 782-01.
On December 4, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner DIMAPINTO BABAI MACAWADIB, to wit:
GMDPealosa III-G
1. Ordering the Chief, Records Management, PNP NHQ, Camp Crame, Quezon City, to make a correction upon
the birth date of herein petitioner to January 11, 1956;
2. Ordering the Director, Personnel and Records Management Service, NAPOLCOM, Makati City, to make
correction upon the birth date of herein petitioner from January 11, 1946 to January 11, 1956; and
3. Ordering the Chief, Records of the Civil Service Commission, Manila and all other offices concern (sic), to make
the necessary correction in the Public Records of herein petitioner to January 11, 1956.
SO ORDERED.5
Subsequently, the RTC issued an Entry of Final Judgment6 indicating therein that its December 4, 2001 Decision in Spl.
Proc. No. 782-01 has become final and executory on March 13, 2002.
On January 8, 2008, herein respondent filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the CA, seeking to nullify the above-mentioned
Decision of the RTC on the ground that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the PNP, "an unimpleaded
indispensable party."7
On December 17, 2008, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition impressed with merit, the same is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated December 4, 2001 of the respondent court in Spl. Proc. No. 782-01 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Also, so as to
prevent further damage upon the PNP, let a permanent injunction issue in the meantime, barring the private respondent
Dimapinto Babai Macawadib from continuing and prolonging his tenure with the PNP beyond the mandatory retirement
age of fifty-six (56) years.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but the CA denied it in its Resolution10 dated February 25, 2009.
GMDPealosa III-G
Hence, the instant petition with the following Assignment of Errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PNP-DPRM IS AN INDISPENSABLE

PARTY IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 782-01 AND THAT THE RTC HAVE (sic) NOT ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE PNPDPRM.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING CA-G.R. SP NO. 02120-MIN
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ASSAILED RTC DECISION DATED DECEMBER 4, 2001 IN SPECIAL
PROCEEDING NO. 782-01 HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND WAS IN FACT FULLY AND
COMPLETELY EXECUTED AFTER THE PNP-DPRM CORRECTED THE DATE OF BIRTH OF THE PETITIONER
FROM JANUARY 11, 1946 TO JANUARY 11, 1956.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PNP-DPRM IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM
ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF THE RTC DECISION IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 782-01.
4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING CA-G.R. SP NO. 02120-MIN FOR
BEING INSUFFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE.11
In his first assigned error, petitioner contends that respondent is not an indispensable party.1wphi1 The Court is not
persuaded. On the contrary, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that it is the integrity and correctness of the public
records in the custody of the PNP, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and Civil Service Commission (CSC) which
are involved and which would be affected by any decision rendered in the petition for correction filed by herein petitioner.
The aforementioned government agencies are, thus, required to be made parties to the proceeding. They are
indispensable parties, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. An indispensable party is defined as
one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his
absence, without injuring or affecting that interest.12 In the fairly recent case of Go v. Distinction Properties Development
and Construction, Inc.,13 the Court had the occasion to reiterate the principle that:
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, "parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants." If there is a failure to implead an indispensable party, any judgment
rendered would have no effectiveness.
GMDPealosa III-G
It is "precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action should be dismissed. The absence of
an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties but even to those present." The purpose of the rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a complete
determination of all issues not only between the parties themselves, but also as regards other persons who may be
affected by the judgment. A decision valid on its face cannot attain real finality where there is want of indispensable
parties.14
Citing previous authorities, the Court also held in the Go case that:
The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires the joinder of all indispensable parties
under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power. (Borlasa v. Polistico,
47 Phil. 345, 348) For this reason, our Supreme Court has held that when it appears of record that there are other
persons interested in the subject matter of the litigation, who are not made parties to the action, it is the duty of the court
to suspend the trial until such parties are made either plaintiffs or defendants. (Pobre, et al. v. Blanco, 17 Phil. 156). x x x
Where the petition failed to join as party defendant the person interested in sustaining the proceeding in the court, the
same should be dismissed. x x x When an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed.15
The burden of procuring the presence of all indispensable parties is on the plaintiff.16
In the instant case, there is a necessity to implead the PNP, NAPOLCOM and CSC because they stand to be adversely
affected by petitioner's petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations in petitioner's service records.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), if petitioner's service is extended by ten years, the government, through the PNP,
shall be burdened by the additional salary and benefits that would have to be given to petitioner during such extension.
Thus, aside from the OSG, all other agencies which may be affected by the change should be notified or represented as
the truth is best ascertained under an adversary system of justice.
As the above-mentioned agencies were not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceedings, the
decision of the trial court granting petitioner's prayer for the correction of entries in his service records, is void. As
GMDPealosa III-G
mentioned above, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.17
On the question of whether or not respondent is estopped from assailing the decision of the RTC for failure of the OSG,
as government representative, to participate in the proceedings before the trial court or to file an opposition to petitioner's
petition for correction of entries in his service records, this Court rules that such an apparent oversight has no bearing on
the validity of the appeal which the petitioner filed before the CA. Neither can the State, as represented by the
government, be considered in estoppel due to the petitioner's seeming acquiescence to the judgment of the RTC when it
initially made corrections to some of petitioner's records with the PNP. This Court has reiterated time and again that the
absence of opposition from government agencies is of no controlling significance, because the State cannot be estopped
by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents.18 Nor is the Republic barred from assailing the decision granting
the petition for correction of entries if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no merit.19
As to the second and last assigned errors, suffice it to say that considering that the assailed decision of the RTC is null
and void, the same could not have attained finality. Settled is the rule that a void judgment cannot attain finality and its
execution has no basis in law.20
At this juncture, it may not be amiss to point out that, like the CA, this Court cannot help but entertain serious doubts on
the veracity of petitioner's claim that he was indeed born in 1956. The late registration of petitioner's certificate of live birth
on September 3, 2001 was made forty-five (45) years after his supposed birth and a mere 34 days after the PNP's
issuance of its Order for his compulsory retirement. He had all the time to make such registration but why did he do it only
when he was about to retire?
The Court, likewise, agrees with the observation of the OSG that, if petitioner was indeed born in 1956, he would have
been merely 14 years old in 1970 when he was appointed as Chief of Police of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. This would not
have been legally tenable, considering that Section 9 of RA 4864, otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966, provides,
among others, that a person shall not be appointed to a local police agency if he is less than twenty-three years of age.
Moreover, realistically speaking, it would be difficult to believe that a 14-year old minor would serve as a police officer,
much less a chief of police.
GMDPealosa III-G
The Court also gives credence to the pronouncement made by the CA which took judicial notice that in the several
hearings of the petition before the appellate court where the petitioner was present, the CA observed that "in the several
hearings of this petition before Us where the private respondent was present, he does not really appear to be 52 years old
but his old age of 62."21
It can be argued that petitioner's belatedly registered certificate of live birth, as a public document, enjoys the presumption
of validity. However, petitioner merely relied on such presumption without presenting any other convincing or credible
evidence to prove that he was really born in 1956. On the contrary, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well
as the totality of the evidence presented during the hearing of the case in the court a quo, sufficiently negate the
presumption of regularity accorded to petitioner's belatedly registered birth certificate.
In this regard, it is also apropos to mention that, in cases of correction or change of information based on belatedly
registered birth certificates, the CSC no longer requires a court order to warrant such correction or change of information
in its records. However, in an apparent move to safeguard its records, the CSC imposes the submission of additional
evidence that would prove the veracity of the entries in a belatedly registered birth certificate. Thus, the CSC, in its
Memorandum Circular No. 31, dated November 20, 2001, demands that, aside from the said birth certificate, the person
requesting the correction or change of information must submit other authenticated supporting documents, such as
baptismal certificate, affidavits of two disinterested witnesses, and "other employment, personal or school records which
would support the entry reflected in the delayed registered birth certificate and which entry is requested to be reflected in
the records of the Commission as the true and correct entry." In the instant case, petitioner was only able to submit
affidavits of two witnesses, who were not really proven to be disinterested and whose testimonies were not even tested in
the crucible of cross-examination. On the contrary, the other pieces of documentary evidence on record, such as his
marriage certificate, and his school and service records, contradict his claims and show that he was, in fact, born in 1946.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated December 17, 2008 and the
Resolution dated February 25, 2009 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02120-MIN, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
GMDPealosa III-G
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,

vs.
DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Court of Appeals
(CA)1Decision2 dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution3 dated July 27, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN. The
assailed decision dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines and, consequently, affirmed in toto
the June 28, 2004 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Gingoog City in Special Proceedings No. 230-
2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay
Uy; while the assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth.5 Impleaded as
respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged that she was born on February 8, 1952 and is the
illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay6 Her Certificate of Live Birth7 shows that her full name is "Anita Sy"
when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay." She further claimed that her school
GMDPealosa III-G
records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate,8 and passport9 bear the name "Norma
S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married, so she
had to follow the surname of her mother.10 She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her
siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.11
Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog
City to effect the corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly granted.12 However, the National
Statistics Office (NSO) records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC.
On May 13, 2004, the RTC issued an Order13 finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and setting the
case for hearing, with the directive that the said Order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of
Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of
respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City
Prosecutors Office for their information and guidance.14 Pursuant to the RTC Order, respondent complied with the
publication requirement.
On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
GINGOOG CITY, or any person acting in his behalf is directed and ordered to effect the correction or change of the
entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioners name and citizenship so that the entries would be:
a) As to petitioners name :
First Name : NORMA
Middle Name : SY
Last Name : LUGSANAY
GMDPealosa III-G
b) As to petitioners nationality/citizenship :
: FILIPINO
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC concluded that respondents petition would neither prejudice the government nor any third party. It also held that
the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer to one and the same person, especially since the Local Civil
Registrar of Gingoog City has effected the correction. Considering that respondent has continuously used and has been
known since childhood as "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and as a Filipino citizen, the RTC granted the petition to avoid
confusion.16
On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that respondents failure to implead other
indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and
the City Prosecutors Office.17 As to whether the petition is a collateral attack on respondents filiation, the CA ruled in
favor of respondent, considering that her parents were not legally married and that her siblings birth certificates uniformly
state that their surname is Lugsanay and their citizenship is Filipino.18 Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied
in a Resolution dated July 27, 2011.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties.
Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil
register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
GMDPealosa III-G
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court
shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceeding is brought may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or
correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned
who shall annotate the same in his record.19
In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those pertaining to her first
name, surname and citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known for
since childhood, including her legal documents such as passport and school and professional records. She likewise relied
on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings who bear the surname "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship of
"Filipino" instead of "Chinese." The changes, however, are obviously not mere clerical as they touch on respondents
filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from "Sy" (which is the surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is
the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing her
GMDPealosa III-G
citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are
substantial.
It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia20 that even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding.21 The pronouncement of the Court in that case is illuminating:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and
innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted,
affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be
enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle
that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Blacks Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding" as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking
relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption
proceeding.22
In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Courts conclusion in Republic v. Kho,23 Alba v. Court of
Appeals,24 and Barco v. Court of Appeals,25 that the failure to implead indispensable parties was cured by the publication
of the notice of hearing pursuant to the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In Republic v. Kho,26 petitioner
therein appealed the RTC decision granting the petition for correction of entries despite respondents failure to implead
the minors mother as an indispensable party. The Court, however, did not strictly apply the provisions of Rule 108,
because it opined that it was highly improbable that the mother was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in
her childrens birth certificates especially since the notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the
residence she shared with them.27
In Alba v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court found nothing wrong with the trial courts decision granting the petition for
correction of entries filed by respondent although the proceedings was not actually known by petitioner. In that case,
GMDPealosa III-G
petitioners mother and guardian was impleaded in the petition for correction of entries, and notices were sent to her
address appearing in the subject birth certificate. However, the notice was returned unserved, because apparently she no
longer lived there. Thus, when she allegedly learned of the granting of the petition, she sought the annulment of judgment
which the Court denied. Considering that the petition for correction of entries is a proceeding in rem, the Court held that
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner is, therefore, not required and the absence of personal service
was cured by the trial courts compliance with Rule 108 which requires notice by publication.29
In Barco v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court addressed the question of whether the court acquired jurisdiction over petitioner
and all other indispensable parties to the petition for correction of entries despite the failure to implead them in said case.
While recognizing that petitioner was indeed an indispensable party, the failure to implead her was cured by compliance
with Section 4 of Rule 108 which requires notice by publication. In so ruling, the Court pointed out that the petitioner in a
petition for correction cannot be presumed to be aware of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting
of a petition. It emphasized that the petitioner therein exerted earnest effort to comply with the provisions of Rule 108.
Thus, the publication of the notice of hearing was considered to have cured the failure to implead indispensable parties.
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as respondent in the petition below.
This, notwithstanding, the RTC granted her petition and allowed the correction sought by respondent, which decision was
affirmed in toto by the CA.
We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue involved in this case. Aside from Kho, Alba and Barco,
the Court has addressed the same in Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,31 Ceruila v. Delantar,32 and Labayo-Rowe v.
Republic.33
In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,34 claiming that his parents were never legally married, respondent therein filed a
petition to change his name from "Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo," the name appearing in his birth certificate
to "Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng." The notice setting the petition for hearing was published and there
being no opposition thereto, the trial court issued an order of general default and eventually granted respondents petition
deleting the entry on the date and place of marriage of parties; correcting his surname from "Magpayo" to "Coseteng";
deleting the entry "Coseteng" for middle name; and deleting the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for his
GMDPealosa III-G
father. The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, assailed the RTC decision on the grounds that the corrections
made on respondents birth certificate had the effect of changing the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate and must
only be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding. The Court nullified the RTC decision for respondents
failure to comply strictly with the procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Aside from the wrong remedy
availed of by respondent as he filed a petition for Change of Name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, assuming that
he filed a petition under Rule 108 which is the appropriate remedy, the petition still failed because of improper venue and
failure to implead the Civil Registrar of Makati City and all affected parties as respondents in the case.
In Ceruila v. Delantar,35 the Ceruilas filed a petition for the cancellation and annulment of the birth certificate of respondent
on the ground that the same was made as an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and, therefore, invalid and
spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein. The RTC issued an order setting the case for hearing with a directive
that the same be published and that any person who is interested in the petition may interpose his comment or opposition
on or before the scheduled hearing. Summons was likewise sent to the Civil Register of Manila. After which, the trial court
granted the petition and nullified respondents birth certificate. Few months after, respondent filed a petition for the
annulment of judgment claiming that she and her guardian were not notified of the petition and the trial courts decision,
hence, the latter was issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due process. The Court annulled the trial
courts decision for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 108, especially the non-impleading of respondent
herself whose birth certificate was nullified.1wphi1
In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,36 petitioner filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth certificates of her children,
specifically to change her name from Beatriz V. Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo, her civil status from
"married" to "single," and the date and place of marriage from "1953-Bulan" to "No marriage." The Court modified the trial
courts decision by nullifying the portion thereof which directs the change of petitioners civil status as well as the filiation
of her child, because it was the OSG only that was made respondent and the proceedings taken was summary in nature
which is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought.
Respondents birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and a legitimate child of
Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her
status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have
impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have
interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
GMDPealosa III-G
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served
upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken.37 A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons
named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties.38 Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts
with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the
opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.39
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties may
be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all
possible interested parties.40 Such failure was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves initiated the
corrections proceedings;41 when there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested
parties;42 or when a party is inadvertently left out.43
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court is mandated.44 If the
entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through
appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or
other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.45
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February
18, 2011 and Resolution dated July 27, 20011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN, are SET ASIDE. Consequently, the June
28, 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, in Spl. Proc. No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for
Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy, is NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
GMDPealosa III-G
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAON STRAIT, e.g., TOOTHED WHALES,
DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES, Joined in and Represented herein by Human Beings
Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, In Their Capacity as Legal Guardians of the Lesser Life-
Forms and as Responsible Stewards of God's Creations, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE), SECRETARY
JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, DENR Regional Director-Region VII and in his capacity as Chairperson of the Taon
Strait Protected Seascape Management Board, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), DIRECTOR
MALCOLM J. SARMIENTO, JR., BFAR Regional Director for Region VII ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM
EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES,
INC. Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 181527
CENTRAL VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT CENTER (FIDEC), CERILO D. ENGARCIAL, RAMON YANONG,
FRANCISCO LABID, in their personal capacity and as representatives of the SUBSISTENCE FISHERFOLKS OF
THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ALOGUINSAN AND PINAMUNGAJAN, CEBU, AND THEIR FAMILIES, AND THE
PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS OF FILIPINOS WHOSE RIGHTS ARE SIMILARLY AFFECTED, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE), JOSE L.
GMDPealosa III-G
ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, in his capacity as DENR Regional Director-Region VII and as Chairperson of the
Taon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board, ALAN ARRANGUEZ, in his capacity as Director -
Environmental Management Bureau-Region VII, DOE Regional Director for Region VIII1 ANTONIO LABIOS, JAPAN
PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD
SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before Us are two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, concerning Service Contract No.
46 (SC-46), which allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Taon Strait, a
narrow passage of water situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu.2
The Petition docketed as G.R. No. 180771 is an original Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Injunction, which seeks to
enjoin respondents from implementing SC-46 and to have it nullified for willful and gross violation of the 1987 Constitution
and certain international and municipal laws.3
Likewise, the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 181527 is an original Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus,
which seeks to nullify the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VII in connection with SC-46; to prohibit
respondents from implementing SC-46; and to compel public respondents to provide petitioners access to the pertinent
documents involving the Taon Strait Oil Exploration Project.4
ANTECEDENT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed
whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Taon Strait. They
are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal guardians and
as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the
GMDPealosa III-G
aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, for her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Taon Strait, among others.5
Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit,
non-governmental organization, established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII; and Cerilo D.
Engarcial (Engarcial), Ramon Yanong (Yanong) and Francisco Labid (Labid), in their personal capacities and as
representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu.
Named as respondents in both petitions are the late Angelo T. Reyes, as then Secretary of the Department of Energy
(DOE); Jose L. Atienza, as then Secretary of the DENR; Leonardo R. Sibbaluca, as then DENRRegional Director for
Region VII and Chairman of the Taon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board; Japan Petroleum Exploration Co.,
Ltd. (JAPEX), a company organized and existing under the laws of Japan with a Philippine branch office; and Supply
Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS), as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX.
In G.R. No. 181527, the following were impleaded as additional public respondents: Alan C. Arranguez (Arranguez) and
Antonio Labios (Labios), in their capacities as then Director of the EMB, Region VII and then Regional Director of the
DOE, Region VII, respectively.6
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and
Exploration Contract-I 02 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the
Taon Strait. The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data.
JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Taon
Strait.7
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration, development, and
production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Taon Strait.8
From May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Taon Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom
profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done to determine the area's underwater composition.9
GMDPealosa III-G
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since the well was to be drilled
in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Taon Strait was declared a protected seascape in
1988,10 JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1586, entitled "Establishing An Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other Environmental
Management Related Measures And For Other Purposes."11
On January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board12 of the Taon Strait (PAMB-Taon Strait) issued
Resolution No. 2007-001,13 wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and
favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX's application for an ECC.
On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas
exploration project in Taon Strait.14 Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a
depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province.15 This drilling lasted until February 8,
2008.16
It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that petitioners applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original
petitions both dated December 1 7, 2007, wherein they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing
SC-46 for, among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.
On March 31, 2008, SOS filed a Motion to Strike17 its name as a respondent on the ground that it is not the Philippine
agent of JAPEX. In support of its motion, it submitted the branch office application of JAPEX,18 wherein the latter's
resident agent was clearly identified. SOS claimed that it had acted as a mere logistics contractor for JAPEX in its oil and
gas exploration activities in the Philippines.
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards opposed SOS' s motion on the ground that it was premature, it was
pro-forma, and it was patently dilatory. They claimed that SOS admitted that "it is in law a (sic) privy to JAPEX" since it did
the drilling and other exploration activities in Taon Strait under the instructions of its principal, JAPEX. They argued that it
would be premature to drop SOS as a party as JAPEX had not yet been joined in the case; and that it was "convenient"
for SOS to ask the Court to simply drop its name from the parties when what it should have done was to either notify or
ask JAPEX to join it in its motion to enable proper substitution. At this juncture, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and
GMDPealosa III-G
Stewards also asked the Court to" implead JAPEX Philippines as a corespondent or as a substitute for its parent
company, JAPEX.19
On April 8, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 180771 and G.R. No. 181527.
On May 26, 2008, the FIDEC manifested20 that they were adopting in toto the Opposition to Strike with Motion to Implead
filed by petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards in G.R. No. 180771.
On June 19, 2008, public respondents filed their Manifestation21 that they were not objecting to SOS's Motion to Strike as
it was not JAPEX's resident agent. JAPEX during all this time, did not file any comment at all.
Thus, on February 7, 2012, this Court, in an effort to ensure that all the parties were given ample chance and opportunity
to answer the issues herein, issued a Resolution directing the Court's process servicing unit to again serve the parties
with a copy of the September 23, 2008 Resolution of the Court, which gave due course to the petitions in G.R. Nos.
180771 and 181527, and which required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The February 7, 2012
Resolution22 reads as follows:
G.R. No. 180771 (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Taon Strait, e.g., Toothed Whales, Dolphins,
Porpoises and Other Cetacean Species, et al. vs. Hon. Angelo Reyes, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Energy, et al.) and G.R. No. 181527 (Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center, et al. vs. Hon. Angelo Reyes, et
al.). - The Court Resolved to direct the Process Servicing Unit to RE-SEND the resolution dated September 23, 2008 to
the following parties and counsel, together with this resolution:
Atty. Aristeo O. Carino 20th Floor Pearlbank Centre

Counsel for Respondent Supply 146 Valero Street
Oilfield Services, Inc. Salcedo Village, Makati City
JAPEX Philippines Ltd. 20th Floor Pearlbank Centre

146 Valero Street
Salcedo Village, Makati City
GMDPealosa III-G
JAPEX Philippines Ltd. 19th Floor Pearlbank Centre
c/o Atty. Maria Farah Z.G. 146 Valero Street
Nicolas-Suchianco Salcedo Village, Makati City
Atty. Maria Farah Z.G. Suite 2404 Discovery Centre

Nicolas-Suchianco 25 ADB Avenue
Resident Agent of JAPEX Ortigas Center, Pasig City
Philippines Ltd.
This Resolution was personally served to the above parties, at the above addresses on February 23, 2012. On March 20,
2012, JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. (JAPEX PH), by way of special appearance, filed a Motion to Admit23 its Motion for
Clarification,24 wherein JAPEX PH requested to be clarified as to whether or not it should deem the February 7, 2012
Resolution as this Court's Order of its inclusion in the case, as it has not been impleaded. It also alleged that JAPEX PH
had already stopped exploration activities in the Taft. on Strait way back in 2008, rendering this case moot.
On March 22, 2012, JAPEX PH, also by special appearance, filed a Motion for Extension of Time25 to file its
Memorandum. It stated that since it received the February 7, 2012 Resolution on February 23, 2012, it had until March 22,
2012 to file its Memorandum. JAPEX PH then asked for an additional thirty days, supposedly to give this Court some time
to consider its Motion for Clarification.
On April 24, 2012, this Court issued a Resolution26 granting JAPEX PH's Motion to Admit its Motion for Clarification. This
Court, addressing JAPEX PH's Motion for Clarification, held:
With regard to its Motion for Clarification (By Special Appearance) dated March 19, 2012, this Court considers JAPEX
Philippines, Ltd. as a real party-in-interest in these cases. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court, a real
party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Contrary to JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. 's allegation that it is a completely distinct corporation, which should
not be confused with JAPEX Company, Ltd., JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. is a mere branch office, established by JAPEX
Company, Ltd. for the purpose of carrying out the latter's business transactions here in the Philippines. Thus, JAPEX
Philippines, Ltd., has no separate personality from its mother foreign corporation, the party impleaded in this case.
GMDPealosa III-G
Moreover, Section 128 of the Corporation Code provides for the responsibilities and duties of a resident agent of a foreign
corporation:
SECTION 128. Resident agent; service of process. - The Securities and Exchange Commission shall require as a
condition precedent to the issuance of the license to transact business in the Philippines by any foreign corporation that
such corporation file with the Securities and Exchange Commission a written power of attorney designating some person
who must be a resident of the Philippines, on whom any summons and other legal processes may be served in all actions
or other legal proceedings against such corporation, and consenting that service upon such resident agent shall be
admitted and held as valid as if served upon the duly authorized officers of the foreign corporation at its home office. Any
such foreign corporation shall likewise execute and file with the Securities and Exchange Commission an agreement or
stipulation, executed by the proper authorities of said corporation, in form and substance as follows:
"The (name of foreign corporation) does hereby stipulate and agree, in consideration of its being granted by the Securities
and Exchange Commission a license to transact business in the Philippines, that if at any time said corporation shall
cease to transact business in the Philippines, or shall be without any resident agent in the Philippines on whom any
summons or other legal processes may be served, then in any action or proceeding arising out of any business or
transaction which occurred in the Philippines, service of any summons or other legal process may be made upon the
Securities and Exchange Commission and that such service shall have the same force and effect as if made upon the
duly-authorized officers of the corporation at its home office."
Whenever such service of summons or other process shall be made upon the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Commission shall, within ten (10) days thereafter, transmit by mail a copy of such summons or other legal process to the
corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of such copy by the Commission shall be a necessary part of and
shall complete such service. All expenses incurred by the Commission for such service shall be paid in advance by the
party at whose instance the service is made.
In case of a change of address of the resident agent, it shall be his or its duty to immediately notify in writing the Securities
and Exchange Commission of the new address.
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the function of a resident agent is to receive summons or legal processes that
may be served in all actions or other legal proceedings against the foreign corporation. These cases have been
GMDPealosa III-G
prosecuted in the name of JAPEX Company, Ltd., and JAPEX Philippines Ltd., as its branch office and resident agent,
had been receiving the various resolutions from this Court, as evidenced by Registry Return Cards signed by its
representatives.
And in the interest of justice, this Court resolved to grant JAPEX PH's motion for extension of time to file its memorandum,
and was given until April 21, 2012, as prayed for, within which to comply with the submission.27
Without filing its Memorandum, JAPEX PH, on May 14, 2012, filed a motion, asking this Court for an additional thirty days
to file its Memorandum, to be counted from May 8, 2012. It justified its request by claiming that this Court's April 24, 2012
Resolution was issued past its requested deadline for filing, which was on April 21, 2012.28
On June 19, 2012, this Court denied JAPEX PH's second request for additional time to file its Memorandum and
dispensed with such filing.
Since petitioners had already filed their respective memoranda,29 and public respondents had earlier filed a
Manifestation30 that they were adopting their Comment dated March 31, 2008 as their memorandum, this Court submitted
the case for decision.
Petitioners' Allegations
Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Taon Strait, petitioners Resident
Marine Mammals and Stewards aver that a study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced
drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They claim that before the seismic survey, the average harvest per day would be from 15
to 20 kilos; but after the activity, the fisherfolk could only catch an average of 1 to 2 kilos a day. They attribute this
"reduced fish catch" to the destruction of the ''payao," also known as the "fish aggregating device" or "artificial
reef."31 Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also impute the incidences of "fish kill"32observed by some of
the local fisherfolk to the seismic survey. And they further allege that the ECC obtained by private respondent JAPEX is
invalid because public consultations and discussions with the affected stakeholders, a pre-requisite to the issuance of the
ECC, were not held prior to the ECC's issuance.
GMDPealosa III-G
In its separate petition, petitioner FIDEC confirms petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards' allegations of
reduced fish catch and lack of public consultations or discussions with the fisherfolk and other stakeholders prior to the
issuance of the ECC. Moreover, it alleges that during the seismic surveys and drilling, it was barred from entering and
fishing within a 7-kilometer radius from the point where the oilrig was located, an area greater than the 1.5-kilometer
radius "exclusion zone" stated in the IEE.33 It also agrees in the allegation that public respondents DENR and EMB
abused their discretion when they issued an ECC to public respondent DOE and private respondent JAPEX without
ensuring the strict compliance with the procedural and substantive requirements under the Environmental Impact
Assessment system, the Fisheries Code, and their implementing rules and regulations.34It further claims that despite
several requests for copies of all the documents pertaining to the project in Taon Strait, only copies of the P AMB-Taon
Strait Resolution and the ECC were given to the fisherfolk.35
Public Respondents' Counter-Allegations
Public respondents, through the Solicitor General, contend that petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards have
no legal standing to file the present petition; that SC-46 does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the various laws cited
in the petitions; that the ECC was issued in accordance with existing laws and regulations; that public respondents may
not be compelled by mandamus to furnish petitioners copies of all documents relating to SC-46; and that all the petitioners
failed to show that they are entitled to injunctive relief. They further contend that the issues raised in these petitions have
been rendered moot and academic by the fact that SC-46 had been mutually terminated by the parties thereto effective
June 21, 2008.36
ISSUES
The following are the issues posited by petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards in G.R. No. 180771:
I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STAND! TO FILE THE INSTANT PETITION;
II. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 IS VIOLA T[IVE] OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES;
GMDPealosa III-G
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE ON-GOING EXPLORATION AND PROPOSED EXPLOITATION FOR OIL AND
NATURAL GAS AT, AROUND, AND UNDERNEATH THE MARINE WATERS OF THE TAON STRAIT
PROTECTED SEASCAPE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PHILIPPINE COMMITMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND INSTRUMENTS; AND
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE (ECC) IN
ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREAS AND HABITATS OF MARINE WILDLIFE AND ENDANGERED SPECIES
IS LEGAL AND PROPER.37
Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 181527, petitioner FIDEC presented the following issues for our consideration:
I. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 EXECUTED BETWEEN RESPONDENTS DOE AND
JAPEX SHOULD BE NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE FOR BEING IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF SPECIFIC
PROVISIONS OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE LAWS;
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE OFF-SHORE OIL EXPLORAT[I]ON CONTEMPLATED UNDER SERVICE
CONTRACT NO. 46 IS LEGALLY PERMISSIBLE WITHOUT A LAW BEING DULY PASSED EXPRESSLY FOR
THE PURPOSE;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE OIL EXPLORATION BEING CONDUCTED WITHIN THE TAON STRAIT
PROTECTED SEASCAPE VIOLATES THE RIGHTS AND LEGAL PROTECTION GRANTED TO PETITIONERS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE LAWS.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE (ECC) FOR
SUCH AN ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL PROJECT INSIDE AN ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA SUCH
AS THE TAON STRAIT PROTECTED SEASCAPE CONFORMED TO LAW AND EXISTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS ON THE MATTER.
V. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO FURNISH

PETITIONERS WITH COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE TAON STRAIT OIL
EXPLORATION PROJECT.38
GMDPealosa III-G
In these consolidated petitions, this Court has determined that the various issues raised by the petitioners may be
condensed into two primary issues:
I. Procedural Issue: Locus Standi of the Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards, petitioners in G.R. No. 180771; and
II. Main Issue: Legality of Service Contract No. 46.
DISCUSSION
At the outset, this Court makes clear that the "'moot and academic principle' is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case." Courts have decided cases otherwise moot and academic under
the following exceptions:
1) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
2) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
3) The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and
4) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.39
In this case, despite the termination of SC-46, this Court deems it necessary to resolve these consolidated petitions as
almost all of the foregoing exceptions are present in this case. Both petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of the
Constitution, the environmental and livelihood issues raised undoubtedly affect the public's interest, and the respondents'
contested actions are capable of repetition.
Procedural Issues
Locus Standi of Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
GMDPealosa III-G
The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, "claim" that they have the legal standing to file this action since
they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit.40 Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,41 they also assert their
right to sue for the faithful performance of international and municipal environmental laws created in their favor and for
their benefit. In this regard, they propound that they have the right to demand that they be accorded the benefits granted
to them in multilateral international instruments that the Philippine Government had signed, under the concept of
stipulation pour autrui.42
For their part, the Stewards contend that there should be no question of their right to represent the Resident Marine
Mammals as they have stakes in the case as forerunners of a campaign to build awareness among the affected residents
of Taon Strait and as stewards of the environment since the primary steward, the Government, had failed in its duty to
protect the environment pursuant to the public trust doctrine.43
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also aver that this Court may lower the benchmark in locus standi as
an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction.44
In opposition, public respondents argue that the Resident Marine Mammals have no standing because Section 1, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court requires parties to an action to be either natural or juridical persons, viz.:
Section 1. Who may be parties, plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law
may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff' may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-
claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the
defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
The public respondents also contest the applicability of Oposa, pointing out that the petitioners therein were all natural
persons, albeit some of them were still unborn.45
As regards the Stewards, the public respondents likewise challenge their claim of legal standing on the ground that they
are representing animals, which cannot be parties to an action. Moreover, the public respondents argue that the Stewards
are not the real parties-in-interest for their failure to show how they stand to be benefited or injured by the decision in this
case.46 Invoking the alter ego principle in political law, the public respondents claim that absent any proof that former
GMDPealosa III-G
President Arroyo had disapproved of their acts in entering into and implementing SC-46, such acts remain to be her
own.47
The public respondents contend that since petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards' petition was not brought
in the name of a real party-in-interest, it should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.48
The issue of whether or not animals or even inanimate objects should be given legal standing in actions before courts of
law is not new in the field o f animal rights and environmental law. Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
cited the 1972 United States case Sierra Club v. Rogers C.B. Morton,49 wherein Justice William 0. Douglas, dissenting to
the conventional thought on legal standing, opined:
The critical question of "standing" would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal rule that
allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate object
about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public outrage. x x
x. Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a legal personality, a fiction found useful for maritime
purposes. The corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical law - is an acceptable adversary and large fortunes ride on its
cases. The ordinary corporation is a "person" for purposes of the adjudicatory processes, whether it represents
proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes.
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees,
swampland, or even air that feels the destructive pressures of modem technology and modem life. The river, for example,
is the living symbol of all the life it sustains or nourishes-fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear,
and all other animals, including man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The river as
plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those people who have a meaningful relation to that body of
water-whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger-must be able to speak for the values which the river
represents and which are threatened with destruction.50 (Citations omitted.)
The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals and inanimate objects standing is
due to the need to comply with the strict requirements in bringing a suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of Court demand
that parties to a suit be either natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates the action to
be brought in the name of the real party-in-interest, even if filed by a representative, viz.:
GMDPealosa III-G
Rule 3
Parties to Civil Actions
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law
may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff' may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-
claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the
defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or
someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be
the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator,
or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed
principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the
principal.
It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that not only natural and juridical persons should
be given legal standing because of the difficulty for persons, who cannot show that they by themselves are real parties-in-
interests, to bring actions in representation of these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many environmental
cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she would be directly injured or affected by the
outcome of the case. However, in our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized
approach. While developments in Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as Justice
Douglas's paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards simplification of procedures
and facilitating court access in environmental cases.
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,51 which allow for a "citizen suit,"
and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental laws:
GMDPealosa III-G
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file
an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue
an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested
parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may
publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of
said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions.52(Emphasis
ours.)
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,
commented:
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing environmental
rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws
and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. The
terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and
generations yet unborn.53 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.) Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the
effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure "may
be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure."54
Elucidating on this doctrine, the Court, in Systems Factors Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission55held
that:
Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested
rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes. Statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. x x x.
GMDPealosa III-G
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already taken
a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in
the name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned."56 Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a
right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind,
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.57
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules,
which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting
here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean
species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of
laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file
this petition.
Impleading Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

as an Unwilling Co-Petitioner
Petitioners Stewards in G.R. No. 180771 impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo for the following reasons, which we quote:
Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, also of legal age, Filipino and resident of Malacailang Palace, Manila
Philippines. Steward Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo happens to be the incumbent President of the Philippine Islands. She is
personally impleaded in this suit as an unwilling co-petitioner by reason of her express declaration and undertaking under
the recently signed ASEAN Charter to protect Your Petitioners' habitat, among others. She is meantime dominated as an
unwilling co-petitioner due to lack of material time in seeking her signature and imprimatur hereof and due to possible
legal complications that may hereafter arise by reason of her official relations with public respondents under the alter ego
principle in political law.58 This is incorrect.
Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
GMDPealosa III-G
Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may
be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.
Under the foregoing rule, when the consent of a party who should be joined as a plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she
may be made a party defendant to the case. This will put the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the Court, which can
properly implead him or her through its processes. The unwilling party's name cannot be simply included in a petition,
without his or her knowledge and consent, as such would be a denial of due process.
Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for including former President Macapagal-Arroyo in their petition,
is not sufficient to implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner. Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-petitioner,
for an act she made in the performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy against embroiling the
President in suits, "to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's
time, also demands undivided attention."59
Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of the petitioners in this suit. Thus, her name
is stricken off the title of this case.
Main Issue:
Legality of Service Contract No. 46

Service Contract No. 46 vis-a-vis
Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution
Petitioners maintain that SC-46 transgresses the Jura Regalia Provision or paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution because JAPEX is 100% Japanese-owned.60 Furthermore, the FIDEC asserts that SC-46 cannot be
considered as a technical and financial assistance agreement validly executed under paragraph 4 of the same
provision.61 The petitioners claim that La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos62 laid down the guidelines for a
valid service contract, one of which is that there must exist a general law for oil exploration before a service contract may
be entered into by the Government. The petitioners posit that the service contract in La Bugal is presumed to have
GMDPealosa III-G
complied with the requisites of (a) legislative enactment of a general law after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution (such
as Republic Act No. 7942, or the Philippine Mining Law of 1995, governing mining contracts) and (b) presidential
notification. The petitioners thus allege that the ruling in La Bugal, which involved mining contracts under Republic Act No.
7942, does not apply in this case.63 The petitioners also argue that Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and
Development Act of 1972 cannot legally justify SC-46 as it is deemed to have been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and
subsequent laws, which enunciate new policies concerning the environment.64 In addition, petitioners in G.R. No. 180771
claim that paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution mandate the exclusive use and enjoyment
by the Filipinos of our natural resources,65 and paragraph 4 does not speak of service contracts but of FTAAs or Financial
Technical Assistance Agreements.66
The public respondents again controvert the petitioners' claims and asseverate that SC-46 does not violate Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. They hold that SC-46 does not fall under the coverage of paragraph 1 but instead,
under paragraph 4 of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution on FTAAs. They also insist that paragraphs 2 and 3,
which refer to the grant of exclusive fishing right to Filipinos, are not applicable to SC-46 as the contract does not grant
exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX nor does it otherwise impinge on the FIDEC's right to preferential use of communal
marine and fishing resources.67
Ruling of the Court
On the legality of Service Contract No. 46

vis-a-vis Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
The petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads as follows:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
GMDPealosa III-G
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone,
and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization
of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and
fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days
from its execution. (Emphases ours.)
This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution. In La
Bugal, we held that the deletion of the words "service contracts" in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them
per se. In fact, in that decision, we quoted in length, portions of the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional
Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to
service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses
prevalent during the martial law regime, to wit: Summation of the
ConCom Deliberations
At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful reading of the Con Com deliberations, as follows:
In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers used the term service contracts in referring to
agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance.
GMDPealosa III-G
They spoke of service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973 Constitution.
It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or eradicate service contracts.
Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to put in place safeguards that would eliminate or minimize the abuses
prevalent during the marital law regime. In brief, they were going to permit service contracts with foreign corporations as
contractors, but with safety measures to prevent abuses, as an exception to the general norm established in the first
paragraph of Section 2 of Article XII. This provision reserves or limits to Filipino citizens -- and corporations at least 60
percent of which is owned by such citizens -- the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources.
This provision was prompted by the perceived insufficiency of Filipino capital and the felt need for foreign investments in
the EDU of minerals and petroleum resources.
The framers for the most part debated about the sort of safeguards that would be considered adequate and reasonable.
But some of them, having more "radical" leanings, wanted to ban service contracts altogether; for them, the provision
would permit aliens to exploit and benefit from the nation's natural resources, which they felt should be reserved only for
Filipinos.
In the explanation of their votes, the individual commissioners were heard by the entire body. They sounded off their
individual opinions, openly enunciated their philosophies, and supported or attacked the provisions with fervor. Everyone's
viewpoint was heard.
In the final voting, the Article on the National Economy and Patrimony -- including paragraph 4 allowing service contracts
with foreign corporations as an exception to the general norm in paragraph 1 of Section 2 of the same article --was
resoundingly approved by a vote of 32 to 7, with 2 abstentions.
Agreements Involving Technical

Or Financial Assistance Are
Service Contracts with Safeguards
GMDPealosa III-G
From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are
between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the government as principal or
"owner" of the works. In the new service contracts, the foreign contractors provide capital, technology and technical know-
how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the
government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises control and supervision over the entire operation.68
In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established that paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place, is
the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal:
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant
thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms,
conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion
of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is
presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that
it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.69
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for noncompliance with the
requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The General Law on Oil Exploration
The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are
governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then
GMDPealosa III-G
President Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum through the utilization of
government and/or local or foreign private resources to yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues
to the Philippine Government.70
Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in 1972, before the adoption of the
1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise repealed, to wit:
ARTICLE XVIII - TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
If there were any intention to repeal Presidential Decree No. 87, it would have been done expressly by Congress. For
instance, Republic Act No. 7160, more popularly known as the Local Government Code of 1991, expressly repealed a
number of laws, including a specific provision in Presidential Decree No. 87, viz.:
SECTION 534. Repealing Clause. - (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code,"
Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and
issuances related to or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b
(2) of Republic Act No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by
Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and
1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded projects.
GMDPealosa III-G
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of
this Code: Sections 2, 16 and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as
amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and
Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative
regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court could not simply assume that while Presidential Decree No. 87 had not yet been expressly repealed, it had
been impliedly repealed. As we held in Villarea v. The Commission on Audit,71 "[i]mplied repeals are not lightly
presumed." It is a settled rule that when laws are in conflict with one another, every effort must be exerted to reconcile
them. In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcopper Mining Corporation,72 we said:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied
repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi,
i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject
and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts
should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. (Citation omitted.)
Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a construction that it is in harmony
with the Constitution is also possible, that construction should be preferred.73 This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission
on Elections74 expounding on this point, pronounced:
It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that
the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to
its spirit and intent. x x x. (Citation omitted.)
GMDPealosa III-G
Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners' contention that SC-46 is prohibited on the ground that there is no general
law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration
and extraction.
But note must be made at this point that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a
service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, as will be discussed below, the exploitation
and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since
the Taon Strait is a NIPAS75 area.
2. President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the same was not submitted to Congress
While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence
of the two other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such contract,
renders it null and void.
As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have conformed not only to the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
87, but also to those of the 1987 Constitution. The Civil Code provides: ARTICLE 1306. The contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. (Italics ours.)
In Heirs of San Miguel v. Court of Appeals,76 this Court held that:
It is basic that the law is deemed written into every contract. Although a contract is the law between the parties, the
provisions of positive law which regulate contracts are deemed written therein and shall limit and govern the relations
between the parties. x x x. (Citations omitted.) Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the
President himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 appeared to have been entered
into and signed only by the DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional
requirement. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of
the execution of such contract.
GMDPealosa III-G
Public respondents' implied argument that based on the "alter ego principle," their acts are also that of then President
Macapagal-Arroyo's, cannot apply in this case. In Joson v. Torres,77 we explained the concept of the alter ego principle or
the doctrine of qualified political agency and its limit in this wise:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law
to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of
the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Emphasis ours, citation
omitted.)
While the requirements in executing service contracts in paragraph 4, Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
seem like mere formalities, they, in reality, take on a much bigger role. As we have explained in La Bugal, they are the
safeguards put in place by the framers of the Constitution to "eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the
martial law regime."78 Thus, they are not just mere formalities, which will only render a contract unenforceable but not
void, if not complied with. They are requirements placed, not just in an ordinary statute, but in the fundamental law, the
non-observance of which will nullify the contract. Elucidating on the concept of a "constitution," this Court, in Manila Prince
Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System,79 held:
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious,
absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded.
The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null
and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of
the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. (Emphasis ours.)
GMDPealosa III-G
As this Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the President himself be the signatory of service
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving the exploration, development, and utilization of our minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils. This power cannot be taken lightly.
In this case, the public respondents have failed to show that the President had any participation in SC-46. Their argument
that their acts are actually the acts of then President Macapagal-Arroyo, absent proof of her disapproval, must fail as the
requirement that the President herself enter into these kinds of contracts is embodied not just in any ordinary statute, but
in the Constitution itself. These service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our natural
resources are of paramount interest to the present and future generations. Hence, safeguards were put in place to insure
that the guidelines set by law are meticulously observed and likewise to eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate
departments and agencies by ensuring that the President has authorized or approved of these service contracts herself.
Even under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now the DOE, obtain the
President's approval for the execution of any contract under said statute, as shown in the following provision:
SECTION 5. Execution of contract authorized in this Act. -Every contract herein authorized shall, subject to the approval
of the President, be executed by the Petroleum Board created in this Act, after due public notice pre-qualification and
public bidding or concluded through negotiations. In case bids are requested or if requested no bid is submitted or the
bids submitted are rejected by the Petroleum Board for being disadvantageous to the Government, the contract may be
concluded through negotiation.
In opening contract areas and in selecting the best offer for petroleum operations, any of the following alternative
procedures may be resorted to by the Petroleum Board, subject to prior approval of the President[.]
Even if we were inclined to relax the requirement in La Bugal to harmonize the 1987 Constitution with the aforementioned
provision of Presidential Decree No. 87, it must be shown that the government agency or subordinate official has been
authorized by the President to enter into such service contract for the government. Otherwise, it should be at least shown
that the President subsequently approved of such contract explicitly. None of these circumstances is evident in the case
at bar.
Service Contract No. 46 vis-a-vis Other Laws
GMDPealosa III-G
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 claim that SC-46 violates Section 27 of Republic Act. No. 9147 or the Wildlife Resources
Conservation and Protection Act, which bans all marine exploration and exploitation of oil and gas deposits. They also
aver that Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS
Act), which allows the exploration of protected areas for the purpose of information-gathering, has been repealed by
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 914 7. The said petitioners further claim that SC-46 is anathema to Republic Act No. 8550
or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, which protects the rights of the fisherfolk in the preferential use of municipal
waters, with the exception being limited only to research and survey activities.80
The FIDEC, for its part, argues that to avail of the exceptions under Section 14 of the NIP AS Act, the gathering of
information must be in accordance with a DENR-approved program, and the exploitation and utilization of energy
resources must be pursuant to a general law passed by Congress expressly for that purpose. Since there is neither a
DENR approved program nor a general law passed by Congress, the seismic surveys and oil drilling operations were all
done illegally.81 The FIDEC likewise contends that SC-46 infringes on its right to the preferential use of the communal
fishing waters as it is denied free access within the prohibited zone, in violation not only of the Fisheries Code but also of
the 1987 Constitutional provisions on subsistence fisherfolk and social justice.82 Furthermore, the FIDEC believes that the
provisions in Presidential Decree No. 87, which allow offshore drilling even in municipal waters, should be deemed to
have been rendered inoperative by the provisions of Republic Act No. 8550 and Republic Act No. 7160, which reiterate
the social justice provisions of the Constitution.83
The public respondents invoke the rules on statutory construction and argue that Section 14 of the NIP AS Act is a more
particular provision and cannot be deemed to have been repealed by the more general prohibition in Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 9147. They aver that Section 14, under which SC-46 falls, should instead be regarded as an exemption
to Section 27.84 Addressing the claim of petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 that there was a violation of Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 9147, the public respondents assert that what the section prohibits is the exploration of minerals, which as defined
in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, exclude energy materials such as coal, petroleum, natural gas, radioactive materials
and geothennal energy. Thus, since SC-46 involves oil and gas exploration, Section 27 does not apply.85
The public respondents defend the validity of SC-46 and insist that it does not grant exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX;
hence, it does not violate the rule on preferential use of municipal waters. Moreover, they allege that JAPEX has not
banned fishing in the project area, contrary to the FIDEC's claim. The public respondents also contest the attribution of the
declining fish catch to the seismic surveys and aver that the allegation is unfounded. They claim that according to the
GMDPealosa III-G
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources' fish catch data, the reduced fish catch started in the 1970s due to destructive
fishing practices.86
Ruling of the Court
On the legality of Service Contract No. 46
vis-a-vis Other Laws
Although we have already established above that SC-46 is null and void for being violative of the 1987 Constitution, it is
our duty to still rule on the legality of SC-46 vis-a-vis other pertinent laws, to serve as a guide for the Government when
executing service contracts involving not only the Tafion Strait, but also other similar areas. While the petitioners allege
that SC-46 is in violation of several laws, including international ones, their arguments focus primarily on the protected
status of the Taon Strait, thus this Court will concentrate on those laws that pertain particularly to the Taon Strait as a
protected seascape.
The Taon Strait is a narrow passage of water bounded by the islands of Cebu in the East and Negros in the West. It
harbors a rich biodiversity of marine life, including endangered species of dolphins and whales. For this reason, former
President Fidel V. Ramos declared the Taon Strait as a protected seascape in 1998 by virtue of Proclamation No. 1234 -
Declaring the Taon Strait situated in the Provinces of Cebu, Negros Occidental and Negros Oriental as a Protected Area
pursuant to the NIP AS Act and shall be known as Taon Strait Protected Seascape. During former President Joseph E.
Estrada's time, he also constituted the Taon Strait Commission via Executive Order No. 76 to ensure the optimum and
sustained use of the resources in that area without threatening its marine life. He followed this with Executive Order No.
177,87 wherein he included the mayor of Negros Occidental Municipality/City as a member of the Taon Strait
Commission, to represent the LGUs concerned. This Commission, however, was subsequently abolished in 2002 by then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, via Executive Order No. 72.88
True to the constitutional policy that the "State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature,"89 Congress enacted the NIP AS Act to secure the
perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated
protected areas. These areas possess common ecological values that were incorporated into a holistic plan
GMDPealosa III-G
representative of our natural heritage. The system encompasses outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically
important public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and
related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland, or marine.90 It classifies and administers all the designated protected
areas to maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to preserve genetic diversity, to ensure
sustainable use of resources found therein, and to maintain their natural conditions to the greatest extent possible.91 The
following categories of protected areas were established under the NIPAS Act:
a. Strict nature reserve;
b. Natural park;
c. Natural monument;
d. Wildlife sanctuary;
e. Protected landscapes and seascapes;
f. Resource reserve;
g. Natural biotic areas; and
h. Other categories established by law, conventions or international agreements which the Philippine Government
is a signatory.92
Under Section 4 of the NIP AS Act, a protected area refers to portions of land and water, set aside due to their unique
physical and biological significance, managed to enhance biological diversity and protected against human exploitation.
The Taon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside and declared a protected area under the category of
Protected Seascape. The NIP AS Act defines a Protected Seascape to be an area of national significance characterized
by the harmonious interaction of man and land while providing opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and
tourism within the normal lifestyle and economic activity of this areas;93 thus a management plan for each area must be
GMDPealosa III-G
designed to protect and enhance the permanent preservation of its natural conditions.94 Consistent with this endeavor is
the requirement that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be made prior to undertaking any activity outside the
scope of the management plan. Unless an ECC under the EIA system is obtained, no activity inconsistent with the goals
of the NIP AS Act shall be implemented.95
The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was established in 1978 under Presidential Decree No. 1586. It
prohibits any person, partnership or corporation from undertaking or operating any declared environmentally critical
project or areas without first securing an ECC issued by the President or his duly authorized representative.96Pursuant to
the EISS, which called for the proper management of environmentally critical areas,97 Proclamation No. 214698 was
enacted, identifying the areas and types of projects to be considered as environmentally critical and within the scope of
the EISS, while DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 provided for its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).
DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 defines an environmentally critical area as "an area delineated as
environmentally sensitive such that significant environmental impacts are expected if certain types of proposed projects or
programs are located, developed, or implemented in it";99 thus, before a project, which is "any activity, regardless of scale
or magnitude, which may have significant impact on the environment,"100 is undertaken in it, such project must undergo an
EIA to evaluate and predict the likely impacts of all its stages on the environment.101An EIA is described in detail as
follows:
h. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) - process that involves evaluating and predicting the likely impacts of a project
(including cumulative impacts) on the environment during construction, commissioning, operation and abandonment. It
also includes designing appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures addressing these consequences
to protect the environment and the community's welfare. The process is undertaken by, among others, the project
proponent and/or EIA Consultant, EMB, a Review Committee, affected communities and other stakeholders.102
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Taon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having been declared as a protected
area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of its management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an
ECC secured after undergoing an EIA to determine the effects of such activity on its ecological system.
The public respondents argue that they had complied with the procedures in obtaining an ECC103 and that SC-46 falls
under the exceptions in Section 14 of the NIP AS Act, due to the following reasons:
GMDPealosa III-G
1) The Taon Strait is not a strict nature reserve or natural park;
2) Exploration is only for the purpose of gathering information on possible energy resources; and 3) Measures are
undertaken to ensure that the exploration is being done with the least damage to surrounding areas.104
We do not agree with the arguments raised by the public respondents.
Sections 12 and 14 of the NIPAS Act read:
SECTION 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities which are outside the scope of the
management plan for protected areas shall be subject to an environmental impact assessment as required by law before
they are adopted, and the results thereof shall be taken into consideration in the decision-making process.
No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the required Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) under the Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where such activities are
allowed to be undertaken, the proponent shall plan and carry them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse
effects and the preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The proponent shall be liable for any damage due to
lack of caution or indiscretion.
SECTION 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2 hereof, protected areas,
except strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the purpose of gathering
information on energy resources and only if such activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas.
Surveys shall be conducted only in accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys
shall be made available to the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation
and utilization of energy resources found within NIP AS areas shall be allowed only through a law passed by Congress.
It is true that the restrictions found under the NIP AS Act are not without exceptions. However, while an exploration done
for the purpose of surveying for energy resources is allowed under Section 14 of the NIP AS Act, this does not mean that
it is exempt from the requirement to undergo an EIA under Section 12. In Sotto v. Sotto,105 this Court explained why a
statute should be construed as a whole:
GMDPealosa III-G
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent.
Consequently each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section and so as to
produce a harmonious whole. It is not proper to confine the attention to the one section to be construed. It is always an
unsafe way of construing a statute or contract to divide it by a process of etymological dissection, into separate words,
and then apply to each, thus separated from its context, some particular definition given by lexicographers, and then
reconstruct the instrument upon the basis of these definitions. An instrument must always be construed as a whole, and
the particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is usually to be ascertained from the context, the nature of
the subject treated of and the purpose or intention of the parties who executed the contract, or of the body which enacted
or framed the statute or constitution. x x x.
Surveying for energy resources under Section 14 is not an exemption from complying with the EIA requirement in Section
12; instead, Section 14 provides for additional requisites before any exploration for energy resources may be done in
protected areas.
The rationale for such additional requirements are incorporated m Section 2 of the NIP AS Act, to wit:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy - Cognizant of the profound impact of man's activities on all components of the natural
environment particularly the effect of increasing population, resource exploitation and industrial advancement and
recognizing the critical importance of protecting and maintaining the natural biological and physical diversities of the
environment notably on areas with biologically unique features to sustain human life and development, as well as plant
and animal life, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure for the Filipino people of present and future
generations the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive
system of integrated protected areas within the classification of national park as provided for in the Constitution.
It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features, possess common ecological values that may be
incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural heritage; that effective administration of this area is possible
only through cooperation among national government, local government and concerned private organizations; that the
use and enjoyment of these protected areas must be consistent with the principles of biological diversity and sustainable
development.
GMDPealosa III-G
To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS), which shall encompass
outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species
of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which
shall be designated as "protected areas."
The public respondents themselves admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the second sub-phase of
SC-46, which required the drilling of an oil exploration well. This means that when the seismic surveys were done in the
Taon Strait, no such environmental impact evaluation was done. Unless seismic surveys are part of the management
plan of the Taon Strait, such surveys were done in violation of Section 12 of the NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1586, which provides:
Section 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. - The President of the Philippines
may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the National Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation
declare certain projects, undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or
corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative. For the proper
management of said critical project or area, the President may by his proclamation reorganize such government offices,
agencies, institutions, corporations or instrumentalities including the re-alignment of government personnel, and their
specific functions and responsibilities.
For the same purpose as above, the Ministry of Human Settlements shall: (a) prepare the proper land or water use pattern
for said critical project(s) or area(s); (b) establish ambient environmental quality standards; (c) develop a program of
environmental enhancement or protective measures against calamitous factors such as earthquakes, floods, water
erosion and others, and (d) perform such other functions as may be directed by the President from time to time.
The respondents' subsequent compliance with the EISS for the second sub-phase of SC-46 cannot and will not cure this
violation. The following penalties are provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1586 and the NIPAS Act.
Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 1586 provides for the penalty involving violations of the ECC requirement:
GMDPealosa III-G
Section 9. Penalty for Violation. - Any person, corporation or partnership found violating Section 4 of this Decree, or the
terms and conditions in the issuance of the Environmental Compliance Certificate, or of the standards, rules and
regulations issued by the National Environmental Protection Council pursuant to this Decree shall be punished by the
suspension or cancellation of his/its certificates and/or a fine in an amount not to exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) for every violation thereof, at the discretion of the National Environmental Protection Council. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Violations of the NIP AS Act entails the following fines and/or imprisonment under Section 21:
SECTION 21. Penalties. - Whoever violates this Act or any rules and regulations issued by the Department pursuant to
this Act or whoever is found guilty by a competent court of justice of any of the offenses in the preceding section shall be
fined in the amount of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000), exclusive of the value of the thing damaged or imprisonment for not less than one (1) year but not more than
six (6) years, or both, as determined by the court: Provided, that, if the area requires rehabilitation or restoration as
determined by the court, the offender shall be required to restore or compensate for the restoration to the damages:
Provided, further, that court shall order the eviction of the offender from the land and the forfeiture in favor of the
Government of all minerals, timber or any species collected or removed including all equipment, devices and firearms
used in connection therewith, and any construction or improvement made thereon by the offender. If the offender is an
association or corporation, the president or manager shall be directly responsible for the act of his employees and
laborers: Provided, finally, that the DENR may impose administrative fines and penalties consistent with this Act.
(Emphases supplied.) Moreover, SC-46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering information on the possible
energy resources in the Taon Strait as it also provides for the parties' rights and obligations relating to extraction and
petroleum production should oil in commercial quantities be found to exist in the area. While Presidential Decree No. 87
may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized,
the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Taon Strait is a NIPAS area.106Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or
extraction in the Taon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.
In view of the foregoing premises and conclusions, it is no longer necessary to discuss the other issues raised in these
consolidated petitions.
GMDPealosa III-G
WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are GRANTED, Service Contract No. 46 is hereby declared
NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1586.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
GMDPealosa III-G

2016.8.1.CivPro Cases. Rule 3

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

2016.8.1.CivPro Cases. Rule 3

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Republic of the Philippines

ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA, CONSORICIA G.R. No. 166620

April 20, 2010

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

b. Printing of officials ballots;

SECTION 2. Government agencies/instrumentalities may source printing services outside NPO

We dismiss the petition.

Interpreting the foregoing provision, we held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, thus:

Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:

Subsequently, we ruled in Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Executive Secretary[25] that:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

ROGER V. NAVARRO, G.R. No. 153788

HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding

The first complaint stated:

Make/Type FUSO WITH MOUNTED CRANE

as evidenced by a LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE entered into by and

Make/Type FUSO WITH MOUNTED CRANE

THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition devoid of merit.

Karen Go is the real party-in-interest

This agreement, made and entered into by and between:

Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:

We faced a similar question in Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza,[17] where we said:

Glenn Gos Role in the Case

The incidents of this co-ownership are such that:

Article 108 of the Family Code provides:

Demand not required prior

Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond.

(d) The actual market value of the property.

ROSENDO BACALSO, RODRIGO G.R. No. 173192

MAXIMO PADIGOS, FLAVIANO

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

2. Declaring as null and void the Deeds of Absolute Sale in question;

4. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[23] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond . . . The fishpond is undivided; it is impossible to pinpoint

Fundamental similarities are observed in the following characteristics to wit:

1. Ovals of a either rounded or angular at the base;

2. Ovals of d either narrow, rounded, or angular at the base;

4. Base alignment of e and i are repeated with sameness;

5. Top of c either with a retrace, angular formation or an eyelet;

6. Terminal ending of o heavy with a short tapering formation;

7. Loop stem of P with wide space and angular;

8. Oval of P either rounded or multi-angular;

And Espina concluded

ANICIA VALDEZ-TALLORIN, G.R. No. 177429

The Facts and the Case

The Courts Rulings

The rules mandate the joinder of indispensable parties. Thus:

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 196894 March 3, 2014

JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO, Petitioners,

Hence, this petition.

The Ruling of the Court

In this respect, the Court agrees with Spouses Crisologo.

xxx xxx xxx

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

G.R. No. 186610 July 29, 2013

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

The petition was docketed as Spl. Proc. No. 782-01.

On December 4, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision, disposing as follows:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PNP-DPRM IS AN INDISPENSABLE

G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,