ADMIN CHAP 2

Camara v. Municipal Court

387 U.S. 523 (1967)

U.S. Supreme Court

Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)

Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco

No. 92

Argued February 15, 1967

Decided June 5, 1967

387 U.S. 523

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

Syllabus

Appellant was charged with violating the San Francisco Housing Code for
refusing, after three efforts by city housing inspectors to secure his
consent, to allow a warrantless inspection of the ground-floor quarters
which he leased and residential use of which allegedly violated the
apartment building's occupancy permit. Claiming the inspection ordinance
unconstitutional for failure to require a warrant for inspections, appellant
while awaiting trial, sued in a State Superior Court for a writ of prohibition,
which the court denied. Relying on Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, and
similar cases, the District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the
ordinance did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The State Supreme Court
denied a petition for hearing.

Held:
1. The Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to
permit a warrantless code enforcement inspection of his personal
residence. Frank v. Maryland, supra, pro tanto overruled. Pp. 387 U. S.
528-534.

(a) The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is enforceable

against the States through the Fourteenth, through its prohibition of
"unreasonable" searches and seizures is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.
P. 387 U. S. 528.

(b) With certain carefully defined exceptions, an unconsented warrantless

search of private property is "unreasonable." Pp. 387 U. S. 528-529.

(c) Contrary to the assumption of Frank v. Maryland, supra, Fourth

Amendment interests are not merely "peripheral" where municipal fire,
health, and housing inspection programs are involved whose purpose is to
determine the existence of physical conditions not complying with local
ordinances. Those programs, moreover, are enforceable by criminal
process, as is refusal to allow an inspection. Pp. 387 U. S. 529-531.

(d) Warrantless administrative searches cannot be justified on the grounds

that they make minimal demands on occupants;

Page 387 U. S. 524

that warrant in such cases are unfeasible; or that area inspection programs
could not function under reasonable search warrant requirements. Pp. 387
U. S. 531-533.

2. Probable cause upon the basis of which warrants are to be issued for
area code enforcement inspections is not dependent on the inspector's
belief that a particular dwelling violates the code, but on the
reasonableness of the enforcement agency's appraisal of conditions in the
area as a whole. The standards to guide the magistrate in the issuance of
such search warrants will necessarily vary with the municipal program
being enforced. Pp. 387 U. S. 534-539.

3. Search warrants which are required in nonemergency situations should

normally be sought only after entry is refused. Pp. 387 U. S. 539-540.
4. In the nonemergency situation here, appellant had a right to insist that
the inspectors obtain a search warrant. P. 387 U. S. 540.

237 Cal.App.2d 128, 46 Cal.Rptr. 585, vacated and remanded.

Page 387 U. S. 525

MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, this Court upheld, by a five-to-four

vote, a state court conviction of a homeowner who refused to permit a
municipal health inspector to enter and inspect his premises without a
search warrant. In Eaton v. Price, 364 U. S. 263, a similar conviction was
affirmed by an equally divided Court. Since those closely divided decisions,
more intensive efforts at all levels of government to contain and eliminate
urban blight have led to increasing use of such inspection techniques, while
numerous decisions of this Court have more fully defined the Fourth
Amendment's effect on state and municipal action. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U. S. 643; Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23. In view of the growing nationwide
importance of the problem, we noted probable jurisdiction in this case and
in See v. City of Seattle, post, p. 387 U. S. 541, to reexamine whether
administrative inspection programs, as presently authorized and
conducted, violate Fourth Amendment rights as those rights are enforced
against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 385 U.S. 808.

Appellant brought this action in a California Superior Court alleging that he

was awaiting trial on a criminal charge of violating the San Francisco
Housing Code by refusing to permit a warrantless inspection of his
residence, and that a writ of prohibition should issue to the criminal court
because the ordinance authorizing such inspections is unconstitutional on
its face. The Superior Court denied the writ, the District Court of Appeal
affirmed, and the Supreme Court of California denied a petition for hearing.
Appellant properly raised and had considered by the California courts the
federal constitutional questions he now presents to this Court.

Though there were no judicial findings of fact in this prohibition proceeding,

we shall set forth the parties' factual allegations. On November 6, 1963, an
inspector

Page 387 U. S. 526

of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of
Public Health entered an apartment building to make a routine annual
inspection for possible violations of the city's Housing Code. [Footnote 1]
The building's manager informed the inspector that appellant, lessee of the
ground floor, was using the rear of his leasehold as a personal residence.
Claiming that the building's occupancy permit did not allow residential use
of the ground floor, the inspector confronted appellant and demanded that
he permit an inspection of the premises. Appellant refused to allow the
inspection because the inspector lacked a search warrant.

The inspector returned on November 8, again without a warrant, and

appellant again refused to allow an inspection. A citation was then mailed
ordering appellant to appear at the district attorney's office. When appellant
failed to appear, two inspectors returned to his apartment on November 22.
They informed appellant that he was required by law to permit an
inspection under 503 of the Housing Code:

"Sec. 503 RIGHT TO ENTER BUILDING. Authorized employees of the City

departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary for the
performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper credentials,
have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or
premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them by the
Municipal Code. "

Page 387 U. S. 527

Appellant nevertheless refused the inspectors access to his apartment

without a search warrant. Thereafter, a complaint was filed charging him
with refusing to permit a lawful inspection in violation of 507 of the Code.
[Footnote 2] Appellant was arrested on December 2 and released on bail.
When his demurrer to the criminal complaint was denied, appellant filed
this petition for a writ of prohibition.

Appellant has argued throughout this litigation that 503 is contrary to the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in that it authorizes municipal officials
to enter a private dwelling without a search warrant and without probable
cause to believe that a violation of the Housing Code exists therein.
Consequently, appellant contends, he may not be prosecuted under 507
for refusing to permit an inspection unconstitutionally authorized by 503.
Relying on Frank v. Maryland, Eaton v. Price, and decisions in other
States, [Footnote 3] the District

Page 387 U. S. 528

Court of Appeal held that 503 does not violate Fourth Amendment rights
because it

"is part of a regulatory scheme which is essentially civil, rather than criminal
in nature, inasmuch as that section creates a right of inspection which is
limited in scope and may not be exercised under unreasonable conditions."

Having concluded that Frank v. Maryland, to the extent that it sanctioned

such warrantless inspections, must be overruled, we reverse.

The Fourth Amendment provides that,

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."

The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless

decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. The Fourth
Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a right of the people which
"is basic to a free society." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 338 U. S. 27. As
such, the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 374 U. S. 30.

Though there has been general agreement as to the fundamental purpose

of the Fourth Amendment, translation of the abstract prohibition against
"unreasonable searches and seizures" into workable guidelines for the
decision of particular cases is a difficult task which has for many years
divided the members of this Court. Nevertheless, one governing principle,
justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been
followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of
private property without proper consent
Page 387 U. S. 529

is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search

warrant. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483; United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48; McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451; Agnello v.
United States, 269 U. S. 20. As the Court explained in Johnson v. United
States, 333 U. S. 10, 333 U. S. 14:

"The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave

concern not only to the individual, but to a society, which chooses to dwell
in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of
privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be
decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government
enforcement agent."

In Frank v. Maryland, this Court upheld the conviction of one who refused
to permit a warrantless inspection of private premises for the purposes of
locating and abating a suspected public nuisance. Although Frank can
arguably be distinguished from this case on its facts, [Footnote 4]
the Frank opinion has generally been interpreted as carving out an
additional exception to the rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. See Eaton v. Price, supra. The District Court
of Appeal so interpreted Frank in this case, and that ruling is the core of
appellant's challenge here. We proceed to a reexamination of the factors
which

Page 387 U. S. 530

persuaded the Frank majority to adopt this construction of the Fourth

Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches.

To the Frank majority, municipal fire, health, and housing inspection

programs

"touch at most upon the periphery of the important interests safeguarded

by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against official intrusion,"

359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 367, because the inspections are merely to

determine whether physical conditions exist which do not comply with
minimum standards prescribed in local regulatory ordinances. Since the
inspector does not ask that the property owner open his doors to a search
for "evidence of criminal action" which may be used to secure the owner's
criminal conviction, historic interests of "self-protection" jointly protected by
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments [Footnote 5] are said not to be involved,
but only the less intense "right to be secure from intrusion into personal
privacy." Id. at 359 U. S. 365.

We may agree that a routine inspection of the physical condition of private

property is a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for
the fruits and instrumentalities of crime. For this reason
alone, Frank differed from the great bulk of Fourth Amendment cases
which have been considered by this Court. But we cannot agree that the
Fourth Amendment interests at stake in these inspection cases are merely
"peripheral." It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the
individual is suspected of criminal behavior. [Footnote 6] For instance, even
the most law-abiding citizen

Page 387 U. S. 531

has a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the
sanctity of his home may be broken by official authority, for the possibility of
criminal entry under the guise of official sanction is a serious threat to
personal and family security. And even accepting Frank's rather
remarkable premise, inspections of the kind we are here considering do, in
fact, jeopardize "self-protection" interests of the property owner. Like most
regulatory laws, fire, health, and housing codes are enforced by criminal
processes. In some cities, discovery of a violation by the inspector leads to
a criminal complaint. [Footnote 7] Even in cities where discovery of a
violation produces only an administrative compliance order, [Footnote 8]
refusal to comply is a criminal offense, and the fact of compliance is verified
by a second inspection, again without a warrant. [Footnote 9] Finally, as
this case demonstrates, refusal to permit an inspection is itself a crime,
punishable by fine or even by jail sentence.

The Frank majority suggested, and appellee reasserts, two other

justifications for permitting administrative health and safety inspections
without a warrant. First, it is argued that these inspections are "designed to
make the least possible demand on the individual occupant." 359 U.S.
at 359 U. S. 367. The ordinances authorizing inspections are hedged with
safeguards, and at any rate the inspector's particular decision to enter must
comply with the constitutional standard of reasonableness even if he may
enter without a warrant. [Footnote 10] In addition, the argument

Page 387 U. S. 532

proceeds, the warrant process could not function effectively in this field.
The decision to inspect an entire municipal area is based upon legislative
or administrative assessment of broad factors such as the area's age and
condition. Unless the magistrate is to review such policy matters, he must
issue a "rubber stamp" warrant which provides no protection at all to the
property owner.

In our opinion, these arguments unduly discount the purposes behind the
warrant machinery contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. Under the
present system, when the inspector demands entry, the occupant has no
way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code involved
requires inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of
the inspector's power to search, and no way of knowing whether the
inspector himself is acting under proper authorization. These are questions
which may be reviewed by a neutral magistrate without any reassessment
of the basic agency decision to canvass an area. Yet only by refusing entry
and risking a criminal conviction can the occupant at present challenge the
inspector's decision to search. And even if the occupant possesses
sufficient fortitude to take this risk, as appellant did here, he may never
learn any more about the reason for the inspection than that the law
generally allows housing inspectors to gain entry. The practical effect of
this system is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official
in the field. This is precisely the discretion to invade private property which
we have consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested
party warrant the need to

Page 387 U. S. 533

search. See cases cited p. 387 U. S. 529 supra. We simply cannot say that
the protections provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in this
context; broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized
review, particularly when those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk
of a criminal penalty.

The final justification suggested for warrantless administrative searches is

that the public interest demands such a rule: it is vigorously argued that the
health and safety of entire urban populations is dependent upon
enforcement of minimum fire, housing, and sanitation standards, and that
the only effective means of enforcing such codes is by routine systematized
inspection of all physical structures. Of course, in applying any
reasonableness standard, including one of constitutional dimension, an
argument that the public interest demands a particular rule must receive
careful consideration. But we think this argument misses the mark. The
question is not, at this stage, at least, whether these inspections may be
made, but whether they may be made without a warrant. For example, to
say that gambling raids may not be made at the discretion of the police
without a warrant is not necessarily to say that gambling raids may never
be made. In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a
general exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the
question is not whether the public interest justifies the type of search in
question, but whether the authority to search should be evidenced by a
warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of
obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind
the search. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 384 U. S. 770-771.
It has nowhere been urged that fire, health, and housing code inspection
programs could not achieve their goals within the confines of a reasonable
search warrant requirement. Thus, we do not find the public need argument
dispositive.

Page 387 U. S. 534

In summary, we hold that administrative searches of the kind at issue here

are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment, that such searches, when authorized and conducted without a
warrant procedure, lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth
Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth
in Frank v. Maryland and in other cases for upholding these warrantless
searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth
Amendment's protections. Because of the nature of the municipal programs
under consideration, however, these conclusions must be the beginning,
not the end, of our inquiry. The Frank majority gave recognition to the
unique character of these inspection programs by refusing to require
search warrants; to reject that disposition does not justify ignoring the
question whether some other accommodation between public need and
individual rights is essential.
II

The Fourth Amendment provides that, "no Warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause." Borrowing from more typical Fourth Amendment cases,
appellant argues not only that code enforcement inspection programs must
be circumscribed by a warrant procedure, but also that warrants should
issue only when the inspector possesses probable cause to believe that a
particular dwelling contains violations of the minimum standards prescribed
by the code being enforced. We disagree.

In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search

be obtained, "probable cause" is the standard by which a particular
decision to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of
reasonableness. To apply this standard, it is obviously necessary first to
focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official
intrusion upon the constitutionally protected

Page 387 U. S. 535

interests of the private citizen. For example, in a criminal investigation, the

police may undertake to recover specific stolen or contraband goods. But
that public interest would hardly justify a sweeping search of an entire city
conducted in the hope that these goods might be found. Consequently, a
search for these goods, even with a warrant, is "reasonable" only when
there is "probable cause" to believe that they will be uncovered in a
particular dwelling.

Unlike the search pursuant to a criminal investigation, the inspection

programs at issue here are aimed at securing city-wide compliance with
minimum physical standards for private property. The primary
governmental interest at stake is to prevent even the unintentional
development of conditions which are hazardous to public health and safety.
Because fires and epidemics may ravage large urban areas, because
unsightly conditions adversely affect the economic values of neighboring
structures, numerous courts have upheld the police power of municipalities
to impose and enforce such minimum standards even upon existing
structures. [Footnote 11] In determining whether a particular inspection is
reasonable -- and thus in determining whether there is probable cause to
issue a warrant for that inspection -- the need for the inspection must be
weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code enforcement.
There is unanimous agreement among those most familiar with this field
that the only effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum
standards required by municipal codes is through routine periodic

Page 387 U. S. 536

inspections of all structures. [Footnote 12] It is here that the probable cause
debate is focused, for the agency's decision to conduct an area inspection
is unavoidably based on its appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole,
not on its knowledge of conditions in each particular building. Appellee
contends that, if the probable cause standard urged by appellant is
adopted, the area inspection will be eliminated as a means of seeking
compliance with code standards, and the reasonable goals of code
enforcement will be dealt a crushing blow.

In meeting this contention, appellant argues, first, that his probable cause
standard would not jeopardize area inspection programs because only a
minute portion of the population will refuse to consent to such inspections,
and second, that individual privacy, in any event, should be given
preference to the public interest in conducting such inspections. The first
argument, even if true, is irrelevant to the question whether the area
inspection is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
second argument is, in effect, an assertion that the area inspection is an
unreasonable search. Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for
determining reasonableness

Page 387 U. S. 537

other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the
search entails. But we think that a number of persuasive factors combine to
support the reasonableness of area code enforcement inspections. First,
such programs have a long history of judicial and public acceptance. See
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 367-371. Second, the public
interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet
it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable
results. Many such conditions -- faulty wiring is an obvious example -- are
not observable from outside the building, and indeed may not be apparent
to the inexpert occupant himself. Finally, because the inspections are
neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime,
they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy. Both
the majority and the dissent in Frank emphatically supported this
conclusion:

"Time and experience have forcefully taught that the power to inspect
dwelling places, either as a matter of systematic area-by-area search or, as
here, to treat a specific problem, is of indispensable importance to the
maintenance of community health; a power that would be greatly hobbled
by the blanket requirement of the safeguards necessary for a search of
evidence of criminal acts. The need for preventive action is great, and city
after city has seen this need and granted the power of inspection to its
health officials, and these inspections are apparently welcomed by all but
an insignificant few. Certainly the nature of our society has not vitiated the
need for inspections first thought necessary 158 years ago, nor has
experience revealed any abuse or inroad on freedom in meeting this need
by means that history and dominant public opinion have sanctioned."

359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 372.

Page 387 U. S. 538

". . . This is not to suggest that a health official need show the same kind of
proof to a magistrate to obtain a warrant as one must who would search for
the fruits or instrumentalities of crime. Where considerations of health and
safety are involved, the facts that would justify an inference of 'probable
cause' to make an inspection are clearly different from those that would
justify such an inference where a criminal investigation has been
undertaken. Experience may show the need for periodic inspections of
certain facilities without a further showing of cause to believe that
substandard conditions dangerous to the public are being maintained. The
passage of a certain period without inspection might of itself be sufficient in
a given situation to justify the issuance of a warrant. The test of 'probable
cause' required by the Fourth Amendment can take into account the nature
of the search that is being sought. 359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 383 (MR.
JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting)."

Having concluded that the area inspection is a "reasonable" search of

private property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it is obvious
that "probable cause" to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are
satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such standards, which will
vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be based upon the
passage of time, the nature of the building (e.g., a multi-family apartment
house), or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily
depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling.
It has been suggested that so to vary the probable cause test from the
standard applied in criminal cases would be to authorize a "synthetic
search warrant," and thereby to lessen the overall protections of the Fourth
Amendment. Frank v. Maryland, 359

Page 387 U. S. 539

U.S. at 359 U. S. 373. But we do not agree. The warrant procedure is

designed to guarantee that a decision to search private property is justified
by a reasonable governmental interest. But reasonableness is still the
ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion
contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted
search warrant. Cf. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186.
Such an approach neither endangers time-honored doctrines applicable to
criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of the probable cause
requirement in this area. It merely gives full recognition to the competing
public and private interests here at stake and, in so doing, best fulfills the
historic purpose behind the constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable government invasions of privacy. See Eaton v. Price, 364
U.S. at 364 U. S. 273-274 (opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN).

III

Since our holding emphasizes the controlling standard of reasonableness,

nothing we say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even
without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency
situations. See North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.
S. 306 (seizure of unwholesome food); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.
S. 11 (compulsory smallpox vaccination); Compagnie Francaise v. Board of
Health, 186 U. S. 380 (health quarantine); Kroplin v. Truax, 119 Ohio St.
610, 165 N.E. 498 (summary destruction of tubercular cattle). On the other
hand, in the case of most routine area inspections, there is no compelling
urgency to inspect at a particular time or on a particular day. Moreover,
most citizens allow inspections of their property without a warrant. Thus, as
a practical matter, and in light of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that
a warrant specify the property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants
should normally be sought only after entry is refused unless

Page 387 U. S. 540

there has been a citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for
securing immediate entry. Similarly, the requirement of a warrant procedure
does not suggest any change in what seems to be the prevailing local
policy, in most situations, of authorizing entry, but not entry by force, to
inspect.

IV

In this case, appellant has been charged with a crime for his refusal to
permit housing inspectors to enter his leasehold without a warrant. There
was no emergency demanding immediate access; in fact, the inspectors
made three trips to the building in an attempt to obtain appellant's consent
to search. Yet no warrant was obtained, and thus appellant was unable to
verify either the need for or the appropriate limits of the inspection. No
doubt, the inspectors entered the public portion of the building with the
consent of the landlord, through the building's manager, but appellee does
not contend that such consent was sufficient to authorize inspection of
appellant's premises. Cf. Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483; Chapman v.
United States, 365 U. S. 610; McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451.
Assuming the facts to be as the parties have alleged, we therefore
conclude that appellant had a constitutional right to insist that the
inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may not
constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection. It
appears from the opinion of the District Court of Appeal that, under these
circumstances, a writ of prohibition will issue to the criminal court under
California law.

The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE
MARQUEZ, respondents.

Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue
warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code,
prohibiting illegal recruitment.

The facts are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street,

Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for
brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:

04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw

ngayon ay narito at
nagbibigay ng salaysay.

S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC

Card ay
ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. Horty
Salazar 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.
 05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and
ginawang panloloko sa
iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?

S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.

06. T: Paano naman naganap ang

pangyayari?

S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag

niya ako. Kinuha
ang PECC Card ko at sinabing
hahanapan ako ng
booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na
ako sa Phils. ay
hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat
ako ng ibang
company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and
PECC Card
ko.

2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand

Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the
petitioner the following telegram:

YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR

BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA
BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE.
MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT
10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT
UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.

4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had

no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged
CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:

HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree
No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the
CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No.
615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the
seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or
intended to be used as the means of committing illegal
recruitment, it having verified that you have

(1) No valid license or authority from the

Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and
deploy workers for overseas employment;

(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under

Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to
Article 38 of the same code.

This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal

prosecution under existing laws.

Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of

November, 1987.

5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and

Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order
designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara
and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to
implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the
group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito
Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News
Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O.
Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that
petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before
entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure
order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed
them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the
team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman
Development (Phil.). However, when required to show
credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio,
the team chanced upon twelve talent performers practicing a
dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The
team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted
for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora
Salazar.

6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following

letter:

Gentlemen:

On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos,

Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we respectfully request that the
personal properties seized at her residence last January 26,
1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure
was contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof.
Among our reasons are the following:

1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or

hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order No.
1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates "due
process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of
the Philippine Constitution.

2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the

Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the
people "to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose."

3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez

and five (5) others (including 2 policemen) are
the private residence of the Salazar family, and the
entry, search as well as the seizure of the personal
properties belonging to our client were without her
consent and were done with unreasonable force
and intimidation, together with grave abuse of the
color of authority, and constitute robbery and
violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of the
Revised Penal Code.
 Unless said personal properties worth around TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) in all (and which
were already due for shipment to Japan) are
returned within twenty-four (24) hours from your
receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal
action, civil and criminal, to protect our client's
interests.

We trust that you will give due attention to these

important matters.

7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter,

petitioner filed the instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a
criminal complaint against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal,
docketed as IS-88-836. 1

On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although
the acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making
prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of
the grave public interest involved.

The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue
warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor
Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the Court's
resolution.

Under the new Constitution, which states:

. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except

upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. 2

it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one
case, it was declared that mayors may not exercise this power:

xxx xxx xxx

 But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just
been described is the state of the law as it was in September,
1985. The law has since been altered. No longer does the
mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary
investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of
the Local Government Code, conferring this power on the
mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the
1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the
date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or things to be seized."
The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested
that thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause
and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search
warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being
evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the
phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973
Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary
investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4

Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:

We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force

exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and
on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached
"judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for
purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor
is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his
office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to
secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands,
invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To
permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of
arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when
he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent,
 Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. 5

Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered
as an amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late
President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the
exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised
recommendatory powers:

(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative

shall have the power to recommend the arrest and detention of
any person engaged in illegal recruitment. 6

On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920,

with the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against
illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and
closure powers:

(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power
to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-
holder of authority if after proper investigation it is determined
that his activities constitute a danger to national security and
public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers.
The Minister shall order the closure of companies,
establishment and entities found to be engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without
having been licensed or authorized to do so. 7

On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree

No. 2018, giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:

(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly

authorized representatives shall have the power to cause the
arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of
authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities
constitute a danger to national security and public order or will
lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall
order the search of the office or premises and seizure of
documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements
used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of
 companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in
the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without
having been licensed or authorized to do so. 8

The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor
Code.

The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of

authoritarian rule in its twilight moments.

We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer
issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the
judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the
Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-
taken. Vivo involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the
defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration
Law. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable
alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in
order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. 10 It is valid,
however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters
involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11

xxx xxx xxx

The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens

(Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil.
1122, 1125). That power may be exercised by the Chief
Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the
peace and domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's
opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are
aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious to
the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express
law, deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16
Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).

The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their

continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute
and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner
of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is,
obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to
extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the
sole domain of the courts.

Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia

argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general
warrant:

Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree

No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the
CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No.
615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the
seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or
intended to be used as the means of committing illegal
recruitment, it having verified that you have

(1) No valid license or authority from the

Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and
deploy workers for overseas employment;

(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under

Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to
Article 38 of the same code.

This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution

under existing laws. 13

We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized,
otherwise, it is null and void, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Another factor which makes the search warrants under

consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in
the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe
the articles sought to be seized in this wise:

1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink,

photo equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables,
communications/ recording equipment, tape
 recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or
connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM"
newspaper and any and all
documents/communications, letters and facsimile of
prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets,

books, and other publications to promote the
objectives and purposes of the subversive
organizations known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6
Movement; and

3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation

of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials
and propaganda, more particularly,

1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No.

NKA 892;

2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No.

NKV 969;

3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;

4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate

No. PBP 665; and

5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No.

NGV 472 with marking "Bagong Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which

authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards,
receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other
written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of
Texas, and the operations of the Community Party in Texas,"
was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too
general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in
connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise"
have been held too general, and that portion of a search
warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia
 which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut
General Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore
invalid. The description of the articles sought to be seized under
the search warrants in question cannot be characterized
differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a

notable chapter in English history; the era of disaccord between
the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of
the Crown were given roving commissions to search where
they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of
dissent both Catholic and Puritan." Reference herein to such
historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of
our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that
speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear
and imminent danger to state security. 14

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following
principles:

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only

judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and
search:

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and

undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of
Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of
deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the

Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The
respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the
implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27392 January 30, 1971

PABLO CATURA and LUZ SALVADOR, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and CELESTINO
TABANIAG, et al., respondents.

Joselito J. de la Rosa for petitioners.

Ernesto Estrella for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

It is a novel question that presents itself before this Court in this petition for
the review of a resolution of respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
Specifically, it is whether respondent Court, in the exercise of its power of
investigation to assure compliance with the internal labor organization
procedures under Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act,1 can require a
labor organization's "books of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union
funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to [its] finances" be
delivered and deposited with it at the hearing to conduct such investigation
in accordance with a complaint duly filed without the officials of such labor
organization, therein named as respondents and petitioners before us,
being heard prior to the issuance of such order. The respondent Court, first
acting through Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador and thereafter en
banc, upheld its power to do so. The challenge to such competence sought
to be fortified by the allegation of the absence of procedural due process
was rejected. After a careful study of the matter, we cannot say that
thereby respondents Court was in error. We have no reason to reverse.
As set forth in the brief for the petitioners, Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador,
the President and Treasurer, respectively, of the Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration Employees Association, a legitimate labor
organization duly registered, there was, on December 27, 1966, a
complaint against them under Section 17 filed by the prosecution division of
the respondent Court, the principal complainants being now respondent
Celestino Tabaniag as well as other employees constituting more than ten
percent of the entire membership of such labor organization. In the
complaint, it was charged that during the tenure of office of petitioners
before us as such President and Treasurer, they were responsible for
"unauthorized disbursement of union funds" with complainants on various
occasions during the latter part of 1966 demanding from them "a full and
detailed report of all financial transaction of the union and to make the book
of accounts and other records of the financial activities of the union open to
inspection by the members," only to be met with a refusal on their part to
comply. It was further asserted that the executive board of such labor
organization passed a resolution calling for a general membership meeting
so that petitioners could be confronted about the status of union funds, but
then, Pablo Catura, as President, cancelled such
meeting.lwph1.t There was thereafter a general membership resolution
reiterating previous demands "for a full and detailed report of all financial
transactions of the union," but again there was no response, thus
compelling the members to refer the matter to the Department of Labor
which duly issued subpoenas for the presentation of such book of accounts
to petitioners without any success. After setting forth that complainants had
exhausted all remedies provided in the union's constitution and by-laws,
which were all unavailing, the complaint sought, after due hearing and
judgement, to declare present petitioners, as respondents, guilty of unfair
labor practice under the above provision of the Industrial Peace Act, for
them to cease and desist from further committing such unfair labor practice
complained of, and to render a full and detailed report of all financial
transactions of the union as well as to make the book of accounts and other
records of these financial activities open to inspection by the members.2

Thereafter, on December 28, 1966, respondent Celestino Tabaniag and the

other members, as petitioners in the above complaint before respondents
Court, sought an injunction to prevent now petitioners Pablo Catura who, it
turned out, was again elected as President in an election on November 15,
1966, from taking his oath of office in view of his alleged persistence in the
abuse of his authority in the disbursement of union funds as well as his
refusal to make a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the
union.3

Then came the order of December 29, 1966, by Associate Judge Joaquin
M. Salvador which, instead of granting the injunction sought, limited itself to
requiring and directing "personally the respondents Pablo Catura and Luz
Salvador, president and treasurer, respectively, of the Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration Employees' Association, to deliver and deposit to
this Court all the said Association's book of accounts, bank accounts, pass
books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to the
finances of the said labor union at the hearing of this petition on January 3,
1967 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. Said respondents are hereby required
to comply strictly with this Order."4 There was a motion for reconsideration
on January 2, 1967 by now petitioners Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador on
the ground that they were not heard before such order was issued, which
moreover in their opinion was beyond the power of respondent Court. With
Associate Judge Ansberto P. Paredes dissenting, the order was sustained
in a resolution by the Court en banc on February 28, 1967. Hence the
present petition filed on April 3, 1967.

The petition was given due course by this Court in a resolution of April 13,
1967 with a preliminary injunction issued upon petitioners' posting a bond
of P2,000.00. Respondents did not take the trouble of filing an answer
within the period expired on June 17, 1967 and petitioners were required to
submit their brief within thirty days under this Court's resolution of July 14,
1967. Such a brief was duly filed on September 19 of that year. There was
no brief for respondents. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision
on October 4, 1968.

In the light of the interpretation to be accorded the applicable legal

provisions and after a careful consideration of the contention that such a
power to issue the challenged order cannot be deemed as possessed by
respondent Court which moreover did not accord petitioners procedural
due process, we have reached the conclusion, as set forth at the opening
of this opinion, that petitioners cannot prevail. The order as issued first by
Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador and thereafter by respondent
Court en banc must be sustained.

1. The controlling provisions of law to the specific situation before this Court
concerning the power of investigation of respondent Court to assure
compliance with internal labor organization procedures with the
corresponding authority to investigate to substantiate alleged violations
may be found in paragraphs (b), (h), and (l) of the aforecited Section 17 of
the Industrial Peace Act. Thus: "The members shall be entitled to full and
detailed reports from their officers and representatives of all financial
transactions as provided in the constitution and by-laws of the
organization."5 ... "The funds of the organization shall not be applied for any
purpose or object other than those expressly stated in its constitution or by-
laws or those expressly authorized by a resolution of the majority of the
member." 6... "The books of accounts and other records of the financial
activities of a legitimate labor organization shall be open to inspection by
any officer or member thereof."7

To repeat, the complaint before respondent Court against petitioners as

President and Treasurer of the union, specifically recited an unauthorized
disbursement of union funds as well as the failure to make a full and
detailed report of financial transactions of the union and to make the book
of accounts and other records of its financial activities open to inspection by
the members. Clearly, the matter was deemed serious enough by the
prosecutor of respondent Court to call for the exercise of the statutory
power of investigation to substantiate the alleged violation so as to assure
that the rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization as
specifically set forth in Section 17 be respected. All that the challenged
order did was to require petitioners, as President and Treasurer of the labor
organization, to "deliver and deposit" with respondent Court all of its book
of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers
and other documents related to its finances at the hearing of the petition
before it on January 3, 1967.

On its face, it cannot be said that such a requirement is beyond the

statutory power conferred. If it were otherwise, the specific provisions of
law allegedly violated may not be effectively complied with. The authority to
investigate might be rendered futile if respondent Court could be held as
having acted contrary to law. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the power to
investigate, to be conscientious and rational at the very least, requires an
inquiry into existing facts and conditions. The documents required to be
produced constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to whether or
not there was a failure to comply with the mandates of the law. It is not for
this Court to whittle down the authority conferred on administrative
agencies to assure the effective administration of a statute, in this case
intended to protect the rights of union members against its officers. The
matter was properly within its cognizance and the means necessary to give
it force and effectiveness should be deemed implied unless the power
sought to be exercised is so arbitrary as to trench upon private rights of
petitioners entitled to priority. No such showing has been made; no such
showing can be made. To repeat, there should be no question about the
correctness of the order herein challenged.

2. Nor is the validity of the order in question to be impugned by the

allegation that there was a denial of procedural due process. If the books
and records sought to be delivered and deposited in court for examination
were the private property of petitioners, perhaps the allegation of the
absence of due process would not be entirely lacking in plausibility. Such is
not the case however. The pertinent section of the Industrial Peace Act
makes clear that such books of accounts and other records of the financial
activities are open to inspection by any member of a labor organization. For
the court to require their submission at the hearing of the petition is, as
above noted, beyond question, and no useful purpose would be served by
first hearing petitioners before an order to that effect can be issued.
Moreover, since as was shown in the very brief of petitioners, there was a
motion for reconsideration, the absence of any hearing, even if on the
assumption purely for argument's sake that there was such a requirement,
has no cured. So it was held by this Court in a recent decision. Thus: "As
far back as 1935, it has already been a settled doctrine that a plea of denial
of procedural due process does not lie where a defect consisting of an
absence of notice of hearing was thereafter cured by the alleged aggrieved
party having had the opportunity to be heard on a motion for
reconsideration. 'What the law prohibits is not the absence
of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity
to be heard.' There is then no occasion to impute deprivation of property
without due process where the adverse party was heard on a motion for
reconsideration constituting as it does 'sufficient opportunity' for him to
inform the Tribunal concerned of his side of the controversy. As was stated
in a recent decision, what 'due process contemplates is freedom from
arbitrariness and what it requires is fairness or justice, the substance rather
than the form being paramount,' the conclusion being that the hearing on a
motion for reconsideration meets the strict requirement of due process."8
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied. The writ of preliminary
injunction issued under the resolution of April 13, 1967 is dissolved and
declared to be without any further force or effect.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,

Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975

SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the

Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations, and the
PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner,
vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, and FERNANDO MANALASTAS,
Assistant City Public Service Officer of Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY SITUATED, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Ist. Assistant Solicitor

General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.

Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents.

MARTIN, J.:
This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set
aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio,
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968,
in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D.
Bagatsing, etc.", which reads as follows:

IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of

P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the
petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the
respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives,
attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from
further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-
finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and
from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner
[private respondent] under Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).

Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised
Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the
Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO)
under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. 2 Purposedly, he charged
the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities: 3

b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral

practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or
technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities
which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests,
and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the
Philippines.

c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of

Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary
evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition
of unlawfully amassed wealth ... .

h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding

investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or
behavior of any public official or employee and to file and
prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the
Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and
580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon
witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take
testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation. 4

Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as

Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas,
then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad
testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office
of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain
investigation pending therein."

Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed

on June 25, 1968 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended
Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and
assailed its legality.

On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order:

IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of

P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the
petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the
respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives,
attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from
further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-
finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and
from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner
[private respondent] under Section 530 of the Revised
Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).

Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a

motion for reconsideration first filed on the fundamental submission that the
Order is a patent nullity. 6

As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting
thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of
fact-finding investigations.
It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the
flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis of
evidence. 7 Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only
for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for
supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for
recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than
illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. 8 An
administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only
in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings
whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a
legislative or judicial nature may be taken 9 and may require the
attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It
may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report
findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions. 10

We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its
subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an
effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths,
and take testimony relevant to the investigation" 11 with the authority "to
require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or
otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications
as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." 12 Such subpoena
power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in
the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is
it merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated
in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one
another with the principal aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of
the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities and
anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the
Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would
therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions
under
sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself
(Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what
function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no
reason to depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when
the law itself makes none.
Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a
subpoena issued under the Rules of Court 13 to abridge its application. The
seeming proviso in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code that the
right to summon witnesses and the authority to require the production of
documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise shall be "subject
in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial
proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly seized upon to
require, in respondents' formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the
Rules, a specific case must be pending before a court for hearing or trial
and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the
court's judicial or adjudicatory functions 14 before a non-judicial subpoena
can be issued by an administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must
be emphasized, however, that an administrative subpoena differs in
essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what the Rules speaks of is a
judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent court,
and not an administrative subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the
"restrictions and qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code could mean the restraints against infringement of
constitutional rights or when the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive
and when the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not
appear. 15

Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the

course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and
whether or not probable cause is shown 16 and even before the issuance of
a complaint. 17 It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a
specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order
be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a
lawfully authorized purpose. 18 The purpose of the subpoena is to discover
evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the
discovered evidence so justifies. 19 Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the
value of testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be
for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed
to have information that might shed some helpful light. 20 Because judicial
power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be
relevant to issues on litigations it does not follow that an administrative
agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and
exercise powers of original inquiry. The administrative agency has the
power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in
order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law
is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.
When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an
administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether
there is probable violation of the law. 21 In sum, it may be stated that a
subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1)
within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and
(3) the information is reasonably relevant. 22

There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by

the Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the
City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions 23 fall within the
Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be elicited
from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in
possession, 24 is reasonably relevant to the investigations.

We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in

administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar to adversary
proceedings. 25 In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., 26 the Court ruled that since the
administrative charge of unexplained wealth against the respondent therein
may result in the forfeiture of the property under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, a proceeding criminal or penal in nature, the complainant
cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching upon
his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Later, in Pascual, Jr. v.
Board of Medical Examiners, 27 the same approach was followed in the
administrative proceedings against a medical practitioner that could
possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice the medical profession.
Nevertheless, in the present case, We find that respondent Fernando
Manalastas is not facing any administrative charge. 28 He is merely cited as
a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and
irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting
the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the
corresponding charges. 29 Since the only purpose of investigation is to
discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the
privilege would thus be unwise. 30 Anyway, by all means, respondent
Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that
tends to disregard his privilege against self-incrimination.

A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the

inherent power of the President of the Philippines to issue
subpoena. 31 More tersely stated, respondents would now challenge, in a
collateral way, the validity of the basic authority, Executive Order No. 4, as
amended in part by Executive Order No. 88. Unfortunately, for reasons of
public policy, the constitutionality of executive orders, which are commonly
said to have the force and effect of statutes 32cannot be collaterally
impeached. 33 Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the court
below as to be acceptable for adjudication now. 34 The settled rule is that
the Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of
the necessity of deciding it. 35

Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued
by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to respondent Fernando Manalastas is
well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue.

WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1,

1968, is hereby set aside and declared of no force and effect.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

OFFICE OF THE COURT A.M. No. P-04-1830

ADMINISTRATOR, [Formerly A.M. No. 04-6-151-MCTC]

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,
 - versus - CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,*

CHICO-NAZARIO,*

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA, and

SYLVIA CANQUE, Clerk of Court, BERSAMIN, JJ.

12th MCTC, Moalboal-Badian-

Alcantara-Alegria, Cebu, Promulgated:

Respondent.

June 4, 2009

x-------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

Per Curiam:

The instant case stemmed from the Investigation Report of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI)-Region VII on the entrapment operation on Sylvia R.
Canque, Clerk of Court, 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Moalboal-
Badian-Alcantara-Alegria, Cebu.

The Investigation Report showed that on June 1, 2004, Marissa Y. Ypanto of

Barangay Polo, Alcantara, Cebu filed a letter-complaint before the NBI alleging
that Canque asked from her the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos in
exchange for the release of the formers common-law husband, Jovencio Patoc,
and the dismissal of his criminal cases in court. Patoc was charged with violation
of Republic Act No. 9165 before the sala of Judge Victor R. Teves of the said court.

The NBI operatives conducted an entrapment operation on June 3, 2004 at

about 9:30 A.M. in the sala of Judge Teves. They arrested Canque after she
received the amount of P40,000.00, previously marked with invisible ink and
dusted with fluorescent powder, from Ypanto in the presence of NBI Investigator
Jedidah S. Hife. Canque was brought to the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI
for laboratory examination. Forensic Chemist Rommel D. Paglinawan, in his
Physics Report,[1] found that the right and left hands of Canque were positive for
the presence of fluorescent powder.

The NBI report further stated that prior to the entrapment, Patocs mother
had already given the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos to Canque
in the presence of Ypanto for the dismissal of Patocs first case for possession of
shabu on November 30, 2003. The case remains pending to date.
In a letter dated June 3, 2004, Atty. Reynaldo O. Esmeralda, Acting Regional
Director, NBI-Region VII, endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas the
case of Canque for immediate inquest. Thereafter, Informations for direct bribery
and violation of Sec. 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, were filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barili, Cebu and were docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
CEB-BRL-1058 and CEB-BRL-1057, respectively.

In November 2003, Auditors from Region VII, Cebu City, conducted the
periodic audit on the cash and accounts of accountable officers of the provinces
of Cebu, Boholand Negros Oriental. After the audit of the cash and accounts of
Canque, the Auditors found that she had a cash shortage of P304,985.00. A letter
of demand[2] was sent to her to produce the missing funds and to submit a written
explanation within seventy-two (72) hours why the shortage occurred.

On August 3, 2004, the office of the Cluster Director, Commission on

Audit, Quezon City received the initial report on the result of the examination of
the cash and accounts of Canque.[3] Attached to said report were the
chronological statements on the events that transpired in the course of the audit
submitted by Ma. Violeta Lucila T. Luta, State Auditor II, Team Leader. On August
6, 2004, the Supervising Auditor forwarded to the Office of the Chief Justice the
initial report on the results of the investigation conducted on the cash and
accounts of Canque. The initial report stated that Canque had a shortage in her
cash collection amounting to P304,985.00 and recommended her immediate
relief from her position and any other position involving money or property
accountability.[4]

In a Resolution dated June 29, 2004, the Court treated the NBI entrapment
on Canque as an administrative complaint for grave misconduct and directed her
to comment thereon. She was immediately placed under suspension until further
orders by the Court. The case was referred to a Consultant of the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) for investigation, report and recommendation.

In her Comment,[5] Canque claimed that sometime in November 2003,

Rebecca Patoc came to her office to inquire about the bail for her son, Jovencio.
When she learned from the judge that the bail was P200,000.00, but that it could
be reduced to P100,000.00 if there was no objection from the Chief of Police,
Rebecca came back two (2) days later with a Motion for Reduction of Bail. After
two weeks, Rebecca came with Ypanto. Canque instructed them to proceed to a
bonding company in Barili. She alleged that at Shamrock Restaurant, Rebecca
gave P20,000.00 as premium payment for the bail bond to a certain Ote Erojo,
who in turn delivered to Rebecca a copy of the Release Order, promising to send
her the bond undertaking by mail. On December 8, 2003, Jovencio and Ypanto
brought the surety bond to Canque at the latters office.

In May 2004, another case for drug pushing was filed against Jovencio.
Canque admits to seeing Ypanto only on two (2) occasions: during the preliminary
investigation on May 24 and on May 31 when Ypanto asked her when the ten-day
period for the filing of Jovencios Counter-Affidavit would expire.

Canque further averred that on June 3, 2004, the last day for the filing of
the Counter-Affidavit, Ypanto came with a woman who introduced herself as
Jovencios sister who had just arrived from Holland. The woman got an envelope
from her bag and handed it to Ypanto. Ypanto tried to give it to Canque, but the
latter did not touch it when she saw that it was not the Counter-Affidavit. The
woman allegedly got the envelope from Ypanto and tried to place it at the back of
the palm of Canque where it lightly touched her skin. The woman then showed
her ID and told Canque that she was an NBI agent. Other NBI agents rushed in and
arrested Canque.

In a Resolution dated November 9, 2004, the Court, upon the

recommendation of the OCA, reassigned the case to the Executive Judge,
RTC, Cebu City for investigation, report and recommendation, considering that all
the persons concerned were residents of Cebu City.

Executive Judge Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr. conducted a hearing on October

18, 2005, attended by Canque, NBI agents Gregorio Algoso, Jr., Reynaldo Villordon
and Jedidah Hife. The notice sent to Ypanto was returned with the information
that she had died.

The Investigation Report[6] states, viz.:

Jedidah S. Hife, a special investigator of the National Bureau of
Investigation Central Visayas Regional Office, identified her Affidavit,
dated June 3, 2004.
 In that Affidavit, Hife declared that on June 3, 2004, at about 9
oclock in the morning of June 3, 2004, at the office of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Moalboal-Badian-Alcantara-Alegria, Cebu, she and
other NBI agents arrested Sylvia Canque in an entrapment operation.

She had been instructed to accompany Marissa Ypanto,

pretending to be her friend, and to give a pre-arranged signal to
other NBI agents at the proper time.

Thus, she and Marissa Ypanto had entered a room inside the
courtroom, and there Marissa introduced her to Sylvia Canque as her
friend. Marissa had brought with her marked money in the amount
of P40,000.00, for which Sylvia had asked from her in exchange for
the dismissal of a case for violation of RA 9165 against Jovencio
Patoc, and eventually the release of the latter.

Sylvia Canque and Marissa went outside. Hife followed and

overheard Sylvia tell Marissa that the money was for the fiscal. Sylvia
showed them a Joint Affidavit executed by PO1 Jeremias Geromo and
PO3 Estanislao Avenido, the police officers who had arrested
Jovencio.

They returned inside the courtroom. Sylvia Canque asked

Marissa how much money she had. Marissa said that she was
carrying P50,000.00, and gave the envelope to Canque, who
wrote P50,000.00 on it. The latter put the envelope inside her bag,
and got it out, and put it in again she seemed undecided, and then
she again asked Marissa how much the envelope contained. Marissa
suggested that she count the money.
 While Sylvia was counting the money, Hife gave the pre-
arranged signal. NBI agents Reynaldo Villordon and Michael Angelo
Abarico entered the courtroom followed by other agents, accosted
Sylvia Canque and recovered from her the marked money amounting
to P40,000.00. Thereupon, they put Canque under arrest and
informed her of her Constitutional rights.

At the NBI office, laboratory examination found Sylvia Canque

positive for fluorescent powder. She was then booked and
fingerprinted.

NBI agents Gregorio Y. Algoso, Jr. and Reynaldo C. Villordon

identified and confirmed the allegations in the Joint Affidavit which
they executed on June 3, 2004.

On June 1, 2004, their office received a letter from a Jonald

Ungab, concerning a certain Marissa Ypanto of Brgy. Polo, Alcantara,
Cebu, who had complained about Sylvia R. Canque, Clerk of Court of
the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Moalboal-Basian-Alcantara-
Alegria, who had asked from her the amount of P40,000.00 in
exchange for the release of her common-law husband, Jovencio
Patoc, and the dismissal of the case filed against him, which was then
being heard in the sala of Judge Victor R. Teves.

In accordance with their plan to entrap Sylvia Canque, Jedidah

accompanied Marissa Ypanto, who introduced Jedidah to Sylvia
Canque as a friend. Marked money prepared by the Forensic
Chemistry Section of the NBI, consisting of six five-hundred-peso
bills, in the total amount of P40,000.00, had been given to Ypanto,
who was to hand it to Sylvia Canque. When the transaction was
done, and Jedidah had given the pre-arranged signal indicating that
the money had been received by Sylvia Canque, they immediately
went inside the office of Sylvia Canque, introduced themselves and
arrested her. They brought Sylvia Canque to the NBI office to be
examined for the presence of fluorescent powder on her hands,
booked, photographed and fingerprinted.

Villordon added that, being just nearby, he saw Marissa give

the money to Sylvia Canque, who counted it. At this point, Jedidah
gave the pre-arranged signal, and the agents went inside. His co-
agent Michael Albarico announced that they were NBI agents. All of
which took Sylvia Canque by surprise.

Physics Report No. 04-P-3306, dated June 3, 2004, of the

Forensic Chemistry Section of the National Bureau of Investigation
states that the examination conducted on June 3, 2004, at 12:30 p.m.
revealed that the left and right hands of Sylvia Canque bore the
presence of yellow fluorescent powder.

For her part, Sylvia Canque identified and confirmed the

allegations she made in her Comment, dated July 21, 2004, adding
nothing to the same.

Still and all, Canque insisted that it was Jedidah who put the
envelope on her forearm, and that she did not count the money
inside it. In fact, it was NBI Director Esmeralda who counted the
money in his office. Until then the envelope was unopened. She
denied having written P50,000.00 on the envelope.
 Findings

Canque admitted that an entrapment operation was

conducted on her. Laboratory tests found her hands positive for the
presence of fluorescent powder. But Canque denied touching the
money herself, claiming that it was Jedidah Hife who put the
envelope on the back of her palm. But if the envelope were (sic) just
put on her forearm, and what was dusted with fluorescent powder
was the money, which was inside the envelope, why were Canques
hands found positive for the presence of the powder?

The undersigned gives credence to the testimony of the NBI

agents, which was coherent, and given in a forthright manner. No
ulterior motive to lie could be ascribed to the agents. Thus, the
undersigned finds the facts to be as narrated by the agents. [7]

The Investigating Judge found respondent Canque guilty of grave

misconduct and recommended the penalty of dismissal, with forfeiture of all her
benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government service.

In a Resolution dated February 7, 2006, the Court referred the Investigation

Report to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.

In its Report dated June 13, 2006, the OCA recommended that the
Investigation Report of Investigating Judge Dumdum be set aside and the
complaint be investigated anew upon finding that Canque was not informed of
her right to be heard by herself and counsel during the investigation which
allegedly amounted to a denial of her right to due process; and for the Audit
Report of Shortage in the amount of P304,985.00 and other actuations and
deficiencies of respondent Canque to be set in the next En Banc Agenda.

On September 5, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent

to file a Comment, within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice, on the
Audit Report of the COA finding a shortage in her cash collection amounting
to P304,985.00. Respondent failed to comment. Thus, in an En Banc Resolution
dated December 4, 2007, the Court considered respondent to have waived her
right to file Comment and referred, for the second time, the matter to the Office
of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.

In a Memorandum dated July 23, 2008, the Office of the Court

Administrator found Canque liable for gross neglect of duty, gross dishonesty and
grave misconduct and recommended her dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with
prejudice to re-employment in any government office or instrumentality,
including government-owned and controlled corporations. It further
recommended that she be ordered to restitute the amount of P304,985.00
representing the shortage in the collection of court funds.

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator.

Grave misconduct is a malevolent transgression of some established and

definite rule of action more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by
the public officer or employee which threatens the very existence of the system
of administration of justice.[8] It manifests itself in corruption, clear intent to
violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rules. [9] It is considered as a
grave offense under the Civil Service Law[10] with the corresponding penalty of
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in government
service.

In the case at bar, respondent violated Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of

Conduct for Court Personnel which states that [c]ourt personnel shall not solicit
or accept any gift, favor or benefit on any explicit or implicit understanding that
such gift shall influence their official actions. This is sufficiently established by the
evidence on record. First, respondent was caught red-handed, in a legitimate
entrapment operation, demanding and receiving money from complainant
Ypanto in connection with the immediate release of the latters common-law
husband Jovencio from police custody; and the dismissal of the criminal charges
against him which were pending before the MCTC, Moalboal-Badian-Alcantara-
Alegria, Cebu her official station. While respondent was in the act of counting the
marked money, she was validly placed under arrest and apprised of her
constitutional rights. Second, her hands were found to have smudges of the
yellow fluorescent powder used to mark the bills when her hands were subjected
to ultraviolet light examination. These results of the entrapment operation clearly
establish the guilt of respondent who has merely denied, without support, the
allegations against her.

This is not all.

Respondent likewise failed to observe the standard of behavior required of

clerks of court as the chief administrative officers of their respective courts as
shown by the initial audit report of the COA finding her remiss in the performance
of her administrative duties as clerk of court. These infractions consist of her
failure to update the court cashbook, as well as her failure to explain the missing
collection records[11] for the Fiduciary Fund (FF) and the shortage in her cash
collection amounting to P304,985.00. These acts of respondent are in violation of
her duties and responsibilities as clerk of court in the collection and custody of
legal funds and fees. Clerks of court are responsible for court records and physical
facilities of their respective courts and are accountable for the courts money and
property deposits under Section B, Chapter 1 of the 1991 Manual for Clerks
of Court and the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, viz.:

The Clerk of Court has general administrative supervision over

all the personnel of the Court. As regards the Courts funds and
revenues, records, properties and premises, said officer is the
 custodian. Thus, the Clerk of Court is generally also the treasurer,
accountant, guard and physical plant manager thereof.

Thus, as custodians of the courts funds, revenues, records, properties and

premises, clerks of court are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or
impairment of the same.

The cited acts of respondent clearly show her failure to discharge her
functions as clerk of court constituting gross neglect of duty, gross dishonesty and
grave misconduct. Each offense is punishable with dismissal even for the first time
of commission under Section 22 (a), (b) and (c) of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service
Laws.

We have held time and again that the Court will not hesitate to impose the
stiffest penalty on those who atrociously display serious lack of integrity,
uprightness and honesty demanded of an employee in the judiciary. Neither shall
we tolerate or condone any conduct that would violate the norms of public
accountability and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in
the justice system,[12] as in the case at bar.

Lastly, the Court does not agree with the finding of the Office of the Court
Administrator in its first Report dated June 13, 2006 recommending that the
Investigation Report of Investigating Judge Dumdum be set aside and that the
complaint be investigated anew since Canque was not informed of her right to be
heard by herself and counsel during the investigation an omission allegedly
amounting to a denial of her right to due process. The essence of due process is
that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any
evidence he may have in support of his defense. Technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus,
administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense.[13] A formal or trial-type hearing is not required.

In the case at bar, despite respondents protestations, the records readily

show that she was afforded the opportunity to present her side as she was
directed to file her comment on the complaint. She was notified of the hearing
and was in fact present during the entire proceedings. As to the issue on the
legality of her arrest, respondent has failed to submit evidence in support of her
bare claims.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Sylvia R. Canque, Clerk of Court,

th
12 MCTC, Moalboal-Badian-Alcantara-Alegria, Cebu is found GUILTY of GRAVE
MISCONDUCT, GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY and GROSS DISHONESTY. She is
hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued
leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and financial institutions. She is further ordered to RETURN to the
Court the amount of P304,985.00 to cover the shortage in the collection of court
funds. In case of her failure to restitute the said amount, in full or in part, the
Employees Leave Division of the Office of Administrative ServicesOCA is directed
to compute the balance of respondents accrued leave credits and forward such
computation to the Finance Division of the Fiscal Management OfficeOCA for the
determination of its monetary value. The said amount plus other benefits that
respondent may be entitled to shall be applied to the above shortage incurred.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17778 November 30, 1962

IN RE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ARMANDO RAMOS,

JESUS L. CARMELO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Probe
Committee, Office of the Mayor of Manila, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ARMANDO RAMOS, respondent-appellee.

City Fiscal Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.

Armando Ramos for and in his own behalf as respondent-appellee.

REGALA, J.:

On February 3, 1960, the Mayor of Manila issued an executive order

creating a committee "to investigate the anomalies involving the license
inspectors and other personnel of the License Inspection Division of the
Office of the City Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division of this
Office (of the Mayor)." He named Mr. Jesus L. Carmelo as chairman of said
committee.

It appears that the committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a

private citizen working as a bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba, requiring him
to appear before it on June 3, 8, 9, 15 and 16 and August 4 and 11, 1960,
in connection with an administrative case against Crisanta Estanislao but
that Ramos, on whom the subpoenas were duly served, refused to appear.

Claiming that Ramos' refusal tended "to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administrative proceedings," petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila a petition to declare Armando Ramos in contempt. After hearing,
during which petitioner was required to show a prima facie case, the trial
court dismissed the petition. The lower court held that there is no law
empowering committees created by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas
and demand that witnesses testify under oath. It also held that to compel
Ramos to testify would be to violate his right against self-incrimination.

It appears that in a statement given to investigators of the Office of the

Mayor, Ramos admitted having misappropriated on several occasions,
sums of money given to him by the owner of Casa de Alba for the payment
of the latter's taxes for 1956-1959 and that this fact had not been
discovered earlier because Ramos used to entertain employees in the City
Treasurer's office at Casa de Alba where Ramos was a bookkeeper as
stated above. The trial court held that to compel Ramos to confirm this
statement in the administrative case against certain employees in the
Office of the City Treasurer would be to compel him to give testimony that
could be used against him in a criminal case for estafa of which the owner
of Casa de Alba was the offended party. From that decision, petitioner
appealed to this Court.

The main issue in this ease is the power, if any, of committee, like the
committee of which petitioner is the chairman, to subpoena witnesses to
appear before it and to ask for their punishment in case of refusal.

The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt)1 of the Rules of Court applies only to
inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed
against administrative officials or bodies like the one in this case, unless
said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of
court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code. (People v. Mendoza; People v. Dizon, 49 O. G. No. 2,
541.)

Petitioner invokes Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which

provides as follows:

Powers incidental to taking of testimony. When authority to take

testimony or evidence is conferred upon an administrative officer or
upon any nonjudicial person, committee, or other body, such authority
shall be understood to comprehend the right to administer oaths and
summons witnesses and shall include authority to require the
production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or
otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and
qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character.

Saving the provisions of section one hundred and two of this Act, any
one who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon summons
issued under the authority of the preceding paragraph or who,
appearing before any individual or body exercising the power therein
defined, refuses to make oath, give testimony, or produce documents
for inspection, when thereunto lawfully required, shall be subject to
discipline as in case of contempt of court and upon application of the
individual or body exercising the power in question shall be dealt with
 by the judge of first instance having jurisdiction of the case in the
manner provided by law.

One who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he has
"authority to take testimony or evidence" before he can apply to the courts
for the punishment of hostile witnesses. (Francia v. Pecson, et al., 87 Phil.
100.)

Now, what authority to take testimony does petitioner's committee have

from which the power to cite witnesses may be implied, pursuant to section
580?

To be sure, there is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor

creating the committee about such a grant of power. All that the order gives
to this body is the power to investigate anomalies involving certain city
employees.

Petitioner contends that the Mayor of Manila has the implied power to
investigate city officials and employees appointed by him to the end that
the power expressly vested in him to suspend and remove such officials of
employees (Sec. 22, Republic Act No. 409) may be justly and fairly
exercised. We agree with this proposition and We held so in the case
of Pagkanlungan v. De la Fuente, 48 O.G. No. 10, p. 4332. But We do not
agree with the petitioner that a delegation of such power to investigation
implies also a delegation of the power to take testimony or evidence of
witnesses whose appearance may be require by the compulsory process of
subpoena. Thus, in denying this power to an investigating body in the
Office of the Mayor of Manila, We said in Francia v. Pecson, et al., supra:
"Were do not think the mayor (of Manila) can delegate or confer the powers
to administer oaths, to take testimony, and to issue subpoenas."

Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the provisions of section 580 of the

Administrative Code are applicable to the City of Manila as these pertain to
national bureaus or offices of the government.

Citing 50 Am. Jur. 449, petitioner contends that "the power of the
investigation committee to issue compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses undoubtedly exists since only complimentary to
the power of the mayor to investigate, suspend and remove city officers
and employees, supra, is the recognized rule that where the statute grants
a right, it also confers by implication every particular power necessary for
the exercise thereof." There is no merit in the argument. In the first place,
the authority cited speaks of statutory, grant of power to a body. Here, We
have seen that whatever power may be claimed by petitioner's committee
may only be traced to the power of the Mayor to investigate as implied from
his power to suspend or remove certain city employees. There is no
statutory grant of power to investigate to petitioner's committee.

In the second place, even granting that the Mayor has the implied power to
require the appearance of witnesses before him, the rule, as noted earlier,
is that the Mayor can not delegate this power to a body like the committee
of the petitioner. (Francia v. Pecson, et al., supra.)

Lastly, 50 Am. Jur. Sec. 428, p. 450 itself admits an exception to the rule
invoked by the petitioner. Thus, it is stated that "where the liberty and
property of persons are sought to be brought within the operation of a
power claimed to be impliedly granted by an act because necessary to its
due execution, the case must be clearly seen to be within those intended to
be reached." Here, no less than the liberty of Armando Ramos is involved
in the claim of the committee to the right to cite witnesses.

We hold, therefore, that petitioner's committee has no power to cite

witnesses to appear before it and to ask for their punishment in case of
refusal. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for Us to pass upon the
other error assigned by petitioner as having been allegedly committed by
the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila is

hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-13827 September 28, 1962

BENJAMIN MASANGCAY, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Godofredo A. Ramos and Ruby Salazar-Alberto for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General and Dominador D. Dayot for respondent.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Benjamin Masangcay, with several others, was on October 14, 1957

charged before the Commission on Election with contempt for having
opened three boxes bearing serial numbers l-8071, l-8072 and l-8073
containing official and sample ballots for the municipalities of the province
of Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said Commission embodied in its
resolution promulgated September 2, 1957, and its unnumbered resolution
date March 5, 1957, inasmuch as he opened said boxes not the presence
of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor,
and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal
Party and the Citizens' Party, as required in the aforesaid resolutions,
which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Masangcay was then the provincial treasurer
of Aklan designated by the Commission in its resolution in Case CE-No.
270, part II 2 (b) thereof, to take charge of the receipt and custody of the
official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their distribution,
among the different municipalities of the province.

In compliance with the summons issued to Masangcay and his co-

respondents to appear and show cause why they should not be punished
for contempt on the basis of the aforementioned charge, they all appeared
before the Commission on October 21, 1957 and entered a plea of not
guilty. Thereupon, evidence was presented by both the prosecution and the
defense, and on December 16, 1957 the Commission rendered its decision
finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as charged and
sentencing each of them to suffer three months imprisonment and pay a
fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment of two months in case of
insolvency, to be served in the provincial jail of Aklan. The other
respondents were exonerated for lack of evidence.
Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue
the constitutionality of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which grants
the Commission on Elections as well as its members the power to punish
acts of contempt against said body under the same procedure and with the
same penalties provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in that the
portion of said section which grants to the Commission and members the
power to punish for contempt is unconstitutional for it infringes the principle
underlying the separation of powers that exists among the three
departments of our constitutional form of government. In other words, it is
contended that, even if petitioner can be held guilty of the act of contempt
charged, the decision is null and void for lack of valid power on the part of
the Commission to impose such disciplinary penalty under the principle of
separation of powers. There is merit in the contention that the Commission
on Elections lacks power to impose the disciplinary penalty meted out to
petitioner in the decision subject of review. We had occasion to stress in
the case of Guevara v. The Commission on Elections 1 that under the law
and the constitution, the Commission on Elections has only the duty to
enforce and administer all laws to the conduct of elections, but also the
power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in
connection with the elections. In this sense, said, the Commission,
although it cannot be classified a court of justice within the meaning of the
Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body,
may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that
by express provision law come under its jurisdiction. The difficulty lies in
drawing the demarcation line between the duty which inherently is
administrative in character and a function which calls for the exercise of the
quasi-judicial function of the Commission. In the same case, we also
expressed the view that when the Commission exercises a ministerial
function it cannot exercise the power to punish contempt because such
power is inherently judicial in nature, as can be clearly gleaned from the
following doctrine we laid down therein:

. . . In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty;

it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could
not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the
law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. As this Court has
aptly said: 'The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts;
its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and
mandates courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice
 (Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U.S. v. Lee Hoc,
36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 O.G., 2570; In Re Kelly, Phil., 944). The
exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary
incident and attribute of courts (Slade Perkins v. Director of
Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by administrative bodies has been
invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony
(People v. Swena, 296 P., 271). And the exercise of that power by an
administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has
been held invalid (Langenberg v. Lecker, 31 N.E., 190; In Re Sims,
37 P., 135; Roberts v. Hacney, 58 SW., 810).1awphl.nt

In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce
and for whose violation the charge for contempt was filed against petitioner
Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial
function for they merely concern the procedure to be followed in the
distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the different
municipalities. In fact, Masangcay, who as provincial treasurer of Aklan was
the one designated to take charge of the receipt, custody and distribution of
election supplies in that province, was charged with having opened three
boxes containing official ballots for distribution among several
municipalities in violation of the instructions of the Commission which
enjoin that the same cannot be opened except in the presence of the
division superintendent of schools, the provincial auditor, and the
authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party, and
the Citizens' Party, for he ordered their opening and distribution not in
accordance with the manner and procedure laid down in said resolutions.
And because of such violation he was dealt as for contempt of the
Commission and was sentenced accordingly. In this sense, the
Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt,
and so its decision is null and void.

Having reached the foregoing conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to pass

on the question of constitutionality raised by petitioner with regard to the
portion of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which confers upon the
Commission on Elections the power to punish for contempt for acts
provided for in Rule 64 of our rules of court.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from insofar as petitioner Benjamin

Masangcay is concerned, as well as the resolution denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, insofar as it concerns him, are hereby reversed,
without pronouncement as to costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179830 December 3, 2009

LINTANG BEDOL, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Challenged in this petition for certiorari are the twin Resolutions issued by
the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in the case
entitled "In the Matter of the Charge of Contempt of the Commission
Against Election Supervisor Lintang Bedol." The first Resolution1 dated
August 7, 2007, held petitioner guilty of contempt of the COMELEC and
meted out to him the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment and a fine
of P1,000.00. The second Resolution2 dated August 31, 2007, denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The facts as stated by the COMELEC follow:

On May 14, 2007, the National and Local elections were held under the
auspices of this Commission.

As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the province of

Maguindanao, the respondent [petitioner] discharged his official functions
and was able to ensure the PBOCs performance of its ministerial duty to
canvass the Certificates of Canvass coming from the twenty two (22) city
and municipalities in the province.

At that time, respondent [petitioner] also was charged with the burdensome
and gargantuan duty of being the concurrent Provincial Elections
Supervisor for the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan a neighboring province of
Maguindanao.

Respondent [petitioner] Bedol failed to attend the scheduled canvassing of

the Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he
is the Provincial Election Supervisor which was slated on May 22, 2007.

On May 25, 2007, respondent appeared before the Commission, en banc

sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) for the election of
senators to submit the provincial certificate of canvass for Maguindanao,
pursuant to his functions as Provincial Elections Supervisor and chair of the
PBOC for Maguindanao. Due to certain observations on the provincial
certificates of canvass by certain parties, canvassing of the certificate was
held in abeyance and respondent was queried on the alleged fraud which
attended the conduct of elections in his area.

He was already informed of the resetting of the canvassing for May 30,
2007, but failed to appear despite prior knowledge.

On June 4, 2007, Celia B. Romero, Director II, ERSD & Concurrent Chief of
the Records and Statistics Division of the COMELEC issued a certification
that as of even date, the canvassing documents for all municipalities of the
province of Maguindanao in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections
were not transmitted by the Provincial Election Supervisor of said province
nor the respective Board of Canvassers.

The Commission and not just the NBOC, in the exercise of its investigatory
powers to determine existing controversies created the Task Force
Maguindanao, headed by Commissioner Nicodemo Ferrer, which was
tasked to conduct a fact-finding investigation on the conduct of elections
and certificates of canvass from the city and municipalities in Maguindanao.

Respondent [petitioner] appeared before the Task Force during its June 11,
2007 fact finding activity and responded to the queries from the chair. It
was during this hearing that respondent [petitioner] Bedol explained that,
while in his custody and possession, the election paraphernalia were stolen
sometime on May 29, 2007, or some fifteen (15) days after the elections.
This was the first time such an excuse was given by the respondent
[petitioner] and no written report was ever filed with the Commission
regarding the alleged loss.1avvphi1

Respondent [petitioner] Bedol was duly informed to be present in the next

scheduled investigative proceedings set for June 14, 2007 as the Task
Force wanted to delve deeper into the alleged loss by propounding
additional questions to Atty. Bedol during the next scheduled proceedings,
such as why he still had in his possession said documents which should
have already been turned over to the Commission, why he did not report to
the COMELEC or to the police authorities the purported theft, and other
pertinent questions. However, despite actual notice in open session, Atty.
Bedol failed to appear, giving the impression that respondent [petitioner]
Bedol does not give importance to this whole exercise and ignores the
negative impact his attitude has on this Commission.

Also respondent [petitioner] failed and refused to submit a written

explanation of his absences which he undertook to submit on June 13,
2007, but was only received by this Commission belatedly on July 03,
2007.

On June 26, 2007, [petitioner] came out on national newspapers, in an

exclusive interview with the Inquirer and GMA-7, with a gleaming 45
caliber pistol strapped to his side, and in clear defiance of the Commission
posted the challenge by saying that those that are saying that there was
cheating in Maguindanao, file a case against me tomorrow, the next day.
They should file a case now and I will answer their accusations.(Words in
brackets ours)

On June 27, 2007, the COMELEC through Task Force Maguindanao head,
Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer, issued a Contempt Charge and Show
Cause Order3 against petitioner citing various violations of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, viz:

You are hereby formally charged of contempt of this Commission for having
committed during the period between May 14, 2007, and June 26, 2007,
acts in violation of specific paragraphs of Section 2, Rule 29 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as follows:
1. (a) Your (PES Bedols) failure to attend the scheduled canvassing
of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of
which he (sic) is (sic) the Provincial Election Supervisor on May 22,
2007; (b) your failure to attend the reset schedule of the canvassing
on May 30, 2007, despite knowledge thereof when you attended the
previously scheduled but again reset canvassing of said PCOCs on
May 25, 2007; (c) your failure to attend the continuation of hearing of
the Task Force Maguindanao on June 14, 2007, despite notice to him
in open session in the hearing held on June 11, 2007, and personal
service to you of a subpoena which you duly signed on the same
date; and your failure/refusal to submit your written explanation of
your said absences which you undertook to submit on June 13, 2007
all of these failures on your part are violations of paragraphs (b) and
(f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

2. Your unlawful assumption of custody in your office in

Maguinadanao of the municipal certificates of canvass (MCOC) and
other accountable election documents of all the municipalities of
Maguinadanao used in the last elections of 2007, but which should
have been delivered to the Commission on Elections in its main office
in Intramuros, Manila, and your admission that said accountable
documents were lost from your said custody these constitute
violations of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d), section 2, Rule 29 of said
Rules.

3. Your pronouncements in the media flaunting [disrespect to] the

authority of the COMELEC over you, challenging the institution to file
a case against you in court as it is only in court that you are ready to
face your accuser are violations of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2,
Rule 29 of said Rules.

4. Your regaling the media (interviews in national television channels,

newspapers and radios) with your boast of possession of an armory
of long firearms and side arms, displaying in public for all to see in
your front-page colored portrait in a national broadsheet and during a
television interview a shiny pistol tucked in a holster at your waist in a
combative mode (sic) these are clear violations of paragraphs (a)
and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules. (Words in brackets ours)
Through the foregoing June 27, 2007 Order, petitioner was directed to
appear before the COMELEC En Banc on July 3, 2007 at 10:00 oclock in
the morning to personally explain why he should not be held in contempt
for the above-mentioned offenses.

On July 2, 2007, petitioner was arrested by members of the Philippine

National Police on the basis of an Order of Arrest4 issued on June 29, 2007
by the COMELEC after petitioner repeatedly failed to appear during the
fact-finding proceedings before Task Force Maguindanao.

During the July 3, 2007 hearing, petitioner questioned the COMELECs

legal basis for issuing the warrant of arrest and its assumption of
jurisdiction over the contempt charges. Upon petitioners motion, he was
granted a period of ten (10) days within which to file the necessary pleading
adducing his arguments and supporting authorities. The continuation of the
hearing was set on July 17, 2007.

On July 17, 2007, which was beyond the ten-day period he requested,
petitioner submitted an Explanation Ad Cautelam with Urgent
Manifestation, containing the following averments:

1. Respondent [petitioner] urgently manifests that he is making a

special appearance as he assails the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Commission and its capacity to prosecute the present case in an
impartial and fair manner.

2. Respondent [petitioner] questions the issuance of a warrant of

arrest against him. He can not be validly arrested or re-arrested as a
witness who is being compelled to testify in a hearing before the
Honorable Commission.

3. Respondent [petitioner] has not committed any contemptuous acts

against the Commission. He has not committed those acts charged
against him by the Commission motu proprio. (Words in brackets
ours.)

During the hearing on July 17, 2007, petitioner reiterated his objection to
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the contempt charges due to the
absence of a complaint lodged with the COMELEC by any private party.
Petitioners objection was treated as a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, which was denied forthwith by the COMELEC. Petitioner was
then required to present evidence which he refused to do. Various exhibits
were then marked and presented to the COMELEC. However, the latter
allowed petitioner to file a Memorandum within a period of ten (10) days
and gave him the opportunity to attach thereto his documentary and other
evidence.

On July 31, 2007, petitioner again belatedly filed his

Memorandum5 maintaining his objection to the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC to initiate the contempt proceedings on ground that the
COMELEC, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the
election of senators, was performing its administrative and not its quasi-
judicial functions. Petitioner argued that the COMELEC, in that capacity,
could not punish him for contempt.

On August 7, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc rendered the first assailed

Resolution, the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, respondent Atty. Lintang

Bedol is hereby found guilty of Contempt of the Commission for the
following acts and omissions:

1. (a) The failure to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial

Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he is the
Provincial Election Supervisor on May 22, 2007 (b) failure to attend
the reset schedule of the canvassing on May 30, 2007, despite
knowledge thereof when Respondent Bedol attended the previously
scheduled but again reset canvassing on May 25, 2007 (c) failure to
attend the continuation of hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao on
June 14, 2007, despite notice to Respondent in open session in the
hearing held on June 11, 2007, and personal service to him of the
subpoena which he duly signed on the same date; the failure/refusal
to submit written explanation of respondents absences which he
undertook to submit on June 13, 2007 --- all of these failures are
violations of paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

2. The unlawful assumption of custody in the Respondents office in

Maguindanao of the Municipal Certificates of Canvass (MCOC) and
other accountable election documents of all the municipalities of
Maguindanao used in the last elections of 2007, but which should
 have been delivered to the Commission on Elections in its main office
in Intramuros, Manila, and Respondents plain admission that said
accountable documents were lost from his said custody --- these
constitute violations of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29
of said Rules.lavvphil

3. The respondents pronouncements in media flaunting disrespect to

the authority of the COMELEC over him, challenging the institution to
file a case against him in court as it is supposedly only in court that
Respondent Bedol was ready to face his accuser are violations of
paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.

4. Regaling the public through the media (interviews in national

television channels, newspapers and radios) with boast of possession
of an armory of long firearms and side arms, displaying in public, for
all to see in his front-page colored portrait in a national broadsheet
and during a television interview, a shiny pistol tucked in a holster at
your waist in a combative mode (sic) --- these are clear violations of
paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.

All the foregoing constitute an exhibition of contumacious acts showing

disrespect for the institution, of which respondent is even a ranking official,
which is clearly contemptuous of this Commission, for which Respondent
Lintang Bedol is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
six (6) months and to pay a fine of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00).

The Legal Department of the Comelec is hereby directed to investigate and

determine whether or not any election offense or crime under the Revised
Penal Code has been committed by respondent Lintang Bedol and to
initiate the filing of the necessary charge/s therefor.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied

by the COMELEC in the other assailed Resolution dated August 31, 2007.

Hence, petitioner filed before the Court the instant petition for certiorari
raising the following issues:

I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS HAS
JURISDICTION TO INITIATE OR PROSECUTE THE CONTEMPT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSSION HAS ALREADY PREJUDGED

THE CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF HIS DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, ASSUMING IT HAS JURISDICTION TO PUNISH FOR
CONTEMPT, ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, CREDIBLE AND
COMPETENT EVIDENCE.

We dismiss the petition.

The main thrust of petitioners argument is that the COMELEC exceeded its
jurisdiction in initiating the contempt proceedings when it was performing its
administrative and not its quasi-judicial functions as the National Board of
Canvassers for the election of senators. According to petitioner, the
COMELEC may only punish contemptuous acts while exercising its quasi-
judicial functions.

The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an

adjunct to its constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws,
by virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of
the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx

(6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of

election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices.

The above-quoted provision should be construed broadly to give effect to

the COMELECs constitutional mandate as enunciated in Loong v.
Commission on Elections,6 which held:
xxx. Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC
the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."
Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all
the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Congruent to
this intent, this Court has not been niggardly in defining the parameters of
powers of COMELEC in the conduct of our elections.

The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into
administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial
power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies
arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of
all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to
the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to
exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by
Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and
administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the
Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code
(Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to
implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus
Election Code.7

The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear

and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply,
and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself
in enforcing and administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines
Inc. v. Esteva,8 described quasi-judicial power in the following manner, viz:

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the

power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons
before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which
the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the
same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when
it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive
or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is
incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive
or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate
facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence,
and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and
exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons
are affected, it is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial
power due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.
[Emphasis ours.]

The Creation of Task Force Maguindanao was impelled by the allegations

of fraud and irregularities attending the conduct of elections in the province
of Maguindanao and the non-transmittal of the canvassing documents for
all municipalities of said province.

Task Force Maguindanaos fact-finding investigation to probe into the

veracity of the alleged fraud that marred the elections in said province; and
consequently, to determine whether the certificates of canvass were
genuine or spurious, and whether an election offense had possibly been
committed could by no means be classified as a purely ministerial or
administrative function.

The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its
quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive
fraud during the elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the
Task Force conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties
concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to argue and
support their respective positions.

The effectiveness of the quasijudicial power vested by law on a

government institution hinges on its authority to compel attendance of the
parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings or proceedings. As
enunciated in Arnault v. Nazareno9

Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always
accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain
what is needed.

In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish
individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-finding investigation, despite
a previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the
COMELECs investigative power, which is an essential incident to its
constitutional mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible
elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was however
derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said hearings
and to answer questions regarding the various election documents which,
he claimed, were stolen while they were in his possession and custody.
Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such contumacious
refusal to attend the Task Force hearings.

Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board of

canvassers at that time it required petitioner to appear before it, the Court
had the occasion to rule that the powers of the board of canvassers are not
purely ministerial. The board exercises quasi-judicial functions, such as the
function and duty to determine whether the papers transmitted to them are
genuine election returns signed by the proper officers.10 When the results
of the elections in the province of Maguindanao were being canvassed,
counsels for various candidates posited numerous questions on the
certificates of canvass brought before the COMELEC. The COMELEC
asked petitioner to appear before it in order to shed light on the issue of
whether the election documents coming from Maguindanao were spurious
or not. When petitioner unjustifiably refused to appear, COMELEC
undeniably acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction when it issued the
assailed resolutions.

In Santiago, Jr. v. Bautista,11 the Court held:

xxx. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of

legislative or administrative duties, and the performance of and
administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise
of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial
functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of
parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer
is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions,
he acts judicially.

On the procedure adopted by the COMELEC in proceeding with the indirect

contempt charges against petitioner, Section 52 (e), Article VII of the
Omnibus Election Code pertinently provides:

Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections.

xxx

(e) Punish contempts provided for in the Rules of Court in the same
procedure and with the same penalties provided therin. Any violation of any
final and executory decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall
constitute contempt thereof. [Emphasis ours.]

The aforecited provision of law is implemented by Rule 29 of COMELECs

Rules of Procedure, Section 2 of which states:

Rule 29 Contempt

Sec. 1. xxx

Sec. 2. Indirect Contempt. After charge in writing has been filed with the
Commission or Division, as the case may be, and an opportunity given to
the respondent to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of the responsible officer of the Commission in the

performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment

or command of the Commission or any of its Divisions, or injunction or
restraining order granted by it;

(c) Any abuse of or any inlawful interference with the process or

proceedings of the Commission or any of its Divisions not constituting
direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rules;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,

or degrade the administration of justice by the Commission or any of its
Divisions;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority; and

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served.

SEC. 3 Penalty for Indirect Contempt. If adjudged guilty, the accused

may be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos
or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both, at the discretion
of the Commission or Division.

The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure is broad enough to allow the initiation of indirect contempt
proceedings by the COMELEC motu proprio. Furthermore, the above-
quoted provision of Section 52(e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code
explicitly adopts the procedure and penalties provided by the Rules of
Court. Under Section 4, Rule 71, said proceedings may be initiated motu
proprio by the COMELEC, viz:

SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect

contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the
contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring
the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a

verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal
action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact
but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless
the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge
and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.

Hence, the COMELEC properly assumed jurisdiction over the indirect

contempt proceedings which were initiated by its Task Force Maguindanao,
through a Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order, notwithstanding the
absence of any complaint filed by a private party.

We turn now to petitioners claim that the COMELEC pre-judged the case
against him, and that its findings were not supported by evidence. His claim
deserves scant consideration.

The fact that the indirect contempt charges against petitioner were initiated
motu proprio by the COMELEC did not by itself prove that it had already
prejudged the case against him. As borne out by the records, the
COMELEC gave petitioner several opportunities to explain his side and to
present evidence to defend himself. All of petitioners belatedly filed
pleadings were admitted and taken into consideration before the
COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution finding petitioner guilty of
indirect contempt.

The COMELEC complied with the aforementioned Section 4, Rule 71 of the

Rules of Court and with the requirements set by Rule 29 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, when it issued the Contempt Charge and Show Cause
Order against petitioner directing him to appear before it and explain why
he should not be held in contempt.

Petitioner claims that the challenged Resolution finding him guilty of indirect
contempt was based merely on hearsay, surmises, speculations and
conjectures, and not on competent and substantial evidence. He contends
that there is no convincing evidence that he deliberately refused to heed
the summonses of the COMELEC or that he was sufficiently notified of the
investigative hearings. He further argues that the loss of the election
documents should not even be automatically ascribed to him.

We are not persuaded.

Petitioner was found guilty of contempt on four (4) grounds. First, he

repeatedly failed to attend, despite notice of the scheduled12 canvassing of
the Provincial Certificates of Canvass, the hearing of the Task Force
Maguindanao; and refused to submit his explanation for such absences,
which he had undertaken to submit, in violation of paragraphs (b) and (f) of
Section 2, Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Petitioner was duly notified of the scheduled hearings. It was his official
responsibility to be present during the scheduled hearing to shed light on
the allegedly stolen election documents but he failed to do so without
offering any valid justification for his non-appearance.

Second, he unlawfully assumed custody of accountable election

documents, which were lost while in his possession, and consequently
failed to deliver the same, in violation of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d) Section
2, Rule 29 of same Rules.

Petitioner admitted that the subject certificate of canvass and other election
documents were lost while in his custody. Petitioner himself admitted
during the hearing held on June 11, 2007 that the documents were stolen
sometime on May 29, 2007. Apart from the said loss of the vital election
documents, his liability stemmed from the fact that he illegally retained
custody and possession of said documents more than two weeks after the
elections. The COMELEC viewed such act as a contemptuous interference
with its normal functions.

Third and fourth, he publicly displayed disrespect for the authority of the
COMELEC through the media (interviews on national television channels,
and in newspapers and radios) by flaunting an armory of long firearms and
side arms in public, and posing for the front page of a national broadsheet,
with a shiny pistol tucked in a holster, in violation of paragraphs (a) and (d),
Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.

Petitioner questions the probative value of the newspaper clippings

published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on June 26, 2007 which showed a
photo of him with a firearm tucked to his side and his supposed exclusive
interview. He claims that said newspaper clippings are mere hearsay,
which are of no evidentiary value.

True, there were instances when the Court rejected newspaper articles as
hearsay, when such articles are offered to prove their contents without any
other competent and credible evidence to corroborate them. However, in
Estrada v. Desierto, et al.,13 the Court held that not all hearsay evidence is
inadmissible and how over time, exceptions to the hearsay rule have
emerged. Hearsay evidence may be admitted by the courts on grounds of
"relevance, trustworthiness and necessity."14 When certain facts are within
judicial notice of the Court, newspaper accounts "only buttressed these
facts as facts."15

Another exception to the hearsay rule is the doctrine of independently

relevant statements, where only the fact that such statements were made is
relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule
does not apply; hence, the statements are admissible as evidence.
Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary,
for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such a fact.16

Here, the newspaper clippings were introduced to prove that petitioner

deliberately defied or challenged the authority of the COMELEC. As
ratiocinated by the COMELEC in the challenged Resolution of August 7,
2007, it was not the mere content of the articles that was in issue, but
petitioners conduct when he allowed himself to be interviewed in the
manner and circumstances, adverted to in the COMELEC Resolution, on a
pending controversy which was still brewing in the COMELEC. While
petitioner claimed that he was misquoted, he denied neither the said
interview nor his picture splashed on the newspaper with a firearm
holstered at his side but simply relied on his objection to the hearsay nature
of the newspaper clippings. It should be stressed that petitioner was no
ordinary witness or respondent. He was under the administrative
supervision of the COMELEC17 and it was incumbent upon him to
demonstrate to the COMELEC that he had faithfully discharged his duties
as dictated by law. His evasiveness and refusal to present his evidence as
well as his reliance on technicalities to justify such refusal in the face of the
allegations of fraud or anomalies and newspaper publication mentioned to
the Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order amounted to an implied
admission of the charges leveled against him.

All told, petitioner brought this predicament upon himself when he opted to
dispense with the presentation of his evidence during the scheduled
hearings and to explain his non-appearance at the hearings of Task Force
Maguindanao and the loss of the certificates of canvass and other election
documents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a

Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
hereby DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 150178. November 26, 2004]

FLORIAN R. GAOIRAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA,

Retired Chairman, Commission on Higher Education, ESTER
 ALBANO GARCIA, now Chairman, Commission on Higher
Education, FELIPE S. AMMUGAUAN, SR., Vocation School
Superintendent I, Angadanan Agro-Industrial College, EDMOND
M. CASTILLEJO, Administrative Officer I, Angadanan Agro-
Industrial College, and DIOSDADO TELAN, Instructor I & Head
Teacher III, OIC Designate, Angadanan Agro-Industrial College,
Angadanan, Isabela, respondents.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court filed by Florian R. Gaoiran, seeking to reverse and set
aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61477. In
the assailed decision, the appellate court reversed the Decision dated
February 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan, Isabela,
Branch 20, nullifying the Resolution dated June 3, 1999 of Hon. Angel C.
Alcala, then Chairman of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED),
dismissing petitioner Gaoiran from the service for grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
On October 29, 1997, a letter-complaint was filed with the CHED
against petitioner Gaoiran, Head Teacher III in the High School Department
of the Angadanan Agro-Industrial College (AAIC),[2] a state-supervised
school in Angadanan, Isabela. In his letter-complaint, respondent Edmond
M. Castillejo, Administrative Officer II, also of the same school, charged the
petitioner with mauling him while he was performing his duties therein. The
incident allegedly took place on August 15, 1997 at 2:30 p.m. inside the
school premises. Appended to the letter-complaint were the verified
criminal complaint filed by respondent Castillejo against the petitioner and
the sworn statements of his witnesses. The criminal complaint for assault to
a person in authority was filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Angadanan-San Guillermo and docketed as Criminal Case No. 97-42.
The letter-complaint was referred to the Legal Affairs Service of the
CHED. Thereafter, Atty. Felina S. Dasig, then Officer-in-Charge of the
Office of the Director III, Legal Affairs Service, conducted a fact-finding
investigation on the mauling incident to determine the existence of a prima
facie case against the petitioner.
 During the fact-finding investigation, respondent Castillejo averred that
at 2:30 p.m. on August 15, 1997, while he was performing his usual duties
as Administrative Officer II, the petitioner suddenly barged into his
(Castillejos) office and, then and there, assaulted and boxed him. The
petitioner delivered blows on respondent Castillejos head, left eye, left
eyebrow and lower lip. Not content with the injuries he inflicted on
respondent Castillejo, the petitioner tried to throw him down the stairs but
was prevented by the timely intervention of Mr. Ismael Bautista, Accountant
I of the same school. Bautista and other employees of the AAIC
corroborated respondent Castillejos statements. Moreover, the medical
certificate issued by Dr. Belinda L. Miguel showed that on August 15, 1997,
she treated respondent Castillejo for the wounds he sustained on his left
eye, left eyebrow and lower lip.
For his part, the petitioner averred that at around 2:30 p.m. of August
15, 1997, he was about to leave the school premises. Suddenly,
respondent Castillejo shouted to the security guard to punch out the
petitioners attendance card. This irked the petitioner because there were
students and other teachers in the vicinity. The petitioner confronted
respondent Castillejo and asked the latter why he had to embarrass him
(petitioner) in front of the students. Respondent Castillejo just turned his
back and proceeded to his office. The petitioner followed him and later saw
that respondent Castillejo was already holding a wrench. Inside respondent
Castillejos office, the petitioner made a side step and just then, respondent
Castillejo slipped and fell flat on the floor. The petitioner noticed that
respondent Castillejos left eyebrow was bleeding and he was putting up a
struggle (nagpupumiglas), so the petitioner held his feet. While going down
the stairs, the petitioner met Bautista and Henry Rupac, Watchman I of the
school.
After the fact-finding investigation was terminated, and upon finding of
a prima facie case against the petitioner for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, Atty. Dasig issued the Formal
Charge and Order of Preventive Suspension dated July 27, 1998 stating in
part:

WHEREFORE, you are hereby directed to answer in writing and under oath the
above charges against you within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, submitting
therewith sworn statements of your witnesses and other pertinent documents, if
any. In your answer, you are directed to state whether or not you elect a formal
hearing of the charges against you or you waive your rights to such hearing. You
are, likewise, advised of your right to counsel.

Considering the gravity of the instant charge against you, pursuant to the
provisions of P.D. 807, as amended, you are hereby PREVENTIVELY
SUSPENDED FOR NINETY (90) DAYS WITHOUT PAY effective upon receipt
thereof.[3]

The petitioner did not submit his written counter-affidavit or answer to

the charges against him. Instead, he filed with the RTC of Cauayan,
Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for certiorari and prohibition to restrain the
enforcement of the said preventive suspension order. However,
considering that the petitioner had already served the suspension, the case
was dismissed for being moot and academic.
The petitioner sought reconsideration of the formal charge and
preventive suspension order, contending that the letter-complaint was not
under oath and that he was not informed nor apprised of the complaint
against him before, during and after the preliminary fact-finding
investigation.
Thereafter, Joel Voltaire V. Mayo, who was later appointed Director of
the Legal Affairs Service of the CHED, issued the Resolution dated
February 20, 1999, dismissing the administrative complaint against the
petitioner on the ground that the letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo
was not under oath.
However, respondent Hon. Angel C. Alcala, then Chairman of the
CHED, apparently unaware of the existence of Director Mayos resolution,
issued another Resolution dated June 3, 1999, finding the petitioner guilty
of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and dismissing him therefrom. The dispositive portion of
respondent Alcalas resolution states:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, respondent FLORIAN R. GAOIRAN

is hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE for unlawfully
attacking a person in authority while in the active performance of his duties and
responsibilities and, then and there, inflicted physical injuries on his person. This is
without prejudice to the complainants right to institute the proper criminal and civil
actions against the respondent relative thereto.
The Vocational Schools Superintendent of Angadanan Agro-Industrial College,
Angadanan, Isabela, is hereby directed to effectively implement this Order and to
submit a report thereon within three (3) days upon implementation.

SO ORDERED.[4]

The petitioner received a copy of the above resolution on July 12, 1999,
which was served on him by respondent Felipe P. Ammugauan, Sr., School
Superintendent I of AAIC.
The petitioner then filed with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20,
a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. He alleged that
respondent Alcala committed grave abuse of discretion when, in the
Resolution dated June 3, 1999, he dismissed the petitioner from the service
despite the fact that the administrative complaint against him had already
been dismissed per the Resolution of February 20, 1999 of Director Mayo
of the Legal Affairs Service.
In its Decision dated February 15, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in
favor of the petitioner as it declared the June 3, 1999 Resolution of
respondent Alcala null and void. The RTC found that after the formal
charge was filed against the petitioner and he chose not to file an answer
thereto, a formal investigation was still required to be conducted under the
Civil Service Rules. When Director Mayo of the Legal Affairs Service, in his
February 20, 1999 Resolution, dismissed the administrative complaint
against the petitioner on the ground that the letter-complaint was not under
oath, the formal investigation had not, as yet, been terminated. Such
dismissal, according to the RTC, put an end to the litigation. Thus,
respondent Alcala acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing his June
3, 1999 Resolution, dismissing the petitioner from the service, for the
reason that the administrative complaint against him had already been
dismissed.
On appeal by the respondents, the Court of Appeals (CA), in the
assailed Decision of September 10, 2001, reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC. The CA declared as valid respondent Alcalas June 3,
1999 Resolution, dismissing the petitioner from the service. On the other
hand, it declared as without legal effect Director Mayos February 20, 1999
Resolution, dismissing the administrative complaint against the petitioner.
In so ruling, the CA noted an apparent irregularity in Director Mayos
February 20, 1999 Resolution. The CA pointed out that while the said
resolution was ostensibly dated February 20, 1999, a copy thereof was
mailed to respondent Castillejo only on July 6, 1999 and received by the
latter only on July 14, 1999. The petitioner, for his part, received a copy
thereof only on July 1, 1999. Prior to these dates, the existence of the said
resolution had not been established; hence, the date of its actual issuance
remained doubtful. The CA ruled that between the two conflicting
resolutions, Director Mayos February 20, 1999 Resolution and respondent
Alcalas June 3, 1999 Resolution, the latter was entitled to the presumption
of regularity. Moreover, respondent Alcala, as then Chairman of the CHED,
had the authority to reverse and set aside the acts or issuances of his
subordinates, including that of Director Mayo.
The CA further ratiocinated that, even granting that the February 20,
1999 Resolution was regularly issued, Director Mayo nonetheless
overstepped his authority because Atty. Dasig, then OIC of the Legal
Affairs Service, had filed the formal charge and order of preventive
suspension against the petitioner as early as July 27, 1998. The CA also
held that, contrary to Director Mayos ruling, the fact that the letter-complaint
was not under oath was not fatal. Even an anonymous complaint may be
acted upon by the authority concerned provided that the same is verifiable,
since under Section 48[5] of Executive Order (E.O.) No.
[6]
292, administrative proceedings may be commenced against a
subordinate officer or employee by the Secretary or head of office of
equivalent rank, or head of local government or chiefs of agencies, or
regional directors.
The CA, likewise, opined that in administrative proceedings, a formal or
trial-type hearing is not, at all times, necessary. In this case, the petitioner
was not denied procedural due process as he was afforded a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain his side. On the other hand, the CA
declared that respondent Ester Albano Garcia, who replaced respondent
Alcala as Chairman of the CHED, was denied procedural due process by
the RTC when it rendered its decision without awaiting her answer to the
petition. The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED

AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Resolution dated June 3, 1999 of then
Chairman of CHED, Angel C. Alcala is hereby declared valid while the Resolution
dated February 20, 1999 of Director Joel Voltaire Mayo is hereby declared to be
without legal effect.
SO ORDERED.[7]

Aggrieved, the petitioner now comes to this Court alleging as follows:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE

ERROR OF LAW FOR NOT UPHOLDING THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF
THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW ESPECIALLY RULE XIV, SECTION 2 OF THE
OMNIBUS RULES IMPLEMENTING BOOK 5 OF EXECUTIVE [ORDER] NO.
292 AND OTHER PERTINENT CIVIL SERVICE LAWS, SECTION 2,
SECTION 4 AND PARAGRAPH D OF SECTION 4;

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE

ERROR OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT A VOID COMPLAINT IS
DEEMED INEXISTENT;

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE

ERROR OF LAW IN NOT ORDERING A FORMAL INVESTIGATION OF
THE CHARGES PROFFERED AGAINST THE PETITIONER THERE BEING
NO FORMAL INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE COMMISSION;

4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE

ERROR OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTER ALBANO
GARCIA WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW KNOWING THAT THE
LATTER, BEING A NOMINAL PARTY, THE LOWER COURT MAY
DISPENSE WITH HER ANSWER TO THE PETITION;

5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE FORMAL CHARGE AND ORDER OF
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION IS LEGAL.[8]

As the petitioner himself submits, the foregoing issues are interrelated;

hence, they shall be resolved jointly.
The petitioner vigorously contends that the letter-complaint of
respondent Castillejo should be deemed inexistent as it was not made
under oath. Consequently, the formal charge and order of preventive
suspension filed against him, which stemmed from the said letter-
complaint, was, likewise, null and void. The petitioner cites Section
2,[9] Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292,
which requires that an administrative complaint against a civil service
official or employee be in writing and under oath. Moreover, the letter-
complaint did not allegedly comply with Section 4(d)[10] of Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 94-0521,[11] also known as the Uniform
Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Investigation, and the
law then in force at the time, because it did not contain a certification of
non-forum shopping.
Since respondent Castillejos letter-complaint failed to comply with the
formal requirements of the law, the petitioner maintains that Director Mayo
rightfully dismissed the same and that respondent Alcala abused his
discretion when he dismissed the petitioner from the service.
The Court is not persuaded.
The pertinent provisions governing the initiation of administrative
complaints against civil service officials or employees are provided in Book
V of E.O. No. 292. Sections 46(c) and 48(1) and (2), Chapter 6, Subtitle A
thereof read:

Sec. 46. Discipline: General provisions.

(c) Except when initiated by the disciplining authority, no complaint against a civil
service official or employee shall be given due course unless the same is in writing
and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant.

...

Sec. 48. Procedures in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees.

(1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer
or employee by the Secretary or head of office of equivalent rank, or head of local
government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written
complaint of any other persons.

(2) In the case of a complaint filed by any other persons, the complainant shall
submit sworn statements covering his testimony and those of his witnesses together
with his documentary evidence. If on the basis of such papers a prima facie case is
found not to exist, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima
facie case exists, he shall notify the respondent in writing, of the charges against
the latter, to which shall be attached copies of the complaint, sworn statements and
other documents submitted, and the respondent shall be allowed not less than
seventy-two hours after receipt of the complaint to answer the charges in writing
under oath together with supporting sworn statements and documents, in which he
shall indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not
considered satisfactory. If the answer is found satisfactory, the disciplining
authority shall dismiss the case.

On the other hand, Section 2, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules

Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, cited by the petitioner, reads:

Sec. 2. Any person may file an administrative complaint with the Commission or
any of its proper office. Said complaint shall be in writing and under oath,
otherwise, the same shall not be given due course.

Further, Section 4(d) of CSC Resolution No. 94-0521, likewise, invoked

by the petitioner, states:

Sec. 4. Complaint in Writing and Under Oath. No complaint against a civil servant
shall be given due course, unless the same is in writing and under oath.

The complaint should be written in a clear manner, simple and concise language
and in a systematic manner as to apprise the civil servant concerned of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him and to enable him to intelligently prepare
his defense or answer.

The complaint shall also contain the following:

...

(d) a statement that no other administrative action or complaint against the same
party involving the same acts or omissions and issues has been filed before another
agency or administrative tribunal.

In the absence of any one of the above-mentioned requirements, the complaints

shall be dismissed.

It must be pointed out that, while the letter-complaint of respondent

Castillejo was not concededly verified, appended thereto were the verified
criminal complaint that he filed against the petitioner, as well as the sworn
statements of his witnesses. These documents could very well be
considered as constituting the complaint against the petitioner. In fact, this
Court, through the Court Administrator, investigates and takes cognizance
of, not only unverified, but also even anonymous complaints filed against
court employees or officials for violations of the Code of Ethical
Conduct.[12] Indeed, it is not totally uncommon that a government agency is
given a wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its investigative
powers.[13] After all, in administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.[14]
In any case, contrary to the petitioners assertion, the letter-complaint of
respondent Castillejo is not a complaint within the purview of the provisions
mentioned above. In the fairly recent case of Civil Service Commission v.
Court of Appeals,[15] this Court held that the complaint under E.O. No. 292
and CSC rules on administrative cases both refer to the actual charge to
which the person complained of is required to answer and indicate whether
or not he elects a formal investigation should his answer be deemed not
satisfactory.
In this case, respondent Castillejos letter-complaint contained the
following averments:

The undersigned wish to file his complaint against Mr. Florian R. Gaoiran, Head
Teacher III of Angadanan Agro-Industrial College for mauling him last August 15,
1997 at around 2:30 in the afternoon for the accused to be disciplined. The case is
now filed in the Court of Justice docketed under Criminal Case No. 97-42 for
Assault to Person in Authority.

I am Mr. Edmond M. Castillejo, Administrative Officer II of Angadanan Agro-

Industrial College, Angadanan, Isabela, furnishing you a copy of my complaint
filed in court, all under oath, for you to determine the gravity of the case
administratively. Mr. Florian R. Gaoiran is now intimidating two of the witnesses
against him thats why may I request for an immediate investigation of the case, by
the commission, for him to be suspended or probably removed from the service to
avoid him from threatening the witnesses.

Your preferential attention and favorable action in this request are earnestly
requested and will be highly appreciated.[16]

Acting thereon, the CHED referred the matter to its Office of Legal
Affairs Service and Atty. Dasig, as OIC Director thereof, conducted a fact-
finding investigation on the incident. The said letter-complaint did not, by
itself, commence the administrative proceedings against the petitioner,
requiring an answer from him, but, as already mentioned, merely triggered
a fact-finding investigation by the CHED.
The Court cannot, therefore, uphold the petitioners contention that
respondent Castillejos letter-complaint was inexistent and could not be
acted upon by the CHED for to do so, would result in an absurd and
restrictive interpretation of E.O. No. 292 and effectively deprive the
Government of its disciplining power over people who hold a public trust.[17]
In this case, it was the formal charge and order of preventive
suspension filed by Atty. Dasig against the petitioner charging him with
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and directing him to submit his answer in writing and under oath that
constituted the complaint.[18] Notably, Atty. Dasig signed the formal charge
and order of preventive suspension for the Commission in her capacity as
then OIC of the CHEDs Legal Affairs Service. As the complaint against the
petitioner was initiated by the appropriate disciplining authority, under
Sections 46(c)[19] and 48(1),[20] Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No.
292, the same need not be subscribed and sworn to. Neither is it required
that the same contain a verification of non-forum shopping.
Section 47(2), Chapter 7 of E.O. No. 292 provides, in part, that the
Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities
and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. Since it was the CHED,[21] as the disciplining authority, through
Atty. Dasig, which filed the formal charge or complaint against the
petitioner, jurisdiction was properly acquired over the case.
Anent the issue on which of the two conflicting resolutions is valid, the
Court agrees with the CA that respondent Alcalas June 3, 1999 Resolution
dismissing the petitioner from the service prevails over that of Director
Mayos February 20, 1999 Resolution dismissing the administrative
complaint.
First, the basis for the dismissal of the administrative complaint stated in
Director Mayos resolution, i.e., that the letter-complaint was not verified, is,
as earlier discussed, patently erroneous. Second, it was issued by Director
Mayo in excess of his authority. It is borne by the records that Atty. Dasig
already filed the formal charge against the petitioner after a fact-finding
investigation had been conducted on the mauling incident and a prima
facie case had been established against him. The formal charge was filed
as early as July 27, 1998 and, on September 21, 1998, Atty. Dasig
submitted her memorandum to respondent Alcala recommending the
petitioners dismissal. It was, thus, highly irregular for Director Mayo to
dismiss the administrative complaint against the petitioner long after the
formal charge had already been filed against him and the matter was
already for respondent Alcalas resolution. Third, respondent Alcala, by
reason of his position as then Chairman of the CHED, had the authority to
reverse and set aside the acts or issuances of his subordinates. His June
3, 1999 Resolution dismissing the petitioner from the service, in effect,
reversed and set aside the Resolution dated February 20, 1999 of Director
Mayo, his subordinate.
Finally, the petitioner insists that no formal investigation was conducted
after the formal charge had been filed against him in violation of Section 22
of CSC Resolution No. 94-0521 which reads:

Section 22. Conduct of Formal Investigation. A formal investigation shall be held

after the respondent has filed his answer or after the period for filing an answer has
expired. It shall be completed within thirty (30) days from the date of the service of
the formal charge, unless the period is extended by the Commission in meritorious
cases.

Although the respondent did not elect a formal investigation, one shall nevertheless
be conducted if upon evaluation of the complaint, the answer, and the documents
in support thereof, the merits of the case cannot be judiciously resolved without
conducting such formal investigation.

The petitioners allegation is, however, belied by respondent Alcalas

statement in his resolution, to wit:

Nevertheless, during the formal investigation of the case, respondent [referring to

the petitioner] failed to submit his written counter-affidavit/answer to the charges
filed against him by the complainant so he was declared in default. This
notwithstanding, the oral testimony given during the fact-finding investigation was
considered in his (respondents) favor to enable this office to determine the veracity
of the allegations imputed against the respondent.

After weighing all the evidences [sic] submitted and the testimonies given by the
witnesses for both complainant and the respondent, this office finds substantial
evidence to hold the respondent administratively liable for violation of
subparagraphs (2) and (27) of Section 46(b), Chapter 7, Title I-A, Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. [22]

Significantly, the petitioner cannot rightfully claim that he was denied

procedural due process. What is repugnant to due process is the denial of
the opportunity to be heard.[23] The petitioner was undoubtedly afforded the
opportunity to present his side as he was directed to file his written answer
to the formal charge against him. He opted not to do so. He cannot now
feign denial of due process.
Under Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book
V of E.O. No. 292, grave misconduct on first offense is punishable by
dismissal. On the other hand, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service on first offense is punishable by suspension for six
months and one day to one year.
In fine, the appellate court committed no reversible error in upholding
respondent Alcalas Resolution of June 3, 1999 finding the petitioner guilty
of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and dismissing him therefrom.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated September 10, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 61477 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and

propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR
UNION, INC., respondents.

Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for

the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.

LAUREL, J.:

The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial

Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration
and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the
following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:

1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin

termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una determinada, termina
o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega
el plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la
localidad o cunado se termine la obra;

2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado

contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y
que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse
declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de
ser empleados u obreros de la misma;

3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo

de trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para
una obra determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros
que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable
de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la
Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se
deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo
obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por
terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the
vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and the
remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial,
and avers:

1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there

was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for
him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union
Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of
Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.

2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio

Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of
this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine
Army.

3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated

September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from the
States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of
this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine
Army.

4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a

company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the
existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548,
petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)

5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective

bargaining, majority rule and elective representation are highly
essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act
No. 213.)

6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the)
principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain
cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and
applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of
American origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule.

7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor

practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and
unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.

8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the

respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could
not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in
the Court of Industrial Relations.
 9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean
the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with

reference to the motion for a new trial of the respondent National Labor
Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the
motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to
dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before
doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly
procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases
of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the
powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding
principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it.
We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the
Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial
evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union
affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired
during the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting
statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit
their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of
views of counsel have no evidentiary value.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are

specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It
is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the
nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government.
Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by
the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will
appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and
dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It
has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide,
and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between,
and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the
relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or
purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any
industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment,
between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number
of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty,
and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the
Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and
certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the
Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for
the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the
dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties
and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph
2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall
investigate and study all industries established in a designated locality, with
a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for
such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or
a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or
less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary
arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or
conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official
investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific
controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There
is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a
departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No.
46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out that
the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated
September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of
Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of
procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity
and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal
forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief
claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural
dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or
determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the
purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or
agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative
policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules
recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to
carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that
the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable
cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes,
in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129,
"the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief
Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80
law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy,
22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the
corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain.
Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom
the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or
consideration."

(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place
when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle
emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of
unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon
power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated
November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be
"substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v.
national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648,
650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4
Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson
Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The
statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law
and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and
similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion
of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would
be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate
the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird,
194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S.
88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene
and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this
assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does
not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having
rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does
not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4,
Adv. Op., p. 131.)"

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the

hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R.
Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining
the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties,
can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case
against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively
to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the
authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of
facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may
be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the
facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only
 advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of
Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or
any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of
inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public official
in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official
such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations
may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the
exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore,

must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of
work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all
controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty
is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing
examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the
right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no
such statutory authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial

questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for
the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable
from the authority conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to

observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang
Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is
barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to
predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.

This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial
prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that
"the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be
proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the
Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers
Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are
illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to
the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the
respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not
be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of
Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are
of such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered
herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments
against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussions, we have
come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if
the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents
referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the
main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial
Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the
fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties
adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial
should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this
case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction
that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and
otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth
hereinabove. So ordered.