University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW Baguio City

Atty. Stephanie Rachel P. Castro, Professor

TORTS AND DAMAGES
Case Digests
3rd Year Special Section
STUDENT NAME 1. PASCUA, JAYBEE D. 2. DAMPAG, JONELLA 3. APPAG, ANNIELYN 4. AGPAD
, AMALIA 5. SANTUCAY, ANNABEL 6. ELAD, MARCIAL 7. GANO, JEVAN KLAIRE 8. URBANO-B
ALMEO, MAURYNE FE 9. LAURENA, AUGUSTU RAY ANTHONY 10. SANTOS, RYAN 11. VALDEZ, L
UIGI 12. ATANACIO, ZINNIA FARICA MAY 13. LACMAA, FRECHIE 14. TAMANG, SWITLE MAE
A. 15. URBANOZO, LAIRD DIONEL N. 16. DELA ROSA, JOHN ROME 17. BARCELON, FREDERIC
K 18. MANGANIP, WINNIE 19. TABUZO, MAE ABEGAIL 20. CASIL, LEO ANGELO 21. RODRIGU
EZ-ARORONG, LALAINE 22. PUBLICO, LOVELI ANNE 23. BARONA, SHERIELYN 24. HIRANG, L
EOMARIE 25. BALAGOT, JESSIE 26. BASUNGIT, ANTONIO 27. PIAGA, RICHARD 28. APIDCHO
R, EMERSON 29. PACIO, MANUEL 30. BAYTAN, ROGELIO
DIGESTED CASES 1-8 9-16 17-24 25-32 33-41 42-50 51-59 60-68 69-77 78-86 87-95 96
-104 105-113 114-122 123-131 132-139 140-149 150-158 159-167 168-176 177-185 186
-190, 1, 1-3 4-12 13-21 22-30 31-39 40-48 49-57 58-67 68-76
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. QUASI-DELICT 1. NAGUIAT VS. NLRC, 269 SCRA 564(1997) 2. PNB
VS. CA, ET AL. 83 SCRA 237 3. SILA VS. PERALTA, 110 PHIL 57 4. ALBENSON ENTERPR
ISES CORP. VS. CA, 217 SCRA 16(1993) 5. ELCANO AND ELCANO VS. HILL AND HILL, 77
SCRA 98 6. VIRATA VS OCHOA, 81 SCRA 472 7. ANDAMO VS. CA 191 SCRA 195 8. DULAY V
S. CA, APRIL 31, 1995 9. WYLIE VS. RARANG, 209 SCRA 327 10. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION
, INC. VS IAC, 148 SCRA 353(1987) 11. QUISABA VS. STA INES-MELALE VENEER AND PLY
WOOD, INC., 58 SCRA 771 12. GATCHALIAN VS. DELIM, 203 SCRA 126, 137 (1991) 13. T
UPAS VS. CA, 193 SCRA 597, 602 (1991) 14. GILCHRIST VS. CUDDY, 29 PHIL. 542 (191
5) 15. GELUZ VS. CA, 2 SCRA 802 (1961) 16. PNB VS. CA, 83 SCRA 237(1978) 17. NATL
IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION VS. IAC, 214 SCRA 35(1992) 18. PHILIP S. YU VS. HONOR
ABLE CA, 217 SCRA 328(1993) 19. GILCHRIST VS. CUDDY, 24 PHIL 471 (1913) 20. ILOL
ILO COLD STORES CO. VS. MUNICIPAL COUNSEL, 24 PHIL 471 21. DE AYALA VS. BARRETTO
, 33 PHIL 538 22. SANRAFAEL HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. CITY OF MANILA, 46
SCRA 40 23. TAYLOR VS. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, 16 PHIL 8 24. ALGARRA VS. SANDEJ
AS. 27 PHIL. 284 25. TAYAG, SR. VS. ALCANTARA, 98 SCRA 723 26. VERAGARA VS. CA,
154 SCRA 564 27. ANDAMO VS. IAC, 191 SCRA 195 28. PHIL. BANK OF COMMERCE VS. CA,
269 SCRA 695 29. RAKES VS. ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC CO., 7 PHIL 359 30. BARRED
O AND GARCIA VS. ALMARIO, 73 PHIL 607 31. DIANA AND DIANA VS. BATANGAS TRANSPORT
ATION CO., 93 PHIL 391 32. CARPIO VS. DAROJA, 180 SCRA 1 33. FAR EAST BANK AND T
RUST CO. VS. CA, 240 SCRA 348 34. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY ET SL. VS. MARJOR
IE NATIVIDAD, ET AL., FEBRUARY 6, 2003 35. AIR FRANCE VS. CARRASCOSO, SEPTEMBER
28, 1966 36. LAYUGAN VS. IAP, 167 SCRA 363 37. VALENZUELA VS. CA, 253 SCRA 303 3
8. ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL VS. CA, 194 SCRA 341, 356-357(1991) 39. VALENZUELA VS
. CA, 253 SCRA 303 40. ONG VS. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT, 104 PHIL 398 41. CIV
IL AERONAUTICS ADM. VS. CA, & ERNEST E. SIMKE, NOV. 8, 1998 42. FAR EASTERN SHIP
PING COMPANY VS. CA, 297 SCRA 30 43. PEOPLE VS. RAMIREZ, 48 PHIL 204 44. ADZUARA
VS. CA, 301 SCRA 657 45. MCKEE VS. IAC, 211 SCRA 517 46. MANILA ELECTRIC CO., V
S. REMOQUILLO, 99 PHIL 117(1956)
47. BULILAN VS. COMMISSIO ON AUDIT, 285 SCRA 445(1998) 48. ASTUDILLO VS. MANILA
ELECTRIC CO., 55 PHIL 427 49. NATL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION VS. IAC, 214 SCRA 35
(1992) 50. UNITES STATES VS. CLEMENTE, 24 PHIL 178 51. VALENZUELA VS. CA, 253 SC
RA 303, 1996 52. PLDT COMPANY, INC. VS. CA, G.R. 57079, SEPT. 29, 1989 53. PHILI
PPINE NATIONAL RAILWAY VS. IAC, 217 SCRA 409(1993) 54. TAYLOR VS. MANILA ELECTRI
C RAILROD AND LIGHT CO., 16 PHIL 8 55. JARCO MARKETING CORP. VS. HON. CA, G.R. 1
29792, DEC. 21, 1999 56. JULIAN DEL ROSARIO VS. MANILA ELECTRIC CO., 57 PHIL 478
(1932) 57. FEDERICO YLARDE VS. EDGARDO AQUINO, 163 SCRA 697(1988) 58. FAR EASTER
N SHIPPING CO. VS. CA, 297 SCRA 30(1998) 59. CULION ICE AND ELECTRIC CO. VS. PHI
L. MOTORS CORP., 955 PHIL 129(1930) 60. E.M. WRIGHT VS. MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & L
IGHT CO., G.R. 7760(1914) 61. PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS VS. THE MANILA RAILROAD CO.,
27 SCRA 674(1969) 62. VICTORINO CUSI & PILAR POBRE VS. PHIL. NATL RAILWAYS, G.R.
L-29889, MAY 31, 1979 63. MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC. VS. THE WORKMENS CO
MPENSATION COMMISSION, 99 PHIL 480 (1956) 64. CIPRIANO VS. CA, 263 SCRA 71(1996)
65. F.F CRUZ AND COM.,INC VA. CA, 164 SCRA 733(1988) 66. HONORIA DELGADO VDA. D
E GRAGORIO VS. GO CHONG BING, 102 PHIL 556(1957) 67. SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC
. VS. CA, 300 SCRA 20(1998) 68. VDA. DE GREGORIO VS. GO CHING BING, 102 PHIL 556
(1957) 69. NEGROS NAVIGATIO CO., INC. VS. CA, G.R. 110398, NOV. 7, 1997 70. BENG
UET ELECTRIC COOP., INC. VS. CA, G.R. 127326, DEC 23, 1999 71. MA-AO SUGAR CENTR
AL CO. INC. VS. CA, G.R. 83491, AUG. 27, 1990 72. ROGELIO RAMOS VS. CA, G.R. 124
354, DEC. 29, 1999 73. D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. VS. CA, G.R. 137873, APL 20, 2001 74.
BATIQUIN VS. CA, 258 SCRA 334 (1996) 75. CEBU SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING WORKS VS
. WILLIAM LINES, G.R. 132607, MAY 5, 1999 76. GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORP. VS. CHATT
O, 210 SCRA 18(1992) 77. DRA. ABDULIA RODRIGUEZ VS. CA, G.R. 121964, JUNE 17, 19
97 78. WINDVALLEY SHIPPING CO. VS. CA, G.R. 119602, OCT 6, 2000 79. ESPIRITU VS.
PHIL. POWER AND DEV. CO., G.R. L-3240-R, SEPT 20, 1949 80. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
OF THE PHILIPPINES INC. VS. CA, G.R. L-44748, AUG. 29, 1986 81. CUSTODIO VS. CA
, 253 SCRA 483 82. CABIGAO VS. UNIV. OF THE EAST, C.A. G.R. 33554-R, AUG 224, 19
73 83. DANGWA TRASPORTATION CO., INC. VS CA, 202 SCRA 575 84. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT
AUTHORITY VS. NATIVIDAD, G.R. 145804, FEB 6, 2003 85. HIDALGO ENTERPRISES VS. B
ALANDAN, 91 PHIL 488(1952) 86. ANDAMO VS. IAC, 191 SCRA 195 (1990) 87. ROMMAN EN
TERPRISES, INC. VS. CA, G.R. 125018, APL 6, 2000 88. JULITA VDA. DE SEVERO VS. F
ELECIANO, 157 SCRA 446 (1988) 89. PHIL. BANK OF COMMERCE VS. CA, 269 SCRA 695(19
97) 90. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. VS. CA, 237 SCRA 761(1994) 91. PILIPINAS B
ANK OF COMMERCE VS. CA, 269 SCRA 695(1997)
92. TABACALERA INSURANCE CO. VS. NORTH FRONT SHIPPING SERVICES INC., 272 SCRA 57
2(1997) 93. BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC. VS CA, 256 SCRA 746(1996) 94. FABRE JR VS. CA,
259 SCRA 426 (1996) 95. REYES VS. SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL, 341 SCRA 760(2000)
96. DR. NINEVETCH CUZ VS. CA, 282 SCRA 188(1997) 97. ROGELIO RAMOS VS. CA, G.R.
124354, DEC 29, 1999 98. GARCIA-RUEDA vs. PASCASIO, 278 SCRA 769 99. DOMINGA RO
QUE vs. MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO, 89 SCRA 178(1979) 100. RAYNERA vs. HICETA , G.R
. No. 120027, April 21, 1999 101. PLDT vs. CA, G.R. No. L-57079, September 29, 1
989 102. KIM vs. PHILIPPINE AERIAL TAXI CO., 58 Phil. 838 103. PHIL. COMMERCIAL
INTL BANK vs. CA, G.R. No. 121413, Jan 29, 2001 104. NPC vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 22
2 SCRA 415 105. SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC. vs. CA, G.R. 126389, July 10, 1998 10
6. ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. CA, 179 SCRA 5(1989) 107. PLEASANTVILLE DEVT
CORPORATION vs. CA, 253 SCRA 10(1996) 108. YOBIDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 281 SCR
A 1(1997) 109. KRAMER, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 178 SCRA 518(1989) 110. RAYNERA
vs. HICETA, 306 SCRA 102(1999) 111. PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. vs. IAC, G.R.
Nos. 66102-04, Aug 30, 1990 112. FILOMENO URBANO, vs. HON. IAC AND PEOPLE, G.R.
No. 72964, January 7, 1988 113. GLAN PEOPLE S LUMBER AND HARDWARE vs. IAC, G.R.
70493, May 18, 1989 114. ROGELIO ENGADA vs. HON. CA, G.R. No. 140698. June 20, 2
003 115. PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC. VS. MARICAR BAESA, G.R. NOS. 79050-51. NO
VEMBER 14, 1989 116. LBC AIR CARGO, INC., VS. HON. CA. 241 SCRA 619(1995) 117. S
AUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 297 SCRA 469(1998) 118. GLOBE MACKAY
CABLE AND RADIO CORP vs. THE HON. CA, 176 SCRA 778(1989) 119. LLORENTE vs. THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, 202 SCRA 309(1991) 120. ARTURO VALENZUELA vs. THE HON. CA, G.R. N
o. 83122 (1990), 190 SCRA 1 121. AMONOY vs. GUTIERREZ, G.R. No. 140420. February
15, 2001 122. JOSUE ARLEGUI vs. HON. CA, G.R. No. 126437 , March 6, 2002 123. P
ETROPHIL CORP vs. CA, G.R. No. 122796, December 10, 2001 124. VIRGINIA M. ANDRAD
E vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. 127932, 2001 125. UNI. OF THE EAST vs. JADER, G.R.
No. 132344, Feb 17, 2000 126. GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. HON. CA, G.R. No. 97336 F
eb 19, 1993 127. MARILYN L. BERNARDO vs. NLRC, March 15, 1996 128. DRILON vs. CO
URT OF APPEALS, 270 SCRA 211(1997) 129. PONCE vs. LEGASPI, 208 SCRA 377(1992) 13
0. YASOA vs. RODENCIO ET. AL, G.R. No. 156339, October 6, 2004 131. PATRICIO vs.
LEVISTE, G.R. No. L-51832 April 26, 1989 132. MARIA FORD VS COURT OF APPEALS, G.
R. NO. 51171-72(1990) 133. ERLINDA ILUSIO VS ERLINDA BIDNER, G.R. No. 139789(200
0) 134. BLAS OPLE VS. RUBEN TORRES, G.R. NO. 127685, JULY 23, 1998 135. AYER PRO
DUCTIONS PTY. VS. CAPULONG, G.R. No. 820380, APL 29, 1988 136. RODRIGO CONCEPCIO
N VS CA, G.R. 120706, JAN 31, 2000 137. MVRS VS. ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL, 396 SCRA
210(2003) 138. INTL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS VS. QUISUMBING AND INTERNATIONAL
SCHOOL, G.R. 128846(2000)
139. BIBOSO VS. JUDGE OSMUNDO M. VILLANUEVA, 2001 140. PHIL. AEOLUS AUTO-MOTIVE
UNITED CORP. VS. NLRC, G.R. 124617, 2000 141. OBRA VS CA, G.R. NO. 120852, OCTOB
ER 28, 1999 142. SERRANO VS NIRC, G.R. NO. 117040, JANUARY 27, 2000 143. ABERCA
VS MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, G.R. NO. L-96866, APRIL 15, 1988 144. ALONZO VS CA, 241
SCRA 51, 1995 145. SAZON VS CA, 255 SCRA 692, 1996 146. BORJAL VS CA, G.R. NO.
126466, JANUARY 14, 1999 147. OCCENA VS ICAMINA, 181 SCRA 328(1990) 148. PEOPLE
VS DEVARAS, 228 SCRA 482(1993) 149. PEOPLE VS BAYOTAS, 236 SCRA 239(1994) 150. V
ILLEGAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 217 SCRA 148(1997) 151. AVELINO CASUPANAN vs. MARI
O LLAVORE LAROYA, G.R. 14539(1992) 152. RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORP. vs. PEOPLE,
G.R. 129029(2000) 153. RUBEN MANIAGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. 104392(1996) 154
. TAMARGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 209 SCRA 518(1992) 155. LIBI VS IAC, 214 SCRA 16
(1992) 156. ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL VS. CA, 194 SCRA 341(1991) 157. SOLIMAN VS..
TUAZON, 209 SCRA 47(1992) 158. JOSE S. AMADORA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. L-477
45(1988) 159. PHIL. SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION VS. CA, 205 SCRA 729 160.
ST. MARYS ACADEMY vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS, Feb. 6, 2002, G.R. No. 143363. 161. VIC
TORY LINER, INC. vs.HEIRS OF ANDRES MALECDAN, December 27, 2002, G. R. No. 15427
8 162. MARTIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 205 SCRA 591(1992) 163. CARTICIANO v. NUVAL,
September 28, 2000, G.R. No. 138054. 164. FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION VS.CA, 287
SCRA 719(1998) 165. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP. vs. CA, 221 SCRA 389 (1993)
166. NPC vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 294 SCRA 209(1998) 167. FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITU
TE vs. IAC, 212 SCRA 637(1992) 168. METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP vs. CA, G.R. 14108
9(2002) 169. SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC. vs. CA, 300 SCRA 20(1998) 170. ERNESTO
PLEYTO vs. MARIA D. LOMBOY, G.R. No. 148737. June 16, 2004 171. ERNESTO SYKI vs
. SALVADOR BEGASA, G.R. No. 149149. October 23, 2003 172. FIGURACION VDA. DE MAG
LANA, vs. CONSOLACION, G.R. No. 60506, August 6, 1992 173. CONRADO AGUILAR, SR.
vs. COMMERCIAL SAVINGS BANK, G.R. No. 128705. June 29, 2001 174. EQUITABLE LEASI
NG CORP. VS. LUCITA SUYON, G.R. 143360, 2002 175. 1ST MALAYAN LEASING AND FINANC
E CORP vs. CA, 209 SCRA 660(1992) 176. NOSTRADAMUS VILLANUEVA VS. DOMINGO, GR NO
. 144274. SEPT 20, 2004 177. ABELARDO LIM VS CA, G.R. 125817(2002) 178. CARPIO V
S DOROJA, 180 SCRA 1(1989) 179. FRANCO VS IAC, 178 SCRA 331(198) 180. YONAHA VS
CA, 255 SCRA 397(1996) 181. GUILATCO VS CITY OF DAGUPAN, G.R. 61516(1989) 182. P
URITA MIRANDA VESTIL VS IAC, G.R. 74431(1989) 183. THE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION OF
EL DEPOSITO, BARRIO CORAZON DE JESUS, SAN JUAN RIZAL VS. LOOD, 47 SCRA 174 184.
FARRALES VS CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO, 44 SCRA 239
185. SANGALANG VS IAC, 1989 186. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. CA, 2
27 SCRA 293(1993) 187. VIRGILIO M. DEL ROSARIO VS. CA, G.R. NO. 118325, JAN. 29,
1997 188. PHILIP S. YU VS. CA, G.R. NO. 86683 JANUARY 21, 1993 189. SO PING BUN
vs. CA, G.R. No. 120554 September 21, 1999 190. GARCIA vs. CORONA, 321 SCRA 218
(1999) II. DAMAGES 1. PEOPLE vs. BALLESTEROS, 285 SCRA 438(1998) 1. BARITUA vs.
COURT OF APPEALS , 267 SCRA 331(1997) 2. HEIRS OF SIMEON BORLADO vs. COURT OF AP
PEALS, 363 SCRA 753 3. CUSTODIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 252 SCRA 483(1996) 4. PHIL
IPPINE RACING CLUB, vs. BONIFACIO, 109 SCRA 233 5. AUYONG HIAN vs. COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, 59 SCRA 110 6. FAROLAN vs. SOLMAC MARKETING CORPORATION, 1991 7. SABA V
S. COURT OF APPEALS, 189 SCRA 50(1990) 8. SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO
vs. CA, 253 SCRA 483 9. CASTRO vs. ACRO TAXICAB CO., INC., 82 SCRA 369 10. PNOC
SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORP. vs. HON. CA, 297 SCRA 402(1998) 11. INTEGRATED PACK
AGING CORP vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 333 SCRA 170(2000) 12. KIERULF vs. COURT OF APP
EALS, 269 SCRA 433; March 13, 1997 13. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.C
A, (249 SCRA 331) (1995) 14. LUFTHANZA GERMAN AIRLINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 243
SCRA 600(1995) 15. BARZAGA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, (258 SCRA105) (1997) 16. PEOP
LE vs. GUTIERREZ , (258SCRA70) (1996) 17. GATCHALIAN V DELIM, 203 SCRA 126FELICI
ANO; October 21, 1991 18. RAAGAS vs TRAYA (22 SCRA 839) (1968) 19. FUENTES VS CO
URT OF APPEALS (323 PHIL 508) (1996) 20. SUMMA INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. CA (310
Phil. 367) (1996) 21. TALISAY SILAY V ASSOCIACION (247 SCRA 361) (1996) 22. DAY
WALT vs. LA CORPORACION DE LOS PADRES AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS, 69 Phil 587 23. CHING
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, (181 SCRA 455, January 11, 1990) 24. LUZON CONCRETE PRODU
CTS, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, (135 SCRA 455) 25. KAIRUZ vs. PACIO, 108 PHIL.
1097 26. ROGELIO E. RAMOS vs. CA, [G.R. No. 124354. December 29, 1999]. 27. SPS.
RENATO S. ONG VS. CA, [G.R. NO. 117103. JANUARY 21, 1999] 28. MANZANARES vs. MO
RETA, (38 Phil 823) 29. GREGORIO PESTAO V. SPOUSES PAZ, G.R. NO. 139875 - DECEMBE
R 4, 2000 30. MONZON, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (169 SCRA 76 [1989]) 31.
PEOPLE VS SUITOS, 220 SCRA 420(1993) 32. PEOPLE VS CORDERO, 263 SCRA 122(1996) 3
3. PEOPLE VS ARINGUE, 283 SCRA 291(1997) 34. PEOPLE VS GALVEZ, 355 SCRA 256(2001
)
35. PLEYTO VS LOMBOY, G.R. NO. 148737, JUNE 16, 2004 36. PEOPLE VS MATARO, G.R.
NO. 130378(2001) 37. PEOPLE VS NULLAN, 305 SCRA 679(1999) 38. PEOPLE VS LISTERIO
, GR. NO. 122099, JULY 5, 2000 39. PEOPLE VS SANCHEZ, 313 SCRA 694(1999) 40. PEO
PLE vs. EFREN MINDANAO, G.R. 123095, JULY 6, 2000 41. PEOPLE vs. VERDE, 302 SCRA
690(1999) 42. PEOPLE vs. Pedro Perreras, G.R. 139622, JULY 31, 2000 43. PEOPLE
vs. UGANAP, G.R. 130605, JUNE 19, 2001 44. SMITH BELL DODWELL SHIPPING AGENCY CO
RP. vs. BORJA , G.R. 143008(2002) 45. PEOPLE vs. ELGER GUZMAN, G.R. 132750(2001)
46. PEOPLE vs. MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, G.R. 121039(2001) 47. PESTAO vs. Spouse
s SUMAYANG, G.R. 139875(2000) 48. CONSOLIDATED DAIRY PRODUCTS CO vs. COURT OF ,
210 SCRA 810(1992) 49. ALGARRA VS. SANDEJAS, 27 PHIL. 284 50. QUIRANTE VS. IAC,
G.R. 73886(1989) 51. AGUSTIN VS. CA, JUNE 6, 1990 52. BICARME VS. CA, JUNE 6, 19
90 53. PEOPLE VS. BERGANTE, 286 SCRA 629(1998) 54. CRISMINA GARMENTS, INC., VS.
CA, G.R. 12872(1999) 55. BAUTISTA VS. MANGALDAN RURAL BANK, INC., 230 SCRA 16(19
94) 56. ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION. VS. CA, 185 SCRA 398(1990) 57. COMPAIA MARI
TIMA VS. ALLIED FREE WORKERS UNION, 77 SCRA 24 58. DEL ROSARIO VS COURT OF APPEA
LS, 267 SCRA 58(1997) 59. PEOPLE VS BUGAYONG, G.R.NO. 126518(1998) 60. ST. PETER
MEMORIAL PARK, INC. VS CLEOFAS, 92 SCRA 389 61. EXPERT TRAVEL AND TOURS, INC. V
S COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.N NO. 130030 62. J MARKETING CORPORATION VS SIA JR., 258 S
CRA 580(1998) 63. INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE CO. VS PABLO BONDAD, G.R.NO. 136722(2000)
64. TRIPLE EIGHT INTEGRATED SERVICES INC. VS. NLRC, 299 SCRA 608(1998) 65. NESC
ITO C. HILARIO VS NLRC, 252 SCRA 555(1996) 66. ARCONA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.
NO. 134784(2002) 67. GREGORIO FULE VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 286 SCRA 698(1998) 68.
SUMALPONG, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, 268 SCRA 764(1997) 69. PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PH
ILS V CA (SPS CHUA), G.R. 111584(2001) 70. PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILS V CA (SPS
CHUA), G.R. 111584, 96 PHIL 321 71. ABS-CBN V CA, G.R. 128690(1999) 72. NPC v.
PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC, 369 SCRA 629(2001) 73. GERALDEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, 2
30 SCRA 320 (1994) 74. PEOPLE vs. CRISTOBAL, 252 SCRA 507(1996) 75. PEOPLE VS. M
ATRIMONIO, 215 SCRA 613(1992) 76. SARMIENTO VS. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION
, 161 SRCA 312
I.
QUASI-DELICT
1. NAGUIAT vs. NLRC FACTS: Clark Field Taxi, Inc. held a concessionaires contract
with the Army Air Force Exchange Services for the operation of taxi services wi
thin Clark Air Base. Sergio Naguiat was the president of CFTI while Antolin Nagu
iat was its vice president. Like Naguiat Enterprises, Inc. which was a trading f
irm, it was also a family-owned corporation. Respondents were employed by the CF
TI as taxicab drivers. They were required to pay a daily boundary fee of US$26.5
0 (for those on duty from 1AM-12N) or US$27 (for those on duty from 12N to 12 MN
). Incidental expenses were maintained by the drivers (including gasoline expens
es). Drivers worked 3-4 times a week depending on the availability of vehicles a
nd earned no less than US$15.00 a day. In excess of that amount, they had to mak
e cash deposits to the company which they could withdraw every fifteen days. AAF
ES was dissolved because of the phase-out of the military bases in Clark and the
services of the respondents were officially terminated on November 26, 1991. AA
FES Taxi Drivers Association, the drivers union, and CFTI held negotiations as r
egards separation benefits. They arrived at an agreement that the separated driv
ers would be given P500 for ever year as severance pay. Most of the drivers acce
pted this but some refused to do so. Those who did not accept the initial severa
nce pay disaffiliated themselves with drivers union and through the National Org
anization of Workingmen, they filed a complaint against Sergio Naguiat under the
name and style Naguiat Enterprises, AAFES and AAFES union. The labor arbiter or
dered the petitioner to pay the drivers P1,200 for every year of service for hum
anitarian consideration, setting aside the earlier agreement between the CFTI an
d the drivers union. It also rejected the idea that the CFTI was forced to close
it business due to great financial losses and lose opportunity since at the tim
e of its closure it was profitably earning. The labor arbiter however did not aw
ard separation pay because to impose a monetary obligation to an employer whose p
rofitable business was abruptly shot (sic) shot down by force majeure would be u
nfair and unjust. The NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter after respo
ndents appealed by granting separation pay to the private respondents. It said t
hat half of the monthly salary should be US$120 which should be paid in Philippi
ne pesos. Naguiat Enterprieses should be joined with Sergio and Antolin Naguiat
as jointly and severally liable. ISSUE: Whether or not there was corporate tort
committed by the corporation and their respective officers? DECISION OF THE SUPR
EME COURT: No. Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the definite scope of "corpora
te tort." Essentially, "tort" consists in the violation of a right given or the
omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply stated, tort is a breach of a legal du
ty. Article 283 of the Labor Code mandates the employer to grant separation pay
to employees in case of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or u
ndertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, which is th
e condition obtaining at bar. CFTI failed to comply with this law-imposed duty o
r obligation. Consequently, its
stockholder who was actively engaged in the management or operation of the busin
ess should be held personally liable. 2. PNB vs. CA FACTS: Mrs. Tapnio had an ex
port sugar quota of 1,000 piculs for the agricultural year 1956-1957 which she d
id not need. She agreed to allow Mr. Jacobo C. Tuazon to use said quota for the
consideration of P2,500.00. This agreement was called a contract of lease of sug
ar allotment. At the time of the agreement, Mrs. Tapnio was indebted to the Phil
ippine National Bank at San Fernando, Pampanga. Her indebtedness was known as a
crop loan and was secured by a mortgage on her standing crop including her sugar
quota allocation for the agricultural year corresponding to said standing crop.
This arrangement was necessary in order that when Mrs. Tapnio harvests, the P.N
.B., having a lien on the crop, may effectively enforce collection against her.
Her sugar cannot be exported without sugar quota allotment Sometimes, however, a
planter harvest less sugar than her quota, so her excess quota is utilized by a
nother who pays her for its use. This is the arrangement entered into between Mr
s. Tapnio and Mr. Tuazon regarding the former s excess quota for 1956-1957. Sinc
e the quota was mortgaged to the P.N.B., the contract of lease had to be approve
d by said Bank, The same was submitted to the branch manager at San Fernando, Pa
mpanga. The latter required the parties to raise the consideration of P2.80 per
picul or a total of P2,800.00 informing them that "the minimum lease rental acce
ptable to the Bank, is P2.80 per picul." In a letter addressed to the branch man
ager on August 10, 1956, Mr. Tuazon informed the manager that he was agreeable t
o raising the consideration to P2.80 per picul. He further informed the manager
that he was ready to pay said amount as the funds were in his folder which was k
ept in the bank. When the branch manager of the Philippine National Bank at San
Fernando recommended the approval of the contract of lease at the price of P2.80
per picul), whose recommendation was concurred in by the Vice-president of said
Bank, J. V. Buenaventura, the board of directors required that the amount be ra
ised to 13.00 per picul. This act of the board of directors was communicated to
Tuazon, who in turn asked for a reconsideration thereof. On November 19, 1956, t
he branch manager submitted Tuazon s request for reconsideration to the board of
directors with another recommendation for the approval of the lease at P2.80 pe
r picul, but the board returned the recommendation unacted upon, considering tha
t the current price prevailing at the time was P3.00 per picul. The parties were
notified of the refusal on the part of the board of directors of the Bank to gr
ant the motion for reconsideration. The matter stood as it was until February 22
, 1957, when Tuazon wrote a letter (Exh. 10-Bank informing the Bank that he was
no longer interested to continue the deal, referring to the lease of sugar quota
allotment in favor of defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio. The result is that the latte
r lost the sum of P2,800.00 which she should have received from Tuazon and which
she could have paid the Bank to cancel off her indebtedness,
The court below held, and in this holding we concur that failure of the negotiat
ion for the lease of the sugar quota allocation of Rita Gueco Tapnio to Tuazon w
as due to the fault of the directors of the Philippine National Bank, The refusa
l on the part of the bank to approve the lease at the rate of P2.80 per picul wh
ich, as stated above, would have enabled Rita Gueco Tapnio to realize the amount
of P2,800.00 which was more than sufficient to pay off her indebtedness to the
Bank, and its insistence on the rental price of P3.00 per picul thus unnecessari
ly increasing the value by only a difference of P200.00. inevitably brought abou
t the rescission of the lease contract to the damage and prejudice of Rita Gueco
Tapnio in the aforesaid sum of P2,800.00. This decision of the of the trial cou
rt was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is lia
ble for the damage caused due to the disapproval of the lease by the Board of Di
rectors of petitioner. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: YES. While petitioner had
the ultimate authority of approving or disapproving the proposed lease since the
quota was mortgaged to the Bank, the latter certainly cannot escape its respons
ibility of observing, for the protection of the interest of private respondents,
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly de
mand in approving or disapproving the lease of said sugar quota. The law makes i
t imperative that every person "must in the exercise of his rights and in the pe
rformance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe ho
nesty and good faith, 4 This petitioner failed to do. Certainly, it knew that th
e agricultural year was about to expire, that by its disapproval of the lease pr
ivate respondents would be unable to utilize the sugar quota in question. In fai
ling to observe the reasonable degree of care and vigilance which the surroundin
g circumstances reasonably impose, petitioner is consequently liable for the dam
ages caused on private respondents. Under Article 21 of the New Civil Code, "any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contra
ry to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage." The afore-cited provisions on human relations were intended to expand t
he concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for t
he untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to spec
ifically provide in the statutes. A corporation is civilly liable in the same ma
nner as natural persons for torts, because "generally speaking, the rules govern
ing the liability of a principal or master for a tort committed by an agent or s
ervant are the same whether the principal or master be a natural person or a cor
poration, and whether the servant or agent be a natural or artificial person. Al
l of the authorities agree that a principal or master is liable for every tort w
hich he expressly directs or authorizes, and this is just as true of a corporati
on as of a natural person, A corporation is liable, therefore, whenever a tortio
us act is committed by an officer or agent under express direction or authority
from the stockholders or members acting as a body, or, generally, from the direc
tors as the governing body." 3. SILVA vs. PERALTA FACTS: At the outbreak of the
war in 1941, the defendant Esther Peralta she resided with her sister, Mrs. Pedr
o Pia, in Maco, Tagum, Mabini Davao. Saturnino Silva, then an American citizen a
nd an officer of the United States Army and married to one Prescilla Isabel of A
ustralia, had been ordered to sent to the Philippines during the enemy
occupation to help unite the guerillas in their fight for freedom. He was the co
mmanding officer of the 130th Regiment general headquarters at Magugpo, Tagum, D
avao. Sometime during the year 1944, Florence, a younger sister of the defendant
, was accused of having collaborated with the enemy, and for this she was arrest
ed, and accompanied by Esther, brought to Anibongan and later to the general hea
dquarters at Magugpo for investigation that Silva first met Esther Florence was
exonorated of the charges made against her and was ordered released, but with th
e advice that she should not return to Maco for the time being. Heeding such adv
ice, Florence and her sister, appellee herein, went to live with the spouses Mr.
and Mrs. Camilo Doctolero at Tipas, Magugpo, Davao. Silva started to frequent t
he house of the Doctoleros, and soon professed love for Esther. Having been made
to believe that he was single, she accepted his marriage proposal; and the two
were married on January 14, 1945 by one Father Cote on the occasion of a house b
lessing. No documents of marriage were prepared nor executed, allegedly because
there were no available printed forms for the purpose. Hence, the lovers lived t
ogether as husband and wife. From the "marriage", a child, named Saturnino Silva
, Jr., was born. On May 8, 1945, Silva sustained serious wounds in the battle of
Ising, for which reason, he was transferred to Leyte, and later to the United S
tates, he divorced Precilla Isabel and later, on May 9, 1948, contracted marriag
e with plaintiff Elenita Ledesma Silva. Upon his return to the Philippines, appe
llee Esther Peralta demanded support for their child, and, his refusal, institut
ed a suit for support in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Thereupon, the p
resent action was filed against Esther, and another suit against her was institu
ted in Cotabato. The Trial Court awarded damages in favor of the defendant thus
the plaintiffs-appellant appeal on both questions of fact and law from the decis
ion of the Court of First Instance of Davao to the Supreme Court, the amount inv
olved being more than P200,000.00. ISSUE: Whether or not damages awarded to appe
llee are a natural and direct consequence of Silva s deceitful maneuvers in maki
ng love to appellee, and inducing her to yield to his advances and live with him
as his wife. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: YES. It is to be noted that while t
he latter s liability was extra-contractual in origin, still, under the Civil Co
de in 1889, the damages resulting from a tort are measured in the same manner as
those due from a contractual debtor in bad faith, since he must answer for such
damages, whether he had forseen them or not, just as he must indemnify not only
for damnum emergens but also for lacrum cessans, as required by Article 1106. A
rticle 1002 of the 1889 Civil Code of Spain formulated no standard for measuring
quasi-delictual damages, the article merely prescribing that the guilty party "
shall be liable for the damages so done". This indefiniteness led modern civil l
aw writers to hold that the standards set is articles 1106 and 1107, placed in t
he general rules on obligations, "rigen por igual para las contractuales y las e
xtras contractuales, las pre establecidas y las que borten ex-lege de actos ilic
itos". (Roces, Notes to Fisher)" Los Daos Civiles y su Reparacion,"(1927).
It is well to note in this connection, that Silva s act in hiding from appellee
that he could not legally marry her, because, he allegedly have an Australian wi
fe, was not mere negligence, but actual fraud (dolo) practiced upon the appellee
. Consequently, he should stand liable for any and all damages arising therefrom
, which include the expense of maintaining the offspring and the expenses of lit
igation to protect the child s right s and the loss of the mother s own earnings
. This is a liability that flows even from Articles 1902 and 1107 (par. 2) of 18
89 (Arts. 2176 and 2202 of the New Code). Art. 1902. Any person who by an act or
omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable fo
r the damage as done. Art. 1107. In case of fraud (dolo) the debtor shall be lia
ble for all losses and damages which clearly arise from the failure to fulfill t
he obligation. 4. ALBENSON vs. CA FACTS: In September, October, and November 198
0, petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation (Albenson for short) delivered to
Guaranteed Industries, Inc. (Guaranteed for short) the mild steel plates which
the latter ordered. As part payment thereof, Albenson was given Pacific Banking
Corporation Check No. 136361 in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn against the ac
count of E.L. Woodworks. When presented for payment, the check was dishonored fo
r the reason "Account Closed." Thereafter, petitioner Albenson, through counsel,
traced the origin of the dishonored check. From the records of the Securities a
nd Exchange Commission (SEC), Albenson discovered that the president of Guarante
ed, the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao."
Upon further inquiry, Albenson was informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industr
y that E.L. Woodworks, a single proprietorship business, was registered in the n
ame of one "Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon verification with the drawee bank
, Pacific Banking Corporation, Albenson was advised that the signature appearing
on the subject check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao." After obtaining the fore
going information, Albenson, through counsel, made an extrajudicial demand upon
private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao, president of Guaranteed, to replace and/or
make good the dishonored check. Respondent Baltao, through counsel, denied that
he issued the check, or that the signature appearing thereon is his. He further
alleged that Guaranteed was a defunct entity and hence, could not have transact
ed business with Albenson. On February 14, 1983, Albenson filed with the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a complaint against Eugenio S. Baltao for viol
ation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Submitted to support said charges was an affi
davit of petitioner Benjamin Mendiona, an employee of Albenson. On September 5,
1983, Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. B
altao for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. In filing said information, Fis
cal Sumaway claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit co
ntroverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so and therefore, was deemed t
o have waived his right.
Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately
filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation, alleging
that it was not true that he had been given an opportunity to be heard in the p
reliminary investigation conducted by Fiscal Sumaway, and that he never had any
dealings with Albenson or Benjamin Mendiona, consequently, the check for which h
e has been accused of having issued without funds was not issued by him and the
signature in said check was not his. On January 30, 1984, Provincial Fiscal Maur
o M. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respo
ndent Baltao. He also instructed the Trial Fiscal to move for dismissal of the i
nformation filed against Eugenio S. Baltao. Fiscal Castro found that the signatu
re in PBC Check No. 136361 is not the signature of Eugenio S. Baltao. Because of
the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly issuing
a check which bounced in violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, respondent Balta
o filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages a
gainst herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjam
in Mendiona, its employee. Regional Trial Court petitioner to pay private respon
dent, among others, the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages and attorney s fees
in the amount of P100,000.00. Dissatisfied to the decision, they appealed the ca
se before the court of Appeals but the Court of Appeals affirmed the said decisi
on of the Trial Court with modification. ISSUE: Whether or not because of the ma
licious prosecution of criminal case filed by the petitioners against the privat
e respondent, petitioner can be held liable for damages to private respondents b
ased on Article 19, 20 and 21. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: NO. The criminal c
omplaint filed against private respondent after the latter refused to make good
the amount of the bouncing check despite demand was a sincere attempt on the par
t of petitioners to find the best possible means by which they could collect the
sum of money due them. A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him
will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for pet
itioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. I
n the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral dama
ges cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se m
ake the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the
law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate (Rubio vs
. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]). Article 19, known to contain what is c
ommonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which may be observed not only in the exercise of one s rights but also in the p
erformance of one s duties. These standards are the following: to act with justi
ce; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, th
erefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exerc
ise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A righ
t, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may neve
rtheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a ma
nner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results i
n damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be held responsible. Although the requirements of each provision is differe
nt, these three (3) articles are all related to each other. As the eminent Civil
ist Senator Arturo Tolentino puts it: "With this article
(Article 21), combined with articles 19 and 20, the scope of our law on civil wr
ongs has been very greatly broadened; it has become much more supple and adaptab
le than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to conceive of any
malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of
these articles" (Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72). There is howeve
r, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the pr
inciple of abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not the pr
inciple of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages under Article
s 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances o
f each case. (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176
SCRA 778 [1989]). The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the fo
llowing: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith
; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks
of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially
provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligent
ly, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall
indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts c
ontra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is l
egal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public p
olicy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure. Certainly, petitioners could not
be said to have violated the aforestated principle of abuse of right. What prom
pted petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 agai
nst private respondent was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due
on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private re
spondent. 5. ELCANO vs. HILL FACTS: Reginald Hill was a married minor living and
getting subsistence from his father, co-defendant Marvin. He killed Agapito Elc
ano, son of petitioners, for which he was criminally prosecuted. However, he was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of inten
t to kill, coupled with mistake." Subsequently, petitioners filed a civil action
for recovery of damages against defendants, which the latter countered by a mot
ion to dismiss. However the trial court dismissed the same. Hence this appeal. I
SSUES: 1) Whether or not the action for recovery of damages against Reginald and
Marvin Hill is barred by res judicata. 2) Whether or not there is vicarious lia
bility on the part Reginalds father, Marvin. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: NO.Th
e acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liabi
lity for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action a
gainst him.
There is need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character,
criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation, which was
firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia (73 Phil. 607). I
n this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquil
iana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with rega
rd to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and con
victed in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have
been sued for civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) Notably
, Article 2177 of the New Civil Code provides that: Responsibility for fault or n
egligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Cons
equently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, w
hether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provide
d that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also crimina
lly, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventualit
y only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e)
of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Articl
e 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act co
nsidered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened
or has not been committed by the accused. Marvin Hill vicariously liable. Howev
er, since Reginald has come of age, as a matter of equity, the formers liability
is now merely subsidiary. Under Art. 2180, the father and in case of his death o
r incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor ch
ildren who live in their company. In the case at bar, Reginald, although married
, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
killing. The joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child
ren is in view of the parental obligation to supervise minor children in order t
o prevent damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear implication of A
rt. 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not sue or be sue
d without the assistance of the parents is that such emancipation does not carry
with it freedom to enter into transactions or do not any act that can give rise
to judicial litigation. 6. VIRATA vs. OCHOA FACTS: Arsenio Virata died as a res
ult of having been bumped while walking along Taft Avenue by a passenger jeepney
driven by Maximo Borilla and registered in the name of Victoria Ochoa. An actio
n for homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted against Maximo Borilla
in the CFI of Rizal.
Atty. Francisco, the private prosecutor, made a reservation to file separately t
he civil action for damages against the driver for his criminal liability, which
he later on withdrew and presented evidence on the damages. The Heirs of Arseni
o Virata again reserved their right to institute a separate civil action. They c
ommenced an action for damages based on quasi-delict against the driver Maximo B
orilla and the registered owner of the vehicle, Victoria Ochoa. Private responde
nts filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is another action pending
for the same cause. The CFI acquitted Borilla on the ground that he caused the
injury by accident. The motion to dismiss was granted. ISSUE: Whether or not the
Heirs of Arsenio Virata can prosecute an action for damages based on quasi-deli
ct against Maximo Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver and owner, respectively on
the passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio Virata? DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT:
YES. In negligence cases, the aggrieved parties may choose between an action un
der the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Co
de. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code is to recover twice for
the same negligent act. In this case, the petitioners are not seeking to recove
r twice for the same negligent act. Before the Criminal Case was decided, they m
anifested in the said case that they were filing a separate civil action for dam
ages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict
. Acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable dou
bt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liabil
ity arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or cu
lpa aquiliana. The source of damages sought to be enforced in the Civil Case is q
uasi-delict, not an act or omission punishable by law. Under Art. 1157 of the Ci
vil Code, quasi-delict and an act or omission punishable by law are two differen
t sources of obligation. Moreover, for petitioners to prevail in the Civil Case,
they have only to establish their cause of action by preponderance of evidence.
7. ANDAMO vs. IAC FACTS: Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are t
he owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is
adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette,
Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land of respondent corporation, waterp
aths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which all
egedly inundated and eroded petitioners land, caused a young man to drown, dama
ged petitioners crops and plants, washed away
costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rai
ny and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action against Efren Musngi, Or
lando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of respondent corpora
tion, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Pe
nal Code. On February 22, 1983, petitioners filed a civil case for damages with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent c
orporation. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land. On
April 26, 1984, the trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in
the civil case until after judgment in the related Criminal Case. And later on d
ismissed the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was
instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved.The decision was based
on Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal a
nd civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but
after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be institu
ted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." Petitioners
appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. On February 17, 19
86, respondent Appellate Court affirmed the order of the trial court. A motion f
or reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court. ISSUE
: Whether or not a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths,
water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation an
d damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Artic
les 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civ
il case can proceed independently of the criminal case DECISION OF THE SUPREME C
OURT: Yes. A careful examination of the complaint shows that the civil action is
one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasidelicts. All the ele
ments of a quasidelict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintif
f, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts
he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault o
r negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. The wat
erpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inu
ndated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal con
nection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by
petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be
the basis for the recovery of damages. In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, the
Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "an
y person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow
or communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and
damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to th
e use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an
indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and
the property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains th
at petitioners complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained a
nd will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built
by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged pr
esence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporati
on supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection betwee
n the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between th
e parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana. It must be str
essed that the use of one s property is not without limitations. Article 431 of
the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in su
ch a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM
NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties wh
ich require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to
infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the righ
t of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constr
ucted and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous
to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of natur
e. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third
person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 1of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damag
e caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence. Article 2176,
whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishabl
e by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary
or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender i
n a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor
is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and wou
ld be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two cases vary. The distinctness of quasi-delicta is sho
wn in Article 21772 of the Civil Code. According to the Report of the Code Commi
ssion "the foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel
or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil neglige
nce. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distin
ct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of
ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate
from criminal negligence. 8. DULAY vs. CA FACTS: On December 7, 1988, an alterc
ation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Ban
g Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela
, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleo
n Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, i
n her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action for damage
s against Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents Safeguard Investigatio
n and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPER
GUARD"), alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. Private respondent SUPERGUARD
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a vali
d cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela s act of shooting Dulay was
beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was c
ommitted with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed
by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: Art. 100. Civil liabili
ty of a person guilty of a felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony i
s also civilly liable. Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint fo
r damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as
the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Articl
e 2176 applies only to quasioffenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
. In addition, the private respondent argued that petitioners filing of the com
plaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal ca
se is a condition sine qua non for the employer s subsidiary liability. Responde
nt SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the
ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees Petitioners opposed
both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents
is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which pro
vides: Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is r
esponsible. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even thou
gh the former are not engaged in any business or an industry. Respondent Judge R
egino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD S motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD S mo
tion for exclusion as defendant. Petitioner appealed the same to the Court of Ap
peals but Court Appeals Eight Division affirmed the decision of the Regional Tri
al Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the civil action contemplated in Article 2177 is
not applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only applies to qu
asi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. DECISION OF THE SUPREM
E COURT: NO. Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justific
ation for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissi
ons resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176
covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are volunta
ry and
intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1
977]), this Court already held that: . . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fau
lt or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts cr
iminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequentl
y, a separate civil action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or no
t he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the o
ffended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to reco
ver damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to th
e bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In ot
her words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section
3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration i
n the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not be
en committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Gar
cia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be pun
ishable by law. (Emphasis supplied) The same doctrine was echoed in the case of
Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court
held: Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only
acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Con
sequently, a civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether o
r not he is prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), t
o recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only
to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
[citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472] (Emphasis supplied) Private respondents s
ubmit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate obiter, and s
hould be read as "voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled with negligence as d
efined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of more substant
ial reasons, this Court will not disturb the above doctrine on the coverage of A
rticle 2176. Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary
under the Revised Penal Code; and that they are not liable for Torzuela s act w
hich is beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard. It having been estab
lished that the instant action is not exdelicto, petitioners may proceed directl
y against Torzuela and the private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Ci
vil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the emplo
yee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on th
e part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or emplo
yee, or in supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer under Arti
cle 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse agai
nst the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employe
e (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incum
bent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are in
tentional and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial cou
rt to dismiss petitioner s complaint simply because it failed to make allegation
s of attendant negligence attributable to private respondents. Cases 1-8 PASCUA,
JAYBEE D. 9. WYLIE V. RARANG FACTS: Petitioners Wylie and Williams were the ass
istant administrative officer and commanding officer, respectively, of the US Na
val base in Subic. Respondent Aurora Rarang was an employee in the Office of the
Provost Marshal assigned as the merchandise control guard. Wylie, as one of his
duties, supervised the publication of the Plan of the Day a daily publication tha
t featured among others, an action line inquiry. On Feb. 3, 1978, an inquiry was p
ublished saying that confiscated goods were being consumed or used for personal
benefit by the merchandise control inspector and that a certain Auring was, in her
self, a disgrace to the office. Rarang, being the only person named Auring in th
e said office, went to press an action for damages against Wylie and Williams an
d the US Naval Base. (That Rarang was indeed the Auring mentioned in the inquiry
was proven by the apology letter issued by Wylie for the inadvertent publicatio
n.)She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defa
mation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing
her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. Defendants alleged that (1) defenda
nts acted in performance of their official functions as officers of the US Navy
and are thus immune from suit (2) US Naval Base is immune from suit being an ins
trumentality of the US Government and (3) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the s
ubject matter and the parties involved. Lower court ruling: defendants pay damag
es because acts were not official acts of the US government, but personal and to
rtious acts (which are not included in the rule that a sovereign country cant be
sued without its consent). Suit against US Naval Base was dismissed. Defendants
appealed the decision to the CA but the same was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not U
S officers who commit a crime or tortious act while discharging official functio
ns are still covered by the principle of state immunity from suit. SC RULING: No
. Our laws and, we presume, those of the United States do not allow the commissi
on of crimes in the name of official duty. The general rule is that public offic
ials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed
in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where th
ere is showing of bad faith. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irrespon
sibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any
other official of the Republic. Under Art. 2176 of the civil code, whoever by a
ct or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obl
iged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-ex
isting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Indeed the imputation of theft cont
ained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is defamation against the character and
reputation of the private respondent. Petitioner
Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recomme
nded the deletion of the name Auring if the article were published. The petition
ers, however, were negligent because under their direction they issued the publi
cation without deleting the name "Auring." Such act or omission is ultra vires a
nd cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed the pr
ivate respondent. The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liabl
e for the damages they caused the private respondent 10. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION IN
C V IAC FACTS: 1:30 am, 15 November 1975 - Leonardo Dionisio, driving his Volksw
agen car, was on his way home to Makati from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with
his boss where had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. He was crossing the interse
ction of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far f
rom his home, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He sw
itched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon a Ford dump truck looming some 2
1/2meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned and registered by Phoenix Con
struction Inc. was parked askew (partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic) on
the right hand side of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic. There
were neither lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set any
where near the dump truck. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven h
ome by Carbonel, its regular driver. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a c
ollision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed
into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physi
cal injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and lo
ss of two gold bridge dentures.- Dionisio commenced an action for damages claimi
ng that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner i
n which Carbonel had parked the dump truck. Phoenix and Carbonel countered that
the proximate cause of Dionisio s injuries was his own recklessness in driving f
ast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without hi
s headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that
it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck dr
iver. CFI RULING : ruled in favor of Dionisio IAC Ruling : affirmed TC but modif
ied amounts. ISSUE: Whether or not last clear chance doctrine should be applied
therefore exculpating Phoenix from paying any damages. SC RULING: NO- We hold th
at private respondent Dionisio s negligence was "only contributory," that the "i
mmediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver s "lack of
due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though
such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article2179, Civil Code of
the Philippines). Phoenix and Carbonel also ask us to apply what they refer to
as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that whil
e the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had the
"last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries and that Di
onisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries
alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the common
law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is a matter fo
r debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of
the Philippines. The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was
to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule-that of contri
butory negligence. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any
recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff s n
egligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of
the defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to gr
ant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defend
ant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordi
ngly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance
doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contribu
tory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been
rejected, as it has been in A2179 CC- Is there perhaps a general concept of "la
st clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized a
s a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We d
o not believe so. Under Art. 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is t
o determine whose negligence-the plaintiff s or the defendant s-was the legal or
proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exe
rcise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of t
erms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the c
ontinuum of time of the plaintiff s and the defendant s negligent acts or omissi
ons, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more
fundamental importance is the nature of the negligent act or omission of each p
arty and the character and gravity of the risks created by such actor omission f
or the rest of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and th
erefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior n
egligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased di
ligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the t
ruck driver s own wrongful act or omission, To accept this proposition is to com
e too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respo
nd for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our la
w on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society an
d to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners prop
osition must tend to weaken the very bonds of society. CA decision is modified b
y reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of expected income
and moral damages Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. 11. QUISABA VS
. STA. INES-MELALE VENEER AND PLYWOOD, INC FACTS: Petitioner Jovito Quisaba was
in the employ of the defendant Corporation for 18 years but was temporarily reli
eved as internal auditor due to his refusal to purchase logs for the companys pla
nt as instructed by the companys Vice President, Robert Hyde which he claims to b
e inconsistent with his position as an internal auditor. Petitioner then filed a
complaint with the CFI of Davao for moral damages, Exemplary damages, terminati
on pay, and attorneys fees against the respondent corporation. Respondent filed t
heir answer and moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdic
tion of the CFI asserting that the proper forum is the NLRC since it involves em
ployer- employee relationship.
CFI : granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint basically i
nvolves an employer employee relationship. ISSUE: Whether a complaint for moral
damages, exemplary damages, termination pay and attorneys fees, arising from an e
mployers constructive dismissal of an employee, is exclusively cognizable by the
regular courts of justice or by the National Labor Relations Commission. SC RULI
NG: It is cognizable by the regular courts of justice. Although the acts complai
ned seemingly appear to constitute matters involving employee-employer relations a
s Quisabas dismissal was the severance of a pre-existing employeremployee relatio
n, his complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se, as in fact he does not
ask for reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his dismissal and the
consequent effects of such dismissal. The right of the respondents to dismiss Qu
isaba should not be confused with the manner in which the right was exercised an
d the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppr
essively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated article 1701 o
f the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression either capital or labor agai
nst the other, in Article 21, which makes the person liable for damages if he wi
lfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good custom or public policy, the sanction for which, by way of moral damages is
provided in Article 2219 no. 10. ACCORDINGLY, the order of the lower court is s
et aside and this case is hereby ordedre remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings in accordance with the law. Costs against the private respondents.
12. GATCHALIAN V. DELIM FACTS: On July 11, 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian
boarded as paying passenger a minibus owned by respondents. While the bus was ru
nning along the highway, a snapping sound was heard, and after a short while, the
bus bumped a cement flower pot, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. The passeng
ers were confined in the hospital, and their bills were paid by respondents spous
e on July 14. Before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers sign an alr
eady prepared affidavit waiving their claims against respondents. Petitioner was
among those who signed. Notwithstanding the said document, petitioner filed a c
laim to recover actual and moral damages for loss of employment opportunities, m
ental suffering and inferiority complex caused by the scar on her forehead. Resp
ondents raised in defense force majeure and the waiver signed by petitioner. The
trial court upheld the validity of the waiver and dismissed the complaint. The
appellate court ruled that the waiver was invalid, but also that the petitioner
is not entitled to damages. ISSUE: (1) Whether the respondent was negligent. (2)
Whether the petitioner is entitled to actual and moral damages. SC RULING: (1)
In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises that
the common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that
it [had] observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 175
5." To overcome this presumption, the common carrier must show to the court that
it had exercised extraordinary diligence to present the injuries. The standard
of extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers is considerably more dem
anding than the standard of ordinary diligence. A common carrier is bound to car
ry its passengers safely "as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard to all the circu
mstances". The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that
respondent had exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. The obviou
s continued failure of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of
the bus, coupled with the driver s refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus afte
r he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of
the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of the passe
ngers, and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver. (2)
At the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school. Her
employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon
the availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. She could not be said to
have in fact lost any employment after and by reason of the accident. She may no
t be awarded damages on the basis of speculation or conjecture. Petitioner s cla
im for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead, is a
nother matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body
; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for whi
ch actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian
is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was bef
ore the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from
the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving ri
se to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante. Moral damages may
be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common carrier is shown. C
onsidering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have suffered as
a result of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her forehead,
we believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award. Petitione
r s claim for P1,000.00 as attorney s fees is in fact even more modest. 13. TUPA
S VS. CA 14. GILCHRIST V. CUDDY FACTS: Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar.
On April 24, He rented it to C. S. Gilchrist for a week for P125. A few days to
the date of delivery, Cuddy sent the money back to Gilchrist. Cuddy then rented
the film to Espejo and his partner Zaldarriaga for P350 for the week knowing tha
t it was rented to someone else and that Cuddy accepted it because he was paying
about three times as much as he had contracted with Gilchrist but they didn t k
now the identity of the other party. Gilchrist filed for injunction against thes
e parties. The trial court and CA granted that there is a contract between Gilch
rist and Cuddy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Espejo and his partner Zaldarriaga should be liable for da
mages though they do not know the identity of Gilchrist. SC RULING: YES. Judgmen
t is affirmed, that Cuddy was liable in an action for damages for the breach of
that contract, and there can be no doubt. The mere right to compete could not ju
stify the appellants in intentionally inducing Cuddy to take away the appellee s
contractual rights. Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of
his own enterprise, industry, skill and credit. He has no right to be free from
malicious and wanton interference, disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or l
oss come as a result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, i
t is damnum absque injuria(loss without injury), unless some superior right by c
ontract or otherwise is interfered with. Cuddy contract on the part of the appel
lants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. The
re was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the
legal liability for interfering with that contract and causing its breach. Liabi
lity of the appellants arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obliga
tions, as they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his con
tract with Gilchrist. So that if the action of Gilchrist had been one for damage
s, it would be governed by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil Code. Articl
e 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes damag
es to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the
damage do done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition p
recedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the identity of a p
erson to whom he causes damages. An injunction is a "special remedy" which was t
here issued by the authority and under the seal of a court of equity, and limite
d, as in order cases where equitable relief is sought, to cases where there is n
o "plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law," which "will not be granted whil
e the rights between the parties are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases
where material and irreparable injury will be done," which cannot be compensate
d in damages, and where there will be no adequate remedy, and which will not, as
a rule, be granted, to take property out of the possession of one party and put
it into that of another whose title has not been established by law . Irreparab
le injury does not meant such injury as is beyond the possibility of repair, or
beyond possible compensation in damages, nor necessarily great injury or great d
amage, but that species of injury, whether great or small, that ought not to be
submitted to on the one hand or inflicted on the other; and, because it is so la
rge on the one hand, or so small on the other, is of such constant and frequent
recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of
law. Gilchrist was facing the immediate prospect of diminished profits by reason
of the fact that the appellants had induced Cuddy to rent to them the film Gilc
hrist had counted upon as his feature film. It is quite apparent that to estimat
e with any decree of accuracy the damages which Gilchrist would likely suffer fr
om such an event would be quite difficult if not impossible. So far as the preli
minary injunction issued against the appellants is concerned, which prohibited t
hem from exhibiting the Zigomar during the week which Gilchrist desired to exhib
it it, we are of the opinion that the circumstances justified the issuance of th
at injunction in the discretion of the court. The remedy by injunction cannot be
used to restrain a legitimate competition, though such competition would involv
e the violation of a contract.
15. GELUZ V. CA FACTS: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz
) for the first time in 1948-- thru her aunt. In 1950, she became pregnant by he
r present husband before they were legally married. To conceal her pregnancy fro
m her parent, she had herself aborted by defendant. After the marriage with the
plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was employed in the COMELEC and her
pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by defendant
in Oct 1953. Less than 2 years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21
, 1955, she again repaired to the defendant s clinic. Nita was again aborted of
a 2-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of P50. It is the third and la
st abortion that constitutes plaintiffs basis in filing this action and award of
damages. The CA and the trial court predicated the award of damages upon the pro
visions of the initial par. of Art. 2206 of the NCC. ISSUE: Whether or not there
can be recovery for damages resulting to the death or abortion of an unborn chi
ld. SC RULING: This award, we believe, to be error for the said art., in fixing
an award for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus
that is not endowed w/ personality. Parents of unborn foetus cannot sue for dama
ges on its behalf. A husband of a woman who voluntarily procured her abortion co
uld not recover damages from the physician who caused the same. (1) Since an act
ion for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primar
ily to the injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the par
ents or heirs of an unborn child. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue
on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death,
since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical p
ersonality (or juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act). It is
no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus
pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article
expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that th
e child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the c
ondition specified in the following article." In the present case, there is no d
ispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother s womb. (2) This i
s not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. Bu
t such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from
the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and ph
ysical integrity. Because the parents cannot expect either help, support or serv
ices from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for t
he illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foe
tus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the dis
appointment of their parental expectations (Art. 2217, CC), as well as to exempl
ary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230, CC). But in th
is case, there is no basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the
husband s indifference to the previous abortions clearly indicates that he was u
nconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affection.
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the
time it is completely delivered from the mother s womb. However, if the foetus
had an intrauterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it
dies within twentyfour hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
16. PNB vs. CA FACTS: Plaintiff, Philamgen as surety, issued a bond in favor of
Tapnio, to secure the latters obligation to PNB of the sum of P2371.79 plus 12%
interest. Philamgen paid the said amount to PNB and seek indemnity from Tapnio.
Tapnio refused to pay alleging that he was not liable to the bank because due to
the negligence of the latter the contract of lease with Tuazon was rescind whic
h amounts to P2, 800.Tapnio mortgage his standing crops and sugar quota to PNB.
Tapnio agreed to lease the sugar quota, in excess of his need to Tuazon which wa
s approved by the branch and vice president of the PNB in the amount of P2.80 pe
r picul. However, the banks board of directors disapproved the lease, stating tha
t the amount should be P3.00 per picul, its market value. Tuazon ask for reconsi
deration to the board which was not acted by the board, so the lease was not con
summated resulting to the loss of P2,800, which could have been earned by Tapnio
. The Trial court and CA ruled that the bank was liable to Tapnio. Thus, this pe
tition. ISSUE: Whether or not PNB is liable to Tapnio. SC RULING: Yes, PNB is li
able to Tapnio. PNB argue that it has a right both under its own Charter and und
er the Corporation Law, to approve or disapprove the said lease of sugar quota a
nd in the exercise of that authority. The SC said that time is of the essence in
the approval of the lease of sugar quota allotments, since the same must be uti
lized during the milling season. There was no proof that there was any other per
son at that time willing to lease the sugar quota allotment of private responden
ts for a price higher than P2.80 per picul. Also, Considering that all the accou
nts of Rita Gueco Tapnio with the Bank were secured by chattel mortgage on stand
ing crops, assignment of leasehold rights and interests on her properties, and s
urety bonds and that she had apparently "the means to pay her obligation to the
Bank, there was NO REASONABLE BASIS for the Board of Directors of petitioner to
have rejected the lease agreement. While petitioner had the ultimate authority o
f approving or disapproving the proposed lease since the quota was mortgaged to
the Bank, the latter certainly cannot escape its responsibility of observing, fo
r the protection of the interest of private respondents. The law makes it impera
tive that every person "must in the exercise of his rights and in the performanc
e of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and and good faith. Ce
rtainly, it knew that the agricultural year was about to expire, that by its dis
approval of the lease private respondents would be unable to utilize the sugar q
uota in question. Under Article 21 of the New Civil Code, "any person who wilful
ly causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." This gran
ts adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossib
le for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes. Cases 9-16
DAMPAG, JONELLA L. 17. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION VS. IAC FACTS: Private
respondents Andres Ventura, Antonio Fajardo, Marcelo Fajardo ,Alfonso Ventura a
nd Florentino Ventura are leasehold tenants of a parcel of the land consisting o
f about five (5) hectare of Riceland situated at sitio Dagat-dagatan,STO.Rosa,Nu
eva Ecija,Sometime in 1967,petitioner NIA constractedan irrigation canal on the
property of Isabel and Virginia Tecson which passed through the private responde
nts landholding as said irrigation canal traverses the Cinco-cinco creek which ab
ut said landholding.The irrigation canal has two (2)outlets which provide privat
e respondents landholding with water coming from said canal and at the same time
serve to drain the excess water of said landholdings. On February 13, 1975, priv
ate respondents filed a complaint per the abatement of nuisance with damages aga
inst pititioners NIA and or the administrator of the NIA alleging that the two o
utlet were with gates to regulate the flow of water from the canal to their land
holdings which resulted to the inundation of said landholdings causing the power
to sustain damages consisting in the destruction of the planted palay crops and
also prevented them from planting on their landholdings. Ruling of the Trial Co
urt: The court finds the complaint meritorious. However,since there were typhoon
s and plant pests that reduced the harvests of the plaintiffs and that there wer
e benefits that accrued to the plaintiffs by reason of said irrigation canal, th
e civil liability of the defendant should naturally be reduced. Wherefore,judgme
nt is hereby entered:1)Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of 3
5,000.00 representing damages;2)Ordering defendant to pay 5,000.00 for attorneys
fees and the cost of the suit. Not satisfied with said decision,petitioners elev
ated the matter to the appellate court which rendered a decision on Feb.27,1986
affirming in toto the decision of the trial court. Ruling of the Intermediate Ap
pellate Court: It has been established that the plaintiffs landholdings were act
ually inundated. The testimonies by all the plaintiffs with respect to the amoun
t of the loss they suffered were not impugned by any contradictory evidence of t
he defendant .To our mind,the testimonies are sufficient proof to make the grant
of damages valid and proper.Besides, the amount awarded by the lower court is j
ust and reasonable considering the circumstances of the case. ISSUE: The petitio
ners contended that the respondent appellate court erred in affirming the decisi
on of the trial court because NIA is immune from suit for quasi-delict or tort,
and assuming NIA could be sued, it is not liable for tort since it did not not a
ct through a special agent as required under paragraph 6,Article 2180 of the civ
il code of the Philippines. RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: Petitioners are in erro
r. As correctly ruled by the court below the NIA is not immune from suit, by vir
tue of the express provision of P.D. 552.
A reading of section 2,sub-paragraph(j) of P.D. NO.552 amending R.A NO.3601 show
s the granting to NIA the power to exercise all the powers of a corporation unde
r the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions
of this act. Paragraph 4 of said law also provide that petitioner NIA may sue an
d be sued in court for all kinds of an, actions ,whether contractual or quasi-co
ntractual, in the recovery of compensation and damages as in the instant case co
nsidering that private respondents action is based on damages caused by the negli
gence of petitioners. This court had previously held that the NIA is a governmen
t agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government.
It is not mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprie
tary function as it has its own assets and liabilities as well as its own corpor
ate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors. Paragraph 6,Article 2180 sta
tes that: The state is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task
done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be
applicable. Article 2176:Whoever by acts or omission causes damage to another, th
ere being fault or negligence,is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if here is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parti
es, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Wherefore, this petition for review on certiorari is hereby denied for lack of m
erit. 18. YU VS.COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Petitioner, the exclusive distributor of
the House of Mayfair wall covering products in the Philippines, cried foul when
his former dealer of the same goods, herein private respondent, purchased the m
erchandise from the house of Mayfair in England through FNF Trading in West Germ
any and sold said merchandise in the Philippines. Both the court of origin and t
he appellate court rejected petitioners thesis that private respondent was engage
d in a sinister form of unfair competition within the context of Article 28 of t
he New Civil Code. Hence, the petition at bar. In the suit for injunction which
petitioner filed before the RTC of the National Capital Judicial Region (Manila)
, petitioner pressed the idea that he was practically by-passed and that private
respondent acted in correct with the FNF Trading in misleading Mayfair into bel
ieving that the goods ordered by the trading firm were intended for shipment to
Nigeria although they were actually shipped to and sold in the Philippines. Priv
ate respondent professed ignorance of the exclusive contract in favor of the pet
itioner. Even then, private respondent responded by asserting that petitioners u
nderstanding with Mayfair is binding only between the parties thereto. Petitione
r impressed before the lower court that he is seeking to enjoin the sale and dis
tribution by private respondent of the same goods in the market. Ruling of the T
rial Court: There is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defend
ant; that the controversy in this case arose from a breach of contract by the FN
F Trading of Germany, for having shipped goods it has purchased from the house o
f
Mayfair to the Philippines; It appears to the court that to restrain the defenda
nt from selling the goods it has ordered from the FNF Trading of Germany , would
be without legal justification. Wherefore, the motion for the issuance of preli
minary injunction for restrain the defendant from selling the goods it has order
ed from the FNF trading of Germany is hereby Denied. The indifference of the tri
al court towards petitioners supplication occasioned the filing of a petition fo
r review on certiorari with the CA. Ruling of the CA: the CA concurred with the
trial court stating that petitioner was not able to demonstrate the unequivocal
right which he sought to protect and that private respondent is a complete stran
ger vis-a-vis the covenant between petitioner and Mayfair. ISSUE: Did the respon
dent appellate court correctly agree with the lower court in disallowing the vis
it solicited by herein petitioner? RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: Verily, injuncti
on is the appropriate remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with contracts w
here the legal remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury is irreparable (G
ilchrist VS. Cuddy, 29 Phil.542); 4-A Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1988 Ed; p.
90). The liability of private respondent, if any, does not emanate from the four
corners of the contract for undoubtedly, Unisia merchandising Co.,Inc. is not a
party thereto but its accountability is . an independent act generative of civil
liability? Wherefore, the petition is hereby Granted the decision of the CA are
hereby reversed and set aside. Let this case be remanded to the court of origin
for issuance of a preliminary injunction. 19. GILCHRIST VS. CUDDY FACTS: C.S Gi
lchrist, the plaintiff, proprietor of the Eagle Theater of Iloilo, contracted wi
th E.A. Cuddy, one of the defendants, of manila, for a film entitled Zigomar or E
elskin, 3d series to be exhibite in his theater in Iloilo during the week beginn
ing may 26,1913. Later, the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga,who were also oper
ating a theater in Iloilo ,representing Pathe Freres, also obtained from Cuddy a
contract for the exhibition of the film aforesaid in their theater in Iloilo du
ring the same week. The plaintiff commenced this action against Cuddy and the de
fendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga for the specific performance of the contract wit
h Cuddy. The complaint prays the court, by a mandatory injunction, order Cuddy t
o deliver , on the 24th of may,1913, is accordance with the aforesaid contract;
the said film to the plaintiff Gilchrist, in accordance with the terms of the ag
reement, so that plaintiff can exhibit the same during the last week beginning m
ay 26,1913, in the Eagle theater, in Iloilo; that the court issue a preliminary
injunctions against the defendant Espejo and Zaldariaga prohibiting them from re
ceiving, exhibiting, or using said film in Iloilo during the last week of may, 1
913, or at any other time prior to the delivery to the plaintiff;
that, on the trial said injunction be maid perpetual and that Cuddy be ordered a
nd commanded to specifically perform his contract with the plaintiff. Ruling of
the Trial Court: The court entered an order which provided that Cuddy should not
send said film Zigomar to the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga and that he sho
uld send its to the plaintiff, Gilchrist. Defendant Espejo and Zaldarriaga havin
g received due notice of the issuance of the mandatory injunction and restrainin
g order, appeared before the court and move that the court vacate such order pro
hibiting them from receiving and exhibiting the film. Ruling of the CA: The cour
t sustained their objection and declined to dismiss the action as to them, the c
ourt denied the defendants the relief asked for and dismissed their claim for da
mages. They thereupon took an appeal from that order. ISSUE: Does the fact that
the appellant did not know at the time the identity of the original lessee of th
e film militate against Gilchrist right to a preliminary injunction, although he
appellants incurred civil liability for such interference? RULING OF THE SUPREM
E COURT: In the examination of the adjudicated cases, where in injunctions have
been issued to restrain wrongful interference with contracts by strangers to suc
h contracts, we have been unable to find any case where this prices question was
involved , as in all of those cases which we have examined, the identity of bot
h of contracting parties was known to the tort-feasors. We might say, however, t
hat this fact does not seem to have been a controlling feature in those cases. T
here is nothing in section 164 of the code of civil procedure which indicates, e
ven remotely, that before on injunction may issue restraining the wrongful inter
ference with contracts by strangers ,the strangers must know the identity of bot
h parties. In the case at bar, the only motive for the interference with the Gil
christ Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profi
t by exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this desir
e ; but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering w
ith the contract and causing its breach. It is therefore, clear under above auth
orities, that they were liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts
, unless they are relieved from such liability by reason of the fact that they d
id not know at the time the identity of the original lessee of the film. 20. ILO
ILO COLD STORAGE CO. VS. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL FACTS: The plaintiff, upon authority
granted by the defendant, constructed an ice and cold storage plant in the city
of Iloilo. Sometime after the plant had been completed and was in operation, nea
rby residents made complaints to the defendant that the smoke from the plant was
very injurious to their health and comfort. Thereupon the defendant appointed a
committee to investigate and report upon the matters contained in said complain
ts. The committee reported that the complaints were well founded.
The defendant council then passed a resolution which reads in part as follows.tha
t after the approval by the honorable provincial board of this resolution , a pe
riod of one month will be granted to the said entity , the Iloilo Ice and Cold s
torage company , in which to proceed with the elevation of said smokestacks, and
if not done the municipal president will execute the order requiring the closin
g or suspension of operation of said establishment. Upon notice and after heavin
g, a preliminary injunction was issued. Subsequently thereto the dependent answe
red the allegations in the complaint and prays that it be absolved from the comp
laint and the plaintiff be declared to have no right to the remedy asked, and th
at the preliminary injunction issued I this case be set aside, with the cost aga
inst the plaintiff. The plaintiff demurred to this answered, and this answer, an
d this demurred was sustained. Ruling of the trial court: the defendant will ame
nd his answer within 5 days or the injunction will be permanently granted as pra
yed for, with costs to the defendant. To this order the defendant excepted and n
ot desiring to amend its answer, appealed to this court. ISSUE: Is the municipal
council has the power to declare the plant of the petitioner a nuisance and aba
tes. HELD: The municipal council is under section 39(j) of the municipal code, s
pecifically empowered to declare and abate nuisances. A nuisance is according to
Blackstone, anything that worketh hurt, inconvenience , or damage they arise fro
m pursuing particular trades or industries in populous neighborhoods; from acts
of public indecency ,keeping disorderly houses and houses of ill fame, gambling
houses. Nuisances have been divided into 2 classes: nuisance per se and nuisance
per accidens. Nuisance per se belong those which are unquestionably and under a
ll circumstances, Nuisances, such as gambling houses of ill fame, etc. The numbe
r of nuisances are such because of particular facts and circumstances surroundin
g the otherwise harmless cause of the nuisance. In the present case it is certai
n that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legiti
mate industry, beneficial to the people and conducive to their health and comfor
t. If it be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question
cannot determined by a mere resolution of the board. It is said that plaintiff
cannot be compelled to build its smoke stock higher if said stock is in fact a n
uisance for the reason that the stock was built under authority granted by the d
efendant and in accordance with the prescribe requirements. For the foregoing re
ason the order sustaining the plaintiff demurrer to the defendant answer is reve
rsed. The record will be returned to the court when it came with
instructions to proceed with the trial of the cause in accordance with this open
ion. No costs will be allowed in this instance. So ordered order reversed. 21. D
E AYALA VS. BARRETTO FACTS: This is a suit for a permanent injunction against th
e erection and operation of a combined brewery and ice plant on Calle General So
lano in the city of Manila, on the ground that it will be a nuisance. From a jud
gment denying the relief prayed for, the plaintiffs have appealed. The twenty-tw
o plaintiffs are either residents or property owners on Calle General Solano. Tw
elve of them are actual residents of the street and of these twelve, six are les
sees of the property owned by other plaintiffs. General Solano has long been a f
ashionable residence street and the dwellings located upon it are large and expe
nsive. At the present day, however, some of these residences are being used for
other purposes. There are now upon this street a coal yard, a warehouse, and a c
igarette factory, all very near the proposed location of the defendants brewery,
and there are also a public school and a club on the street. ISSUE: Is Calle Gen
eral Solano is a strictly residential street, and that the proposed plant to be
operated will create such nuisance? HELD: Under these facts we do not think that
it can be said with entire correctness that the street in question is a strictl
y residential street. That it is not purely a residence street is clear, and tha
t there are numerous businesses near it in nearly every direction is also clear.
There is no doubt that the appropriateness of the locality selected by the defe
ndants as the site of their proposed plant must have considerable bearing upon t
he question whether the plant will create a nuisance. It appears that the locali
ty in question is gradually being transformed from a fashionable residence distr
ict into an industrial center. We think that the preponderating weight of eviden
ce is to the effect that the new brewery will be operated with a minimum of offe
nse to nearby residents, and that in view of the semi-industrial character of th
e locality, what noise, etc., is produced, cannot be held to be unreasonable. It
is possible that plaintiffs, or some of them, might prove damages by reason of
property depreciation. But at all the events, this is not a proper case for the
issuance of the extra-ordinary remedy of injunction. The judgment appealed from
is affirmed, with costs against the appellants. SO ORDERED. 22. SAN RAFAEL HOME
OWNERS ASSOCIATION INC. VS. CITY OF MANILA FACTS: Civil case no.65992 and civil
case no. 66179, the first prohibition with preliminary injunction and the second
for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction were filed in the Cour
t of first instance of Manila by the San Rafael Homeowners Association, Inc. and
others. The respondents were the City of Manila and the members of the city off
icials. The petitioners sought to restrain the respondents from conducting a pub
lic bidding for the construction and establishment of an incinerator-thermal pla
nt as a system of garbage and refuse disposal in the City of Manila on the groun
d that an incinerator is a nuisance per se. The records shows that since 1955 th
e City of Manila had been conducting studies on the problem of garbage
and refuse disposal. In 1961 a pilot composting plant was in operation at the No
rth Harbor. On November 15,1965 city ordinance no. 5274 was enacted, Authorizing
the establishment , equipping and construction of a garbage and refuse disposal
plant and appropriating the sum of 15,000.00 for that purpose. The two cases were
heard jointly, and from the decision of the court a quo dismissing them the pet
itioners brought an instant appeal. In their brief the petitioners cite numerous
errors in the decision of the lower court. The main points, however are that th
e advertised bidding for an incinerator was in excess of the respondents authori
ty because an incinerator is a nuisance per se and because its establishment wou
ld violate ordinance no. 5274, the City charter of Manila, the revised administr
ative code, an the local autonomy. ISSUE: Whether or not the argument of the pet
itioners that composting is better than incineration as a method of garbage and
refuse disposal and that incineration will prove to be a nuisance is meritorious
? HELD: It is, to our mind, entirely pointless to go into an academic discussion
of the relative merits of the composting and the incineration methods of garbar
ge and refuse disposal for purposes of deciding whether or not at this stage pro
hibition should issue to stop the bidding called for by the respondents. The ins
tant petitions for that purpose are premature. Certainly this court cannot and s
hould not substitute its judgment this early for that of the respondents, and on
a purely theoretical basis rule that the bids submitted should not be opened, o
r if opened should not be accepted, because not one of the plants therein offere
d to be established would serve the purpose envisaged and because, if so establi
shed, it would so pollute the environment as to constitute a nuisance. If and wh
en such a result becomes a reality, or at least an imminent threat, that will be
the time the petitioners may come to court .That they are not successful now wi
ll not preclude them from doing so, because a continuing nuisance calls for a co
ntinuing remedy. Wherefore, we find the present appeal to be without merit, and
hereby affirm the judgment of the court a quo, with costs against the petitioner
s-appellants. Judgment affirmed. 23. TAYLOR VS. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIG
HT CO. FACTS: An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other inju
ries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative.
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street rail
way and an electric light system in the city of Manila.The plaintiff, David Tayl
or, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of,15 years of age.
On the 30th of September , 1905 David together with his companion Manuel Clapar
ols went to the companys premises and found some twenty or thirty brass fulminati
ng caps scattered on the ground. They tried to break the cap with a stone and ha
mmer but failed, so they opened one of the caps with a knife and finding that it
was filed with a yellowish substance they lighted it with a match and explosion
followed causing them more or less injuries and to the removal of the right eye
of David. So this action arises and the trial court ruled in favor of the plain
tiff. RULING OF THE LOWER COURT: The claim of the plaintiff shows that evidence
in the record sufficiently establishes the contrary, and justifies the court in
drawing the reasonable inference that the caps found on its premises were its pr
operty.Thus,
applying the provisions of the Articles 1089 of the Civil Code read together wit
h articles 1902,1903, and 1908 of that Code, the company is liable for the damag
e which was occurred. Not satisfied with the decision of lower court, counsel fo
r defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the
facts proven at the trial do not establish the liability of the company under t
he provisions of these articles. ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to dama
ges HELD: In the case at bar, we are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case h
ad sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which h
e exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was
sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understa
nd and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which
would have avoided the injury resulted from his own deliberate act; and that th
e injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate resu
lt of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these
injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligent act of the defendant
in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiffs own act was
the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury .W
e think it is quite clear that the immediate cause of the explosion ,the acciden
t which resulted in plaintiffs injury ,was his own act in putting a match to the
contents of the cap, and that having contributed to the principal occurrence, as
one of its determining factors, he can not recover. Twenty days after the date o
f this decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the court belo
w, without costs to either party in this instance, and 10 days thereafter let th
e record be returned to the court wherein it originated, where judgment will be
entered in favor of the defendant for the costs in first instance and the compla
int dismissed without day. SO ORDERED. Judgment reversed. 24. ALGARRA VS. SANDEJ
AS FACTS : Plaintiff received personal injuries as a result of defendants neglige
nt act and was incapacitated for two months. Plaintiff was a commission agent, h
ad about twenty regular customers, who purchased his wares in small quantities,
necessitating regular and frequent deliveries. Being unable to attend to their w
ants during the two months he was incapacitated, his regular customers turned th
eir trade to other competing agents. On recovering, he had lost all but four reg
ular customers, whose purchases netted him about seven pesos per month. It took
him four years to build up his patronage to its proportions at the time of the a
ccident. At that time this trade netted him about fifty pesos per month. RULING
OF THE LOWER COURT: Under this state of facts, the lower court, while recognizin
g the justness of the claim, refused to allow him anything for injury to his bus
iness due to his enforced absence therefrom, stating that the civil liability is
almost always limited to indemnity for damage to the party aggrieved for the ti
me during which he was incapacitated for work.
ISSUE: Whether this damage to his business can be so nearly ascertained as to ju
stify a court in awarding any amount whatever HELD: When it is shown that a plai
ntiffs business is a going concern with a fairly steady average profit on the inv
estment, it may be assumed that had the interruption to the business through def
endants wrongful act not occurred, it would have continued producing this averag
e income so long as is usual with things of that nature. When in addition to the
previous average income of the business it is further shown what the reduced re
ceipts of the business are immediately after the cause of the interruption has b
een removed , there can be no manner of doubt that a loss of profits has resulte
d from the wrongful act of the defendant. In the present case ,we not only have
the value of plaintiffs business to him just prior to the accident, but we also h
ave its value to him after the accident. At the trial, he testified that his wif
e had earned about 15 pesos during the 2 months that he was disabled. That this
almost total destruction of his business was directly chargeable to defendants wr
ongful act there can be no manner of doubt; and the mere fact that the loss can
not be ascertained with absolute accuracy, is no reason for denying plaintiffs cl
aim altogether as it would be a reproach to the law if he could not recover dama
ges at all. Wherefore ,the judgment of the lower court is set aside, and the pla
intiff is awarded the following damages: ten pesos for medical expenses; one hun
dred pesos for the two months of his enforce absence from his business ; and two
hundred and fifty pesos for the damage done to his business in the way of loss
of profits ,or a total of three hundred and sixty pesos .No cost will be allowed
in this instance. Judgment set aside, damages allowed. Cases 17-24 APPAG, ANNIE
LYN D. 25. TAYAG VS. ALCANTARA FACTS: Pedro Tayag, Sr. on his way home was ridin
g a bicycle along Mcarthur Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac when he was bumped
and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing a body number 1107 and a plate number
YL604PUB74 which was being driven by Romeo Villa. As a result, Pedro Tayag, Sr.
suffered injuries which caused his instant death. The heirs of Pedro Tayag then
filed a case against the bus company and the driver in a Civil Case No. 5114. Ph
ilippine Rabbit filed a motion to suspend the civil case on the ground that the
criminal case against the driver is still pending. When the driver was acquitted
on the criminal case, the bus company filed a motion to dismiss the civil case
which was granted by the Hon. Judge Alcantara. This now led to the petition for
certiorari by the plaintiff. ISSUE: Whether or not the Hon. Judge Alcantara acte
d without or in excess of his jurisdiction in dismissing the civil case.
HELD: Yes. Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or commission complained of as a felony. such civil action may proc
eed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of th
e latter. All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present,
namely: (1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of p
rivate respondent; (2) damage caused by the said act or commission; (3) direct c
ausal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and (4) no pre-exis
ting contractual relation between the parties. The petitioners cause of action
being based on a quasi delict the acquittal of the driver, private respondent Ro
meo Villa, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 836 is not a bar to the pro
secution of Civil Case No. 5114 for damages based on quasi-delict. In the light
of the foregoing, We hold that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discre
tion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing Civil Case No. 5114. 26. VE
RGARA vs. CA, AMADEO AZARCON FACTS:Martin Belmonte was driving a truck belonging
to Vicente Vergara when it rammed head-on to the store-residence of Amadeo Azarco
n causing damage amounting to Php53,024.22. Vergara alleged that what happened w
as an act of God being that the cargo truck had mechanical problem in a way that
the steering wheel refused to respond causing the driver to lost control. The t
rial court decided in favor of Amadeo Azarcon which was affirmed in too by the C
A ordering Vergara and the insurance company to pay jointly and severally Amadeo
Azarcon. Thus the appeal to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial
court is correct in holding the owner Vergara liable for fault and negligence. H
ELD: Yes. It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quas
i-delict are present in the case at bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to th
e plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some per
son for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause
and effect between such negligence and the damages. Contrary to the claim of the
petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes can not be considered as fortui
tous in character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the accident preventa
ble. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to overcome the d
isputable presumption of negligence on his part in the selection and supervision
of his driver. 27. ANDAMO vs. IAC FACTS: Spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo
owned a land adjacent to the property of the Missionaries of Our Lady of La Sale
tte, Inc. The missionaries constructed
in the property waterpaths, contrivances and artificial lake which inundated and
eroded the property of the Andamos casuing the death of a man and damaged the c
rops therein and endangered the life of the workers of the Andamos. The Andamos
then filed a criminal case against the missionaries then later on filed a civil
case praying for preliminary injunction. The lower court, deciding on the opposi
tion of the missionaries, suspended the further hearing on the civil case and th
en finally basing on Sec. 3, Rule 11 of Rules of Court dismissed the same for la
ck of jurisdiction since the criminal case was still unresolved. The appellate c
ourt affirmed the decision and denied the motion for reconsideration. Thus this
appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the civil case based on Sec. 3, R
ule 11 of the Rules of Court was proper. HELD: It is not proper. Section 3 (a),
Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions a
rising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the crimina
l action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final ju
dgment has been rendered in the criminal action." A careful examination of the a
forequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and
2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are
present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence
of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) t
he connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defenda
nt and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio
, the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held th
at "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the
flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing lo
ss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled
to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment
of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party. WHEREFORE, the assail
ed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court aff
irming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (
Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 28. PHILI
PPINE BANK OF COMMERCE VS. CA FACTS: Rommelss Marketing Corporation ( RMC ) maint
ained 2 separate accounts with the Philippine Bank of Commerce in Pasig Branch.
For one ( 1 ) years, the RMC has been entrusting funds in the amount of Php304,9
79.74 to Irene Yabut, the company secretary, for the purpose of depositing the s
aid funds in the companys account under PBC. Unknown to the knowledge of the comp
any, Irene Yabut has been depositing the funds in the account of his husband Cot
as. When depositing, Yabut will fill-up the deposit slip with its duplicate wher
e the original copy contains the name account number of her husband while the du
plicate contains the companys account number but the name was left blank but stil
l the teller validated the deposit slip. The RMC then filed an action to recover
the money.
The trial court found PBC negligent ordering it together with the teller, Mabaya
d, to pay jointly and severally the following: 304,979.72 representing the lost
deposit plus interest; 14% thereof as exemplary damages; and 25% of the total am
ount due as attorneys fees. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Thus the present case at the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not PBC is liable
for the lost deposits due to the negligent act of its teller Mabayad. HELD: Art.
2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. In the case at be
nch, there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the private respondent (pl
aintiff in the trial court) RMC in the amount of P304,979.74. It is in ascribing
fault or negligence which caused the damage where the parties point to each oth
er as the culprit. It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the
negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank
teller, which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respon
dent, and not the latter s act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, as in
sisted by the petitioners. Furthermore, under the doctrine of "last clear chance
" (also referred to, at times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peri
l"), petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, s
tates that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is app
reciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to deter
mine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who
had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so
is chargeable with the consequences thereof. The foregoing notwithstanding, it c
annot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not c
hecking its monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company would hav
e been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secret
ary. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RM
C, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance in their fin
ancial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which sh
all mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent 23 under
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code, to wit: . . . When the plaintiff s own negli
gence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover dam
ages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate c
ause of the injury being the defendant s lack of due care, the plaintiff may rec
over damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. In view o
f this, we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allo
cating the damage on a 60-40 ratio. Thus, 40% of the damage awarded by the respo
ndent appellate court, except the award of P25,000.00 attorney s fees, shall be
borne by private respondent RMC; only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the
petitioners. The award of attorney s fees shall be borne exclusively by the pet
itioners. WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is modified
by reducing the amount of actual damages private respondent is entitled to by 4
0%. Petitioners may recover from Ms. Azucena Mabayad the amount they would pay t
he private respondent. Private respondent shall have recourse against Ms. Irene
Yabut. In all other respects, the appellate court s decision is AFFIRMED. 29. RA
KES vs. ATLANTIC GULF and PACIFIC CO. FACTS: M.H. Rakes who was under the employ
ment of Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company was at work transporting iron rails fr
om the barge from the harbor to the companys yard in Manila. During the process,
the track sagged, the tie broke, the car carrying the said iron rails either can
ted thus the rails slid off hitting the leg of Rakes causing it to be amputated.
Rakes then filed an action against Atlantic for their negligence. The trial cou
rt decided in favor of Rakes ordering the Atlantic to pay Rakes the amount of Ph
p5,000.00. The Atlantic then filed a petition alleging therein that the remedy f
or injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action and the negligence
of Rakes was the cause of his injury for having noticed the depression in the t
rack he still continued his work and that he walked at the side of the car inste
ad of along the boards. The appellate court affirmed the said decision. ISSUE: W
hether or not the action of Rakes is considered negligent thus contributed to hi
s injury exempting the Atlantic from any liability. HELD: Although the defendants
negligence may have been the primary cause of the injury complained of, yet an a
ction for such injury cannot be maintained if the proximate and immediate cause
of the injury can be traced to the want of ordinary care and caution in the pers
on injured; subject to this qualification, which has grown up in recent years (h
aving been first enunciated in Davies vs. Mann, 10 M. & W., 546) that the contri
butory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown
that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have
avoided the consequences of the injured partys negligence. Difficulty seems to b
e apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered im
mediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be between
the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could
have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, indep
endent of it, but contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspie
ce or the failure to replace it. This produced the event giving occasion for dam
ages that is, the shrinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To t
his event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not co
ntribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had th
e crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission of
duty, the last would have been one of the determining causes of the event or acc
ident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the pri
ncipal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where,
in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he ma
y recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event
should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
imprudence. Accepting, though with some hesitation, the judgment of the trial co
urt, fixing the damage incurred by the plaintiff at 5,000 pesos, the equivalent
of 2,500 dollars, United States money, we deduct therefrom 2,500 pesos, the amou
nt fairly attributable to his negligence, and direct judgment to be entered in f
avor of the plaintiff for the resulting sum of 2,500 pesos, with cost of both in
stances, and ten days hereafter let the case be remanded to the court below for
proper action. So ordered. 30. BARREDO and GARCIA vs. ALMARIO FACTS: A taxi cab
owned by Fausto Barredo and was being driven by Pedro Fontanilla collided head-o
n to a carretela being guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned i
nflicting injuries to the passenger Fausto Garcia who later on died because of t
he injury sustained in the collision. A criminal action was filed against Fontan
illa in which he was convicted to an indeterminate sentence which was affirmed b
y the Court of Appeals. The parents of Faustino then filed a separate civil acti
on against Barredo and Fontanilla where the trial court ruled in favor of the pa
rents of Faustino. The appellate affirmed the decision stating therein that ther
e is no proof that Barredo exercised the diligence f a good father of a family t
o prevent the damage. Thus this appeal to the Supreme Court where Barredo allege
d that his liability is only subsidiary and as there has been no civil action ag
ainst Fontanilla, the criminally liable person, Barredo cannot be held responsib
le. ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is liable being the owner of the taxicab and m
aking him responsible to the acts of his driver. HELD: ART. 1902. Any person who
by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall
be liable for the damage so done. ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next p
receding article is enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, but al
so for those of persons for whom another is responsible. The legal provisions, a
uthors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of
this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little und
erstood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations
. Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but
also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civ
il Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the
literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or
injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence even
the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil l
iability arising from a crime. Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a crimina
l case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil cas
e, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages.
There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond r
easonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of
evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a c
ivil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there woul
d be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Thirdly,
to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability effective, and t
hat is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latters) property first, would be
tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method
of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is
also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibi
lity of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. At this juncture, it
should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and thei
r presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and
employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to
the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resu
lting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that th
ey should guarantee the latters careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial
safety of others. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usu
al course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by suc
h practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligenc
e under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high ti
me we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own na
tural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime
under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguardi
ng of private rights because it re- establishes an ancient and additional remedy
, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on
the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely dire
cted by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and
efficacious redress. In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appe
als should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant- petition
er. 31. DIANA and DIANA vs. BATANGAS TRANSPORTATION CO. FACTS: Florencio Diana a
nd some other passengers died while riding in Truck No. 14 owned Batangas Transp
ortation Co. and being driven by Vivencio Bristol when it rammed into a ditch at
Bay Laguna. Bristol was then charged with multiple homicide through reckless im
prudence and was convicted thus ordering him and Batangas Transportation Co. to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased. The heirs then filed a civil case to recove
r from the Batangas Transportation for the negligent act of their driver. A writ
of execution was issued but Bristol was unable to comply with his obligation an
d the Batangas Transportation failed also to comply under its subsidiary liabili
ty. The lower court dismissed the civil case acting on the motion to dismiss of
the Batangas Transporation basing it on Rule 8, Sec. 1 (d) of Rule of Court alle
ging that the criminal action for the same caus of action was still pending. The
court of appeals did not take on the case on the ground that is poses merely a
question of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the civil action by the lower court under
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court is correct. HELD: No its not correct. The requireme
nts for the application of Rule 8, Sec. 1 (d) are: 1.) Identity of parties or at
least such as representing the same interest in both actions. 2.) Identity of r
ights asserted and relief prayed for the relief being founded on the same facts.
3.) The identity on the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgm
ent which may be rendered on the other action will be regardless of which party
if successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. Conside
ring the distinguishing characteristics of the two cases, which involve two diff
erent remedies, it can hardly be said that there is identity of reliefs in both
actions as to make the present case fall under the operation of Rule 8, section
1(d) of the Rules of Court. In other words, it is a mistake to say that the pres
ent action should be dismissed because of the pendency of another action between
the same parties involving the same cause. Evidently, both cases involve differ
ent causes of action. In fact, when the Court of Appeals dismissed the action ba
sed on culpa aquiliana (civil case No. 8023), this distinction was stressed. It
was there said that the negligent act committed by defendant s employee is not a
quasi crime, for such negligence is punishable by law. What plaintiffs should h
ave done was to institute an action under article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
(CA-G.R. No. 3632-R). And this is what plaintiffs have done. To deprive them now
of this remedy, after the conviction of defendant s employee, would be to depri
ve them altogether of the indemnity to which they are entitled by law and by a c
ourt decision, which injustice it is our duty to prevent. Wherefore, the order a
ppealed from is reversed and the case is hereby remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs. 32. CARPIO vs. DOROJA FACTS:
Edwin Ramires, while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney which was owned and operate
d by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionision Carpio while crossing the street which ca
used him a fractured left clavicle and other injuries. An action for reckless im
prudence resulting to serious physical injuries was filed against Ramires where
he pleaded guilty to the lower offense. He was then sentenced to suffer I month
imprisonment and to indemnify Carpio in the amount of Php45.00 representing the
can of tomatoes, Php200.00 which he paid in the hospital, and Php1,500.00 as att
orneys fees. The civil aspect was appealed where the appellate court modified gra
nting the victim to recover moral damages in the amount of Php5,000.00 at the sa
me time affirming the other civil liabilities. A writ of execution was then serv
ed but the driver was insolvent thus Carpio moved for the imposition of the subs
idiary liability of the owner-operator but the trial judge denied alleging that
the appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of the owner and
that Carpio failed to raise the matter in his appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the denial for the writ of execution against the owner in
performance of his subsidiary liability was proper. HELD: The present case is ne
ither an action for culpa-contractual nor for culpaaquiliana. This is basically
an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of th
e Revised Penal Code. In no case can this be regarded as a civil action for the
primary liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, i.e., a
ction for culpa-aquiliana. The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held s
ubsidiarily liable because the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on
appeal and in like manner, the appellate court s decision made no mention of suc
h subsidiary liability is of no moment. As already discussed, the filing of a se
parate complaint against the operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is no
t necessary since his liability is clear from the decision against the accused.
Such being the case, it is not indispensable for the question of subsidiary liab
ility to be passed upon by the appellate court. Such subsidiary liability is alr
eady implied from the appellate court s decision. The position taken by the resp
ondent appellate court that to grant the motion for subsidiary writ of execution
would in effect be to amend its decision which has already become final and exe
cutory cannot be sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the basis of
his subsidiary liability does not constitute an amendment of the judgment becau
se in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, once all the requisite
s as earlier discussed are met, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily lia
ble, without need of a separate action. Such being the case, the subsidiary liab
ility can be enforced in the same case where the award was given, and this does
not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon the co
urt to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the emplo
yer has been heard), upon conviction of the employee and after execution is retu
rned unsatisfied due to the employee s insolvency. WHEREFORE, the order of respo
ndent court disallowing the motion for subsidiary writ of execution is hereby SE
T ASIDE. The Court a quo is directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding t
he subsidiary liability of the alleged owner-operator of the passenger jitney. C
osts against private respondent. Cases 25-32 AGPAD, AMALIA B. 33. FAR EAST BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY vs. CA, et al. FACTS: Luis Luna has a FAREASTCARD issued by Fa
r East Bank and Trust Company. with a supplemental card issued to Clarita S. Lun
a. Clarita lost her credit card and informed Far East. She submitted an affidavi
t of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank would record the lost card, along w
ith the principal card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.
When Luis had lunch for a close friend at a restaurant in a hotel, the card was
not honored then Luis was forced to pay in cash so he felt embarrassed. Luis Lun
a demanded from Far East the payment of damages. The vice-president of the bank,
expressed the bank s apologies to Luis in a letter. A letter was also sent to t
he restaurant to assure that Luis was "very valued clients" of Far East. The hot
el wrote back to say that the credibility of Luis had never been "in question."
Still evidently feeling aggrieved Luis filed a complaint for damages. RTC found
Far East liable and ordered to pay Luna. The CA affirmed the decision of the tri
al court. ISSUE: Whether or not this is an action for quasi-delict. HELD: No. Th
e Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can b
e the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application o
f applicable principles on tort even where there is a pre-existing contract betw
een the plaintiff and the defendant (Phil. Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 106 SC
RA 143; Singson vs. Bank of Phil. Islands, 23 SCRA 1117; and Air France vs. Carr
ascoso, 18 SCRA 155). This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve Luna s case f
or it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would consti
tute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi
-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly
: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission
can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parti
es are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisio
ns to the case. Here, Luna s damage claim is predicated solely on their contract
ual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cann
ot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent
actionable tort. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED by deleting the a
ward of moral and exemplary damages to Luna; in its stead, Far East is ordered t
o pay an amount of P5,000.00 by way of nominal damages. 34. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT A
UTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN vs. NAVIDAD FACTS: About half an hour past 7pm, Nicanor
Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station. While Navidad was standing o
n the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard, emplo
yed by Prudent Security Agency, approached Navidad. A misunderstanding ensued th
at led to a fist fight. No evidence was adduced to indicate how the fight starte
d or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on
the LRT tracks. When Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by Rodolfo Roman, was
coming in that struck him and killed him instantaneously. The widow of Nicanor,
Marjorie Navidad, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodo
lfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc., and Prudent for the d
eath of her husband. Prudent denied liability and averred that it had exercised
due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.
Trial Court found in favor of Natividad and against Prudent Security and Junelit
o Escartin ordering the jointly and severally payment of actual damages , compen
satory damages, indemnity for the death of Nicanor, moral damages, attorneys fee
s, and costs of suit. But the Court of Appeals exonerated Prudent from any liabi
lity for the death of Nicanor and, instead, held the LRTA and Roman jointly and
severally liable. ISSUE: Whether or not Prudent Security is liable for negligenc
e of its employee Escartin. HELD: No. If at all, that liability could only be fo
r tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjuncti
on with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employers
liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is
established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumpti
on juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris famil
ies in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary
and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervisio
n of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a showi
ng, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on
the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? I
t would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when t
he same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual an
d the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. I
n fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes
a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictu
al liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be sa
id to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply. T
here is nothing to link Prudent to the death of Nicanor, for the reason that the
negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven. WHEREFORE, the
assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to awa
rd of damages and Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. 35. AIR FRANCE vs. C
ARRASCOSO et al. FACTS: Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a g
roup of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes. Air France, through i
ts authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to a "first class" round
trip airplane ticket for Carrascoso from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok
, he travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the airline forc
ed him to vacate the "first class" seat because, in the words of the witness Ern
esto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better
right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat he refused, and
told the Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion e
nsued, and, according to said Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervo
us in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a ho
t discussion with the manager, they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacifi
ed Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" and he reluctantly gave his
"first class" seat in the plane.
The CFI ordered Air France to pay Carrascoso moral damages, exemplary damages, a
nd the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the trip Ban
gkok-Rome. The CA affirmed the decision. ISSUE: WON moral damages could be recov
ered from AirFrance, granted that their employee was accused of the tortuous act
. HELD: Yes. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its emplo
yees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. For the willful malevolent
act of petitioner s manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 o
f the Civil Code says: ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury t
o another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage. In parallel circumstances, we applie
d the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of Article
2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. Wherefore, the judgment of
the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We accordingly vote
to affirm the same. 36. LAYUGAN vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, et. Al. FACTS
: While Pedro Layugan and companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck
which was parked along the right side of the National Highway, Godofredo Isidro
truck driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped them. As a result, Layugan was
injured and hospitalized and spent P10, 000.00 and will incur more expenses for
recuperating. He would be deprived of lifetime income of P70, 000.00 and has pa
id his lawyer P10, 000.00. Trial Court: Isidro was found liable. Intermediate Ap
pellate Court: It reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the com
plaint, the third-party complaint, and the counter- claims of both appellants. I
SSUE: Whether or not Isidro was liable by the negligence of Serrano. HELD: Yes.
It is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparen
tly did not check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he could
have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and coul
d have repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided. Moreover, to o
ur mind, the fact that the Isidro used to instruct his driver to be careful in h
is driving, that the driver was licensed, and the fact that he had no record of
any accident, as found by the court, are not sufficient to destroy the finding o
f negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the facts established at the tria
l. Isidro or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have conducted a thorou
gh inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it. In the ligh
t of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prov
e that the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his empl
oyees which would exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver toLayuga
n. But even if we concede that the diligence of a good father of a family was ob
served by Isidro in the supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of evide
nce on record of the observance by
Isidro of the same quantum of diligence in the supervision of his mechanic, if a
ny, who would be directly in charge in maintaining the road worthiness of his (I
sidro s) truck. But that is not all. There is paucity of proof that Isidro exerc
ised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his driver,
Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection of his mechanic, if any, in order to
insure the safe operation of his truck and thus prevent damage to others. Accor
dingly, the responsibility of Isidro as employer treated in Article 2180, paragr
aph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased. Wherefore, decision of the trial court
is hereby REINSTATED in toto. 37. VALENZUELA vs. C.A., et al. FACTS: At around 2
:00 in the morning, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving from her restaurant to he
r home. She was travelling with a companion, Cecilia Ramon. She noticed somethin
g wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people,
to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been
verified, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, put on her emergenc
y lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was
standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man
who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a car driven by
Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Va
lenzuela was thrown against the windshield of the car Li and then fell to the gr
ound. She was pulled out from under defendants car. Plaintiffs left leg was seve
red up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to th
e rest of the body. Lower court sustained the plaintiffs submissions and found de
fendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Artic
le 2176 of the Civil Code. Court of Appeals found Li grossly negligent that ther
e was ample basis from the evidence of record for the trial courts finding that
the Valenzuelas car was properly parked at the right, beside the sidewalk when it
was bumped by Lis car. ISSUE: Whether or not Valenzuela was guilty of contributo
ry negligence. HELD: No. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the i
njured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which f
alls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protectio
n. While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought o
r the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the con
duct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusivel
y by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoughtful care, but b
y the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly c
rippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a po
int which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other
motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a park
ing zone or turn on a dark Street or alley where she would likely find no one to
help her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency (s
imply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) becaus
e the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motoris
ts. In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of Aurora Boulev
ard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid putting her
self
and other motorists in danger, she did what was best under the situation. As nar
rated by respondent court: She stopped at a lighted place where there were peopl
e, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having b
een told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she ca
nnot reach her home she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, behind a T
oyota Corona Car." In fact, respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the invest
igator on the scene of the accident confirmed that Valenzuelas car was parked ve
ry close to the sidewalk. The sketch which he prepared after the incident showed
Valenzuelas car partly straddling the sidewalk, clear and at a convenient dista
nce from motorists passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This fact was its
elf corroborated by the testimony of witness Rodriguez. Under the circumstances
described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emerg
ency and could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumst
ances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. Th
e emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was
not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable prec
autions. Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the
negligence of Li on the night of the accident. Negligence, as it is commonly und
erstood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others." It is the fai
lure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circums
tances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. We stressed, in
Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, that negligence is the want of care require
d by the circumstances. The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in
the court below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in driving hi
s Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast speed at ab
out 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle rendering the st
reet slippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on record to show that he was
under the influence of liquor. Under these conditions, his chances of effective
ly dealing with changing conditions on the road were significantly lessened. As
Prosser and Keaton emphasize: Under present day traffic conditions, any driver o
f an automobile must be prepared for the sudden appearance of obstacles and pers
ons on the highway, and of other vehicles at intersections, such as one who sees
a child on the curb may be required to anticipate its sudden dash into the stre
et, and his failure to act properly when they appear may be found to amount to n
egligence. Lis obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation confronting him
on the night of the accident was clearly of his own making. Wherefore, the deci
sion of the Regional Trial Court is reinstated. 38. ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL vs.
C.A. FACTS: Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman high school student, wanted to j
oin a school picnic of another class. Ferdinand s parents, Dr. Romulo and Lilia
Castillo, because of
short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring fo
od to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back hom
e after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went
on with them to the beach. During the picnic, one of the female teachers was ap
parently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue
, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He died. Trial court
found the teachers failed to exercise the diligence required of them by law und
er the circumstances to guard against the harm they had foreseen but dismissed t
he complaint against the school. Court of Appeals found the teachers and the sch
ool liable. ISSUE: (A) Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the d
efendants. (B) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civ
il Code is applicable to the case at bar. HELD: (A) No. no negligence could be a
ttributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the r
espondents-spouses. Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the sect
ion where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good fat
her of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students
who joined the picnic. In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez an
d Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout masters who have knowled
ge in First Aid application and swimming. Moreover, even respondents witness, S
egundo Vinas, testified that "the defendants (petitioners herein) had life saver
s especially brought by the defendants in case of emergency." (p. 85, Rollo) The
records also show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanl
y possible to save the child. (B) No. Respondent Court of Appeals committed an e
rror in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code in rendering petitioner school l
iable for the death of respondent s son. Article 2180, par. 4 states that: The o
bligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one s own acts or o
missions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Employers s
hall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers a
cting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not e
ngaged in any business or industry. Under this paragraph, it is clear that befor
e an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or
omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee w
as in the performance of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers/pe
titioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incide
nt happened not within the school premises, not on a school
day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely p
rivate affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happen
ed while some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were having a
picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its pr
incipal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activit
y neither is it considered as an extracurricular activity. Wherefore, petitioner
s are not guilty of any fault or negligence, hence, no moral damages can be asse
ssed against them. 39. VALENZUELA vs. C.A., et al., 253 SCRA 303, same(37) 40. O
NG, et al. vs. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT FACTS: Dominador Ong (14 years old) a
nd his two brothers went to the swimming pool operated by MetropolitanWater Dist
rict (MWD). After paying the entrance fee, the three proceeded to the small pool
. Later, Dominador told his brothers that hell just be going to the locker room t
o drink a bottle of Coke. No one saw him returned. Later, one bather noticed som
eone at the bottom of the big pool and another notified the lifeguard in attenda
nt (Abao), who immediately dove into the water. The body was later identified as
Dominadors. He was attempted to be revived multiple times but of no avail. Lower
court found that the action of plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed the complai
nt. ISSUE: Whether or not the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to
the negligence of Metropolitan and/or its employees. HELD: No. The existence of
fault or negligence on the part of the employees is belied by the written statem
ents of two witnesses. Nowhere in said statements do they state that the lifegua
rd was chatting with the security guard at the gate of the swimming pool or was
reading a comic magazine when the alarm was given for which reason he failed to
immediately respond to the alarm. On the contrary, what Ruben Ong particularly e
mphasized therein was that after the lifeguard heard the shouts for help, the la
tter immediately dived into the pool to retrieve the person under water who turn
ed out to be his brother. There is sufficient evidence to show that Metropolitan
has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons
or prevent accident which may cause their death. Thus, it has been shown that t
he swimming pools are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen r
esuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted wit
h black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspi
cuous place within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of t
he pools. Metropolitan employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they had ta
ken a course for that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency. These
lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way
as to have two guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of the bathers.
There is a
male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscita
tor. And there are security guards who are available always in case of emergency
. The record also shows that after retrieving the body from the pool, lifeguard
Abao immediately gave him manual artificial respiration. Soon thereafter, the nur
se and sanitary inspector came with an oxygen resuscitator. When they found that
the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspector immediately injected him with
camphorated oil. When the manual artificial respiration proved ineffective they
applied the oxygen resuscitator until its contents were exhausted. And while all
these efforts were being made, they sent for Dr. Ayuyao but already dead. All o
f the foregoing shows all humanly possible under the circumstances to restore li
fe to minor Ong was done and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for
his death. We do not see how the doctrine of last clear chance may apply. As the
doctrine usually is stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportuni
ty of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent o
r the negligence of a third person which is imputed to his opponent, is consider
ed in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. Since it is n
ot known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent tha
t he went there without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of
Metropolitan as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Ab
anio responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it an
d immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of Metropoli
tan had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that
there is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants t
o impute liability to Metropolitan. Wherefore, decision of the lower court is af
firmed. 41. CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. FACTS:
Ernest Simke is a naturalized Filipino citizen and the Honorary Consul General
of Israel in the Philippines. One afternoon, he, with several other persons, wen
t to the Manila International Airport to meet his future son-in-law. He and his
group proceeded to the viewing deck or terrace of the airport. While walking on
the terrace, Simke slipped over an elevation about four (4) inches high at the f
ar end of the terrace. He fell on his back and broke his thigh bone. The next da
y, he was operated. CFI rendered in Simkes favor prompting petitioner to appeal t
o the Court of Appeals. The latter affirmed the trial court s decision. ISSUE: W
hether or not there was negligent on the part of Civil Aeronautics. HELD: Yes. T
he inclination itself is an architectural anomaly for it is neither a ramp becau
se a ramp is an inclined surface in such a way that it will prevent people or pe
destrians from sliding. But if, it is a step then it will not serve its purpose,
for pedestrian purposes.
The legal foundation of CAA s liability for quasi-delict can be found in Article
2176 of the Civil Code. As the CAA knew of the existence of the dangerous eleva
tion which it claims though, was made precisely in accordance with the plans and
specifications of the building for proper drainage of the open terrace, its fai
lure to have it repaired or altered in order to eliminate the existing hazard co
nstitutes such negligence as to warrant a finding of liability based on quasi-de
lict upon CAA. Contributory negligence under Article 2179 of the Civil Code cont
emplates a negligent act or omission on the part of the plaintiff, which althoug
h not the proximate cause of his injury, contributed to his own damage, the prox
imate cause of the plaintiffs own injury being the defendant s lack of due care.
In the instant case, no contributory negligence can be imputed to the private r
espondent, considering the following test formulated in the early case of Picart
v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918): The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in d
oing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ord
inarily prudent man would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is gu
ilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be su
pplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.
The existence of the negligence in a given case is not determined by reference t
o the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law consid
ers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary int
elligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what
would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of cour
se be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the fact
s involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot be here of much
value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men-govern their conduct
by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and a
re not supposed to be omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to ta
ke care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. C
ould a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of
the course actually pursued If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precau
tions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before ne
gligence can be held to exist. Simke could not have reasonably foreseen the harm
that would befall him, considering the attendant factual circumstances. Even if
he had been looking where he was going, the step in question could not easily b
e noticed because of its construction. As the trial court found: In connection w
ith the incident testified to, a sketch, shows a section of the floorings oil wh
ich plaintiff had tripped, This sketch reveals two pavements adjoining each othe
r, one being elevated by four and one-fourth inches than the other. From the arc
hitectural standpoint the higher, pavement is a step. However, unlike a step com
monly seen around, the edge of the elevated pavement slanted outward as one walk
s to one interior of the terrace. The length of the inclination between the edge
s of the two pavements is three inches. Obviously, plaintiff had stepped on the
inclination because had his foot landed on the lower pavement he would not have
lost his balance. The same sketch shows that both pavements including the inclin
ed portion are tiled in red
cement, the lines of the tilings are continuous. It would therefore be difficult
for a pedestrian to see the inclination especially where there are plenty of pe
rsons in the terrace as was the situation when plaintiff fell down. There was no
warning sign to direct one s attention to the change in the elevation of the fl
oorings. Wherefore, decision of lower court is affirmed. Cases 33-41 SANTUCAY, A
NNABEL R. 42. FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs. CA FACTS: On June 20, 1980, the M
/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated by the Fa
r Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver,
British Columbia at about 7:00 o clock in the morning. The vessel wasB assigned
Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Captain Robert
o Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing
of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilo
ts Association(MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the v
essel to Berth No. 4.- Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and
stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov
, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the v
essel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and
proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was id
eal for docking maneuvers.When the vessel reached the landmark (the bigchurch by
the Tondo North Harbor) onehalf mile fromthe pier, Gavino ordered the engine st
opped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier,Gavino ordered
the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on th
e bow. The left anchor, with 2 shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did n
ot take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion e
nsued between the crew members. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and t
he crew members. When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov
assured Gavino that there was nothing to it.- After Gavino noticed that the anc
hor did not take hold ,he ordered the engines halfastern. Abellana, who was then
on the pier a pron noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavan
kov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave t
he "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be
dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing conside
rable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damage too. Kavankov filed his se
a protest. Gavino submitted his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the repor
t to the Philippine Ports Authority. Abellana likewise submitted his report of t
he incident.- The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports A
uthority the amount of P1,126,132.25. RULLING BY THE TRIAL COURT: The trial cour
t ordered the defendants therein jointly and severally to pay the PPA the amount
of P1,053,300.00 representing actual damages and the costs of suit. RULLING BY
THE CA:Respondent appellate court affirmed the findings of the court a quo excep
t that if found no employer-employee relationship existing between herein privat
e
respondents Manila Pilots Association (MPA) and Capt. Gavino. This being so, it
ruled instead that the liability of MPA is anchored, not on Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, but on the provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, an
d accordingly modified said decision of the trial court by holding MPA, along wi
th its co-defendants therein, still solidarily liable to PPA but entitled MPA to
reimbursement from Capt. Gavino for such amount of the adjudged pecuniary liabi
lity in excess of the amount equivalent to seventy-five percent (75%) of its pre
scribed reserve fund. ISSUE: WON both the pilot and the master were negligent RU
LLING BY THE SC: YES.- The SC started by saying that in a collision between a st
ationary object and a moving object, there is a presumption of fault against the
moving object (basedon common sense and logic). It then went on to determine wh
o between the pilot and the master was negligent. PILOT - A pilot, in maritime l
aw, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of
ports, or in certain waters. He is an expert whos supposed to know the seabed, e
tc. that a master of a ship may not know because the pilot is familiar with the
port. He is charged to perform his duties with extraordinary care because the sa
fety of people and property on the vessel and on the dock are at stake.- Capt. G
avino was found to be negligent. The court found that his reaction time (4 minut
es) to the anchor not holding ground and the vessel still going too fast was too
slow. As an expert he shouldve been reacting quickly to any such happenings. MAS
TER - In compulsory pilotage, the pilot momentarily becomes the master of the ve
ssel. The master, however may intervene or countermand the pilot if he deems the
re is danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of the pilot or if the pi
lot is drunk.- Based on Capt. Kavankovs testimony, he never sensed the any danger
even when the anchor didnt hold and they were approaching the dock too fast. He
blindly trusted the pilot. This is negligence on his part.He was right beside th
e pilot during the docking, so he could see and hear everything that the pilot w
as seeing and hearing.- The masters negligence translates to unseaworthiness of t
he vessel, and in turn means negligence on the part of FESC. CONCURRENT TORTFEAS
ORS - As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need
not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concu
rring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff s, is the proximate
cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injur
ies, person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only on
e of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with in
jury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to a
s great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured
. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would no
t have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful ac
ts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury
are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not
have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and rec
overy may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under th
e circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, a
nd that the duty owed by them to the
injured person was not the same. No actor s negligence ceases to be a proximate
cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wro
ng doer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts we
re the sole cause of the injury.- There is no contribution between joint tortfea
sors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total dam
age. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or mo
re persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and pro
ximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine
in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is respons
ible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury
or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily lia
ble for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. WHEREFORE, in
view of all of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions for review are DENIED
and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. Counsel f
or FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario, specifically its associate
, Atty. Herbert A. Tria, is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar acts of heedless disregard of its undertakings under the Rules shall
be dealt with more severely. The original members of the legal team of the Offi
ce of the Solicitor General assigned to this case, namely, Assistant Solicitor G
eneral Roman G. Del Rosario and Solicitor Luis F. Simon, are ADMONISHED and WARN
ED that a repetition of the same or similar acts of unduly delaying proceedings
due to delayed filing of required pleadings shall also be dealt with more string
ently. The Solicitor Genral is DIRECTED to look into the circumstances of this c
ase and to adopt provident measures to avoid a repetition of this incident and w
hich would ensure prompt compliance with orders of this Court regarding the time
ly filing of requisite pleadings, in the interest of just, speedy and orderly ad
ministration of justice. Let copies of this decision be spread upon the personal
records of the lawyers named herein in the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDE
RED. 43. PEOPLE vs. PEDRO RAMIREZ FACTS: On the night of February 18, 1923, Bart
olome Quiaoit invited Pedro Ramirez, the accused, Victoriano Ranga, the deceased
, and Agustin Menor to hunt in the mount Balitok of the municipality of Nueva Er
a, Province of Ilocos Norte. The three proceeded to hunt, leaving Bartolome Quia
oit in a hut approximately 1 kilometer from the place where the act complained o
f took place. Upon the hunters having arrived at a place in mount Balitok, Pedro
Ramirez, who was carrying the shotgun of Bartolome Quiaoit with a lantern, happ
ened to hunt a deer, and then he told his companions to stay there and watch ove
r the prey while he entered the forest to get it. Thus Victoriano Ranga and Agus
to Menor were waiting when suddenly the report of the shotgun was heard hitting
Victoriano Ranga in the eye and the right temple, who thereafter died on that ni
ght as a result of the wounds.chan
RULLING BY THE TRIAL COURT: Ramirez was sentenced by the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Norte, for the crime of homicide, to the penalty of fourteen years, e
ight months and one day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the mother of the de
ceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the costs. ISSUE IN THE SC: Whether or not
there existed no motive whatever for resentment on the part of the defendant aga
inst the offended party and had exercised all the necessary diligence to avoid e
very undesirable accident. RULLING BY THE SC: The defense alleges that the trial
court must have solved the reasonable doubt in favor of the defendant. After co
nsidering carefully the evidence and all the circumstances of the case, we are o
f the opinion and so hold that the defendant is guilty of the crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence, and must be punished under paragraph 1 of article 5
68 of the Penal Code. Wherefore the penalty of one year and one day of prision c
orreccional, with the accessories prescribed by the law, must be imposed upon hi
m, and with modification, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other re
spects, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered. 44. ADZUARA vs. COURT
OF APPEALS FACTS OF THE CASE: On 17 December 1990, at half past 1:00 o clock in
the morning, Xerxes Adzuara y Dotimas, then a law student, and his friends Rene
Gonzalo and Richard Jose were cruising in a 4-door Colt Galant sedan along the s
tretch of Quezon Avenue coming from the direction of EDSA towards Delta Circle a
t approximately 40 kilometers per hour.Upon reaching the intersection of 4th Wes
t Street their car collided with a Toyota Corona sedan owned and driven by Grego
rio Martinez. Martinez had just attended a Loved Flock meeting with his daughter
Sahlee and was coming from the eastern portion of Quezon Avenue near Delta Circ
le. He was then executing a U-turn at the speed of 5 kph at the north-west porti
on of Quezon Avenue going to Manila when the accident occurred. Sahlee Martinez
sustained physical injuries which required confinement and medical attendance at
the National Orthopaedic Hospital for five (5) days. Both petitioner and Martin
ez claimed that their lanes had green traffic lights although the investigating
policeman Marcelo Sabido declared that the traffic light was blinking red and or
ange when he arrived at the scene of the accident an hour later. On 12 July 1991
petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City with reck
less imprudence resulting in damage to property with less serious physical injur
ies under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. On 11 December 1991, before the pr
esentation of evidence, private complainant Martinez manifested his intention to
institute a separate civil action for damages against petitioner. RULING BY THE
TRIAL COURT: The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, convicted Xerxes Adzuara
after trial and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of two (2) months and fifte
en (15) days of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P50,000.00, with subsidiary i
mprisonment in case of insolvency.
RULING BY THE COURT OF APPEALS: The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of th
e trial court but deleted the fine of P50,000.00. ISSUE ON THE SC: What degree o
f care and vigilance then did the circumstances require at half past 1:00 o cloc
k in the morning along an almost deserted avenue. RULING BY THE SC: In the insta
nt case, nothing on record shows that the facts were not properly evaluated by t
he court a quo. As such, we find no reason to disturb their findings. It bears t
o stress that the appreciation of petitioner s post-collision behavior serves on
ly as a means to emphasize the finding of negligence which is readily establishe
d by the admission of petitioner and his friend Renato that they saw the car of
Martinez making a U-turn but could not avoid the collision by the mere applicati
on of the brakes. Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances.
It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depen
ds upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which
the circumstances reasonably require. What degree of care and vigilance then did
the circumstances require? At half past 1:00 o clock in the morning along an al
most deserted avenue, ordinary care and vigilance would suffice. This may consis
t of keeping a watchful eye on the road ahead and observing the traffic rules on
speed, right of way and traffic light. The claim of petitioner that Martinez ma
de a swift U-turn which caused the collision is not credible since a Uturn is do
ne at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running
straight ahead. Nonetheless, no evidence was presented showing skid marks cause
d by the car driven by Martinez if only to demonstrate that he was driving at a
fast clip in negotiating the U-turn. On the other hand, the speed at which petit
ioner drove his car appears to be the prime cause for his inability to stop his
car and avoid the collision. His assertion that he drove at the speed of 40 kph.
is belied by Martinez who testified that when he looked at the opposite lane fo
r any oncoming cars, he saw none; then a few seconds later, he was hit by Adzuar
a s car. The extent of the damage on the car of Martinez and the position of the
cars after the impact further confirm the finding that petitioner went beyond t
he speed limit required by law and by the circumstances. It is a rule that a mot
orist crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way over the one making a U-t
urn. But if the person making a U-turn has already negotiated half of the turn a
nd is almost on the other side so that he is already visible to the person on th
e thru-street, the latter must give way to the former. Petitioner was on the thr
u-street and had already seen the Martinez car.He should have stopped to allow M
artinez to complete the U-turn having, as it were, the last clear chance to avoi
d the accident which he ignored. In fact, he never stopped. Rather, he claimed t
hat on the assumption that he was negligent, the other party was also guilty of
contributory negligence since his car had no lights on. The negligence of Martin
ez however has not been satisfactorily shown. Petitioner insists that the traffi
c light facing him at the intersection was green which only indicated that he ha
d the right of way. But the findings of the court a quo on the matter countervai
l this stance, hence, we see no reason to disturb them. To weaken the evidence o
f the prosecution, petitioner assails the testimony of Martinez as being replete
with inconsistencies. The records however reveal that these inconsistencies ref
er only to minor points which indicate veracity rather than
prevarication by the witness. They tend to bolster the probative value of the te
stimony in question as they erase any suspicion of being rehearsed. Finally, pet
itioner claims that the medical certificate presented by the prosecution was unc
orroborated by actual testimony of the physician who accomplished the same and a
s such has no probative value insofar as the physical injuries suffered by Sahle
e are concerned. Regretfully, we cannot agree. The fact of the injury resulting
from the collision may be proved in other ways such as the testimony of the inju
red person. In the case at bar, Sahlee Martinez testified that her injuries as d
escribed in the medical certificate were caused by the vehicular accident of 17
December 1990. This declaration was corroborated by Gregorio. This, no less, is
convincing proof. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court o
f Appeals of 22 November 1995 finding petitioner XERXES ADZUARA Y DOTIMAS guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentencing him to suffer an im
prisonment of two (2) months and fifteen (15) days of arresto mayor medium is AF
FIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. 45. MCKEE vs. IAC FACTS: To avoid
hitting 2 boys who suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the
lane of the car, Jose Koh blew the horn of his car, swerved to the left and ente
red the lane of the truck. He attempted to return to his lane but before he coul
d do so, he already collided with the cargo truck.-Truck and Ford collided in Pu
long Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway. 3 people in the Ford escort died inclu
ding the driver, Jose Koh. RULLING BY THE TRIAL COURT: The trial court dismissed
petitioners complaints in Civil Case No. 4477 and Civil Case No. 4478 of the t
hen Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga entitled "Car
men Dayrit Koh, Leticia Koh, Julieta Koh Tuquero, Araceli Koh McKee and Elizabet
h Koh Turla vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," and "George McKee and Araceli
Koh McKee vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," respectively, and granted the
private respondents counterclaim for moral damages, attorney s fees and litigat
ion expenses. RULLING BY THE IAC: On 29 November 1983, respondent Court, by then
known as the Intermediate Appellate Court, promulgated its consolidated decisio
n in A.C.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040 and 69041,the dispositive portion of which reads: W
HEREFORE, the decision appealed from it hereby reversed and set aside and anothe
r one is rendered, ordering defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants. I
SSUE: WON the owners of the cargo truck (Tayag and Manalo)are liable for the res
ulting damages RULLING BY THE SC: YES, The Court rules that it was the truck dri
ver s negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which
was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck dri
ver, Manalo and Tayag are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and pr
imarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligen
t flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is onl
y juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible
defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage. Article 2180 reads as follows: The obligation imposed by Ar
ticle 2176 is demandable not only for one s own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good fa
ther of a family to prevent damage. The diligence of a good father referred to m
eans the diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. The answers of
the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose thi
s defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it. The diligence of a good father
referred to means the diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. 6
0 The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did n
ot interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it. The respondent
Court was then correct in its Decision of 29 November 1983 in reversing the deci
sion of the trial court which dismissed Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478. Its assa
iled Resolution of 3 April 1984 finds no sufficient legal and factual moorings.
In the light of recent decisions of this Court, 61 the indemnity for death must,
however, be increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00. WHEREFORE, the instant pet
ition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the respondent Court of 3 April 198
4 is SET ASIDE while its Decision of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040
-41 is REINSTATED, subject to the modification that the indemnity for death is i
ncreased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Ko
h McKee. Costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED. 46. MANILA ELECTRIC COMP
AN vs. REMOQUILLO FACTS: On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story hou
se of Antonio Pealoza, his stepbrother, located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manil
a, to repair a media agua said to be in a leaking condition. The media agua was just
below the window of the third story. Standing on said media agua, Magno received
from his son thru that window a 3 X 6 galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking p
ortion, turned around and in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came into
contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company (later referred to
as the Company) strung parallel to the edge of the media agua and 2 1/2 feet from
it, causing his death by electrocution. RULLING BY THE TRIAL COURT: After heari
ng, the trial court rendered judgment in favor to the respondents P10,000 as com
pensatory damages;P784 as actual damages,ryP2,000 as moral and exemplary damages
; and P3,000 as attorneys fees, with costs.
RULLING BY THE COURT OF APPEALS: On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter a
ffirmed the judgment with slight modification by reducing the attorneys fees from
P3,000 to P1,000 with costs. ISSUE: WON Manila Electric is guilty of negligence
. RULLING BY THE SC: NO- It was the victim who was guilty of negligence the liab
ility of electric companies for damages or personal injury is governed by the ru
les of negligence, nevertheless such companies are not insurers of the safety of
the public. Reasoning - The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negl
igence, and in some measure by the too close proximity of the media agua to the el
ectric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit giv
en by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the me
dia agua. Had the house owner followed the terms of the permit given him by the c
ity for the construction of hismedia agua, the distance from the wires to the edge
of said media agua would have been 3ft and 11 3/8inches.- The company cannot be e
xpected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces t
he distance between its wires and said construction, and to change the installat
ion of its wires so as to preserve said distance.- The violation of the permit f
or the construction was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contribu
ted to it. The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent
act of Magno himself. It is to be presumed that due to his age and experience h
e was qualified to do so. He had training and experience for the job. He could n
ot have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in the
m.- To hold the defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno, such suppose
d negligence of the company must have been the proximate and principal cause of
the accident We realize that the stringing of wires of such high voltage (3,600
volts), un insulated and so close to houses is a constant source of danger, even
death, especially to persons who having occasion to be near said wires, do not
adopt the necessary precautions. But maybe, the City of Manila authorities and t
he electric company could get together and devise means of minimizing this dange
r to the public. Just as the establishment of pedestrian lanes in city thoroughf
ares may greatly minimize danger to pedestrians because drivers of motor vehicle
s may expect danger and slow down or even stop and take other necessary precauti
on upon approaching said lanes, so, a similar way may possibly be found. Since t
hese high voltage wires cannot be properly insulated and at reasonable cost, the
y might perhaps be strung only up to the outskirts of the city where there are f
ew houses and few pedestrians and there step-down to a voltage where the wires c
arrying the same to the city could be properly insulated for the better protecti
on of the public. In view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Cou
rt of Appeals is hereby reversed and the complaint filed against the Company is
hereby dismissed. No costs. 47. BULILAN VS. COMMISSION OF AUDIT 48. ASTUDILLO vs
. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
FACTS: The district of Intramuros, Manila, is surrounded by a wall with openings
at intervals for ingress or egress. One of these openings toward Manila Bay is
known as the Santa Lucia Gate. Above the gate and between the wall and a street
is a considerable space sodded with grass with the portion directly over the gat
e paved with stone. This has become a public place where persons come to stroll,
to rest, and enjoy themselves. Near this place is an electric light pole with t
he corresponding wires. The pole was located close enough to the public place ab
ove described that a person by reaching his arm out of the full length would be
able to hold of one of the wires. At about 6 oclock in the evening of August 14,
1923, a group of boys came to this place. One of these boys for some unknown rea
son, placing one foot on a projection reached out and grasped a charged electric
wire. Death resulted almost instantly. This action was instituted by the mother
of the deceased boy to recover damages from the electric company. RULLING BY TH
E TRIAL COURT: The trial court judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff a
nd against the defendant for the sum of P15,000, and costs. ISSUE: WON the actio
n should be dismissed due to thecontributory negligence of the plaintiffs RULING
BY THE SC: NO- The death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in
permitting hot water to flow through the public streets, there to endanger the
lives of passers-by who were unfortunately enough to fall into it- The mother an
d her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte
, on the evening when the religious procession was held.- There was nothing abno
rmal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No
one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightene
d child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The contributory
negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to re
covery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages
. We, therefore, conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to damages. But the evi
dence indicative of the true measure of those damages is sadly deficient. All th
at we know certainly is that the deceased was less than 20 years of age, a stude
nt, and working in the Ateneo de Manila, but at what wages we are not told. We a
re also shown that approximately P200 was needed to defray the travel and funera
l expenses. As would happen in the case of a jury who have before them one of th
e parents, her position to life, and the age and sex of the child, varying opini
ons, have been disclosed in the court regarding the estimate of the damages with
reference to the next of kin. Various sums have been suggested, beginning as lo
w as P1,000 and extending as high as P5,000. A majority of the court finally arr
ived at the sum of P1,500 as appropriate damages in this case. The basis of this
award would be the P1,000 which have been allowed in other cases for the death
of young children without there having been tendered any special proof of the am
ount of damages suffered, in connection with which should be taken into account
the more mature age of the boy in the case at bar, together with the particular
expenses caused by his death. (Manzanares vs Moreta [1918], 38 Phil., 821; Berna
l and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant [1930], 54 Phil., 327;
Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co. [1930], p. 18, ante.) In the light of the fore
going, the various errors assigned by the appellant will in the main be overrule
d, but as above indicated, the judgment will be modified by allowing the
plaintiff to recover from the defendant the sum of P1,500, and the costs of both
instances. 49. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION VS. IAC FACTS: Private respon
dents Andres Ventura, Antonio Fajardo, Marcelo Fajardo, Alfonso Ventura and Flor
entino Ventura are leasehold tenants situated in Nueava Ecija. In 1967, petition
er NIA constructed an irrigation canal on the property of Isabel and Virginia Te
cson which passed through the private respondents landholdings as said canal trav
erses the Cinco Cinco creek which abuts the landholding. On Febuary 13,1975, priv
ate respondents filed a complaint for the abatement of the nuisance with damages
against petitioners NIA in which the said canal resulted to the inundation of s
aid landholdings causing damages in the destruction of the planted palay crops a
nd also prevented them from planting on their landholdings, RULLING BY THE TRIAL
COURT: The trial court finds the complaint meritorious ordering the defendants
to pay for the damages and the cost of suit. RULLING BY THE APPELLATE COURT: Aff
irming in toto the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: W/N the petitioners are l
iable for the damages caused by their negligent act. RULING BY THE SC: With rega
rds to petitioners contention that the respondent appellate court erred in awardi
ng damages to prive respondents, we find the courts decision in accordance with t
he evidence and the law. As correctly held by the appelleate court: It has been e
stablished that the platiffs landholdings were actually inundated. The testimonie
s by all the plaintiffs with respect to the amount of the loss they suffered wer
e not impugned by any contradictory evidences of the defendant. To our mind, the
se testimonies are sufficient proof to make the grant of damages valid and prope
r. Besides, the amount awarded by the lower court is but just and reasonable con
sidering the circumstances of the case. WHEREFORE, this petition for review on ce
rtiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. 50. UNITED STATES vs. C
LEMENTE FACTS: That on the 17th day of June, 1912, in the city of Manila, Enriqu
e Clemente, at the time being and acting as motorman of a street car No. 111 upo
n the line PasayCervantes of the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, a c
orporation duly organized and doing business in the city of Manila, Philippine I
slands, and then and there directing and operating said street car, as the motor
man thereof, upon and along Dakota Street in said city, and then and there being
under the obligation as such motorman of said street car to conduct and direct
the same with due care and caution, in order to avoid any accident which might o
ccur to the vehicles and pedestrians who were passing upon and over said Dakota
Street, with reckless imprudence and with
inexcusable negligence and in violation of the ordinance pertaining to the matte
r, conducted and directed said street car, without paying any attention to the p
edestrians who were crossing said street of his lack of care and reckless neglig
ence he directed and conducted street car No. 111 against and over the body and
head of Juan Garcia, a child 3 years of age, who was then and there passing acro
ss the said Dakota Street, dragging the body of said child over said street-car
track for a considerable distance, fracturing and destroying its skull and causi
ng instant death. RULING BY THE TRIALCOURT: Enrique Clemente, not guilty as char
ged in the complaint of homicide through reckless negligence or rather through f
earful negligence, but find him guilty of a violation of the regulations through
imprudence and negligence, which resulted in the death of the child as alleged
in the complaint, and sentence him to five months of arresto mayor, and to pay t
he costs of the action. RULING BY THE SC: We are aware that the crime of homicid
e through an act of simple negligence which violates an ordinance of regulation
is not necessarily included in the crime of homicide through reckless negligence
. The latter crime might possibly be committed without the violation of an ordin
ance or regulation. In that event it would not include the crime of homicide thr
ough an act of simple negligence which violates an ordinance or regulation. The
courts have not yet gone so far as to hold that, where there is an acquittal of
the greater crime and a conviction of a lesser crime not included in the greater
and not charged in the information, an appeal from a conviction of the lesser c
rime opens the way to a conviction of the greater crime in the appellate court i
f the evidence is there found sufficient; nor has there been such holding in a c
ase where two crimes, neither one included in the other, were charged in the sam
e information, and an acquittal was had as to the higher and a conviction as to
the lower. In the case at bar, however, we have both the higher and the lower de
grees of the same crime charged in the information. We have, also, a case in whi
ch the commission of the homicide was accompanied by a violation of the ordinanc
e, and in which, therefore, the crime of homicide through an act of negligence w
hich violates an ordinance was included in the crime of homicide by an act of re
ckless negligence. This is a case where, as a matter of fact, the one was includ
ed in the other. Under the authorities, therefore, an appeal from a conviction o
f the lower grade opens the whole case for reconsideration by this court upon al
l the evidence, and requires us in the performance of our duty to pronounce such
a judgment in the premises as in conscience we ought. The judgment of the court
below is reversed, and the accused is hereby convicted of the crime of homicide
committed through reckless negligence, and is hereby sentenced to one year and
one day of prision correccional with the accessories provided by law, with costs
. Cases 42-50 ELAD, MARCIAL A. 51. VALENZUELA vs COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Ma. Lou
rdes Valenzuela was driving when she realized she had a flat tire. She parked al
ong the sidewalk of Aurora Blvd., alighted from the car, put on her emergency
lights and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side
of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the
tire when she was suddenly bumped by a car driven by defendant Richard Li and r
egistered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the imp
act plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, whi
ch was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under def
endant s car. Plaintiff s left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh. Sh
e was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted wi
th an artificial leg. She filed a claim for damages against defendant. Lis alibi
was that he was driving at 55kph when he was suddenly confronted with a speeding
car coming from the opposite direction. He instinctively swerved to the right t
o avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff s car, which h
e did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or e
arly warning device, and the area was poorly lighted. Defendants counterclaimed
for damage, alleging that plaintiff was the one who was reckless or negligent. T
he RTC found Li guilty of gross negligence; Alexander and Li solidarily liable.
Later, the CA affirmed but absolved Alexander. ISSUES: 1. WON Li was grossly neg
ligent in driving the company issued car. 2. WON Valenzuela was guilty of contri
butory negligence HELD: Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascr
ibable was the negligence of Li on the night of the accident. Negligence, as it
is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others.
It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance whi
ch the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. We
stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, that negligence is the want o
f care required by the circumstances. The circumstances established by the evide
nce adduced in the court below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent
in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving at a fa
st speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle re
ndering the street slippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on record to sh
ow that he was under the influence of liquor. Under these conditions, his chance
s of effectively dealing with changing conditions on the road were significantly
lessened. We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty of
contributory negligence. Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize t
hat an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the sta
ndard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation.
The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or danger
ous situations and does not require the same standard of thoughtful and reflecti
ve care from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions
. Under the emergency rule adopted by this Court in Gan vs Court of Appeals, an
individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required t
o act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid
the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the
emergency was brought by his own negligence.
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonab
ly dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to
the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of h
er lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk
in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had t
aken all reasonable precautions. 52. PHIL. LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO. vs COURT
OF APPEALS FACTS: On July 30, 1968, the jeep of Esteban spouses ran over amound
of earth and fell into an open trench, anexcavation allegedly undertaken by PLD
T for theinstallation of its underground conduit system. Thecomplaint alleged th
at respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left un
covered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or si
gns. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, lea
ving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent husband suffered cut li
ps. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered. PLDT, in its answer,
denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent spo
uses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be
held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company, an independent contract
or which undertook the said construction work. The R TC ruled in favor of Esteba
n spouses whereas the CA reversing the decision of the lower court and dismissin
g the complaint of respondent spouses. It held that respondent Esteban spouses w
ere negligent and consequently absolved petitioner PLDT from the claim for damag
es. ISSUE: WON PLDT is liable to respondent Esteban spouses. HELD: The above fin
dings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not onl
y contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause
of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereb
y precludes their right to recover damages. 30 The perils of the road were known
to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reason
able care and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injuri
ous consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged
negligence on the part of petitioner. As opined in some quarters, the omission t
o perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excava
tion, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted ac
t would have prevented the injury. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had t
he last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the n
egligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he pass
ed on that street almost every day and had knowledge of the presence and locatio
n of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife
to danger; hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence
. 53. PHIL. NATIONAL RAILWAYS vs. INTERMIDIATE APPELATE COURT FACTS: The case ar
ose from a collision of a passenger express train of defendant Philippine Nation
al Railways, (PNR) coming from San Fernando, La Union and bound for Manila and a
passenger bus of Baliwag Transit, Inc. which was on its way to Hagonoy,
Bulacan, from Manila, but upon reaching the railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao
, Calumpit, Bulacan at about 1:30 in the afternoon of August 10, 1974, got stall
ed and was hit by defendant s express train causing damages to plaintiff s bus a
nd its passengers, eighteen (18) of whom died and fifty-three (53) others suffer
ed physical injuries. Plaintiff alleging that the proximate cause of the collisi
on was the negligence and imprudence of defendant PNR, and its locomotive engine
er, Honorio Cirbado, in operating its passenger train in a busy intersection wit
hout any bars, semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman to warn the publi
c of approaching train that would pass through the crossing, filed the instant a
ction for Damages against defendants. The defendants, in their Answer traversed
the material allegation of the Complaint and as affirmative defense alleged that
the collision was caused by the negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of
plaintiff s bus driver, Romeo Hughes. The trial court held by imputing negligen
ce on the part of the train engineer and his employer. CA affirmed. ISSUES: 1. W
ON, both drivers are negligent; that likewise which of said companies was neglig
ent at said railroad intersection. 2. WON, BTI has exercised the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. HEL
D: Contributory negligence may not be ascribed to the bus driver; it was evident
that he had taken the necessary precautions before passing over the railway tra
ck; if the bus was hit, it was for reasons beyond the control of the bus driver
because he had no place to go. The failure of the Philippine National Railways t
o put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores is evide
nce of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no
law or ordinance requiring it, because public safety demands that said devices
or equipments be installed, in the light of aforesaid jurisprudence. In the opin
ion of this Court the X sign or the presence of "STOP, LOOK, LISTEN" warnings wo
uld not be sufficient protection of the motoring public as well as the pedestria
ns, in the said intersection. Likewise, it was established that the weather cond
ition was characterized with intermittent rain which should have prompted the tr
ain engineer to exercise extra precaution. Also, the train reached Calumpit, Bul
acan ahead of scheduled arrival thereat, indicating that the train was travellin
g more than the normal speed of 30 kilometers per hour. If the train were really
running at 30 kilometers per hour when it was approaching the intersection, it
would probably not have travelled 190 meters more from the place of the accident
(page 10, Brief for Petitioners). All of these factors, taken collectively, eng
endered the concrete and yes, correct conclusion that the train engineer was neg
ligent who, moreover, despite the last opportunity within his hands vis-a-vis th
e weather condition including the presence of people near the intersection, coul
d have obviated the impending collision had he slackened his speed and applied t
he brakes (Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 [1918]). Concerning the exercise of di
ligence normally expected of an employer in the selection and supervision of its
employees, respondent court expressed the view that PNR was remiss on this scor
e since it allowed Honorio Cabardo, who finished only primary education and beca
me an engineer only through sheer experience, to operate the
locomotive, not to mention the fact that such plea in avoidance was not asserted
in the answer and was thus belatedly raised on appeal. 54. TAYLOR vs MANILA ELE
CTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT CO FACTS: The defendant is a foreign corporation engage
d in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city
of Manila. The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the inj
uries complained of, 15 years of age. On September 30, 1905, plaintiff, with a b
oy named Manuel Claparols, 12, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor,
to visit one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who promised to make them a c
ylinder for a miniature engine. Upon inquiry that Mr.Murphy was not in his quart
ers, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity, spent some time in wan
dering about the company s premises. Here they found some 20 or 30 brass fulmina
ting caps scattered on the ground. They opened one of the caps with a knife, and
finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and Dav
id held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosi
on followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. David was struc
k in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured hi
s right eye to such an extent as to necessitate its removal by the surgeons. No
measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prev
ent visitors from entering and walking about its premises unattended, when they
felt disposed so to do. The trial court s decision, awarding damages to the plai
ntiff, upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with
articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that code. ISSUE: WON the defendants negligence
is the proximate cause of plaintiff s injuries. HELD: We are of opinion that und
er all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving
the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury rece
ived by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, attributable t
o the negligence of the defendant, and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that
plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match to its c
ontents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries i
nflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore, is not civilly r
esponsible for the injuries thus incurred. We are satisfied that the plaintiff i
n this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the dang
er to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap;
that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified hi
m to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of
caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own delibera
te act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct
and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may
be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence
act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless p
laintiff s own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which i
nflicted the injury. 55. JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvels Department S
tore, Makati City. On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor o
f Syvels Dept. Store. Criselda momentarily let go of her daughters hand to sign he
r credit card slip at the payment and verification counter. She suddenly felt a
gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and saw her daughter o
n the floor, pinned by the gift wrapping counter. Zhieneth was crying and scream
ing for help. Criselda was able to ask people to help her and bring her daughter
to the hospital. She was operated on immediately at the hospital. She died 14 d
ays later, on the hospital bed. She was 6 years old. The cause of her death was
attributed to the injuries she sustained. The Aguilars demanded from the petition
ers the reimbursement of hospital and medical bills, and wake and funeral expense
s. Petitioners refused to pay. So the Aguilars filed a complaint for damages. The
trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim after finding that the pre
ponderance of evidence favored petitioner. The Court of Appeals, however, decide
d in favor of private respondents and reversed the appealed judgment. It found t
hat petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter.
ISSUE: (1) whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negli
gence; (2) In case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable
to private respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA and Z
HIENETH for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store p
remises. HELD: Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cann
ot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising
ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not h
ave been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence. The test in determ
ining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v
. Smith, thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that rea
sonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in t
he same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. We rule that the tra
gedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETHs death could only be
attributed to negligence.Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store sup
ervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Ye
t, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the
safety of the stores employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent m
an would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably f
ailed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family. Anen
t the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that f
avors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributo
ry negligence. Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assu
me that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accep
t petitioners theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the
truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. CRISE
LDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. At this precise mo
ment, it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further,
at the time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away fr
om her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRIS
ELDA. The
time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did no
t loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. She even admitted to the
doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything; the counter
just fell on her. 56. JULIAN DEL ROSARIO vs MANILA ELECTRIC CO. FACTS: This act
ion was instituted by Julian del Rosario for the purpose of recovering damages f
rom Meralco for the death of his son, Alberto, resulting from a shock from a wir
e used by the defendant for the transmission of electricity. Aug 4, 1930, shortl
y after 2 oclock in the afternoon trouble developed in an overhead wire conductin
g electricity for lightning purposes in the City of Manila. The wire soon parted
and one of the charged ends fell to the ground in shrubbery close to the way. T
he lightning company received a telephonic report of this incident at 2.25 p.m.
and promised to send an inspector. At 4 p.m., the neighboring school turned out
and as the children went home one of the boys, of the age 9 years, touched the w
ire with his hand and received a shock which resulted in his death. The CFI rend
ers decision in favor of Manila Electric. Co. ISSUE: WON Manila Electric Co. is
liable. HELD: We are of the opinion that the presumption of negligence on the pa
rt of the company from the breakage of this wire has been overcome, and the defe
ndant is in our opinion responsible for the accident. Furthermore, when notice r
eceived at the Malabon station at 2.25pm, somebody should have been dispatched t
o the scene of the trouble at once, or other measures taken to guard the point o
f danger; but more than an hour and a half passed before anyone representing the
company appeared on the scene, and in the meantime this child had been claimed
as a victim. The circumstances that the boy who was killed touched the wire afte
r one of his companions had warned him not to do so, did not relieve the company
of responsibility, owing to his immature years and natural curiosity of a child
to do something out of ordinary. 57. FEDERICO YLARDE vs EDGARDO AQUINO FACTS: S
oriano was the school principal and Aquino was a teacher. The school was littere
d with concrete blocks. Teacher Banez started burying them. Aquino gathered 18 m
ale pupils to help. He ordered them to dig but work wasnt finished. The following
day, Aquino called 4 of the 18 pupils to continue. Aquino continued digging whi
le the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil. Aquino left t
he children to level the loose soil and borrowed a key from Banez. Aquino told t
he kids not to touch the stone. 3 of the 4 kids jumped into the pit. The remaini
ng Abaga jumped on the concrete block causing it to slide down. The 2 kids were
able to escape but student Ylarde sustained injuries. Three days later, he died.
Parents filed suit against Aquino and Soriano. Lower court dismissed the case a
nd CA affirmed and said child Ylarde was negligent. ISSUE: WON Aquino and Sorian
o can be held liable for damages.
HELD: As regards the principal, we hold that he cannot be made responsible for t
he death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a
school of arts and trades. This is in line with our ruling in Amadora vs. Court
of Appeals, wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Arti
cle 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academ
ic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. This C
ourt went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of
the school who can be held liable. From a review of the record of this case, it
is very clear that private respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross negligen
ce when he: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual labourers an
d instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the
one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2) required t
he children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowi
ng that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked asi
de by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to l
evel the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone
was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he would not be able to c
heck on the children s safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation
, an obviously attractive nuisance. The negligent act of private respondent Aqui
no in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection
to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by them, it was but natural for the chil
dren to play around. Tired from the strenuous digging, they just had to amuse th
emselves with whatever they found. Driven by their playful and adventurous insti
ncts and not knowing the risk they were facing three of them jumped into the hol
e while the other one jumped on the stone. Since the stone was so heavy and the
soil was loose from the digging, it was also a natural consequence that the ston
e would fall into the hole beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate child ca
ught by its heavy weight. Everything that occurred was the natural and probable
effect of the negligent acts of private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the
child Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by
private respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned t
o real danger. 58. FAR EASTERN SHIPPING vs COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: M/V PAVLODAR
was owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Co.. It arrived at the port o
f Manila from Columbia. Capt. Abellana was tasked by Philippine Port Authority t
o supervise the berthing. Senen Gavino was assigned by Manila Pilots Association
to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth 4. Gav
ino boarded the vessel with Victor Kavankov, the master vessel. The vessel then
anchor and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The vessel reached the la
ndmark and Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was about 2,000 ft
. from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped and the two shackles were dro
pped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected and the speed of the ves
sel did not slacken causing a commotion to ensue. After Gavino noticed that the
anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half- astern. Abellana, who was
then at pier apron noticed the vessel was approaching fast. Gavino thereafter g
ave full- astern but before the right anchor and shackles could be dropped, the
vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing damage to the peir. The vessel
sustained damage too. The PPA filed before the trial court for a sum of money ag
ainst Far Eastern, Gavino and MPA. The trial
court renders decision in favor of PPA. The CA affirmed the findings of the cour
t with modifications. ISSUE: WON, FESC, Gavino, and MPA are solidarily liable. H
ELD: Those who undertake any work calling for special skills are required not on
ly to exercise reasonable care in what they do but also possess a standard minim
um of special knowledge and ability- every man who offers his services to anothe
r, and is employed, assumes to exercise in the employment such skills he possess
es, with a reasonable degree of diligence. Where several causes producing an inj
ury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would
not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and
recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although unde
r circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was culpable, and th
at the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actors neglig
ence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the neglig
ence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is
liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. There is no contri
bution between the tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them ar
e liable for the total damage. As a general rule, the owners or those in possess
ion and control of a vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages cau
sed to persons or property by reason of her negligent management or navigation.
59. CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO. vs PHIL. MOTORS CORPORATION FACTS: The pla
intiff and defendant are domestic corporations; H.D. Cranston was the representa
tive of the plaintiff. Plaintiff was the registered owner of the motor schooner
Gwendoline, which was used in the fishing trade in the Philippine Islands. In Ja
nuary, 1925, Cranston decided, if practicable, to have the engine on the Gwendol
ine changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner. He therefore made kn
own his desire to McLeod & Co., thru Mc Kellar, and was told that he might make
inquiries of the Philippine Motors Corporations. Cranston had a conference with
PMC thru Quest, its manager, who agreed to do the job, with the understanding th
at payment should be made upon completion of the work. As a result of the afores
aid interview, work of effecting the change in the engine was begun and conducte
d under the supervision of Quest. Quest then installed a new carburetor. The res
ult of this experiment was satisfactory. In the course of the preliminary work u
pon the carburetor and its connections, it was observed that the carburetor was
flooding; this was called to Quest s attention. After preliminary experiments an
d adjustments had been made, the boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run
. The first part of the course was covered without any untoward development. As
the boat was coming in from this run, the engine stopped, and connection again h
ad to be made with the gasoline line to get a new start. After this had been don
e, the mechanic, switched to the tube connecting with the new mixture. A moment
later a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to shoot
back into the carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were
covered
with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew were unable to subdue. They
were therefore compelled, as the fire spread, to take to a boat, and their esca
pe was safely affected, but the Gwendoline was reduced to a mere hulk. The salva
ge from, the wreck, when sold, brought only the sum of P150. The value of the bo
at, before the accident occurred, as the court found, was P10, 000 ISSUE: WON de
fendant is liable for the loss of the boat. HELD: The trial judge seems to have
proceeded on the idea that, inasmuch as Quest had control of the Gwendoline duri
ng the experimental run, the defendant corporation was in the position of a bail
ee and that, as a consequence, the burden of proof was on the defendant to excul
pate itself from responsibility by proving that the accident was not due to the
fault of Quest. We are unable to accede to this point of view. Certainly, Quest
was not in charge of the navigation of the boat on this trial run. His employmen
t contemplated the installation of new parts in the engine only, and it seems ra
ther strained to hold that the defendant corporation had thereby become bailee o
f the boat. As a rule workmen who make repairs on a ship in its owner s yard, or
a mechanic who repairs a coach without taking it to his shop, are not bailees,
and their rights and liabilities are determined by the general rules of law, und
er their contract. The true bailee acquires possession and what is usually spoke
n of as special property in the chattel bailed. As a consequence of such possess
ion and special property, the bailee is given a lien for his compensation. These
ideas seem to be incompatible with the situation now under consideration. But t
hough defendant cannot be held liable in the supposition that the burden of proo
f had not been sustained by it in disproving the negligence of its manager, we a
re nevertheless of the opinion that the proof shows by a clear preponderance tha
t the accident to the Gwendoline and the damages resulting there from are charge
able to the negligence or lack of skill of Quest. Cases 51-59 GANO, JEVAN KLAIRE
L. 60. E. M. WRIGHT vs MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO. FACTS: This is an actio
n brought to recover damages for injuries sustained in an accident which occurre
d in Caloocan on the night of August 8, 1909. The defendant is a corporation eng
aged in operating an electric street railway in the city of Manila and its subur
bs, including the municipality of Caloocan. The plaintiff s residence in Calooca
n fronts on the street along which defendant s tracks run, so that to enter his
premises from the street plaintiff is obliged to cross defendant s tracks. On th
e night mentioned plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to
enter his premises the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the ve
hicle with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop, threw plaintiff from the vehic
le and caused the injuries complained of. It is admitted that the defendant was
negligent in maintaining its tracks as described, but it is contended that the p
laintiff was also negligent in that he was intoxicated to such an extent at the
time of the accident that he was unable to take care of himself properly and tha
t such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident.
Trial Court: both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff s negligence wa
s not as great as defendant s and under the authority of the case of Rakes vs. A
. G. & P. Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) apportioned the damages and awarded plaintiff
a judgment of P1,000. ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff was negligent. SC: No.
As is clear from reading the opinion, no facts are stated therein which warrant
the conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. The conclusion that if he had
been sober he would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts as found
. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicl
e under the conditions described. A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not
only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by re
ason of the unsure footing and falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails w
ith such force as to break a wheel, this might be sufficient to throw a person f
rom the vehicle no matter what his condition; and to conclude that, under such c
ircumstances, a sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to d
raw a conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork. It having
been found that the plaintiff was not negligent, it is unnecessary to discuss th
e question presented by the appellant company with reference to the applicabilit
y of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co., above; and we do not find facts in th
e opinion of the court below which justify a larger verdict than the one found.
61. PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS vs THE MANILA RAILROAD CO. FACTS: On the evening of Fe
b 21, 1957, at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in front of
the Clark Air Force Base, the jeep that Ralph W. Corliss was driving collided c
ollided with a locomotive of defendant-appellee Manila Railroad Company. Before
the locomotive, which had been previously inspected and found to be in good cond
ition approached, the crossing, that is, about 300 meters away, the defendant bl
ew the siren and repeated it in compliance with the regulations until he saw the
jeep suddenly spurt and that although the locomotive was running between 20 and
25 kilometers an hour and although he had applied the brakes, the jeep was caug
ht in the middle of the tracks. Trial court: Dismissed the complaint for recover
y of damages filed by plaintiff-appellant, Preciolita V. Corliss. The lower cour
t, after summarizing the evidence, concluded that the deceased "in his eagerness
to beat, so to speak, the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and attempted to r
each the other side, but unfortunately he became the victim of his own miscalcul
ation." ISSUE: Wether or not the decision of the lower court is correct. SC: Yes
. Mr. Justice Cardozo said that bear witness to the need for caution in framing s
tandards of behavior that amount to rules of law.... Extraordinary situations ma
y not wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or regulations that are fitting for
the commonplace or normal." What Justice Cardozo announced would merely emphasi
ze what was set forth earlier that each and every, case on questions of negligen
ce is to be decided in accordance with
the peculiar circumstances that present themselves. There can be no hard and fas
t rule. There must be that observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vi
gilance which the situation demands. Thus defendant-appellee acted. It is undeni
able then that no negligence can rightfully be imputed to it. What commends itse
lf for acceptance is this conclusion arrived at by the lower court: "Predicated
on the testimonies of the plaintiff s witnesses, on the knowledge of the decease
d and his familiarity with the setup of the checkpoint, the existence of the tra
cks; and on the further fact that the locomotive had blown its siren or whistle,
which was heard by said witnesses, it is clear that Corliss Jr. was so sufficie
ntly warned in advance of the oncoming train that it was incumbent upon him to a
void a possible accident and this consisted simply in stopping his vehicle befor
e the crossing and allowing the train to move on. A prudent man under similar ci
rcumstances would have acted in this manner. This, unfortunately, Corliss, Jr. f
ailed to do." WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of November 29, 1962 di
smissing the complaint, is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs. 62. VICT
ORINO CUSI and PILAR POBRE vs PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS FACTS: On the night o
f October 5, 1963, plaintiffs-appellees attended a birthday party inside the Uni
ted Housing Subdivision in Paranaque, Rizal. After the party which broke up at a
bout 11 o clock that evening, the plaintiffs-appellees proceeded home in their V
auxhall car with Victorino Cusi at the wheel. Upon reaching the railroad tracks,
finding that the level crossing bar was raised and seeing that there was no fla
shing red light, and hearing no whistle from any coming train, Cusi merely slack
ened his speed and proceeded to cross the tracks. At the same time, a train boun
d for Lucena traversed the crossing, resulting in a collision between the two. T
he impact threw the plaintiffsappellees out of their car which was smashed. One
Benjamin Franco, who came from the same party and was driving a vehicle right be
hind them, rushed to their aid and brought them. to San Juan de Dios Hospital fo
r emergency treatment. Victorino Cusi claimed that prior to the accident he was
a successful businessman the Special Assistant to the Dolor Lopez Enterprises, t
he managing partner of Cusi and Rivera Partnership, the manager of his ricemill,
and with substantial investments in other business enterprises. As a result of
his injuries, he was unable to properly attend to his various business undertaki
ngs. On the other hand, his wife, Pilar, was a skilled music and piano teacher.
After the accident, she lost the dexterity of her fingers forcing her to quit he
r profession. She also bore ugly scars on several parts of her body, and she suf
fered anxiety of a possible miscarriage being then five (5) months pregnant at t
he time of the accident. Court of First Instance: Ordered defendant-appellant to
indemnify the plaintiffsappellees in the total amount of Two Hundred Thirty-Nin
e Thousand and Six Hundred Forty-Eight Pesos, and Seventy-Two Centavos (P239,648
.72) for injuries received in a collision caused by the gross negligence of defe
ndant-appellant, plus Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorney s fees and exp
enses of litigation. ISSUE: Wether or not gross negligence of Victorino Cusi was
the proximate cause of the collision.
SC: No.After a thorough perusal of the facts attendant to the case, this Court i
s in fun accord with the lower court. Plaintiff-appellee Victorino Cusi had exer
cised all the necessary precautions required of him as to avoid injury to -himse
lf and to others. We find no need for him to have made a full stop; relying on h
is faculties of sight and hearing, Victorino Cusi had no reason to anticipate th
e impending danger. The record shows that the spouses Cusi previously knew of th
e existence of the railroad crossing, having stopped at the guardhouse to ask fo
r directions before proceeding to the party. At the crossing, they found the lev
el bar raised, no warning lights flashing nor warning bells ringing, nor whistle
from an oncoming train. They safely traversed the crossing. On their return hom
e, the situation at the crossing did not in the least change, except for the abs
ence of the guard or flagman. Hence, on the same impression that the crossing wa
s safe for passage as before, plaintiff-appellee Victorino Cusi merely slackened
his speed and proceeded to cross the tracks, driving at the proper rate of spee
d for going over railroad crossings. Had defendant-appellant been successful in
establishing that its locomotive driver blew his whistle to warn motorists of hi
s approach to compensate for the absence of the warning signals, and that Victor
ino Cusi, instead of stopping or slackening his speed, proceeded with reckless s
peed and regardless of possible or threatened danger, then We would have been pu
t in doubt as to the degree of prudence exercised by him and would have, in all
probability, declared him negligent. But as the contrary was established, we rem
ain convinced that Victorino Cusi had not, through his own negligence, contribut
ed to the accident so as to deny him damages from the defendant-appellant. The o
nly question that now remains to be resolved is the reasonableness of the amount
awarded as damages to the plaintiffs- appellees. The following actual expenses
and losses are fully substantiated: (a) Hospital bills of Mrs. Cusi from October
, 1963 to May, 1964 in the amount of Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos
and Five Centavos (P13,550.05); (b) Another hospital bill of Mrs. Cusi in 1965 i
n the amount of Three Thousand and One Pesos and Ninety Centavos (P3,001.90); (c
) Doctor s fees for two surgical operations performed on Mrs. Cusi by one Dr. Ma
nuel Rivera in the amount of One Thousand and Five Hundred Pesos (Pl,500.00); (d
) Loss of Victorino s wrist watch valued at Two Hundred and Fifty Pesos (P250.00
); (e) Loss of Pilar s half of her pair of demand earrings(l-carrats) valued at T
wo Thousand Seven Hundred and Fifty Pesos (P2,750,00); (f) Repair of the damaged
Vauxhall car in the amount of Two Thousand Eight Hundred and Ninety Four Pesos
and Seventy- Seven Centavos (P2,894.77). The total award of actual damages in th
e amount of Twenty Three Thousand Nine Hundred Forty-Six Pesos and Seventy-Two C
entavos (P23,946.72) is, therefore, correct. The lower court awarded Twenty-One
Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P21,600.00) to Mrs. Cusi for loss of income for the
three years that she was under constant medical treatment, and Fourteen Thousand
Pesos (P14,000.00) for impairment of her earning capacity; and Forty Thousand P
esos (P 40,000.00) to Mr. Cusi for loss of income for the eight months that he w
as disabled and impairment of his earning capacity. We find the award reasonable
. The records show that Mrs. Cusi, previously a skilled piano teacher averaging
a monthly income of Six Hundred Pesos (P600.00), cannot now teach nor play the p
iano since the accident which resulted in the loss of the dexterity of her finge
rs;
likewise, Mr. Cusi cannot now vigorously attend to his businesses which previous
ly netted him a monthly average income of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). As re
gards the award of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for profits which Victorin
o Cusi failed to realize from a certain real estate transaction with the Dolor L
opez Enterprises, we affirm the same as the defendant-appellant has failed to pr
esent an iota of evidence to overcome plaintiffs-appellees evidence credited by
the lower court as to the certainty of the materialization of the stated transa
ction. The award of Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00) to Mrs. Cusi and Fifty T
housand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Victorino Cusi as moral damages is not excessive.
In their own respective fields of endeavor, both were successful. Now they have
to bear throughout their whole lifetime the humiliation wrought by their physica
l deformities which no doubt affected, and will continue to do so, their social
lives, their financial undertakings, and even their mental attitudes. Likewise,
the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) given as attorney s fees and expen
ses of litigation is not unreasonable. The total amount of damages awarded by th
e trial court should bear legal interest at 6% from the rendition of the j judgm
ent, which was on March 26, 1968. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the total amount of damages shall bea
r legal interest at six per cent (6%) from the rendition of the decision dated M
arch 26, 1968 63. MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC., vs THE WORKMENS COMPENSATIO
N COMMISSION FACTS: on August 23, 1951, at 6:chanry00 a.m. in Bo. Sumangga, Mogp
og, Marinduque, the deceased Mamador together with other laborers of theResponde
nt-corporation, (Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc.) boarded a truck belonging to
the latter, which was then driven by one Procopio Macunat, also employed by the
corporation, and on its way to their place of work at the mine camp at Talantun
an, while trying to overtake another truck on the company road, it turned over a
nd hit a coconut tree, resulting in the death of said Mamador and injury to the
others. Procopio Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased. (Criminal Case No. 1491). He has paid nothing however, t
o the latter. THE WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION: Confirming the referees award
of compensation to the heirs of Pedro Mamador for his accidental death. ISSUE: w
ether or not violating the employers prohibition against laborers riding the haul
age trucks would constitute negligence. SC: There is no doubt that mere riding o
n haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It cou
ldnt be, because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. It is argued th
at there was notorious negligence in this particular instance because there was
the employers prohibition. Does violation of this order constitute
negligence? Many courts hold that violation of a statute or ordinance constitute
s negligence per se. Others consider the circumstances. However there is practic
al unanimity in the proposition that violation of a rule promulgated by a Commis
sion or board is not negligence per se; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut it may be
evidence of negligence. (C.J.S., Vol. 65, p. 427.) This order of the employer (
prohibition rather) couldnt be of a greater obligation than the rule of a Commiss
ion or board. And the referee correctly considered this violation as possible ev
idence of negligence; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut it declared that under the
circumstance, the laborer could not be declared to have acted with negligence. C
orrectly, it is believed, since the prohibition had nothing to do with personal
safety of the riders. Such finding is virtually a finding of fact which we may n
ot overrule in this certiorari proceeding. Nevertheless, even granting there was
negligence, it surely was not notorious negligence, which we have interpreted to
mean the same thing as gross negligence 3 implying conscious indifference to conseq
uences pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in i
njury utter disregard of consequences. (38 Am. Jur., 691) Getting or accepting a fr
ee ride on the companys haulage truck couldnt be gross negligence, because as the
referee found, no danger or risk was apparent. There being no other material point
raised in the petition for review, the award of compensation is hereby affirmed
, with costs against Petitioner. 64. CIPRIANO and/or E.S. CIPRIANO ENTERPRISES v
s. CA FACTS: In the afternoon of May 1, 1991, fire broke out at the Lambat resta
urant, which petitioner also owned, adjoining his Mobilkote rustproofing shop. T
he fire destroyed both the shop and the restaurant, including private respondents
Kia Pride. The car had been kept inside the building, allegedly to protect it f
rom theft. Petitioner claimed that despite efforts to save the vehicle, there wa
s simply not enough time to get it out of the building, unlike three other cars
which had been saved because they were parked near the entrance of the garage. O
n May 8 1991, private respondent sent a letter to petitioner, demanding reimburs
ement for the value of the Kia Pride. In reply, petitioner denied liability on t
he ground that the fire was a fortuitous event. This prompted private respondent
to bring this suit for the value of its vehicle and for damages against petitio
ner. Private respondent alleged that its vehicle was lost due to the negligence
and imprudence of the petitioner, citing petitioners failure to register his busi
ness with the Department of Trade and Industry under P.D. No. 1572 and to insure
it as required in the rules implementing the Decree. In his Answer, petitioner
invoked Art. 1174 of the Civil Code and denied liability for the loss which he a
lleged was due to a fortuitous event. He later testified that he employed an ele
ctrician who regularly inspected the lighting in his restaurant and rustproofing
shop. In addition, he claimed he had installed fire-fighting devices and that t
he fire was
an accident entirely independent of his will and devoid of any negligence on his
part. He further averred that private respondents car was ready for release as e
arly as afternoon of April 30, 1991, and that it was private respondents delay in
claiming it that was the cause of the loss. RTC: The trial court sustained the
private respondents contention that the failure of defendant to comply with P.D. N
o. 1572 is in effect a manifest act of negligence which renders defendant [petit
ioner herein] liable for the loss of the car even if the same was caused by fire
, even as it ruled that the business of rustproffing is definitely covered by P.D.
No. 1572. Since petitioner did not register his business and insure it, he must
bear the cost of loss of his customers. As already noted, the court ordered peti
tioner to pay private respondent P252,155.00 with interest at 6% per annum from
the filing of the case and attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000.00. CA: affirm
ed the decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that the provisions of th
e Civil Code relied upon by the petitioner are not applicable to this case, and
that the law applicable to the case is P.D. No. 1572, the purpose of which is to
protect customers who entrust their properties to service and repair enterprise
s. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was required to insure his business and the
vehicles received by him in the course of his business. Whether or not his failu
re to do so constituted negligence, rendering him liable for loss due to the ris
k required to be insured against. SC: We hold that both questions must be answer
ed in the affirmative. We have already held that violation of a statutory duty i
s negligence per se. In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held the
owner of a furniture shop liable for the destruction of the plaintiffs house in
a fire which started in his establishment in view of his failure to comply with
an ordinance which required the construction of a firewall. In Teague v. Fernand
ez, we stated that where the very injury which was intended to be prevented by t
he ordinance has happened, non-compliance with the ordinance was not only an act
negligence, but also the proximate cause of the death. Indeed, the existence of
a contract between petitioner and private respondent does not bar a finding of
negligence under the principles of quasi-delict, as we recently held in Fabre v.
Court of Appeals. Petitioner s negligence is the source of his obligation. He i
s not being held liable for breach of his contractual obligation due to negligen
ce but for his negligence in not complying with a duty imposed on him by law. It
is therefore immaterial that the loss occasioned to private respondent was due
to a fortuitous event, since it was petitioners negligence in not insuring agains
t the risk which was the proximate cause of the loss. Thus, P.D. No. 1572, 1 req
uires service and repair enterprises for motor vehicles, like that of petitioners
to register with the Department of Trade and Industry. As condition for such re
gistration or accreditation, Ministry Order No. 32 requires covered enterprises
to secure insurance coverage. Rule III of this Order provides in pertinent parts
1- REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCREDITATION 1) Enterprises applying for original accredita
tion shall submit the following: 1.1. List of machineries/equipment/tools in use
ful condition;
1.2. List of certified engineers/accredited technicians mechanics with their per
sonal data; 1.3. Copy of Insurance Policy of the shop covering the property entr
usted by its customer for repair, service or maintenance together with a copy of
the official receipt covering the full payment of premium; 1.4. Copy of Bond re
ferred to under Section 7, Rule III of this Rules and Regulations; 1.5. Written
service warranty in the form prescribed by the Bureau; 1.6. Certificate issued b
y the Securities and Exchange Commission and Articles of Incorporation or Partne
rship in case of corporation or partnership; 1.7. Such other additional document
s which the Director may require from time to time. 1.8 - INSURANCE POLICY The i
nsurance policy for the following risks like theft, pilferage, fire, flood and l
oss should cover exclusively the machines, motor vehicles, heavy equipment, engi
nes, electronics, electrical, airconditioners, refrigerators, office machines an
d data processing equipment, medical and dental equipment, other consumer mechan
ical and industrial equipment stored for repair and/or service in the premises o
f the applicant. There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is
for his failure to comply with this duty that he was guilty of negligence render
ing him liable for damages to private respondent. While the fire in this case ma
y be considered a fortuitous event,[ this circumstance cannot exempt petitioner
from liability for loss. We think, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in s
ustaining the award of attorneys fees by the lower court. It is now settled that
the reasons or grounds for an award of attorneys fees must be set forth in the de
cision of the court. They cannot be left to inference as the appellate court hel
d in this case. The reason for this is that it is not sound policy to penalize t
he right to litigate. An award of attorneys fees, being an exception to this poli
cy and limited to the grounds enumerated in the law,[ must be fully justified in
the decision. It can not simply be inserted as an item of recoverable damages i
n the judgment of the court. Since in this case there is no justification for th
e award of attorneys fees in the decision of the trial court, it was error for th
e Court of Appeals to sustain such award. WHEREFORE, the decision, dated Novembe
r 18, 1992, of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the
award of attorneys fees is DELETED. 65. F.F. CRUZ and CO., INC vs THE COURT OF AP
PEALS FACTS: The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner in Caloocan City was
situated adjacent to the residence of private respondents. Sometime in August 1
971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first approached Eric Cruz, petitioner s
plant manager, to request that a firewall be constructed between the shop and pr
ivate respondents residence. The request was repeated several times but they fe
ll on deaf ears. In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in pe
titioner s shop. Petitioner s employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried t
o put out the fire, but their efforts proved futile. The fire spread to private
respondents house. Both the shop and the house were razed to the ground. The ca
use of the conflagration was never discovered. The National Bureau of Investigat
ion found specimens from the burned structures negative for the presence of infl
ammable substances.
Court of First Instance: the Court hereby renders judgment, in favor of plaintif
fs, and against the defendant: 1. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff
s the amount of P80,000.00 for damages suffered by said plaintiffs for the loss
of their house, with interest of 6% from the date of the filing of the Complaint
on January 23, 1975, until fully paid; 2. Ordering the defendant to pay to the
plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 for the loss of plaintiffs furnitures, religio
us images, silverwares, chinawares, jewelries, books, kitchen utensils, clothing
and other valuables, with interest of 6% from date of the filing of the Complai
nt on January 23, 1975, until fully paid; 3. Ordering the defendant to pay to th
e plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as exemplary damag
es, and P5,000.00 as and by way of attorney s fees; 4. With costs against the de
fendant; 5. Counterclaim is ordered dismissed, for lack of merit. CA: affirmed t
he decision of the trial court but reduced the award of damages. The damages to
be awarded to plaintiff should be reduced to P70,000.00 for the house and P50,00
0.00 for the furniture and other fixtures with legal interest from the date of t
he filing of the complaint until full payment. ISSUE: whether or not the doctrin
e of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in this cases SC: The facts of the case lik
ewise call for the application of the doctrine, considering that in the normal c
ourse of operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material such
as wood chips, sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery ma
y be found thereon. It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the
part of petitioner or its employees was not merely presumed. The Court of Appea
ls found that petitioner failed to construct a firewall between its shop and the
residence of private respondents as required by a city ordinance; that the fire
could have been caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette; that gasoline and
alcohol were used and stored in the shop; and that workers sometimes smoked insi
de the shop [CA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 33.] Even without applying the doctrin
e of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner s failure to construct a firewall in accordan
ce with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of negligence. Even t
hen the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it no
t for another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failur
e to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over
it. As it was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and beyond that hei
ght it consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which would predictably crumb
le and melt when subjected to intense heat. Defendant s negligence, therefore, w
as not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect to the s
pread thereof to the neighboring houses. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., supra;
Emphasis supplied.] In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be
found guilty of negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall between i
ts property and private respondents residence which sufficiently complies with
the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with an ordinance providing
for safety regulations had been ruled by the Court
as an act of negligence [Teague v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-29745, June 4, 1973, 51
SCRA 181.] The Court of Appeals, therefore, had more than adequate basis to fin
d petitioner liable for the loss sustained by private respondents. 2. Since the
amount of the loss sustained by private respondents constitutes a finding of fac
t, such finding by the Court of Appeals should not be disturbed by this Court [M
.D. Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-23882, February 17,
1968, 22 SCRA 559], more so when there is no showing of arbitrariness. In the i
nstant case, both the CFI and the Court of Appeals were in agreement as to the v
alue of private respondents furniture and fixtures and personal effects lost in
the fire (i.e. P50,000.00). With regard to the house, the Court of Appeals redu
ced the award to P70,000.00 from P80,000.00. Such cannot be categorized as arbit
rary considering that the evidence shows that the house was built in 1951 for P4
0,000.00 and, according to private respondents, its reconstruction would cost P2
46,000.00. Considering the appreciation in value of real estate and the diminuti
on of the real value of the peso, the valuation of the house at P70,000.00 at th
e time it was razed cannot be said to be excessive. 3. While this Court finds th
at petitioner is liable for damages to private respondents as found by the Court
of Appeals, the fact that private respondents have been indemnified by their in
surer in the amount of P35,000.00 for the damage caused to their house and its c
ontents has not escaped the attention of the Court. Hence, the Court holds that
in accordance with Article 2207 of the Civil Code the amount of P35,000.00 shoul
d be deducted from the amount awarded as damages. Said article provides: Art. 22
07. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received indemnity f
rom the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or bre
ach of contract complained of, the insurance company is subrogated to the rights
of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who violated the contract. I
f the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or lo
ss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the per
son causing the loss or injury. (Emphasis supplied.] The law is clear and needs
no interpretation. Having been indemnified by their insurer, private respondents
are only entitled to recover the deficiency from petitioner. On the other hand,
the insurer, if it is so minded, may seek reimbursement of the amount it indemn
ified private respondents from petitioner. This is the essence of its right to b
e subrogated to the rights of the insured, as expressly provided in Article 2207
. Upon payment of the loss incurred by the insured, the insurer is entitled to b
e subrogated pro tanto to any right of action which the insured may have against
the third person whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss [Fireman s Fu
nd Insurance Co. v. Jamila & Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-27427, April 7, 1976, 70 SCRA
323.] Under Article 2207, the real party in interest with regard to the indemni
ty received by the insured is the insurer [Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v. Heald Lumber
Co., 101 Phil. 1031, (1957).] Whether or not the insurer should exercise the ri
ghts of the insured to which it had been subrogated lies solely within the forme
r s sound discretion. Since the insurer is
not a party to the case, its identity is not of record and no claim is made on i
ts behalf, the private respondent s insurer has to claim his right to reimbursem
ent of the P35,000.00 paid to the insured. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modif
ications as to the damages awarded for the loss of private respondents house, c
onsidering their receipt of P35,000.00 from their insurer: (1) the damages award
ed for the loss of the house is reduced to P35,000.00; and (2) the right of the
insurer to subrogation and thus seek reimbursement from petitioner for the P35,0
00.00 it had paid private respondents is recognized. 66. HONORIA DELGADO VDA. DE
GREGORIO, ET AL., vs GO CHONG BING FACTS: On or before June 2, 1952, defendant
was the owner of a truck. He had a driver and a cargador or driver s helper by t
he name of Francisco Rosomera. In the afternoon of June 2, 1952, defendant order
ed Romera to drive his truck, with instructions to follow another track driven b
y his driver and help the latter in crossing Sumlog river which was then flooded
, should it be unable to cross the river because of the flood. Romera at that ti
me was not a licensed driver. He only had a student s permit, issued to him on M
arch 31, 1952 (Exhibit "1"). The truck started from the town of Lupon at about 5
:30 o clock in the afternoon, driven by Romera. Some persons boarded the truck a
nd among them was one policeman by the name of Venancio Orfanel. While the truck
was on the way, it made a stop and then Orfanel took the wheel from Romera, whi
le the latter stayed on the driver s left, reclined on a spare tire inside of th
e truck. As to the circumstances under which Orfanel was able to take hold of an
d drive the truck, there is some dispute and this matter will be taken up later
in the decision. While the truck was being driven by Orfanel, with another truck
ahead of it driven by defendant s driver it so happened that they came to a tru
ck that was trying to park on the left side of the road. Romera suggested to Orf
anel that he shift to low gear and Orfanel did so. But as they approached the pa
rking truck, and in order to avoid colliding with it, Orfanel swerved the truck
towards the right. It so happened that at that time two pedestrians were on the
right side of the road, As the truck had swerved to the right and was proceeding
to hit the said pedestrians, Romera told Orfanel to apply the brake, but Orfane
l instead of doing so put his foot on the gasoline and the truck did not stop bu
t went on and hit and run over one of the pedestrians, by the name of Quirico Gr
egorio. The plaintiffs appellants in this action are Gregorio s widow and his c
hildren and of the accident, Orfanel was prosecuted for homicide with reckless i
mprudence. He pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced accordingly. Court
of First Instance: absolved defendant from liability for the accidental death of
Quirico Gregorio ISSUE: whether or not the defendant is liable. SC: We are of t
he belief that defendant s claim that Romera gave the wheel to the policeman for
fear of, or out of respect for, the latter, has been proved by a preponderance
of the evidence. The testimony of witness Dayo is not corroborated by any other
testimony. As he testified that he was two meters behind Romera, he could not ha
ve noticed with exactness the circumstances under which the policeman was able
to get hold of the wheel and drive the truck and his testimony in that respect c
annot be believed. We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that the defendan
t s cargador, or Francisco Romera gave the wheel to Orfanel out of respect for t
he latter, who was a uniformed policeman and because he believed that the latter
had both the ability and the authority to drive the truck, especially as he him
self had only a student s permit and not a driver s license. The court a quo dis
missed the action on the ground that as the death or accident was caused by an a
ct or omission of a person who is not in any way related to the defendant, and a
s such act or omission was punishable by law, and as a matter of fact he had alr
eady been punished therefor, no civil liability should be imposed upon the defen
dant. Against this decision the plaintiffs have appealed to this Court, contendi
ng that when defendant permitted his cargador, who was not provided with a drive
r s license, to drive the truck, he thereby violated the provisions of the Revis
ed Motor Vehicle Law (section 28., Act No. 3992), and that this constitutes negl
igence per se. (People vs. Santos, et al., CA-G.R. No. 1088-1089R.) But admittin
g for the sake of argument that the defendant had so violated the law, or may be
deemed negligent in entrusting the truck to one who is not provided with a driv
er s license, it is clear that he may not be declared liable for the accident be
cause his negligence was not the direct and proximate cause thereof. The leading
case in this jurisdiction on negligence is that of Taylor vs. Manila Electric R
ailroad and Light Company, 16 Phil. 8. Negligence as a source of obligation both
under the civil law and in American cases was carefully considered and it was h
eld: We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the
generally accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action su
ch as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, m
ust establish by competent evidence: (1) Damages to the plaintiff. (2) Negligenc
e by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose act
s it must respond, was guilty. (3) The connection of cause and effect between th
e negligence and the damage. (Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.,
supra. p.15) In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, in
order that a person may be held guilty for damage through negligence, it is nece
ssary that there be an act or omission on the part of the person who is to be ch
arged with the liability and that damage is produced by the said act or omission
. In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof
is upon the plaintiff, it is apparent that it is the duty of him who shall clai
m damages to establish their existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and Marc
h 18, July 6, and September 27, 1898, have especially supported the principle, t
he first setting forth in detail the necessary points of the proof, which are tw
o: An Act or omission on the part of the person who is to be charged with the li
ability, and the production of the damage by said act or omission. This includes
, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect between the a
ct or the omission and the damage; the latter must be the direct result of one o
f the first two. As the decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary that t
he damages result immediately and directly from an act performed culpably and wr
ongfully;
 necessarily presupposing, a legal ground for imputability. (Taylor vs. Manila E
lectric Railroad and Light Co., supra, p. 28.). It is evident that the proximate
, immediate and direct cause of the death of the plaintiffs intestate was the n
egligence of Orfanel, a uniformed policeman, who took the wheel of the truck fro
m defendant s cargador, in spite of the protest of the latter. The reason for ab
solving the defendant therefor is not because the one responsible for the accide
nt had already received indemnification for the accident, but because there is n
o direct and proximate causal connection between the negligence or violation of
the law by the defendant to the death of the plaintiff s intestate. For the fore
going considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, without cos
ts. 67. SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC vs COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: on August 31, 198
0, a Mercedes Benz panel truck of petitioner Sanitary Steam Laundry collided wit
h a Cimarron which caused the death of three persons and the injuries of several
others. The passengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees of the Project Man
agement Consultants, Inc. (PMCI). The Cimarron was owned by Salvador Salenga, fa
ther of one of the employees of PMCI. Driving the vehicle was Rolando Hernandez.
The driver of the truck claimed that a jeepney in front of him suddenly stopped
. He said he stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and that this ca
used his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite
lane. As a result, his panel truck collided with the Cimarron on the north-boun
d lane. RTC: Rendered judgment for private respondents. CA: Affirmed the decisio
n of the RTC ISSUE: Whether or not the driver of Cimarron was guilty of contribu
tory negligence. SC: First of all, it has not been shown how the alleged neglige
nce of the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles. In
deed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injur
y received and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He mus
t show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the
injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in
whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without leg
al consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Petitioner says
that driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during nig
httime certainly increases the risk of accident, that because the Cimarron had on
ly one headlight, there was decreased visibility, and that the fact that the vehic
le was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded decreased [its] maneuverability.
However, mere allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge its burd
en of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the contributing cause of
the injury. Furthermore, based on the evidence in this case, there was no way e
ither driver could have avoided the collision.
68. HONORIA DELGADO VDA. DE GREGORIO, ET AL., vs GO CHONG BING FACTS: On or befo
re June 2, 1952, defendant was the owner of a truck. He had a driver and a carga
dor or driver s helper by the name of Francisco Rosomera. In the afternoon of Ju
ne 2, 1952, defendant ordered Romera to drive his truck, with instructions to fo
llow another track driven by his driver and help the latter in crossing Sumlog r
iver which was then flooded, should it be unable to cross the river because of t
he flood. Romera at that time was not a licensed driver. He only had a student s
permit, issued to him on March 31, 1952 (Exhibit "1"). The truck started from t
he town of Lupon at about 5:30 o clock in the afternoon, driven by Romera. Some
persons boarded the truck and among them was one policeman by the name of Venanc
io Orfanel. While the truck was on the way, it made a stop and then Orfanel took
the wheel from Romera, while the latter stayed on the driver s left, reclined o
n a spare tire inside of the truck. As to the circumstances under which Orfanel
was able to take hold of and drive the truck, there is some dispute and this mat
ter will be taken up later in the decision. While the truck was being driven by
Orfanel, with another truck ahead of it driven by defendant s driver it so happe
ned that they came to a truck that was trying to park on the left side of the ro
ad. Romera suggested to Orfanel that he shift to low gear and Orfanel did so. Bu
t as they approached the parking truck, and in order to avoid colliding with it,
Orfanel swerved the truck towards the right. It so happened that at that time t
wo pedestrians were on the right side of the road, As the truck had swerved to t
he right and was proceeding to hit the said pedestrians, Romera told Orfanel to
apply the brake, but Orfanel instead of doing so put his foot on the gasoline an
d the truck did not stop but went on and hit and run over one of the pedestrians
, by the name of Quirico Gregorio. The plaintiffs appellants in this action are
Gregorio s widow and his children and of the accident, Orfanel was prosecuted f
or homicide with reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty to the charge and was se
ntenced accordingly. Court of First Instance: absolved defendant from liability
for the accidental death of Quirico Gregorio ISSUE: whether or not the defendant
is liable. SC: We are of the belief that defendant s claim that Romera gave the
wheel to the policeman for fear of, or out of respect for, the latter, has been
proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The testimony of witness Dayo is not
corroborated by any other testimony. As he testified that he was two meters beh
ind Romera, he could not have noticed with exactness the circumstances under whi
ch the policeman was able to get hold of the wheel and drive the truck and his t
estimony in that respect cannot be believed. We are, therefore, forced to the co
nclusion that the defendant s cargador, or Francisco Romera gave the wheel to Or
fanel out of respect for the latter, who was a uniformed policeman and because h
e believed that the latter had both the ability and the authority to drive the t
ruck, especially as he himself had only a student s permit and not a driver s li
cense. The court a quo dismissed the action on the ground that as the death or a
ccident was caused by an act or omission of a person who is not in any way relat
ed to the defendant, and as such act or omission was punishable by law, and as a
matter of fact he had already been punished therefor, no civil liability should
be imposed upon the defendant. Against this decision the plaintiffs have appeal
ed to this Court, contending that when
defendant permitted his cargador, who was not provided with a driver s license,
to drive the truck, he thereby violated the provisions of the Revised Motor Vehi
cle Law (section 28., Act No. 3992), and that this constitutes negligence per se
. (People vs. Santos, et al., CA-G.R. No. 1088-1089R.) But admitting for the sak
e of argument that the defendant had so violated the law, or may be deemed negli
gent in entrusting the truck to one who is not provided with a driver s license,
it is clear that he may not be declared liable for the accident because his neg
ligence was not the direct and proximate cause thereof. The leading case in this
jurisdiction on negligence is that of Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and L
ight Company, 16 Phil. 8. Negligence as a source of obligation both under the ci
vil law and in American cases was carefully considered and it was held: We agree
with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally ac
cepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that un
der consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish
by competent evidence: (1) Damages to the plaintiff. (2) Negligence by act or o
mission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must res
pond, was guilty. (3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence
and the damage. (Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., supra. p.15)
In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, in order that a
person may be held guilty for damage through negligence, it is necessary that th
ere be an act or omission on the part of the person who is to be charged with th
e liability and that damage is produced by the said act or omission. In accordan
ce with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is upon the
plaintiff, it is apparent that it is the duty of him who shall claim damages to
establish their existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and March 18, July 6,
and September 27, 1898, have especially supported the principle, the first sett
ing forth in detail the necessary points of the proof, which are two: An Act or
omission on the part of the person who is to be charged with the liability, and
the production of the damage by said act or omission. This includes, by inferenc
e, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect between the act or the omi
ssion and the damage; the latter must be the direct result of one of the first t
wo. As the decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary that the damages re
sult immediately and directly from an act performed culpably and wrongfully; ne
cessarily presupposing, a legal ground for imputability. (Taylor vs. Manila Elec
tric Railroad and Light Co., supra, p. 28.). It is evident that the proximate, i
mmediate and direct cause of the death of the plaintiffs intestate was the negl
igence of Orfanel, a uniformed policeman, who took the wheel of the truck from d
efendant s cargador, in spite of the protest of the latter. The reason for absol
ving the defendant therefor is not because the one responsible for the accident
had already received indemnification for the accident, but because there is no d
irect and proximate causal connection between the negligence or violation of the
law by the defendant to the death of the plaintiff s intestate. For the foregoi
ng considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, without costs.
Cases 60-68 URBANO-BALMEO, MAURYNE FE N. 69. NEGROS NAVIGATION VS CA FACTS: Priv
ate respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros Navigation Co. inc four s
pecial cabin tickets for his family who were going to Bacolod City to attend a f
amily reunion boarding to Don Juan. Don Juan collided off the Tablas Straitin Mi
ndoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine Nationa
l Oil Company (PNOC). As a result the M/V Don Juan sank. Several of her passenge
rs perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of some of the victims were found and
broughts shore, but the four members of private respondents families were never
found. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners exercised the extraordinary diligen
ce required? HELD: No, as with the Mecemas case, this Court found petitioner gui
lty of negligence in (1) allowing or tolerating the ship captain and crew member
s in playing mahjong during the voyage, (2) in failing to maintain the vessel se
aworthy and (3) in allowing the ship to carry more passengers than it was allowe
d to carry. Also, the duty to exercise due diligence includes the duty to take p
assengers or cargoes that are within the carrying capacity of the vessel. 70. BE
NGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE VS COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: For five (5) years up to t
he time of his death, Jose Bernardo managed a stall at the Baguio City meat mark
et. On 14 January 1985 at around 7:50 in the morning, Jose together with other m
eat vendors went out of their stalls to meet a jeepney loaded with slaughtered p
igs in order to select the meat they would sell for the day. Jose was the very f
irst to reach the parked jeepney. Grasping the handlebars at the rear entrance o
f the vehicle, and as he was about to raise his right foot to get inside, Jose s
uddenly stiffened and trembled as though suffering from an epileptic seizure. Ro
meo Pimienta who saw Jose thought he was merely joking but noticed almost in dis
belief that he was already turning black. In no time the other vendors rushed to
Jose and they discovered that the antenna of the jeepney bearing the pigs had g
otten entangled with an open electric wire at the top of the roof of a meat stal
l. Pimienta quickly got hold of a broom and pried the antenna loose from the ope
n wire. But shortly after, Jose released his hold on the handlebars of the jeep
only to slump to the ground. He died shortly in the hospital. Cause of his death
was "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to massive brain congestion with pethe
ccial hemorrhage, brain bilateral pulmonary edema and congestion and endocardial
petecchial hemorrhage and dilation (history of electrocution)." FIRST ISSUE: Wh
eter or not respondent should be awarded damages notwithstanding a clear showing
that the electrocution and death of Jose Bernardo were directly attributable to
the fault and negligence of jeepney owner Guillermo Canave, Jr.
FIRST HELD: The records of the case show that respondent court did not commit an
y reversible error in affirming the findings of the trial court that BENECO was
solely responsible for the untimely death of Jose Bernardo through accidental el
ectrocution. SECOND ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of moral damages and attorne
y s fees on the same ground of non-culpability is proper. SECOND HELD: It is set
tled that moral damages are not intended to enrich the complainant but to serve
to obviate his/her spiritual suffering by reason of the culpable action of the d
efendant. Its award is aimed at the restoration of the spiritual status quo ante
, and it must be commensurate to the suffering inflicted. As a result of the acc
idental death of Jose, his widow Caridad and their three (3) minor children had
to scrounge for a living in order to keep their heads above water. Caridad had t
o depend on the generosity of her relatives which came intermittently and far be
tween and augment whatever she received from them with her meager income from he
r small business. She must have agonized over the prospect of raising her three
(3) small children all by herself given her unstable financial condition. For th
e foregoing reasons, we sustain the award of moral damages by respondent court e
xcept as to the amount thereof. In the instant case, we are of the opinion that
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 are more in accord with the injury suf
fered by private respondent and her children. As for attorney s fees, we find no
legal nor factual basis to overturn the ruling of respondent court on the matte
r; accordingly, the grant of P20,000.00 attorney s fees to private respondent Be
rnardo is adopted. 71. MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO., INC. AND GUILLERMO ARANETA VS. C
OURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On March 22, 1980, Famoso was riding with a co-employee i
n the caboose or "carbonera" of Plymouth No. 12, a cargo train of the petitioner
, when the locomotive was suddenly derailed. He and his companion jumped off to
escape injury, but the train fell on its side, caught his legs by its wheels and
pinned him down. He was declared dead on the spot. The claims for death and oth
er benefits having been denied by the petitioner, the herein private respondent
filed suit in the Regional Trial Court of Bago City. Judge Marietta Hobilla-Alin
io ruled in her favor but deducted from the total damages awarded 25% thereof fo
r the decedent s contributory negligence and the total pension of P41,367.60 pri
vate respondent and her children would be receiving from the SSS for the next fi
ve years. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners exercised the ordinary diligence
required? HELD: No. Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment
of the locomotive was caused by protruding rails which had come loose because th
ey were not connected and fixed in place by fish plates. Fish plates are describ
ed as strips of iron 8" to 12" long and 3 1/2" thick which are attached to the r
ails by 4 bolts, two on each side, to keep the rails aligned. Although they coul
d be removed only with special equipment, the fish
plates that should have kept the rails aligned could not be found at the scene o
f the accident. It is possible that the fish plates were loosened and detached d
uring its first trip and the rails were as a result already mis-aligned during t
he return trip. But the Court feels that even this was unlikely, for, as earlier
noted, the fish plates were supposed to have been bolted to the rails and could
be removed only with special tools. The fact that the fish plates were not foun
d later at the scene of the mishap may show they were never there at all to begi
n with or had been been removed long before. At any rate, the absence of the fis
h plates - whatever the cause or reason - is by itself alone proof of the neglig
ence of the petitioner. Res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine was described recently i
n Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, thus: Where the thing which causes in
jury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is s
uch as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the ma
nagement use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an e
xplanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. The peti
tioner also disclaims liability on the ground of Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
contending it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of i
ts employees. The Court cannot agree. The record shows it was in fact lax in req
uiring them to exercise the necessary vigilance in maintaining the rails in good
condition to prevent the derailments that sometimes happened "every hour." Obvi
ously, merely ordering the brakemen and conductors to fill out prescribed forms
reporting derailments - which reports have not been acted upon as shown by the h
ourly derailments - is not the kind of supervision envisioned by the Civil Code.
72. ROGELIO E. RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Sometime in 1985, petitioner E
rlinda Ramos, after seeking professional medical help, wasadvised to undergo an
operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder (cholecystectomy).She w
as referred to Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, who agreed to perform the operation on her
. Theoperation was scheduled for June 17, 1985 at 9:00 in the morning at private
respondent De LosSantos Medical Center (DLSMC). Since neither petitioner Erlind
a nor her husband, petitioner Rogelio, knew of any anesthesiologist, Dr. Hosaka
recommended to them the services of Dr.Gutierrez.Petitioner Erlinda was admitted
to the DLSMC the day before the scheduled operation. By 7:30in the morning of t
he following day, petitioner Erlinda was already being prepared for operation.Up
on the request of petitioner Erlinda, her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, who was
then Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was allowed t
o accompany her inside theoperating room At around 9:30 in the morning, Dr. Hosa
ka had not yet arrived so Dr. Gutierrez tried to get intouch with him by phone.
."By 10:00 in the morning, when Dr. Hosaka was still not around, petitioner Roge
lio alreadywanted to pull out his wife from the operating room. He met Dr. Garci
a, who remarked that hewas also tired of waiting for Dr. Hosaka. Dr. Hosaka fina
lly arrived at
the hospital at around12:10 in the afternoon, or more than three (3)hours after
the scheduled operation. Cruz, who was then still inside the operating room, hea
rd about Dr. Hosakas arrival." Cruz noticed a bluish discoloration of Erlindas nai
lbeds on her left hand. She (Cruz) then heard Dr. Hosaka instruct someone to cal
l Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. When he arrived, Dr. Calderon attempte
d to intubate the patient. Cruz went out of the operating room to express her co
ncern to petitioner Rogelio that Erlindas operation was not going well. Cruz quic
kly rushed back to the operating room and saw that the patient was still in tren
delenburg position. At almost 3:00 in the afternoon, she saw Erlinda being wheel
ed to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). The doctors explained to petitioner Rogelio
that his wife had bronchospasm. Erlinda stayed in the ICU for a month. She was
released from the hospital onlyfour months later or on November 15, 1985. Since
the ill-fated operation, Erlinda remained in comatose condition until she died o
n August 3, 1999. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not dr. Orlino hosaka (surgeon) is liabl
e for negligence; 2. Whether or not dr. Perfecta Gutierrez (anesthesiologist) is
liable for negligence; and 3. Whether or not the hospital (delos santos medical
center ) is liable for any act of negligence committed by their visiting consul
tant surgeon and anesthesiologist RULING: In the case at bar, the following issu
es were resolved as follows: 1) Dr. Hosaka s irresponsible conduct of arriving v
ery late for the scheduled operation of petitioner Erlinda is violative, not onl
y of his duty as a physician "to serve the interest of his patients with the gre
atest solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill," but also of Art
icle 19 of the Civil Code which requires a person, in the performance of his dut
ies, to act with justice and give everyone his due. 2) Dr. Gutierrez claim of lac
k of negligence on her part is belied by the records of the case. It has beensuf
ficiently established that she failed to exercise the standards of care in the a
dministration of anesthesia on a patient. Dr. Gutierrez omitted to perform a tho
rough preoperative evaluation on Erlinda. Further, there is no cogent reason for
the Court to reverse its finding that it was the faulty intubation on Erlinda t
hat caused her comatose condition. There is no question that Erlinda became coma
tose after Dr. Gutierrez performed a medical procedure on her. 3)After a careful
consideration of the arguments raised by DLSMC, the Court finds that respondent
hospitals position on this issue is meritorious. There is no employeremployee re
lationship between DLSMC and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka which would hold DLSMC so
lidarily liable for the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda under Article 2180
of the Civil Code. Further, no evidence was adduced to show that the injury suf
fered by petitioner Erlinda was due to a failure on the part of respondent DLSMC
to provide for hospital facilities and staff necessary for her treatment. For t
hese reasons, the Supreme Cord reverse the finding of liability on the part of D
LSMC for the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda 73. D.M. CONSUNJI INC. V COUR
T OF APPEALS AND MARIA J. JUEGO
FACTS: Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of
D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was
immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending physici
an, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM. Jos
e Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their work a
s carpenter at the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower
Building were on board a platform. Jose was crushed to death when the platform
fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which was merely inserted to the co
nnecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. Lucki
ly, Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety. PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern
Police District investigated the tragedy and filed report dated Nov. 25, 1990.
Maria Juergo, Joses widow filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC
and was rendered a favorable decision to receive support from DM Consunji amoun
ting to P644,000. DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision. ISSUE: Whether
Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death ben
efits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund. HELD: The respondent is not precl
uded from recovering damages under the civil code. Maria Juergo was unaware of p
etitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. She filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a c
opy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutors Memorandum dismissing
the criminal complaint against petitioners personnel. Supreme Court remanded to t
he RTC of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is m
ore than that of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). Should the award d
ecreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments alre
ady made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted ther
e from. 74. BATIGUIN V CA FACTS: Dr. Batiquin performed a caesarian operation on
a patient. Afterwards, she was found to be feverish. When the patient submitted
herself to another surgery, she was found to have an ovarian cyst on the left a
nd right side of the ovaries and a piece of rubber material was embedded on the
right side of the uterus. HELD: Res ipsa Where the thing which causes the injury
is shown to under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the managemen
t used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explana
tion by the defendant, that the accident arose from ordinary want of care. All t
he requisites are present in this case. (1) The entire proceedings of the contro
l of Dr. Batiquin. caesarian were under the exclusive
(2)The patient underwent no other operation which could habe caused the offendin
g piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that it could hav
e only been a by-product of the caesarian section. RULE: Res ipsa Where the thin
g which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the Defendant, and
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if thos
e who have themanagement use proper care,it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of
ordinary care. 75. CEBU SHIPYARD V WILLIAM FACTS: Cebu Shipyard and Engineering
Works, Inc. repaired marine vessels while the Prudential is in the non-life ins
urance business. William Lines, Inc., the owner of M/V Manila City, a luxury pas
senger-cargo vessel, which caught fire and sank. At the time of the incident, su
bject vessel was insured with Prudential for P45M for hull and machinery. CSEW w
as insured for only Php 10 million for the ship repairers liability policy. They
entered into a contract where negligence was the only factor that could make CSE
W liable for damages. Moreover, liability of CSEW was limited to only Php 1 mill
ion for damages. The Hull Policy included an Additional Perils (INCHMAREE) Clause
covering loss of or damage to the vessel through the negligence of, among others
, ship repairmen. William brought Manila City to the dry dock of CSEW for repair
s. The officers and cabin crew stayed at the ship while it was being repaired. A
fter the vessel was transferred to the docking quay, it caught fire and sank, re
sulting to its total loss. William brought suit against CSEW alleging that it wa
s through the latters negligence that the ship caught fire and sank. Prudential w
as impleaded as co-plaintiff after it had paid the value of insured items. It wa
s subrogated to 45 million, or the value it claimed to indemnify. The trial cour
t brought judgment against CSEW 45 million for the ship indemnity, 65 million fo
r loss of income, and more than 13 million in other damages. The CA affirmed the
TC decision. CSEW contended that the cause of the fire was due to Williams hot w
orks on the said portion of the ship which they didnt ask CSEW permission for. Pr
udential, on the other hand, blamed the negligence of the CSEW workers in the in
stance when they didnt mind rubber insulation wire coming out of the aircondition
ing unit that was already burning. Hence this MFR. ISSUE: 1. WON CSEW had managem
ent and supervisory control of the ship at the time the fire broke out 2. WON the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies against the crew 3. WON Prudential has th
e right of subrogation against its own insured 4. WON the provisions limiting CS
EWs liability for negligence to a maximum of Php 1 million are valid HELD: Yes. Y
es. Yes. No. Petition denied.
1. The that factual findings by the CA are conclusive on the parties and are not
reviewable by this Court. They are entitled to great weight and respect when th
e CA affirmed the factual findings arrived at by the trial court. The CA and the
Cebu RTC are agreed that the fire which caused the total loss of subject M/V Ma
nila City was due to the negligence of the employees and workers of CSEW. Furthe
rmore, in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put i
nto issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained. 2. For the doctrine of res i
psa loquitur to apply to a given situation, the following conditions must concur
: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone
is negligent; and (2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence. The fact
s and evidence reveal the presence of these conditions. First, the fire would no
t have happened in the ordinary course of things if reasonable care and diligenc
e had been exercised. Second, the agency charged with negligence, as found by th
e trial court and the CA and as shown by the records, is CSEW, which had control
over subject vessel when it was docked for annual repairs. What is more, in the
present case the trial court found direct evidence to prove that the workers di
dnt exercise due diligence in the care of subject vessel. The direct evidence sub
stantiates the conclusion that CSEW was really negligent even without applying s
uch doctrine. 3. Petitioner contends that Prudential is not entitled to be subro
gated to the rights of William Lines, Inc., theorizing that (1) the fire which g
utted M/V Manila City was an excluded risk and (2) it is a co-assured under the
Marine Hull Insurance Policy. This was wrong. The one who caused the fire has al
ready been adjudicated by the courts as CSEW. Upon proof of payment by Prudentia
l to William Lines, Inc., the former was subrogated to the right of the latter t
o indemnification from CSEW. As aptly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the law say
s: Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received in
demnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wro
ng or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogate
d to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has viola
ted the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cov
er the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the defi
ciency from the person causing the loss or injury. When Prudential paid the latt
er the total amount covered by its insurance policy, it was subrogated to the ri
ght of the latter to recover the insured loss from the liable party, CSEW. Petit
ioner theorizes further that there can be no right of subrogation as it is deeme
d a co-assured under the subject insurance policy with reliance on Clause 20 of
the Work Order which states:
The insurance on the vessel should be maintained by the customer and/or owner of
the vessel during the period the contract is in effect. Clause 20 of the Work O
rder in question is clear in the sense that it requires William Lines to maintai
n insurance on the vessel during the period of dry-docking or repair. However, t
he fact that CSEW benefits from the said stipulation does not automatically make
it as a co-assured of William Lines. The intention of the parties to make each
other a co-assured under an insurance policy is to be read from the insurance co
ntract or policy itself and not from any other contract or agreement because the
insurance policy denominates the beneficiaries of the insurance. The hull and m
achinery insurance procured by William Lines, Inc. from Prudential named only Wil
liam Lines, Inc. as the assured. There was no manifestation of any intention of W
illiam Lines, Inc. to constitute CSEW as a co-assured under subject policy. The
claim of CSEW that it is a co-assured is unfounded. Then too, in the Additional
Perils Clause of the same Marine Insurance Policy, it is provided that this insu
rance also covers loss of or damage to vessel directly caused by the negligence
of charterers and repairers who are not assured. As correctly pointed out by res
pondent Prudential, if CSEW were deemed a co-assured under the policy, it would
nullify any claim of William Lines, Inc. from Prudential for any loss or damage
caused by the negligence of CSEW. Certainly, no ship owner would agree to make a
ship repairer a co-assured under such insurance policy; otherwise, any claim fo
r loss or damage under the policy would be invalidated. 4. Although in this juri
sdiction, contracts of adhesion have been consistently upheld as valid per se; a
s binding as an ordinary contract, the Court recognizes instances when reliance
on such contracts cannot be favored especially where the facts and circumstances
warrant that subject stipulations be disregarded. Thus, in ruling on the validi
ty and applicability of the stipulation limiting the liability of CSEW for negli
gence to P1M only, the facts and circumstances vis-a-vis the nature of the provi
sion sought to be enforced should be considered, bearing in mind the principles
of equity and fair play. It is worthy to note that M/V Manila City was insured w
ith Prudential for P45M. Upon thorough investigation by its hull surveyor, M/V M
anila City was found to be beyond economical salvage and repair. The evaluation
of the average adjuster also reported a constructive total loss. The said claim
of William Lines, Inc., was then found to be valid and compensable such that Pru
dential paid the latter the total value of its insurance claim. Furthermore, it
was ascertained that the replacement cost of the vessel, amounts to P55M. Consid
ering the circumstances, it would unfair to limit the liability of petitioner to
One Million Pesos only. To allow CSEW to limit its liability to P1M notwithstan
ding the fact that the total loss suffered by the assured and paid for by Pruden
tial amounted to P45M would sanction the exercise of a degree of diligence short
of what is ordinarily required because, then, it would not be difficult for pet
itioner to escape liability by the simple expedient of paying an amount very muc
h lower than the actual damage suffered by William.
76. GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION VS CHATTO FACTS : Plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto,
and her 15-year old daughter, Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie "Mothe
r Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation
.- Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcon
y collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued.- Shoc
ked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as t
hey were able to get outto the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where
they were confined and treated for one (1) day.- The next day, they transferred
to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from J
une 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11.- Due to cont
inuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA
in July 1982 for further treatment. She was treated at the Cook county hospital
in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for about three (3) months during
which time she had to return to the Cook County Hospital five (5) or, six (6)tim
es.- Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the cei
ling of its theater was done due to force majeure. It maintained that its theate
r did not suffer from any structural or construction defect.- The trial court aw
arded actual or compensatory and moral damages and attorney s fees to the plaint
iffs.- Respondent Court found the appeal later filed to be without merit.- Its m
otion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the respondent C
ourt, petitioner filed the petition in the SC. ISSUE WON the collapse of the cei
ling was caused by Force majeure HELD: NO- Petitioner s claim that the collapse
of the ceiling of the theater s balcony was due to Force majeure is not even fou
nded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus limong, admitted that "he could
not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defen
se, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force maje
ure. That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure.
The real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either
he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is incompetent. He is
not an engineer, but an architect who had not even passed the government s exami
nation.- Verily, post incident investigation cannot beconsideredas material to t
he present proceedings.What is significant is the finding of the trial court, af
firmed by the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction defect
s. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding.- The building was con
structed barely 4 years prior to the accident in question. It was not shown that
any of the causes denominates as force majeure Obtained immediately before or a
t the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have been easily d
iscovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and mai
ntaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was n
o adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident.- That the
structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Eng
ineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not a
t all prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regard
s the ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ev
er inspected at all.- It is settled that: The owner or proprietor of a place of
public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises appliances and amusement d
evices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being
subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract ag
ainst unknown defects
not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means.- This implied warranty has giv
en rise to the rule that: Where a patron of a theater or other place of public a
musement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusiv
ely under the control and management of the defendant, and the accident is such
as in the ordinary course of eventswould not have happened if proper care had be
en exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of
negligence on the part of the defendant. 77. DRA. ABDULIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. VS C
OURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. FACTS: A fire broke out which caused the destruction of
two apartment buildings owned by the appellants, and partially destroying a comm
ercial building. The appellants alleged that because of the gross negligence and
lack of due care of the workers of the defendants, the bunkhouse of the workers
caught fire that spread rapidly and burnt the adjacent buildings. Appellants ba
sed their claim on a fire investigation report which stated that "the fire start
ed at the generator and extended to the bunkhouse and spread among the combustib
le materials within the construction site." ISSUE: WON the appellants can invoke
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur? RULING: No. The trial court concluded that t
he fire could not have started at the generator after all the defendant s witnes
ses testified that the generator did not caught fire and a picture was presented
showing that the bunkhouse was intact while the fire was raging. The trial cour
t declared that "the fire was not caused by an instrumentality within the exclus
ive control of the defendants," which is one of the requisites for the applicati
on of res ipsa loquitur in the law of negligence. Cases 69-77 LAURENA, AUGUSTU R
AY ANTHONY C. 78. WINDVALLEY SHIPPING CO. V CA FACTS: Sometime in February 1988,
the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., priva
te respondent herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Mr.
Ezzar del Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designate
d by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas th
rough the Orinoco River. While on transit, the Philippine Roxas experienced some
vibrations when it entered the San Roque Channel at mile 172. The vessel procee
ded on its way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was
a result of the shallowness of the channel. Then, the Philippine Roxas ran stra
nded in the Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels. A
s a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner
Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on th
at day. Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional Trial C
ourt of Manila against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Co
mpany (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of u
nearned profits, and interest thereon amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney
s fees, costs, and
expenses of litigation. The complaint against Pioneer Insurance Company was dism
issed in an Order dated November 7, 1988. The trial court rendered its decision
on October 16, 1991 in favor of the petitioner, Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. WH
EREFORE, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, ordering defendant Philippine P
resident Lines, Inc. to pay to the plaintiff the sum of U.S. $259,243.43, as act
ual and compensatory damages, and U.S. $162,031.53, as expenses incurred abroad
for its foreign lawyers, plus additional sum of U.S. $22,000.00, as and for atto
rney s fees of plaintiff s local lawyer, and to pay the cost of this suit. Defen
dant s counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit. Both parties appealed: the p
etitioner appealing the non-award of interest with the private respondent questi
oning the decision on the merits of the case. C.A favored PPL. "WHEREFORE, findi
ng defendant-appellant s appeal to be meritorious, judgment is hereby rendered r
eversing the Decision of the lower court. Plaintiff-appellant s Complaint is dis
missed and it is ordered to pay defendant-appellant the amount of Three Hundred
Twenty-three Thousand, Forty-two Pesos and Fifty-three Centavos (P323,042.53) as
and for attorney s fees plus cost of suit. Plaintiff-appellant s appeal is DISM
ISSED. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied for
lack of merit. ISSUE: Whether or not no fault of negligence can be attributed t
o the master nor the owner of the Philippine Roxas for the grounding of said ves
sel resulting in the blockage of the Rio Orinico. HELD: The petition is without
merit. There being no contractual obligation, the private respondent is obliged
to give only the diligence required of a good father of a family in accordance w
ith the provisions of Article 1173 of the New Civil Code, thus: Art. 1173. The fa
ult or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence whic
h is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumsta
nces of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad fai
th, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the la
w or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the perfor
mance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. The
diligence of a good father of a family requires only that diligence which an or
dinary prudent man would exercise with regard to his own property. This we have
found private respondent to have exercised when the vessel sailed only after the
"main engine, machineries, and other auxiliaries" were checked and found to be
in good running condition; when the master left a competent officer, the officer
on watch on the bridge with a pilot who is experienced in navigating the Orinoc
o River; when the master ordered the inspection of the vessel s double bottom ta
nks when the vibrations occurred anew. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does no
t apply to the case at bar because the circumstances surrounding the injury do n
ot clearly indicate negligence on the part of the private respondent. For the sa
id doctrine to apply, the following conditions must be met: (1) the accident was
of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened ex
cept for defendant s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an ag
ency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of
the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must
not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the per
son injured. As has already been held above, there was a temporary shift of cont
rol over the ship from the master of the vessel to the pilot on a compulsory pil
otage channel. Thus, two of the requisites necessary for the doctrine to apply,
i.e., negligence and control, to render the respondent liable, are absent. WHERE
FORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the C
ourt of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 36821 is AFFIRMED. 79. ESPIRITU VS. PHILIPPINE
POWER AND DEV. CO 80. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHIL. INC. V CA FACTS: 176 AS
JR 1215PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO DIONELA CABANGAN LEGASPI CITY WIR
E ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK-PER 115 PM
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO
The above letter is the main concern of Plaintiff-respondent Loreto Dionela. He
alleges that petitioner added extraneous and libelous matters in the message se
nt to the private respondent. He said the defamatory words on the telegram sent
to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment and
affected adversely his business as well because other people have come to know
of said defamatory words. Defendant corporation as a defense, alleges that the a
dditional words in Tagalog was a private joke between the sending and receiving
operators and that they were not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and ther
efore did not form part of the telegram and that the Tagalog words are not defam
atory. The additional words in Tagalog were never noticed and were included in t
he telegram when delivered. The trial court ruled against the Radio Communicatio
ns of the Philippines Stating that there is no question that the additional word
s in Tagalog are libelous. They clearly impute a vice or defect of the plaintiff
. Whether or not they were intended for the plaintiff, the effect on the plainti
ff is the same. Any person reading the additional words in Tagalog will naturall
y think that they refer to the addressee, the plaintiff. There is no indication
from the face of the telegram that the additional words in Tagalog were sent as
a private joke between the operators of the defendant. The liability of the defe
ndant is predicated not only on Article 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
but on the following articles of said Code: ART. 19.- Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, g
ive everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damag
e to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. It follows that the plain
tiff is entitled to damages and attorney s fees. The plaintiff is a businessman.
The libelous Tagalog words must have affected his business and social standing
in the community. The respondent appellate court confirmed trial courts decision.
The proximate cause, therefore, resulting in injury to appellee, was the failur
e of the appellant to take the necessary or precautionary steps to avoid the occ
urrence of the humiliating incident now complained of. The company had not impos
ed any safeguard against such eventualities and this void in its operating proce
dure does not speak well of its concern for their clientele s interests. Neglige
nce here is very patent. This negligence is imputable to appellant and not to it
s employees. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Petitioner-employer should answer directl
y and primarily for the civil liability arising from the criminal act of its emp
loyee. 2. Whether or not the liability of petitioner-company-employer is predica
ted on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Articles on Human Relations. RULING
: Petitioner s contentions do not merit our consideration. The action for damage
s was filed in the lower court directly against respondent corporation not as an
employer subsidiarily liable under the provisions of Article 1161 of the New Ci
vil Code in relation to Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The cause of action
of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code (sup
ra). As well as on respondent s breach of contract thru the negligence of its ow
n employees. Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of rec
eiving and transmitting messages. Everytime a person transmits a message through
the facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered into. Upon receipt of t
he rate or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to transmit the message accurate
ly. There is no question that in the case at bar, libelous matters were included
in the message transmitted, without the consent or knowledge of the sender. The
re is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous
and libelous matters in the message sent to the private respondent. As a corpora
tion, the petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence the acts of its e
mployees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner.
To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees
in the pursuit of petitioner s business is to deprive the general public availi
ng of the services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy. In mos
t cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However,
since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the do
ctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering the pr
esence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury. WHEREFORE, premises con
sidered, the judgment of the appellate court is hereby AFFIRMED. 81. CUSTODIO V
CA
FACTS: The case is about the grant of an easement of right of way. The plaintiff
owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment and was able to acquire said pr
operty through a contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quinter
o as vendors. Said property may be described to be surrounded by other immovable
s pertaining to defendants. There are two possible passageways. The first passag
eway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distant from Mabasas
residence to the main Street. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width
and length from plaintiff Mabasas residence to the main Street. There were tenan
ts of the palintiff occupying the premises. However, plaintiffs tenants vacated t
he apartment because there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway
making it narrower in width and even extended said fence in such a way that the
entire passageway was enclosed. Trial court rendered a decision ordering defend
ants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access - ingress and egr
ess, to the public street; Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios an
d Santoses P8,000 as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. The part
ies are to shoulder their respective litigation expenses. The CA affirmed the ju
dgment of the trial court with modification: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of
the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein
grant of damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The Court hereby orders defendants-a
ppellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five Thousand (P65,000) P
esos as Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as Moral Damages, and Te
n Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary Damages. The rest of the appealed decisi
on is affirmed to all respects. CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
. ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is in correct order. RULING: We agr
ee with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages in favor
of private respondents. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. A
reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award of dama
ges was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, i
ncurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the le
ased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway. However, the mere fact
that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover dam
ages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action f
or a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plainti
ff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute
a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the
injury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a material distinction between dama
ges and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the l
oss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense
or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage with
out injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injur
ia. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which h
e complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a
breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff - a concurrence of inju
ry to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The under
lying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was
injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some du
ty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded
; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely becau
se the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering. Many accidents occur and many
injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause damage or loss to anoth
er but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create
no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be borne
by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages resulting fro
m an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. In other words, in or
der that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be n
ot only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may happe
n in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his p
erson or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omiss
ion which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absq
ue injuria. In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal in
jury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be sai
d to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle
of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is
essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have a
cted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2)
The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.
82. CABIGAO VS. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, C.A. 83. DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO. INC.
V CA FACTS: This is a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death o
f Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident. While petitioner Theodor
e M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation
in a reckless and imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and r
egulations and safety to persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrit
o Cudiamat. However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hosp
ital, the said driver, in utter bad faith and without regard to the welfare of t
he victim, first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective dest
inations before banging said victim to the Lepanto Hospital where he died. Petit
ioners alleged that they had observed and continued to observe the extraordinary
diligence required in the operation of the transportation company and the super
vision of the employees, even as they add that they are not absolute insurers of
the safety of the public at large. Further, it was alleged that it was the vict
im s own carelessness and negligence which gave rise to the subject incident. Tr
ial court rendered decision: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby pr
onounced that Pedrito Cudiamat was negligent, which negligence was the proximate
cause of his death. Nonetheless, defendants in equity, are hereby ordered to pa
y the
heirs of Pedrito Cudiamat the sum of P10,000.00 which approximates the amount de
fendants initially offered said heirs for the amicable settlement of the case. N
o costs. CA set aside the decision of the trial court and rendered judgment: The
sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos by way of indemnity for death of the
victim Pedrito Cudiamat; The sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) by way of moral
damages; The sum of Two Hundred Eighty Eight Thousand (P288,000.00) Pesos as ac
tual and compensatory damages; The costs of this suit. Petitioners motion for r
econsideration was denied by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are negli
gent and liable for the damages claimed. RULING: It cannot be said that the dece
ased in negligence. It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including c
ommon carriers by railroad train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyan
ces a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to
board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passenger
s resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while th
ey are doing so. Further, even assuming that the bus was moving, the act of the
victim in boarding the same cannot be considered negligent under the circumstanc
es. As clearly explained in the testimony of the aforestated witness for petitio
ners, Virginia Abalos, th bus had "just started" and "was still in slow motion"
at the point where the victim had boarded and was on its platform. It is not neg
ligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or stree
tcar which is moving slowly. An ordinarily prudent person would have made the at
tempt board the moving conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The f
act that passengers board and alight from slowly moving vehicle is a matter of c
ommon experience both the driver and conductor in this case could not have been
unaware of such an ordinary practice. The victim herein, by stepping and standin
g on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger and is entitled
all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation. Hence,
it has been held that the duty which the carrier passengers owes to its patrons
extends to persons boarding cars as well as to those alighting therefrom. Common
carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, are b
ound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transpo
rted by the according to all the circumstances of each case. A common carrier is
bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can pro
vide, using the utmost diligence very cautious persons, with a due regard for al
l the circumstances. It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on
a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the
damages sought by the passenger. By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes t
he express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and o
bserve extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and
any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to
the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the general
rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carr
ier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Arti
cles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code. With respect to the award of damages, an o
versight was, however, committed by respondent Court of Appeals in computing the
actual damages based on the gross income of the victim. The rule is that the am
ount recoverable by the heirs of a victim of a tort is not the loss of the entir
e earnings, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the benefi
ciary would have received. In other words, only net earnings, not gross earnings
, are to be considered, that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessa
ry in the creation of such earnings or income and minus living and other inciden
tal expenses. 84. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY V MARJORIE NAVIDAD FACTS: On 14 O
ctober 1993, Nicanor Navidad, while drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after pu
rchasing a token for his fare. While Navidad was standing on the platform near t
he LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approa
ched Navidad. A misunderstanding between the two led to a fist fight. No evidenc
e, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the tw
o, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the
exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Rom
an, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed ins
tantaneously. Thereafter, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navid
ad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Esca
rtin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc., and Prudent
for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navid
ad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denie
d liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its security guards. The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence
while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer co
ntending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his ass
igned task. The trial court rendered its decision; WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Prudent Security
and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plai
ntiffs. The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed fo
r lack of merit. The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dism
issed. Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court promulgated
its now assailed decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death
of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severall
y. The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then
as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage thereto had already existed whe
n the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying
the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent fro
m liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agen
cy to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin in
flicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact
of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and mana
ged by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman. The appellate court denied pe
titioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not LRTA and are liable for the death of Nicanor Navidad based
on a common carriage contract. RULING: The law requires common carriers to carr
y passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due
regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety t
o its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for
so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in
pursuance to the contract of carriage. The statutory provisions render a common
carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence o
r wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of
other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through the ex
ercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In
case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or bee
n negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the dut
y to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees
and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unf
oreseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by
the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the a
ppellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been a
t fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved. The
foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its fa
ilure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the disc
harge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose
to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an
independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is no
t relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. Should Pruden
t be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort unde
r the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Art
icle 2180, of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employers liability
is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is establish
ed, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris t
antum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can on
ly be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the e
mployee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a showing, one mi
ght ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one h
and, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be
solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same ac
t or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the othe
r in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a
liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which bre
aches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach o
f contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liabili
ty had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have
been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply. The award o
f nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages ar
e adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpo
se of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It is an establis
hed rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages. 85. HID
ALGO ENTERPRISES V BALADAN FACTS: Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the o
wner of an ice-plant factory in whose premises were installed two tanks full of
water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine. While the factory com
pound was surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves were not provided with any
kind of fence or top covers. The wide gate entrance is continually open where a
nyone can pass through it. There was no guard assigned on the gate. At about noo
n of April 16, 1948, plaintiff s son, Mario Balandan, an 8year old boy, while pl
aying with and in company of other boys of his age entered the factory premises
through the gate, to take a bath in one of said tanks and while bathing, Mario s
ank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already a cadaver, h
aving been died of drowning. The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instan
ce of Laguna, took the view that the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisanc
e (the tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid acciden
ts to persons entering its premises. It applied the doctrine of attractive nuisa
nce, of American origin, recognized in this Jurisdiction in Taylor vs. Manila El
ectric 16 Phil., 8. The doctrine may be stated, in short, as follows: One who ma
intains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character
likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to
prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a chi
ld of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a tr
espasser in the premises. The principle reason for the doctrine is that the cond
ition or appliance in question although its danger is apparent to those of age,
is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to appr
oach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such
children. ISSUE: Whether or not the body of water like swimming pool or water t
ank an attractive nuisance in order to claim damages for the injury or death suf
fered by a child. RULING: The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not appl
icable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some
unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its locat
ion. The reason why a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not conside
red an attractive nuisance was lucidly explained by the Indiana Appellate Court
as follows: Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children.
Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger ch
ildren are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the d
anger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his ow
n property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger,
. . . (he) is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance." An
derson vs. ReithRiley Const. Co., N. E., 2nd, 184, 185; 112 Ind. App., 170. Ther
efore, as petitioner s tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the ques
tion whether the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions become immaterial.
86. ANDAMO V IAC
FACTS: Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parc
el of land adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of L
a Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. The corporations waterpaths and contriv
ances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated
and eroded petitioners land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners
crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioner
s and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and oth
er improvements to destruction. Petitioners instituted a criminal action against
Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of r
espondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324
of the Revised Penal Code. And later on, petitioners filed another action agains
t respondent Corporation for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of p
reliminary injunction before the same court. Respondent corporation filed its an
swer to the complaint and opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary in
junction. The trial court issued the disputed order dismissing the Civil Case fo
r lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the c
ivil case was still unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Sect
ion 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civi
l actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after
the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted unt
il final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. Petitioners appealed
from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC affirmed the questioned
order of the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was also denied. ISSUE:
Whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water con
ductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage
to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case c
an proceed independently of the criminal case. RULING: The petitioners have a va
lid point. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civ
il action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts
. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered b
y the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person
for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect betwe
en the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plai
ntiff. Clearly, from petitioner s complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances bui
lt by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitione
rs. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of b
uilding these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if
proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery
of damages. It must be stressed that the use of one s property is not without li
mitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing can
not make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person.
" SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutua
l and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reaso
nable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Alth
ough we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such st
ructures must be so constructed and maintained
using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowne
rs and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures
cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter c
an claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered. Article 2176 of the
Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or
omission constituting fault or negligence. Article 2176, whenever it refers to
"fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also act
s criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequ
ently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whet
her or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided t
hat the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged al
so criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in th
e two cases vary. The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of
the Civil Code, which states: Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligen
ce under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. According
to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first si
ght startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact natur
e of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal la
w, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa
aquiliana" or quasidelict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundati
on and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction betwee
n criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been s
ustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain. Cases 78-86 SANTOS, RYAN G.
87. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: EMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC
. (REMMAN), and CRISPIN E. LAT are adjoining landowners in Barangay Bugtong Na P
ulo, Lipa City. The land of Lat containing an area of 1.8 hectares is agricultur
al and planted mostly with fruit trees while REMMAN occupies a land area of fift
een (15) hectares six (6) hectares of which are devoted to its piggery business.
REMMAN s land is one and a half (1) meters higher in elevation than that of resp
ondent Lat. Sometime in July 1984 Lat noticed that REMMAN s waste disposal lagoo
n was already overflowing and inundating one-fourth (1/4) of Lat s plantation. H
e made several representations with REMMAN but they fell on deaf ears. On 14 Mar
ch 1985, after almost one (1) hectare of Lat s plantation was already inundated
with water containing pig manure, as a result of which the trees growing on the
flooded portion started to wither and die, Lat filed a complaint for damages wit
h preliminary mandatory injunction against REMMAN. Lat alleged that the acidity
of the soil in his plantation increased
because of the overflow of the water heavy with pig manure from REMMAN s piggery
farm. REMMAN denied all the allegations of Lat and raised as an affirmative def
ense that measures such as the construction of additional lagoons were already a
dopted to contain the waste water coming from its piggery to prevent any damage
to the adjoining estates. RTC DECISION: After conducting an ocular inspection an
d evaluating the evidence of both parties the Regional Trial Court found that in
deed REMMANs waste disposal lagoon overflowed with the contaminated water floodin
g one (1) hectare of Lat s plantation. The waste water was ankle-deep and caused
death and destruction to one (1) jackfruit tree, fifteen (15) coconut trees, on
e hundred twenty-two (122) coffee trees, and an unspecified number of mango tree
s, bananas and vegetables. As a consequence, the trial court ordered REMMAN to i
ndemnify Lat P186,975.00 for lost profits for three (3) crop years and P30,000.0
0 as attorney s fees SC RULING: REMMAN argues that its liability for the damages
suffered by Lat was not clearly established. We disagree. During the ocular ins
pection conducted by the lower court where representatives of both parties were
present, it was established that the waste water containing pig manure was conti
nuously flowing from REMMAN s piggery farm to Lat s plantation. The water was an
kle-deep and flooded one (1) hectare of Lat s plantation. The overflow of the "a
cidic, malodorous and polluted water" continued from June 1984 to March 1985 thu
s destroying one (1) jackfruit tree, fifteen (15) coconut trees, one hundred an
twenty-two (122) coffee trees, and an unspecified number of mango trees, bananas
and vegetables. In addition, the appellate court found that there was indeed ne
gligence on the part of REMMAN which directly caused the damage to the plantatio
n of Lat. Thus -novero x x x Negligence was clearly established. It is uncontrov
erted that the land of appellee was flooded on account of the overflow of acidic
, malodorous and polluted water coming from the adjacent piggery farm of appella
nt sometime in May 1984. This resulted in the impairment of the productivity of
appellee s land as well as the eventual destruction and death of several fruit t
rees, such as coconuts, coffee, jackfruits, bananas and other plants x x x x App
ellant cannot avoid liability because their negligence was the proximate cause o
f the damage. Appellee s property was practically made a catch-basin of polluted
water and other noxious substances emptying from appellant s piggery which coul
d have been prevented had it not been for the negligence of appellant arising fr
om its: (a) failure to monitor the increases in the level of water in the lagoon
s before, during and after the heavy downpours which occurred during the rainy m
onths of 1984; (b) failure to augment the existing lagoons prior to the incident
, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the flooding, the piggery had gro
wn to a capacity of 11,000 heads, and considering that it was reasonably forseea
ble that the existing waste disposal facilities were no longer adequate to accom
odate the increasing volume of waste matters in such a big farm; and more import
antly, (c) the repeated failure to comply with their promise to appellee REMMAN
contends that the damages allegedly sustained by Lat have not been satisfactoril
y established.
We a not convinced. The factual findings of the court a quo rightly support its
conclusions on this respect Coming now to the issue of damages, We find appellan
t s allegations not well-taken. Appellant contends that actual and compensatory
damages require evidentiary proof, and there being no evidence presented as to t
he necessity of the award for damages, it was erroneous for the lower court to h
ave made such award. It must be remembered that after the ocular inspection, the
court a quo rendered an inventory of dead and rotten trees and plants found in
appellee s property. Appellee also testified on the approximate annual harvest a
nd fair market value thereof. Significantly, no opposition or controverting evid
ence was presented by appellant on the matter. Hence, appellant is bound thereby
and cannot now be heard to complain. As correctly held by the court a quo: An o
cular inspection has been conducted by the trial court. The inventory of the tre
es damaged and the itemized valuation placed therein by private respondent after
the ocular inspection which is not rebutted by the petitioner, is the more accu
rate indicator of the said amount prayed for as damages. If the valuation is ind
eed unreasonable, petitioner should present controverting evidence of the fair m
arket value of the crops involved. The trial court held that the private respond
ent himself had been subjected to extensive cross and re-cross examination by th
e counsel for the petitioner on the amount of damages 88. JULITA T. VDA. DE SEVE
RO vs. FELICIANO FACTS: This case treated as a special civil action for certiora
ri was originally filed as a petition for review by way of appeal on certiorari
seeking to set aside the order of the then Court of First Instance of Samar, Bra
nch V, in Calbayog City dated April 6, 1976 dismissing Civil Case No. 522-CC ent
itled "Julita T. Vda, de Severo, et al., versus Luningning Feliciano Go, et al.
for lack of jurisdiction. The antecedents of the case are as follows: The late
Ricardo Severo was an employee of herein private respondents Luningning Felician
o Go and Joaquin Go, first as baker of Joni s Cakes and Pastries," an enterpris
e owned by respondents located at 1634 P. Guevarra Street, Santa Cruz, Manila an
d finally, as driver-mechanic from 1961 up to February 16, 1972. On the latter d
ate, unidentified armed men forcibly took away and/or carnapped the car owned by
respondents and driven by Ricardo Severo who, in his efforts to resist the carn
appers, was shot and killed by the latter. Up to now, the parties responsible fo
r Severo s death have not been Identified nor apprehended. On September 18, 1974
, herein petitioners, the widow and minor children of Ricardo Severo, filed an a
ction against respondents-employers before the trial court for "Death Compensati
on and Damages" in the total amount of P74,500.00 TRIAL COURT RULING: The respon
dent court, acting on the latest motion to dismiss, issued an order dated April
6, 1976 stating that petitioners cause of action falls within the purview of th
e Workmen s Compensation Act and the proper forum was the Workmen s Compensation
Commission. It declared itself without jurisdiction following
Our ruling in the case of Robles vs. Yap Wing, L-20442, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA
267, to wit: The Court after a careful consideration of the grounds in the defe
ndants motion, and considering the allegation of the complaint describing their
main cause of action, which is a claim for death compensation and damages, is o
f the opinion and so holds that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decid
e the case. The plaintiffs right to relief being derived on an accident resulti
ng in death of Ricardo Severo, an employee of the defendants, while engaged in t
he performance of the task assigned to him, this Court is devoid of statutory co
mpetence to pass upon the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim, as of the tim
e the cause of action accrue, falls within the purview of the Workmen s Compensa
tion Act as amended and, therefore, the proper form (sic) was the Workmen s Comp
ensation Commission, thru its regional offices under the Department of Labor, a
body empowered to act upon all claims for compensation for death, injury or sick
ness. Thus our Supreme Court in the case of Ciriaco Robles vs. Yap Wing, No. L-2
0442, Oct. 4, 1971 ruled: Before the enactment of Republic Act No. 722(Amending
Act. No. 3228), which took effect on June 20, 1952, claims for compensation unde
r the Workmen s Compensation Act were cognizable by the regular courts, but sinc
e then, as provided in Section 46 thereof as amended, the Workmen s Compensatio
n shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the W
orkmen s Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. ... In relati
on to this, Section 5 of the Act provides that the rights and remedies granted b
y this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compen
sation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to an employee, his
personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer unde
r the Civil Code or other laws, because of said injury. SC RULING: The petition
is impressed with merit. The ruling in the case of Robles vs. Yap Wing, supra, t
hat the action of the injured employee or that of his heirs in case of his death
is restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen s
Compensation Act relied upon by the trial court, no longer controls. We have aba
ndoned the same in the recent case of Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Hon. Celso
Avelino, G.R. No. L-43674, promulgated on June 30, 1987, citing the case of Flo
resca vs. Philex Mining Company, L-30642, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 141. We state
d thus. In the recent case of Floresca vs. Philex Mining Company, L-30642, April
30, 1985, 136 SCRA 141, involving a complaint for damages for the death of five
miners in a cave-in on June 28, 1967, this Court was confronted with three dive
rgent opinions on the exclusivity rule as presented by several amici curiae. One
view is that the injured employee or his heirs, in case of death, may initiate
an action to recover damages (not compensation under the Workmen s Compensation
Act) with the regular courts on the basis of negligence of the employer pursuant
to the Civil Code. Another view, as enunciated in the Robles case, is that the
remedy of an employee for work connected injury or accident is exclusive in acco
rdance with Section 5 of the WCA. A third view is that the action is selective a
nd the employee of his heirs have a choice of availing themselves of the benefit
s under the WCA or of suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for highe
r damages from the employer by reason of his negligence. But once the election h
as been exercised, the employee or his heirs are no longer free to opt for the o
ther remedy. In other words, the employee cannot pursue both actions simultaneou
sly. This latter view was adopted by the majority in the Floresca case,
reiterating as main authority its earlier decision in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Co
mpany, L25382, April 30, 1982, 32 SCRA 442. In so doing, the Court rejected the
doctrine of exclusivity of the rights and remedies granted by the WCA as laid do
wn in the Robles case 89. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACT
S: Challenged in this petition for review is the Decision dated February 28, 199
1 1 rendered by public respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision d
ated November 15, 1985 of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Re
gion, Branch CLX (160), Pasig City, in Civil Case No. 27288 entitled "Rommel s M
arketing Corporation, etc. v. Philippine Bank of Commerce, now absorbed by Phili
ppine Commercial and Industrial Bank." The case stemmed from a complaint filed b
y the private respondent Rommel s Marketing Corporation (RMC for brevity), repre
sented by its President and General Manager Romeo Lipana, to recover from the fo
rmer Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC for brevity), now absorbed by the Philippi
ne Commercial International Bank, the sum of P304,979.74 representing various de
posits it had made in its current account with said bank but which were not cred
ited to its account, and were instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido
Cotas, allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner
bank RTC JUDGMENT: RMC demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money, bu
t as its demand went unheeded, it filed a collection suit before the Regional Tr
ial Court of Pasig, Branch 160. The trial court found petitioner bank negligent
and ruled as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendan
t Philippine Bank of Commerce, now absorbed by defendant Philippine Commercial &
Industrial Bank, and defendant Azucena Mabayad to pay the plaintiff, jointly an
d severally, and without prejudice to any criminal action which may be institute
d if found warranted: 1. The sum of P304,979.72, representing plaintiffs lost de
posit, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint;
2. A sum equivalent to 14% thereof, as exemplary damages; 3. A sum equivalent t
o 25% of the total amount due, as and for attorney s fees; and 4. Costs. SC RULI
NG: Our law on quasi-delicts states: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission cause
s damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual r
elation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the pro
visions of this Chapter. There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some ot
her person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and e
ffect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
by the plaintiff.
In the case at bench, there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the priva
te respondent (plaintiff in the trial court) RMC in the amount of P304,979.74. I
t is in ascribing fault or negligence which caused the damage where the parties
point to each other as the culprit. Negligence is the omission to do something w
hich a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate
the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a pruden
t and reasonable man would do. The seventy-eight (78)-year-old, yet still releva
nt, case of Picart v. Smith, provides the test by which to determine the existen
ce of negligence in a particular case which may be stated as follows: Did the de
fendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not
, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard su
pposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of
the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The
law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of o
rdinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. ON THE DOCTR
INE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE AND THE CONCEPT OF PROXIMATE CAUSE: Proximate cause is
determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common
sense, policy and precedent. Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, reiterated in the case
of Bank of the Phil. Islands v. Court of Appeals, defines proximate cause as "th
at cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient i
ntervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not ha
ve occurred. . . ." In this case, absent the act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently v
alidating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut wou
ld not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with imp
unity. Apropos, once again, is the pronouncement made by the respondent appellat
e court, to wit: . . . . Even if Yabut had the fraudulent intention to misapprop
riate the funds entrusted to her by plaintiff, she would not have been able to d
eposit those funds in her husband s current account, and then make plaintiff bel
ieve that it was in the latter s accounts wherein she had deposited them, had it
not been for bank teller Mabayad s aforesaid gross and reckless negligence. The
latter s negligence was thus the proximate, immediate and efficient cause that
brought about the loss claimed by plaintiff in this case, and the failure of pla
intiff to discover the same soon enough by failing to scrutinize the monthly sta
tements of account being sent to it by appellant bank could not have prevented t
he fraud and misappropriation which Irene Yabut had already completed when she d
eposited plaintiff s money to the account of her husband instead of to the latte
r s accounts. Furthermore, under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also refer
red to, at times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"), petition
er bank was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that wh
ere both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably late
r in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fa
ult or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable
with the consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also mean tha
t an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the
recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against
liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could
have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here, assuming
that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest emp
loyee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as
advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, t
hru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by i
ts client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedur
e 90. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: This petit
ion for certiorari seeks to annul the decision of respondent Court of Appeals da
ted October 29, 1992 in CA GR CV No. 26571 affirming the decision of the Regiona
l Trial Court of Lipa, Batangas Branch XIII for damages, and the Resolution date
d November 11, 1993 denying petitioner s motion for reconsideration of the afore
said decision. The case emanated from a dispute between the Rural Bank of Padre
Garcia, Inc. (RBPG) and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (MBTC) relative to a
credit memorandum dated April 5, 1982 from the Central Bank in the amount of P3
04,000.00 in favor of RBPG. The records show that Isabel Katigbak is the preside
nt and director of RBPG, owning 65% of the shares thereof. Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company (MBTC) is the rural bank s depository bank, where Katigbak mainta
ins current accounts with MBTC s main office in Makati as well as its Lipa City
branch. On April 6, 1982, MBTC received from the Central Bank a credit memo date
d April 5, 1982 that its demand deposit account was credited with P304,000.00 fo
r the account of RBPG, representing loans granted by the Central Bank to RBPG. O
n the basis of said credit memo, Isabel Katigbak issued several checks against i
ts account with MBTC in the total amount of P300,000.00, two (2) of which (Metro
bank Check Nos. 0069 and 0070) were payable to Dr. Felipe C. Roque and Mrs. Eliz
a Roque for P25,000.00 each. Said checks issued to Dr. and Mrs. Roque were depos
ited by the Roques with the Philippine Banking Corporation, Novaliches Branch in
Quezon City. When these checks were forwarded to MBTC on April 12, 1982 for pay
ment (six (6) days from receipt of the Credit Memo), the checks were returned by
MBTC with the annotations "DAIF TNC" (Drawn Against Insufficient Funds Try Next
Clearing) so they were redeposited on April 14, 1982. These were however again
dishonored and returned unpaid for the following reason: "DAIF TNC NO ADVICE FRO
M CB." SC RULING: On October 29, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
affirming that of the trial court, except for the deletion of the award of tempe
rate damages, the reduction of moral damages from P500,000.00 to P50,000.00 in f
avor of RBPG and P100,000.00 for Isabel Katigbak and P50,000.00, as attorney s f
ees. Plaintiffs-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, qu
estioning the deletion of the award of temperate damages and the reduction of th
e award of moral damages and attorney s fees. The motion was denied.
The damage to private respondents reputation and social standing entitles them
to moral damages. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, frig
ht, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, socia
l humiliation and similar injury. Temperate or moderate damages which are more t
han nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the
nature of the case, be proved with certainty. Temperate damages may be allowed
in cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss can
not be adduced, although the court is convinced that there has been such loss. T
he appellate court, however, justified its deletion when MBTC reasoned out that
the amount of P50,000.00 is not part of the relief prayed for in the complaint,
aside from the fact that the amount allegedly suffered by Mrs. Katigbak is susce
ptible of proof. Moral and temperate damages which are not susceptible of pecuni
ary estimation are not awarded to penalize the petitioner but to compensate the
respondents for injuries suffered as a result of the former s fault and negligen
ce, taking into account the latter s credit and social standing in the banking c
ommunity, particularly since this is the very first time such humiliation has be
fallen private respondents. The amount of such losses need not be established wi
th exactitude, precisely due to their nature. The carelessness of petitioner ban
k, aggravated by the lack of promptness in repairing the error and the arrogant
attitude of the bank officer handling the matter, justifies the grant of moral d
amages, which are clearly not excessive and unconscionable. 91. PHILIPPINE BANK
OF COMMERCE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, same (89) 92. TABACALERA INSURANCE CO. vs. NO
RTH FRONT SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. FACTS: ABACALERA INSURANCE CO., Prudential Gua
rantee & Assurance, Inc., and New Zealand Insurance Co., Ltd., in this petition
for review on certiorari, assail the 22 December 1994 decision of the Court of A
ppeals and its Resolution of 16 February 1995 which affirmed the 1 June 1993 dec
ision of the Regional Trial Court dismissing their complaint for damages against
North Front Shipping Services, Inc. On 2 August 1990, 20,234 sacks of corn grai
ns valued at P3,500,640.00 were shipped on board North Front 777, a vessel owned
by North Front Shipping Services, Inc. The cargo was consigned to Republic Flou
r Mills Corporation in Manila under Bill of Lading No. 001and insured with the h
erein mentioned insurance companies. The vessel was inspected prior to actual lo
ading by representatives of the shipper and was found fit to carry the merchandi
se. The cargo was covered with tarpaulins and wooden boards. The hatches were se
aled and could only be opened by representatives of Republic Flour Mills Corpora
tion. The vessel left Cagayan de Oro City on 2 August 1990 and arrived Manila on
16 August 1990. Republic Flour Mills Corporation was advised of its arrival but
it did not immediately commence the unloading operations. There were days when
unloading had to be stopped due to variable weather conditions and sometimes for
no apparent reason at all. When the cargo was eventually unloaded there was a s
hortage of 26.333 metric tons. The remaining merchandise was already moldy, ranc
id and
deteriorating. The unloading operations were completed on 5 September 1990 or tw
enty (20) days after the arrival of the barge at the wharf of Republic Flour Mil
ls Corporation in Pasig City. Precision Analytical Services, Inc., was hired to
examine the corn grains and determine the cause of deterioration. A Certificate
of Analysis was issued indicating that the corn grains had 18.56% moisture conte
nt and the wetting was due to contact with salt water. The mold growth was only
incipient and not sufficient to make the corn grains toxic and unfit for consump
tion. In fact the mold growth could still be arrested by drying. Republic Flour
Mills Corporation rejected the entire cargo and formally demanded from North Fro
nt Shipping Services, Inc., payment for the damages suffered by it. The demands
however were unheeded. The insurance companies were perforce obliged to pay Repu
blic Flour Mills Corporation P2,189,433.40. TRIAL COURT RULING: The court below
dismissed the complaint and ruled that the contract entered into between North F
ront Shipping Services, Inc., and Republic Flour Mills Corporation was a charter
-party agreement. As such, only ordinary diligence in the care of goods was requ
ired of North Front Shipping Services, Inc. The inspection of the barge by the s
hipper and the representatives of the shipping company before actual loading, co
upled with the Permit to Sail issued by the Coast Guard, sufficed to meet the de
gree of diligence required of the carrier. On the other hand, the Court of Appea
ls ruled that as a common carrier required to observe a higher degree of diligen
ce North Front 777 satisfactorily complied with all the requirements hence was i
ssued a Permit to Sail after proper inspection. Consequently, the complaint was
dismissed and the motion for reconsideration rejected. The charter-party agreeme
nt between North Front Shipping Services, Inc., and Republic Flour Mills Corpora
tion did not in any way convert the common carrier into a private carrier. We ha
ve already resolved this issue with finality in Planters Products, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals thus A charter-party is defined as a contract by which an entire s
hip, or some principal part thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a
specified time or use; a contract of affreightment by which the owner of a ship
or other vessel lets the whole or a part of her to a merchant or other person f
or the conveyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration of the paym
ent of freight x x x x Contract of affreightment may either be time charter, whe
rein the vessel is leased to the charterer for a fixed period of time, or voyage
charter, wherein the ship is leased for a single voyage. In both cases, the cha
rter-party provides for the hire of the vessel only, either for a determinate pe
riod of time or for a single or consecutive voyage, the ship owner to supply the
ship s store, pay for the wages of the master of the crew, and defray the expen
ses for the maintenance of the ship. Upon the other hand, the term common or pu
blic carrier is defined in Art. 1732 of the Civil Code. The definition extends
to carriers either by land, air or water which hold themselves out as ready to e
ngage in carrying goods or transporting passengers or both for compensation as a
public employment and not as a casual occupation
SC RULING: In fine, we find that the carrier failed to observe the required extr
aordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods placed in its care. The proo
fs presented by North Front Shipping Services, Inc., were insufficient to rebut
the prima facie presumption of private respondent s negligence, more so if we co
nsider the evidence adduced by petitioners. It is not denied by the insurance co
mpanies that the vessel was indeed inspected before actual loading and that Nort
h Front 777 was issued a Permit to Sail. They proved the fact of shipment and it
s consequent loss or damage while in the actual possession of the carrier. Notab
ly, the carrier failed to volunteer any explanation why there was spoilage and h
ow it occurred. On the other hand, it was shown during the trial that the vessel
had rusty bulkheads and the wooden boards and tarpaulins bore heavy concentrati
on of molds. The tarpaulins used were not new, contrary to the claim of North Fr
ont Shipping Services, Inc., as there were already several patches on them, henc
e, making it highly probable for water to enter. Laboratory analysis revealed th
at the corn grains were contaminated with salt water. North Front Shipping Servi
ces, Inc., failed to rebut all these arguments. It did not even endeavor to esta
blish that the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods was due to the fo
llowing: (a) flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or c
alamity; (b) act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (c)
act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (d) the character of the
goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (e) order or act of compet
ent public authority.This is a closed list. If the cause of destruction, loss or
deterioration is other than the enumerated circumstances, then the carrier is r
ightly liable therefor. However, we cannot attribute the destruction, loss or de
terioration of the cargo solely to the carrier. We find the consignee Republic F
lour Mills Corporation guilty of contributory negligence. It was seasonably noti
fied of the arrival of the barge but did not immediately start the unloading ope
rations. No explanation was proffered by the consignee as to why there was a del
ay of six (6) days. Had the unloading been commenced immediately the loss could
have been completely avoided or at least minimized. As testified to by the chemi
st who analyzed the corn samples, the mold growth was only at its incipient stag
e and could still be arrested by drying. The corn grains were not yet toxic or u
nfit for consumption. For its contributory negligence, Republic Flour Mills Corp
oration should share at least 40% of the loss. 93. BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC. vs. COU
RT OF APPEALS FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to review the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV-31246 awarding damages in favor of the spous
es Antonio and Leticia Garcia for breach of contract of carriage.filed by the sp
ouses Garcia questioning the same Court of Appeals Decision which reduced their
award of damages. On November 13, 1995, we denied their petition for review. Th
e records show that on July 31, 1980, Leticia Garcia, and her five-year old son,
Allan Garcia, boarded Baliwag Transit Bus No. 2036 bound for Cabanatuan City dr
iven by Jaime Santiago. They took the seat behind the driver.
At about 7:30 in the evening, in Malimba, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the bus passengers
saw a cargo truck parked at the shoulder of the national highway. Its left rear
portion jutted to the outer lane, the shoulder of the road was too narrow to ac
commodate the whole truck. A kerosene lamp appeared at the edge of the road obvi
ously to serve as a warning device. The truck driver, Julio Recontique, and his
helper, Arturo Escala, were then replacing a flat tire. The truck is owned by re
spondent A & J Trading. Bus driver Santiago was driving at an inordinately fast
speed and failed to notice the truck and the kerosene lamp at the edge of the ro
ad. Santiago s passengers urged him to slow down but he paid them no heed. Santi
ago even carried animated conversations with his co-employees while driving. Whe
n the danger of collision became imminent, the bus passengers shouted "Babangga
tayo!". Santiago stepped on the brake, but it was too late. His bus rammed into
the stalled cargo truck. It caused the instant death of Santiago and Escala, and
injury to several others. Leticia and Allan Garcia were among the injured passe
ngers. Leticia suffered a fracture in her pelvis and right leg. They rushed her
to the provincial hospital in Cabanatuan City where she was given emergency trea
tment. After three days, she was transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital
where she was confined for more than a month. She underwent an operation for pa
rtial hip prosthesis. Allan, on the other hand, broke a leg. He was also given e
mergency treatment at the provincial hospital. Spouses Antonio and Leticia Garci
a sued Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J Trading and Julio Recontique for damages in
the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. Leticia sued as an injured passenger of Bal
iwag and as mother of Allan. At the time of the complaint, Allan was a minor, he
nce, the suit initiated by his parents in his favor. Baliwag, A & J Trading and
Recontique disclaimed responsibility for the mishap. Baliwag alleged that the ac
cident was caused solely by the fault and negligence of A & J Trading and its dr
iver, Recontique. Baliwag charged that Recontigue failed to place an early warni
ng device at the corner of the disabled cargo truck to warn oncoming vehicles.On
the other hand, A & J Trading and Recontique alleged that the accident was the
result of the negligence and reckless driving of Santiago, bus driver of Baliwag
. SC RULING: As a common carrier, Baliwag breached its contract of carriage when
it failed to deliver its passengers, Leticia and Allan Garcia to their destinat
ion safe and sound. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a ver
y cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances. In a contract of c
arriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent wh
en a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court
need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the
common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence tha
t the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 a
nd 1755 of the Civil Code. The records are bereft of any proof to show that Bali
wag exercised extraordinary diligence. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrate
s its driver s recklessness. Leticia Garcia testified that the bus was running a
t a very high speed despite the drizzle and the darkness of the highway. The pas
sengers pleaded for its driver to slow down, but their plea was ignored. Leticia
also revealed that the driver was smelling of liquor. She could smell him as sh
e was seated right behind the driver. Another passenger, Felix Cruz testified
that immediately before the collision, the bus driver was conversing with a coem
ployee. All these prove the bus driver s wanton disregard for the physical safet
y of his passengers, which make Baliwag as a common carrier liable for damages u
nder Article 1759 of the Civil Code. The award of moral damages is in accord wit
h law. In a breach of contract of carriage, moral damages are recoverable if the
carrier, through its agent, acted fraudulently or in bad faith. The evidence sh
ows the gross negligence of the driver of Baliwag bus which amounted to bad fait
h. Without doubt, Leticia and Allan experienced physical suffering, mental angui
sh and serious anxiety by reason of the accident. Leticia underwent an operation
to replace her broken hip bone with a metal plate. She was confined at the Nati
onal Orthopedic Hospital for 45 days. The young Allan was also confined in the h
ospital for his foot injury. Contrary to the contention of Baliwag, the decision
of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals awarded moral damages to
Antonio and Leticia Garcia not in their capacity as parents of Allan. Leticia w
as given moral damages as an injured party. Allan was also granted moral damages
as an injured party but because of his minority, the award in his favor has to
be given to his father who represented him in the suit. 94. FABRE, JR. vs. COURT
OF APPEALS FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision o
f the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 28245, dated September 30, 1992, which affir
med with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
58, ordering petitioners jointly and severally to pay damages to private respon
dent Amyline Antonio, and its resolution which denied petitioners motion for reco
nsideration for lack of merit. Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were
owners of a 1982 model Mazda minibus. They used the bus principally in connecti
on with a bus service for school children which they operated in Manila. The cou
ple had a driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom they hired in 1981, after trying him o
ut for two weeks. His job was to take school children to and from the St. Schola
sticas College in Malate, Manila. On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for
the World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the tr
ansportation of 33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union
and back in consideration of which private respondent paid petitioners the amoun
t of P3,000.00. The group was scheduled to leave on November 2, 1984, at 5:00 ocl
ock in the afternoon. However, as several members of the party were late, the bu
s did not leave the Tropical Hut at the corner of Ortigas Avenue and EDSA until
8:00 oclock in the evening. Petitioner Porfirio Cabil drove the minibus. The usua
l route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at
Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the
area (it being his first trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour through
the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil
came upon a sharp curve on the highway, running on a south to east direction, w
hich he described as siete. The road was slippery because it was raining, causing
the bus, which was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to th
e left road shoulder. The
bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fenc
e of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side, coming to a
full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A
coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion. Several
passengers were injured. Private respondent Amyline Antonio was thrown on the fl
oor of the bus and pinned down by a wooden seat which came off after being unscr
ewed. It took three persons to safely remove her from this position. She was in
great pain and could not move. The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not
see the curve until it was too late. He said he was not familiar with the area a
nd he could not have seen the curve despite the care he took in driving the bus,
because it was dark and there was no sign on the road. He said that he saw the
curve when he was already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He allegedly slowed down
to 30 kilometers per hour, but it was too late. The Lingayen police investigate
d the incident the next day, November 3, 1984. On the basis of their finding the
y filed a criminal complaint against the driver, Porfirio Cabil. The case was la
ter filed with the Lingayen Regional Trial Court. Petitioners Fabre paid Jesus E
scano P1,500.00 for the damage to the latters fence. On the basis of Escanos affid
avit of desistance the case against petitioners Fabre was dismissed. Amyline Ant
onio, who was seriously injured, brought this case in the RTC of Makati, Metro M
anila. As a result of the accident, she is now suffering from paraplegia and is
permanently paralyzed from the waist down. During the trial she described the op
erations she underwent and adduced evidence regarding the cost of her treatment
and therapy. Immediately after the accident, she was taken to the Nazareth Hospi
tal in Ba-ay, Lingayen. As this hospital was not adequately equipped, she was tr
ansferred to the Sto. Nio Hospital, also in the town of Ba-ay, where she was give
n sedatives. An xray was taken and the damage to her spine was determined to be
too severe to be treated there. She was therefore brought to Manila, first to th
e Philippine General Hospital and later to the Makati Medical Center where she u
nderwent an operation to correct the dislocation of her spine. RTC RULING: No co
nvincing evidence was shown that the minibus was properly checked for travel to
a long distance trip and that the driver was properly screened and tested before
being admitted for employment. Indeed, all the evidence presented have shown th
e negligent act of the defendants which ultimately resulted to the accident subj
ect of this case. Accordingly, it gave judgment for private respondents holding:
Considering that plaintiffs Word for the World Christian Fellowship, Inc. and M
s. Amyline Antonio were the only ones who adduced evidence in support of their c
laim for damages, the Court is therefore not in a position to award damages to t
he other plaintiffs. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders ju
dgment against defendants Mr. & Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. and Porfirio Cabil y Ja
mil pursuant to articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and
said defendants are ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs
CA RULING: he Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts finding that petitioner
Cabil failed to exercise due care and precaution in the operation of his vehicl
e considering the time and the place of the accident. The Court of Appeals held
that the Fabres were themselves presumptively negligent. Hence, this petition. P
etitioners raise the following ISSUES: I. Whether or not petitioners were neglig
ent. II. Whether or not petitioners were liable for the injuries suffered by pri
vate respondents. III. Whether or not damages can be awarded and in the positive
, up to what extent. SC RULING: As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exe
rcise extraordinary diligence for the safe transportation of the passengers to the
ir destination. This duty of care is not excused by proof that they exercised th
e diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of t
heir employee. As Art. 1759 of the Code provides: Common carriers are liable for
the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of
the formers employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope o
f their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. This lia
bility of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of t
heir employees. The same circumstances detailed above, supporting the finding of
the trial court and of the appellate court that petitioners are liable under Ar
ts. 2176 and 2180 for quasi delict, fully justify finding them guilty of breach
of contract of carriage under Arts. 1733, 1755 and 1759 of the Civil Code. Secon
dly, we sustain the award of damages in favor of Amyline Antonio. However, we th
ink the Court of Appeals erred in increasing the amount of compensatory damages
because private respondents did not question this award as inadequate.To the con
trary, the award of P500,000.00 for compensatory damages which the Regional Tria
l Court made is reasonable considering the contingent nature of her income as a
casual employee of a company and as distributor of beauty products and the fact
that the possibility that she might be able to work again has not been foreclose
d. In fact she testified that one of her previous employers had expressed willin
gness to employ her again. With respect to the other awards, while the decisions
of the trial court and the Court of Appeals do not sufficiently indicate the fa
ctual and legal basis for them, we find that they are nevertheless supported by
evidence in the records of this case. Viewed as an action for quasi delict, this
case falls squarely within the purview of Art. 2219(2) providing for the paymen
t of moral damages in cases of quasi delict. On the theory that petitioners are
liable for breach of contract of carriage, the award of moral damages is authori
zed by Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2220, since Cabils gross negligence amounte
d to bad faith. Amyline Antonios testimony, as well as the testimonies of her fat
her and co-passengers, fully establish the physical suffering and mental anguish
she endured as a result of the injuries caused by petitioners negligence.
The award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees was also properly made. However
, for the same reason that it was error for the appellate court to increase the
award of compensatory damages, we hold that it was also error for it to increase
the award of moral damages and reduce the award of attorneys fees, inasmuch as p
rivate respondents, in whose favor the awards were made, have not appealed. As a
bove stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals can be sustained either on the
theory of quasi delict or on that of breach of contract. The question is whethe
r, as the two courts below held, petitioners, who are the owners and driver of t
he bus, may be made to respond jointly and severally to private respondent. We h
old that they may be. In Dangwa Trans. Co. Inc. v. Court of Appeals, on facts si
milar to those in this case, this Court held the bus company and the driver join
tly and severally liable for damages for injuries suffered by a passenger. Again
, in Bachelor Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals a driver found negligent in fail
ing to stop the bus in order to let off passengers when a fellow passenger ran a
muck, as a result of which the passengers jumped out of the speeding bus and suf
fered injuries, was held also jointly and severally liable with the bus company
to the injured passengers. The same rule of liability was applied in situations
where the negligence of the driver of the bus on which plaintiff was riding conc
urred with the negligence of a third party who was the driver of another vehicle
, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buo, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,and Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Ap
peals] the bus company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the dr
iver of the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to the injured passen
ger or the latters heirs. The basis of this allocation of liability was explained
in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus: Nor should it make any difference that the
liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs from contract while that of respond
ents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises from quasi-delict. As early as 1
913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of
injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he
was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the own
ers of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. Some membe
rs of the Court, though, are of the view that under the circumstances they are l
iable on quasi-delict. It is true that in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. C
ourt of Appeals this Court exonerated the jeepney driver from liability to the i
njured passengers and their families while holding the owners of the jeepney joi
ntly and severally liable, but that is because that case was expressly tried and
decided exclusively on the theory of culpa contractual. As this Court there exp
lained: The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo [the driver]
and spouses Mangune and Carreon [the jeepney owners] were negligent. However, it
s ruling that spouses Mangune and Carreon are jointly and severally liable with
Manalo is erroneous. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with
the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind
this is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the c
arrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier
is exclusively responsible therefore to
the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver (see V
iluan v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16
SCRA 742) 95. REYES, vs. SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL FACTS: This is a petition for
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 36551 affirmin
g the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch IX, Cebu City which dismissed
a complaint for damages filed by petitioners against respondents. The facts are
as follows: Petitioner Leah Alesna Reyes is the wife of the late Jorge Reyes. T
he other petitioners, namely, Rose Nahdja, Johnny, Lloyd, and Kristine, all surn
amed Reyes, were their children. Five days before his death on January 8, 1987,
Jorge had been suffering from a recurring fever with chills. After he failed to
get relief from some home medication he was taking, which consisted of analgesic
, antipyretic, and antibiotics, he decided to see the doctor. On January 8, 1987
, he was taken to the Mercy Community Clinic by his wife. He was attended to by
respondent Dr. Marlyn Rico, resident physician and admitting physician on duty,
who gave Jorge a physical examination and took his medical history. She noted th
at at the time of his admission, Jorge was conscious, ambulatory, oriented, cohe
rent, and with respiratory distress. Typhoid fever was then prevalent in the loc
ality, as the clinic had been getting from 15 to 20 cases of typhoid per month.S
uspecting that Jorge could be suffering from this disease, Dr. Rico ordered a Wi
dal Test, a standard test for typhoid fever, to be performed on Jorge. Blood cou
nt, routine urinalysis, stool examination, and malarial smear were also made. Af
ter about an hour, the medical technician submitted the results of the test from
which Dr. Rico concluded that Jorge was positive for typhoid fever. As her shif
t was only up to 5:00 p.m., Dr. Rico indorsed Jorge to respondent Dr. Marvie Bla
nes. Dr. Marvie Blanes attended to Jorge at around six in the evening. She also
took Jorges history and gave him a physical examination. Like Dr. Rico, her impre
ssion was that Jorge had typhoid fever. Antibiotics being the accepted treatment
for typhoid fever, she ordered that a compatibility test with the antibiotic ch
loromycetin be done on Jorge. Said test was administered by nurse Josephine Page
nte who also gave the patient a dose of triglobe. As she did not observe any adv
erse reaction by the patient to chloromycetin, Dr. Blanes ordered the first five
hundred milligrams of said antibiotic to be administered on Jorge at around 9:0
0 p.m. A second dose was administered on Jorge about three hours later just befo
re midnight. At around 1:00 a.m. of January 9, 1987, Dr. Blanes was called as Jo
rges temperature rose to 41C. The patient also experienced chills and exhibited re
spiratory distress, nausea, vomiting, and convulsions. Dr. Blanes put him under
oxygen, used a suction machine, and administered hydrocortisone, temporarily eas
ing the patients convulsions. When he regained consciousness, the patient was ask
ed by Dr. Blanes whether he had a previous heart ailment or had suffered from ch
est pains in the past. Jorge replied he did not.After about 15 minutes, however,
Jorge again started to vomit, showed restlessness, and his convulsions returned
. Dr. Blanes re-applied the emergency measures taken before and, in addition, va
lium was administered. Jorge, however, did not respond to the treatment and slip
ped into cyanosis, a bluish or
purplish discoloration of the skin or mucous membrane due to deficient oxygenati
on of the blood. At around 2:00 a.m., Jorge died. He was forty years old. The ca
use of his death was Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and typhoid
fever. On June 3, 1987, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court of Ceb
u City a complaint for damages against respondents Sisters of Mercy, Sister Rose
Palacio, Dr. Marvie Blanes, Dr. Marlyn Rico, and nurse Josephine Pagente. On Se
ptember 24, 1987, petitioners amended their complaint to implead respondent Merc
y Community Clinic as additional defendant and to drop the name of Josephine Pag
ente as defendant since she was no longer connected with respondent hospital. Th
eir principal contention was that Jorge did not die of typhoid fever.Instead, hi
s death was due to the wrongful administration of chloromycetin. They contended
that had respondent doctors exercised due care and diligence, they would not hav
e recommended and rushed the performance of the Widal Test, hastily concluded th
at Jorge was suffering from typhoid fever, and administered chloromycetin withou
t first conducting sufficient tests on the patients compatibility with said drug.
They charged respondent clinic and its directress, Sister Rose Palacio, with ne
gligence in failing to provide adequate facilities and in hiring negligent docto
rs and nurse TRIAL COURT RULING: On September 12, 1991, the trial court rendered
its decision absolving respondents from the charges of negligence and dismissin
g petitioners action for damages. The trial court likewise dismissed respondents c
ounterclaim, holding that, in seeking damages from respondents, petitioners were
impelled by the honest belief that Jorges death was due to the latters negligence
. Petitioners brought the matter to the Court of Appeals. On July 31, 1997, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence this petition.
Petitioners raise the following assignment of errors: ISSUES: I. The honorable c
ourt of appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in the instant case. II. The honorable court
of appeals committed reversible error when it made an unfounded assumption that
the level of medical practice is lower in iligan city. III. The honorable court
of appeals gravely erred when it ruled for a lesser standard of care and degree
of diligence for medical practice in iligan city when it appreciate[d] no docto
rs negligence in the treatment of jorge reyes. SC RULING: In the present case, th
ere is no doubt that a physician-patient relationship existed between respondent
doctors and Jorge Reyes. Respondents were thus dutybound to use at least the sa
me level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condi
tion under the same circumstances. It is breach of this duty which constitutes a
ctionable malpractice. As to this aspect of medical malpractice, the determinati
on of the reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert testimony is e
ssential. Inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions
are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recogni
zed that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to c
ausation.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
There is a case when expert testimony may be dispensed with, and that is under t
he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. As held in Ramos v. Court of Appeals: Although
generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prov
e that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the sta
ndard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is availed by th
e plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the
injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general
rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly w
ithin the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the comm
on knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the fa
cts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are compet
ent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a
reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and
acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions
which are observable by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in
cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find
a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the ai
d of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can det
ermine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach
that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had b
een exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an applica
tion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ord
inarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. Whe
n the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus bet
ween the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while
under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce exper
t medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquit
or is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions
, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him. Thus, cour
ts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations:
leaving of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation, inju
ries sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not under, or in the area
, of treatment, removal of the wrong part of the body when another part was inte
nded, knocking out a tooth while a patients jaw was under anesthetic for the remo
val of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient was under the influence
of anesthetic, during or following an operation for appendicitis, among others.
Petitioners asserted in the Court of Appeals that the doctrine of res ipsa loqu
itur applies to the present case because Jorge Reyes was merely experiencing fev
er and chills for five days and was fully conscious, coherent, and ambulant when
he went to the hospital. Yet, he died after only ten hours from the time of his
admission. This contention was rejected by the appellate court. Petitioners now
contend that all requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur were prese
nt, namely: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unles
s someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injur
y was under the exclusive control of the person in charge; and (3) the injury su
ffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the per
son injured.
The contention is without merit. We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeal
s. In the Ramos case, the question was whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist, a
nd a hospital should be made liable for the comatose condition of a patient sche
duled for cholecystectomy In that case, the patient was given anesthesia prior t
o her operation. Noting that the patient was neurologically sound at the time of
her operation, the Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as mental br
ain damage does not normally occur in a gallblader operation in the absence of n
egligence of the anesthesiologist. Taking judicial notice that anesthesia proced
ures had become so common that even an ordinary person could tell if it was admi
nistered properly, we allowed the testimony of a witness who was not an expert.
In this case, while it is true that the patient died just a few hours after prof
essional medical assistance was rendered, there is really nothing unusual or ext
raordinary about his death. Prior to his admission, the patient already had recu
rring fevers and chills for five days unrelieved by the analgesic, antipyretic,
and antibiotics given him by his wife. This shows that he had been suffering fro
m a serious illness and professional medical help came too late for him. Respond
ents alleged failure to observe due care was not immediately apparent to a layma
n so as to justify application of res ipsa loquitur. The question required exper
t opinion on the alleged breach by respondents of the standard of care required
by the circumstances. Furthermore, on the issue of the correctness of her diagno
sis, no presumption of negligence can be applied to Dr. Marlyn Rico. As held in
Ramos: . . . . Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfu
nctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstan
ces of each case. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases
where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation,
that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily
have followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction must be made between
the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something more unusual and
not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual pr
ocedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that t
he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a phy
sician or a surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific
treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why
any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treat
ment did not produce the desired result.
Specific Acts of Negligence
We turn to the question whether petitioners have established specific acts of ne
gligence allegedly committed by respondent doctors. Petitioners contend that: (1
) Dr. Marlyn Rico hastily and erroneously relied upon the Widal test, diagnosed
Jorges illness as typhoid fever, and immediately prescribed the administration of
the antibiotic chloromycetin; and (2) Dr. Marvie Blanes erred in ordering the a
dministration of the second dose of 500 milligrams of chloromycetin barely three
hours after the first was given.Petitioners presented the testimony of Dr. Apol
inar Vacalares, Chief Pathologist of the Northern Mindanao Training Hospital, Ca
gayan de Oro City, who performed an autopsy on the body of Jorge Reyes. Dr. Vaca
lares testified that, based on his findings during the autopsy, Jorge Reyes did
not die of typhoid fever but of shock undetermined, which could be due to allerg
ic reaction or chloromycetin overdose. We are not persuaded.
First. While petitioners presented Dr. Apolinar Vacalares as an expert witness,
we do not find him to be so as he is not a specialist on infectious diseases lik
e typhoid fever.Furthermore, although he may have had extensive experience in pe
rforming autopsies, he admitted that he had yet to do one on the body of a typho
id victim at the time he conducted the postmortem on Jorge Reyes. It is also pla
in from his testimony that he has treated only about three cases of typhoid feve
r. He is thus not qualified to prove that Dr. Marlyn Rico erred in her diagnosis
. Both lower courts were therefore correct in discarding his testimony, which is
really inadmissible. In Ramos, the defendants presented the testimony of a pulm
onologist to prove that brain injury was due to oxygen deprivation after the pat
ient had bronchospasms triggered by her allergic response to a drug,] and not du
e to faulty intubation by the anesthesiologist. As the issue was whether the int
ubation was properly performed by an anesthesiologist, we rejected the opinion o
f the pulmonologist on the ground that he was not: (1) an anesthesiologist who c
ould enlighten the court about anesthesia practice, procedure, and their complic
ations; nor (2) an allergologist who could properly advance expert opinion on al
lergic mediated processes; nor (3) a pharmacologist who could explain the pharma
cologic and toxic effects of the drug allegedly responsible for the bronchospasm
s. Second. On the other hand, the two doctors presented by respondents clearly w
ere experts on the subject. They vouched for the correctness of Dr. Marlyn Ricos
diagnosis. Dr. Peter Gotiong, a diplomate whose specialization is infectious dis
eases and microbiology and an associate professor at the Southwestern University
College of Medicine and the Gullas College of Medicine, testified that he has a
lready treated over a thousand cases of typhoid fever. According to him, when a
case of typhoid fever is suspected, the Widal test is normally used,and if the 1
:320 results of the Widal test on Jorge Reyes had been presented to him along wi
th the patients history, his impression would also be that the patient was suffer
ing from typhoid fever.As to the treatment of the disease, he stated that chloro
mycetin was the drug of choice. He also explained that despite the measures take
n by respondent doctors and the intravenous administration of two doses of chlor
omycetin, complications of the disease could not be discounted. As regards Dr. V
acalares finding during the autopsy that the deceaseds gastrointestinal tract was
normal, Dr. Rico explained that, while hyperplasia in the payers patches or layer
s of the small intestines is present in typhoid fever, the same may not always b
e grossly visible and a microscope was needed to see the texture of the cells. R
espondents also presented the testimony of Dr. Ibarra T. Panopio who is a member
of the Philippine and American Board of Pathology, an examiner of the Philippin
e Board of Pathology, and chief pathologist at the MetroCebu Community Hospital,
Perpetual Succor Hospital, and the Andres Soriano Jr. Memorial Medical Center.
He stated that, as a clinical pathologist, he recognized that the Widal test is
used for typhoid patients, although he did not encourage its use because a singl
e test would only give a presumption necessitating that the test be repeated, be
coming more conclusive at the second and third weeks of the disease. He corrobor
ated Dr. Gotiongs testimony that the danger with typhoid fever is really the poss
ible complications which could develop like perforation, hemorrhage, as well as
liver and cerebral complications.As regards the 1:320 results of the Widal test
on Jorge Reyes, Dr. Panopio stated that no additional information could be obtai
ned from a higher ratio.He also agreed with Dr. Gotiong that hyperplasia in the
payers patches may be microscopic.
Indeed, the standard contemplated is not what is actually the average merit amon
g all known practitioners from the best to the worst and from the most to the le
ast experienced, but the reasonable average merit among the ordinarily good phys
icians.Here, Dr. Marlyn Rico did not depart from the reasonable standard recomme
nded by the experts as she in fact observed the due care required under the circ
umstances. Though the Widal test is not conclusive, it remains a standard diagno
stic test for typhoid fever and, in the present case, greater accuracy through r
epeated testing was rendered unobtainable by the early death of the patient. The
results of the Widal test and the patients history of fever with chills for five
days, taken with the fact that typhoid fever was then prevalent as indicated by
the fact that the clinic had been getting about 15 to 20 typhoid cases a month,
were sufficient to give upon any doctor of reasonable skill the impression that
Jorge Reyes had typhoid fever. Dr. Rico was also justified in recommending the
administration of the drug chloromycetin, the drug of choice for typhoid fever.
The burden of proving that Jorge Reyes was suffering from any other illness rest
ed with the petitioners. As they failed to present expert opinion on this, prepo
nderant evidence to support their contention is clearly absent. Third. Petitione
rs contend that respondent Dr. Marvie Blanes, who took over from Dr. Rico, was n
egligent in ordering the intravenous administration of two doses of 500 milligra
ms of chloromycetin at an interval of less than three hours. Petitioners claim t
hat Jorge Reyes died of anaphylactic shockor possibly from overdose as the secon
d dose should have been administered five to six hours after the first, per inst
ruction of Dr. Marlyn Rico. As held by the Court of Appeals, however: That chlor
omycetin was likewise a proper prescription is best established by medical autho
rity. Wilson, et. al., in Harrisons Principle of Internal Medicine, 12th ed. writ
e that chlorampenicol (which is the generic of chloromycetin) is the drug of cho
ice for typhoid fever and that no drug has yet proven better in promoting a favo
rable clinical response. Chlorampenicol (Chloromycetin) is specifically indicated
for bacterial meningitis, typhoid fever, rickettsial infections, bacteriodes in
fections, etc. (PIMS Annual, 1994, p. 211) The dosage likewise including the firs
t administration of five hundred milligrams (500 mg.) at around nine oclock in th
e evening and the second dose at around 11:30 the same night was still within me
dically acceptable limits, since the recommended dose of chloromycetin is one (1
) gram every six (6) hours. (cf. Pediatric Drug Handbook, 1st Ed., Philippine Pe
diatric Society, Committee on Therapeutics and Toxicology, 1996). The intravenou
s route is likewise correct. (Mansser, ONick, Pharmacology and Therapeutics) Even
if the test was not administered by the physician-on-duty, the evidence introdu
ced that it was Dra. Blanes who interpreted the results remain uncontroverted. (
Decision, pp. 16-17) Once more, this Court rejects any claim of professional neg
ligence in this regard. .... As regards anaphylactic shock, the usual way of gua
rding against it prior to the administration of a drug, is the skin test of whic
h, however, it has been observed: Skin testing with haptenic drugs is generally n
ot reliable. Certain drugs cause nonspecific histamine release, producing a weal
-and-flare reaction in normal individuals. Immunologic activation of mast cells
requires a polyvalent allergen, so a negative skin test to a univalent haptenic
drug does not rule out anaphylactic sensitivity to that drug. (Terr, Anaphylaxis a
nd Urticaria in Basic and Clinical Immunology, p. 349) What all this means legall
y is that even if the deceased suffered from an
anaphylactic shock, this, of itself, would not yet establish the negligence of t
he appelleephysicians for all that the law requires of them is that they perform
the standard tests and perform standard procedures. The law cannot require them
to predict every possible reaction to all drugs administered. The onus probandi
was on the appellants to establish, before the trial court, that the appellee-p
hysicians ignored standard medical procedure, prescribed and administered medica
tion with recklessness and exhibited an absence of the competence and skills exp
ected of general practitioners similarly situated. Fourth. Petitioners correctly
observe that the medical profession is one which, like the business of a common
carrier, is affected with public interest. Moreover, they assert that since the
law imposes upon common carriers the duty of observing extraordinary diligence
in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers, physicians
and surgeons should have the same duty toward their patients.They also contend
that the Court of Appeals erred when it allegedly assumed that the level of medi
cal practice is lower in Iligan City, thereby reducing the standard of care and
degree of diligence required from physicians and surgeons in Iligan City. The st
andard of extraordinary diligence is peculiar to common carriers. The Civil Code
provides: Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the v
igilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them
, according to the circumstances of each case. . . . The practice of medicine is
a profession engaged in only by qualified individuals. It is a right earned thr
ough years of education, training, and by first obtaining a license from the sta
te through professional board examinations. Such license may, at any time and fo
r cause, be revoked by the government. In addition to state regulation, the cond
uct of doctors is also strictly governed by the Hippocratic Oath, an ancient cod
e of discipline and ethical rules which doctors have imposed upon themselves in
recognition and acceptance of their great responsibility to society. Given these
safeguards, there is no need to expressly require of doctors the observance of e
xtraordinary diligence. As it is now, the practice of medicine is already conditi
oned upon the highest degree of diligence. And, as we have already noted, the st
andard contemplated for doctors is simply the reasonable average merit among ord
inarily good physicians. That is reasonable diligence for doctors or, as the Cou
rt of Appeals called it, the reasonable skill and competence . . . that a physici
an in the same or similar locality . . . should apply. Cases 87-95 VALDEZ, LUIGI
E. 96. DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On March 22, 1991, prosecu
tion witness, Rowena Umali De Ocampo, accompanied her mother to the Perpetual He
lp Clinic and General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Lagu
na. They arrived at the said hospital at around 4:30 in the afternoon of the sam
e day. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the
petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterecto
my operation on March 23, 1991. Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowen
a tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. The following
day, before her mother was wheeled into the operating room, Rowena asked the pet
itioner if the operation could be postponed. The petitioner called Lydia into he
r office and the two had a conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the pet
itioner told her that she must be operated on as scheduled. Dr. Ercillo went out
of the operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena s
sister immediately bought. An hour later, Dr. Ercillo came out again this time
to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought type "A" blood from the St. Gera
ld Blood Bank and the same was brought by the attendant into the operating room.
After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the operation
was finished. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating
room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other relatives to
buy additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with
petitioner s order as there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood b
ank. Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to
Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gaspi
ng for breath. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena s husband tog
ether with the driver of the accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospita
l to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it arrive
d. But at around 10:00 o clock P.M. she went into shock and her blood pressure d
ropped to 60/50. Lydia s unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San
Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further e
xamined. The transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital was without the prior c
onsent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the inte
nded transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo Dist
rict Hospital. Upon Lydia s arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was
wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated o
n her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. The attending
physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology
Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrive
d, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood pressure was alread
y 0/0. While the petitioner was closing the abdominal wall, the patient died. Th
us, on March 24, 1991, at 3:00 o clock in the morning, Lydia Umali was pronounce
d dead. Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and
"Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause. RULINGS
: MTCC: In convicting the petitioner, the MTCC found the following circumstances
as sufficient basis to conclude that she was indeed negligent in the performanc
e of the operation: . . . , the clinic was untidy, there was lack of provision l
ike blood and oxygen to prepare for any contingency that might happen during the
operation. The manner and the fact that the patient was brought to the San Pabl
o District Hospital for reoperation indicates that there was something wrong in
the manner in which Dra. Cruz conducted the operation. There was no showing that
before the operation, accused Dra. Cruz had conducted a cardio pulmonary cleara
nce or any typing of the blood of the patient. It was
(sic) said in medical parlance that the "the abdomen of the person is a temple o
f surprises" because you do not know the whole thing the moment it was open (sic
) and surgeon must be prepared for any eventuality thereof. The patient (sic) ch
art which is a public document was not presented because it is only there that w
e could determine the condition of the patient before the surgery. The court als
o noticed in Exh. "F-1" that the sister of the deceased wished to postpone the o
peration but the patient was prevailed upon by Dra. Cruz to proceed with the sur
gery. The court finds that Lydia Umali died because of the negligence and carele
ssness of the surgeon Dra. Ninevetch Cruz because of loss of blood during the op
eration of the deceased for evident unpreparedness and for lack of skill, the re
ason why the patient was brought for operation at the San Pablo City District Ho
spital. As such, the surgeon should answer for such negligence. With respect to
Dra. Lina Ercillo, the anaesthesiologist, there is no evidence to indicate that
she should be held jointly liable with Dra. Cruz who actually did the operation.
RTC: The RTC reiterated the abovementioned findings of the MTCC and upheld the
latter s declaration of "incompetency, negligence and lack of foresight and skil
l of appellant (herein petitioner) in handling the subject patient before and af
ter the operation." CA: . . . While we may grant that the untidiness and filthin
ess of the clinic may not by itself indicate negligence, it nevertheless shows t
he absence of due care and supervision over her subordinate employees. Did this
unsanitary condition permeate the operating room? Were the surgical instruments
properly sterilized? Could the conditions in the OR have contributed to the infe
ction of the patient? Only the petitioner could answer these, but she opted not
to testify. This could only give rise to the presumption that she has nothing go
od to testify on her defense. Anyway, the alleged "unverified statement of the p
rosecution witness" remains unchallenged and unrebutted. Likewise undisputed is
the prosecution s version indicating the following facts: that the accused asked
the patient s relatives to buy Tagamet capsules while the operation was already
in progress; that after an hour, they were also asked to buy type "A" blood for
the patient; that after the surgery, they were again asked to procure more type
"A" blood, but such was not anymore available from the source; that the oxygen
given to the patient was empty; and that the son-in-law of the patient, together
with a driver of the petitioner, had to rush to the San Pablo City District Hos
pital to get the muchneeded oxygen. All these conclusively show that the petitio
ner had not prepared for any unforeseen circumstances before going into the firs
t surgery, which was not emergency in nature, but was elective or pre-scheduled;
she had no ready antibiotics, no prepared blood, properly typed and cross-match
ed, and no sufficient oxygen supply. Moreover, there are a lot of questions that
keep nagging Us. Was the patient given any cardio-pulmonary clearance, or at le
ast a clearance by an internist, which are standard requirements before a patien
t is subjected to surgery. Did the petitioner determine as part of the pre-opera
tive evaluation, the bleeding parameters of the patient, such as bleeding time a
nd clotting time? There is no showing that these were done. The petitioner just
appears to have been in a hurry to perform the operation, even as the family wan
ted a postponement to April 6, 1991. Obviously, she did not prepare the patient;
neither did she get the family s consent to the operation. Moreover, she did no
t prepare a medical chart with instructions for the patient s care. If she did a
ll these, proof
thereof should have been offered. But there is none. Indeed, these are overwhelm
ing evidence of recklessness and imprudence. ISSUE BEFORE THE SC: Whether or not
petitioner s conviction of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homici
de, arising from an alleged medical malpractice, is supported by the evidence on
record. SC RULING: Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lac
k of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according t
o the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good stand
ing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profes
sion at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. In the re
cent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pascasio, et al., this Court sta
ted that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the nee
ded training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the sa
me field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his p
atients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any
other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimon
y is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but
also that the physician s conduct in the treatment and care falls below such sta
ndard. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice a
ctions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been r
ecognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion a
s to causation. Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case i
s the absence of any expert testimony on the matter of the standard of care empl
oyed by other physicians of good standing in the conduct of similar operations.
The prosecution s expert witnesses in the persons of Dr. Floresto Arizala and Dr
. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only testifi
ed as to the possible cause of death but did not venture to illuminate the court
on the matter of the standard of care that petitioner should have exercised. Al
l three courts below bewail the inadequacy of the facilities of the clinic and i
ts untidiness; the lack of provisions such as blood, oxygen, and certain medicin
es; the failure to subject the patient to a cardio-pulmonary test prior to the o
peration; the omission of any form of blood typing before transfusion; and even
the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation p
erformed on her by the petitioner. But while it may be true that the circumstanc
es pointed out by the courts below seemed beyond cavil to constitute reckless im
prudence on the part of the surgeon, this conclusion is still best arrived at no
t through the educated surmises nor conjectures of laymen, including judges, but
by the unquestionable knowledge of expert witnesses. For whether a physician or
surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment o
f his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. 30 The
deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from it
s realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in m
ost instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. Expert testimony should
have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are
constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other ph
ysicians in good standing when performing the same operation. It must be remembe
red that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant
case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the neces
sary precaution and employs the
best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary
is sufficiently established. This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion w
hich is so sadly lacking in the case at bench. Even granting arguendo that the i
nadequacy of the facilities and untidiness of the clinic; the lack of provisions
; the failure to conduct pre-operation tests on the patient; and the subsequent
transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation performed on her
by the petitioner do indicate, even without expert testimony, that petitioner w
as recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no cogent pr
oof exists that any of these circumstances caused petitioner s death. Thus, the
absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence: that the injury to the per
son or property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence. In litigations inv
olving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellan
t s negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proo
f of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of
such breach and the resulting death of his patient. This Court has no recourse
but to rely on the expert testimonies rendered by both prosecution and defense w
itnesses that substantiate rather than contradict petitioner s allegation that t
he cause of Lydia s death was DIC which, as attested to by an expert witness, ca
nnot be attributed to the petitioner s fault or negligence. The probability that
Lydia s death was caused by DIC was unrebutted during trial and has engendered
in the mind of this Court a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner s guilt. Thus,
her acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. While
we condole with the family of Lydia Umali, our hands are bound by the dictates o
f justice and fair dealing which hold inviolable the right of an accused to be p
resumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, this
Court finds the petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for whi
le a conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a prepon
derance of evidence is required to establish civil liability. The petitioner is
a doctor in whose hands a patient puts his life and limb. For insufficiency of e
vidence this Court was not able to render a sentence of conviction but it is not
blind to the reckless and imprudent manner in which the petitioner carried out
her duties. A precious life has been lost and the circumstances leading thereto
exacerbated the grief of those left behind. The heirs of the deceased continue t
o feel the loss of their mother up to the present time and this Court is aware t
hat no amount of compassion and commiseration nor words of bereavement can suffi
ce to assuage the sorrow felt for the loss of a loved one. Certainly, the award
of moral and exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of Lydia Umali are proper i
n the instant case. WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. NINEVETCH CRU
Z is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
but is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Lydia Umali the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil liability, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100
,000.00) as moral damages, and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as exemplary da
mages. Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Professional Regulation C
ommission (PRC) for appropriate action.
97. ROGELIO E. RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Erlinda Ramos had occasional co
mplaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of a stone
in her gall bladder. Because the discomforts somehow interfered with her normal
ways, she sought professional advice. She was advised to undergo an operation fo
r the removal of a stone in her gall bladder. She underwent a series of examinat
ions which included blood and urine tests which indicated she was fit for surger
y. At around 7:30 A.M. of June 17, 1985 and while still in her room, she was pre
pared for the operation by the hospital staff. At around 10:00 A.M., Rogelio E.
Ramos was "already dying [and] waiting for the arrival of the doctor" even as he
did his best to find somebody who will allow him to pull out his wife from the
operating room. At about 12:15 P.M., Herminda Cruz, who was inside the operating
room with the patient, heard somebody say that "Dr. Hosaka is already here." Sh
e then saw people inside the operating room "moving, doing this and that, [and]
preparing the patient for the operation". She then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating
the hapless patient. She thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds
of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka approached her. She
then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon, another a
nesthesiologist. After Dr. Calderon arrived at the operating room, she saw this
anesthesiologist trying to intubate the patient. The patient s nailbed became bl
uish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position a position where the
head of the patient is placed in a position lower than her feet which is an ind
ication that there is a decrease of blood supply to the patient s brain. Immedia
tely thereafter, she went out of the operating room, and she told Rogelio E. Ram
os "that something wrong was . . . happening". Dr. Calderon was then able to int
ubate the patient. At almost 3:00 P.M. of that fateful day, she saw the patient
taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). About two days thereafter, Rogelio E. Ra
mos was able to talk to Dr. Hosaka. The latter informed the former that somethin
g went wrong during the intubation. Reacting to what was told to him, Rogelio re
minded the doctor that the condition of his wife would not have happened, had he
looked for a good anesthesiologist. Erlinda Ramos stayed at the ICU for a month
. About four months thereafter or on November 15, 1985, the patient was released
from the hospital. During the whole period of her confinement, she incurred hos
pital bills amounting to P93,542.25 which is the subject of a promissory note an
d affidavit of undertaking executed by Rogelio E. Ramos in favor of DLSMC. Since
that fateful afternoon of June 17, 1985, she has been in a comatose condition.
She cannot do anything. She cannot move any part of her body. She cannot see or
hear. She is living on mechanical means. She suffered brain damage as a result o
f the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to five minutes. After being disch
arged from the hospital, she has been staying in their residence, still needing
constant medical attention, with her husband Rogelio incurring a monthly expense
ranging from P8,000.00 to P10,000.00. She was also diagnosed to be suffering fr
om "diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage". RULINGS: RTC: After considering the ev
idence from both sides, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of p
etitioners, to wit:
After evaluating the evidence as shown in the finding of facts set forth earlier
, and applying the aforecited provisions of law and jurisprudence to the case at
bar, this Court finds and so holds that defendants are liable to plaintiffs for
damages. The defendants were guilty of, at the very least, negligence in the pe
rformance of their duty to plaintiffpatient Erlinda Ramos. On the part of Dr. Pe
rfecta Gutierrez, this Court finds that she omitted to exercise reasonable care
in not only intubating the patient, but also in not repeating the administration
of atropine (TSN, August 20, 1991, pp. 5-10), without due regard to the fact th
at the patient was inside the operating room for almost three (3) hours. For aft
er she committed a mistake in intubating [the] patient, the patient s nailbed be
came bluish and the patient, thereafter, was placed in trendelenburg position, b
ecause of the decrease of blood supply to the patient s brain. The evidence furt
her shows that the hapless patient suffered brain damage because of the absence
of oxygen in her (patient s) brain for approximately four to five minutes which,
in turn, caused the patient to become comatose. On the part of Dr. Orlino Hosak
a, this Court finds that he is liable for the acts of Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez who
m he had chosen to administer anesthesia on the patient as part of his obligatio
n to provide the patient a good anesthesiologist , and for arriving for the sche
duled operation almost three (3) hours late. On the part of DLSMC (the hospital)
, this Court finds that it is liable for the acts of negligence of the doctors i
n their "practice of medicine" in the operating room. Moreover, the hospital is
liable for failing through its responsible officials, to cancel the scheduled op
eration after Dr. Hosaka inexcusably failed to arrive on time. In having held th
us, this Court rejects the defense raised by defendants that they have acted wit
h due care and prudence in rendering medical services to plaintiff-patient. For
if the patient was properly intubated as claimed by them, the patient would not
have become comatose. And, the fact that another anesthesiologist was called to
try to intubate the patient after her (the patient s) nailbed turned bluish, bel
ie their claim. Furthermore, the defendants should have rescheduled the operatio
n to a later date. This, they should have done, if defendants acted with due car
e and prudence as the patient s case was an elective, not an emergency case. WHE
REFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered in favor of the plain
tiffs and against the defendants. Accordingly, the latter are ordered to pay, jo
intly and severally, the former the following sums of money, to wit: 1) the sum
of P8,000.00 as actual monthly expenses for the plaintiff Erlinda Ramos reckoned
from November 15, 1985 or in the total sum of P632,000.00 as of April 15, 1992,
subject to its being updated; 2) the sum of P100,000.00 as reasonable attorney
s fees;
3) the sum of P800,000.00 by way of moral damages and the further sum of P200,00
0,00 by way of exemplary damages; and, 4) the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED. CA: The appellate court rendered a Decision, dated 29 May 1995, reve
rsing the findings of the trial court. The decretal portion of the decision of t
he appellate court reads: WHEREFORE, for the foregoing premises the appealed dec
ision is hereby REVERSED, and the complaint below against the appellants is here
by ordered DISMISSED. The counterclaim of appellant De Los Santos Medical Center
is GRANTED but only insofar as appellees are hereby ordered to pay the unpaid h
ospital bills amounting to P93,542.25, plus legal interest for justice must be t
empered with mercy. SO ORDERED. ISSUE BEFORE THE SC: Whether or not the doctrine
of Res Ipsa Loquitur is applicable to the instant case. SC RULING: We find the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. As will hereinafte
r be explained, the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a schedule
d gall bladder operation presents a case for the application of res ipsa loquitu
r. In the present case, Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy and expect
ed a routine general surgery to be performed on her gall bladder. On that fatefu
l day she delivered her person over to the care, custody and control of private
respondents who exercised complete and exclusive control over her. At the time o
f submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound and, except for a few minor disco
mforts, was likewise physically fit in mind and body. However, during the admini
stration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of cholecystectomy she suffe
red irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went
out of the operating room already decerebrate and totally incapacitated. Obvious
ly, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally
occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. In fact, this kind of situatio
n does not in the absence of negligence of someone in the administration of anes
thesia and in the use of endotracheal tube. Normally, a person being put under a
nesthesia is not rendered decerebrate as a consequence of administering such ane
sthesia if the proper procedure was followed. Furthermore, the instruments used
in the administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all u
nder the exclusive control of private respondents, who are the physicians-in-cha
rge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory neg
ligence because she was under the influence of anesthetics which rendered her un
conscious. Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain
) is injured or destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the immedia
te and exclusive control of the physicians, we hold that a practical administrat
ion of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur. Upon these facts a
nd under these circumstances the Court would be able to say, as a matter of comm
on knowledge and observation, if negligence attended the management and care of
the patient. Moreover, the liability of the physicians and the hospital in this
case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the desired results of
an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the diagnosis or treatment as in
fact no operation or treatment was ever performed on Erlinda. Thus, upon all th
ese initial determination a case is made out for the application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur.
Nonetheless, in holding that res ipsa loquitur is available to the present case
we are not saying that the doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where inj
ury occurs to a patient while under anesthesia, or to any and all anesthesia cas
es. Each case must be viewed in its own light and scrutinized in order to be wit
hin the res ipsa loquitur coverage. Having in mind the applicability of the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine and the presumption of negligence allowed therein, the Co
urt now comes to the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
private respondents were not negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesth
esia phase of the operation and, if in the affirmative, whether the alleged negl
igence was the proximate cause of Erlinda s comatose condition. Corollary theret
o, we shall also determine if the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the testi
monies of the witnesses for the private respondents. In sustaining the position
of private respondents, the Court of Appeals relied on the testimonies of Dra. G
utierrez, Dra. Calderon and Dr. Jamora. In giving weight to the testimony of Dra
. Gutierrez, the Court of Appeals rationalized that she was candid enough to adm
it that she experienced some difficulty in the endotracheal intubation of the pa
tient and thus, cannot be said to be covering her negligence with falsehood. The
appellate court likewise opined that private respondents were able to show that
the brain damage sustained by Erlinda was not caused by the alleged faulty intu
bation but was due to the allergic reaction of the patient to the drug Thiopenta
l Sodium (Pentothal), a short-acting barbiturate, as testified on by their exper
t witness, Dr. Jamora. On the other hand, the appellate court rejected the testi
mony of Dean Herminda Cruz offered in favor of petitioners that the cause of the
brain injury was traceable to the wrongful insertion of the tube since the latt
er, being a nurse, was allegedly not knowledgeable in the process of intubation.
In so holding, the appellate court returned a verdict in favor of respondents p
hysicians and hospital and absolved them of any liability towards Erlinda and he
r family. In view of the evidence at hand, we are inclined to believe petitioner
s stand that it was the faulty intubation which was the proximate cause of Erli
nda s comatose condition. Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in nat
ural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produ
ces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. An injury or d
amage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears f
rom the evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial part
in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury
or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of th
e act or omission. It is the dominant, moving or producing cause. Applying the a
bove definition in relation to the evidence at hand, faulty intubation is undeni
ably the proximate cause which triggered the chain of events leading to Erlinda
s brain damage and, ultimately, her comatosed condition. Private respondents the
mselves admitted in their testimony that the first intubation was a failure. Thi
s fact was likewise observed by witness Cruz when she heard respondent Dra. Guti
errez remarked, "Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumal
aki ang tiyan." Thereafter, witness Cruz noticed abdominal
distention on the body of Erlinda. The development of abdominal distention, toge
ther with respiratory embarrassment indicates that the endotracheal tube entered
the esophagus instead of the respiratory tree. In other words, instead of the i
ntended endotracheal intubation what actually took place was an esophageal intub
ation. During intubation, such distention indicates that air has entered the gas
trointestinal tract through the esophagus instead of the lungs through the trach
ea. Entry into the esophagus would certainly cause some delay in oxygen delivery
into the lungs as the tube which carries oxygen is in the wrong place. That abd
ominal distention had been observed during the first intubation suggests that th
e length of time utilized in inserting the endotracheal tube (up to the time the
tube was withdrawn for the second attempt) was fairly significant. Due to the d
elay in the delivery of oxygen in her lungs Erlinda showed signs of cyanosis. 66
As stated in the testimony of Dr. Hosaka, the lack of oxygen became apparent on
ly after he noticed that the nailbeds of Erlinda were already blue. However, pri
vate respondents contend that a second intubation was executed on Erlinda and th
is one was successfully done. We do not think so. No evidence exists on record,
beyond private respondents bare claims, which supports the contention that the
second intubation was successful. Assuming that the endotracheal tube finally fo
und its way into the proper orifice of the trachea, the same gave no guarantee o
f oxygen delivery, the hallmark of a successful intubation. In fact, cyanosis wa
s again observed immediately after the second intubation. Proceeding from this e
vent (cyanosis), it could not be claimed, as private respondents insist, that th
e second intubation was accomplished. Even granting that the tube was successful
ly inserted during the second attempt, it was obviously too late. As aptly expla
ined by the trial court, Erlinda already suffered brain damage as a result of th
e inadequate oxygenation of her brain for about four to five minutes. The above
conclusion is not without basis. Scientific studies point out that intubation pr
oblems are responsible for one-third (1/3) of deaths and serious injuries associ
ated with anesthesia. Nevertheless, ninety-eight percent (98%) or the vast major
ity of difficult intubations may be anticipated by performing a thorough evaluat
ion of the patient s airway prior to the operation. As stated beforehand, respon
dent Dra. Gutierrez failed to observe the proper pre-operative protocol which co
uld have prevented this unfortunate incident. Had appropriate diligence and reas
onable care been used in the pre-operative evaluation, respondent physician coul
d have been much more prepared to meet the contingency brought about by the perc
eived anatomic variations in the patient s neck and oral area, defects which wou
ld have been easily overcome by a prior knowledge of those variations together w
ith a change in technique. In other words, an experienced anesthesiologist, adeq
uately alerted by a thorough pre-operative evaluation, would have had little dif
ficulty going around the short neck and protruding teeth. Having failed to obser
ve common medical standards in pre-operative management and intubation, responde
nt Dra. Gutierrez negligence resulted in cerebral anoxia and eventual coma of E
rlinda. We now determine the responsibility of respondent Dr. Orlino Hosaka as t
he head of the surgical team. As the so-called "captain of the ship," it is the
surgeon s responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their task in
the proper manner. Respondent Dr. Hosaka s negligence can be found in his failu
re to exercise the proper authority (as the "captain" of the operative team) in
not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In
fact, no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified
if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it doe
s not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled
another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda s cholecys
tectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter s operation. Becau
se of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regardi
ng the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professiona
l duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the event
s which resulted in Erlinda s condition. We now discuss the responsibility of th
e hospital in this particular incident. The unique practice (among private hospi
tals) of filling up specialist staff with attending and visiting "consultants,"
who are allegedly not hospital employees, presents problems in apportioning resp
onsibility for negligence in medical malpractice cases. However, the difficulty
is only more apparent than real. In the first place, hospitals exercise signific
ant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct of their
work within the hospital premises. Doctors who apply for "consultant" slots, vis
iting or attending, are required to submit proof of completion of residency, the
ir educational qualifications; generally, evidence of accreditation by the appro
priate board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship in most cases, and references.
These requirements are carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administ
ration or by a review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or reje
ct the application. This is particularly true with respondent hospital. After a
physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending consultant, he is norma
lly required to attend clinico-pathological conferences, conduct bedside rounds
for clerks, interns and residents, moderate grand rounds and patient audits and
perform other tasks and responsibilities, for the privilege of being able to mai
ntain a clinic in the hospital, and/or for the privilege of admitting patients i
nto the hospital. In addition to these, the physician s performance as a special
ist is generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the basis of mortality
and morbidity statistics, and feedback from patients, nurses, interns and reside
nts. A consultant remiss in his duties, or a consultant who regularly falls shor
t of the minimum standards acceptable to the hospital or its peer review committ
ee, is normally politely terminated. In other words, private hospitals, hire, fi
re and exercise real control over their attending and visiting "consultant" staf
f. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which respondent
hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient s condition, the
control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfil
l the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the excepti
on of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exi
sts, the control test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing
, we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligenc
e cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals an
d their attending and visiting physicians. This being the case, the question now
arises as to whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respo
ndent doctors for petitioner s condition. The basis for holding an employer soli
darily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 o
f the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts
but also for those of others based on the former s responsibility under a relati
onship of patria potestas. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity
concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the f
amily to prevent damage. In other words, while the burden of proving
negligence rests on the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts
to the respondents (parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who should prove that
they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. In
the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its respon
sibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it e
xercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervisio
n of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of super
vision which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof
, or proof of a similar nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge
its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. Having failed to do this, r
espondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians fo
r Erlinda s condition. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the Court of Appeals
erred in accepting and relying on the testimonies of the witnesses for the priv
ate respondents. Indeed, as shown by the above discussions, private respondents
were unable to rebut the presumption of negligence. Upon these disquisitions we
hold that private respondents are solidarily liable for damages under Article 21
76 of the Civil Code. We now come to the amount of damages due petitioners. The
trial court awarded a total of P632,000.00 pesos (should be P616,000.00) in comp
ensatory damages to the plaintiff, "subject to its being updated" covering the p
eriod from 15 November 1985 up to 15 April 1992, based on monthly expenses for t
he care of the patient estimated at P8,000.00. At current levels, the P8000/mont
hly amount established by the trial court at the time of its decision would be g
rossly inadequate to cover the actual costs of home-based care for a comatose in
dividual. The calculated amount was not even arrived at by looking at the actual
cost of proper hospice care for the patient. What it reflected were the actual
expenses incurred and proved by the petitioners after they were forced to bring
home the patient to avoid mounting hospital bills. And yet ideally, a comatose p
atient should remain in a hospital or be transferred to a hospice specializing i
n the care of the chronically ill for the purpose of providing a proper milieu a
dequate to meet minimum standards of care. In the instant case for instance, Erl
inda has to be constantly turned from side to side to prevent bedsores and hypos
tatic pneumonia. Feeding is done by nasogastric tube. Food preparation should be
normally made by a dietitian to provide her with the correct daily caloric requ
irements and vitamin supplements. Furthermore, she has to be seen on a regular b
asis by a physical therapist to avoid muscle atrophy, and by a pulmonary therapi
st to prevent the accumulation of secretions which can lead to respiratory compl
ications. Given these considerations, the amount of actual damages recoverable i
n suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum cost
of proper care, not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to und
ertake at home to avoid bankruptcy. However, the provisions of the Civil Code on
actual or compensatory damages present us with some difficulties. Well-settled
is the rule that actual damages which may be claimed by the plaintiff are those
suffered by him as he has duly proved. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an ad
equate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. Our
rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of lit
igation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been c
ompleted and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these provisions neglect
to take into account those situations, as in this case, where the resulting inju
ry might be continuing and possible future complications directly arising from t
he injury, while certain to occur, are difficult to predict. In these cases, the
amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are to adequately and correc
tly respond to the injury caused, should be one which compensates for pecuniary
loss incurred and proved, up to the time of trial; and one which would meet pecu
niary loss certain to be suffered but which could not, from the nature of the ca
se, be made with certainty. In other words, temperate damages can and should be
awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury i
s chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no inc
ompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. The
reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases. As it would not be equi
table and certainly not in the best interests of the administration of justice f
or the victim in such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke thei
r aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded temp
erate damages are appropriate. The amount given as temperate damages, though to
a certain extent speculative, should take into account the cost of proper care.
In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing ca
re for a comatose patient who has remained in that condition for over a decade.
Having premised our award for compensatory damages on the amount provided by pet
itioners at the onset of litigation, it would be now much more in step with the
interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate damages would allow peti
tioners to provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility which generall
y specializes in such care. They should not be compelled by dire circumstances t
o provide substandard care at home without the aid of professionals, for anythin
g less would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of P1,500,
000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable. Petitioner Erlinda Ra
mos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has been in a comatos
e state for over fourteen years now. The burden of care has so far been heroical
ly shouldered by her husband and children, who, in the intervening years have be
en deprived of the love of a wife and a mother. Meanwhile, the actual physical,
emotional and financial cost of the care of petitioner would be virtually imposs
ible to quantify. Even the temperate damages herein awarded would be inadequate
if petitioner s condition remains unchanged for the next ten years. We recognize
d, in Valenzuela that a discussion of the victim s actual injury would not even
scratch the surface of the resulting moral damage because it would be highly spe
culative to estimate the amount of emotional and moral pain, psychological damag
e
and injury suffered by the victim or those actually affected by the victim s con
dition. 84 The husband and the children, all petitioners in this case, will have
to live with the day to day uncertainty of the patient s illness, knowing any h
ope of recovery is close to nil. They have fashioned their daily lives around th
e nursing care of petitioner, altering their long term goals to take into accoun
t their life with a comatose patient. They, not the respondents, are charged wit
h the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. The family s moral injury
and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. For the foregoing reasons, an
award of P2,000,000.00 in moral damages would be appropriate. Finally, by way of
example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. Con
sidering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that at
torney s fees valued at P100,000.00 are likewise proper. Our courts face unique
difficulty in adjudicating medical negligence cases because physicians are not i
nsurers of life and, they rarely set out to intentionally cause injury or death
to their patients. However, intent is immaterial in negligence cases because whe
re negligence exists and is proven, the same automatically gives the injured a r
ight to reparation for the damage caused. Established medical procedures and pra
ctices, though in constant flux are devised for the purpose of preventing compli
cations. A physician s experience with his patients would sometimes tempt him to
deviate from established community practices, and he may end a distinguished ca
reer using unorthodox methods without incident. However, when failure to follow
established procedure results in the evil precisely sought to be averted by obse
rvance of the procedure and a nexus is made between the deviation and the injury
or damage, the physician would necessarily be called to account for it. In the
case at bar, the failure to observe pre-operative assessment protocol which woul
d have influenced the intubation in a salutary way was fatal to private responde
nts case. WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court appeale
d from are hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidaril
y against private respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages
computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment
of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculousl
y survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as temperate dam
ages; 4) P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages and attorney s fees; and, 5) the
costs of the suit. SO ORDERED. 98 GARCIA-RUEDA vs. PASCASIO FACTS: Florencio V.
Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda, underwent surgical operation
at the UST hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. He was atten
ded by Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon, while Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-
Reyes was the anaesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery, however, Florencio
died of complications of "unknown cause," according to officials of the UST Hos
pital. Not satisfied with the findings of the hospital, petitioner requested the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an autopsy on her husband s b
ody. Consequently, the
NBI ruled that Florencio s death was due to lack of care by the attending physic
ian in administering anaesthesia. Pursuant to its findings, the NBI recommended
that Dr. Domingo Antonio and Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes be charged for Homicide
through Reckless Imprudence before the Office of the City Prosecutor. The case w
as initially assigned to Prosecutor Antonio M. Israel, who had to inhibit himsel
f because he was related to the counsel of one of the doctors. As a result, the
case was re-raffled to Prosecutor Norberto G. Leono who was, however, disqualifi
ed on motion of the petitioner since he disregarded prevailing laws and jurispru
dence regarding preliminary investigation. The case was then referred to Prosecu
tor Ramon O. Carisma, who issued a resolution recommending that only Dr. Reyes b
e held criminally liable and that the complaint against Dr. Antonio be dismissed
. The case took another perplexing turn when Assistant City Prosecutor Josefina
Santos Sioson, in the "interest of justice and peace of mind of the parties," re
commended that the case be re-raffled on the ground that Prosecutor Carisma was
partial to the petitioner. Thus, the case was transferred to Prosecutor Leoncia
R. Dimagiba, where a volte face occurred again with the endorsement that the com
plaint against Dr. Reyes be dismissed and instead, a corresponding information b
e filed against Dr. Antonio. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, ques
tioning the findings of Prosecutor Dimagiba. Pending the resolution of petitione
r s motion for reconsideration regarding Prosecutor Dimagiba s resolution, the i
nvestigative "pingpong" continued when the case was again assigned to another pr
osecutor, Eudoxia T. Gualberto, who recommended that Dr. Reyes be included in th
e criminal information of Homicide through Reckless Imprudence. While the recomm
endation of Prosecutor Gualberto was pending, the case was transferred to Senior
State Prosecutor Gregorio A. Arizala, who resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from
any wrongdoing, a resolution which was approved by both City Prosecutor Porfirio
G. Macaraeg and City Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero. ISSUE BEFORE THE SC: Whether
or not there was negligence on the part of the atteding physicians. SC RULING:
"Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may b
e, well founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would le
ad a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest
or strong suspicion, that a thing is so." The term does not mean actual and posi
tive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion
and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inq
uiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is en
ough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of th
e prosecution in support of the charge. In the instant case, no less than the NB
I pronounced after conducting an autopsy that there was indeed negligence on the
part of the attending physicians in administering the anaesthesia. The fact of
want of competence or diligence is evidentiary in nature, the veracity of which
can best be passed upon after a full-blown trial for it is virtually impossible
to ascertain the merits of a medical negligence case without extensive investiga
tion, research, evaluation and consultations with medical experts. Clearly, the
City Prosecutors are not in a competent position to pass judgment on such a tech
nical
matter, especially when there are conflicting evidence and findings. The bases o
f a party s accusation and defenses are better ventilated at the trial proper th
an at the preliminary investigation. A word on medical malpractice or negligence
cases. In its simplest terms, the type of lawsuit which has been called medical
malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim w
hich a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medi
cal professional which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue s
uch a claim, a patient must prove that a health care provider, in most cases a p
hysician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care p
rovider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prude
nt provider would not have done; and that that failure or action caused injury t
o the patient. Hence, there are four elements involved in medical negligence cas
es: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. Evidently, when the victim emp
loyed the services of Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes, a physician-patient relationshi
p was created. In accepting the case, Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes in effect repres
ented that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and sur
geons practicing in the same field, they will employ such training, care and ski
ll in the treatment of their patients. They have a duty to use at least the same
level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a c
ondition under the same circumstances. The breach of these professional duties o
f skill and care, or their improper performance, by a physician surgeon whereby
the patient is injured in body or in health, constitutes actionable malpractice.
Consequently, in the event that any injury results to the patient from want of
due care or skill during the operation, the surgeons may be held answerable in d
amages for negligence. Moreover, in malpractice or negligence cases involving th
e administration of anaesthesia, the necessity of expert testimony and the avail
ability of the charge of res ipsa loquitur to the plaintiff; have been applied i
n actions against anaesthesiologists to hold the defendant liable for the death
or injury of a patient under excessive or improper anaesthesia. Essentially, it
requires two-pronged evidence: evidence as to the recognized standards of the me
dical community in the particular kind of case, and a showing that the physician
in question negligently departed from this standard in his treatment. Another e
lement in medical negligence cases is causation which is divided into two inquir
ies: whether the doctor s actions in fact caused the harm to the patient and whe
ther these were the proximate cause of the patient s injury. Indeed here, a caus
al connection is discernible from the occurrence of the victim s death after the
negligent act of the anaesthesiologist in administering the anesthesia, a fact
which, if confirmed, should warrant the filing of the appropriate criminal case.
To be sure, the allegation of negligence is not entirely baseless. Moreover, th
e NBI deduced that the attending surgeons did not conduct the necessary intervie
w of the patient prior to the operation. It appears that the cause of the death
of the victim could have been averted had the proper drug been applied to cope w
ith the symptoms of malignant hyperthermia. Also, we cannot ignore the fact that
an antidote was readily available to counteract whatever
deleterious effect the anaesthesia might produce. Why these precautionary measur
es were disregarded must be sufficiently explained. 99. DOMINGA ROQUE vs. MAGTAN
GGOL C. GUNIGUNDO FACTS: On July 23, 1974 respondent Gunigundo received a copy o
f the order in the said case dismissing it on the grounds of laches and prior ju
dgment. On August 22 or the last day of the reglementary period within which to
appeal or file a motion for new trial he filed, through an associate, a motion f
or an extension of fifteen days or up to September 6 within which to file a moti
on for reconsideration. The motion was granted but Gunigundo was not able to fil
e the motion for reconsideration. Instead, on the last day, September 6, he sent
by registered mail a motion for a second extension of ten days. On September 16
, the last day of the second extension sought by him, he filed a motion for a th
ird extension of forty-eight hours. The motion for reconsideration was mailed on
September 18, 1974, the last day of the third extension. The trial court denied
the second and third motions for extension on the ground that the order of dism
iss was already final It also denied Gunigundo s motion for reconsideration of t
he orders denying his motions for extension. Gunigundo then filed in the Court o
f Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus wherein he assailed the orders
denying his motions for extension. He prayed that the lower court be directed to
resolve his motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed his peti
tion (Roque vs. Court of First Instance, CA-G.R. No. SP-04431, November 27, 1975
). It applied the ruling that the filing of a motion for extension of the period
to file the record on appeal does not suspend the period for appeal. On Septemb
er 6, 1976, the spouses Dominga Roque and Jose G. Zaplan two of the eight plaint
iffs in Civil Case No. 3826-M, filed in this Court a joint affidavit charging At
ty. Gunigundo with gross negligence in not seasonably filing the motion for reco
nsideration and in not perfecting an appeal from the trial court s order of dism
issal. After the submission of respondent s answer, the case was referred to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In June 1978 or
during the pendency of the case in the Solicitor General s office, the complain
ing spouses made a volte-facie. They executed an affidavit of desistance before
Atty. Rosario R. Rapanut, a senior attorney in the Citizens Legal Assistance Off
ice. They alleged that their complaint for disbarment was due to a misunderstand
ing. They affirmed that respondent Gunigundo was not negligent in handling their
case. ISSUE BEFORE THE SC: Whether or not the lawyer, through his own fault, is
liable for damages. SC RULING: In this case, had the respondent been more consc
ientious or experienced, he could have easily avoided the loss of his client s r
ight to appeal by filing the motion for reconsideration within the thirty-day pe
riod. He could have even withdrawn from the case with his clients consent and r
equired them to get another lawyer to perfect their appeal. However, the fact th
at the complaints and their six co-plaintiffs lost the right to appeal would not
necessarily mean that they were damaged. The lower court s order of
dismissal has in its favor the presumption of validity or correctness. Indeed, a
n examination of that order discloses that the trial court painstakingly studied
the motion to dismiss and carefully rationalized its order. If found that the a
ction was filed more than forty years after the disputed land was registered in
the name of defendants predecessor-in-interest. Where a judgment became final t
hrough the fault of the lawyer who did not appeal therefrom, that fact alone is
not a sufficient ground for the losing party to recover damages from his lawyer
since the action for damages rests "on the unsubstantiated and arbitrary supposi
tion of the injustice of the decision which became final through the fault and n
egligence" of the lawyer (Heridia vs. Salinas, 10 Phil. 157, 162. See Ventanilla
vs. Centeno, 110 Phil. 811, where the lawyer who failed to perfect an appeal wa
s ordered to pay his client two hundred pesos as nominal damages). In view of th
e foregoing and considering complainants affidavit of desistance in this case,
drastic disciplinary action against the respondent is not warranted. But he is a
dmonished to exercise care and circumspection in attending to the affairs of his
clients. A repetition of the same irregularity will be treated with more severi
ty. A copy of this decision should be attached to respondent s personal record.
100. RAYNERA vs. HICETA FACTS: On March 23, 1989, at about 2:00 in the morning,
Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home. He was riding a motorcycle traveling on th
e southbound lane of East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. The Isuzu truck was
travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. The truck was loaded wi
th two (2) metal sheets extended on both sides, two (2) feet on the left and thr
ee (3) feet on the right. There were two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35 watts
each, on both sides of the metal plates. The asphalt road was not well lighted.
At some point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motorcycle into the lef
t rear portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail lights. Due to the c
ollision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper Geraldino D. Lucelo
rushed him to the Paraaque Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the atte
nding physician, Dr. Marivic Aguirre, pronounced Reynaldo Raynera dead on arriva
l. On May 12, 1989, the heirs of the deceased demanded from respondents payment
of damages arising from the death of Reynaldo Raynera as a result of the vehicul
ar accident. The respondents refused to pay the claims. On September 13, 1989, p
etitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila a complaint for damages a
gainst respondents owner and driver of the Isuzu truck. In their complaint again
st respondents, petitioners sought recovery of damages for the death of Reynaldo
Raynera caused by the negligent operation of the truck-trailer at nighttime on
the highway, without tail lights. In their answer filed on April 4, 1990, respon
dents alleged that the truck was travelling slowly on the service road, not park
ed improperly at a dark portion of the road, with no tail lights, license plate
and early warning device.
RULINGS: RTC: On December 19, 1991, the trial court rendered decision in favor o
f petitioners. It found respondents Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla negligent i
n view of these circumstances: (1) the truck trailer had no license plate and ta
il lights; (2) there were only two pairs of red lights, 50 watts each, on both s
ides of the steel plates; and (3) the truck trailer was improperly parked in a d
ark area. The trial court held that respondents negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of Reynaldo Rayneras death, for which they are jointly and severa
lly liable to pay damages to petitioners. The trial court also held that the vic
tim was himself negligent, although this was insufficient to overcome respondent
s negligence. The trial court applied the doctrine of contributory negligence and
reduced the responsibility of respondents by 20% on account of the victims own n
egligence. The dispositive portion of the lower courts decision reads as follows:
All things considered, the Court is of the opinion that it is fair and reasonabl
e to fix the living and other expenses of the deceased the sum of P54,000.00 a y
ear or about P4,500.00 a month (P150.00 p/d) and that, consequently, the loss or
damage sustained by the plaintiffs may be estimated at P1,674,000.00 for the 31
years of Reynaldo Rayneras life expectancy. Taking into account the cooperative n
egligence of the deceased Reynaldo Raynera, the Court believes that the demand o
f substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damages on 80-20 ratio. Th
us, P1,337,200.00 shall be paid by the defendants with interest thereon, at the
legal rate, from date of decision, as damages for the loss of earnings. To this
sum, the following shall be added: (a) P33,412.00, actually spent for funeral se
rvices, interment and memorial lot; (b) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees; (c) cost of
suit. SO ORDERED. CA: After due proceedings, on April 28, 1995, the Court of Appe
als rendered decision setting aside the appealed decision. The appellate court h
eld that Reynaldo Rayneras bumping into the left rear portion of the truck was th
e proximate cause of his death, and consequently, absolved respondents from liab
ility. ISSUES BEFORE THE SC: A. Whether or not respondents were negligent. B. Wh
ether such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Reynaldo Raynera.
SC RULING: The Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the Cour
t of Appeals. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human af
fairs, would do, or the doing of something, which a prudent and reasonable man w
ould not do.
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroke
n by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. During the trial, it was established that the tr
uck had no tail lights. The photographs taken of the scene of the accident showe
d that there were no tail lights or license plates installed on the Isuzu truck.
Instead, what were installed were two (2) pairs of lights on top of the steel p
lates, and one (1) pair of lights in front of the truck. With regard to the rear
of the truck, the photos taken and the sketch in the spot report proved that th
ere were no tail lights. Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, r
espondents truck was visible in the highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed
, approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. It used the service road, instead
of the highway, because the cargo they were hauling posed a danger to passing mo
torists. In compliance with the Land Transportation Traffic Code (Republic Act N
o. 4136) respondents installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, as t
he vehicles cargo load extended beyond the bed or body thereof. We find that the
direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim. Traveling behind
the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of
him. He was in control of the situation. His motorcycle was equipped with headl
ights to enable him to see what was in front of him. He was traversing the servi
ce road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway. Traf
fic investigator Cpl. Virgilio del Monte testified that two pairs of 50-watts bu
lbs were on top of the steel plates, which were visible from a distance of 100 m
eters. Virgilio Santos admitted that from the tricycle where he was on board, he
saw the truck and its cargo of iron plates from a distance of ten (10) meters.
In light of these circumstances, an accident could have been easily avoided, unl
ess the victim had been driving too fast and did not exercise due care and prude
nce demanded of him under the circumstances. Virgilio Santos testimony strengthen
ed respondents defense that it was the victim who was reckless and negligent in d
riving his motorcycle at high speed. The tricycle where Santos was on board was
not much different from the victims motorcycle that figured in the accident. Alth
ough Santos claimed the tricycle almost bumped into the improperly parked truck,
the tricycle driver was able to avoid hitting the truck. It has been said that
drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cau
se of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. The rationale behind t
he presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the si
tuation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. We agree
with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid the collision with th
e front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle. Consequently, no other
person was to blame but the victim himself since he was the one who bumped his
motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had the last clear chance of avo
iding the accident.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRM the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 35895, dismissing the amended compla
int in Civil Case No. 89-50355, Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Manila. No cost
s. SO ORDERED. 101. PLDT vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: This case had its inception
in an action for damages instituted in the former Court of First Instance of Ne
gros Occidental by private respondent spouses against petitioner Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they sustained
in the evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fe
ll into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the insta
llation of its underground conduit system. The complaint alleged that respondent
Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered becau
se of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. As a res
ult of the accident, respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on h
er arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the respond
ent husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shatt
ered. PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries
sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and that
the entity which should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and Compa
ny (Barte, for short), an independent contractor which undertook the constructio
n of the manhole and the conduit system. Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party c
omplaint against Barte alleging that, under the terms of their agreement, PLDT s
hould in no manner be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the n
egligence or carelessness of Barte or any of its employees. In answer thereto, B
arte claimed that it was not aware nor was it notified of the accident involving
respondent spouses and that it had complied with the terms of its contract with
PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate standard signs in the vicinity
of the work site, with barricades at both ends of the excavation and with red l
ights at night along the excavated area to warn the traveling public of the pres
ence of excavations. RULINGS: RTC: On October 1, 1974, the trial court rendered
a decision in favor of private respondents, the decretal part of which reads: IN
VIEW OF THE FOREGOING considerations the defendant Philippine Long Distance Tel
ephone Company is hereby ordered (A) to pay the plaintiff Gloria Esteban the sum
of P20,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 exemplary damages; to plaintiff An
tonio Esteban the sum of P2,000.00 as moral damages and P500.00 as exemplary dam
ages, with legal rate of interest from the date of the filing of the complaint u
ntil fully paid. The defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P3,000.00 as attorney s fees. (B) The third-party defendant is hereby ordered t
o reimburse whatever amount the defendant-third party plaintiff has paid to the
plaintiff. With costs against the defendant.
CA: On September 25, 1979, the Special Second Division of the Court of Appeals r
endered a decision in said appealed case, with Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava as
ponente, reversing the decision of the lower court and dismissing the complaint
of respondent spouses. It held that respondent Esteban spouses were negligent a
nd consequently absolved petitioner PLDT from the claim for damages. ISSUES BEFO
RE THE SC: Whether or not the accident which befell private respondents was due
to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and not imputable to negl
igent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. SC RULING: Such findings were rea
ched after an exhaustive assessment and evaluation of the evidence on record, as
evidenced by the respondent court s resolution of January 24, 1980 which we quo
te with approval: First. Plaintiff s jeep was running along the inside lane of L
acson Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the
ACCIDENT MOUND. Exhibit B shows, through the tiremarks, that the ACCIDENT MOUND
was hit by the jeep swerving from the left that is, swerving from the inside lan
e. What caused the swerving is not disclosed; but, as the cause of the accident,
defendant cannot be made liable for the damages suffered by plaintiffs. The acc
ident was not due to the absence of warning signs, but to the unexplained abrupt
swerving of the jeep from the inside lane. That may explain plaintiff-husband s
insistence that he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason he ran into
it. Second. That plaintiff s jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hi
t the ACCIDENT MOUND could have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson St
reet to the south of the ACCIDENT MOUND. It has been stated that the ditches alo
ng Lacson Street had already been covered except the 3 or 4 meters where the ACC
IDENT MOUND was located. Exhibit B-1 shows that the ditches on Lacson Street nor
th of the ACCIDENT MOUND had already been covered, but not in such a way as to a
llow the outer lane to be freely and conveniently passable to vehicles. The situ
ation could have been worse to the south of the ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason
no picture of the ACCIDENT MOUND facing south was taken. Third. Plaintiff s jeep
was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff-husband claimed. At that
speed, he could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND.
The jeep would not have climbed the ACCIDENT MOUND several feet as indicated by
the tiremarks in Exhibit B. The jeep must have been running quite fast. If the
jeep had been braked at 25 kilometers an hour, plaintiff s would not have been t
hrown against the windshield and they would not have suffered their injuries. Fo
urth. If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running quite fast on
the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the ri
ght and had to climb over the ACCIDENT MOUND, then plaintiff-husband had not exe
rcised the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. With th
e drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regu
lar lights which should have made him see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time. If he was
running on the outside lane at 25 kilometers an hour, even on dim lights, his fa
ilure to see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time to brake the car was negligence on his p
art. The ACCIDENT MOUND was relatively
big and visible, being 2 to 3 feet high and 1-1/2 feet wide. If he did not see t
he ACCIDENT MOUND in time, he would not have seen any warning sign either. He kn
ew of the existence and location of the ACCIDENT MOUND, having seen it many prev
ious times. With ordinary precaution, he should have driven his jeep on the nigh
t of the accident so as to avoid hitting the ACCIDENT MOUND. The above findings
clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only cont
ributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the
occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby prec
ludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to, henc
e appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care
and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious conse
quences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligenc
e on the part of petitioner. The presence of warning signs could not have comple
tely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and wa
rn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private respondent
s already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowl
edge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the
excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane
towards the accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform
a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, cons
titutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would ha
ve prevented the injury. It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT
for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care
was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one should
exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. Furthermore, res
pondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the ac
cident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resid
ent of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge
of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence th
at exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the co
nsequences of his imprudence. Moreover, we also sustain the findings of responde
nt Court of Appeals in its original decision that there was insufficient evidenc
e to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. We have for consideration only th
e self-serving testimony of respondent Antonio Esteban and the unverified photog
raph of merely a portion of the scene of the accident. The absence of a police r
eport of the incident and the non-submission of a medical report from the hospit
al where private respondents were allegedly treated have not even been satisfact
orily explained. As aptly observed by respondent court in its aforecited extende
d resolution of January 24, 1980 (a) There was no third party eyewitness of the
accident. As to how the accident occurred, the Court can only rely on the testim
onial evidence of plaintiffs themselves, and such evidence should be very carefu
lly evaluated, with defendant, as the party being charged, being given the benef
it of any doubt. Definitely without ascribing the same motivation to plaintiffs,
another person could have deliberately engineered a similar accident in the hop
e and expectation that the Court can grant him substantial moral and exemplary d
amages from the big corporation that defendant is. The statement is made only to
stress the disadvantageous position of defendant which
would have extreme difficulty in contesting such person s claim. If there were n
o witness or record available from the police department of Bacolod, defendant w
ould not be able to determine for itself which of the conflicting testimonies of
plaintiffs is correct as to the report or non-report of the accident to the pol
ice department. A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the
burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. T
he facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by compete
nt evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burd
en in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, othe
rwise his action must fail. WHEREFORE, the resolutions of respondent Court of Ap
peals, dated March 11, 1980 and September 3,1980, are hereby SET ASIDE. Its orig
inal decision, promulgated on September 25,1979, is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRM
ED. SO ORDERED. 102. KIM vs. PHILIPPINE AERIAL TAXI CO. FACTS: On the Morning of
September 4, 1931, the plaintiff herein bought, in Manila, a passenger ticket f
or a flight to Iloilo in one of the defendant company s hydroplanes starting fro
m Madrigal Field in Pasay. Inasmuch as the engine of the plane Mabuhay, in which
he was to take the flight, was not working satisfactorily, the said plaintiff h
ad to wait for some time. While the engine was being tested, the plaintiff saw h
ow it was started by turning the propeller repeatedly and how the man who did it
ran away from it each time in order not to be caught by the said propeller. Bef
ore the plane Mabuhay was put in condition for the flight, the plane Taal arrive
d and it was decided to have the plaintiff make the flight therein. The plaintif
f and his companion were carefully carried from the beach to the plane, entering
the same by the rear or tail end, and were placed in their seats to which they
were strapped. Later, they were shown how the straps could be tightened or loose
ned in case of accident and were instructed further not to touch anything in the
plane. After an uneventful flight, the plane landed on the waters of Guimaras S
trait, in front of Iloilo, and taxied toward the beach until its pontoons struck
bottom, when the plane stopped. the pilot shut off the gasoline feed pipe, perm
itting the engine, however, to continue to function until all the gasoline was d
rained from the feed pipe and carburetor. This operation was necessary in accord
ance with the established practice of aviation in order to avoid danger of fire
which would exist if the pipes and carburetor remained full of gasoline, and to
prevent the sudden cooling of the engine which might cause serious damage, espec
ially to the valves. What really happened was that at the moment the pontoons to
uched bottom and while the pilot was signalling to the banca, the plaintiff unfa
stened the straps around him and, not even waiting to put on his hat, climbed ov
er the door to the lower wing, went down the ladder to the pontoon and walked al
ong the pontoon toward the revolving propeller. The propeller first grazed his f
orehead and, as he threw up his arm, it was caught by the revolving blades there
of and so injured that it had be amputated. ISSUE BEFORE THE SC: Whether or not
the defendant entity has complied with its contractual obligation to carry the p
laintiff-appellant Teh Le Kim safe and sound to his destination.
SC RULING: The contract entered into by the plaintiff Teh Le Kim and the defenda
nt entity Philippine Aerial Taxi Co., Inc., was that upon payment of the price o
f the passage, which the carrier had received, the latter would carry the former
by air in one of its hydroplanes and put him, safe and sound, on the beach at I
loilo. After an uneventful flight, the hydroplane, which carried the plaintiff a
nd his companion, arrived at the Iloilo beach, as usual, with nothing more left
to do but to take the plaintiff and his companion, safe and sound, ashore. In or
der to do this, it was necessary to wait for the propeller to stop, turn the rea
r or tail end of the plane towards the shore, take the passengers out by the afo
resaid rear or tail end thereof, place them in a banca and take them ashore. By
sheer common sense, the plaintiff ought to know that a propeller, be it that of
a ship or of an aeroplane, is dangerous while in motion and that to approach it
is to run the risk of being caught and injured thereby. He ought to know further
more that inasmuch as the plane was on the water, he had to wait for a banca to
take him ashore. Notwithstanding the shouts and warning signals given him from t
he shore by the representatives of the consignee firm, the plaintiff herein, not
being a man of ordinary prudence, hastily left the cabin of the plane, walked a
long one of the pontoons and directly into the revolving propeller, while the ba
nca which was to take him ashore was still some distance away and the pilot was
instructing the boatman to keep it at a safe distance from the plane. Under such
circumstances, it is not difficult to understand that the plaintiff-appellant a
cted with reckless negligence in approaching the propeller while it was still in
motion, and when the banca was not yet in a position to take him. That the plai
ntiff-appellant s negligence alone was the direct cause of the accident, is so c
lear that it is not necessary to cite authoritative opinions to support the conc
lusion that the injury to his right arm and the subsequent amputation thereof we
re due entirely and exclusively to his own imprudence and not to the slightest n
egligence attributable to the defendant entity or to its agents. Therefore, he a
lone should suffer the consequences of his act. Wherefore, not finding any error
in the judgment appealed from, it is hereby affirmed in toto, with the costs ag
ainst the appellant. So ordered. 103. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v
s. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: These consolidated petitions involve several fraudule
ntly negotiated checks. The original actions a quo were instituted by Ford Phili
ppines to recover from the drawee bank, CITIBANK, N.A. (Citibank) and collecting
bank, Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIBank) [formerly Insular Bank
of Asia and America], the value of several checks payable to the Commissioner o
f Internal Revenue, which were embezzled allegedly by an organized syndicate. On
October 19, 1977, the plaintiff Ford drew and issued its Citibank Check No. SN-
04867 in the amount of P4,746,114.41, in favor of the Commissioner of Internal R
evenue as payment of plaintiffs percentage or manufacturer s sales taxes for the
third quarter of 1977. The aforesaid check was deposited with the degendant IBA
A (now PCIBank) and was subsequently cleared at the Central Bank. Upon presentme
nt with the defendant Citibank, the proceeds of the check was paid to IBAA as co
llecting or depository bank. The proceeds of the same Citibank check of the plai
ntiff was never paid to or received by the payee thereof, the Commissioner of In
ternal Revenue.
As a consequence, upon demand of the Bureau and/or Commissioner of Internal Reve
nue, the plaintiff was compelled to make a second payment to the Bureau of Inter
nal Revenue of its percentage/manufacturers sales taxes for the third quarter o
f 1977 and that said second payment of plaintiff in the amount of P4,746,114.41
was duly received by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It has been duly establishe
d that for the payment of plaintiff s percentage tax for the last quarter of 197
7, the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued Revenue Tax Receipt No. 18747002, dated
October 20, 1977, designating therein in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, as the autho
rized agent bank of Metrobanl, Alabang branch to receive the tax payment of the
plaintiff. On December 19, 1977, plaintiff s Citibank Check No. SN-04867, togeth
er with the Revenue Tax Receipt No. 18747002, was deposited with defendant IBAA,
through its Ermita Branch. The latter accepted the check and sent it to the Cen
tral Clearing House for clearing on the samd day, with the indorsement at the ba
ck "all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsements guaranteed." Thereafter,
defendant IBAA presented the check for payment to defendant Citibank on same dat
e, December 19, 1977, and the latter paid the face value of the check in the amo
unt of P4,746,114.41. Consequently, the amount of P4,746,114.41 was debited in p
laintiff s account with the defendant Citibank and the check was returned to the
plaintiff. In a letter dated February 28, 1980 by the Acting Commissioner of In
ternal Revenue addressed to the plaintiff - supposed to be Exhibit "D", the latt
er was officially informed, among others, that its check in the amount of P4, 74
6,114.41 was not paid to the government or its authorized agent and instead enca
shed by unauthorized persons, hence, plaintiff has to pay the said amount within
fifteen days from receipt of the letter. Upon advice of the plaintiff s lawyers
, plaintiff on March 11, 1982, paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the amoun
t of P4,746,114.41, representing payment of plaintiff s percentage tax for the t
hird quarter of 1977. As a consequence of defendant s refusal to reimburse plain
tiff of the payment it had made for the second time to the BIR of its percentage
taxes, plaintiff filed on January 20, 1983 its original complaint before this C
ourt. On December 24, 1985, defendant IBAA was merged with the Philippine Commer
cial International Bank (PCI Bank) with the latter as the surviving entity. Defe
ndant Citibank maintains that: the payment it made of plaintiff s Citibank Check
No. SN-04867 in the amount of P4,746,114.41 "was in due course", it merely reli
ed on the clearing stamp of the depository/collecting bank, the defendant IBAA t
hat "all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsements guaranteed", and the pro
ximate cause of plaintiff s injury is the gross negligence of defendant IBAA in
indorsing the plaintiff s Citibank check in question. It is admitted that on Dec
ember 19, 1977 when the proceeds of plaintiff s Citibank Check No. SN-048867 was
paid to defendant IBAA as collecting bank, plaintiff was maintaining a checking
account with defendant Citibank. Although it was not among the stipulated facts
, an investigation by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) revealed that C
itibank Check No. SN-04867 was recalled by Godofredo Rivera, the General Ledger
Accountant of Ford. He purportedly needed to hold back the check because there w
as an error in the computation of the tax due to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). With Rivera s instruction, PCIBank replaced th
e check with two of its own Manager s Checks (MCs). Alleged members of a syndica
te later deposited the two MCs with the Pacific Banking Corporation. Ford, with
leave of court, filed a third-party complaint before the trial court impleading
Pacific Banking Corporation (PBC) and Godofredo Rivera, as third party defendant
s. But the court dismissed the complaint against PBC for lack of cause of action
. The course likewise dismissed the third-party complaint against Godofredo Rive
ra because he could not be served with summons as the NBI declared him as a "fug
itive from justice. RULINGS: RTC: On June 15, 1989, the trial court rendered its
decision, as follows: "Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follo
ws: "1. Ordering the defendants Citibank and IBAA (now PCI Bank), jointly and se
verally, to pay the plaintiff the amount of P4,746,114.41 representing the face
value of plaintiff s Citibank Check No. SN-04867, with interest thereon at the l
egal rate starting January 20, 1983, the date when the original complaint was fi
led until the amount is fully paid, plus costs; "2. On defendant Citibank s cros
s-claim: ordering the cross-defendant IBAA (now PCI Bank) to reimburse defendant
Citibank for whatever amount the latter has paid or may pay to the plaintiff in
accordance with next preceding paragraph; "3. The counterclaims asserted by the
defendants against the plaintiff, as well as that asserted by the cross-defenda
nt against the cross-claimant are dismissed, for lack of merits; and "4. With co
sts against the defendants. SO ORDERED." CA: On March 27, 1995, the appellate co
urt issued its judgment as follows: "WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the co
urt AFFIRMS the appealed decision with modifications. The court hereby renderes
judgment: 1. Dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 49287 insofar as defenda
nt Citibank N.A. is concerned; 2. Ordering the defendant IBAA now PCI Bank to pa
y the plaintiff the amount of P4,746,114.41 representing the face value of plain
tiff s Citibank Check No. SN-04867, with interest thereon at the legal rate star
ting January 20, 1983, the date when the original complaint was filed until the
amount is fully paid; 3. Dismissing the counterclaims asserted by the defendants
against the plaintiff as well as that asserted by the cross-defendant against t
he cross-claimant, for lack of merits. Costs against the defendant IBAA (now PCI
Bank).
IT IS SO ORDERED." ISSUE BEFORE THE SC: Whether or not the the collecting bank s
negligence is the proximate cause of the loss it incurred. SC RULING: Citibank
Check No. SN-04867 was deposited at PCIBank through its Ermita Branch. It was co
ursed through the ordinary banking transaction, sent to Central Clearing with th
e indorsement at the back "all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsements gu
aranteed," and was presented to Citibank for payment. Thereafter PCIBank, instea
d of remitting the proceeds to the CIR, prepared two of its Manager s checks and
enabled the syndicate to encash the same. On record, PCIBank failed to verify t
he authority of Mr. Rivera to negotiate the checks. The neglect of PCIBank emplo
yees to verify whether his letter requesting for the replacement of the Citibank
Check No. SN-04867 was duly authorized, showed lack of care and prudence requir
ed in the circumstances. Furthermore, it was admitted that PCIBank is authorized
to collect the payment of taxpayers in behalf of the BIR. As an agent of BIR, P
CIBank is duty bound to consult its principal regarding the unwarranted instruct
ions given by the payor or its agent. As aptly stated by the trial court, to wit
: "xxx. Since the questioned crossed check was deposited with IBAA [now PCIBank]
, which claimed to be a depository/collecting bank of BIR, it has the responsibi
lity to make sure that the check in question is deposited in Payee s account onl
y. As agent of the BIR (the payee of the check), defendant IBAA should receive i
nstructions only from its principal BIR and not from any other person especially
so when that person is not known to the defendant. It is very imprudent on the
part of the defendant IBAA to just rely on the alleged telephone call of the one
Godofredo Rivera and in his signature considering that the plaintiff is not a c
lient of the defendant IBAA." It is a well-settled rule that the relationship be
tween the payee or holder of commercial paper and the bank to which it is sent f
or collection is, in the absence of an argreement to the contrary, that of princ
ipal and agent.22 A bank which receives such paper for collection is the agent o
f the payee or holder.23 Even considering arguendo, that the diversion of the am
ount of a check payable to the collecting bank in behalf of the designated payee
may be allowed, still such diversion must be properly authorized by the payor.
Otherwise stated, the diversion can be justified only by proof of authority from
the drawer, or that the drawer has clothed his agent with apparent authority to
receive the proceeds of such check. Citibank further argues that PCI Bank s cle
aring stamp appearing at the back of the questioned checks stating that ALL PRIO
R INDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF INDORSEMENTS GURANTEED should render PCIBank liabl
e because it made it pass through the clearing house and therefore Citibank had
no other option but to pay it. Thus, Citibank had no other option but to pay it.
Thus, Citibank assets that the proximate cause of Ford s injury is the gross ne
gligence of PCIBank. Since the questione dcrossed check was deposited with PCIBa
nk, which claimed to be a
depository/collecting bank of the BIR, it had the responsibility to make sure th
at the check in questions is deposited in Payee s account only. Indeed, the cros
sing of the check with the phrase "Payee s Account Only," is a warning that the
check should be deposited only in the account of the CIR. Thus, it is the duty o
f the collecting bank PCIBank to ascertain that the check be deposited in payee
s account only. Therefore, it is the collecting bank (PCIBank) which is bound to
scruninize the check and to know its depositors before it could make the cleari
ng indorsement "all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsement guaranteed". I
n Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Equitable Banking Corporation,24 we
ruled: "Anent petitioner s liability on said instruments, this court is in full
accord with the ruling of the PCHC s Board of Directors that: In presenting th
e checks for clearing and for payment, the defendant made an express guarantee o
n the validity of "all prior endorsements." Thus, stamped at the back of the che
cks are the defedant s clear warranty: ALL PRIOR ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF END
ORSEMENTS GUARANTEED. Without such warranty, plaintiff would not have paid on th
e checks. No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear meaning of defendant
s warranty. As the warranty has proven to be false and inaccurate, the defendant
is liable for any damage arising out of the falsity of its representation." Las
tly, banking business requires that the one who first cashes and negotiates the
check must take some percautions to learn whether or not it is genuine. And if t
he one cashing the check through indifference or othe circumstance assists the f
orger in committing the fraud, he should not be permitted to retain the proceeds
of the check from the drawee whose sole fault was that it did not discover the
forgery or the defect in the title of the person negotiating the instrument befo
re paying the check. For this reason, a bank which cashes a check drawn upon ano
ther bank, without requiring proof as to the identity of persons presenting it,
or making inquiries with regard to them, cannot hold the proceeds against the dr
awee when the proceeds of the checks were afterwards diverted to the hands of a
third party. In such cases the drawee bank has a right to believe that the cashi
ng bank (or the collecting bank) had, by the usual proper investigation, satisfi
ed itself of the authenticity of the negotiation of the checks. Thus, one who en
cashed a check which had been forged or diverted and in turn received payment th
ereon from the drawee, is guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to
the success of the fraud practiced on the drawee bank. The latter may recover fr
om the holder the money paid on the check. Having established that the collectin
g bank s negligence is the proximate cause of the loss, we conclude that PCIBank
is liable in the amount corresponding to the proceeds of Citibank Check No. SN-
04867. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals i
n CA-G.R. CV No. 25017 are AFFIRMED. PCIBank, know formerly as Insular Bank of A
sia and America, is declared solely responsible for the loss of the proceeds of
Citibank Check No SN 04867 in the amount P4,746,114.41, which shall be paid toge
ther with six percent (6%) interest
thereon to Ford Philippines Inc. from the date when the original complaint was f
iled until said amount is fully paid. However, the Decision and Resolution of th
e Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 28430 are MODIFIED as follows: PCIBank and Cit
ibank are adjudged liable for and must share the loss, (concerning the proceeds
of Citibank Check Numbers SN 10597 and 16508 totalling P12,163,298.10) on a fift
y-fifty ratio, and each bank is ORDERED to pay Ford Philippines Inc. P6,081,649.
05, with six percent (6%) interest thereon, from the date the complaint was file
d until full payment of said amount.1wphi1.nt Costs against Philippine Commercial
International Bank and Citibank N.A. SO ORDERED. 104. NPC vs. COURT OF APPEALS F
ACTS: This present controversy traces its beginnings to four (4) separate compla
ints 2 for damages filed against the NPC and Benjamin Chavez before the trial co
urt. The plaintiffs therein, now private respondents, sought to recover actual a
nd other damages for the loss of lives and the destruction to property caused by
the inundation of the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan on 26-27 October 1978. The fl
ooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the defendants of wate
r through the spillways of the Angat Dam (Hydroelectric Plant). In said complain
ts, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that: 1) defendant NPC operated and main
tained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzag
aray, Bulacan; 2) defendant Benjamin Chavez was the plant supervisor at the time
of the incident in question; 3) despite the defendants knowledge, as early as
24 October 1978, of the impending entry of typhoon "Kading," they failed to exer
cise due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam; 4) when the said wa
ter level went beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of the typhoon,
the defendants suddenly, negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the dam
s spillways, thereby releasing a large amount of water which inundated the banks
of the Angat River; and 5) as a consequence, members of the household of the pl
aintiffs, together with their animals, drowned, and their properties were washed
away in the evening of 26 October and the early hours of 27 October 1978. In th
eir Answers, the defendants, now petitioners, alleged that: 1) the NPC exercised
due care, diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenance of the hydroe
lectric plant; 2) the NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the select
ion of its employees; 3) written notices were sent to the different municipaliti
es of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the impending release of a lar
ge volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advise them to take th
e necessary precautions; 4) the water released during the typhoon was needed to
prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to people and property;
5) in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they cou
ld still not contain or control the flood that resulted and; 6) the damages incu
rred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeu
re and are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria. By way of speci
al affirmative defense, the defendants averred that the NPC cannot be sued becau
se it performs a purely governmental function. RULINGS: RTC: The lower court ren
dered its decision on 30 April 1990 dismissing the complaints "for lack of suffi
cient and credible evidence."
CA: In its joint decision promulgated on 19 August 1991, the Court of Appeals re
versed the appealed decision and awarded damages in favor of the private respond
ents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOIN
G, the joint decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new
one is hereby rendered: 1. In Civil Case No. SM-950, ordering defendants-appelle
es to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiffs-appellants, with legal interest fro
m the date when this decision shall become final and executory, the following: A
. Actual damages, to wit: 1) Gaudencio C. Rayo, Two Hundred Thirty One Thousand
Two Hundred Sixty Pesos (P231,260.00); 2) Bienvenido P. Pascual, Two Hundred Fou
r Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P204.500.00); 3) Tomas Manuel, One Hundred Fifty
Five Thousand Pesos (P155,000.00); 4) Pedro C. Bartolome, One Hundred Forty Seve
n Thousand Pesos (P147,000.00);. 5) Bernardino Cruz, One Hundred Forty Three Tho
usand Five Hundred Fifty Two Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P143,552.50); 6) Jose Pal
ad, Fifty Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P57,500.00); 7) Mariano S. Cruz, Fo
rty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00); 8) Lucio Fajardo, Twenty nine Thousand Eighty P
esos (P29,080.00); and B. Litigation expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)
; 2. In Civil case No. SM-951, ordering defendants-appellees to pay jointly and
severally, plaintiff-appellant, with legal interest from the date when this deci
sion shall have become final and executory, the following : A. Actual damages of
Five Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P520,000.00);. B. Moral damages of five hun
dred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00); and. C. Litigation expenses of Ten Thousand P
esos (P10,000.00);. 3. In Civil Case No. SM-953, ordering defendants-appellees t
o pay, jointly and severally, with legal interest from the date when this decisi
on shall have become final and executory; A. Plaintiff-appellant Angel C. Torres
: 1) Actual damages of One Hundred Ninety Nine Thousand One Hundred Twenty Pesos
(P199,120.00); 2) Moral Damages of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.0
0); B. 1) 2) C. 1) 2) D. Plaintiff-appellant Norberto Torres: Actual damages of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); Moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,00
0.00); Plaintiff-appellant Rodelio Joaquin: Actual damages of One Hundred Thousa
nd Pesos (P100,000.00); Moral damages of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00
); and Plaintifsf-appellants litigation expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.
00);
4. In Civil case No. SM-1247, ordering defendants-appellees to pay, jointly and
severally, with legal interest from the date when this decision shall have becom
e final and executory : A. Plaintiffs-appellants Presentacion Lorenzo and Clodua
ldo Lorenzo: 1) Actual damages of Two Hundred Fifty Six Thousand Six Hundred Pes
os (P256,600.00); 2) Moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); B. 1) 2
) C. 1) D. Plaintiff-appellant Consolacion Guzman : Actual damages of One Hundre
d forty Thousand Pesos (P140,000.00); Moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50
,000.00); Plaintiff-appellant Virginia Guzman : Actual damages of Two Hundred Fi
ve Hundred Twenty Pesos (205,520.00); and Plaintiffs-appellants litigation expen
ses of Ten Thousand Pesos (10,000.00).
In addition, in all the four (4) instant cases, ordering defendants-appellees to
pay, jointly and severally, plaintiffs-appellants attorney fees in an amount eq
uivalent to 15% of the total amount awarded. No pronouncement as to costs. The f
oregoing judgment is based on the public respondent s conclusion that the petiti
oners were guilty of: . . . a patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprud
ence and negligence . . . in the management and operation of Angat Dam. The unho
liness of the hour, the extent of the opening of the spillways, And the magnitud
e of the water released, are all but products of defendants-appellees headlessn
ess, slovenliness, and carelessness. The resulting flash flood and inundation of
even areas (sic) one (1) kilometer away from the Angat River bank would have be
en avoided had defendants-appellees prepared the Angat Dam by maintaining in the
first place, a water elevation which would allow room for the expected torrenti
al rains. This conclusion, in turn, is anchored on its findings of fact, to wit:
As early as October 21, 1978, defendants-appellees knew of the impending onslau
ght of and imminent danger posed by typhoon "Kading". For as alleged by defendan
tsappellees themselves, the coming of said super typhoon was bannered by Bulleti
n Today, a newspaper of national circulation, on October 25, 1978, as "Super How
ler to hit R.P." The next day, October 26, 1978, said typhoon once again merited
a headline in said newspaper as "Kading s Big Blow expected this afternoon" (Ap
pellee s Brief, p. 6). Apart from the newspapers, defendants-appellees learned o
f typhoon "Kading through radio announcements (Civil Case No. SM-950, TSN, Benj
amin Chavez, December 4, 1984, pp. 7-9). Defendants-appellees doubly knew that t
he Angat Dam can safely hold a normal maximum headwater elevation of 217 meters
(Appellee s brief, p. 12; Civil Case No. SM-
951, Exhibit "I-6"; Civil Case No. SM-953, Exhibit "J-6"; Civil Case No. SM-1247
, Exhibit "G-6"). Yet, despite such knowledge, defendants-appellees maintained a
reservoir water elevation even beyond its maximum and safe level, thereby givin
g no sufficient allowance for the reservoir to contain the rain water that will
inevitably be brought by the coming typhoon. On October 24, 1978, before typhoon
"Kading" entered the Philippine area of responsibility, water elevation ranged
from 217.61 to 217.53, with very little opening of the spillways, ranging from 1
/2 to 1 meter. On October 25, 1978, when typhoon "Kading" entered the Philippine
area of responsibility, and public storm signal number one was hoisted over Bul
acan at 10:45 a.m., later raised to number two at 4:45 p.m., and then to number
three at 10:45 p.m., water elevation ranged from 217.47 to 217.57, with very lit
tle opening of the spillways, ranging from 1/2 to 1 meter. On October 26, 1978,
when public storm signal number three remained hoisted over Bulacan, the water e
levation still remained at its maximum level of 217.00 to 218.00 with very littl
e opening of the spillways ranging from 1/2 to 2 meters, until at or about midni
ght, the spillways were suddenly opened at 5 meters, then increasing swiftly to
8, 10, 12, 12.5, 13, 13.5, 14, 14.5 in the early morning hours of October 27, 19
78, releasing water at the rate of 4,500 cubic meters per second, more or less.
On October 27, 1978, water elevation remained at a range of 218.30 to 217.05 (Ci
vil Case No. SM-950, Exhibits "D" and series, "L", "M", "N", and "O" and Exhibit
s "3" and "4"; Civil Case No. SM-951, Exhibits "H" and "H-1"; Civil Case No. SM-
953, Exhibits "I" and "I-1"; Civil Case No. SM 1247, Exhibits "F" and "F-1"). Fr
om the mass of evidence extant in the record, We are convinced, and so hold that
the flash flood on October 27, 1978, was caused not by rain waters (sic), but b
y stored waters (sic) suddenly and simultaneously released from the Angat Dam by
defendantsappellees, particularly from midnight of October 26, 1978 up to the m
orning hours of October 27, 1978. ISSUE BEFORE THE SC: Whether or not the NPC sh
ould be held liable to the private respondents for any kind of damage - such dam
age being in the nature of damnum absque injuria, since the incident in question
was caused by force majeure. SC RULING: We reiterate here in Our pronouncement
in the latter case that Juan F. Nakpil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals is still good
law as far as the concurrent liability of an obligor in the case of force majeu
re is concerned. In the Nakpil case, We held: To exempt the obligor from liabili
ty under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an
"act of God," the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obl
igation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be eit
her unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impo
ssible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a moral manner; and (d) the d
ebtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to th
e creditor. (Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553; Estrada v. Consolacion,
71 SCRA 423; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527; Republic of the Phil. v.
Luzon Stevedoring Corp., 21 SCRA 279; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657).
Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concur
s a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any
manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civ
il Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability. T
he principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act
must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agenc
ies are to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief.
When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part
the result of the participation of man, whether it be from active intervention
or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it
were, and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris,
pp. 1174-1175). Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a person conc
urs with an act of God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liabi
lity by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be
exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from a
ny previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been
occasioned. (Fish & Elective Co. v. Phil. Motors, 55 Phil. 129; Tucker v. Milan,
49 O.G. 4379; Limpangco & Sons v. Yangco Steamship Co., 34 Phil. 594, 604; Lasa
m v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657). Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke th
e act of God or force majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage sustain
ed by private respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence
. The event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeur
e; a human factor negligence or imprudence had intervened. The effect then of th
e force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted
from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized
, as it were, and removed from the laws applicable to acts of God. WHEREFORE, fo
r want of merit, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Consolidated D
ecision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 27290-93 is AFFIRMED, with co
sts against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. Cases 96-104 ATANACIO, ZINNIA FARICA MA
Y V. 105. SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Private respond
ents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City, while petitioner own
s a four-storey school building along the same College Road. On October 11, 1989
, at about 6:30 in the morning, a powerful typhoon Saling hit Metro Manila. Buffet
ed by very strong winds, the roof of petitioners building was partly ripped off a
nd blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private resp
ondents house. After the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the destroye
d buildings was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building off
icial, Engr. Jesus L. Reyna.
In the complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, for
damages based on culpa aquiliana, private respondents alleged that the damage to
their house rendered the same uninhabitable; forcing them to stay temporarily i
n others houses and this was granted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed wi
th modification the trial courts disposition reducing the award for moral damages
from P1, 000,000.00 to P200, 000.00. ISSUE: Whether or not the awarding of actu
al and moral damages as well as attorneys fees and costs of suit binding even if
fortuitous event arises without human intervention? RULING: In order that a fort
uitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free
from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have
been occasioned. An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person
who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible
adverse consequences. When a persons negligence concurs with an act of God in pr
oducing damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by
showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a for
tuitous event. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the participa
tion of man whether it be from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to ac
t the whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from the rules applicabl
e to acts of God. There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous e
vent, a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any
amount of foresight, diligence or care. In order to be exempt from liability ari
sing from any adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have been no
human participation amounting to a negligent act. In other words, the person see
king exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence. Negligence, as
commonly understood, is conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue ris
k or harm to others. It may be the failure to observe that degree of care, preca
ution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, or the omission to d
o something which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by considerations which o
rdinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do. At the outset, it bea
rs emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of another has
the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence causative of his inju
ry or loss. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively establish
ed by competent evidence, not merely by presumptions and conclusions without bas
is in fact. Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner,
merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocu
lar inspection of petitioners school building after the typhoon. As the term impa
rts, an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing. What is vi
sual to the eye though, is not always reflective of the real cause behind. For i
nstance, one who hears a gunshot and then sees a wounded person cannot always de
finitely conclude that a third person shot the victim. It could have been self-i
nflicted or caused accidentally by a stray bullet. The relationship of cause and
effect must be clearly shown. On the other hand, petitioner elicited from one o
f the witnesses of private respondents, city building official Jesus Reyna, that
the original plans and design of petitioners school building were approved prior
to its construction. Engr. Reyna admitted that it was a
legal requirement before the construction of any building to obtain a permit fro
m the city building official (city engineer, prior to the passage of the Buildin
g Act of 1977). In like manner, after construction of the building, a certificat
ion must be secured from the same official attesting to the readiness for occupa
ncy of the edifice. Having obtained both building permit and certificate of occu
pancy, these are, at the very least, prima facie evidence of the regular and pro
per construction of subject school building. In addition, petitioner presented i
ts vice president for finance and administration who testified that an annual ma
intenance inspection and repair of subject school building were regularly undert
aken. Petitioner was even willing to present its maintenance supervisor to attes
t to the extent of such regular inspection but private respondents agreed to dis
pense with his testimony and simply stipulated that it would be corroborative of
the vice presidents narration. Moreover, the city building official, who has bee
n in the city government service since 1974, admitted in open court that no comp
laint regarding any defect on the same structure has ever been lodged before his
office prior to the institution of the case at bench. It is a matter of judicia
l notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this country. If subject school
buildings roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could no
t have withstood long years and several typhoons even stronger than Saling. With t
his disposition on the pivotal issue, private respondents claim for actual and mo
ral damages as well as attorneys fees must fail. Petitioner cannot be made to ans
wer for a purely fortuitous event. More so because no bad faith or willful act t
o cause damage was alleged and proven to warrant moral damages. Private responde
nts failed to adduce adequate and competent proof of the pecuniary loss they act
ually incurred. It is not enough that the damage be capable of proof but must be
actually proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, pointing out specific fa
cts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne. P
rivate respondents merely submitted an estimated amount needed for the repair of
the roof of their subject building. What is more, whether the necessary repairs w
ere caused ONLY by petitioners alleged negligence in the maintenance of its schoo
l building, or included the ordinary wear and tear of the house itself, is an es
sential question that remains indeterminable. The Court deems unnecessary to res
olve the other issues posed by petitioner. However, the writ of execution issued
on April 1, 1993 by the trial court is hereby nullified and set aside. Private
respondents are ordered to reimburse any amount or return to petitioner any prop
erty which they may have received by virtue of the enforcement of said writ. WHE
REFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged Decision is REVERSED. The com
plaint of private respondents in Civil Case No. 7314 before the trial court a qu
o is ordered DISMISSED and the writ of execution issued on April 1, 1993 in said
case is SET ASIDE. Accordingly, private respondents are ORDERED to return to pe
titioner any amount or property received by them by virtue of said writ. Costs a
gainst the private respondents.
106. ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: From the evidence
of plaintiffs it appears that in the evening of June 28 until the early morning
of June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon by the code name "Gening" buffeted the provin
ce of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake. Be
tween 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967, after the typhoon had abated and when
the floodwaters were beginning to recede the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly c
alled Nana Belen, ventured out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on
No. 19 Guerrero Street, Laoag City, and proceeded northward towards the directi
on of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to
look after the merchandise therein that might have been damaged. Wading in wais
t-deep flood on Guerrero, the deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl
at the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo Est
avillo, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned by the deceased
. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance of between 5 and 6 meters beh
ind the deceased, Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the
water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing so b
ecause on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling fr
om a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for h
elp, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to
go to the deceased, but at four meters away from her he turned back shouting tha
t the water was grounded. Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help from Anton
io Yabes at the YJ Cinema building which was four or five blocks away. After due
trial, the CFI found the facts in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complai
nt but awarded to the latter P25,000 in moral damages and attorney s fees of P45
,000. An appeal was filed with the CA which issued the controverted decision. IS
SUE: Whether or not the trial court did not err in awarding moral damages and at
torney s fees to Defendant Corporation? RULING: From the preceding, we find that
the CA did not abuse its discretion in reversing the trial court s findings but
tediously considered the factual circumstances at hand pursuant to its power to
review questions of fact raised from the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
formerly the Court of First Instance (see sec. 9, BP 129). In considering the li
ability of petitioner, the respondent CA awarded the following in private respon
dent s favor: P30,229.45 in actual damages (i.e., P12,000 for the victim s death
and P18,229.45 for funeral expenses); P50,000 in compensatory damages, computed
in accordance with the formula set in the Villa-Rey Transit case (31 SCRA 511)
with the base of P15,000 as average annual income of the deceased; P10,000 in ex
emplary damages; P3,000 attorney s fees; and costs of suit. Except for the award
of P12,000 as compensation for the victim s death, We affirm the respondent CA
s award for damages and attorney s fees. Pusuant to recent jurisprudence (People
vs. Mananquil, 132 SCRA 196; People vs. Traya, 147 SCRA 381), We increase the s
aid award of P12,000 to P30,000, thus, increasing the total actual damages to P4
8,229.45. The exclusion of moral damages and attorney s fees awarded by the lowe
r court was properly made by the respondent CA, the charge of malice and bad fai
th on the part of respondents in instituting his case being a mere product of wi
shful thinking and speculation. Award of damages and attorney s fees is unwarran
ted where the action was filed in good faith; there should be no penalty on the
right to litigate (Espiritu vs.
CA, 137 SCRA 50). If damage results from a person s exercising his legal rights,
it is damnum absque injuria (Auyong Hian vs. CTA, 59 SCRA 110). WHEREFORE, the
questioned decision of the respondent, except for the slight modification that a
ctual damages be increased to P48,229.45 is hereby AFFIRMED. 107. PLEASANTVILLE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Edith Robillo purchased from
petitioner a parcel of land designated as Lot 9, Phase II and located at Taculi
ng Road, Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In 1975, respondent Eldred Jar
dinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was vacant
. Upon completing all payments, Jardinico secured from the Register of Deeds of
Bacolod City on December 19, 1978 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106367 in hi
s name. It was then that he discovered that improvements had been introduced on
Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof. It appears tha
t on March 26, 1974, Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision fro
m C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent of peti
tioner. Under the Contract to Sell on Installment, Kee could possess the lot eve
n before the completion of all installment payments. On January 20, 1975, Kee pa
id CTTEI the relocation fee of P50.00 and another P50.00 on January 27, 1975, fo
r the preparation of the lot plan. These amounts were paid prior to Kee s taking
actual possession of Lot 8. After the preparation of the lot plan and a copy th
ereof given to Kee, CTTEI through its employee, Zenaida Octaviano, accompanied K
ee s wife, Donabelle Kee, to inspect Lot 8. Unfortunately, the parcel of land po
inted by Octaviano was Lot 9. Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct his residen
ce, a store, an auto repair shop and other improvements on the lot. The MTCC hel
d that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was attributable to CTTEI. It furt
her ruled that petitioner and CTTEI could not successfully invoke as a defense t
he failure of Kee to give notice of his intention to begin construction required
under paragraph 22 of the Contract to Sell on Installment and his having built
a sari-sari store without the prior approval of petitioner required under paragr
aph 26 of said contract, saying that the purpose of these requirements was merel
y to regulate the type of improvements to be constructed on the Lot. On appeal,
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, Bacolod City (RTC) ruled that petitioner an
d CTTEI were not at fault or were not negligent, there being no preponderant evi
dence to show that they directly participated in the delivery of Lot 9 to Kee5 T
he appellate court ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware
of the "mix-up" when he began construction of the improvements on Lot 8. ISSUE:
Whether or not the award of attorney s fees is proper? RULING: The MTCC awarded
Jardinico attorney s fees and costs in the amount of P3,000.00 and P700.00, res
pectively, as prayed for in his complaint. The RTC deleted the award, consistent
with its ruling that petitioner was without fault or negligence. The
Court of Appeals, however, reinstated the award of attorney s fees after ruling
that petitioner was liable for its agent s negligence. The award of attorney s f
ees lies within the discretion of the court and depends upon the circumstances o
f each case . We shall not interfere with the discretion of the Court of Appeals
. Jardinico was compelled to litigate for the protection of his interests and fo
r the recovery of damages sustained as a result of the negligence of petitioner
s agent . In sum, we rule that Kee is a builder in good faith. The disposition o
f the Court of Appeals that Kee "is entitled to the rights granted him under Art
icles 448, 546 and 548 of the New Civil Code" is deleted, in view of the deed of
sale entered into by Kee and Jardinico, which deed now governs the rights of Ja
rdinico and Kee as to each other. There is also no further need, as ruled by the
appellate Court, to remand the case to the court of origin "for determination o
f the actual value of the improvements and the property (Lot 9), as well as for
further proceedings in conformity with Article 448 of the New Civil Code." WHERE
FORE , the petition is partially GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals i
s hereby MODIFIED as follows: (1) Wilson Kee is declared a builder in good faith
; (2) Petitioner Pleasantville Development Corporation and respondent C.T. Torre
s Enterprises, Inc. are declared solidarily liable for damages due to negligence
; however, since the amount and/or extent of such damages was not proven during
the trial, the same cannot now be quantified and awarded; (3) Petitioner Pleasan
tville Development Corporation and respondent C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. are
ordered to pay in solidum the amount of P3,000.00 to Jardinico as attorney s fee
s, as well as litigation expenses; and (4) The award of rentals to Jardinico is
dispensed with. 108. YOBIDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On April 26, 1988, spous
es Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor children named Ardee and Jasmin, bearded
at Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur, a Yobido Liner bus bound for Davao City. Along Pi
cop Road in Km. 17, Sta. Maria, Agusan del Sur, the left front tire of the bus e
xploded. The bus fell into a ravine around three (3) feet from the road and stru
ck a tree. The incident resulted in the death of 28-year-old Tito Tumboy and phy
sical injuries to other passengers. On November 21, 1988, a complaint for breach
of contract of carriage, damages and attorney s fees was filed by Leny and her
children against Alberta Yobido, the owner of the bus, and Cresencio Yobido, its
driver, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. When the defendants ther
ein filed their answer to the complaint, they raised the affirmative defense of
caso fortuito. They also filed a third-party complaint against Philippine Phoeni
x Surety and Insurance, Inc. This third-party defendant filed an answer with com
pulsory counterclaim. At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to a stipu
lation of facts. On August 29, 1991, the lower court rendered a decision dismiss
ing the action for lack of merit. On the issue of whether or not the tire blowou
t was a caso fortuito, it found
that "the falling of the bus to the cliff was a result of no other outside facto
r than the tire blow-out." Dissatisfied, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered the Decision reversing that of the lower
court. ISSUE: Whether or not the damages being prayed for justifies the act bre
ach of contract of carriage by the petitioner in this particular case? RULING: I
n view of the foregoing, petitioners contention that they should be exempt from
liability because the tire blowout was no more than a fortuitous event that cou
ld not have been foreseen, must fail. A fortuitous event is possessed of the fol
lowing characteristics: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrenc
e, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligations, must be independ
ent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitu
tes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fu
lfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obliger must be free from a
ny participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. As
Article 1174 provides, no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event whi
ch could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other wo
rds, there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury
or loss. Under the circumstances of this case, the explosion of the new tire may
not be considered a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the s
ituation. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free
from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle. Neit
her may the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand name
noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within
five days use. Be that as it may, it is settled that an accident caused either
by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a c
aso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from liability for damages. Moreover,
a common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure or
fortuitous event alone. The common carrier must still prove that it was not neg
ligent in causing the death or injury resulting from an accident. Having failed
to discharge its duty to overthrow the presumption of negligence with clear and
convincing evidence, petitioners are hereby held liable for damages. Article 176
4 19 in relation to Article 2206 20 of the Civil Code prescribes the amount of a
t least three thousand pesos as damages for the death of a passenger. Under prev
ailing jurisprudence, the award of damages under Article 2206 has been increased
to fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00). Moral damages are generally not recoverab
le in culpa contractual except when bad faith had been proven. However, the same
damages may be recovered when breach of contract of carriage results in the dea
th of a passenger, 22 as in this case. Exemplary damages, awarded by way of exam
ple or correction for the public good when moral damages are awarded, 23 may lik
ewise be recovered in contractual obligations if the defendant acted in wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. 24 Because petitioners f
ailed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of a common
carrier, which resulted in the death of Tito Tumboy, it is deemed to have acted
recklessly. 25 As such, private respondents shall be entitled to exemplary damag
es. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED subject t
o the modification that petitioners shall, in addition to the monetary awards th
erein, be liable for the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00.
Costs against petitioners. 109. KRAMER, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: The rec
ord of the case discloses that in the early morning of April 8, 1976, the F/B Ma
rjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kr
amer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon
Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island
vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent Trans-Asia Ship
ping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, takin
g with it its fish catch. On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complain
t for damages against the private respondent before Branch 117 of the Regional T
rial Court in Pasay City. It was granted due to the need to rely on highly techn
ical aspects attendant to such collision. The private respondent elevated the ca
se to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action for certiorari and p
rohibition, alleging therein that the trial court committed a grave abuse of dis
cretion in refusing to dismiss the Complaint filed by the petitioners. In a Deci
sion dated November 27, 1987, 7 and clarified in a Resolution dated January 12,
1988, 8 the Court of Appeals granted the Petition filed by the private responden
t and ordered the trial court to dismiss the Complaint. The petitioners filed a
Motion for the reconsideration of the said Decision but the same was denied by t
he Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated May 27, 1988. ISSUE: Whether or not a
Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private responde
nt arising from a marine collision is statute of limitations? RULING: The petiti
on is devoid of merit. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upo
n a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive peri
od begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia, thi
s Court ruled that in an action for damages arising from the collision of two (2
) trucks, the action being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescripti
ve period must be counted from the day of the collision. In Espanol vs. Chairman
, Philippine Veterans Administration, 17 this Court held as followsThe right of
action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements
, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whate
ver law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to re
spect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violat
ive of the right of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last element occurs or
takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen ... .
From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be coun
ted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commis
sion of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the
time when the cause of action arises. It is therefore clear that in this action
for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year pre
scriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved pa
rty need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of
Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the
other party before he can file an action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does
not apply in this case. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can
seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners,
agents or personnel of the other vessel. Thus, the respondent court correctly f
ound that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The collision occurred on Apr
il 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was filed in court only on May 30, 1 985,
was beyond the four (4) year prescriptive period. WHEREFORE, the petition is dis
missed. No costs. 110. RAYNERA vs. HICETA FACTS: On March 23, 1989, at about 2:0
0 in the morning, Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home. He was riding a motorcyc
le traveling on the southbound lane of East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. Th
e Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. The t
ruck was loaded with two (2) metal sheets extended on both sides, two (2) feet o
n the left and three (3) feet on the right. There were two (2) pairs of red ligh
ts, about 35 watts each, on both sides of the metal plates. The asphalt road was
not well lighted. At some point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motor
cycle into the left rear portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail li
ghts. Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper Ge
raldino D. Lucelo rushed him to the Paraaque Medical Center. Upon arrival at the
hospital, the attending physician, Dr. Marivic Aguirre, pronounced Reynaldo Rayn
era dead on arrival. On May 12, 1989, the heirs of the deceased demanded from re
spondents payment of damages arising from the death of Reynaldo Raynera as a res
ult of the vehicular accident. The respondents refused to pay the claims. On Sep
tember 13, 1989, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila a compl
aintfor damages against respondents owner and driver of the Isuzu truck. On Dece
mber 19, 1991, the trial court rendered decision in favor of petitioners and it
held that respondents negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of Reynald
o Rayneras death, for which they are jointly and severally liable to pay damages
to petitioners. On January 10, 1992, respondents Hiceta and Orpilla appealed to
the Court of Appeals. After due proceedings, on April 28, 1995, the Court of App
eals rendered decision setting aside the appealed decision. The appellate court
held that Reynaldo Rayneras bumping
into the left rear portion of the truck was the proximate cause of his death, an
d consequently, absolved respondents from liability. ISSUE: Whether or not the r
espondents were negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was the proximate
cause of the death of Reynaldo Raynera? RULING: The Court finds no reason to dis
turb the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Negligence is the omission to
do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordina
rily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something,
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. [23] Proximate cause is that cau
se, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient interve
ning cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occ
urred. During the trial, it was established that the truck had no tail lights. Th
e photographs taken of the scene of the accident showed that there were no tail
lights or license plates installed on the Isuzu truck. Instead, what were instal
led were two (2) pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, and one (1) pair of
lights in front of the truck. With regard to the rear of the truck, the photos
taken and the sketch in the spot report proved that there were no tail lights. D
espite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents truck was visibl
e in the highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed, approximately 20 to 30 k
ilometers per hour. It used the service road, instead of the highway, because th
e cargo they were hauling posed a danger to passing motorists. In compliance wit
h the Land Transportation Traffic Code (Republic Act No. 4136) [25] respondents i
nstalled 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, as the vehicles cargo load
extended beyond the bed or body thereof. We find that the direct cause of the a
ccident was the negligence of the victim. Traveling behind the truck, he had the
responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. He was in contr
ol of the situation. His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable him t
o see what was in front of him. He was traversing the service road where the pre
scribed speed limit was less than that in the highway. Traffic investigator Cpl.
Virgilio del Monte testified that two pairs of 50-watts bulbs were on top of th
e steel plates, [26] which were visible from a distance of 100 meters. [27] Virg
ilio Santos admitted that from the tricycle where he was on board, he saw the tr
uck and its cargo of iron plates from a distance of ten (10) meters. [28] In lig
ht of these circumstances, an accident could have been easily avoided, unless th
e victim had been driving too fast and did not exercise due care and prudence de
manded of him under the circumstances. Virgilio Santos testimony strengthened res
pondents defense that it was the victim who was reckless and negligent in driving
his motorcycle at high speed. The tricycle where Santos was on board was not mu
ch different from the victims motorcycle that figured in the accident. Although S
antos claimed the tricycle almost bumped into the improperly parked truck, the t
ricycle driver was able to avoid hitting the truck.
It has been said that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are
presumed to be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence.
[29] The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle
has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle
in front of him. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to
avoid the collision with the front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehi
cle. Consequently, no other person was to blame but the victim himself since he
was the one who bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had t
he last clear chance of avoiding the accident. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition f
or review on certiorari and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.
R. CV No. 35895, dismissing the amended complaint in Civil Case No. 89-50355, R
egional Trial Court, Branch 45, Manila. No costs. 111. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LIN
ES, INC. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. Nos. 66102-04, August 30, 1990 F
ACTS: About 11:00 o clock in the morning on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua,
Caridad Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro M
orales and Zenaida Parejas boarded the jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune a
nd Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat, Pampang
a bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to spend Christmas at their respective h
omes. Although they usually ride in buses, they had to ride in a jeepney that da
y because the buses were full. Their contract with Manalo was for them to pay P2
4.00 for the trip. Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right
rear wheel of the jeepney was detached, so it was running in an unbalanced posit
ion. Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of which, the jeepney which was th
en running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn, invading and ev
entually stopping on the western lane of the road in such a manner that the jeep
ney s front faced the south (from where it came) and its rear faced the north (t
owards where it was going). The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the gre
ater portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming f
rom the north, among which was Bus No. 753 of petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus L
ines, Inc. (Rabbit) driven by Tomas delos Reyes. As a result of the collision, t
hree passengers of the jeepney (Catalina Pascua, Erlinda Meriales and Adelaida E
stomo) died while the other jeepney passengers sustained physical injuries. Afte
r conducting the investigation, the police filed with the Municipal Court of San
Manuel, Tarlac, a criminal complaint against the two drivers for Multiple Homic
ide. At the preliminary investigation, a probable cause was found with respect t
o the case of Manalo, thus, his case was elevated to the Court of First Instance
. However, finding no sufficiency of evidence as regards the case of delos Reyes
, the Court dismissed it. Manalo was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonm
ent. Not having appealed, he served his sentence. The complaint for damages was
then filed before the Court of First Instance in Pangasinan where costs are adju
dged against defendants Mangune, Carreon and
Manalo and Filriters Guaranty. But on appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court r
eversed the above-quoted decision by finding delos Reyes negligent. ISSUE: Wheth
er or not the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver Tomas delos Reyes
who acted with diligence required to pay the plaintiffs- appellant jointly and
severally damages that the former prayed for? RULING: It cannot be said that the
bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed
of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such calculation to be correct, is ye
t within the speed limit allowed in highways. We cannot even fault delos Reyes f
or not having avoided the collision. As aforestated, the jeepney left a skid mar
k of about 45 meters, measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached u
p to the point of collision. Delos Reyes must have noticed the perilous conditio
n of the jeepney from the time its right rear wheel was detached or some 90 mete
rs away, considering that the road was straight and points 200 meters north and
south of the point of collision, visible and unobstructed. Delos Reyes admitted
that he was running more or less 50 kilometers per hour at the time of the accid
ent. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in 3.24 sec
onds. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour, delos Reyes would have co
vered that distance in only 2.025 seconds. Verily, he had little time to react t
o the situation. To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too muc
h from him. Aside from the time element involved, there were no options availabl
e to him. As the trial court remarked (pp. 107-108, Record on Appeal): . . . The
y (plaintiffs) tried to impress this Court that defendant de los Reyes, could ha
ve taken either of two options: (1) to swerve to its right (western shoulder) or
(2) to swerve to its left (eastern lane), and thus steer clear of the Mangune j
eepney. This Court does not so believe, considering the existing exigencies of s
pace and time. As to the first option, Phil. Rabbit s evidence is convincing and
unrebutted that the Western shoulder of the road was narrow and had tall grasse
s which would indicate that it was not passable. Even plaintiffs own evidence, t
he pictures (Exhs. P and P-2, Pascua) are mute confirmation of such fact. Indeed
, it can be noticed in the picture (Exh. P-2, Pascua) after the Rabbit bus came
to a full stop, it was tilted to right front side, its front wheels resting most
probably on a canal on a much lower elevation that of the shoulder or paved roa
d. It too shows that all of the wheels of the Rabbit bus were clear of the roadw
ay except the outer left rear wheel. These observation appearing in said picture
(Exh P-2, Pascua) clearly shows coupled with the finding the Rabbit bus came to
a full stop only five meters from the point of impact (see sketch, Exh. K-Pascu
a) clearly show that driver de los Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right atte
mpt to avoid hitting the Mangune s jeepney. That it was not successful in fully
clearing the Mangune jeepney as its (Rabbit s) left front hit said jeepney (see
picture Exh. 10-A-Rabbit) must have been due to limitations of space and time. A
fter a minute scrutiny of the factual matters and duly proven evidence, We find
that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouse
s Mangune and Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are need
ed precisely pro hac vice. In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or
is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negli
gently, and this disputable presumption may
only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as pr
escribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code 2 or that the dea
th or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event 3 (Lasam v. Smith, J
r., 45 Phil. 657). The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the u
nrebutted testimonies of Caridad Pascua, Police Investigator Tacpal, Police Corp
oral Cacalda, his (Manalo s) conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and M
ultiple Serious Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence, and t
he application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur supra. The negligence of spo
uses Mangune and Carreon was likewise proven during the trial (p. 110, Record on
Appeal): To escape liability, defendants Mangune and Carreon offered to show th
ru their witness Natalio Navarro, an alleged mechanic, that he periodically chec
ks and maintains the jeepney of said defendants, the last on Dec. 23, the day be
fore the collision, which included the tightening of the bolts. This notwithstan
ding the right rear wheel of the vehicle was detached while in transit. As to th
e cause thereof no evidence was offered. Said defendant did not even attempt to
explain, much less establish, it to be one caused by a caso fortuito. . . . In a
ny event, "[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to saf
ely carry his passenger to his destination, an accident caused either by defects
in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver, is not a caso fortui
to which would avoid the carriers liability for damages (Son v. Cebu Autobus Com
pany, 94 Phil. 892 citing Lasam, et al. v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657; Necesito, e
tc. v. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75). The trial court was therefore right in find
ing that Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon were negligent. However, its rul
ing that spouses Mangune and Carreon are jointly and severally liable with Manal
o is erroneous.The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the c
arrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this
is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier
and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is ex
clusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to
the negligence of his driver (sees Viluan v. The Court of Appeals et al., G.R. N
os. L-21477-81 April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742). In other words, the carrier can neit
her shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for
his driver s negligence is his. Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and sev
erally liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier s liability personal
instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the shar
e which corresponds to the driver, contradictory to the explicit provision of Ar
ticle 2181 of the New Civil Code. We affirm the amount of damages adjudged by th
e trial court, except with respect to the indemnity for loss of life. Under Arti
cle 1764 in relation to Article 2206 of the New Civil Code, the amount of damage
s for the death of a passenger is at least three thousand pesos (P3,000.00). The
prevailing jurisprudence has increased the amount of P3,000.00 to P30,000.00 (s
ee Heirs of Amparo delos Santos, et al. v. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G
.R. No. 51165, June 21, 1990 citing De Lima v. Laguna Tayabas Co., G.R. Nos. L-3
5697-99, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 70). ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANT
ED. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated July 29, 1983 and its
resolution dated November 28, 1983 are SET ASIDE. The decision of the Court of
First Instance dated December 27, 1978 is
REINSTATED MODIFICATION that only Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Filriter
s Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. are liable to the victims or their heirs
and that the amount of indemnity for loss of life is increased to thirty thousan
d pesos (P30,000.00). So ordered. 112. FILOMENO URBANO, vs. HON. IAC AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: At about 8:00 o clock in the morning of October 23, 19
80, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his rice field at Barangay Anonang, San F
abian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcel
o Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming
from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano saw Marcelo Javie
r and Emilio Erfe cutting grass and asked them who was responsible for the openi
ng of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then
got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between t
hem ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo and hacked Javier hitting him on the righ
t palm of his hand. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was ove
rtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the ba
ck portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to ha
ck and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hack
ing Javier. Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe b
rought Javier to the physician. Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urban
o and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00
for the medical expenses of Javier. At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Jav
ier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. Whe
n admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. E
dmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter s serious
condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wou
nd in Javier s palm which could have been infected by tetanus. And on November 1
5, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. Urbano was then charg
ed with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan
City, Third Judicial District. Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." Af
ter trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to s
uffer an indeterminate prison term. The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirm
ed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the h
eirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant. ISSUE: Whet
her or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wou
nded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier
s death? RULING: We look into the nature of tetanusThe incubation period of teta
nus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms,
ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomati
c within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease,
and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approach
es 100 percent. Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritabi
lity, and headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting co
mplaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swal
lowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often c
omplain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest ma
nifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of l
ockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustaine
d contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle inv
olvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs
and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however,
most muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms encountere
d depend upon the major muscle groups affected. Reflex spasm usually occur withi
n 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an interval referred to as the onset time
. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with
a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimu
li arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous an
d excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both pai
nful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli pro
duce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respirati
on may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles w
hich prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central
nervous system damage and death. Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation
period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is us
ually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild
. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset t
ime; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but vent
ilation remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus inc
lude a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe tris
mus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasm
s. (Harrison s Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emph
asis supplied) Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found insi
de a man s body depends on the incubation period of the disease. In the case at
bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried th
e bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23,
1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetan
us, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he die
d. If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already inf
ected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier sh
ould have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms o
f tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 da
ys after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been
more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time
. The more credible conclusion is
that at the time Javier s wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form
of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier s wound cou
ld have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the c
ircumstance surrounding Javier s death, his wound could have been infected by te
tanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The rule is that the
death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since
we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused th
e victim s death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medi
cal findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of t
he wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time
Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, dist
inct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038). Doubts are pre
sent. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subs
equent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may ha
ve been the proximate cause of Javier s death with which the petitioner had noth
ing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 11
8). "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion b
y which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cau
se of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such c
ondition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of th
e independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an indep
endent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances wh
ich result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent a
ct or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931932). (at p. 125) It st
rains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal l
iability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight
physical injuries. However, the petitioner s criminal liability in this respect
was wiped out by the victim s own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and Ja
vier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement
where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier
. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of P
residential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 12
7 SCRA 16). We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and
remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It
does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability.
The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may st
ill be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tri
a, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said: ... While the guilt of the a
ccused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, on
ly a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Artic
le 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability o
f the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCR
A 559).
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides th
at the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability fo
r the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows
: The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also release
s him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine le
gal system. It has given use to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice,
where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to
the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil
responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not prov
ed, civil liability cannot be demanded. This is one of those causes where confus
ed thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fai
ls to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil resp
onsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liab
ilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order
and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the of
fender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved pa
rty. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813
of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon
the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition
of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper
that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offe
nse should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnity t
he complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable do
ubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only b
y a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less pri
vate because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? "For these
reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion.
It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible
source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable p
ersons injured or wronged." The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemn
ification imposed by the trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the indemnifi
cation was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the h
omicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly examined.
This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim
are so minded. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questione
d decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is RE
VERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Cost
s de oficio. SO ORDERED. 113. GLAN PEOPLE S LUMBER AND HARDWARE vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, FACTS: Engineer Orlando T. Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and Maxim
o Patos were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc., wi
th Calibo at the wheel, as it approached from the South Lizada Bridge going towa
rds the direction of Davao City at
about 1:45 in the afternoon of July 4,1979. At about that time, the cargo track,
loaded with cement bags, GI sheets, plywood, driven by defendant Paul Zacarias
y Infants, coming from the opposite direction of Davao City and bound for Glan,
South Cotabato, had just crossed said bridge. At about 59 yards after crossing t
he bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engin
eer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. As a result
of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly damaged while the left s
ide of the jeep, including its fender and hood, was extensively damaged. After t
he impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a fe
w meters to the rear of the truck, while the truck stopped on its wheels on the
road. On November 27, 1979, the instant case for damages was filed by the surviv
ing spouse and children of the late Engineer Calibo who are residents of Tagbila
ran City against the driver and owners of the cargo truck. The Court reached the
conclusion "that the plaintiffs failed to establish by preponderance of evidenc
e the negligence, and thus the liability, of the defendants." Accordingly, the C
ourt dismissed the complaint (and defendants counterclaim) "for insufficiency o
f evidence." Likewise dismissed was thirdparty complaint presented by the defend
ants against the insurer of the truck. The Court of Appeals saw things different
ly. It rendered judgment on the plaintiffs appeal, reversing the decision of th
e Trial Court. It found Zacarias to be negligent ISSUE: Whether or not negligenc
e of an employee gave rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the e
mployer, and their liability is both primary and solidary? RULING: The finding t
hat "the truck driven by defendant Paul Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep w
hen the collision occurred" is a loose one, based on nothing more than the showi
ng that at the time of the accident, the truck driven by Zacarias had edged over
the painted center line of the road into the opposite lane by a width of twenty
-five (25) centimeters. It ignores the fact that by the uncontradicted evidence,
the actual center line of the road was not that indicated by the painted stripe
but, according to measurements made and testified by Patrolman Juanita Dimaano,
one of the two officers who investigated the accident, correctly lay thirty-six
(36) centimeters farther to the left of the truck s side of said stripe. The Ap
pellate Court was not correct in finding that Paulino Zacarias had acted neglige
ntly in applying his brakes instead of getting back inside his lane upon espying
the approaching jeep. Being well within his own lane, as has already been expla
ined, he had no duty to swerve out of the jeep s way as said Court would have ha
d him do. And even supposing that he was in fact partly inside the opposite lane
, coming to a full stop with the jeep still thirty (30) meters away cannot be co
nsidered an unsafe or imprudent action, there also being uncontradicted evidence
that the jeep was "zigzagging" 20 and hence no way of telling in which directio
n it would go as it approached the truck. Also clearly erroneous is the finding
of the Intermediate Appellate Court that Zacarias had no driver s license at the
time. The traffic accident report attests to the proven fact that Zacarias volu
ntarily surrendered to the investigating officers his driver s license, valid fo
r 1979, that had been renewed just the day before the accident, on July 3, 1979.
21 The Court was apparently misled by the circumstance that when said driver wa
s first asked to show his license by the investigators at the scene of the colli
sion, he had first inadvertently produced the license of a fellow driver, Leonar
do Baricuatro, who had left
said license in Davao City and had asked Zacarias to bring it back to him in Gla
n, Cotabato. The evidence not only acquits Zacarias of any negligence in the mat
ter; there are also quite a few significant indicators that it was rather Engine
er Calibo s negligence that was the proximate cause of the accident. Zacarias ha
d told Patrolman Dimaano at the scene of the collision and later confirmed in hi
s written statement at the police headquarters 23 that the jeep had been "zigzag
ging," which is to say that it was travelling or being driven erratically at the
time. The other investigator, Patrolman Jose Esparcia, also testified that eyew
itnesses to the accident had remarked on the jeep s "zigzagging." 24 There is mo
reover more than a suggestion that Calibo had been drinking shortly before the a
ccident. The decision of the Trial Court adverts to further testimony of Esparci
a to the effect that three of Calibo s companions at the beach party he was driv
ing home from when the collision occurred, who, having left ahead of him went to
the scene when they heard about the accident, had said that there had been a dr
inking spree at the party and, referring to Calibo, had remarked: "Sabi na huag
nang mag drive . . . . pumipilit," (loosely translated, "He was advised not to d
rive, but he insisted.") The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid
and complete a defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and a
pplied in the 1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, supra, which involved a similar sta
te of facts. Of those facts, which should be familiar to every student of law, i
t is only necessary to recall the summary made in the syllabus of this Court s d
ecision that: (t)he plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing an automobil
e ahead he improperly pulled his horse over to the railing on the right. The dri
ver of the automobile, however guided his car toward the plaintiff without dimin
ution of speed until he was only few feet away. He then turned to the right but
passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened, jumped around a
nd was killed by the passing car. . . . . Plaintiff Picart was thrown off his ho
rse and suffered contusions which required several days of medical attention. He
sued the defendant Smith for the value of his animal, medical expenses and dama
ge to his apparel and obtained judgment from this Court which, while finding tha
t there was negligence on the part of both parties, held that that of the defend
ant was the immediate and determining cause of the accident and that of the plai
ntiff ". . . the more remote factor in the case": It goes without saying that th
e plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent neg
ligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have alread
y stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always
is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be n
oted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since
the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an
appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who h
as the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is charge
able with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the oth
er party. Since said ruling clearly applies to exonerate petitioner Zacarias and
his employer (and co-petitioner) George Lim, an inquiry into whether or not the
evidence supports the latter s additional defense of due diligence in the selec
tion and supervision of said driver
is no longer necessary and wig not be undertaken. The fact is that there is such
evidence in the record which has not been controverted. It must be pointed out,
however, that the Intermediate Appellate Court also seriously erred in holding
the petitioners Pablo S. Agad and Felix Lim solidarily liable for the damages aw
arded in its appealed decision, as alleged owners, with petitioner George Lim, o
f Glan People s Lumber and Hardware, employer of petitioner Zacarias. This manif
estly disregarded, not only the certificate of registration issued by the Bureau
of Domestic Trade identifying Glan People s Lumber and Hardware as a business n
ame registered by George Lim, 28 but also unimpugned allegations into the petiti
oners answer to the complaint that Pablo S. Agad was only an employee of George
Lim and that Felix Lim, then a child of only eight (8) years, was in no way con
nected with the business. In conclusion, it must also be stated that there is no
doubt of this Court s power to review the assailed decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court under the authority of precedents recognizing exceptions to the
familiar rule binding it to observe and respect the latter s findings of fact.
Many of those exceptions may be cited to support the review here undertaken, but
only the most obvious that said findings directly conflict with those of the Tr
ial Court will suffice. 29 In the opinion of this Court and after a careful revi
ew of the record, the evidence singularly fails to support the findings of the I
ntermediate Appellate Court which, for all that appears, seem to have been promp
ted rather by sympathy for the heirs of the deceased Engineer Calibo than by an
objective appraisal of the proofs and a correct application of the law to the es
tablished facts. Compassion for the plight of those whom an accident has robbed
of the love and support of a husband and father is an entirely natural and under
standable sentiment. It should not, however, be allowed to stand in the way of,
much less to influence, a just verdict in a suit at law. WHEREFORE, the appealed
judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED, and the compla
int against herein petitioners in Civil Case No. 3283 of the Court of First Inst
ance of Bohol, Branch IV, is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED
. Cases 105-113 LACMAAN, FRECHIE O. 114. ROGELIO ENGADA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEAL
S, G.R. No. 140698. June 20, 2003 FACTS: On November 29, 1989, at about 1:30 in
the afternoon, Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for Il
oilo City. On board was Sheila Seyan, the registered owner of the Tamaraw. While
traversing the road along Barangay Acquit, Barotac Nuevo, the Tamaraw passenger
s allegedly saw from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up, driven by
petitioner Rogelio Engada. The pick-up had just negotiated a hilly gradient on t
he highway. When it was just a few meters away from the Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-
ups right signal light flashed, at the same time, it swerved to its left, encroac
hing upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on collision course
with it. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. Iran swerved to his left bu
t the pick-up also swerved to its right. Thus, the pick-up collided with the
Tamaraw, hitting the latter at its right front passenger side. The impact caused
the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its body. Seyan was thrown
out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. The pick-up stopped diagonally as
tride the center of the road. Seyan and Iran were brought to Barotac Nuevo Medic
are Hospital. Seyan was profusely bleeding from her nose and was in a state of s
hock with her eyes closed. In the afternoon of the same day, November 29, 1989,
she was transferred to St. Pauls Hospital in Iloilo City where she was confined.
Her medical certificate revealed that she suffered a fracture on the right femur
, lacerated wound on the right foot, multiple contusions, abrasions, blunt abdom
inal injury, and lacerations of the upper-lower pole of the right kidney. She wa
s discharged from the hospital only on January 15, 1990. Seyan incurred P130,000
in medical expenses. The Toyota Tamaraw jeepney ended up in the junk heap. Its
total loss was computed at P80,000. On August 25, 1994 the trial court found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Imprudence resulting in physic
al injuries and damage to property defined and penalized in Article 263, paragra
ph 4 and in relation with Article 365, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, he
reby sentences the accused Rogelio Engada to suffer imprisonment of one (1) mont
h and one (1) day of arresto mayor. Accused is further ordered to pay complainan
t Mrs. Sheila Seyan the amount of P51,000.00 for the total destruction of the To
yota Tamaraw Jeepney and P110,000.00 for indemnification of hospital and medical
expenses, and to pay the cost of the suit. Petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals. On May 31, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed
with modification the trial courts decision as to the penalty imposed upon the a
ccused who is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) months of arre
sto mayor. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals err in finding that the ac
tion of petitioner, Rogelio Engada, was the proximate cause of the collision. RU
LING: For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers o
f vehicles abandoning their lane, petitioner must be held liable. Iran could not
be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the pick-up, he swerved to his left. Pe
titioners acts had put Iran in an emergency situation which forced him to act qui
ckly. An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is r
equired to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted
to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undert
ake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, un
less the emergency was brought by his own negligence. Petitioner tries to extric
ate himself from liability by invoking the doctrine of last clear chance. He ave
rs that between him and Iran, the latter had the last clear chance to avoid the
collision, hence Iran must be held liable. The doctrine of last clear chance sta
tes that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an ac
cident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law
solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. But as already stated
on this point, no convincing evidence was adduced by petitioner to support his i
nvocation of the above cited doctrine. Instead, what has been shown is the prese
nce of an emergency and the proper application of the emergency
rule. Petitioners act of swerving to the Tamaraws lane at a distance of 30 meters
from it and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it approached the Tamar
aw, denied Iran time and opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was n
o clear chance to speak of. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in hol
ding petitioner responsible for the vehicular collision and the resulting damage
s, including the injuries suffered by Mrs. Sheila Seyan and the total loss of th
e Tamaraw jeepney. It also did not err in imposing on petitioner the sentence of
four (4) months of arresto mayor. 115. PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC. VS. MARICA
R BAESA FACTS: At about 7:00 oclock in the morning of June 12, 1981, the spouses
Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim, Marcelino and Maricar, t
ogether with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and seven
other persons, were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Malal
am River, Ilagan, Isabela, to celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of Ceasar
and Marilyn Baesa. The group, numbering fifteen (15) persons, rode in the passen
ger jeepney driven by David Ico, who was also the registered owner thereof. From
Ilagan, Isabela, they proceeded to Barrio Capayacan to deliver some viands to o
ne Mrs. Bascos and thenceforth to San Felipe, taking the highway going to Malala
m River. Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right and proceeded to Ma
lalam River at a speed of about 20 kph. While they were proceeding towards Malal
am River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its regular route to Manila,
encroached on the jeepneys lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with it.
As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa an
d their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa, died while the rest of the pas
sengers suffered injuries. The jeepney was extensively damaged. After the accide
nt the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio Ramirez, boarded a car and proceede
d to Santiago, Isabela. From that time on up to the present, Ramirez has never b
een seen and has apparently remained in hiding. All the victims and/or their sur
viving heirs except herein private respondents settled the case amicably under t
he No Fault insurance coverage of PANTRANCO. On July 3, 1984, the Court of First I
nstance of Pangasinan rendered a decision against PANTRANCO awarding the total a
mount of Two Million Three Hundred Four Thousand Six Hundred Forty-Seven Pesos (
P2,304,647.00) as damages, plus 10% thereof as attorneys fees and costs to Marica
r Baesa in Civil Case No. 561-R, and the total amount of Six Hundred Fifty Two T
housand Six Hundred Seventy-Two Pesos (P652,672.00) as damages, plus 10% thereof
as attorneys fees and costs to Fe Ico and her children in Civil Case No. 589-R.
On appeal, the cases were consolidated and the Court of Appeals modified the dec
ision of the trial court by ordering PANTRANCO to pay the total amount of One Mi
llion One Hundred Eighty-Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty-Seven Pesos (P1,189,9
27.00) as damages, plus Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as attorneys fees to M
aricar Baesa, and the total amount of Three Hundred Forty-Four Thousand Pesos (P
344,000.00) plus Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorneys fees to Fe Ico and
her children, and to pay the costs in both cases. PANTRANCO filed a motion for r
econsideration of the Court of Appeals decision, but on June 26, 1987, it denied
the same for lack of merit. ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in applying the doctrine of the last
clear chance. 2. Whether or not the petitioner had observed the diligence of a g
ood father of a family to prevent damage. 3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in fixing the damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased vi
ctims. RULING: 1. The above contention of petitioner is manifestly devoid of mer
it. Contrary to the petitioners contention, the doctrine of last clear chance finds
no application in this case. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary
to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the acc
ident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due ca
re, have been aware of it. One cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury
if he does not know or could not have known the existence of the peril. In this
case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the im
pending danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroachi
ng on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder o
n his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus t
o its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction.
Petitioners misplaced reliance on the aforesaid law is readily apparent in this c
ase. The cited law itself provides that it applies only to vehicles entering a t
hrough highway or a stop intersection. At the time of the accident, the jeepney
had already crossed the intersection and was on its way to Malalam River. Petiti
oner itself cited Fe Icos testimony that the accident occurred after the jeepney
had travelled a distance of about two (2) meters from the point of intersection.
In fact, even the witness for the petitioner, Leo Marantan, testified that both
vehicles were coming from opposite directions, clearly indicating that the jeep
ney had already crossed the intersection. Considering the foregoing, the Court f
inds that the negligence of petitioners driver in encroaching into the lane of th
e incoming jeepney and in failing to return the bus to its own lane immediately
upon seeing the jeepney coming from the opposite direction was the sole and prox
imate cause of the accident without which the collision would not have occurred.
There was no supervening or intervening negligence on the part of the jeepney d
river which would have made the prior negligence of petitioners driver a mere rem
ote cause of the accident. 2. The Court finds the above contention unmeritorious
. The finding of negligence on the part of its driver Ambrosio Ramirez gave rise
to the presumption of negligence on the part of petitioner and the burden of pr
oving that it exercised due diligence not only in the selection of its employees
but also in adequately supervising their work rests with the petitioner (Lilius
v. Manila Railroad Company, 59 Phil. 758 (1934), Umali v. Bacani, G.R. No. L-40
570, June 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 623.] Contrary to petitioners claim, there is no pres
umption that the usual recruitment procedures and safety standards were observed
. The mere issuance of rules and regulations and the formulation of various comp
any policies on safety, without showing that they are being complied with, are n
ot sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from the negligence of
its employee. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show
that in recruiting and employing the erring driver, the recruitment procedures a
nd company policies on efficiency and safety were followed. Petitioner failed to
do this. Hence, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the finding of both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by the pet
itioner, which consists mainly of the uncorroborated testimony of its Training C
oordinator, is insufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence against pe
titioner. 3. The Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible e
rror in fixing the amount of damages for the loss of earning capacity of the dec
eased victims. While it is true that private respondents should have presented d
ocumentary evidence to support their claim for damages for loss of earning capac
ity of the deceased victims, the absence thereof does not necessarily bar the re
covery of the damages in question. The testimony of Fe Ico and Francisca Bascos
as to the earning capacity of David Ico and the spouses Baesa, respectively, are
sufficient to establish a basis from which the court can make a fair and reason
able estimate of the damages for the loss of earning capacity of the three decea
sed victims. Moreover, in fixing the damages for loss of earning capacity of a d
eceased victim, the court can consider the nature of his occupation, his educati
onal attainment and the state of his health at the time of death. However, it sh
ould be pointed out that the Court of Appeals committed error in fixing the comp
ensatory damages for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and Marcelino Baesa. Responde
nt court awarded to plaintiff (private respondent) Maricar Baesa Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00) as compensatory damages for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and
Marcelino Baesa. [CA Decision, p.14; Rollo, 57.] In other words, the Court of Ap
peals awarded only Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) as indemnity for the deat
h of Harold Jim Baesa and another Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) for the de
ath of Marcelino Baesa. This is clearly erroneous. In the case of People v. de l
a Fuente, G.R. Nos. 63251-52, December 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 518, the indemnity for
the death of a person was fixed by this Court at Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000
.00). Plaintiff Maricar Baesa should therefore be awarded Sixty Thousand Pesos (
P60,000.00) as indemnity for the death of her brothers, Harold Jim Baesa and Mar
celino Baesa or Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) for the death of each brother
. The other items of damages awarded by respondent court which were not challeng
ed by the petitioner are hereby affirmed. 116. LBC AIR CARGO, INC., VS. HON. COU
RT OF APPEALS FACTS: On November 15, 1987, at about 11:30 in the morning, Rogeli
o Monterola, a licensed driver, was traveling on board his Suzuki motorcycle tow
ards Mangagoy on the right lane along a dusty national road in Bislig, Surigao d
el Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van of the LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, d
riven by defendant Jaime Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite direction on it
s way to the Bislig Airport. On board were passengers Fernando Yu, Manager of LB
C Air Cargo, and his son who was seated beside Tano. When Tano was approaching t
he vicinity of the airport road entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing
against each other from the opposite direction. Tano stopped his vehicle and wa
ited for the two racing vehicles to pass by. The stirred cloud of dust made visi
bility extremely bad. Instead of waiting for the dust to settled, Tano started t
o make a sharp left turn towards the airport road. When he was about to reach th
e center of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged
from the dust and smashed head-on against the right side of the LBC van. Montero
la died from the severe injuries he sustained. A criminal case for "homicide thr
u reckless imprudence" was filed against Tano. A civil suit was likewise institu
ted by the heirs of deceased Monterola against Tano, along with Fernando Yu and
LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, for the recovery of damages. The two cases were trie
d jointly by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, of Surigao del Sur. On 29 July
1990, the trial court dismissed both cases on the ground that the proximate cau
se of the "accident" was the negligence of deceased Rogelio Monterola. . On 18 J
uly 1991, the appellate court reversed the court a quo. ISSUES: 1. Whether or no
t the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Jaime Tano, Jr. was negligent in th
e driving of his vehicle and in failing to give a signal to approaching vehicles
of his intention to make a left turn. 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals er
red in not finding that the proximate cause of the accident was the victim s neg
ligence in the driving of his motorcycle in a very fast speed and thus hitting t
he petitioner s cargo van RULING: 1. Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "
last clear chance" (also referred to, at times, as "supervening negligence" or a
s "discovered peril"). The doctrine, in essence, is to the effect that where bot
h parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in ti
me than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with t
he consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an an
tecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for su
pervening negligence of, or bar a defense against the liability sought by, anoth
er if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence (Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa,
179 SCRA 384; Glan People s Lumber and Hardware vs. Intermediate Appellate Cour
t, 173 SCRA 464). In the case at bench, the victim was traveling along the lane
where he was rightly supposed to be. The incident occurred in an instant. No app
reciable time had elapsed, from the moment Tano swerved to his left to the actua
l impact; that could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid
the collision. It is true however, that the deceased was not all that free from
negligence in evidently speeding too closely behind the vehicle he was following
. We, therefore, agree with the appellate court that there indeed was contributo
ry negligence on the victim s part that could warrant a mitigation of petitioners
liability for damages. 2. From every indication, the proximate cause of the acc
ident was the negligence of Tano who, despite extremely poor visibility, hastily
executed a left turn (towards the Bislig airport road entrance) without first w
aiting for the dust to settle. It was this negligent act of Tano, which had plac
ed his vehicle (LBC van) directly on the path of the motorcycle coming from the
opposite direction, that almost instantaneously caused the collision to occur. S
imple prudence required him not
to attempt to cross the other lane until after it would have been safe from and
clear of any oncoming vehicle. 117. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: On January 21, 1988 SAUDIA hired Milagros P. Morada as a Flight Attendant
for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. On April 27, 1990, while on a l
ay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, Morada went to a disco dance with fellow crew mem
bers Thamer AlGazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Allah left on
some pretext and Thamer attempted to rape her. The Indonesian police came and ar
rested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice. When she return
ed to Jeddah, several SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the Jakarta incide
nt. On June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated her through an interpreter abou
t the Jakarta incident then they let her go. Just as her plane was about to take
off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take fligh
t. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer escorted her to the same court where t
he judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to her
in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only t
hen did she realized that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer an
d Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found Morada guilty of (1) adul
tery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of I
slamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic
tradition. Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed
the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her
return to Manila, she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her bei
ng informed of the cause. The trial court issued an Order dated August 29, 1994
denying the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Saudia. Respondent Judg
e subsequently issued another Order dated February 2, 1995, denying SAUDIA s Mot
ion for Reconsideration. However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, r
espondent Court of Appeals rendered the Decision dated April 10, 1996, now also
assailed. It ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that
the Amended Complaint s basis for recovery of damages is Article 21 of the Civi
l Code, and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. It furthe
r held that certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to Dismi
ss, inasmuch as the petitioner should have proceeded to trial, and in case of an
adverse ruling, find recourse in an appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that in this case Philippine Law should govern. RULING:
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to
answer two important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given sit
uation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (
2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation. Several
theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal system that should
ultimately control. Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrins
ically advance both notions of justice and predictability, they do not always do
so. The forum is then faced with the problem of deciding which of these two imp
ortant values should be stressed. Before a choice can be made, it is necessary f
or us to determine under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall. Thi
s process is known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of
qualification". It is the "process of deciding whether or not the facts relate t
o the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule." The purpose of "character
ization" is to enable the forum to select the proper law. Considering that the c
omplaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the "connecting factor" or "
point of contact" could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex
loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we f
ind that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where t
he alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippine
s where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing an
d working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner woul
d, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, "act with
justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith." Instead, petitioner
failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury all
egedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is impo
rtant here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged i
njury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant
, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All
told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the al
leged tort. Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of l
ex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liability have been
advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keepin
g abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion t
o apply the "State of the most significant relationship" rule, which in our view
should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of this case. In
applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant re
lationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated ac
cording to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) t
he place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the
injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporatio
n and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship
, if any, between the parties is centered. Lastly, no error could be imputed to
the respondent appellate court in upholding the trial court s denial of defendan
t s (herein petitioner s) motion to dismiss the case. Not only was jurisdiction
in order and venue properly laid, but appeal after trial was obviously available
, and expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case at hand. Indu
bitably, the Philippines is the state intimately concerned with the ultimate out
come of the case below, not just for the benefit of all the litigants, but also
for the vindication of the country s system of law and justice in a transnationa
l setting. With these guidelines in mind, the trial court must proceed to try an
d adjudge the case in the light of relevant Philippine law, with due considerati
on of the foreign element or elements involved. Nothing said herein, of course,
should be construed as prejudging the results of the case in any manner whatsoev
er. 118. GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP. vs. THE HONORABLE CA FACTS: Restitut
o M. Tobias was employed by Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACK
AY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the
engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious pur
chases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of
pesos. According to Tobias, it was he who actually discovered
the anomalies and reported them on November 10, 1972 to his immediate superior E
duardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executiv
e Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY. On November 11, 1972, one
day after Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted him by stating th
at he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leav
e, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to l
eave the office keys. On November 20, 1972, when Tobias returned to work after t
he forced leave, petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a
"swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also in
structed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for exam
ination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies
. Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious,
oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming illnes
s, did not testify during the hearings. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private
respondent by ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00
) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages,
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (
P30,000.00) as attorney s fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision
to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, Tobias appealed as to the amount of
damages. However, the Court of Appeals, an a decision dated August 31, 1987 aff
irmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners motion for reconsideration having b
een denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed. ISSUES: Whe
ther or not petitioners are liable for damages to respondent Tobias. RULING: Con
sidering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contr
ary to petitioners contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was reas
onable under the circumstances. According to the principle of damnum absque inju
ria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or am
ount to a legal wrong is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, Septemb
er 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915); The
Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987].
This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even g
ranting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, t
he abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong fo
r which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by To
bias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismisse
d but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by pet
itioners. However, the Court has already ruled in Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-2
0089, December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that per express provision of Article
2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases men
tioned in Article 21 of said Code." Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no err
or in awarding moral damages to Tobias. Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code
provides that "in quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defenda
nt acted with gross negligence," the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Air
ways, Inc., G.R. No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49
SCRA 1, ruled that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages,
with more reason is its imposition justified when the act performed is deliberat
e, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As in the Zulueta case, the nature of t
he wrongful acts shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is s
ufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter. 119. LLORENTE
vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Atty. Llorente was employed in the PCA, a public co
rporation (Sec. 1, PD 1468) from 1975 to August 31, 1986, when he resigned. He o
ccupied the positions of Assistant Corporate Secretary for a year, then Corporat
e Legal Counsel until November 2, 1981 and, finally, Deputy Administrator for Ad
ministrative Services, Finance Services, Legal Affairs Departments. As a result
of a massive reorganization in 1981, hundreds of PCA employees resigned effectiv
e October 31, 1981. Among them were Mr. Curio, Mrs. Perez, Mr. Azucena, and Mrs.
Javier. They were all required to apply for PCA clearances in support of their
gratuity benefits. After the clearance was signed by the PCA officers concerned,
it was to be approved, first, by Atty. Llorente, in the case of a rank-and-file
employee, or by Col. Duefias, the acting administrator, in the case of an offic
er, and then by Atty. Rodriguez, the corporate auditor. The clearanceof Mrs. Jav
ier of the same date of October 30, 1991 was also signed by all PCA officers con
cerned, including Mrs. Sotto even though the former had unsettled obligations no
ted thereon. The clearance of Mr. Curio dated November 4,1981, likewise favorabl
y passed all officers concerned, including Mrs. Sotto, the latter signing despit
e the notation handwritten on December 8, 1981. On December 1, 1982, Mr. Curio b
rought the matter of his unapproved clearance to Col. Dueas. His voucher was also
approved, and his gratuity benefits paid to him in the middle of December 1986,
after deducting those obligations. Between December 1981 and December 1986, Mr.
Curio failed to get gainful employment; as a result, his family literally went
hungry, In 1981, he applied for work with the Philippine Cotton Authority, but w
as refused, because he could not present his PCA clearance. According to the San
diganbayan, the petitioner was guilty nonetheless of abuse of right under Articl
e 19 of the Civil Code and as a public officer, he was liable for damages suffer
ed by the aggrieved party (under Article 27). ISSUE: Whether or not the petition
er is liable under Article 19 of the Civil Code and liable for damages suffered
by the aggrieved party. RULING: It is no defense that the petitioner was motivat
ed by no ill-will (a grudge, according to the Sandiganbayan), since the facts sp
eak for themselves. It is no defense either that he was, after all, complying me
rely with legal procedures since, as we indicated, he was not as strict with res
pect to the three retiring other employees. There can be no other logical conclu
sion that he was acting unfairly, no more, no less, to Mr. Curio. It is the esse
nce of Article 19 of the Civil Code, under which the petitioner was made to pay
damages, together with Article 27, that the performance of duty be done with jus
tice and good faith. In the case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the Philippines, we
held the defendant liable under Article 19 for disposing of its propertv a perfe
ctly legal act in order to escape the reach of a creditor. In two fairly more re
cent cases, Sevilla vs. Court of Appeals and Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, we
held that a principal is liable
under Article 19 in terminating the agency again, a legal act when terminating t
he agency would deprive the agent of his legitimate business. We believe that th
e petitioner is liable under Article 19. The Court finds the award of P90,000.00
to be justified bv Article 2202 of the Civil Code, which holds the defendant li
able for all "natural and probable" damages. Hennenegildo Cunct presented eviden
ce that as a consequence of the petitioner s refusal to clear him, he failed to
land a job at the Philippine Cotton Authority and Philippine First Marketing Aut
hority. He also testified that a job in either office would have earned him sala
ry of P2,500.00 a month, or P150,000.00 in five years. Deducting his probable ex
penses of reasonably about P1,000.00 a month or P60,000.00 in five years, the pe
titioner owes him a total actual damages of P90,000.00 120. ARTURO P. VALENZUELA
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Arturo P. Valenzuela (Valenzuela) is
a General Agent of private respondent Philippine American General Insurance Comp
any, Inc. (Philamgen) since 1965. As such, he was authorized to solicit and sell
in behalf of Philamgen all kinds of non-life insurance, and in consideration of
services rendered was entitled to receive the full agent s commission of 32.5%
from Philamgen under the scheduled commission rates. From 1973 to 1975, Valenzue
la solicited marine insurance from one of his clients, the Delta Motors, Inc. (D
ivision of Electronics Airconditioning and Refrigeration) in the amount of P4.4
Million from which he was entitled to a commission of 32%. However, Valenzuela d
id not receive his full commission which amounted to P1.6 Million from the P4.4
Million insurance coverage of the Delta Motors. During the period 1976 to 1978,
premium payments amounting to P1,946,886.00 were paid directly to Philamgen and
Valenzuela s commission to which he is entitled amounted to P632,737.00. In 1977
, Philamgen started to become interested in and expressed its intent to share in
the commission due Valenzuela on a fifty-fifty basis. Valenzuela refused. On Fe
bruary 8, 1978 Philamgen and its President, Bienvenido M. Aragon insisted on the
sharing of the commission with Valenzuela. Because of the refusal of Valenzuela
, Philamgen and its officers, namely: Bienvenido Aragon, Carlos Catolico and Rob
ert E. Parnell took drastic action against Valenzuela. They: (a) reversed the co
mmission due him by not crediting in his account the commission earned from the
Delta Motors, Inc. insurance \ (b) placed agency transactions on a cash and carr
y basis; (c) threatened the cancellation of policies issued by his agency ; and
(d) started to leak out news that Valenzuela has a substantial account with Phil
amgen. All of these acts resulted in the decline of his business as insurance ag
ent Then on December 27, 1978, Philamgen terminated the General Agency Agreement
of Valenzuela. After due proceedings, the trial court found that since defendan
ts are not justified in the termination of Arturo P. Valenzuela as one of their
General Agents, defendants shall be liable for the resulting damage and loss of
business of Arturo P. Valenzuela. On January 29, 1988, respondent Court of Appea
ls promulgated its decision in the appealed case. ISSUES: Whether or not Philamg
en and/or its officers can be held liable for damages due to the termination of
the General Agency Agreement it entered into with the petitioners.
RULING: Prescinding from the foregoing, and considering that the private respond
ents terminated Valenzuela with evident mala fide it necessarily follows that th
e former are liable in damages. Respondent Philamgen has been appropriating for
itself all these years the gross billings and income that it unceremoniously too
k away from the petitioners. The preponderance of the authorities sustain the pr
eposition that a principal can be held liable for damages in cases of unjust ter
mination of agency. In Danon v. Brimo, 42 Phil. 133 [1921]), this Court ruled th
at where no time for the continuance of the contract is fixed by its terms, eith
er party is at liberty to terminate it at will, subject only to the ordinary req
uirements of good faith. The right of the principal to terminate his authority i
s absolute and unrestricted, except only that he may not do so in bad faith. The
trial court in its decision awarded to Valenzuela the amount of Seventy Five Th
ousand Pesos (P75,000,00) per month as compensatory damages from June 1980 until
its decision becomes final and executory. This award is justified in the light
of the evidence extant on record showing that the average gross premium collecti
on monthly of Valenzuela over a period of four (4) months from December 1978 to
February 1979, amounted to over P300,000.00 from which he is entitled to a commi
ssion of P100,000.00 more or less per month. Moreover, his annual sales producti
on amounted to P2,500,000.00 from where he was given 32.5% commissions. Under Ar
ticle 2200 of the new Civil Code, "indemnification for damages shall comprehend
not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the
obligee failed to obtain." The circumstances of the case, however, require that
the contractual relationship between the parties shall be terminated upon the sa
tisfaction of the judgment. No more claims arising from or as a result of the ag
ency shall be entertained by the courts after that date. 121. SERGIO AMONOY vs.
Spouses GUTIERREZ FACTS: On 12 January 1965, the Project of Partition submitted
was approved and two (2) of the said lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba a
nd Alfonso Formilda. The Attorney s fees charged by Amonoy was P27,600.00 and on
20 January 1965 Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formida executed a deed of real es
tate mortgage on the said two (2) lots adjudicated to them, in favor of Amonoy t
o secure the payment of his attorney s fees. But it was only on 6 August 1969 af
ter the taxes had been paid, the claims settled and the properties adjudicated,
that the estate was declared closed and terminated.Asuncion Pasamba died on 24 F
ebruary 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passsed away on 2 July 1969. Among the heirs
of the latter was his daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. On 28 Sep
tember 1972 judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay
within 90 days the P27,600.00 secured by the mortgage, P11,880.00 as value of th
e harvests, and P9,645.00 as another round of attorney s fees. Failing in that,
the two (2) lots would be sold at public auction. They failed to pay. In its Jan
uary 27, 1993 Decision, the RTC dismissed respondents suit. On appeal, the CA s
et aside the lower court s ruling and ordered petitioner to pay respondents P250
,000 as actual damages. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, whic
h was also denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct was co
rrect in deciding that the petition was liable to the respondents for damages.
RULING: Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exer
cise of a person s rights is a loss without injury- damnum absque injuria - for
which the law gives no remedy. In other words, one who merely exercises one s ri
ghts does no actionable injury and cannot be held liable for damages. Clearly th
en, the demolition of respondents house by petitioner, despite his receipt of t
he TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In in
sisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this Court s Order and wittin
gly caused the destruction of respondents; house.1wphi1.nt Obviously, petitioner c
annot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the valid exercise o
f a right.Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal
protection that the principle accords. And when damage or prejudice to another i
s occasioned thereby, liability cannot be obscured, much less abated. In the ult
imate analysis, petitioner s liability is premised on the obligation to repair o
r to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of one s act or omission,
whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.
122. JOSUE ARLEGUI vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: The object of the controver
sy is a residential apartment unit (no. 15) located at the corner of Romualdez a
nd Kalentong Streets in Mandaluyong City. The said property was formerly owned b
y Serafia Real Estate, Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as Serafia), a comp
any owned by Alberto, Alfonso and Simeon, all surnamed Barretto, and their sibli
ngs Rosa B. Ochoa and Teresita B. Alcantara. For more than twenty (20) years, un
it no. 15 was leased by Serafia to the spouses Gil and Beatriz Genguyon. In a le
tter dated March 26, 1984, the Genguyon spouses, along with the other tenants in
the apartment building were informed by Alberto Barretto that Serafia and its a
ssets had already been assigned and transferred to A.B. Barretto Enterprises. Ap
prehensive that they were about to be ejected from their respective units, the t
enants formed an organization called the Barretto Apartment Tenants Association.
They elected officers from among themselves to represent them in the negotiatio
ns with A.B. Barretto Enterprises for the purchase of their respective apartment
units. Among those elected were Josue Arlegui as vice-president and Mateo Tan L
u as auditor of the association. Sometime thereafter, believing that negotiation
s were still ongoing, the Genguyons were surprised to learn on January 23, 1987
that the unit they were leasing had already been sold to Mateo Tan Lu. This notw
ithstanding, the Genguyons continued to occupy the subject premises and paid the
rentals therefore. The following year, or on July 7, 1988, the Genguyons were i
nformed that Mateo Tan Lu had sold the subject apartment unit to Josue Arlegui.
Not long thereafter, they received a letter from Arleguis lawyer demanding that t
hey vacate the premises. When they failed to accede to Arleguis demand, the latte
r filed an action for ejectment against the Genguyons before the Metropolitan Tr
ial Court of Mandaluyong City.. On January 11, 1990, the RTC ordered the issuanc
e of a writ of preliminary injunction directing the MTC to desist from taking fu
rther action in the ejectment case pending before it.
On February 14, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 3
2833, annulling and setting aside the RTC decision. ISSUES: Whether or not the C
ourt of Appeals erred in holding that the private respondents are entitled to da
mages instead of the petitioner. RULING: There is no doubt that because of Tan L
u and Arleguis violation of the trust and confidence reposed in them as officers
and negotiators in behalf of the tenantsmembers of the Association, damages have
accrued upon spouses Genguyons for which they must be indemnified. Article 19 o
f the New Civil Code of the Philippines exhorts the citizens in the correct exer
cise of rights and performance of duties in this wise: Art. 19. Every person mus
t, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This princip
le of abuse of rights is based upon the famous maxim suum jus summa injuria (the
abuse of a right is the greatest possible wrong). The acts of Tan Lu and Arlegu
i directly violate the principles enunciated in Art. 19 which declares that ever
y person must practice justice, honesty and good faith in his dealings with his
fellowmen. That there was a valid pact or agreement among the Association member
s and their entrusted officers charged with the negotiations, is an accepted fac
t. As two of the three entrusted officers charged with the negotiations, Tan Lu
and Arlegui fall within the purview of Art. 19 which is also implemented by Art.
21, New Civil Code, a sequent of Art. 19, which declares that "[A]ny person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to moral
s, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. In a
ddition, Articles 2221 and 2222 of the New Civil Code provide that the Court may
award nominal damages: (1) in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has be
en violated or invaded, may be vindicated or recognized; or (2) in every case wh
ere any property right has been invaded. Under the circumstances, whether as com
pensatory or nominal damages, the amount of P35,000.00, inclusive of attorneys fe
es, is just and reasonable. Cases114-122 TAMANG, SWITLE MAE A. 123. PETROPHIL CO
RPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On December 27, 1970, Petrophil Corporatio
n (Petrophil) entered into contract with Dr. Amanda Ternida-Cruz, allowing the l
atter to haul and transport any and all packages and/or bulk products of Petroph
il. The contract provided that (1) Petrophil could terminate the contract for br
each, negligence, discourtesy, improper and/or inadequate performance or abandon
ment; (2) that Dr. Cruz is required to reserve the use of at least two (2) units
of tank trucks solely for the hauling requirements of Petrophil; and (3) that t
he contact shall be for an indefinite period, provided that
Petrophil may terminate said contract at any time with 30 days prior written not
ice. In a letter dated May 21, 1987, Petrophil, advised Dr. Cruz that it was ter
minating her hauling contract in accordance with what the provisions of the cont
ract. Dr. Cruz filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, a complaint agains
t Petrophil seeking the nullity of the termination of the contract and declaring
its suspension as unjustified and contrary to its terms and conditions. Jessie
de Vera, Marcial Mulig, Antonio and Rufino Cuenca, all tank truck drivers of Dr.
Cruz, also filed a complaint for damages against Petrophil. The two cases conso
lidated and tried jointly. During the hearing, Dr. Cruz claimed that the termina
tion of her hauling contract was a retaliation against her for allegedly sympath
izing with the then striking Petrophil employees and for informing the PNOC pres
ident of anomalies perpetrated by some of its officers and employees. Driver Jes
sie de Vera corroborated these allegations and testified that before the termina
tion of the contract, Petrophil officials reduced their hauling trips to make li
fe harder for them so that they would resign from Dr: Cruz s employ, which in tu
rn would result in the closure of her business. Petrophil on the other hand prof
essed that the hauling trips were reduced not because Dr. Cruz was being punishe
d, but because the company was assigning hauling trips on the basis of compartme
ntation and not on a first-come first-serve. Additionally, witnesses for Petroph
il testified that on April 25, 1987, there was a strike at the Pandacan terminal
and Dr. Cruz and her husband were at the picket line. They refused to load petr
oleum products, resulting in the disruption of delivery to service stations in M
etro Manila and in the provinces, which in turn resulted in loss of sales and re
venues. Because of Dr. Cruz s refusal to load, the management terminated the hau
ling contract The trial court ruled in favor of Dr Cruz and ordered Petrophil to
pay Dr. Cruz the sum of P309,723.65 as unearned hauling charges and P20,000.00
as attorney s fees and expenses of suit and to pay Jessie de Vera and Rufino Cue
nca the sums of P64,390.00 and P5,000.00 as unearned income and attorney s fees.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court declaring that the termination o
f the contract was "for cause", and that the procedures set forth in petitioner
s policy guidelines should be followed. Hence this petition. ISSUE: 1. Whether p
etitioner was guilty of arbitrary termination of the contract, which would entit
le Dr. Cruz to damages. 2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it imposed a
tortious liability where the requisites were not established by the evidence. RU
LING: We differ with Petrophil on the first issue. Recall that before Petrophil
terminated the contract on May 25, 1987, there was a strike of its employees at
the Pandacan terminal. Dr. Cruz and her husband were seen at the picket line and
were reported to have instructed their truck drivers not to load petroleum prod
ucts. At the resumption of the operation in Pandacan terminal, Dr. Cruz s contra
ct was suspended for one week and eventually terminated. Based on these circumst
ances, the Court of Appeals like the trial court concluded that Petrophil termin
ated the contract because of
Dr. Cruz s refusal to load petroleum products during the strike. In respondent c
ourt s view, the termination appeared as a retaliation or punishment for her sym
pathizing with the striking employees. Nowhere in the record do we find that pet
itioner asked her to explain her actions. Petrophil simply terminated her contra
ct. These factual findings are binding and conclusive on us, especially in the a
bsence of any allegation that said findings are unsupported by the evidence, or
that the appellate and trial courts misapprehended these facts.16 In terminating
the hauling contract of Dr. Cruz without hearing her side on the factual contex
t above described, a petitioner opened itself to a charge of bad faith. While Pe
trophil had the right to terminate the contract, petitioner could not act purpos
ely to injure private respondents. In BPI Express Card Corporation vs. CA, 296 S
CRA 260, 272 (1998), we held that there is abuse of a right under Article 19 if
the following elements are present: 1) there is a legal right or duty; 2) which
is exercised in bad faith; 3) for the sole purpose of prejudicing or injuring an
other. We find all these three elements present in the instant case. Hence, we a
re convinced that the termination by petitioner of the contract with Dr. Cruz ca
lls for appropriate sanctions by way of damages. On the second assigned error, p
etitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred when it imposed a tortious li
ability where the requisites therefor were not established by the evidence. Acco
rding to petitioner, aside from the hearsay and inadmissible testimony of Jessie
de Vera, there is no other evidence that the termination of the contract was do
ne with deliberate intent to harm or for the sole purpose of prejudicing the res
pondentdrivers. Petitioner adds that the termination was an exercise of a right
and directed primarily at Dr. Cruz. Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that e
very person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to anot
her, shall indemnify the latter for the damage done. Petitioner might not have d
eliberately intended to injure the respondent-drivers. But as a consequence of i
ts willful act directed against Dr. Cruz, respondent-drivers lost their jobs and
consequently suffered loss of income. Note that under Article 20, there is no r
equirement that the act must be directed at a specific person, but it suffices t
hat a person suffers damage as a consequence of a wrongful act of another in ord
er that indemnity could be demanded from the wrongdoer.The appellate court did n
ot err, given the circumstances of this case, in awarding damages to respondent-
drivers. 124. VIRGINIA M. ANDRADE vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On July 6, 1971, V
irginia Andrade was appointed as permanent teacher in the Division of City Schoo
ls, Manila and was initially assigned as English teacher at the Araullo High Sch
ool, Manila. She was referred by Virginia Fermin to Dominador Wingsing principla
of Araullo High School regarding her teaching load. However because of Andrades
low teaching performance, she was referred back to Ms Fermin. Displeased from be
ing referred back and forth from one person to another, she wrote a letter to Su
perintendent Arturo F. Coronel, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of the
Division of City Schools, Manila, requesting that she be given a teaching assig
nment. In an indorsement addressed to Superintendent Coronel, respondent Wingsin
g cited three (3) reasons why petitioner Andrade was not given any teaching load
: (1) drastic drop of enrollment; (2) she was declared an excess teacher; and (3
) she ranked lowest in
her performance rating hence, Superintendent Coronel informed that the she would
be designated to a non-teaching position in the meantime. On October 4, 1985, A
ndrade made a request to Benedicto M. Hormilla, Chief of Personnel Services of t
he Division of City Schools of Manila, that she be transferred to Ramon Magsaysa
y High School in Manila, and said request was favorably acted upon by Superinten
dent Coronel. Andrade then reported for work at the Ramon Magsaysay High School,
but in a letter of the same date, she relayed that she is withdrawing her reque
st for transfer back at the Araullo High School. Thereafter, she discovered that
her name has been deleted from the regular monthly payroll and transferred to a
special voucher list. Andrade, distressed by the situation filed an action for
damages with mandatory injunction against respondent Wingsing, English Departmen
t Head Fermin and Assistant Schools Division Superintendent Coronel before the R
egional Trial Court Quezon City claiming that they conspired in depriving her of
her teaching load and humiliated her further by excluding her name from the reg
ular monthly payroll. In his answer, respondent Wingsing explained that the decr
ease in the enrollment for the school year 1985-1986 necessitated that a number
of teachers be declared in a list as excess teachers, and as petitioner had the
lowest performance rating, she was included in the said list and as for the dele
tion of Andrades name from the regular monthly payroll, Wingsing declared that he
and his co-defendants were merely exercising and doing their duties in accordan
ce with the existing school policies, rules and regulations. The trial court ren
dered its Decision absolving Virginia Fermin and Arturo Coronel, but held herein
respondent Wingsing liable to petitioner for actual and compensatory damages in
the amount of P93,575.99, attorneys fees in the sum of P10,000.00 and costs of s
uit. Wingsing appealed to the Court of Appeals, maintaining the necessity of dec
laring excess teachers, including the petitioner, during the subject school year
and invoking regularity in the performance of his functions as principal of the
Araullo High School. Finding merit in his argument, the appellate court reverse
d the decision of the trial court and denied Andrades motion for reconsideration.
Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Dominador S. Wingsing, Vi
rginia E. Fermin and Arturo F. Coronel of withholding her teaching load and dele
ting her name in the payroll his attended by badfaith thus entitling her to coll
ect damages. RULING: Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. While Article 19 of the New Civil Code may have been inte
nded as a declaration of principle, the cardinal law on human conduct expressed in
said article has given rise to certain rules, e.g., that where a person exercis
es his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a ma
nner that is not in keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens himself to civ
il liability. The elements of abuse of ones rights under the said Article 19 are
the following: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised
in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. In thi
s regard, it appeared that the complaint of petitioner Andrade failed to meet th
e second and third requirements. A careful review of the records reveals that th
e declaration of petitioner as an excess teacher was not motivated by any person
al desire on the part of respondent Wingsing to cause her undue misery or injury
, but merely the result of the valid exercise of authority. The decrease in the
enrollment for the school year 1985-1986 in the Araullo High School resulted in
a number of teachers being declared as excess teachers in the following subjects
: Social Studies, 1; Math, 2, and English, 1. In exercising his judgment, the ev
idence reveals that respondent Wingsing was not at all dictated by whim or fancy
, nor of spite against the petitioner but was rather guided by the following fac
tors: qualification to teach, seniority, teaching performance and attitude towar
ds the school community. For two (2) consecutive years petitioner received an un
satisfactory rating, the lowest, from two (2) English Department Heads, namely:
Herminia Valdez and Virginia Fermin. Petitioner knew about her poor rating, but
she refused to acknowledge it. She did not question nor contest the same. Homero
om teacher Zaida Perez and Remedios P. Rutaquio, a retired Supervisor of English
, Division of City Schools, Manila, both testified that petitioner frequently ab
sented herself from classes. Assistant Principal Romeo F. Amparado likewise test
ified that petitioner was often the subject of complaints from school personnel
and students, one of which involved the slapping of a student without provocatio
n, for which petitioner was suspended for one month without pay. Petitioner Andr
ade was therefore declared as an excess teacher, as rightfully recommended by pr
ivate respondent, the latter being the school principal. It was a judgment made
in good faith by respondent. Entrenched is the rule that bad faith does not simp
ly connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some mo
ral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through som
e motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. In the case
at bar, we find that there was no dishonest purpose, or some moral obliquity, or cons
cious doing of a wrong, or breach of a known duty, or some motive or interest or ill
will that can be attributed to the private respondent. It appeared that efforts
to accommodate petitioner were made as she was offered to handle two (2) non-tea
ching jobs, that is, to handle Developmental Reading lessons and be an assistant
Librarian, pending her re-assignment or transfer to another work station, but s
he refused. The same would not have been proposed if the intention of private re
spondent were to cause undue hardship on the petitioner. Good faith is always pr
esumed unless convincing evidence to the contrary is adduced. It is incumbent up
on the party alleging bad faith to sufficiently prove such allegation. Absent en
ough proof thereof, the presumption of good faith prevails. In the case at bar,
the burden of proving alleged bad faith therefore was with petitioner but she fa
iled to discharge suchonus probandi. Without a clear and persuasive evidence of
bad faith, the presumption of good faith in favor of private respondent stands.
With regards to the deletion of petitioners name from the regular monthly payroll
of teachers, we find the same to be merely the result of a school policy being
implemented by the school personnel. Private respondent Wingsing had nothing to
do with the preparation of the payroll as it was the school payroll clerk who pr
epared the same. As explained by payroll clerk Aida Soliman, petitioners name was
not deleted from the regular monthly payroll but merely transferred to the last
page of the roll since she failed to submit her Form 48 or Daily Time Record (D
TR) sheet on time. The move was
made so that the other teachers would not be unduly prejudiced by the delayed re
lease of petitioners salary, which as a policy was the consequence for late submi
ssion of DTRs. There was no showing that private respondent had a hand in this s
ituation as Aida Soliman likewise revealed that the decision to transfer petitio
ners name on the last page of the payroll was made on the instruction of the Acco
unting Services upon discovery that she did not report to work on the first day
of class. Indeed, after being declared as an excess teacher and having declined
her transfer to Ramon Magsaysay High School, petitioners status could only be des
cribed as floating. She should have expected that there would be changes in her si
tuation, and that she should not have immediately blamed it on others, more part
icularly on private respondent. Although there might have been a delay in the re
ceipt of petitioners salary, we find that it was not as grave as she painted it o
ut to be considering that she was nonetheless paid her salary until October 15,
1986. The only reason why she failed to receive her salary and benefits from Oct
ober 16, 1986 to June 1988 was because she did not report for work during the sa
id period due to her unjustified refusal to accept her assignment. 125. UNIVERSI
TY OF THE EAST vs. ROMEO A. JADER, FACTS: Romeo Jader was a law student of Unive
rsity of the East from 1984-1988. In his first Semester in his last year, he fai
led in his subject Practice Court I and was given an incomplete grade. He petiti
oned for the removal of the incomplete grade to his professor Carlos Ortega and
was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson. He took the exam and was given a grade
of 5 by his professor. In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the
College of Law met to deliberate on who among the fourth year students should be
allowed to graduate. The Jaders name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidate
s for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester
(1987-1988). He graduated and thereafter prepared himself for the bar examinati
on. He took a enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. Ha
ving learned of the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to t
ake the bar examination. Consequently, Jader sued petitioner for damages allegin
g that he suffered moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched repu
tation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1
988 bar examinations arising from the latter s negligence. He prayed for an awar
d of moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorney s fees, and costs
of suit. In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing ma
inly that it never led respondent to believe that he completed the requirements
for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative list o
f graduating students. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor o
f the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter to pay plaintiff t
he sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS (P35,470.00) with lega
l rate of interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid, the amount
of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as attorney s fees and the cost of suit. On
appeal by both parties was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) with modificati
on.
Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate and immediate cause of
the alleged damages incurred by the Jader arose out of his own negligence in not
verifying from the professor concerned the result of his removal exam. RULING:
The petition lacks merit. When a student is enrolled in any educational or learn
ing institution, a contract of education is entered into between said institutio
n and the student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired by the school a
re considered merely as agents and administrators tasked to perform the school s
commitment under the contract. Since the contracting parties are the school and
the student, the latter is not duty-bound to deal with the former s agents, suc
h as the professors with respect to the status or result of his grades, although
nothing prevents either professors or students from sharing with each other suc
h information. The Court takes judicial notice of the traditional practice in ed
ucational institutions wherein the professor directly furnishes his/her students
their grades. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform a
nd furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to whe
ther he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment
of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate. Al
though commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not a
n ordinary occasion, since such ceremony is the educational institution s way of
announcing to the whole world that the students included in the list of those w
ho will be conferred a degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied a
ll the requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to the ceremony, the sc
hool has the obligation to promptly inform the student of any problem involving
the latter s grades and performance and also most importantly, of the procedures
for remedying the same. Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the re
sult of the removal examination, particularly at a time when he had already comm
enced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. A
bsence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecuti
on by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the C
ivil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue
advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, toget
her with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the tra
nsaction unconscientious. It is the school that has access to those information
and it is only the school that can compel its professors to act and comply with
its rules, regulations and policies with respect to the computation and the prom
pt submission of grades. Students do not exercise control, much less influence,
over the way an educational institution should run its affairs, particularly in
disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance with the
school s rules and orders. Being the party that hired them, it is the school tha
t exercises general supervision and exclusive control over the professors with r
espect to the submission of reports involving the students standing. Exclusive
control means that no other person or entity had any control over the instrument
ality which caused the damage or injury. The college dean is the senior officer
responsible for the operation of an academic program, enforcement of rules and r
egulations, and the supervision of faculty and student services. He must see to
it that his own professors and teachers, regardless of their status or position
outside of the university, must comply with the rules set by the latter. The neg
ligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for
instance by not promptly submitting a student s grade, is not only imputable to
the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer. Considering furth
er, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is en
gaged in legal education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its stu
dents, more specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19
and 20 of the Civil Code which states: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exerc
ise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give e
veryone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Art. 20. Every person who,
contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemni
fy the latter for the same. Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. In civ
ilized society, men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended
injury that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their fel
lowmen, when they act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary
understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with whom t
hey deal in the general course of society will act in good faith. The ultimate t
hing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civi
lized society. Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and
be indifferent to them, for without the latter, the former are useless. Educatio
nal institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status
and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifferen
ce of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affecte
d by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. Want of care to the co
nscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the
cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable.
Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance o
f its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance th
at respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely
the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act s
easonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student s grades at any time beca
use a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on t
he submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner s liability arose f
rom its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination an
d in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements
for the course. Worth quoting is the following disquisition of the respondent c
o urt: It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendant-appelle
e University had been informed during the deliberation that the professor in Pra
ctice Court I gave plaintiff-appellant a failing grade. Yet, defendant-appellee
still did not inform plaintiffappellant of his failure to complete the requireme
nts for the degree nor did they remove his name from the tentative list of candi
dates for graduation. Worse, defendant-appellee university, despite the knowledg
e that plaintiff-appellant failed in Practice Court I, again included plaintiff-
appellant s name in the "tentative list of candidates for graduation which was p
repared after the deliberation and which became the basis for the commencement r
ites program. Dean Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-appellant s name was allo
wed to remain in the tentative list of candidates for
graduation in the hope that the latter would still be able to remedy the situati
on in the remaining few days before graduation day. Dean Tiongson, however, did
not explain how plaintiff appellant Jader could have done something to complete
his deficiency if defendant-appellee university did not exert any effort to info
rm plaintiff-appellant of his failing grade in Practice Court I. Petitioner cann
ot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to
the delayed relay of information to respondent. When one of two innocent partie
s must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it. The moder
n tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of ri
ght, even when the act is not illicit. If mere fault or negligence in one s acts
can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason sho
uld abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be protected only when h
e acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prude
nce and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. However, w
hile petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the l
atter s actual damages, we hold that respondent should not have been awarded mor
al damages. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals findings that respondent
suffered shock, trauma and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate
and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very least, it beho
oved on respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary
requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, r
espondent should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, sp
ecifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. Given the
se considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have suffered untold emba
rrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review classes
and not being able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed humiliated b
y his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if
he has satisfied all the requirements including his school records, before prepa
ring himself for the bar examination. Certainly, taking the bar examinations doe
s not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects thereof; there are also p
rerequisites of documentation and submission of requirements which the prospecti
ve examinee must meet. 126. GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS
: On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, fil
ed a complaint in the trial court for damages against the petitioner for the all
eged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges that the petitione
r courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that
they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of t
he school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited t
he private respondent s parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their ap
proval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to
live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began livin
g with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner s attitude tow
ards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a resul
t of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a re
presentative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the co
mplaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to liv
e
with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bac
olod City. In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner claimed that he never pro
posed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neithe
r sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his a
partment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place
because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passp
ort; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the baran
gay captain. After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of
the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision favoring the private resp
ondent. The decision is anchored on the trial court s findings and conclusions t
hat (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is
not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexua
l advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, pr
omised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marr
y her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceit
ful promise, private respondent and her parents in accordance with Filipino cust
oms and traditions made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at
the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and
relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise t
o marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has
abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs
, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respon
dent s testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and co
urage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny an
d ridicule if her claim was false. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in
toto. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code a
pplies to the case at bar thus justifies a claim for damages. RULING: The existi
ng rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provis
ions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report
of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote: The el
imination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not ac
tionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. The his
tory of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown th
at no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and uns
crupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of
action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . .
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is d
esigned to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by g
ranting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is imp
ossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute
books. As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or de
termined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the st
atutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they h
ave actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it ne
cessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code t
he following rule: Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to ano
ther in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage. An example will illustrate the purview of
the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteenyear old daughter of "X". A promise
of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pr
egnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen
years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be
filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and thoug
h the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her paren
ts cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her
parents would have such a right of action. Thus at one stroke, the legislator, i
f the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prov
ide for specifically in the statutes. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defi
nes a quasi-delict thus: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, th
ere being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the part
ies, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulnes
s or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana,
is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. T
orts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligenc
e, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false im
prisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envi
sioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentiona
l and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised
Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176
of the Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which,
in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21
fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 o
f the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil
wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American la
w on torts. In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of
the opinion, and so hold, that where a man s promise to marry is in fact the pro
ximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to
fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of her
self unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention
of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive devic
e to entice or inveigle her to accept
him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of dama
ges pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of t
he fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation
which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should ha
ve been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner s "fraud
ulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff tha
t made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise
these fraud and deception on appellant s part that made plaintiff s parents agre
e to their daughter s living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage.
" 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished p
ossession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral sed
uction the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier advert
ed to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished u
nder either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the pri
vate respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seductio
n. Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied
in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.
Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, this Court denied recovery of damages
to the woman because: . . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is
morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years
younger than the complainant who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and a
s highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent
are supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprent
ice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that, complainan
t "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him
, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement even before the
y had the benefit of clergy. In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, while this Court
likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery
was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed
. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said c
ase: The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in
the Code Commission s memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been sedu
ced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual in
tercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the ide
a of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of th
e seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U
.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595). It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra
) that To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promis
e or inducementand the woman must yield because of the promise or other induceme
nt. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual d
esire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be
induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, p
ersuasions and wiles, which are
calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her person to ul
timately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 1
23). Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one wh
ole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maint
ain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse.
Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she s
urrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of th
e defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one
year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, a
nd would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not
intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, w
e conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other
cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Ins
tance in dismissing the complaint. In his annotations on the Civil Code, Associa
te Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined that i
n a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral dama
ges may be recovered: . . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if
the intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-146
28, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs
. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248
, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the
EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or mo
ral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other
way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust
has intervened). . . . together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such
as the expenses for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil
. 471). Senator Arturo M. Tolentino is also of the same persuasion: It is submit
ted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, still subsists, notwithstanding the inc
orporation of the present article in the Code. The example given by the Code Com
mission is correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense,
but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished wi
thout any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence,
but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot b
e said that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity. But so long
as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies
. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to dec
eive the woman under the circumstances, because an act which would deceive a gir
l sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thir
ty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury,
there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the cri
minal law and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal c
ase for that reason. We are unable to agree with the petitioner s alternative pr
oposition to the effect that granting, for argument s sake, that he did promise
to marry the private respondent, the
latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari
delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine
laid down inBatarra vs. Marcos, the private respondent cannot recover damages fr
om the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private re
spondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primar
ily because of her own doing, for: . . . She is also interested in the petitione
r as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a
plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (
TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of
a man who can give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financi
al assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her
to accept a proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner. These sta
tements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that
he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent
on account of the latter s ignoble birth, inferior educational background, pove
rty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the
very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marr
ying with a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him.
Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly int
ended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing t
hat indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life s partner. His was no
thing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believe
d that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be a
ble to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipi
no s concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos h
ave for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such depl
orable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs e
very person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and g
ood faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligation
s. No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and tradi
tions. The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the p
rivate respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she ev
entually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but bec
ause of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscien
ce about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was
not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari
delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar of
fense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." At most, it could be conceded
that she is merely in delicto. Equity often interferes for the relief of the le
ss guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been brought about by the
imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wr
ong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procur
ed by fraud. In Mangayao vs. Lasud, We declared: Appellants likewise stress that
both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against the other
(Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been
interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or less, e
quivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the
other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209). We should stress, h
owever, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that t
his Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the
petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval
to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of thei
r daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity. 127.
MARILYN L. BERNARDO vs. NLRC FACTS: Petitioner Marilyn Bernardo was employed at
the Univet Agricultural Products, Inc., a division of United Laboratories. On J
anuary 1989, the Manufacturing Department of the Univet Agricultural asked for t
wo filing cabinets. Accordingly, petitioner prepared the Capital Appropriations
Request (CAR) for the purchase of two filing cabinets. The request was signed by
Dr. Salvador P. Cajilog, department head, and later approved by five other offi
cers of Univet Agricultural. Before the CAR was transmitted to the purchasing de
partment for the procurement of the office equipment, it was discovered that pet
itioner had included in the order the acquisition of one executive swivel chair.
On February 18, 1989, a memorandum was issued to petitioner, requiring her to e
xplain within 48 hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against her. P
etitioner admitted making the insertion in the Capital Appropriations Request bu
t explained that she had done so in good faith. Apparently, petitioners explanati
on was considered not satisfactory, because on March 18, 1989, she was given not
ice of the termination of her employment. Petitioner wrote Dr. Delfin Samson, pr
esident of United Laboratories, Inc., asking for a fair investigation. Getting no
favorable response, she filed on April 7, 1989 a complaint for illegal dismissal
against Univet Agricultural Products, Inc. Petitioner alleged that she made the
intercalation in the CAR in good faith, without any intention of defrauding the
company, because she intended the chair for the manager of her department. She
claimed that what she did was made with the knowledge of Dr. Cajilog. Petitioner
alleged that she was dismissed because she had exposed the involvement of two c
ompany officers, Conrado Baylon and Dr. Benedicto Santiago, in the rival company
, Biomass Corp. of the Philippines. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismis
sing petitioners complaint for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter found petitioner
guilty of dishonesty and serious misconduct, warranting dismissal from the servi
ce. On appeal the NLRC, while finding petitioner liable to disciplinary action,
thought that the penalty imposed by the company was too severe. Accordingly, it
set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered the petitioner reinstate
d and paid backwages.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but her motion was denied on May 20, 1992.
Hence, this petition alleging that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion. Hence
this case. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to Moral damages and th
e payment of attorneys fees under Art. 2208. RULING: Petitioners claim for moral d
amages is without merit. Not only was she guilty of misconduct, there is no show
ing that the company acted in bad faith or fraud or in a manner which is contrar
y to morals, good customs or public policy, in dismissing petitioner. Univet Agr
icultural was acting in the legitimate protection of its interest in seeing to i
t that its employees were performing their jobs with honesty, integrity and fide
lity. For the same reason there is no basis for an award of attorneys fees. Under
Art. 2208(2) of the Civil Code, the award of such fees is to be justified if th
e claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to p
rotect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the party against whom it
is sought. 128. DRILON vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: In a letter-complaint to the
n Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon dated March 20, 1990, General Renato de V
illa, who was then the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, re
quested the Department of Justice to order the investigation of several individu
als named therein, including herein private respondent Homobono Adaza, for their
alleged participation in the failed December 1989 coup detat. Gen. de Villas lett
er-complaint with its annexes was referred for preliminary inquiry to the Specia
l Composite Team of Prosecutors. Petitioner then Assistant Chief State Prosecuto
r Aurelio Trampe, the Team Leader, finding sufficient basis to continue the inqu
iry, issued a subpoena to the individuals named in the letter-complaint, Adaza i
ncluded, and assigned the case for preliminary investigation to a panel of inves
tigators composed of prosecutors George Arizala, as Chairman, and Ferdinand Abes
amis and Cesar Solis as members. The panel then found that there is probable cau
se to hold herein respondents for trial for the crime of REBELLION WITH MURDER A
ND FRUSTRATED MURDER hence recommended the filing of the corresponding informati
on against them in court. Feeling aggrieved by the institution of these proceedi
ngs against him, private respondent Adaza filed a complaint for damages, ]before
Branch 100 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In his complaint, Adaza
charged petitioners with engaging in a deliberate, willful and malicious experim
entation by filing against him a charge of rebellion complexed with murder and f
rustrated murder when petitioners, according to Adaza, were fully aware of the n
on-existence of such crime in the statute books. The petitioners filed a Motion
to Dismiss Adazas complaint on the ground that said complaint states no actionabl
e wrong constituting a valid cause of action against petitioners but was denied.
On appeal, the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit and orde
red respondent Judge to proceed with the trial of Civil Case. Hence, this petiti
on, dated October 9, 1992, pleading this Court to exercise its power of review u
nder Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent may
collect damages arising from the alleged malicious prosecution of rebellion wit
h murder and frustrated murder to him. RULING: The term malicious prosecution ha
s been defined in various ways. In American jurisdiction, it is defined as: One b
egun in malice without probable cause to believe the charges can be sustained (E
ustace v. Dechter, 28 Cal. App. 2d. 706,83 P. 2d. 525). Instituted with intentio
n of injuring defendant and without probable cause, and which terminates in favo
r of the person prosecuted. For this injury an action on the case lies, called t
he action of malicious prosecution (Hicks v. Brantley, 29 S.E. 459, 102 Ga. 264;
Eggett v. Allen, 96 N.W. 803, 119 Wis. 625). In Philippine jurisdiction, it has
been defined as: An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal pro
secution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously
and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or
other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is th
e putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation
or injury (Cabasaan v. Anota, 14169-R, November 19, 1956). The statutory basis f
or a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in the provisi
ons of the New Civil Code on Human Relations and on damages particularly Article
s 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219 (8). To constitute malicious pro
secution, however, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a si
nister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberat
ely by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concede
dly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does n
ot make one liable for malicious prosecution. Thus, in order for a malicious pro
secution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove three (3) elements: (1) the f
act of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the p
rosecutor and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in
bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) that t
he prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or s
inister motive. All these requisites must concur. 129. PONCE vs. LEGASPI FACTS:
Petitioner Ponce and husband Manuel owned 43% of the stockholdings of L NOR Mari
ne Services, Inc. (L NOR).48% of the stocks was owned by the spouses Porter. The
allegations of petitioner state that during the time while respondent Legaspi i
s the legal counsel of LNOR, there occurred fraudulent manipulations by spouses
Porter another officers and that with the aid of Legaspi, they incorporated the
Yrasport Dry docks, Inc.
which was designed to compete with LNOR but still used the office space, equipme
nt and goodwill of LNOR. On account of the illicit schemes and frauds committed
by Edward Porter and the officers of the corporation, complainant asked Legaspi
to take steps to protect LNOR, of which he is the legal counsel by retainer. The
latter refused, without valid excuse. Instead, he appeared as counsel to Porter
and others in the estafa case against them. Complainant filed for disbarment ag
ainst Legaspi, alleging that he committed gross misconduct in office as a member
of the Philippine Bar because, as legal counsel, he violated his duty to and th
e trust of his client L NOR, when he represented conflicting interests and assis
ted the Porter spouses in incorporating a competitor. The disbarment case howeve
r was dismissed. Legaspi subsequently filed a complaint for damages against peti
tioner, which was granted by the lower court and affirmed by CA. ISSUE: Whether
Legaspi is entitled to damages as a result of the disbarment case RULING: Before
proceeding with the merits of the case, the scope of an action for damages aris
ing from malicious prosecution needs to be clarified. Both the Court of Appeals
and the petitioner are of the belief that the suit for damages filed by Atty. Le
gaspi is not one arising from malicious prosecution because "a disbarment procee
ding is not a criminal action. (De Jesus-Paras v. Vailoces, 1 SCRA 954 [1961])."
The obvious inference is that only an unsuccessful criminal action may subseque
ntly give rise to a claim for damages based on malicious prosecution. This is no
t correct. While generally, malicious prosecution refers to unfounded criminal a
ctions and has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits just to vex and hu
miliate the defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause
(Equitable Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 133 SCRA 138 [1
984]) the foundation of an action for malicious prosecution is an original proce
eding, judicial in character. (Lorber v. Storrow, 70 P. 2d 513 [1937]; Shigeru H
ayashida v. Tsunehachi Kakimoto, 23 P. 2d 311 [1933]; Graves v. Rudman, 257 N.Y.
S. 212 [1932]). A disbarment proceeding is, without doubt, judicial in character
and therefore may be the basis for a subsequent action for malicious prosecutio
n. A perusal of the allegations in Atty. Legaspi s complaint for damages, partic
ularly paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 15 thereof (Rollo, pp. 56-59) shows that his ma
in cause of action was predicated on injury resulting from the institution of th
e disbarment case against him. This being the case, we find that the suit filed
by the respondent lawyer makes out a case of damages for malicious prosecution.
An action for damages arising from malicious prosecution is anchored on the prov
isions of Article 21, 2217 and 2219 [8] of the New Civil Code. Under these Artic
les: Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a mann
er that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate th
e latter for damages. Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, menta
l anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, mor
al shock, social humiliation and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary c
omputation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of t
he defendant s wrongful act or omission. Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recover
ed in the following and analogous cases:
(8) Malicious prosecution. In order, however, for the malicious prosecution suit
to prosper, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the f
urther fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action f
inally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosec
utor acted without probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or i
mpelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive. (Lao v. Court o
f Appeals, 199 SCRA 58 [1991]; Rehabilitation Finance Corporation v. Kohl, 4 SCR
A 535 [1962]; Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, 32 Phil. 363 [1915]). Atty. Legaspi
may have suffered injury as a consequence of the disbarment proceedings. But the
adverse result of anaction does not per se make the action wrongful and subject
the actor to make payment of damages for the law couldnot have meant to impose
a penalty on the right to litigate. One who exercises his rights does no injury.
If damageresults from a person s exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absq
ue injuria 130. MS. VIOLETA YASOA vs. RODENCIO and JOVENCIO DE RAMOS FACTS: Aurea
Yasoa and her son, Saturnino, went to the house of Jovencio de Ramos to ask for
financial assistance in paying their loans to Philippine National Bank (PNB), ot
herwise their residential house and lot, covered by TCT No. T-32810, would be fo
reclosed. Inasmuch as Aurea was his aunt, Jovencio acceded to the request. They
agreed that, upon payment by Jovencio of the loan to PNB, half of Yasoas subject p
roperty would be sold to him. On December 29, 1971, Jovencio paid Aureas bank loa
n. As agreed upon, Aurea executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Jovencio o
ver half of the lot consisting of 123 square meters. The said lot was then regis
tered. Twenty-two years later, Aurea filed an estafa complaint against brothers
Jovencio and Rodencio de Ramos on the ground that she was deceived by them. Aure
a alleged that Rodencio asked her to sign a blank paper on the pretext that it w
ould be used in the redemption of the mortgaged property. Aurea signed the blank
paper without further inquiry because she trusted her nephew, Rodencio. Thereaf
ter, they heard nothing from Rodencio and this prompted Nimpha Yasoa Bondoc to co
nfront Rodencio but she was told that the title was still with the Register of D
eeds. However, when Nimpha inquired from the Register of Deeds, she was shocked
to find out that the lot had been divided into two, pursuant to a deed of sale a
pparently executed by Aurea in favor of Jovencio. Aurea averred that she never s
old any portion of her property to Jovencio and never executed a deed of sale. O
n February 21, 1994, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rodrigo B. Zayenis dismisse
d the criminal complaint for estafa for lack of evidence. On account of this dis
missal, Jovencio and Rodencio filed a complaint for damages on the ground of mal
icious prosecution with the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, Branch 91
, They alleged that the filing of the estafa complaint against them was done wit
h malice and it caused irreparable injury to their reputation, as Aurea knew ful
ly well that she had already sold half of the property to Jovencio. The trial co
urt ruled in favor of Jovencio.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal due to improper remedy. Hence this pet
ition. ISSUE: Whether the filing of the criminal complaint for estafa by petitio
ners against respondents constituted malicious prosecution. RULING: In this juri
sdiction, the term "malicious prosecution" has been defined as "an action for da
mages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other l
egal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, afte
r the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the
defendant therein." To constitute "malicious prosecution," there must be proof
that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex or humiliate a per
son, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his ch
arges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case t
o the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecu
tion. In this case, however, there is reason to believe that a malicious intent
was behind the filing of the complaint for estafa against respondents. The recor
ds show that the sale of the property was evidenced by a deed of sale duly notar
ized and registered with the local Register of Deeds. After the execution of the
deed of sale, the property was surveyed and divided into two portions. Separate
titles were then issued in the names of Aurea Yasoa (TCT No. 73252) and Jovencio
de Ramos (TCT No. 73251). Since 1973, Jovencio had been paying the realty taxes
of the portion registered in his name. In 1974, Aurea even requested Jovencio t
o use his portion as bond for the temporary release of her son who was charged w
ith malicious mischief. Also, when Aurea borrowed money from the Rural Bank of L
umban in 1973 and the PNB in 1979, only her portion covered by TCT No. 73252 was
mortgaged. All these pieces of evidence indicate that Aurea had long acknowledg
ed Jovencios ownership of half of the property. Furthermore, it was only in 1993
when petitioners decided to file the estafa complaint against respondents. If pe
titioners had honestly believed that they still owned the entire property, it wo
uld not have taken them 22 years to question Jovencios ownership of half of the p
roperty. The only conclusion that can be drawn from the circumstances is that Au
rea knew all along that she was no longer the owner of Jovencios portion after ha
ving sold it to him way back in 1971. Likewise, other than petitioners bare alleg
ations, no other evidence was presented by them to substantiate their claim. Mal
icious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases, requires the elements of (
1) malice and (2) absence of probable cause. These two elements are present in t
he present controversy. Petitioners were completely aware that Jovencio was the
rightful owner of the lot covered by TCT No. 73251, clearly signifying that they
were impelled by malice and avarice in bringing the unfounded action. That ther
e was no probable cause at all for the filing of the estafa case against respond
ents led to the dismissal of the charges filed by petitioners with the Provincia
l Prosecutors Office in Siniloan, Laguna. Petitioners reliance on Drilon vs. Court
of Appeals is misplaced. It must be noted that in Drilon, the investigating pan
el found that there was probable cause to hold private respondent Homobono Adaza
for trial for the crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder. Thus, p
etitioner (now Senate President) Franklin Drilon could not be held liable for ma
licious prosecution as there existed probable cause for the criminal
case. Here, the complaint for estafa was dismissed outright as the prosecutor di
d not find any probable cause against respondents. A suit for malicious prosecut
ion will prosper where legal prosecution is carried out without probable cause.
In sum, we find no reversible error on the part of the appellate court in dismis
sing the petition and in effect affirming the trial courts decision holding petit
ioners liable for damages for the malicious prosecution of respondents. 131. PAT
RICIO vs. THE HONORABLE OSCAR LEVISTE FACTS: On 16 May 1976 at about 10:00 o clo
ck in the evening, while a benefit dance was on-going in connection with the cel
ebration of the town fiesta, petitioner together with two (2) policemen were pos
ted near the gate of the public auditorium to check on the assigned watchers of
the gate. Private respondent Bienvenido Bacalocos, President of the Association
of Barangay Captains of Pilar, Capiz and a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, who
was in a state of drunkenness and standing near the same gate together with his
companions, struck a bottle of beer on the table causing an injury on his hand w
hich started to bleed. Then, he approached petitioner in a hostile manner and as
ked the latter if he had seen his wounded hand, and before petitioner could resp
ond, private respondent, without provocation, hit petitioner s face with his blo
odied hand. As a consequence, a commotion ensued and private respondent was brou
ght by the policemen to the municipal building. As a result of the incident, a c
riminal complaint for Slander by Deed was filed by petitioner with the Municipal
Trial Court of Pilar, Capiz, but the same was dismissed. Subsequently, a compla
int for damages was filed by petitioner with the court a quo. The trial court ru
led in favor of herein petitioner (as complainant), holding private respondent l
iable to the former for moral damages as a result of the physical suffering, mor
al shock and social humiliation caused by private respondent s act of hitting pe
titioner on the face in public. ISSUE: Whether or not Patricio is entitled to da
mages for the humiliation he experienced during the town fiesta RULING: There is
no question that moral damages may be recovered in cases where a defendant s wr
ongful act or omission has caused the complainant physical suffering, mental ang
uish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral sh
ock, social humiliation and similar injury. 16 An award of moral damages is allo
wed in cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civ
il Code, to wit: ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi
-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other las
civious acts. (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or
arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309; (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles
21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. Private respondent s contention that th
ere was no bad faith on his part in slapping petitioner on the face and that the
incident was merely accidental is not tenable. It was established before the co
urt a quo that there was an existing feud between the families of both petitione
r and private respondent and that private respondent slapped the petitioner with
out provocation in the presence of several persons. The act of private responden
t in hitting petitioner on the face is contrary to morals and good customs and c
aused the petitioner mental anguish, moral shock, wounded feelings and social hu
miliation. Private respondent has to take full responsibility for his act and hi
s claim that he was unaware of what he had done to petitioner because of drunken
ness is definitely no excuse and does not relieve him of his liability to the la
tter. Pursuant to Art. 21 of the Civil Code in relation to par. (10) of Art. 221
9 of the same Code, "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compen
sate the latter for the damage." The fact that no actual or compensatory damage
was proven before the trial court, does not adversely affect petitioner s right
to recover moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded in appropriate cases refe
rred to in the chapter on human relations of the Civil Code (Articles 19 to 36),
without need of proof that the wrongful act complained of had caused any physic
al injury upon the complainant. It is clear from the report of the Code Commissi
on that the reason underlying an award of damages under Art. 21 of the Civil Cod
e is to compensate the injured party for the moral injury caused upon his person
, thus ... . Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in t
he interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following
rule: ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a man
ner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate t
he latter for the damage. In addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary o
r corrective damages may be imposed upon herein private respondent by way of exa
mple or correction for the public good. Exemplary damages are required by public
policy to suppress the wanton acts of the offender. They are an antidote so tha
t the poison of wickedness may not run through the body politic. The amount of e
xemplary damages need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is entitled
to either moral, temperate or compensatory damages, as the case may be, althoug
h such award cannot be recovered as a matter of right. In cases where exemplary
damages are awarded to the injured party, attorney s fees are also recoverable.
Cases 123-131 URBANOZO, LAIRD DIONEL N. 132. MARIA FORD VS COURT OF APPEALS FACT
S: There are two sides in the incident of the case. First is Sulpicia Fabrigars,
she claims that on our about July 27, 1973 at around 3:00 to 3:30 P.M., being a
head teacher at a public school of Barrio Sta. Dumalag, Capiz by reason of the d
eputization of the of all public school teachers to assist the COMELEC in the co
nduct of national referendum, was humiliated by Barrio Captain Vicente Uy becaus
e she was telling Vicente Uys son, Elmo Uy, in writing remarks on the voting shee
ts. She claims that she was humiliated publicly by Vicente Uy and that she would
be reported to Maria Ford, owner of a sugar central. She further claims that Ma
ria ford also humiliated her by slapping her in the face publicly. However, Vice
nte Uy presented his version that at around 2:00 PM, upon knowledge that his son
was being embarrassed by Sulpicia Fabrigar, approached the latter talked calmly
but the Fabrigar refused to do so and would most likely hit Elmo Uy. Vicente Uy
referred the matter to Maria Ford and that the latter tried to approach Fabriga
r but to no avail. Maria Ford slapped Fabrigar claiming that she was already hys
terical in order for her to calm down. Trial Courts decision: Statements of Vicen
te Uy which did not call for any comment from Sulpicia Fabrigar, her silence sho
uld be deemed to be an admission of their truth and truth can not hurt or insult
. Hence, he complaint filed by Sulpicia Fabrigar is dismissed. Court of Appeals
decision: The facts obtaining in this case indicate that appellee Ford in perfor
ming the act of slapping the school teacher in front of the people was motivated
by personal animosity we believe that Maria Ford has by deed slandered plaintif
f Sulpicia Fabrigar which would entitle the latter to damages. There can be no c
ircumstance more humiliating for a headteacher of a barrio school than to be see
n by the barrio folks being slapped in her face. Hence, the court ordered that V
icente Uy and Maria Ford be held accountable for the damage done to Sulpicia Fab
rigar. ISSUE: Whether or not Maria Ford is liable for damages by slapping Sulpic
ia Fabrigar? HELD: We are satisfied with private respondent s explanation. Her i
nitiative in promptly instituting her complaint clearly manifests her honest int
ention to vindicate the wrong committed against her. She explained that shortly
after the incident between her and petitioner Uy, petitioner Ford came and slapp
ed her. Thus, when the report was made by private respondent to the police autho
rities of Dumalag Capiz, the immediate hurt and humiliation being felt by her wa
s not only the slander committed by petitioner Uy but, primarily and foremost, t
he slapping by petitioner Ford. Hence, the police report of private respondent w
hich focused on her being slapped by petitioner Ford, although inadvertently omi
tting the incident with petitioner Uy in view of her emotional state then, shoul
d not be construed to mean that private respondent was not slandered by petition
er Uy.
133. ERLINDA ILUSIO VS ERLINDA BIDNER FACTS: Erlinda Ilusio is the wife of lawye
r Potenciano Ilusorio they have lived together as hudband and wife for about 30
years, but eventually separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Pote
nciano living in his penthouse in Baguio City and his wife in Antipolo City. Pot
enciano, upon visiting Erlinda in the United States, their children alleged that
Erlinda gave Potenciano an overdose of medicine causing sever health failure as
a result. Later on Erlinda filed with the RTC a petition for guardianship over
the person and property of his husband because he was getting old and frail. Pot
enciano lived in Makati, upon knowledge of Erlinda, she filed with the Court of
appeals for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She
alleged that respondent refused petitioners demands to see and visit her husband
and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City. Court of Appeals dec
ision: The court ordered that for humanitarian consideration and upon petitioners
manifestation, respondents Erlinda K. Ilusorio Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap,
the administrator of Cleveland Condominium or anywhere in its place, his guards
and Potenciano Ilusorios staff especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor to allow visitat
ion rights to Potenciano Ilusorios wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her children, n
otwithstanding any list limiting visitors thereof, under penalty of contempt in
case of violation of refusal thereof and that the previous grant of Habeas Corpu
s be recalled and the herein petition for habeas corpus be DENIED DUE COURSE, as
it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subje
ct of the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of Habeas Corpus is valid
? HELD: The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inqu
ire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom
if such restraint is illegal.To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint
of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nomina
l or moral. As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the Court of Appeals
observed that he was of sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant q
uestions to the satisfaction of the court. Being of sound mind, he is thus posse
ssed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolv
e on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he ma
de may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which excl
usively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that
he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declarat
ion, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse
the findings of the Court of Appeals. With his full mental capacity coupled with
the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation r
ights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to pr
ivacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional rig
ht. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live wi
th his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ ofhabeas corpu
s carried out by
sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authori
ty and is best left to the man and womans free choice. 134. BLAS OPLE VS RUBEN TO
RRES FACTS: On 12 Dec 1996, Ramos issued AO 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System". The late Senator Ople averred th
at the said AO is unconstitutional because it infringes upon the peoples privacy
and that the said AO is an encroachment of the Legislatures power to legislate la
ws. Blas opined that the said AO is not merely an AO because it partakes of the
nature of a law hence it is beyond the presidents power to issue such. He filed a
petition to enjoin Ruben Torres et al from carrying out such AO. Torres et al c
ountered that the AO is not a law for it creates no office; confers no right; af
fords no protection and imposes no duty. ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the p
resident is an encroachment of the functions of the Legislature. HELD: As head o
f the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents
the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the offic
ials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive departme
nt, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly
the functions of the executive department, bureau and office or interfere with
the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the Presiden
t also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance o
f general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over
bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effe
ctively. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies an
d enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the P
resident to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the of
ficial conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, r
ules and regulations. Upon these precepts, AO 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order i
s: Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particul
ar aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrativ
e head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. An administrative order is
an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the a
dministrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and sh
ould be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legisl
ative policy. An AO is not a law. In here, AO 308 partakes the nature of a law h
ence it is beyond executive power. Only the legislative can enact such a law of
general effect. 135. AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. VS HON. IGNACIO CAPULONG FACTS: Petit
ioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movieproduction company, Ayer Pr
oductions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippi
ne and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at
EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorse
d by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified
his approval of the intended film production. It is designed to be viewed in a s
ix-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docudrama" style, creating
four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual docu
mentary footage as background. David Williamson is Australia s leading playwrigh
t and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian h
ave developed a script. Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, approp
riation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any
member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other mediu
m for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand
and the name of Enrile was deleted from themovie script, and petitioners procee
ded to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enri
le invoking his right to privacy. Lower court decision: The court ordered for th
e desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or
his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff whic
h nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile
. ISSUE: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated. HELD: Yes. Freedom o
f speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictu
res and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through tele
vision. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films
is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualifi
cation for availing of freedom of speech and of expression. The projected motion
picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither
private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film
would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present dang
er" of any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public in
terest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the h
istory of the country. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events,
clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place,
Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost, to som
e extent at least, their right to privacy. The line of equilibrium in the specif
ic context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and
of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirem
ent that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in i
ts presentation of events. 136. RODRIGO CONCEPCION VS COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: So
metime in 1985, the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allen Nicolas resided at 51 M. Co
ncepcion, San Joaquin, Pasig City, in an apartment leased to them by Concepcion
who
also resided in the same compound where the apartment was located. Nestor was th
en engaged in the business of supplying government agencies with office equipmen
ts. Concepcion joined this venture by contributing capital on the condition that
after her capital investment was returned to her, any profit would be divided e
qually between her and Nestor. Sometime in the 2nd week of July 1985, Rodrigo br
other of Concepcions husband (dead), angrily accosted Nestor at the latters apartm
ent and accused him of adultery with Concepcion. To clarify matters, Nestor went
with Rodrigo to see his relatives who allegedly have knowledge of such adultery
. However, those people denied any knowledge thereof. Nevertheless, Rodrigo reit
erated his accusation and threatened Concepcion that should something happen to
his sick mother, in case the mother would learn about the affair, he would kill Co
ncepcion. The Nicolas spouses sued Rodrigo for damages. Regional Trial Court dec
ision: The court ordered to pay respondent spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nico
las the sums of P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages a
nd P10,000.00 for attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit. Court of Appeals decisi
on: Affirms the decision of the lower court. ISSUE: Whether or not there is basi
s in law for the award of damages to spouses Nicolas. HELD: The Code Commission
stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The s
acredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for
amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civiliza
tion of every country is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficientl
y protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personalit
y is not exalted, then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, the rights of person
s are aptly protected, and damages are provided for violations of a persons digni
ty, personality, privacy and peace of mind. The decision of the CA is affirmed.
137. MVRS VS. ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL FACTS- The ISLAMIC DA WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHIL
(IDCP), alocal federation of more than 70 Muslim religious orgs,and some indivi
dual Muslims filed in the RTC Manila acomplaint for damages in their own behalf
and as aclass suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLI
CATIONS, et.al.- Complaint alleged that what was published in BULGARwas insultin
g and damaging to the Muslims; that thesewords alluding to the pig as the God of
the Muslims wasnot only published out of sheer ignorance but withintent to hurt
the feelings, cast insult and disparage theMuslims and Islam; that on account o
f these libelouswords Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philbut the en
tire Muslim world, esp. every Muslimindividual in non-Muslim countries MVRS clai
med it was merely an expression of belief/opinion and was published without mali
ce. Also, it did not mention respondents as object of the article,hence, were no
t entitled to damages. RTC dismissed- plaintiffs failed to establish theircause
of action since the persons allegedly defamed bythe article were not specificall
y identified. CA reversed-it was "clear from the disputed articlethat the defama
tion was directed to all adherents of Islamic faith.
ISSUE- Whether or nothe cause of action should rise from anintentional tortuous
act causing mental distress HELD:.Action arising from an intentional tortuous ac
tcausing mental distress cannot be sustained in thiscase, for such action is per
sonal in nature, and since noparticular individual was identified in the dispute
darticle, such cause of action cannot be sustained. Torts with independent civil
action: DEFAMATION An "emotional distress" tort action is personal innature; it
is a civil action filed by an individual toassuage the injuries to his emotiona
l tranquility due topersonal attacks on his character.- The purported damage cau
sed by the publishedarticle falls under principle of relational harm- whichinclu
des harm to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation; as
distinguished from the principle of reactive harm- which includes injuries to in
dividual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distres
s. The present case falls within the application of the relational harm principl
e of tort actions for defamation.- To recover for this the plaintiff must show t
hat: (a)conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of pla
intiff; (b)conduct was extreme and outrageous; (c)causal connection between defe
ndant s conduct and the plaintiff s mentaldistress; and, (d) the plaintiff s men
tal distress was extreme and severe.- Any party seeking recovery for mental angu
ish must prove more than mere worry, anxiety, embarrassment or anger. 138. INTER
NATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS V. QUISUMBING AND INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL FAC
TS: International School (IS) pays its teachers who are hired from abroad, or fo
reignhires, a higher salary than its local-hires, whether the latter are Filipin
o or not (most are Filipino, but some are American). It justifies this under the
dislocation factor that foreigners must be given a higher salary both to attract
them to teach here, and to compensate them for the significant economic disadvant
ages involved in coming here. The Teachers Union cries discrimination. ISSUE: Whet
her or not discrimination exists which would constitute damage HELD: Discriminat
ion exists. Equal pay for equal work is a principal long honored in this jurisdi
ction, as it rests on fundamental norms of justice 1. Art. XIII, Sec. 1 of the C
onstitution (Social Justice and Human Rights) exhorts Congress to give the highe
st priority to the enactment of measures that protect and ennhance the right od
all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalitite
s. The Constitution also provides that labor is entitled to humane conditions of w
ork.. These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace, but include
as well the manner by which employers treat their employees. Lastly, the Constit
ution directs the State to promote equality of employment opportunities for all, reg
ardless of sex, race, or creed. It would be an affront to both the spirit and
the letter of these provisions if the State closes its eyes to unequal and discr
iminatory terms and conditions of employment. 2. International law, which spring
s from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General pr
inciples of law include principles of equity, i.e., fairness and justice, based
on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
numerous other international Conventions all embody the general principle again
st discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines,
through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its nation
al laws. 139. BIBOSO VS. JUDGE OSMUNDO M. VILLANUEVA FACTS: Complainant Lucita E
. Biboso, 33, claimed that at around 11 oclock in the morning of August 20, 1996,
she went to see respondent at the MCTC in Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat to follow up
her case, she was molested by respondent. Lucita claims that Judge Villanueva ki
ssed, hugged, unzipped the pants of complainant and that she could not do anythi
ng because of respondents strength. What she did then is evade the sexual advanc
es of respondent and ran outside the chamber and went home. Respondent on the ot
her hand claims that the allegations made by the complainant is false, claiming
that he dismissed two cases submitted by Biboso, and such act was a form of reve
nge. Furthermore he claims that he was in Lebak and not in his office, he submit
ted several documentary evidence of him being in Lebak. Regional Trial Court dec
ision: Executive Judge German M. Malcampo found complainants claim of sexual hara
ssment to be unsubstantiated due to material inconsistencies between complainants
affidavit-complaint and her testimony during the investigation of the case. Nev
ertheless, in view of his finding that respondent gave assistance to complainants
father-in-law in filing a case in his sala, Judge Malcampo recommended that res
pondent be reprimanded and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P20,000.00. IS
SUE: Whether or not respondent commit sexual harassment towards complainant HELD
: Complainant thus failed to prove her charges against respondent. The inconsist
encies between her testimony and complaint-affidavit, in contrast to the credibl
e testimonial and documentary evidence presented by respondent, put in serious d
oubt the veracity of her claims. Indeed, it appears, as respondent judge claims,
that this case was filed to punish him for having dismissed the cases filed by
complainant and her father-in-law, especially as the filing of this case came on
the heels of the dismissal of the latter. There could no other reason for compl
ainant to turn against respondent when the latter had previously helped complain
ant in her legal problems to the extent of preparing her father-in-laws complaint
-affidavit for estafa against Navarra and even issuing a writ of execution in on
e case (Civil Case No. 71) and a warrant of arrest in another (Criminal Case No.
1662-B). Furthermore, it took complainant more than a year after the commission
of the alleged sexual harassment on September 4, 1996 to file the instant admin
istrative complaint. Even complainant s explanation as to why she executed her a
ffidavit-complaint only on October 16, 1997 was conflicting. She initially
stated that she was only able to execute her complaint-affidavit for this case o
n said late date because rumors had spread by that time that she was respondents
lover (kabit).During her cross-examination, however, she stated that she had to
defer the execution of her complaint because she had to wait for her husband to
come back from Manila. 140. PHILIPPINE AEOLUS AUTO-MOTIVE UNITED CORPORATION Vs.
NLRC FACTS: On October 5 1994, a memorandum was issued to Rosalinda C. Cortez r
equiring her to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against her f
or throwing a stapler against Plant Manager Chua, for losing the sum amount of m
oney of P1488.00 and for asking a co-employee to stamp her card to make it appea
r that she was at work when in fact she was not. Said memorandum was refused by
respondent Cortez and did not submit an explanation hence she was placed in a pr
eventive suspension. While pending suspension she was given a second memorandum
requiring her to explain why the ATM applications of 9 of her co-workers were no
t processed. She submitted a written explanation with respet to the money lost a
nd the punching of the card. A third memorandum was issued against her for termi
nation on grounds of gross and habitual negligence, serious misconduct and fraud
or willful breach of trust. Hence respondent filed for illegal dismissal. Labor
Arbiters decision: Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding the termination of
Cortez as valid and legal, at the same time dismissing her claim for damages for
lack of merit. NLRC decision: reversed the decision of the labor arbiter and fo
und corporation guilty of illegal dismissal and the reinstatement of Cortez with
back wages. ISSUE: Whether or not Cortez is entitled to damages in the event th
at the illegality of her dismissal is sustained. HELD: In determining entitlemen
t to moral and exemplary damages, we restate the bases therefor. In moral damage
s, it suffices to prove that the claimant has suffered anxiety, sleepless nights
, besmirched reputation and social humiliation by reason of the act complained o
f. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are granted in addition to, inter alia,
moral damages "by way of example or correction for the public good" if the empl
oyer acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
" Anxiety was gradual in private respondent s five (5)-year employment. It began
when her plant manager showed an obvious partiality for her which went out of h
and when he started to make it clear that he would terminate her services if she
would not give in to his sexual advances. Sexual harassment is an imposition of
misplaced "superiority" which is enough to dampen an employee s spirit in her c
apacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life.
If for this alone private respondent should be adequately compensated. Thus, for
the anxiety, the seen and unseen hurt that she suffered, petitioners should als
o be made to pay her moral damages, plus exemplary damages, for the oppressive m
anner with which petitioners effected her dismissal from the service, and to ser
ve as a forewarning to lecherous officers and employers who take undue advantage
of their ascendancy over their employees.
All told, the penalty of dismissal is too excessive and not proportionate to the
alleged infractions committed considering that it does not appear that private
respondent was an incorrigible offender or that she inflicted serious damage to
the company, nor would her continuance in the service be patently inimical to he
r employer s interest. Even the suspension imposed upon her while her case was p
ending investigation appears to be unjustified and uncalled for. Cases 132-140 D
ELA ROSA, JOHN ROME L. 141. OBRA VS CA FACTS: Petitioner Obra was a regional dir
ector of the Bureau of Mines and Geo Sciences in Baguio City. On June 26, 1985 J
eannette Grybos wrote him a letter in behalf of the Gillies heirs in Mankayan. T
he letter alleged that the spouses James and June Brett were conducting illegal
mining activities in lands owned by the said heirs and without the requisite per
mits. Obra then wrote Regional Unified Command 1 (RUC-1) Brig. Gen. Dumipit and
enlisted his help in stopping a truck illegedly used by respondents in shipping
the illegally mined ores. Obra also wrote the provincial commander of Benguet Co
l. Estepa and requested that he stop any mining activities over the contested ar
ea. Elements of RUC-1 seized an Isuzu Elf truck belonging to respondents and imp
ounded it. Private respondents filed a complaint for injunction and damages with
an application for a TRO in the RTC due to violations of Art. 32 and 19-21 of t
he Civil Code. Court likewise ruled that no investigation had been made and acco
rding to jurisprudence respondents are entitled to damages for violation of thei
r rights. Accordingly, the trial court ruled that, under Art. 32 of the Civil Co
de and the ruling in Aberca v. Ver, private respondents were entitled to actual
and compensatory damages, moral damages, and exemplary damages in the total amou
nt of P100,000.00 and attorney s fees in the total amount of P10,000.00, plus co
sts of suit. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the decision in toto. ISSUE
S & ARGUMENTS: 1. WoN Petitioners could not be held liable for damages in the pe
rformance of their duty in Good Faith. 2. WoN Petitioners are entitled to an awa
rd of Damages. RULING: PETITION IS WITHOUT MERIT, CA DECISION AFFIRMED PD No. 12
81 gave powers to order arrest, even without warrant, of persons violation PD No
. 463 or any laws being enforced by Bureau of Mines and seize tools used for the
same in favor of the government and to deputize any PC, police agency, barangay
or any person qualified to police mining activities. The petitioners contend th
at this grant of power is valid even in the Constitution.
The Constitution merely makes valid the grant of power to issue warrants but did
not in any way exempt the agencies so empowered from the duty of determining pr
obable cause as basis for the issuance of warrants. The real question is whether
or not petitioner conducted any investigation at all. As we said in Aberca v. V
er, the military is not to be restrained from pursuing their task or carrying ou
t their mission with vigor. However, in doing so, care must be taken that consti
tutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded. In this case, there was absol
utely no justification for the disregard of procedures for issuing search and se
izure orders. The Court of Appeals rightly concluded then that petitioners viola
ted private respondents constitutional rights to due process and to security ag
ainst unreasonable searches and seizure in ordering the seizure and impoundment
of private respondents vehicle. For as the trial court held: From all the above
arguments and counter-arguments, the Court finds that the petitioners do not se
riously dispute that the private respondents were, indeed, deprived of the use o
f their Isuzu "ELF" Truck when the private respondents foreman and the driver o
f the truck were told by Sgt. Morales of the RUC-I that the same could not leave
the mining area in Palasa-an, Mankayan, Benguet, "per orders", and the same was
parked in front of the building where the military team specifically assigned f
or that particular mission was staying. The arguments of the petitioners that th
ere was no distraint and/or seizure because the keys of the truck were always in
the possession of private respondents driver Kiyabang, that, on several occasi
ons, the truck left the Palasa-an mining area, . . . and that the private respon
dents voluntarily and maliciously refused to use or enjoy their own truck . . .
are facetious, to say the least, and deserve no serious consideration, in the li
ght of the undisputed fact that the military men led by Sgt. Morales did not all
ow him to drive the truck out of the Palasa-an mining area, and on those occasio
ns when he drove the truck out of the mining area, it was on missions of mercy a
nd for purposes of the needs of the military personnel assigned in the Palasaan
mining area, and these, always with a soldier on board the truck. There was, the
refore, a distraint and at least constructive seizure by the military men led by
Sgt. Morales, "as per orders," of the Isuzu Ilf truck of the private respondent
s, effectively depriving the latter of its use and enjoyment of their property.
Likewise, it is not disputed by the petitioners that Petitioners Obra s request
for the "checking and apprehending" of private respondents truck by Petitioner
Dumpit s RUC-I Command on June 26, 1985 (Exh. C) and the actual apprehension of
said truck by Sgt. Morales and his men on July 1, 1985, were not preceded by and
based on an investigation conducted by Petitioner Obra or his Office, but, inst
ead, were based on the letter-complaint of Jeannette Grybos received by said Off
ice also on June 26, 1985 (Exh. B). The petitioners claim that this did not vio
late the constitutional right of the private respondents to due process because
of the aforequoted reasons completely ignores the fundamental rule that laws sho
uld not be so interpreted or implemented as to violate the provisions of the con
stitution. Specifically, Petitioner Obra s interpretation of the law that grants
him "jurisdictional supervision and control" over persons and things that have
something to do with mines and mining (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 1281) authorizes him to
distrain and seize private respondents truck, as he actually did through Sgt. M
orales and his men, "without prerequisite conditions such as a prior preliminary
investigation of the case" (taken from the above quotation from petitioners Me
morandum), clearly violates the provision of the Bill of Rights on due process .
. .
These findings and conclusions of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of A
ppeals, are binding on this Court in the absence of any showing that they are co
ntrary to the evidence in the record. On the other hand, petitioner Dumpit claim
s that unlike the superior officers in Aberca, he had no knowledge of the acts o
f his subordinates since they did not file an "afterincident report" which was t
he standard procedure in these cases. He claims that all he did was to endorse t
he request to Major Densen, the Intelligence Officer of RUC-1, to coordinate wit
h the BMGS and implement the order accordingly. These contentions have no merit.
It was sufficiently proved in this case that the seizure of the truck was effec
ted upon the orders of petitioner Dumpit, acting on the request of petitioner Ob
ra. Private respondents witnesses testified that when they asked the military m
en who stopped them upon their entry to the "Mamakar" mining site, the soldiers
told them that they were acting upon the orders of "the general in Camp Dangwa."
Sgt. Morales even issued a certification that the truck was seized "as per orde
rs." Art. 32 of the Civil Code makes liable any public officer who is directly o
r indirectly responsible for violating an individual s constitutional rights. Th
e ruling in Aberca, which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, is stated as
follows: . . . [T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language
of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly" or
"indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and libe
rties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly respon
sible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly respo
nsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved part
y. . . . While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human
rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it shou
ld nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil
Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for
the transgressions joint tortfeasors. It was clear from petitioner Obra s letter
to petitioner Dumpit that assistance was sought for the seizure of private resp
ondents truck. Thus, when petitioner Dumpit endorsed the request to his subordi
nates for proper action, there could not have been any other foreseeable consequ
ence but the eventual seizure of the truck. Petitioner Dumpit cannot evade respo
nsibility for his acts by claiming that he merely performed a ministerial duty i
n ordering the implementation of petitioner Obra s request. Otherwise, Art. 32 c
ould easily be avoided by the mere plea that the officer concerned was only carr
ying out a ministerial duty. Petitioner Dumpit was a ranking military official.
It is unseemly for him to claim that he was merely executing a ministerial act.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
142. SERRANO VS NIRC FACTS: This is a Petition seeking review of the resolutions
, dated March 30, 1994 and August 26, 1994, of the National Labor Relations Comm
ission (NLRC) which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed pet
itioner Ruben Serrano s complaint for illegal dismissal and denied his motion fo
r reconsideration. Petitioner was hired by the Respondent Isetann Department Sto
re as a security checker to apprehend shoplifters. As a cost-cutting measure, pr
ivate respondent decided to phase out its security section engage the services o
f an independent security agency. Petitioner was then terminated. The problem wa
s that Petitioner was only given notice of dismissal on the same day that he was
terminated. This prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. NLRC o
rdered petitioner to be given separation pay holding that the phase-out of the s
ecurity section was a legitimate business decision. However, respondent was deni
ed the right to be given written notice before termination of his employment. IS
SUES: Was the dismissal illegal? What is the effect of violation of the notice r
equirement when termination is based on an authorized cause? RULING: An employers
good faith in implementing a redundancy program is not necessarily put in doubt
by the availment of the services of an independent contractor to replace the se
rvices of the terminated employees to promote economy and efficiency. Absent pro
of that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not
interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer. If termination of employ
ment is not for any of the cause provided by law, it is illegal and the employee
should be reinstated and paid backwages. To contend that even if the terminatio
n is for a just cause, the employee concerned should be reinstated and paid back
wages would be to amend Art 279 by adding another ground for considering dismiss
al illegal. If it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the causes
mentioned in Art 282, the in accordance with that article, he should not be rei
nstated but must be paid backwages from the time his employment was terminated u
ntil it is determined that the termination of employment is for a just cause bec
ause the failure to hear him before he is dismissed renders the termination with
out legal effect. Accordingly, we hold that the termination of petitioner s serv
ices was for an authorized cause, i.e., redundancy. Hence, pursuant to Art. 283
of the Labor Code, petitioner should be given separation pay at the rate of one
month pay for every year of service. Sanctions for Violations of the Notice Requ
irement Art. 283 also provides that to terminate the employment of an employee f
or any of the authorized causes the employer must serve "a written notice on the
workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month befor
e the intended date thereof." In the case at bar, petitioner was given a notice
of termination on October 11, 1991. On the same day, his services were terminate
d. He was thus denied his right to be
given written notice before the termination of his employment, and the question
is the appropriate sanction for the violation of petitioner s right. The decisio
n followed the ruling in several cases involving dismissals which, although base
d on any of the just causes under Art. 282, were effected without notice and hea
ring to the employee as required by the implementing rules. As this Court said:
"It is now settled that where the dismissal of one employee is in fact for a jus
t and valid cause and is so proven to be but he is not accorded his right to due
process, i.e., he was not furnished the twin requirements of notice and opportu
nity to be heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer must be sanctio
ned for non-compliance with the requirements of, or for failure to observe, due
process." We agree with our esteemed colleagues, Justices Puno and Panganiban, t
hat we should rethink the sanction of fine for an employer s disregard of the no
tice requirement. We do not agree, however, that disregard of this requirement b
y an employer renders the dismissal or termination of employment null and void.
That would be to uphold the right of the employee but deny the right of the empl
oyer to dismiss for cause. Rather, the remedy is to order the payment to the emp
loyee of full backwages from the time of his dismissal until the court finds tha
t the dismissal was for a just cause. But, otherwise, his dismissal must be uphe
ld and he should not be reinstated. This is because his dismissal is ineffectual
. Not all notice requirements are requirements of due process. Some are simply p
art of a procedure to be followed before a right granted to a party can be exerc
ised. Others are simply an application of the Justinian precept, embodied in the
Civil Code, to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith toward one s fellowmen. Such is the notice requirement in Arts. 282-
283. The consequence of the failure either of the employer or the employee to li
ve up to this precept is to make him liable in damages, not to render his act (d
ismissal or resignation, as the case may be) void. The measure of damages is the
amount of wages the employee should have received were it not for the terminati
on of his employment without prior notice. If warranted, nominal and moral damag
es may also be awarded. 143. ABERCA VS MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER FACTS: Then Presiden
t Marcos had already lifted Martial Law but the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus was still suspended. General Ver ordered Task Force Makabansa (TFM) to co
nduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground hou
ses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Ma
nila. Petitioners filed a complaint which contained allegations of searches made
without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defecti
ve warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and per
sonal effects belonging to them and other items of property which were not subve
rsive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of pe
titioners without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances
; detention of petitioners at several undisclosed places of safehouses" where t
hey were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture
and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting
incriminatory statements. The complaint
contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the petitioners violative
of their constitutional rights. The RTC of Quezon City dismissed the complaint
upon motion by the respondents. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS 1. WoN the TFM may be held li
able for their acts under an official duty 2. WoN the suspension of the privileg
e of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searc
hes conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution. Respondents: They have immunity from suit of
a state for they only followed the orders of the President when he called them
out. It was their constitutional duty to exercise their functions. RULING: YES,
THEIR DUTY TO SUPPRESS LAWLESSNESS IS NOT A BLANKET LICENSE WHICH IGNORED THE CO
NSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THEPEOPLE. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the
act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitution
al rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others 1. Freedom from arbitra
ry arrest or illegal detention; 2. The right against deprivation of property wit
hout due process of law; 3. The right to be secure in one s person, house, paper
s and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; 4. The privacy of comm
unication and correspondence; 5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness ag
ainst one s self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced b
y a promise of immunity or reward to make a confession, except when the person c
onfessing becomes a state witness. The complaint in this litigation alleges fact
s showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs constitutional righ
ts and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and imp
aired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made withou
t search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warr
ants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal e
ffects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subver
sive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of pla
intiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances;
detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of safehouses" where they
were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and
other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting inc
riminatory statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpe
trated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights. Secondly, n
either can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" shou
ld be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of
its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violat
ion. The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply
set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence
that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of act
ion must be based on what appears
on the face of the complaint. To determine the sufficiency of the cause of actio
n, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered.
For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of
the facts alleged in the complaint. Applying this test, it is difficult to justi
fy the trial court s ruling, dismissing for lack of cause of action the complain
t against all the defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bie
nvenido Balaba. The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants w
hich, if admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or ca
uses of action against all of them under Article 32 of the Civil Code. According
ly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the resolution of the responde
nt court, dated November 8, 1983, its order dated May 11, 1984 and its resolutio
n dated September 21, 1984. Let the case be remanded to the respondent court for
further proceedings. With costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED. 144. A
LONZO VS CA FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari challenges the decisio
n of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 10504 and its resolution 2 denying t
he motion for the reconsideration of the decision. The decision affirmed in toto
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, in Criminal Ca
se No. 13698 convicting the petitioner of libel. Petitioner, Dr. Merle Alonzo wa
s the Field Operations Officer of the Philippine Medical Care Commission (PMCC).
She was directed to conduct inspections of medicareaccredited clinics and hospi
tals. Among these hospitals were Sto. Nio Medical Clinic and Our Lady of Fatima M
edical Clinic, both in Davao del Sur and owned by herein private respondents Vel
asco spouses. In her report to the Vice Chairman of the PMCC regarding said hosp
itals, she included, with the violations, the statement, In all, this particular
clinic should be closely monitored because, aside from the above mentioned viola
tions, the husband is a judge and it gives them a certain amount of untouchabilit
y. In fact, they make court suits their pastime. Dr. Velasco and her husband, Judg
e Dan Velasco, then filed a complaint for libel against the petitioner with the
Office of the City Fiscal of Davao City and, after preliminary investigation, As
sistant City Fiscal Raul Bendigo filed the corresponding information for libel a
gainst the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court, Davao City; which docketed
it as Criminal Case No. 13698. After due trial, the trial court promulgated on 1
9 November 1990 its decision finding the petitioner "guilty beyond reasonable do
ubt of two (2) crimes of libel, penalized under Article 355 of the Revised Penal
Code, as charged," and sentenced her "to pay a fine of P1,000.00; for each crim
e; pay Dr. Angeles Te-Velasco and Judge Dan U. Velasco P5,000.00 each for moral
damages; and to pay the costs." Such Judgment was affirmed by the CA on appeal.
A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. ISSUE: WoN the questioned repo
rt is libelous.
RULING: Libel is defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code as follows: Ar
t. 333. Definition of libel. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a c
rime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act or omission, conditi
on, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contemp
t of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
For an imputation then to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a)
it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity
; and (d) the victim must be identifiable. Any of the imputations covered by Art
icle 353 is defamatory and, under the general rule laid down in Article 354, eve
ry defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true; if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. There is malice wh
en the author of the imputation is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and sp
eaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person w
ho claims to have been defamed. Truth then is not a defense, unless it is shown
that the matter charged as libelous was made with good motives and for justifiab
le ends. Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code provides, in part, as follows: Ar
t. 361. Proof of truth. In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may b
e given in evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as li
belous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives and for j
ustifiable ends, the defendant shall be acquitted. However, malice is not presum
ed and must, therefore, be proved, under the following exceptions provided for i
n Article 354, viz.: 1. A private communication made by any person to another in
the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and 2. A fair and true repo
rt, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks; of any judicial legisla
tive or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of a
ny statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other ac
t performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. The privilege
d character of these communications is not absolute, but merely qualified since
they could still be shown to be malicious by proof of actual malice or malice in
fact. 7 The burden of proof in this regard is on the plaintiff or the prosecuti
on. Publication means "to make public; to make known to people in general; to br
ing before the public." Specifically put, publication in the law of libel means
the making known of the defamatory matter, after it has been written, to some pe
rson other than the person of whom it is written. If the statement is sent strai
ght to a person whom it is written there is no publication of it. The reason for
this is that [a] communication of the defamatory matter to the person defamed c
annot injure his reputation though it may wound his self-esteem. A man s reputat
ion is not the good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in which other
s hold him. We Cannot agree with the differing conclusion of the Court of Appeal
s that "the derogatory remarks were obviously made out of ill-will or revenge, i
n view of the rumored threat of libel from the complainants according to the Dav
ao del Sur PHA
grapevine." For one, this only shows that both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals could not agree on what the basis for the motive of the petitioner shoul
d be. For another, as indicated above, the private respondents themselves focuse
d their minds and hearts on the untruthfulness of the violations indicated in th
e petitioner s report. Finally, the statement on the threat of a libel charge wa
s evidently based on a rumor (from the grapevine) which we, nevertheless, find t
o be relevant to the report since it serves to forewarn the petitioner s superio
rs of the risks she and they might meet as a consequence of her report on the vi
olations and to emphasize the need for PMCC s firmness and courage to pursue the
appropriate charges as may be warranted in the premises. All told then, the pro
secution in this case was unable to prove malice in fact. Finally there was, in
law, no publication of the questioned report. The rule is settled that a communi
cation made by a public officer in the discharge of his official duties to anoth
er or to a body of officers having a duty to perform with respect to the subject
matter of the communication does not amount to a publication within the meaning
of the law on defamation. There was also no publication when Atty. Balasabas, a
third person, read the complaint against Dr. Velasco and the report of the peti
tioner attached thereto. The private respondents entrusted these documents to At
ty. Balasabas with the request that he give them to their counsel, Atty. David M
ontaa. Where the plaintiff himself communicated or by his acts caused the communi
cation of the libelous matter to a third person, there was no actionable publica
tion. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the C
ourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 10504 is hereby REVERSED and petitioner DR. ME
RLE A. ALONZO is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. No pronouncement as to c
osts. SO ORDERED. 145. SAZON VS CA FACTS: Petitioner, Fernando Sazon and private
complainant Abdon Reyes were both elected to the new board of directors for the
PML Homes in Marikina. Later, petitioner was also elected as the president of t
he new board of directors defeating private complainant, Abdon. Abdon, unable to
accept defeat, questioned such election and filed an election protest. Upon app
roval, Abdon immediately scattered leaflets entitled Supalpal si Sazon among his c
o-homeowners. And at about the same time the phrase. Sazon, nasaan ang pondo ng s
imbahan? was seen at the gates of the subdivision. In response, petitioner, Sazon
, as the editor of the homeowners association newsletter, published an article w
hich defined Abdon as manlilinlang, mandurugas , and manloloko, and accused him of be
ng the mastermind of the phrase at the gates. Aggrieved by the aforequoted artic
le, the Abdon filed a complaint for libel against Sazon.
On March 18, 1992, the trial court rendered its decision finding the petitioner
guilty of the crime charged, and accordingly sentenced him, thus: WHEREFORE, fore
going considered, the accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the cri
me charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FOUR (4) months and
ONE (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to TWO (2) years, FOUR (4) months and O
NE (1) day of prision correccional as maximum, with the accessory penalties prov
ided by law, and to pay a fine of P200.00 in accordance with Art. 353, in relati
on to Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code. With costs against the accused. The Co
urt of Appeals affirmed the decision. Thus the present petition. ISSUE: WoN the
questioned article is libelous. ARGUMENTS: 1. Petitioner insists that the allege
dly offensive words found in the subject article are not actually defamatory. Ac
cording to petitioner, the word mandurugas and other words and phrases used in the
questioned article do not impute to private complainant any crime, vice or defe
ct which would be injurious or damaging to his name and reputation. As far as pe
titioner is concerned, the descriptive words and phrases used should be consider
ed as mere epithets which are a form of non-actionable opinion, because while th
ey may express petitioners strong emotional feelings of dislike, they do not mean
to reflect adversely on private complainants reputation. 2. Petitioner also main
tains that there was no malice in this case. He argues that the prosecution fail
ed to present evidence demonstrating that the accused was prompted by personal i
ll-will or spite or that he did not act in response to duty but acted merely to
cause harm to private complainant. Consequently, the prosecution failed to disch
arge its burden of proving malice on the part of the accused beyond all reasonab
le doubt. RULING: Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel in this wi
se: ART. 353. Definition of libel. - A libel is a public and malicious imputation
of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, co
ndition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or co
ntempt of a natural or juridical person, on to blacken the memory of one who is
dead. For an imputation then to be libelous, the following requisites must concur
: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publi
city; and (d) the victim must be identifiable. Petitioner concedes the existence
of the third and fourth requisites in the case at bench. Accordingly, only the f
irst and second elements need to be discussed herein. In libel cases, the questi
on is not what the writer of an alleged libel means, but what the words used by
him mean. Here, the defamatory character of the words used by the petitioner are
shown by the very recitals thereof in the questioned article. No evidence aliun
de need be adduced to prove it. Petitioner used the following words and phrases
in describing the private complainant: mandurugas, mag-ingat sa panlilinlang, matagal
na tayong niloloko, may kasamang pagyayabang, ang ating pobreng super kulit, patuloy
na kabulastugan, mastermind sa paninirang puri,
etc. Jurisprudence has laid down a test to determine the defamatory character of
words used in the following manner, viz: Words calculated to induce suspicion ar
e sometimes more effective to destroy reputation than false charges directly mad
e. Ironical and metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander. A charge
is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and
understand that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty
of certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue, or rep
utation, or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule. This test was sa
tisfied in the case at bench. Branding private complainant Reyes mandurugas, et al
. most certainly exposed him to public contempt and ridicule. No amount of sophi
stical explanation on the part of petitioner can hide, much less erase, the nega
tive impression already created in the minds of the readers of the libelous mate
rial towards private complainant. Respondent Court of Appeals is, thus, correct
in holding that these words and phrases (mandurugas, et al.) are indisputably defam
atory for they impute upon the private complainant a condition that is dishonora
ble and shameful, since they tend to describe him as a swindler and/or a deceive
r. The general rule laid down in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides t
hat: Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presume
d to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable moti
ve for making it is shown. x x x Prescinding from this provision, when the imputa
tion is defamatory, as in this case, the prosecution need not prove malice on th
e part of the defendant (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that the
defendants imputation is malicious (malice in law). The burden is on the side of
the defendant to show good intention and justifiable motive in order to overcome
the legal inference of malice. Unfortunately, petitioner miserably failed to di
scharge this burden in the case before us. even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, t
hat petitioners article qualifies under the category of privileged communication,
this does not still negate the presence of malice in the instant case. It is we
ll to note that the existence of malice in fact may be shown by extrinsic eviden
ce that the defendant bore a grudge against the offended party, or that there wa
s rivalry or ill-feeling between them which existed at the date of the publicati
on of the defamatory imputation or that the defendant had an intention to injure
the reputation of the offended party as shown by the words used and the circums
tances attending the publication of the defamatory imputation. The circumstances
under which the subject article was published by the petitioner serve to buttre
ss the inference that petitioner was animated solely by revenge towards the priv
ate complainant on account of the leaflet entitled Supalpal si Sazon, earlier circ
ulated among the homeowners as well as the writings near the entrance gate of th
e subdivision, all of which petitioner believes to be the handiwork of the priva
te complainant. Furthermore, the words used in the questioned article were mostl
y uncalled for, strongly sending the message that petitioners objective was merel
y to malign and injure the reputation of the private complainant. This is certai
nly indicative of malice in fact on the part of the petitioner. WHEREFORE, the d
ecision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that, i
n lieu of imprisonment and fine, the penalty to be imposed upon the
petitioner shall be a fine of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) PESOS with subsidiary i
mprisonment in case of insolvency. SO ORDERED. 146. BORJAL VS CA FACTS: A civil
action for damages based on libel was filed before the court against Borjal and
Soliven for writing and publishing articles that are allegedly derogatory and of
fensive against Francisco Wenceslao, attacking among others the solicitation let
ters he send to support a conference to be launch concerning resolving matters o
n transportation crisis that is tainted with anomalous activities. Wenceslao how
ever was never named in any of the articles nor was the conference he was organi
zing. The lower court ordered petitioners to indemnify the private respondent fo
r damages which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A petition for review was
filed before the SC contending that private respondent was not sufficiently iden
tified to be the subject of the published articles. ISSUE: WoN there are suffici
ent grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel. RULING: In order to ma
intain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it
is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended
party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown
that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous p
ublication. These requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar. The
element of identifiability was not met since it was Wenceslaso who revealed he
was the organizer of said conference and had he not done so the public would not
have known. The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom
of the press and that privileged communications must be protective of public op
inion. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and consti
tute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair com
ment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is
deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicia
lly proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when t
he discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public ca
pacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imput
ation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegati
on of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expre
ssion of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opi
nion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the
facts. The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the decl
ared objective of the conference, the composition of its members and participant
s, and the manner by which it was intended to be funded no doubt lend to its act
ivities as being genuinely imbued with public interest. Respondent is also deeme
d to be a public figure and even otherwise is involved in a public issue. The co
urt held that freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed and protected
with the reminder among media members to practice highest ethical standards in
the exercise thereof. A privileged communication may be either: 1. Absolutely pr
ivileged communication are those which are not actionable even if the author has
acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987
Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. 2. Qualifiedly privileged c
ommunications are those containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unl
ess found to have been made without good intention justifiable motive. To this g
enre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comme
nts or remarks." 147. OCCENA VS ICAMINA FACTS: On May 31, 1979, herein petitione
r Eulogio Occena instituted before the Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of S
ibalom, San Remigio Belison, Province of Antique, Criminal Case No. 1717, a crim
inal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against herein private respondent Crist
ina Vegafria for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the followi
ng insulting words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, tr
aidor, malugus, Hudas," which, freely translated, mean: "You are a foolish Baran
gay Captain, ignoramus, traitor, tyrant, Judas" and other words and statements o
f similar import which caused great and irreparable damage and injury to his per
son and honor. Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilt
y. Trial thereafter ensued, at which petitioner, without reserving his right to
file a separate civil action for damages actively intervened thru a private pros
ecutor. After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight O
ral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subs
idiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were
awarded to petitioner in view of the trial court s opinion that "the facts and c
ircumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding
of moral damages." ISSUES & ARGUMENTS 1. WoN the decision of the Second Municipa
l Trial Court of Sibalom, San-RemigioBelison, Province of Antique constitutes th
e final adjudication on the merits of private respondent s civil liability; and
2. W/N petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks ut
tered by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory. HOLDI
NG: The decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court as affirmed by the Regiona
l Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 1709 cannot be considered as a final adjudica
tion on the civil liability of private respondent simply because said decision h
as not yet become final due to the timely appeal filed by petitioner with respec
t to the civil liability of the accused in said case. It was only the unappealed
criminal aspect of the case which has become final. We tackle the second issue
by determining the basis of civil liability arising from crime. Civil obligation
s arising from criminal offenses are governed by Article 100 of the Revised Pena
l Code which provides that "(E)very person criminally liable for a felony is als
o civilly liable," in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code on quasidelict,
the provisions for independent civil actions in the Chapter on Human Relations
and the provisions regulating damages, also found in the Civil Code.
Underlying the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable is also ci
villy liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has du
al character: (1) as an offense against the state because of the disturbance of
the social order; and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by th
e crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt
and others wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either
because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person inj
ured by the crime. 3 In the ultimate analysis, what gives rise to the civil liab
ility is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentional or
negligently and whether or not punishable by law. Article 2219, par. (7) of the
Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or an
y other form of defamation This provision of law establishes the right of an off
ended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damag
es for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is likewise all
owed to recover punitive or exemplary damages. It must be remembered that every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no goo
d intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. And malice may be inf
erred from the style and tone of publication subject to certain exceptions which
are not present in the case at bar. Calling petitioner who was a barangay capta
in an ignoramus, traitor, tyrant and Judas is clearly an imputation of defects i
n petitioner s character sufficient to cause him embarrassment and social humili
ation. Petitioner testified to the feelings of shame and anguish he suffered as
a result of the incident complained of. 6 It is patently error for the trial cou
rt to overlook this vital piece of evidence and to conclude that the "facts and
circumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding
of moral damages." Having misapprehended the facts, the trial court s findings
with respect thereto is not conclusive upon us. From the evidence presented, we
rule that for the injury to his feelings and reputation, being a barangay captai
n, petitioner is entitled to moral damages in the sum of P5,000.00 and a further
sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages. 148. PEOPLE VS DEVARAS FACTS: On July 10
, 1990, at about 7 oclock in the evening, the three appellants were drinking tuba
with him in the house of Pablo Devaras and that thereafter they joined him on h
is tour of duty as bantay-bayan. They had been making the rounds in the town for
about four hours when, while at the Daguitan bridge, they saw a zigzagging pedi
cab approach. When the pedicab was halfway across the bridge, Blademir Devaras,
who was carrying a long bolo known as a sansibar, suddenly attacked Efren Verzosa,
the pedicab driver. Efren fell from his seat but Blademir continued hacking him
with the bolo, hitting him in the head and neck. At about the same time, Ronilo
Caisek, who also carrying a long bolo, attacked Felix Verzosa, the passenger, w
ho tried to parry the blows with his arms as he got out of the vehicle. He fell,
staggered and ran but was overtaken by Ronilo, who continued striking the helpl
ess old man in the head, neck, chest and shoulders.
Ronilo said that he was barely 5 meters away from the assailants and was so shoc
ked at what had happened that he could barely move or say anything. Pablo Devara
s also did not participate in the brutal slaying but later helped his cousin Bla
demir throw Efrens body over the bridge into the river below. Ronilo himself was
ordered to help throw the body of Felix and, although he initially hesitated, ha
d to comply in the end because he was threatened with death if he refused to obe
y. After the joint trial, Judge Pedro S. Espina of the Regional Trial Court of P
alo, Leyte, finding the presence of treachery but no conspiracy, convicted Blade
mir Devaras as principal and Pablo Devaras as accessory in the murder of Efren V
erzosa, and Ronilo Caisek for the murder of Felix Verzosa. Blademir Devaras and
Caisek were both sentenced to reclusion perpetua and each was ordered to pay civ
il indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of their respective victim
s. Pablo Devaras was convicted as an accessory in the murder of Efren Verzosa an
d sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 6 years, 1 month and 11 days to 8 yea
rs and 20 days. All three have appealed on the grounds that the trial court erre
d a) in convicting them of murder instead of homicide; and b) in not holding tha
t Ruel Animos should also have been charged and convicted as an accessory like a
ppellant Pablo Devaras. ISSUES 1. WoN the crime was that of murder. 2. WoN Ruel
Animos was supposed to be charged and convicted as an accessory to the cime. 3.
WoN the appellants are solidarily liable to pay civil indemnity for both victims
. RULING: We defer to the factual findings of the trial court, there being no sh
owing that they were reached arbitrarily or without basis. The evaluation of the
credibility of the witnesses is better made by the judge presiding at the trial
rather than by the appellate court because of the formers opportunity to observe
the deportment of the witnesses and to ascertain therefrom whether they are nar
rating the truth or falsifying it. Moreover, the assignment of errors is in effe
ct an admission by the appellants of their participation in the killings of the
two victims. As we see it, their appeal is only an attempt to reduce their penal
ties. The first error assigned by the appellants is untenable because the eviden
ce of record clearly shows that Blademir and Ronilo suddenly attacked their unar
med victims with bolos, thereby insuring the commission of the offense without r
isk themselves arising from the defense the victims might make. Alevosia qualifi
ed the crime to murder. The killings would have been homicide only without the a
ttendance of treachery, which is one of the qualifying circumstances mentioned i
n Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The second assigned error must also be
dismissed. The determination of the persons to be prosecuted on the basis of the
evidence against them rests primarily with the prosecutor, who is vested with q
uasi-judicial discretion in the discharge of this function. We have held that, a
s an exception, the prosecutor can be compelled by mandamus if he abuses this di
scretion and refuses to include a person as a co-accused against whom
there appears to be at least prima facie. However, this extraordinary writ is av
ailable only if the petitioner shows that he has first exhausted all remedies in
the ordinary course of law, such as a motion filed with the trial court for the
indictment of the person or persons excluded by the prosecutor. It does not app
ear that such a motion was filed by the appellants in the case at bar. If both B
ladimir Devaras and Pablo Devaras had been convicted as principals, they would h
ave been solidarily liable for the civil indemnity to the heirs of Efren Versoza
. But inasmuch as Pablo Devaras was convicted only as an accessory, he and Blade
mir Devaras shall be directly liable only for their respective shares in the awa
rd of P50,000.00, and subsidiarily liable for the others share. The following art
icles of the Revised Penal Code are applicable: Art. 109. Share of each person c
ivilly liable. If there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the
courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond. Art. 110. Severa
l and subsidiary liability of principals, accomplices and accessories of a felon
y; Preference in payment. Notwithstanding the provisions of the next preceding a
rticle, the principals, accomplices and accessories, each within their respectiv
e class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quota
s, and subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable. The subsidiary liabil
ity shall be enforced, first against the property of the principals; next agains
t that of accomplices, and lastly against that of the accessories. Whenever the
liability in solidum or the subsidiary liability has been enforced, the person b
y whom payment has been made shall have the right of ~action against the others
for the amount of their respective shares. In the exercise of our discretion, we
hereby require Blademir Devaras, as principal, to indemnify the heirs of Efren
Verzosa in the amount of P40,000.00 and Pablo Devaras, as accessory, to pay the
amount of P10,000.00, provided that each shall be subsidiarily liable for the ot
hers share in case of the latters insolvency. WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial
court is AFFIRMED, but with modification. The penalty of reclusion perpetua for
both Bladimir Devaras and Ronilo Caisek, and the civil indemnity of P50,000.00
to be paid by Caisek to the heirs of Felix Verzosa, are maintained. But the inde
terminate penalty to be imposed on Pablo Devaras shall be four years and two mon
ths of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor, as max
imum, and that of the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 due the heirs of Felix Verzo
sa, P40,000.00 shall be paid by Blademir Devaras and P10,000.00 by Pablo Devaras
, provided that each shall be liable for the others share in case of insolvency.
Costs against the appellants. 149. PEOPLE VS BAYOTAS FACTS: Rogelio Bayotas y Co
rdova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof. Pending appeal of
his conviction, Bayotas died in the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio resp
iratory arrest. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its resolution dismissed the
criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to fil
e its comment with regard to Bayotas civil liability arising from his commissio
n of the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his vi
ew that the
death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of
his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the ca
se of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved for
the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil l
iability is based. Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed
the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while j
udgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil
penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the C
ourt of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obli
gation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, c
ivil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is re
ndered. ISSUE: Whether the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguish his civil liability. HOLDING: Yes. Article 89 of the Revised Penal C
ode is the controlling statute. It reads, in part: Art. 89. How criminal liabili
ty is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished: (1.) By
the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary
penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment; The legal precept contained in this Article is li
fted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870. Accordingly, SC ru
le: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex del
icto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he
must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended
) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previousl
y charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon whic
h the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall b
e enforced. If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-del
ict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real
or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or a
dministrator of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rul
es of Court: Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against exec
utor or administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt
or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; bu
t actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an inj
ury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him. This
is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala where we held that, in recovering d
amages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 3
3 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or administrato
r of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rul
e 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses
, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims
arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed
, refers only to purely personal obligations other than those which have their s
ource in delict or tort. Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of a
lso arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the es
tate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. Summary
of Rules:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his crimin
al liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by J
ustice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgme
nt terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arisi
ng from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex deli
cto in senso strictiore." 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a s
ource of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumera
tes these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise a
s a result of the same act or omission: (a) Law (b) Contracts (c) Quasicontracts
(d) . . . (e) Quasi-delicts 3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained
in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by w
ay of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1
985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be en
forced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, d
epending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained a
bove. 4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his r
ight to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during t
he prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-o
ffended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the p
endency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation
of right by prescription. Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, SC he
ld that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and t
he civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequent
ly, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification. Cases 141-149 BARCELON
, FREDERICK I. 150. VILLEGAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: The subject property is
allocated by petitioner Iluminada Villegas, to her son Ramon Villegas as his re
sidence. Private respondent Rufo Quemuel is a lessee of said property, allegedly
since 1969 of the second floor of the house for a present monthly rental of P16
0.00 and in 1974, a lessee of the ground floor for a monthly rental of P 200.00.
After the dismissal and after the receipt from lessor of a letter of demand dat
ed April 7, 1980, lessee Quemuel entered into an agreement dated September 16, 1
980 with Senedela Nazareth and Iluminada Villegas, which provided among others t
he condonation of all unpaid rentals from December, 1976 up to January 15, 1981,
if Quemuel leaves voluntarily and surrenders peacefully the leased premises on
or before January 15, 1981 without need of further demand. In the event of failu
re of herein
private respondent Quemuel to surrender peacefully the leased premises he will p
ay damages in the amount of P 20,000.00 and in addition, he pays all the back re
ntals from December 1, 1976 to January 15, 1981 and all rentals thereafter. In a
letter dated August 1, 1981 of Iluminada Villegas and Senedela Nazareth to Rufo
Quemuel, demand to comply with the terms of the agreement was made after the la
tter failed to comply despite the extension given. In their second letter dated
August 17, 1981 the same demands were made. The last of such demand letters was
allegedly made on October 2, 1981, asking for the refund of P 6,000.00 and deman
ding that Quemuel vacate the premises and pay the back rentals up to September,
1981 in the sum of P 21,750.00. On August 17, 1981, a complaint for Unlawful Det
ainer and Damages was filed by Iluminada Villegas and Senedela Nazareth in the C
ourt of First Instance of Manila to enforce the agreement. However, after answer
of Rufo Quemuel, said case was withdrawn by motion of plaintiffs dated November
16, 1981 which was granted by the court on December 18, 1981. Meanwhile, on Dec
ember 1, 1981 before the aforementioned motion to withdraw was granted, the less
ors Iluminada Villegas and Senedela Nazareth filed before the City Court of Mani
la, an ejectment case against Rufo Quemuel. ISSUES: whether herein petitioner s
cause of action is anchored not only upon the failure of herein private responde
nt to pay the rent from 1976 but also upon the failure of private respondent to
comply with the terms and conditions of their compromise agreement, particularly
the portion thereof that he should vacate the leased premises on or before Janu
ary 15, 1981 or on April 16, 1981, as extended. HELD: Quemuel was already unlawf
ully withholding possession of the leased premises from his lessor, herein petit
ioner. To remedy this situation, the law grants the petitioner-lessor the right
of filing a case of unlawful detainer against herein lessee. Unlawful detainer i
s defined as the act of withholding the possession of land or building from anot
her who is entitled to it after the expiration or termination of the right of th
e illegal detainer to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or implie
d, when one year had not yet elapsed from the time the original possession had b
ecome illegal. Under Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is provid
ed that the act of withholding possession which could be the subject matter of a
n ejectment suit is that which results from any contract. In other words, an unl
awful detainer case can spring not only from a contract of lease but may also sp
ring from a compromise agreement which is also a contract such as in the case at
bar. And under Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 otherwise known as the J
udiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Metropolitan Trial Court shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over such case. 151. AVELINO CASUPANAN vs. MARI
O LLAVORE LAROYA FACTS: Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Lar
oya and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo and driven by petitioner
Avelino Casupanan, figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed wit
h the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal ca
se against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, do
cketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On
the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for qua
si-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089. When the civil case was filed, the c
riminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant
in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of for
um-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the
motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case. On Motion fo
r Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a sepa
rate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC
denied the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan an
d Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Tri
al Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66 assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal. ISSU
E: Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can val
idly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-d
elict against the private complainant in the criminal case. HELD: We make this r
uling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in the crimi
nal case may vary with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil
action. This possibility has always been recognized ever since the Civil Code in
troduced in 1950 the concept of an independent civil action under Articles 32, 3
3, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expre
ssly provides that the independent civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. There can indeed
be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action c
ontemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution wheth
er it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent charac
ter of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the res
ult of the latter. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRAN
TED. The Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civi
l Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED. SO OR
DERED. 152. RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION vs. PEOPLE FACTS: That on or about
the 20th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela
, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said acc
used being the driver and person-in-charge of a Trailer Truck Tractor bearing Pl
ate No. N2A-867 registered in the name of Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, wit
h a load of 2,000 cases of empty bottles of beer grande, willfully, unlawfully a
nd feloniously drove and operated the same while along the National Highway of B
arangay Tagaran, in said Municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent ma
nner, without due regard to traffic laws, rules and ordinances and without takin
g the necessary precautions to prevent injuries to persons and damage to propert
y, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said trailer truc
k to hit and bump a Nissan Pick-up bearing Plate No. BBG-957 driven by Feliciano
Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr., Pacquing, due to irreversible shock, internal an
d external hemorrhage and multiple injuries, open wounds, abrasions, and further
causing damages to the heirs of Feliciano Balcita in the
amount of P100,000.00 and to the death of Francisco Dy, Jr.; @ Pacquing and dama
ges to his Nissan Pick-Up bearing Plate No. BBG-957 in the total amount of P2,00
0,000.00. Upon arraignment on October 23, 1989, the accused entered a plea of no
t guilty. On the same occasion, the offended parties made a reservation to file
a separate civil action against the accused arising from the offense charged. On
November 29, 1989, the offended parties actually filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes T
rucking Corporation, as employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, based on quas
i delict. ISSUE: May the Court award damages to the offended parties in the crim
inal case despite the filing of a civil action against the employer of the truck
driver; and in amounts exceeding that alleged in the information for reckless i
mprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property? HELD: In the instant cas
e, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages agai
nst petitioner as employer of the accused, based on quasi delict, under Article
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Private respondents sued petitioner R
afael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the employer of the accused, to be vicariou
sly liable for the fault or negligence of the latter. Under the law, this vicari
ous liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific provisions of
law. The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the C
ivil Code, which would allow an action predicated on quasi-delict to be institut
ed by the injured party against the employer for an act or omission of the emplo
yee and would necessitate only a preponderance of evidence to prevail. Here, the
liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direc
t and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supe
rvision of the employee. The enforcement of the judgment against the employer in
an action based on Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent s
ince the nature of the liability of the employer with that of the employee, the
two being statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary. The second, pre
dicated on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that an employer may
be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by his employee in th
e discharge of his duty. This liability attaches when the employee is convicted
of a crime done in the performance of his work and is found to be insolvent that
renders him unable to properly respond to the civil liability adjudged. As rega
rds the first issue, the answer is in the negative. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corpor
ation, as employer of the accused who has been adjudged guilty in the criminal c
ase for reckless imprudence, can not be held subsidiarily liable because of the
filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. In view of
the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil action for reco
very of civil liability, the same was not instituted with the criminal action. S
uch separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the accused. WHEREFORE, the
Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the amended decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR No. 14448, promulgated on January 6, 1997,
and the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan,
in Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311 and Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, dated June 6, 19
92.
153. RUBEN MANIAGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On January 7, 1990, one of his bu
ses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private re
spondent Alfredo Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City. As a result of the accide
nt, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and
multiple physical injuries was filed on March 2, 1990 against petitioner s drive
r, Herminio Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch III, wh
ere it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7514-R. A month later, on April 19, 199
0, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against petiti
oner himself. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2050-R, was assigned to
Branch IV of the same court. ISSUE: whether the civil action could not proceed i
ndependently of the criminal case because no reservation of the right to bring i
t separately had been made in the criminal case. HELD: The reservation of the ri
ght to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution
starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended p
arty a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. n the present case, the
criminal action was filed against the employee, bus driver. Had the driver been
convicted and found insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily li
able for damages. But if the right to bring a separate civil action (whether ari
sing from the crime or from quasi delict) is reserved, there would be no possibi
lity that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there would b
e no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused. In such a case the
institution of a separate and independent civil action under the Civil Code woul
d not result in the employee being held liable for the same act or omission. The
rule requiring reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition again
st double recovery for the same act or omission. As held in Barredo v. Garcia, t
he injured party must choose which of the available causes of action for damages
he will bring. If he fails to reserve the filing of a separate civil action he
will be deemed to have elected to recover damages from the bus driver on the bas
is of the crime. In such a case his cause of action against the employer will be
limited to the recovery of the latter s subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of
the Revised Penal Code. Nor does it matter that the action is against the employ
er to enforce his vicarious liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Though
not an accused in the criminal case, the employer is very much a party, as long
as the right to bring or institute a separate action (whether arising from crime
or from quasi delict) is not reserved. The ruling that a decision convicting th
e employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer "not only with regard to
its civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of
an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee" is true not on
ly with respect to the civil liability arising from crime but also with respect
to the civil liability under the Civil Code. Since whatever is recoverable again
st the employer is ultimately recoverable by him from the employee, the policy a
gainst double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same
act or omission whether the action is brought against the employee or against hi
s employer. Thus in Dulay v. Court of Appeals this Court held that an employer m
ay be sued under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code and that the right to bring the act
ion did not have to be reserved because, having been instituted before the crimi
nal case against the employee, the filing of the civil action against the employ
er constituted an express reservation of the right to institute it separately.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the complaint against peti
tioner is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. 154. TAMARGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On 20
October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer T
amargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. According
ly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branc
h 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macari
o Tamargo, Jennifer s adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia
Tamargo, Jennifer s natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara
Bundoc, Adelberto s natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the t
ragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] agains
t Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal
liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment. ISSUES: whether
or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may b
e given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable
parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed b
y the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents. HE
LD: We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having bee
n retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that re
troactive effect may be giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liabil
ity upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no ac
tual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhap
s be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential
to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child
. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroac
tively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a
tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have pre
vented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical cus
tody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result
, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underl
ying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumpti
on of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spo
uses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control
at the time the tort was committed. Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare C
ode fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article 35 provides as follows: Art.
35. Trial Custody. No petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless and
until the adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised trial custody p
eriod of at least six months to assess their adjustment and emotional readiness
for the legal union. During the period of trial custody, parental authority shal
l be vested in the adopting parents. Under the above Article 35, parental author
ity is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial c
ustody, i.e., before the issuance of a
decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual cust
ody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custod
y period either had not yet begun or bad already been completed at the time of t
he air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with hi
s natural parents, not the adopting parents. Accordingly, we conclude that respo
ndent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto s natural parents, were indispensable parties to
the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the tria
l court of petitioners complaint, the indispensable parties being already befor
e the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess o
f jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereb
y GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September
1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners c
omplaint filed before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMA
NDED to that court for further proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs
against respondent Bundoc spouses. This Decision is immediately executory. SO OR
DERED. 155. LIBI VS IAC FACTS: Wendell Libi, son of petitioners, and Julie Ann G
otiong, the daughter of private respondent spouses, were sweethearts until Julie
broke up withWendell upon finding out of his sadistic and irresponsible charact
er.Wendell tried hard to reconcile with Julie Ann but when the latterrefused, We
ndell started making threats. On that fateful day of January 14,1978, Julie Ann
and Wendell diedfrom a single gunshot wound each comingfrom the same Smith and W
esson revolver licensed in the name of petitionerCresencio Libi. There being no
eyewitnesses to the crime, petitioners and privaterespondents herein advanced co
nflicting versions of the case. Privaterespondents claimed that with the use of
the same gun, Wendell took hisown life after killing Julie Ann. On the other han
d, the petitioners argued thatan unknown third party, whom Wendell may have disp
leased by reason of his work as a narcotic informant, must have caused the death
of Wendell and Julie Ann.As a result of the death of Julie Ann, private respond
ents filed an actionto recover damages arising from the vicarious liability of t
he parents of Wendell (petitioners herein) under Article 2180 of the New Civil C
ode. Aftertrial, the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Likewise,
thecounterclaim filed by the petitioners was dismissed for lack of merit.On app
eal lodged by private respondents, the respondent court setaside the dismissal o
f the case and held petitioners liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC. Hence this ca
se.Herein petitioners seek for the reversal of judgment of requiring themto pay
P30,000.00 for moral damages, P10,000.00 for exemplary damages. ISSUE: Are petit
ioners liable for vicarious liability under Art 2180 of the NCC? HELD: Under sai
d Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against thef
ather and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by
the Childand Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon
the father and,in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case
of her death or incapacity,upon the guardian, but the liability may also be volu
ntarily assumed by a relative or familyfriend of the youthful offender. However,
under the Family Code, this
civil liability isnow, without such alternative qualification, the responsibilit
y of the parents and those whoexercise parental authority over the minor offende
r. 33 For civil liability arising fromquasi-delicts committed by minors, the sam
e rules shall apply in accordance with Articles2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code,
as so modified. In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann G
otiong was caused by afelony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respon
dent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages arising therefr
om. Subject to the preceding modifications of the premises relied upon by it the
refor and on the bases of the legal imperatives hereinexplained, we conjoin in i
ts findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise therequisite diligenti
ssimi patris familias to prevent such damages.ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition
is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondentCourt of Appeals is hereby AFFI
RMED, with costs against petitioners. 156. ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL VS. COURT OF
APPEALS FACTS: The complaint alleged that Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman st
udent of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school pic
nic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferd
inand s parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castill
o, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed h
im to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he shou
ld go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers,
Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the picnic and while the studen
ts, including Ferdinand, were in the water, one of the female teachers was appar
ently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, b
ut in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was recovered
but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed. He was brought to a certain Dr. Lu
na in Sariaya, Quezon and later to the Mt. Cannel General Hospital where he was
pronounced dead on arrival. ISSUE: Whether or not there was negligence attributa
ble to the defendants which will warrant the award of damages to the plaintiffs.
HELD: While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to their
son to join the picnic, this does not mean that the petitioners were already re
lieved of their duty to observe the required diligence of a good father of a fam
ily in ensuring the safety of the children. But in the case at bar, petitioners
were able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence. Hence, the cl
aim for moral or exemplary damages becomes baseless. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the qu
estioned decision dated November 19, 1987, finding petitioners herein guilty of
negligence and liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo and awarding the respo
ndents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE insofar as the petitioners herein are concer
ned, but the portion of the said decision dismissing their counterclaim, there b
eing no merit, is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. 157. SOLIMAN VS.. TUAZON
FACTS: On March 22, 1983, petitioner Soliman filed a civil complaint for damages
against private respondent Republic Central Colleges, the RL Security Agency In
c and one Jimmy Solomon, a security guard, as defendants. The complaint alleged
that on August 13, 1982, while the plaintiff was in the campus ground and premis
es of the defendant, Republic Central Colleges, as he is a regular enrolled stud
ent and taking his morning classes, the defendant Solomon, without any provocati
on, in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, with int
ent to kill, attack, assault, strike and shoot the plaintiff on the abdomen with
a .38 Caliber Revolver. The plaintiff was treated and confined at Angeles Medic
al Center, Angeles City, and as per doctors opinion, the plaintiff may not be abl
e to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance
of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months before his wounds
would be completely healed. Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismis
s, contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it. Private r
espondent argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained b
y petitioner for the reason that private respondent school was not the employer
of the security guard charged, Jimmy Solomon, and hence was not responsible for
any wrongful act of Solomon. Private respondent school further argued that Artic
le 2180, 7th paragraph, of the NCC did not apply, since said paragraph holds tea
chers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, while security guard was not a pupil
or apprentice of the school. In an order dated November 29, 1983, respondent Jud
ge granted private respondent schools motion to dismiss, holding that security gu
ard Solomon was not an employee of the school. Petitioner moved for reconsiderat
ion, without success. In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, it is con
tended that respondent trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he r
efused to apply the provisions of Article 2180, as well as those of Articles 349
, 350 and 352 of the NCC and granted the schools motion to dismiss. ISSUE: Whethe
r or not petitioner is entitled to damages and the judge committed grave abuse o
f discretion when he refused to apply provisions of Arts 2180, 349, 350 and 352.
HELD: The Court resolved to grant due course to the petition, to treat the comm
ent of respondent Colleges as its answer and to reverse and set aside the order
dated November 29, 1983. The case was remanded to the court a quo for further pr
oceedings consistent with the Resolution. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault o
r negligence exists not only for one s own act or omission, but also for acts or
omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible. The first paragraph o
f Article 2180 offers no basis for holding the Colleges liable for the alleged w
rongful acts of security guard Jimmy B. Solomon inflicted upon petitioner Solima
n, Jr. Private respondent school was not the employer of Jimmy Solomon. Since th
ere is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentic
e of the Colleges, he being in fact an employee of the R.L. Security Agency Inc.
Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damag
e inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitut
e parental
authority. In the instant case, as already noted, Jimmy Solomon who committed al
legedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner, was not a pupil, studen
t or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges; the school had no substitute p
arental authority over Solomon. In the circumstances obtaining in the case at ba
r, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school an
d Bautista had been breached thru the former s negligence in providing proper se
curity measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if th
ere be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach o
f contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence o
f the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence b
ecomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautis
ta. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the sc
hool s liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the
contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Artic
le 21 of the Civil Code. The Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficultie
s posed by the obligation of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school
, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks.
This is specially true in the populous student communities of the so-called "un
iversity belt" in Manila where there have been reported several incidents rangin
g from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to exp
ect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises,
for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail aga
inst an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside scho
ol premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid li
ability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students
was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of t
hat degree of diligence which is required by the nature of obligation and corres
ponding to the circumstances of person, time and place. In the PSBA case, the tr
ial court had denied the school s motion to dismiss the complaint against it, an
d both the Court of Appeals and this Court affirmed the trial court s order. In
the case at bar, the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by responde
nt Colleges, upon the assumption that petitioner s cause of action was based, an
d could have been based, only on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. As PSBA, howeve
r, states, acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the
same time constitute breach of a contractual, or other legal, obligation. Respo
ndent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could ha
ve no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Re
spondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather sh
ould have, in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constitu
ting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of respondent C
olleges. In line, therefore, with the most recent jurisprudence of this Court, a
nd in order to avoid a possible substantial miscarriage of justice, and putting
aside technical considerations, we consider that respondent trial judge committe
d serious error correctible by this Court in the instant case.
158. JOSE S. AMADORA vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Like any prospective graduate,
Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises where he would
ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his h
igh school diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it tur
ned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On A
pril 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit A
lfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. The victim was only se
venteen years old. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . A
dditionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim s parents, filed a civil acti
on for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San J
ose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the p
hysics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respe
ctive parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial
, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to th
e plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of
earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exempla
ry damages, and attorney s fees . On appeal to the respondent court, however, th
e decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved . In its
decision, which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule 4
5 of the Rules of Court, the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not ap
plicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trade
s but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the students were n
ot in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had
already ended, that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun and that
in any event the defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing
the injury. ISSUES: whether or not the teachers are liable. HELD: Applying the f
oregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the following conclusions: 1.
At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the
authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth ye
ar classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditor
ium to finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for
what is important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously o
bserved, even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of
the school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought him in the cust
ody of the school authorities. 2. The rector, the high school principal and the
dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charg
e as previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a general authority ov
er the student body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teac
her placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately invo
lved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who the te
acher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora
had gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did
not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teache
r-incharge of Alfredo s killer. 3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher
-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline
upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of th
e school or condoned their nonobservance. His absence when the tragedy happened
cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or required to repo
rt to school on that day. And while it is true that the offending student was st
ill in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically ab
sent when the tort was committed, it has not been established that it was caused
by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the p
rivate respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence, through th
e enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline. especia
lly in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicen
sed gun from one of the students and returned the same later to him without taki
ng disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this
was clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the sc
hool, it does not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not b
een shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the pe
titioners son. 5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Reco
letos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher
or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage
caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the to
rt committed by any of the other private respondents for none of them has been f
ound to have been charged with the custody of the offending student or has been
remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody. In sum, t
he Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of th
e principles herein announced that none of the respondents is liable for the inj
ury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter s
death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972.
While we deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under
the tragic circumstances here related, we nevertheless are unable to extend the
m the material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief, under the law they ha
ve invoked. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to c
osts. It is so ordered. Cases 150-158 MANGANIP, WINNIE D. 159. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL
OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: A stabbing incident on 3
0 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-fl
oor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted
the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch 47) for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate
officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year comm
erce course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not members
of the school s academic community but were elements from outside the school. T
he suit impleaded the petitioners. During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano
terminated his relationship with the other petitioners by resigning from his pos
ition in the school. RULING OF TRIAL COURT: The respondent trial court, however,
overruled petitioners contention and thru an order, denied their motion to dis
miss. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly dealt with by an ord
er, hence filed a petition to appellate court. RULING OF C.A.: The respondent ap
pellate court denied the petition of the petitioners and primarily anchored its
decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of
the Civil Code. Pertinent portions of the appellate court s now assailed ruling
state: Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption fr
om the old Spanish Civil Code. The comments of Manresa and learned authorities o
n its meaning should give way to present day changes. The law is not fixed and f
lexible; it must be dynamic. In fact, the greatest value and significance of law
as a rule of conduct in its flexibility to adopt to changing social conditions
and its capacity to meet the new challenges of progress. Construed in the light
of modern day educational system, Article 2180 cannot be construed in its narrow
concept as held in the old case of Exconde vs. Capuno and Mercado vs. Court of
Appeals; hence, the ruling in the Palisoc case that it should apply to all kinds
of educational institutions, academic or vocational. At any rate, the law holds
the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve themselve
s of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 2180 by "proving t
hat they observed all the diligence to prevent damage." This can only be done at
a trial on the merits of the case. ISSUE: Whether or not PSBA and the petitione
rs are liable for damages to respondents. RULING: While we agree with the respon
dent appellate court that the motion to dismiss the complaint was correctly deni
ed and the complaint should be tried on the merits, we do not however agree with
the premises of the appellate court s ruling. Article 2180, in conjunction with
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This
Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Pali
soc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. In all such cases, it h
ad been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage sh
ould have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational inst
itution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in
its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present cas
e for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the
PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.
However, does the appellate court s failure to consider such material facts mean
the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not necessarily foll
ow. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is estab
lished a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both pa
rties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide t
he student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the o
ther hand, the student covenants to abide by the school s academic requirements
and observe its rules and regulations. Institutions of learning must also meet t
he implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an atmosph
ere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting k
nowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are
flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school
premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure
that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus pre
mises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. Because the circumstances of the pre
sent case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista,
the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows
that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contrac
tual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, wh
ether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court
from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In
Air France vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded da
mages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitione
r airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airli
ne s liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carr
iage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort m
ay exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may b
e also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231). This view was
not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already o
f a similar mind. InCangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fishe
r elucidated thus: The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than
that of contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juri
dical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that
is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not
relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contra
ctual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions t
hat the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constitut
ed the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between
the parties. Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on
Human Relations, particularly Article 21, which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is con
trary to morals, good custom or public policy shall compensate the latter for th
e damage. (emphasis supplied). Air France penalized the racist policy of the air
line which emboldened the petitioner s employee to forcibly oust the private res
pondent to cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a better right
to the seat." InAustro-American, supra, the public embarrassment caused to the
passenger was the justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circui
t), to award damages to the latter. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that
should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be violative
of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-del
ict. In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as ye
t, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breache
d thru the former s negligence in providing proper security measures. This would
be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of neglige
nce, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation on
ly. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be r
elevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only becaus
e of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contr
actual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school s liability. The negli
gence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negli
gence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code. Th
is Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation
of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, c
annot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially true in
the populous student communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila w
here there have been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other
forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipa
te all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the se
curity measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or grou
p determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs.
Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that th
e breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its neglig
ence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence wh
ich is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circums
tances of persons, time and place. As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence
on the substance of the private respondents complaint, the record is bereft of
all the material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court can make
such a determination from the evidence still to unfold. WHEREFORE, the foregoin
g premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of origin (RTC, Manila,
Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling o
f the Court. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. 160. ST. MARYS ACADEMY vs
. WILLIAM CARPITANOS FACTS: From 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-appellant St.
Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year
1995-1996. A facet of
the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enr
ollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was p
art of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along wi
th other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendan
t Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapita
n City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student o
f the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and
as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the i
njuries he sustained from the accident. RULING OF TRIAL COURT: On 20 February 199
7, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its decision th
e dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, j
udgment is hereby rendered in the following manner: 1. Defendant St. Marys Academ
y of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs William Carpitanos and Lu
isa Carpitanos, the following sums of money: a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00
) indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin S. Carpitanos; b. FORTY THOUSAND PES
OS (P40,000.00) actual damages incurred by plaintiffs for burial and related exp
enses; c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for attorneys fees; d. FIVE HUNDRED THO
USAND PESOS (P500,000.00) for moral damages; and to pay costs. 2. Their liabilit
y being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are hereb
y ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount of damages above-stated in the eve
nt of insolvency of principal obligor St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City; 3. Defen
dant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission of the tort an
d who was under special parental authority of defendant St. Marys Academy, is ABS
OLVED from paying the above-stated damages, same being adjudged against defendan
ts St. Marys Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents; 4. Defendant Vivenci
o Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability. His counterclaim not being in
order as earlier discussed in this decision, is hereby DISMISSED. IT IS SO ORDER
ERED. RULING OF C.A.: In due time, petitioner St. Marys academy appealed the deci
sion to the Court of Appeals. On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulg
ated a decision reducing the actual damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirmin
g the decision a quo, in toto. On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Marys Academy
filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. However, on May 22, 2000, t
he Court of Appeals denied the motion. ISSUES: 1) Whether the Court of Appeals e
rred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpi
tanos. 2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral dam
ages against the petitioner. RULING: We reverse the decision of the Court of App
eals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the death of Sh
erwin Carpitanos under Articles 218 and 219of the Family Code, pointing out that
petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teach
er accompany the minor students in the jeep. Under Article 218 of the Family Cod
e, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while
under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrat
ors and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child
care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authoriz
ed activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or i
nstitution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excu
rsions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises
whenever authorized by the school or its teachers. Under Article 219 of the Fami
ly Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parent
al authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the act
s or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruc
tion, or custody. However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding
that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the
injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accide
nt. In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be show
n that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence
of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be
a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient caus
es. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For
, negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unle
ss it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate cause
of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the r
esult would not have occurred. In this case, the respondents failed to show that t
he negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of t
he accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of Jame
s Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. In thei
r comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted th
e documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident was the detac
hment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident
was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jee
p of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos, parents
of the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of
the traffic investigator who stated that the cause of the accident was the deta
chment of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle. Signific
antly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause
of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless
driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on Article 219 of the
Family Code that those given the authority and responsibility under the precedin
g Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts
or omissions of the unemancipated minor was unfounded. Further, there was no evid
ence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep
of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of responden
t Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was drivin
g the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the
time of the accident. Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the n
egligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel gui
de of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of
petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between th
e remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors pare
nts or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. The proximate caus
e of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroke
n by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. Considering that the negligence of the minor dri
ver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by responden
t Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control,
and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held l
iable for the death resulting from such accident. Consequently, we find that pet
itioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages in the amount of P500,0
00.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Though in
capable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. In this case, the p
roximate cause of the accident was not attributable to petitioner. For the reaso
n that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the decision of the
Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpit
anos must be deleted. Moreover, the grant of attorneys fees as part of damages is
the exception rather than the rule The power of the court to award attorneys fee
s under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable just
ification. Thus, the grant of attorneys fees against the petitioner is likewise d
eleted. Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the veh
icle was respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact.
We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for publ
ic service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for
injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways o
r streets. Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the
respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment o
f the steering
wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the v
ehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpit
anos. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals and that of the trial court. The Court remands the case to the trial cou
rt for determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Ma
rys Academy, Dipolog City. No costs. SO ORDERED. 161. VICTORY LINER, INC. vs.HEIR
S OF ANDRES MALECDAN FACTS: Petitioner is a common carrier. Private respondent E
lena Malecdan is the widow of the deceased, while private respondents Veronica,
Virginia, Mary Pauline, Arthur, Viola, Manuel and Valentin Malecdan are their ch
ildren. Andres Malecdan was a 75 year-old farmer residing in Barangay Nungnungan
2, Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela. On July 15, 1994, at around 7:
00 p.m., while Andres was crossing the National Highway on his way home from the
farm, a Dalin Liner bus on the southbound lane stopped to allow him and his car
abao to pass. However, as Andres was crossing the highway, a bus of petitioner V
ictory Liner, driven by Ricardo C. Joson, Jr., bypassed the Dalin bus. In so doi
ng, respondent hit the old man and the carabao on which he was riding. As a resu
lt, Andres Malecdan was thrown off the carabao, while the beast toppled over. Th
e Victory Liner bus sped past the old man, while the Dalin bus proceeded to its
destination without helping him. The incident was witnessed by Andres Malecdan s
neighbor, Virgilio Lorena, who was resting in a nearby waiting shed after worki
ng on his farm. Malecdan sustained a wound on his left shoulder, from which bone
fragments protruded. He was taken by Lorena and another person to the Cagayan D
istrict Hospital where he died a few hours after arrival. The carabao also died
soon afterwards. Subsequently, a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resu
lting in homicide and damage to property was filed against the Victory Liner bus
driver Ricardo Joson, Jr. RULING OF TRIAL COURT: The dispositive portion of the
trial court s decision reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering t
he defendants to pay, jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the amounts of: a.
P50,000.00 as death indemnity; b. P88,339.00 for actual damages; c. P200,000.00
for moral damages; d. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; e. Thirty percent (30%)
as attorney s fees of whatever amount that can be collected by the plaintiff; an
d f. The costs of the suit. The counterclaim of the defendant Victory Liner, Inc
. against the plaintiffs and the thirdparty complaint of the same defendant agai
nst the Zenith Insurance Corporation are dismissed. SO ORDERED. RULING OF C.A.:
On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with the modificat
ion that the award of attorney s fees was fixed at P50,000.00.
ISSUES: I. Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in affirming the
appealed decision of the regional trial court granting p200,000.00 as moral dama
ges which is double the p100,000.00 as prayed for by the private respondents in
their complaint and in granting actual damages not supported by official receipt
s and spent way beyond the burial of the deceased victim. II. Whether or not the
affirmation by the honorable court of appeals of the appealed decision of the r
egional trial court granting the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorn
ey s fees which were not proved and considering that there is no finding of bad
faith and gross negligence on the part of the petitioner was not established, is
in accord with law and jurisprudence. III. Whether or not the honorable court o
f appeals erred in affirming the appealed decision of the regional trial court w
hich disregarded the appellant s testimonial and documentary evidence that it ha
s exercised extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of its empl
oyees, or stated differently, whether or not the affirmation by the court of app
eals of the appealed decision of the trial court that is contrary to law and jur
isprudence constitutes grave abuse and excess of jurisdiction. RULING: We find t
he appealed decision to be in order. First. Victory Liner, Inc. no longer questi
ons the findings of the Regional Trial Court that Andres Malecdan was injured as
a result of the gross negligence of its driver, Ricardo Joson, Jr. What petitio
ner now questions is the finding that it (petitioner) failed to exercise the dil
igence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its em
ployee. Petitioner argues, With all due respect, the assignment of three inspect
ors to check and remind the drivers of petitioner Victory Liner of its policies
in a two-and-a-half hour driving distance, the installation of tachometers to mo
nitor the speed of the bus all throughout the trip, the periodic monitoring and
checking of the trips from one station to another through a trip ticket from sta
tion to station, the regular periodic conducting of safety and defensive driving
[training sessions] for its drivers are concrete and physical proofs of the for
mulated operating standards, the implementation and monitoring of the same, desi
gned for the exercise of due diligence of a good father of a family in the super
vision of its employees. It explained that it did not present bus driver Joson,
Jr. on the witness stands because he had been dismissed from the company after t
he incident, which it found was a breach in the company regulations. Petitioner
blames private respondents for the death of their father, Andres Malecdan, who w
as already 75 years old, for allowing him to plough their field by himself. The
contention has no merit. Article 2176 provides: Whoever by act or omission cause
s damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual re
lation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the prov
isions of this Chapter.
Article 2180 provides for the solidary liability of an employer for the quasi-de
lict committed by an employee. The responsibility of employers for the negligenc
e of their employees in the performance of their duties is primary and, therefor
e, the injured party may recover from the employers directly, regardless of the
solvency of their employees. The rationale for the rule on vicarious liability h
as been explained thus: What has emerged as the modern justification for vicario
us liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk. The losses
caused by the torts of employees, which as a practical matter are sure to occur
in the conduct of the employer s enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise its
elf, as a required cost of doing business. They are placed upon the employer bec
ause, having engaged in an enterprise, which will on the basis of all past exper
ience involve harm to others through the tort of employees, and sought to profit
by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured plaintiff, should b
ear them; and because he is better able to absorb them and to distribute them, t
hrough prices, rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them
to society, to the community at large. Added to this is the makeweight argument
that an employer who is held strictly liable is under the greatest incentive to
be careful in the selection, instruction and supervision of his servants, and t
o take every precaution to see that the enterprise is conducted safely. Employer
s may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees ac
ting within the scope of their assigned task only if they can show that "they ob
served all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." For th
is purpose, they have the burden of proving that they have indeed exercised such
diligence, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the
performance of his duties. In the selection of prospective employees, employers
are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service
records.18 With respect to the supervision of employees, employers must formulat
e standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose discipl
inary measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof
, including documentary evidence. In the instant case, petitioner presented the
results of Joson, Jr. s written examination, actual driving tests, x-ray examina
tion, psychological examination, NBI clearance, physical examination, hematology
examination, urinalysis, student driver training, shop training, birth certific
ate, high school diploma and reports from the General Maintenance Manager and th
e Personnel Manager showing that he had passed all the tests and training sessio
ns and was ready to work as a professional driver. However, as the trial court n
oted, petitioner did not present proof that Joson, Jr. had nine years of driving
experience. Petitioner also presented testimonial evidence that drivers of the
company were given seminars on driving safety at least twice a year. Again, howe
ver, as the trial court noted there is no record of Joson, Jr. ever attending su
ch a seminar. Petitioner likewise failed to establish the speed of its buses dur
ing its daily trips or to submit in evidence the trip tickets, speed meters and
reports of field inspectors. The finding of the trial court that petitioner s bu
s was running at a very fast speed when it overtook the Dalin bus and hit the de
ceased was not disputed by petitioner. For these reasons, we hold that the trial
court did not err in finding petitioner to be negligent in the supervision of i
ts driver Joson, Jr.
Second. To justify an award of actual damages, there should be proof of the actu
al amount of loss incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the v
ictim. We cannot take into account receipts showing expenses incurred some time
after the burial of the victim, such as expenses relating to the 9th day, 40th d
ay and 1st year death anniversaries. In this case, the trial court awarded P88,3
39.00 as actual damages. While these were duly supported by receipts, these incl
uded the amount of P5,900.00, the cost of one pig which had been butchered for t
he 9th day death anniversary of the deceased. This item cannot be allowed. We, t
herefore, reduce the amount of actual damages to P82,439.00.00. The award of P20
0,000.00 for moral damages should likewise be reduced. The trial court found tha
t the wife and children of the deceased underwent "intense moral suffering" as a
result of the latter s death. Under Art. 2206 of the Civil Code, the spouse, le
gitimate children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased ma
y demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased
. Under the circumstances of this case an award of P100,000.00 would be in keepi
ng with the purpose of the law in allowing moral damages. On the other hand, the
award of P50,000.00 for indemnity is in accordance with current rulings of the
Court. Art. 2231 provides that exemplary damages may be recovered in cases invol
ving quasidelicts if the defendant acted with gross negligence. Exemplary damage
s are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a de
terrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.
In this case, petitioner s driver Joson, Jr. was grossly negligent in driving a
t such a high speed along the national highway and overtaking another vehicle wh
ich had stopped to allow a pedestrian to cross. Worse, after the accident, Joson
, Jr. did not stop the bus to help the victim. Under the circumstances, we belie
ve that the trial court s award of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages is proper. Fi
nally, private respondents are entitled to attorney s fees. Under Art. 2008 of t
he Civil Code, attorney s fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case, ex
emplary damages are awarded. In the recent case of Metro Manila Transit Corporat
ion v. Court of Appeals, we held an award of P50,000.00 as attorney s fees to be
reasonable. Hence, private respondents are entitled to attorney s fees in that
amount. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 17, 2002,
is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Victory Liner, Inc. i
s ordered to pay the following amounts to the respondent heirs of Andres Malecda
n: 1. Death indemnity in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); 2. Act
ual damages in the amount of Eighty-Two Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos
(P82,439.00); 3. Moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100
,000.00); 4. Exemplary damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00
); 5. Attorney s fees in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); and 6.
Costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
162. MARTIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Ernesto Martin was the owner of a privat
e car bearing license plate No. NPA930. At around 2 o clock in the morning of Ma
y 11, 1982, while being driven by Nestor Martin, it crashed into a Meralco elect
ric post on Valley Golf Road, in Antipolo, Rizal. The car was wrecked and the po
le severely damaged. Meralco subsequently demanded reparation from Ernesto Marti
n, but the demand was rejected. It thereupon sued him for damages in the Regiona
l Trial Court of Pasig, alleging inter alia that he was liable to it in the sum
of P17,352.00 plus attorney s fees and litigation costs as the employer of Nesto
r Martin. The petitioner s main defense was that Nestor Martin was not his emplo
yee. After the plaintiff had rested, the defendant moved to dismiss the complain
t on the ground that no evidence had been adduced to show that Nestor Martin was
his employee. The motion was denied. The case was considered submitted for deci
sion with the express waiver by the defendant of his right to present his own ev
idence. The defendant thus did not rebut the plaintiff s allegation that he was
Nestor Martin s employer. RULING OF TRIAL COURT: In the decision dated August 27
, 1985, Judge Eutropio Migrio held in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him the am
ount claimed, with 12% interest, and P4,000.00 attorney s fees, plus costs. RULI
NG OF C.A.: The decision was seasonably elevated to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed it in toto on February 22, 1988, prompting this petition for review. IS
SUE: Whether or not the employer is liable. RULING: The petition has merit. It i
s important to stress that the complaint for damages was filed by the private re
spondent against only Ernesto Martin as alleged employer of Nestor Martin, the d
river of the car at the time of the accident. Nestor Martin was not impleaded. T
he action was based on tort under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, providing in p
art that: Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees an
d household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The above rule is appli
cable only if there is an employer-employee relationship although it is not nece
ssary that the employer be engaged in any business or industry. It differs in th
is sense from Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which requires that the emp
loyer be engaged in an industry to be subsidiarily liable for the felony committ
ed by his employee in the course of his employment. Whether or not engaged in an
y business or industry, the employer under Article 2180 is liable for the torts
committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned task. But it is ne
cessary first to establish the employment relationship. Once this is done, the p
laintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting wi
thin the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. I
t is only then that the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpo
se the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee
as allowed in that article.
In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever was adduced by the plaintiff to show
that the defendant was the employer of Nestor Martin at the time of the accident
. The trial court merely presumed the existence of the employer-employee relatio
nship and held that the petitioner had not refuted that presumption. It noted th
at although the defendant alleged that he was not Nestor Martin s employer, "he
did not present any proof to substantiate his allegation." As the trial court pu
t it: There is no need to stretch one s imagination to realize that a car owner
entrusts his vehicle only to his driver or to anyone whom he allows to drive it.
Since neither plaintiff nor defendant has presented any evidence on the status
of Nestor Martin, the Court presumes that he was at the time of the incident, an
employee of the defendant. It is elementary that he who makes an allegation is
required to prove the same. Defendant alleges that Nestor Martin was not his emp
loyee but he did not present any proof to substantiate his allegation. While it
is true plaintiff did not present evidence on its allegation that Nestor Martin
was defendant s employee, the Court believes and so holds, that there was no nee
d for such evidence. As above adverted to, the Court can proceed on the presumpt
ion that one who drives the motor vehicle is an employee of the owner thereof. A
presumption is defined as an inference as to the existence of a fact not actual
ly known, arising from its usual connection with another which is known, or a co
njecture based on past experience as to what course human affairs ordinarily tak
e. It is either a presumption juris, or of law, or a presumption hominis, or of
fact. There is no law directing the deduction made by the courts below from the
particular facts presented to them by the parties. Such deduction is not among t
he conclusive presumptions under Section 2 or the disputable presumptions under
Section 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. In other words, it is not a presump
tion juris. Neither is it a presumption hominis, which is a reasonable deduction
from the facts proved without an express direction of law to that effect. The f
acts proved, or not denied, viz., the ownership of the car and the circumstances
of the accident, are not enough bases for the inference that the petitioner is
the employer of Nestor Martin. In the modern urban society, most male persons kn
ow how to drive and do not have to employ others to drive for them unless this i
s needed for business reasons. Many cannot afford this luxury, and even if they
could, may consider it an unnecessary expense and inconvenience. In the present
case, the more plausible assumption is that Nestor Martin is a close relative of
Ernesto Martin and on the date in question borrowed the car for some private pu
rpose. Nestor would probably not have been accommodated if he were a mere employ
ee for employees do not usually enjoy the use of their employer s car at two o c
lock in the morning. As the employment relationship between Ernesto Martin and N
estor Martin could not be presumed, it was necessary for the plaintiff to establ
ish it by evidence. Meralco had the burden of proof, or the duty "to present evi
dence on the fact in issue necessary to establish his claim" as required by Rule
131, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Failure to do this was fatal to i
ts action.
It was enough for the defendant to deny the alleged employment relationship, wit
hout more, for he was not under obligation to prove this negative averment. Ei i
ncumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat. This Court has consistently applied t
he ancient rule that "if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving hi
s cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which h
e bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception o
r defense." The case of Amor v. Soberano, a Court of Appeals decision not elevat
ed to this Court, was misapplied by the respondent court in support of the petit
ioner s position. The vehicle involved in that case was a six-by-six truck, whic
h reasonably raised the factual presumption that it was engaged in business and
that its driver was employed by the owner of the vehicle. The case at bar involv
es a private vehicle as its license plate indicates. No evidence was ever offere
d that it was being used for business purposes or that, in any case, its driver
at the time of the accident was an employee of the petitioner. It is worth menti
oning in this connection that in Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of Appeals
, the owner of the jeep involved in the accident was absolved from liability whe
n it was shown that the driver of the vehicle was not employed as such by the la
tter but was a "working scholar" as that term is defined by the Omnibus Rules Im
plementing the Labor Code. He was assigned to janitorial duties. Evidence was in
troduced to establish the employment relationship but it failed nonetheless to h
old the owner responsible. Significantly, no similar evidence was even presented
in the case at bar, the private respondent merely relying on its mere allegatio
n that Nestor Martin was the petitioner s employee. Allegation is not synonymous
with proof. The above observations make it unnecessary to examine the question
of the driver s alleged negligence or the lack of diligence on the part of the p
etitioner in the selection and supervision of his employee. These questions have
not arisen because the employment relationship contemplated in Article 1860 of
the Civil Code has not been established. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the respondent court is REVERSED, and Civil Case No. 48045 in the R
egional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 151, is DISMISSED, with costs against the r
espondent. It is so ordered. 163. CARTICIANO v. NUVAL FACTS: On September 3, 199
2 at about 9:30 in the evening, plaintiff Zacarias Carticiano was on his way hom
e to Imus, Cavite. Plaintiff Zacarias was driving his fathers (plaintiff Rosendo
Carticiano) Ford Laser car, traversing the coastal roads of Longos, Bacoor, Cav
ite. On the same date and time, defendant Nuvals owner-type Jeep, then driven by
defendant Darwin was traveling on the opposite direction going to Paraaque. Whe
n the two cars were about to pass one another, defendant Darwin veered his vehic
le to his left going to the center island of the highway and occupied the lane w
hich plaintiff Zacarias was traversing.
As a result thereof, plaintiff Zacarias Ford Laser collided head-on with defenda
nt Nuvals Jeep. Defendant Darwin immediately fled from the scene. Plaintiff Zaca
rias was taken out of the car by residents of the area and was brought to the ho
spital by Eduard Tangan, a Narcom agent who happened to pass by the place. Plain
tiff Zacarias suffered multiple fracture on his left leg and other injuries in h
is body. Plaintiff Zacarias underwent a leg operation and physical therapy to re
pair the damaged leg. Defendant Nuval offered P100,000.00 as compensation for th
e injuries caused. Plaintiffs refused to accept the amount. On this account, pla
intiffs filed a criminal suit against defendant Darwin. Plaintiffs also filed th
is present civil suit against defendants for damages. RULING OF THE COURT OF APP
EALS: The Court of Appeals explained that in order to hold an employer liable fo
r the negligent acts of an employee under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it mus
t be shown that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task wh
en the tort complained of was committed. The employer in this case, Respondent M
ario Nuval, cannot be held liable for the tort committed by Darwin. First, appel
lants did not present evidence showing that the driver was indeed an employee of
respondent at the time the accident occurred. And second, even assuming arguend
o that Darwin was in fact an employee of Nuval, it was not shown that the former
was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the incident happened. Th
us, the requisites for holding an employer liable for the tort committed by an e
mployee were not satisfied. ISSUES: Petitioners present the following issues: 1.
Whether or not Defendant Darwin was in fact an employee of Defendant Nuval; 2.
Whether or not Defendant Nuval was negligent in the selection and supervision of
his employees; 3. Whether or not Defendant Nuval was grossly negligent in the s
afekeeping of the key to his owner-type jeep and of said vehicle itself; 4. Whet
her or not respondent must be held liable for the damages and injuries suffered
by appellees; 5. Whether or not findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are su
bject to exceptions.9 RULING: The Petition is meritorious. First Issue: No Proof
That Employment Was Terminated Respondent maintains that on the date the accide
nt happened, Darwin was no longer his employee because the latters services had
already been terminated. Nuval adds that Darwin was hired for a period of only f
our to six days. To substantiate this claim, the former presented payroll and em
ployment records showing that the latter was no longer his employee. We disagree
. The only proof proferred by Respondent Nuval to show that Darwin was no longer
his employee was the payroll in which the latters name was not included. Howeve
r, as revealed by the testimonies of the witnesses presented during trial, respo
ndent had other employees working for him who were not listed in the payroll eit
her. The trial court explained as follows:
It surfaced that the payroll and daily time records presented by defendant Nuval
[were] not reliable proofs of the names and number of employees that defendant
Nuval had at the time of the incident in view of the testimonies of witnesses fo
r defendant Nuval tending to show that there were more employees of defendant Nu
val who were not in the payroll. The rather easy access which Darwin had to the
keys to the vehicle of Nuval further weakened the latters cause.First, nobody qu
estioned the fact that the former had freely entered respondents house where the
keys to the vehicle were kept. The theory of Nuval that Darwin must have stolen
the keys as well as the vehicle is rather farfetched and not supported by any p
roof whatsoever. It is obviously an afterthought concocted to present some sembl
ance of a defense. Second, both respondent and his employees who testified did n
ot act as if the vehicle had been stolen. He had not reported the alleged theft
of his vehicle. Neither did he search nor ask his employees to search for the su
pposedly stolen vehicle. In fact, he testified that his employees had told him t
hat the keys and the vehicle had merely probably been stolen by Darwin. Atty. Bo
badilia: Did you ask among your employees who gave the key to Darwin? Mario Nuva
l: I asked them, sir. Atty. Bobadilla: What was the reply of your employees? M.
Nuval: According to my employees he stole the key of the jeepney at home. Atty.
Abas: I disagree with the interpretation of the interpreter because the answer o
f the witness is ninanak yata. Interpreter: I agree, your Honor. Court: So, what
is the correct interpretation? A: According to my employees perhaps the key was
stolen, or perhaps Darwin stole the key to the jeep. From the totality of the e
vidence, we are convinced that Darwin was Nuvals driver at the time of the accid
ent. Second to Fourth Issues: Employers Liability The CA agreed with the theory
of respondent that he could not be held liable for the negligent acts of his emp
loyee because Darwin was not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks when
the damage occurred. Respondent adds that he observed the diligence of a good fa
ther of a family and was not negligent in safeguarding the keys to the said vehi
cle. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that employers shall be liable for
damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned task
s. The said provision is reproduced below: ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by
article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his de
ath or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the min
or children who live [in] their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused
by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live i
n their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsib
le for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which
the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall
be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engage
d in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it a
cts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the offi
cial to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility tre
ated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(Italics supplied) The facts established in the case at bar show that Darwin wa
s acting within the scope of the authority given him when the collision occurred
. That he had been hired only to bring respondents children to and from school m
ust be rejected. True, this may have been one of his assigned tasks, but no conv
incing proof was presented showing that it was his only task. His authority was
to drive Nuvals vehicle. Third parties are not bound by the allegation that the
driver was authorized to operate the jeep only when the employers children were
on board the vehicle. Giving credence to this outlandish theory would enable emp
loyers to escape their legal liabilities with impunity. Such loophole is easy to
concoct and is simply unacceptable. The claim of respondent that he had exercis
ed the diligence of a good father of a family is not borne out by the evidence.
Neither is it supported by logic. His main defense that at the time of the accid
ent Darwin was no longer his employee, having been merely hired for a few days,
is inconsistent with his other argument of due diligence in the selection of an
employee. Once a driver is proven negligent in causing damages, the law presumes
the vehicle owner equally negligent and imposes upon the latter the burden of p
roving proper selection of employee as a defense. Respondent failed to show that
he had satisfactorily discharged this burden. No Proof of Contributory Negligen
ce Respondent Nuvals accusation that Petitioner Zacarias Carticiano is guilty of
contributory negligence by failing to stop his car or to evade the oncoming jee
p is untenable. Both the trial and the appellate courts found that the accident
was caused by the fact that Darwins jeep suddenly veered towards Zacarias lane w
hen the vehicles were about to pass each other, thus making it difficult if not
impossible for petitioner to avoid the head-on collission. Nuval utterly failed
to present sufficient evidence to show that Zacarias could have evaded the jeep.
Given the distance between the vehicles and the speed at which they were travel
ling, the former was not able to demonstrate convincingly that the latter could
have minimized the damage complained of.
Review of Factual Findings Generally, the factual findings of lower courts are a
ccorded great respect by this Court. However, the above rule is subject to certa
in exceptions, one of which is when the two lower courts findings oppose each ot
her. In the present case, there is a clear conflict between the findings of the
trial court and those of the CA. Such conflict hinges on whether it was sufficie
ntly proven that the employment of Darwin had indeed been terminated by responde
nt, and whether the former was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at
the time the collision occurred. The resolution of both of these pivotal factual
issues is determinative of respondents vicarious liability for the injuries cau
sed by Darwin. It is thus necessary for this Court to pore over the evidence add
uced, as it did already. Damages Article 2199 of the Civil Code allows the aggri
eved party to recover the pecuniary loss that he has suffered. ART. 2199. Except
as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensati
on only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such comp
ensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. Based on the above, P
etitioner Zacarias is entitled to indemnification for actual damages caused by t
he negligence of Darwin, for which the latters employer, Respondent Nuval, is so
lidarily liable. And as found by the trial court, petitioner is entitled to P160
,715.19 for his medical treatment, as testified to by Dr. Eduardo Arandia. In th
e same vein, both petitioners are also entitled to P173,788, which represents th
e costs incurred for the repair of the damaged vehicle. The Civil Code allows in
demnification for lost profit or income, but petitioners failed to adduce suffic
ient proof of such loss. However, moral damages are in order, based on Articles
2217 and 2219 of the Civil Code which respectively provide: ART. 2217. Moral dam
ages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmir
ched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovere
d if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. A
RT. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: x
xx (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries x x x As a direct result of the c
ollision, petitioner suffered physically. It is also true that he experienced an
d will continue to experience social humiliation and ridicule for having his lef
t leg shorter than the right which causes him to limp when walking. For the abov
e, we agree with the trial court that Petitioner Zacarias is entitled to an awar
d of moral damages. Exemplary damages and attorneys fees are likewise authorized
by the following provisions of the Civil Code:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or cor
rection for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need
not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate o
r compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or
not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been ag
reed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated
damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the questi
on of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff mu
st show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages we
re it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages. ART. 2208. In the absence
of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial c
osts, cannot be recovered, except: (1) When exemplary damages are awarded x x x.
As held by the trial court, respondents refusal to answer adequately for the da
mages forced petitioners to litigate and incur expenses. And to serve as an exam
ple for the public good, exemplary damages are affirmed, since Petitioner Zacari
as has already shown that he is entitled to compensatory and moral damages in ac
cordance with Article 2234 of the Civil Code. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial courts De
cision REINSTATED, except that the award of P100,000 for lost income or opportun
ities is DELETED. SO ORDERED. 164. FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION VS.COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: This was a two-car collision at dawn. At around 3 o clock of 21 April 19
87, two (2) vehicles, both Mitsubishi Colt Lancers, cruising northward along Epi
fanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong City, figured in a traffic accident. The
car bearing Plate No. PDG 435 owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven at the
outer lane of the highway by Benjamin Jacildone, while the other car, with Plat
e No. PCT 792, owned by respondent FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), and driven b
y Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee, was at the center lane, left of the other vehicle
. Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR swerved
to the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. At that time Dahl-Jen
sen, a Danish tourist, did not possess a Philippine driver s license. As a conse
quence, petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation, in view of its insurance contract
with Soriano, paid the latter P25,382.20. By way of subrogation, it sued DahlJen
sen and respondent FILCAR as well as respondent Fortune Insurance Corporation (F
ORTUNE) as insurer of FILCAR for quasi-delict before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City. Unfortunately, summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since he was
no longer staying at his given address; in fact, upon motion of petitioner, he w
as dropped from the complaint.
RULING OF TRIAL COURT: On 30 July 1991 the trial court dismissed the case for fa
ilure of petitioner to substantiate its claim of subrogation. RULING OF C.A.: On
31 January 1995 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial co
urt although based on another ground, i.e., only the fault or negligence of Dahl
-Jensen was sufficiently proved but not that of respondent FILCAR. In other word
s, petitioner failed to establish its cause of action for sum of money based on
quasi-delict. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are liable on the strength o
f the ruling in MYCAgro-Industrial Corporation v. Vda. de Caldo that the registe
red owner of a vehicle is liable for damages suffered by third persons although
the vehicle is leased to another. RULING: We find no reversible error committed
by respondent court in upholding the dismissal of petitioner s complaint. The pe
rtinent provision is Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states: "Whoever by act o
r omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existi
ng contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . . . "
To sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a) dama
ge suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c)
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant
and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. We agree with respondent court that p
etitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or
negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jen
sen was sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that th
e damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the circumstance
that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was driving was
at the center lane. It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to D
ahlJensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal liab
ility. Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein. Article 2180 of
the same Code which deals also with quasi-delict provides: The obligation impos
ed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one s own acts or omissions, but a
lso for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages c
aused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and l
ive in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of
the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their funct
ions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and ho
usehold helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; bu
t not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done prop
erly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicabl
e. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liabl
e for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as the
y remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall c
ease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligenc
e of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The liability imposed by Art.
2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of
the persons made responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise
due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causi
ng damage. Yet, as correctly observed by respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly a
pplicable because none of the circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the cas
e under consideration. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business
was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no vincu
lum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any
way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being a
n employer of the latter. We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of
the same Code which provides: "In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily
liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have by th
e use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune . . . . If the owner was not in
the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable." Obviously, t
his provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of maste
r-driver relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petiti
oner has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-deli
ct; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper. Petitio
ner s insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation is rooted in a misapprehensi
on of our ruling therein. In that case, the negligent and reckless operation of
the truck owned by petitioner corporation caused injuries to several persons and
damage to property. Intending to exculpate itself from liability, the corporati
on raised the defense that at the time of the collision it had no more control o
ver the vehicle as it was leased to another; and, that the driver was not its em
ployee but of the lessee. The trial court was not persuaded as it found that the
true nature of the alleged lease contract was nothing more than a disguise effe
cted by the corporation to relieve itself of the burdens and responsibilities of
an employer. We upheld this finding and affirmed the declaration of joint and s
everal liability of the corporation with its driver. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 31 January 1995 sustai
ning the dismissal of petitioner s complaint by the trial court is AFFIRMED. Cos
ts against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
165. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Private r
espondent Clarita T. Camacho (private respondent for short) was the operator of
a gasoline station in Naguilian Road, Baguio City, wherein she sells petitioner
Shell s petroleum products. Sometime in April 1983, private respondent requested
petitioner to conduct a hydro-pressure test on the underground storage tanks of
the said station in order to determine whether or not the sales losses she was
incurring for the past several months were due to leakages therein. Petitioner a
cceded to the said request and on April 27, 1983, one Jesus "Jessie" Feliciano t
ogether with other workers, came to private respondent s station with a Job Orde
r from petitioner to perform the hydro-pressure test. On the same day, Feliciano
and his men drained the underground storage tank which was to be tested of its
remaining gasoline. After which, they filled the tank with water through a water
hose from the deposit tank of private respondent. Then, after requesting one of
private respondent s gasoline boys to shut off the water when the tank was fill
ed, Feliciano and his men left. At around 2:00 a.m. the following day, private r
espondent saw that the water had reached the lip of the pipe of the underground
storage tank and so, she shut off the water faucet. At around 5:30 a.m., private
respondent s husband opened the station and started selling gasoline. But at ab
out 6:00 a.m., the customers who had bought gasoline returned to the station com
plaining that their vehicles stalled because there was water in the gasoline tha
t they bought. On account of this, private respondent was constrained to replace
the gasoline sold to the said customers. However, a certain Eduardo Villanueva,
one of the customers, filed a complaint with the police against private respond
ent for selling the adulterated gasoline. In addition, he caused the incident to
be published in two local newspapers. Feliciano, who arrived later that morning
, did not know what caused the water pollution of the gasoline in the adjacent s
torage tank. So he called up Nick Manalo, Superintendent of Shell s Poro Point I
nstallation at San Fernando, La Union, and referred the matter to the latter. Ma
nalo went up to Baguio in the afternoon to investigate. Thereafter, he and Felic
iano again filled with water the underground storage tank undergoing hydro-press
ure test whereat they noticed that the water was transferring to the other tanks
from whence came the gasoline being sold. Manalo asked permission from Shell s
Manila Office to excavate the underground pipes of the station. Upon being grant
ed permission to do so, Feliciano and his men began excavating the driveway of p
rivate respondent s station in order to expose the underground pipeline. The tas
k was continued by one Daniel "Danny" Pascua who replaced Feliciano, Pascua remo
ved the corroded pipeline and installed new independent vent pipe for each stora
ge tank. RULING OF TRIAL COURT: The trial court dismissed private respondent s c
omplaint for damages for the reason that: "The hydro-pressure test which brought
about the incident was conducted by Jesus Feliciano, who was neither an employe
e nor agent nor representative of the defendant. Jesus Feliciano is responsible
for his own acts and omissions. He alone was in control of the manner of how he
is to undertake the hydro-pressure test.
Considering that the conduct of said hydro-pressure test was under the sole and
exclusive control and supervision of Jesus Feliciano, the overflow with water ca
using the same to sip into the adjoining tank cannot be attributed to the fault
or negligence of defendant. RULING OF C.A.: From the adverse decision of the tri
al court, private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which court revers
ed the decision of the trial court. Thus, "PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision bei
ng appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, another rendered orde
ring defendant to pay plaintiff: 1. P100,000.00 as moral damages; 2. P2,639.25 a
nd P15,000.00 representing the actual losses suffered by plaintiff as a result o
f the water pollution of the gasoline. No costs. SO ORDERED." Petitioner moved t
o have the above decision reconsidered but the same was denied in a Resolution d
ated March 9, 1992. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be held accountable
for the damage to private respondent due to the hydro-pressure test conducted by
Jesus Feliciano. RULING: It is a well-entrenched rule that an employer-employee
relationship must exist before an employer may be held liable for the negligenc
e of his employee. It is likewise firmly settled that the existence or non-exist
ence of the employer-employee relationship is commonly to be determined by exami
nation of certain factors or aspects of that relationship. These include: (a) th
e manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of p
ayment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of a power to control the putative
employee s conduct, although the latter is the most important element. In this c
ase, respondent Court of Appeals held petitioner liable for the damage caused to
private respondent as a result of the hydro-pressure test conducted by Jesus Fe
liciano due to the following circumstances: 1. Feliciano was hired by petitioner
; 2. He received his instructions from the Field Engineer of petitioner, Mr. Rob
erto Mitra; 3. While he was at private respondent s service station, he also rec
eived instructions from Nick Manalo, petitioner s Poro Point Depot Superintenden
t; 4. Instructions from petitioner s Manila Office were also relayed to him whil
e he was at .the job site at Baguio City; 5. His work was under the constant sup
ervision of petitioner s engineer; 6. Before he could complete the work, he was
instructed by Mr. Manalo, petitioner s Superintendent, to discontinue the same a
nd it was turned over to Daniel Pascua, who was likewise hired by petitioner. Ba
sed on the foregoing, respondent Court of Appeals concluded that Feliciano was n
ot an independent contractor but was under the control and supervision of petiti
oner in the performance of the hydro-pressure test, hence, it held petitioner li
able for the former s acts and omissions.
We are not in accord with the above finding of respondent Court of Appeals. As a
ptly held by the trial court, petitioner did not exercise control and supervisio
n over Feliciano with regard to the manner in which he conducted the hydro-press
ure test. All that petitioner did, through its Field Engineer, Roberto Mitra, wa
s relay to Feliciano the request of private respondent for a hydro-pressure test
, to determine any possible leakages in the storage tanks in her gasoline statio
n. The mere hiring of Feliciano by petitioner for that particular task is not th
e form of control and supervision contemplated by may be the basis for establish
ing an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and Feliciano. The fact
that there was no such control is further amplified by the absence of any Shell
representative in the job site time when the test was conducted. Roberto Mitra
was never there. Only Feliciano and his men were. True, it was petitioner who se
nt Feliciano to private respondent s gasoline station in conduct the hydro-press
ure test as per the request of private respondent herself. But this single act d
id not automatically make Feliciano an employee of petitioner. As discussed earl
ier, more than mere hiring is required. It must further be established that peti
tioner is the one who is paying Felicia s salary on a regular basis; that it has
the power to dismiss said employee, and more importantly, that petitioner has c
ontrol and supervision over the work of Feliciano. The last requisite was sorely
missing in the instant case. A careful perusal of the records will lead to the
conclusion that Feliciano is an independent contractor. Section 8 of Rule VIII,
Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides: "Sec. 8. Job
contracting. There is job contracting permissible under the Code if the followi
ng conditions are met: (1) The contractor carries on an independent business and
undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility ac
cording to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his
employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work
except as to the results thereof; and (2) The contractor has substantial capita
l or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and
other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business." Feliciano
is independently maintaining a business under a duly registered business name, "
JFS Repair and Maintenance Service," and is duly registered with the Bureau of D
omestic Trade. He does not enjoy a fixed salary but instead charges a lump sum c
onsideration for every piece of work he accomplishes. If he is not able to finis
h his work, he does not get paid, as what happened in this case. Further, Felici
ano utilizes his own tools and equipment and has a complement of workers. Neithe
r is he required to work on a regular basis. Instead, he merely awaits calls fro
m clients such as petitioner whenever repairs and maintenance services are reque
sted. Moreover, Feliciano does not exclusively service petitioner because he can
accept other business but not from other oil companies. All these are the hallm
arks of an independent contractor. Being an independent contractor, Feliciano is
responsible for his own acts and omissions. As he alone was in control over the
manner of how he was to undertake the hydro-pressure test, he alone must bear t
he consequences of his negligence, if any, in the conduct of the same.
Anent the issue of damages, the same has been rendered moot by the failure of pr
ivate respondent to establish an employer-employee relationship between petition
er and Feliciano. Absent said relationship, petitioner cannot be held liable for
the acts and omissions of the independent contractor, Feliciano. WHEREFORE, pre
mises considered, the appealed decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial court REINSTATED. Without pronouncement
as to costs. SO ORDERED. 166. NPC vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On July 22, 1979,
a convoy of four (4) dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC)
left Marawi city bound for Iligan city. Unfortunately, enroute to its destinatio
n, one of the trucks with plate no RFT-9-6-673 driven by a certain Gavino Ilumba
figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in
the death of three (3) persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical
injuries to seventeen other passengers. On June 10, 1980, the heirs of the vict
ims filed a complaint for damages against National Power Corporation (NPC) and P
HESCO Incorporated (PHESCO) before the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del
Norte, Marawi City. When defendant PHESCO filed its answer to the complaint it
contended that it was not the owner of the dump truck which collided with the To
yota Tamaraw but NPC. Moreover, it asserted that it was merely a contractor of N
PC with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latter s proj
ects. On the other hand, NPC denied any liability and countered that the driver
of the dump truck was the employee of PHESCO. RULING OF TRIAL COURT: The trial c
ourt rendered a decision dated July 25, 1988 absolving NPC of any liability. The
dispositive portion reads: Consequently, in view of the foregoing consideration
, judgment is hereby rendered ordering PHESCO, Inc. and Gavino Ilumba upon recei
pt hereof: 1. To pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs thru the Dansalan Coll
ege the sum of P954,154.55 representing the actual or compensatory damages incur
red by the plaintiffs; and 2. To pay the sum of P50,000.00 representing Attorney
s fees. SO ORDERED. RULING OF C.A.: Dissatisfied, PHESCO appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which on November 10, 1994 reversed the trial court s judgment. We q
uote the pertinent portion of the decision: A "labor only" contractor is conside
red merely as an agent of the employer (Deferia vs. National Labor Relations Com
mission, 194 SCRA 525). A finding that a contractor is a "labor only" contractor
is equivalent to a finding that there is an employer-employee relationship betw
een the owner of the project and the employees of the "labor only" contractor (I
ndustrial Timer Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 202 SCRA 46
5). So, even if Phesco hired driver Gavino Ilumba, as Phesco is admittedly a "la
bor only" contractor of Napocor the statute itself establishes an employer-emplo
yee relationship between the employer (Napocor) and the employee (driver Ilumba)
of the
labor only contractor (Phesco). (Ecal vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 1
95 SCRA 224). Consequently, we hold Phesco not liable for the tort of driver Gav
ino Ilumba, as there was no employment relationship between Phesco and driver Ga
vino Ilumba. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, to hold the employer liable f
or torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned task, the
re must exist an employeremployee relationship. (Martin vs. Court of Appeals, 20
5 SCRA 591). WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the appealed decision. In lieu thereof, the C
ourt renders judgment sentencing defendant National Power Corporation to pay pla
intiffs the sum of P174,889.20 plus P20,000.00 as attorney s fees and costs. SO
ORDERED. ISSUE: The principal query to be resolved is, as between NPC and PHESCO
, who is the employer of Ilumba, driver of the dumptruck which figured in the ac
cident and which should, therefore, would be liable for damages to the victims.
RULING: As earlier stated, NPC denies that the driver of the dump truck was its
employee. It alleges that it did not have the power of selection and dismissal n
or the power of control over Ilumba. PHESCO, meanwhile, argues that it merely ac
ted as a "recruiter" of the necessary workers for and in behalf of NPC. Before w
e decide who is the employer of Ilumba, it is evidently necessary to ascertain t
he contractual relationship between NPC and PHESCO. Was the relationship one of
employer and job (independent) contractor or one of employer and "labor only" co
ntractor? Job (independent) contracting is present if the following conditions a
re met: (a) the contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the
contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his
own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or pr
incipal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except to the
result thereof; and (b) the contractor has substantial capital or investments in
the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials wh
ich are necessary in the conduct of his business. Absent these requisites, what
exists is a "labor only" contract under which the person acting as contractor is
considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsib
le to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been
directly employed by him. Taking into consideration the above distinction and th
e provisions of the "Memorandum of Understanding" entered into by PHESCO and NPC
, we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in "labor only" contracting. It must
be noted that under the Memorandum, NPC had mandate to approve the "critical pat
h network and rate of expenditure to be undertaken by PHESCO. Likewise, the mann
ing schedule and pay scale of the workers hired by PHESCO were subject to confir
mation by NPC. Then too, it cannot be ignored that if PHESCO enters into any sub
contract or lease, again NPC s concurrence is needed. Another consideration is t
hat even in the procurement of tools and equipment that will be used by PHESCO,
NPC s favorable recommendation is still necessary before these tools and equipme
nt can be purchased. Notably, it is NPC that will provide the money or funding t
hat will be used by PHESCO to undertake the project. Furthermore, it must be emp
hasized that the project being undertaken by PHESCO, i.e., construction of power
energy facilities, is related to
NPC s principal business of power generation. In sum, NPC s control over PHESCO
in matters concerning the performance of the latter s work is evident. It is eno
ugh that NPC has the right to wield such power to be considered as the employer.
Under this factual milieu, there is no doubt that PHESCO was engaged in "labor-
only" contracting vis--vis NPC and as such, it is considered merely an agent of t
he latter. In labor-only contracting, an employer-employee relationship between
the principal employer and the employees of the "labor-only" contractor is creat
ed. Accordingly, the principal employer is responsible to the employees of the "
labor-only" contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the pr
incipal employer. Since PHESCO is only a "labor-only" contractor, the workers it
supplied to NPC, including the driver of the ill-fated truck, should be conside
red as employees of NPC. After all, it is axiomatic that any person (the princip
al employer) who enters into an agreement with a job contractor, either for the
performance of a specified work or for the supply of manpower, assumes responsib
ility over the employees of the latter. However, NPC maintains that even assumin
g that a "labor only" contract exists between it and PHESCO, its liability will
not extend to third persons who are injured due to the tortious acts of the empl
oyee of the "labor-only" contractor. Stated otherwise, its liability shall only
be limited to violations of the Labor Code and not quasi-delicts. To bolster its
position, NPC cites Section 9(b), Rule VII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Imple
menting the Labor Code which reads: (b) Labor only contracting as defined herein
is hereby prohibited and the person acting as contractor shall be considered me
rely as an agent or intermediary of the employer who shall be responsible to the
workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed b
y him. In other words, NPC posits the theory that its liability is limited only
to compliance with the substantive labor provisions on working conditions, rest
periods, and wages and shall not extend to liabilities suffered by third parties
, viz.: Consequently, the responsibilities of the employer contemplated in a "la
bor only" contract, should, consistent with the terms expressed in the rule, be
restricted "to the workers." The same can not be expanded to cover liabilities f
or damages to third persons resulting from the employees tortious acts under Ar
ticle 2180 of the Civil Code. The reliance is misplaced. It bears stressing that
the action was premised on the recovery of damages as a result of quasi-delict
against both NPC and PHESCO, hence, it is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code
which is the applicable law in resolving this case. To be sure, the pronouncemen
t of this Court in Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC, is most instructive: The
present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment betw
een an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by o
ne for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, aga
inst both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementin
g rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article
2180 of the Civil
Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer a
s a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code
. Corollarily from the above doctrine, the ruling in Cuison v. Norton & Harrison
Co., finds applicability in the instant case,viz.: It is well to repeat that un
der the civil law an employer is only liable for the negligence of his employees
in the discharge of their respective duties. The defense of independent contrac
tor would be a valid one in the Philippines just as it would be in the United St
ates. Here Ora was a contractor, but it does not necessarily follow that he was
an independent contractor. The reason for this distinction is that the employer
retained the power of directing and controlling the work. The chauffeur and the
two persons on the truck were the employees of Ora, the contractor, but Ora, the
contractor, was an employee of Norton & Harrison Co., charged with the duty of
directing the loading and transportation of the lumber. And it was the negligenc
e in loading the lumber and the use of minors on the truck which caused the deat
h of the unfortunate boy. On the facts and the law, Ora was not an independent c
ontractor, but was the servant of the defendant, and for his negligence defendan
t was responsible. Given the above considerations, it is apparent that Article 2
180 of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code will determine the liability of NPC
in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person for any negligent a
ct of the employees of the "labor only" contractor. This is consistent with the
ruling that a finding that a contractor was a "labor-only" contractor is equival
ent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owne
r (principal contractor) and the "labor-only" contractor, including the latter s
workers. With respect to the liability of NPC as the direct employer, Article 2
180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides: Employers shall be liable for the dam
ages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry. In this regard, NPC s liability is direct, primary and solidary with P
HESCO and the driver. Of course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied b
y it, shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the neglig
ence which gave rise to the action. Finally, NPC, even if it truly believed that
it was not the employer of the driver, could still have disclaimed any liabilit
y had it raised the defense of due diligence in the selection or supervision of
PHESCO and Ilumba. However, for some reason or another, NPC did not invoke said
defense. Hence, by opting not to present any evidence that it exercised due dili
gence in the supervision of the activities of PHESCO and Ilumba, NPC has foreclo
sed its right to interpose the same on appeal in conformity with the rule that p
oints of law, theories, issues of facts and arguments not raised in the proceedi
ngs below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal. Consequently, its l
iability stands. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of t
he Court of Appeals dated November 10, 1994 and its accompanying resolution date
d February 9, 1995 are AFFIRMED without prejudice to the right of NPC to demand
from PHESCO and Ilumba
reimbursement of the damages it would be adjudged to pay to complainants. No cos
ts. SO ORDERED. 167. FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE vs. IAC FACTS: It is undisputed
that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of
petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he w
as assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning o
f each school day. Having a student driver s license, Funtecha requested the dri
ver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle while the latter was
on his way home one late afternoon. It is significant to note that the place whe
re Allan lives is also the house of his father, the school president, Agustin Ma
sa. Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed free board while h
e was a student of Filamer Christian Institute. Allan Masa turned over the vehic
le to Funtecha only after driving down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous cur
b, and viewing that the road was clear. According to Allan s testimony, a fast m
oving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to th
e right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if something
had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pi
noy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in h
is lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him. Allan affirmed
that Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to the right. At the time of the inc
ident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had only one functioning headlight. Al
lan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard of th
e petitioner-school. He further said that there was no specific time for him to
be off-duty and that after driving the students home at 5:00 in the afternoon, h
e still had to go back to school and then drive home using the same vehicle. Dri
ving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan
and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-s
chool. Allan s job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it t
o fetch students in the morning of the next school day. DECISION OF THE SUPREME
COURT: October 16, 1990 (Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of Appeals, 190 SC
RA 477) reviewing the appellate court s conclusion that there exists an employer
-employee relationship between the petitioner and its co-defendant Funtecha. The
Court ruled that the petitioner is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtec
ha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts th
e petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable, and that Funtecha was m
erely a working scholar who, under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is not considered an employee of the pe
titioner. RULING: After a re-examination of the laws relevant to the facts found
by the trial court and the appellate court, the Court reconsiders its decision.
We reinstate the Court of Appeals decision penned by the late Justice Desideri
o Jurado and concurred in by Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Serafin E. Camilon
. Applying Civil Code provisions, the appellate court affirmed the trial court d
ecision which ordered the payment of the
P20,000.00 liability in the Zenith Insurance Corporation policy, P10,000.00 mora
l damages, P4,000.00 litigation and actual expenses, and P3,000.00 attorney s fe
es. It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had know
ledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose. Moreover, it
is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtecha s po
ssession of a student driver s license and his desire to undergo driving lessons
during the time that he was not in his classrooms. In learning how to drive whi
le taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan s house, Funtecha definitel
y was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enj
oyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which th
e jeep was intended by the petitioner school. (See L. Battistoni v. Thomas, Can
SC 144, 1 D.L.R. 577, 80 ALR 722 [1932]; See also Association of Baptists for Wo
rld Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen s Insurance Co., Inc. 124 SCRA 618 [1983]). The
refore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking
over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which
act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was
done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of
their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of a
n employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interest
s of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the inflicti
on of the injury or damage. (Manuel Casada, 190 Va 906, 59 SE 2d 47 [1950]) Even
if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act,
the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answe
ring the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident
performing any act in furtherance of his master s business. (Kohlman v. Hyland,
210 NW 643, 50 ALR 1437 [1926]; Jameson v. Gavett, 71 P 2d 937 [1937]) Section 1
4, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on which the petit
ioner anchors its defense, was promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and Employm
ent only for the purpose of administering and enforcing the provisions of the La
bor Code on conditions of employment. Particularly, Rule X of Book III provides
guidelines on the manner by which the powers of the Labor Secretary shall be exe
rcised; on what records should be kept; maintained and preserved; on payroll; an
d on the exclusion of working scholars from, and inclusion of resident physician
s in the employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive labor pro
visions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is concerned. In other w
ords, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labo
r. The Court, thus, makes the distinction and so holds that Section 14, Rule X,
Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instit
uted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student
of a school and against the school itself. The present case does not deal with a
labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and an al
leged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused
by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his e
mployer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the
primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplac
ed. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to a
void liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-contrac
tual obligation arising from the negligence or reckless imprudence of a person "
whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to other(s) who are i
n a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over (him)." (Bahia v. L
itonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624 [1915]) Funtecha is an employee of petitioner F
ilamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver s position in orde
r that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it
being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the
benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school dri
ver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve
the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that the
re was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee,
or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its h
aving exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its emp
loyees Funtecha and Allan. The Court reiterates that supervision includes the fo
rmulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of its employees an
d the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public
and persons with whom the employer has relations through his employees. (Bahia v
. Litonjua and Leynes, supra,at p. 628; Phoenix Construction, v. Intermediate Ap
pellate Court, 148 SCRA 353 [1987]) An employer is expected to impose upon its e
mployees the necessary discipline called for in the performance of any act indis
pensable to the business and beneficial to their employer. In the present case,
the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as
would prohibit any one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles if
one is not the official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer
president from authorizing another employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthe
rmore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warne
d its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver
. The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from
the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. (Cangco v. Manila Rai
lroad Co., 38 Phil. 768, 772 [1918]). In the absence of evidence that the petiti
oner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision
of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or o
missions of its employees. (Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263 [1976]; Poblete v. Fabr
os, 93 SCRA 200 [1979]; Kapalaran Bus Liner v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]; Fr
anco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 331 [1989]; Pantranco North Expre
ss, Inc. v. Baesa, 179 SCRA 384 [1989]) The liability of the employer is, under
Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse ag
ainst the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the p
laintiff. It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of the school jeep, Alla
n Masa, was not made a party defendant in the civil case for damages. This is qu
ite understandable considering that as far as the injured pedestrian, plaintiff
Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it was Funtecha who was the one driving the v
ehicle and presumably was one authorized by the school to drive. The plaintiff a
nd his heirs should not now be left to suffer
without simultaneous recourse against the petitioner for the consequent injury c
aused by a janitor doing a driving chore for the petitioner even for a short whi
le. For the purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing circumstances, it
is enough that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs were able to esta
blish the existence of employer-employee relationship between Funtecha and petit
ioner Filamer and the fact that Funtecha was engaged in an act not for an indepe
ndent purpose of his own but in furtherance of the business of his employer. A p
osition of responsibility on the part of the petitioner has thus been satisfacto
rily demonstrated. WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision dat
ed October 16, 1990 is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent appellate
court affirming the trial court decision is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. Cases 159-16
7 TABUZO, MAE ABEGAIL I. 168. METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPE
ALS FACTS: The eyewitness account of plaintiffs witness, Maria Zenaida Baylon, te
nds to show that in the afternoon of December 24, 1986, she, her daughter Maria
Zenia and the victim, Florentina Sabalburo, were on their way to Baclaran to buy
foodstuffs for their Noche Buena. For some time, they stood on the island at th
e intersection of St. Andrews Street and Domestic Road, [Pasay City] waiting for
the traffic light to change so they could cross to the other side of St. Andrew
s Street where they intended to take a ride for Baclaran. When the traffic light
turned red and the vehicles along St. Andrews Street had stopped, the three of
them stepped off the island. Just as they started to cross the street, she (Bayl
on) saw an MMTC bus coming from their right (Tramo) which was moving at a fast s
peed. The next moment, the left front portion of the bus hit the victim on the r
ight side of her head. The impact was of such force that the victims right ear wa
s slashed off and she thereupon fell on the cement and became unconscious. The v
ictim was brought by the bus driver, Apolinario Ajoc and the bus conductress to
the San Juan de Dios Hospital where she was given medical attention. Florentina
Sabalburo never regained consciousness and it was on January 3, 1987 that she su
ccumbed to her injuries. Private respondents filed a complaint for damages again
st MMTC and its driver, Ajoc, with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. the compl
aint essentially alleged that Ajoc drove the MMTC bus in a wanton and reckless m
anner, in gross violation of traffic rules and regulations, without due regard f
or the safety of others, thus causing the untimely death of the victim. Petition
ers denied the material allegations of the complaint, disclaimed any liability f
or the incident, and insisted that the accident was solely due to the victims own
negligence. ISSUE: Whether or not article 2179 as an exception to article 2176
of the civil code is applicable in the instant case
HELD: Petitioners insist that a closer look at the facts established by the tria
l court would show that the incident happened at around 3:30 in the afternoon of
December 24, 1986 or barely eight (8) hours before Christmas Eve. Thus, the vic
tims thoughts were naturally directed towards the Noche Buena. The victim then cr
ossed busy Andrew Avenue for the purpose of getting a ride to Baclaran to buy fo
od for the Christmas Eve celebration. Since her thoughts were on the Christmas E
ve feast, she crossed where there was no pedestrian lane and while the green lig
ht for vehicular traffic was on. Petitioner MMTC submits that petitioner Ajoc ca
nnot be charged with negligence considering that he cannot see what is in the mi
nd of a pedestrian. Considering that the victims own negligence was the direct an
d proximate cause of her injuries and untimely demise, it was error for the Cour
t of Appeals not to have applied Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the instant c
ase. Petitioners claim that at the time of the incident, the victims mind was preo
ccupied with the preparations for the Noche Buena, is naught but pure conjecture
and speculation, with nary a scintilla of proof to support it, according to res
pondents. Both the trial and appellate courts established that the immediate and
proximate cause of the victims death was the negligent and careless driving by p
etitioner Ajoc. Therefore, the full force of Article 2176 of the Civil Code appl
ies, concluded respondents. In asking us to apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code
, we note that petitioners are asking us to make a finding that the victims own n
egligence was the direct and proximate cause of her death. This we cannot do. Th
e issue of whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact. The Supre
me Court is not a trier of facts, although it has the power and authority to rev
iew and reverse the factual findings of lower courts where these do not conform
to the evidence or where the courts below came up with contradictory factual fin
dings. We have thoroughly perused the records of this case, and nowhere do we fi
nd evidence to support petitioners claim that the victim was so engrossed in thin
king about Noche Buena while crossing a busy street. Petitioners stance regarding
the victims alleged negligence is non sequitur. It simply does not follow that o
ne who is run over by a vehicle on Christmas Eve (or any other holiday for that
matter) is negligent because his thoughts were on the holiday festivities. Inste
ad, the records support private respondents claim that the MMTC bus was being dri
ven carelessly. As found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals
, the victim and her companions were standing on the island of Andrew Avenue, wa
iting for the traffic light to change so they could cross. Upon seeing the red l
ight, the victim and her companions started to cross. It was then when petitione
r Ajoc, who was trying to beat the red light, hit the victim. As the court a quo
noted, Ajocs claim that he failed to see the victim and her companions proves his
recklessness and lack of caution in driving his vehicle. Findings of fact of the
trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and
conclusive on the Supreme Court. More so, as in this case, where petitioners hav
e not adequately shown that the courts below overlooked or disregarded certain f
acts or circumstances of such import as would have altered the outcome of the ca
se. Contrary to petitioners insistence, the applicable law in this case is Articl
e 2176 of the Civil Code and not Article 2179. Petitioner MMTC next contends tha
t the Court of Appeals erred in finding it solidarily liable for damages with it
s driver/employee, Ajoc, pursuant to the relevant paragraphs
of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. It argues that the act of Ajoc in bringing th
e victim to a hospital reflects MMTCs diligence in the selection and supervision
of its drivers, particularly with regard to safety measures. Hence, having exerc
ised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of its employees to prevent damage, MMTC should not be held vicariously liable.
It should be stressed, however, that whenever an employees negligence causes dam
age or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that
there was negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection of th
e employee (culpa in eligiendo) or the supervision over him after the selection
(culpa in vigilando). Hence, to escape solidary liability for a quasi-delict com
mitted by his employee, an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting con
vincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his employee, he has exer
cised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. In the present case,
petitioner MMTC failed to rebut the presumption of negligence on its part. The c
laim that Ajocs act of bringing the victim to the nearest medical facility shows
adequate supervision by MMTC over its employees deserves but scant consideration
. For one, the act was after the fact of negligence on Ajocs part. For another, t
he evidence on record shows that Ajocs act was neither voluntary nor spontaneous;
he had to be prevailed upon by the victims companions to render assistance to hi
s victim. Moreover, the evidence to show that MMTC had exercised due diligence i
n the selection and supervision of its employees consisted merely of the pertine
nt guidelines for the screening and selection of its drivers, as well as periodi
c seminars on road safety. As found by the trial court, and affirmed by the appe
llate court, petitioner MMTC failed to show that its driver, Ajoc, had actually
undergone such screening or had attended said seminars. As previously held, [t]he
mere formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that the
y were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt (an employer) from liabil
ity arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to
show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedu
res and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed. In this case, MM
TC has made no satisfactory showing that it had paid more than lip service to it
s guidelines and policies in hiring and supervision. Its failure to do so cannot
but warrant the proper sanctions from this Court, considering that MMTC is a go
vernment-owned public utility organized for the public welfare. Having failed to
rebut the presumption of negligence on its part, MMTC is primarily and directly
liable for the damages caused by its employee, the erring driver, Ajoc, pursuan
t to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The owners of public utilities fall within
the scope of this article. As earlier stated, MMTC is a public utility, organize
d and owned by the government for public transport service. Hence, its liability
to private respondents, for the negligent and reckless acts of its driver, Ajoc
, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is both manifest and clear. 169. SANITARY
STEAM LAUNDRY, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: This case involves a collision
between a Mercedes Benz panel truck of petitioner Sanitary Steam Laundry and a C
imarron which caused the death of three persons and the injuries of several othe
rs. The accident took place at the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on August 3
1, 1980. All the victims were riding in the Cimarron.
The passengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees of the Project Management C
onsultants, Inc. (PMCI). The Cimarron was owned by Salvador Salenga, father of o
ne of the employees of PMCI. Driving the vehicle was Rolando Hernandez. It appea
rs that at about 8:00 p.m., as it was traveling along Aguinaldo Highway in Imus,
Cavite on its way back to Manila, the Cimarron was hit on its front portion by
petitioners panel truck which was traveling in the opposite direction. The driver
, Herman Hernandez, claimed that a jeepney in front of him suddenly stopped. He
said he stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and that this caused
his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane
. As a result, his panel truck collided with the Cimarron on the north-bound lan
e. The driver of the Cimarron, Rolando Hernandez, and two of his passengers, nam
ely, Jason Bernabe and Dalmacio Salunoy, died. Several of the other passengers o
f the Cimarron were injured and taken to various hospitals. On December 4, 1980,
private respondents filed this civil case for damages before the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, against petitioner. On November 23, 1990,
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, to which the case was transferred following
the reorganization of the judiciary, rendered judgment for private respondents.
The Court of Appeals, to which the decision of the trial court was appealed, af
firmed the decision on January 26, 1995. Hence, this appeal. ISSUES: 1. Whether
the driver of the Cimarron was guilty of contributory negligence and, therefore,
the liability of the petitioner should be mitigated, if not totally extinguishe
d. 2. Whether the non-submission of the NBI clearance and police clearance of th
e petitioners driver does not mean that the latter failed to exercise the diligen
ce of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employ
ees. HELD: Petitioner contends that the driver of the Cimarron was guilty of con
tributory negligence and, therefore, its liability should be mitigated, if not t
otally extinguished. It claims that the driver of the Cimarron was guilty of vio
lation of traffic rules and regulations at the time of the mishap. Hence, in acc
ordance with Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, he was presumed to be negligent. Accor
ding to petitioner, the negligence consisted of the following: 1. The Cimarron w
as overloaded because there were from 20 to 25 passengers inside when the passen
ger capacity of the vehicle was only 17. 2. The front seat of the Cimarron was o
ccupied by four adults, including the driver. 3. The Cimarron had only one headl
ight on (its right headlight) as its left headlight was not functioning. Petitio
ner cites Art. III, 2 of R.A. No. 4136, known as the Land Transportation and Traf
fic Code, which provides that No person operating any vehicle shall allow more pa
ssengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered carry capac
ity and Art. IV, 3(e) which states that Every motor vehicle of more than one meter
of projected width, while in use on any public highway shall bear two headlights
... which not later than one-half hour after sunset and until at least one-half
hour before sunrise and whenever weather conditions so require, shall both be li
ghted.
Petitioner asserts that the fact that its panel truck encroached on a portion of
the lane of the Cimarron does not show that its driver was negligent. Petitione
r cites the case of Bayasen v. Court of Appeals, which allegedly held that the s
udden swerving of a vehicle caused by its driver stepping on the brakes is not n
egligence per se. Petitioner further claims that even if petitioners swerving to
the lane of respondents were considered proof of negligence, this fact would not
negate the presumption of negligence on the part of the other driver arising fr
om his violations of traffic rules and regulations. Petitioner likewise invokes
the ruling in Mckee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, in which a driver who invad
ed the opposite lane and caused a collision between his car and a truck coming f
rom the opposite lane, was exonerated based on the doctrine of last clear chance
, which states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avo
iding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident. Petitioner contends that the
ruling in that case should be applied to the present case. According to petition
er, although the driver of the panel truck was initially negligent, the driver o
f the Cimarron had the last opportunity to avoid the accident. However, because
of his negligence (i.e., the aforementioned violations of traffic rules and regu
lations such as the use of only one headlight at night and the overcrowding at t
he front seat of the vehicle), he was not able to avoid a collision with the pan
el truck. We find the foregoing contention to be without merit. First of all, it
has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contribute
d to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of sh
owing a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the L
and Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the stat
ute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially cont
ributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law
, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contrib
uting cause of the injury. Petitioner says that driving an overloaded vehicle wit
h only one functioning headlight during nighttime certainly increases the risk o
f accident, that because the Cimarron had only one headlight, there was decreased
visibility, and that the fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat
overcrowded decreased [its] maneuverability. However, mere allegations such as the
se are not sufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleg
ed negligence was the contributing cause of the injury. The panel truck drivers t
estimony is consistent with the testimonies of private respondents that the pane
l truck went out of control and simply smashed into the Cimarron in which they w
ere riding. Nor is there any basis in fact for petitioners contention that becaus
e of overcrowding in the front seat of the Cimarron there was decreased maneuvera
bility which prevented the Cimarron driver from avoiding the panel truck. There i
s absolutely no basis for this claim. There is nothing in the testimonies of the
passengers of the Cimarron, particularly Charito Estolano, who was seated in fr
ont, which suggest that the driver had no elbow room for maneuvering the vehicle
. To the contrary, from the testimony of some of the witnesses, it appears that
the driver of the Cimarron tried to avoid the collision but because of the emerg
ency created by the speeding panel truck coming from the opposite direction he w
as not able to fully move his Cimarron away from the
path of the oncoming vehicle. We are convinced that no maneuvering which the Cimar
ron driver could have done would have avoided a collision with the panel truck,
given the suddenness of the events. Clearly, the overcrowding in the front seat
was immaterial On its liability as employer of the negligent driver, petitioner
contends that the nonsubmission of the NBI clearance and police clearance of its
driver does not mean that it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father
of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. It argues that
there is no law requiring employees to submit NBI and police clearance prior to
their employment. Hence, petitioners failure to require submission of these docum
ents does not mean that it did not exercise due diligence in the selection and s
upervision of its employees. On the other hand, it asserts that its employment o
f Herman Hernandez as a driver means that he had passed the screening tests of t
he company, including submission of the aforementioned documents. Petitioner mai
ntains that the presumption is that the said driver submitted NBI and police cle
arance. Petitioner likewise contends that the Court of Appeals position that it f
ailed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee
s by not requiring its prospective employees to undergo psychological and physic
al tests before employment has no basis in law because there is no law requiring
such tests prior to hiring employees. The petitioners contention has no merit. T
he Court of Appeals did not say that petitioners failure to submit NBI and police
clearances of its driver was proof that petitioner failed to exercise due dilig
ence in the selection of its employees. What the Court of Appeals said was that
petitioners policy of requiring prospective employees to submit NBI and police cl
earance and to have at least two (2) years experience as driver prior to employm
ent was not enough to prove the exercise of due diligence and that even this pol
icy petitioner failed to prove by its failure to present the drivers NBI and poli
ce records during the trial. With respect to the requirement of passing psycholo
gical and physical tests prior to his employment, although no law requires it, s
uch circumstance would certainly be a reliable indicator of the exercise of due
diligence. As the trial court said: . . . No tests of skill, physical as well as
mental and emotional, were conducted on their would-be employees. No on-the-job
training and seminars reminding employees, especially drivers, of road courtesi
es and road rules and regulations were done. There were no instructions given to
defendants drivers as to how to react in cases of emergency nor what to do after
an emergency occurs. There was even failure on the part of defendant to present
its concerned employees 204 file. All these could only mean failure on the part
of defendant to exercise the diligence required of it of a good father of a fami
ly in the selection and supervision of its employees. Indeed, driving exacts a m
ore than usual toll on the senses.Accordingly, it behooves employers to exert ex
tra care in the selection and supervision of their employees. They must go beyon
d the minimum requirements fixed by law. In this case, David Bautista, the offic
e manager of petitioner in its Dasmarias plant, said that petitioner has a policy
of requiring job applicants to submit clearances from the police and the NBI. I
n the case of applicants for the position of driver they are required to have at
least two (2) years driving experience and to be holders of a professional driv
ers license for at least two
years. But the supposed company policies on employment were not in writing. Nor
did Bautista show in what manner he supervised the drivers to ensure that they d
rove their vehicles in a safe way. 170. ERNESTO PLEYTO vs. MARIA D. LOMBOY FACTS
: At approximately 11:30 a.m. of May 16, 1995, PRBL driven by petitioner Pleyto,
was traveling along MacArthur Highway in Gerona, Tarlac bound for Vigan, Ilocos
Sur. It was drizzling that morning and the macadam road was wet. Right in front
of the bus, headed north, was the tricycle owned and driven by one Rodolfo Esgu
erra. According to Rolly Orpilla, a witness and one of the bus passengers, Pleyt
o tried to overtake Esguerras tricycle but hit it instead. Pleyto then swerved in
to the left opposite lane. Coming down the lane, some fifty meters away, was a s
outhbound Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by Arnulfo Asuncion. The car was headed f
or Manila with some passengers. Seated beside Arnulfo was his brother-in-law, Ri
cardo Lomboy, while in the back seat were Ricardos 18-year old daughter Carmela a
nd her friend, one Rhino Daba. PRBL smashed head-on the car, killing Arnulfo and
Ricardo instantly. Carmela and Rhino suffered injuries, but only Carmela requir
ed hospitalization. In their Answer, petitioners PRBL and Ernesto Pleyto both cl
aimed that the bus was running slowly at the time of the accident. They pointed
out the Bus had been inspected by driver Pleyto and examined by a mechanic prior
to the trip, in accordance with the companys standard operating procedure. It wa
s found in good working condition. Pleyto claimed that while cruising along the
highway at Gerona, Tarlac, he noticed Esguerras tricycle and followed it at a saf
e distance after he was unable to overtake it. Suddenly and without warning, the
tricycle stopped in the middle of the road. Pleyto stepped on the brakes and th
e bus lost speed. But, since it skidded towards the direction of the tricycle, h
e swerved the bus to the other lane to avoid hitting it, only to collide with th
e Manila-bound Mitsubishi car. The Trial Court in its decision judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs and against the defendants ordering the defendants to pay sol
idarily the plaintiffs the following amounts: 1) P50,000.00 as indemnification f
or the death of Ricardo Lomboy; 2) P1,642,521.00 for lost earnings of Ricardo Lo
mboy; 3) P59,550.00 as actual damages for the funeral, wake, religious services
and prayer for the soul of the departed; 4) P52,000.00 for the medical treatment
and medicine of Carmela Lomboy; 5) P500,000.00 as moral damages for the wife an
d children excluding Carmela Lomboy; 6) P50,000.00 as moral damages for Carmela
Lomboy; and 7) To pay costs. The RTC found Pleyto negligent and lacking in preca
ution when he overtook the tricycle with complete disregard of the approaching c
ar in the other lane. It found the testimony of Rolly Orpilla credible and persu
asive as against Pleytos self-serving and unbelievable testimony. The court found
that Pleyto should have been more prudent in overtaking a tricycle, considering
that it was drizzling, the road was slippery, and another vehicle was approachi
ng from the opposite direction. The RTC found that Pleyto had clearly violated t
raffic rules and regulations, and thus was negligent under Article 2185 of the C
ivil Code of the Philippines because petitioner Pleyto failed to present any pro
of to rebut the
presumption. The lower court likewise held co-petitioner PRBL equally liable und
er Article 2180 of the Civil Code for its failure to show that it had maintained
proper supervision of its employees notwithstanding strict standards in employe
e selection. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the decision of the trial
court, with modification in the award of damages, to wit: for actual damages, i
t is reduced to P39,550.00, for funeral and religious services and P27,000.00 fo
r medical expenses of Carmela Lomboy; and the award for loss of earning capacity
is accordingly corrected to P1,152,000.00. ISSUES: 1. Whether the Supreme Court
may review the conclusion drawn by the Court of Appeals, namely, that the PRBL
bus overtook a tricycle thus causing the accident, since it was made in disregar
d of facts undisputed by the parties. 2. Whether the court of appeals disregarde
d the doctrine laid down in villa Rey Transit, Inc. V. Court Of Appeals, G.R. No
. L-25499, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 511, when it arbitrarily pegged the monthl
y living expenses at 50% of gross earnings. HELD: 1. No. At the outset, it appea
rs that petitioners call for this Court to review the factual findings and concl
usions of the Court of Appeals. Petitioners assail the appellate courts affirmanc
e of the finding by the trial court that Pleyto was negligent. The issue of negl
igence is factual and, in quasi-delicts, crucial in the award of damages. But it
is well established that under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, on
ly questions of law, not of fact, may be raised before the Supreme Court. It mus
t be stressed that this Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not its functio
n to re-examine and weigh anew the respective evidence of the parties. Factual f
indings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, a
re conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record. In the pre
sent petition, no compelling reason is shown by petitioners whatsoever for this
Court to reverse those findings. 2. No. The petitioners misread Villa Rey Transi
t case. Thus, it has been consistently held that earning capacity, as an element
of damages to ones estate for his death by wrongful act is necessarily his net ea
rning capacity or his capacity to acquire money, less the necessary expense for h
is own living. Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not loss of the entire
earning, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the benefici
ary would have received. In other words, only net earnings, not gross earning, a
re to be considered that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary i
n the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental e
xpenses. In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an element of damag
es, the net earnings, which is computed by deducting necessary expenses from the
gross earnings, and not the gross earnings, is to be utilized in the computatio
n. Note that in the present case, both the Court of Appeals and the trial court
used net earnings, not gross earnings in computing loss of earning capacity. The
amount of net earnings was arrived at after deducting the necessary expenses (p
egged at 50% of gross income) from the gross annual income. This computation is
in accord with settled jurisprudence, including the Villa Rey case.
Thus, no reversible error may be attributed to the court a quo in fixing the los
s of earning capacity at said amount. 171. ERNESTO SYKI vs. SALVADOR BEGASA FACT
S: On June 22, 1992, around 11:20 a.m., near the corner of Araneta and Magsaysay
Streets, Bacolod City, respondent Salvador Begasa and his three companions flag
ged down a passenger jeepney driven by Joaquin Espina and owned by Aurora Pisuen
a. While respondent was boarding the passenger jeepney (his right foot already i
nside while his left foot still on the boarding step of the passenger jeepney),
a truck driven by Elizalde Sablayan and owned by petitioner Ernesto Syki bumped
the rear end of the passenger jeepney. Respondent fell and fractured his left th
igh bone (femur). On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a complaint for damages
for breach of common carriers contractual obligations and quasi-delict against Au
rora Pisuena, the owner of the passenger jeepney, herein petitioner Ernesto Syki
, the owner of the truck, and Elizalde Sablayan, the driver of the truck. After
hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint against Aurora Pisuena, the own
er and operator of the passenger jeepney but ordered petitioner Ernesto Syki and
his truck driver, Elizalde Sablayan, to pay respondent Salvador Begasa, jointly
and severally, actual and moral damages plus attorneys fees. Petitioner Syki and
his driver appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court found
no reversible error in the decision of the trial court and affirmed the same in
toto. The appellate court also denied their motion for reconsideration. ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitioner has failed to observe the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of his driver. 2. Whether the respo
ndent is guilty of contributory negligence that should mitigate or decrease the
liability of the petitioner. HELD: Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides: xxx
xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though t
he former are not engaged in any business or industry. x x x The responsibility
treated in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. From
the above provision, when an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee,
a legal presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent in the sel
ection and/or supervision of said employee. The said presumption may be rebutted
only by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he exercised the dilig
ence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employ
ee. If the employer successfully overcomes the legal presumption of negligence,
he is relieved of liability. In other words, the burden of proof is on the emplo
yer.
The employer must not merely present testimonial evidence to prove that he obser
ved the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of his employee, but he must also support such testimonial evidence with concret
e or documentary evidence. The reason for this is to obviate the biased nature o
f the employers testimony or that of his witnesses. In this case, petitioners evid
ence consisted entirely of testimonial evidence. He testified that before he hir
ed Elizalde Sablayan, he required him to submit a police clearance in order to d
etermine if he was ever involved in any vehicular accident. He also required Sab
layan to undergo a driving test conducted by his mechanic, Esteban Jaca. Petitio
ner claimed that he, in fact, accompanied Sablayan during the driving test and t
hat during the test, Sablayan was taught to read and understand traffic signs li
ke Do Not Enter, One Way, Left Turn and Right Turn. Petitioners mechanic, Esteban
n the other hand, testified that Sablayan passed the driving test and never figu
red in any vehicular accident except the one in question. He also testified that
he maintained in good condition all the trucks of petitioner by checking the br
akes, horns and tires thereof before providing hauling services. Petitioner, how
ever, never presented the alleged police clearance given to him by Sablayan nor
the results of Sablayans driving test. Petitioner also did not present records of
the regular inspections that his mechanic allegedly conducted. The unsubstantia
ted and self-serving testimonies of petitioner and his mechanic were, without do
ubt, insufficient to overcome the legal presumption that petitioner was negligen
t in the selection and supervision of his driver. Accordingly, we affirm the rul
ing of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable for the injuries suffered
by respondent. It should be emphasized that the legal obligation of employers to
observe due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees provi
ded in Article 2180 of the Civil Code is not an empty provision or a mere formal
ism since the non-observance thereof actually becomes the basis of the employers
vicarious liability. Employers should thus seriously observe such adegree of dil
igence (and prove it in court by sufficient and concrete evidence) that would ex
culpate them from liability. Petitioner next contends that, even if he is liable
, the award of damages given to respondent should be decreased or mitigated beca
use respondent was guilty of contributory negligence. Petitioner claims that his
driver was allegedly caught unaware when the passenger jeepney hailed by respon
dent suddenly stopped at the intersection of a national highway. Petitioner argu
es that, had respondent flagged down the passenger jeepney at the proper place,
the accident could have been avoided. Petitioners contention has no merit. Articl
e 2179 provides: When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proxima
te cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was onl
y contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defend
ants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mi
tigate the damages to be awarded. The underlying precept of the above article on
contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his o
wn injury should not be entitled to recover damages in
full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must th
us be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. In the
present case, was respondent partly negligent and thus, should not recover the
full amount of the damages awarded by the trial court? We rule in the negative.
There was no evidence that respondent Begasa and his three companions flagged do
wn the passenger jeepney in a prohibited area. All the facts showed was that the
passenger jeepney was near the corner of Araneta and Magsaysay Streets, Bacolod
City when petitioners driver bumped it from the rear. No city resolution, traffi
c regulation or DPWH memorandum was presented to show that the passenger jeepney
picked up respondent and his three companions in a prohibited area. In fact, th
e trial court dismissed the case against the driver and owner of the passenger j
eepney on the ground that they were not liable, meaning, that no negligence coul
d be attributed to them. The trial court also found no negligence on the part of
respondent Begasa. This factual finding was affirmed in toto by the Court of Ap
peals. It must be emphasized that petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rule
s of Court should deal only with questions of law. The factual conclusions of th
e Court of Appeals are given great weight and even finality by the Supreme Court
, specially when, as in the present case, the appellate court upholds the findin
gs of fact of the trial court. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals can
only be overturned if it is shown that such findings are obviously whimsical, ca
pricious and arbitrary, or contrary to the factual findings of the trial court.
In this case, we find no reason to overturn the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals. Thus, we affirm the appellate courts finding that there was no contribu
tory negligence on the part of respondent. In sum, the sole and proximate cause
of the accident was the negligence of petitioners driver who, as found by the low
er courts, did not slow down even when he was already approaching a busy interse
ction within the city proper. The passenger jeepney had long stopped to pick up
respondent and his three companions and, in fact, respondent was already partly
inside the jeepney when petitioners driver rear-ended it. The impact was so stron
g that respondent fell and fractured his left thigh bone (femur), and suffered s
evere wounds in his left knee and leg. No doubt petitioners driver was reckless.
Since the negligence of petitioners driver was the sole and proximate cause of th
e accident, petitioner is liable, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, to pay d
amages to respondent Begasa for the injuries sustained by him. WHEREFORE, the pe
tition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO OR
DERED. 172. FIGURACION VDA. DE MAGLANA, vs. CONSOLACION FACTS: Lope Maglana was
an employee of the Bureau of Customs whose work station was at Lasa, here in Dav
ao City. On December 20, 1978, early morning, Lope Maglana was on his way to his
work station, driving a motorcycle owned by the Bureau of Customs. At Km. 7, La
nang, he met an accident that resulted in his death. He died on the spot. The PU
J jeep that bumped the deceased was driven by Pepito Into, operated and
owned by defendant Destrajo. From the investigation conducted by the traffic inv
estigator, the PUJ jeep was overtaking another passenger jeep that was going tow
ards the city poblacion. While overtaking, the PUJ jeep of defendant Destrajo ru
nning abreast with the overtaken jeep, bumped the motorcycle driven by the decea
sed who was going towards the direction of Lasa, Davao City. The point of impact
was on the lane of the motorcycle and the deceased was thrown from the road and
met his untimely death. Consequently, the heirs of Lope Maglana, Sr., here peti
tioners, filed an action for damages and attorney s fees against operator Patric
io Destrajo and the Afisco Insurance Corporation (AFISCO for brevity) before the
then Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch II. An information for homicide t
hru reckless imprudence was also filed against Pepito Into. the lower court rend
ered a decision finding that Destrajo had not exercised sufficient diligence as
the operator of the jeepney. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHER
EFORE, the Court finds judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against defendant Des
trajo, ordering him to pay plaintiffs the sum of P28,000.00 for loss of income;
to pay plaintiffs the sum of P12,000.00 which amount shall be deducted in the ev
ent judgment in Criminal Case No. 3527-D against the driver, accused Into, shall
have been enforced; to pay plaintiffs the sum of P5,901.70 representing funeral
and burial expenses of the deceased; to pay plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as
moral damages which shall be deducted in the event judgment (sic) in Criminal Ca
se No. 3527-D against the driver, accused Into; to pay plaintiffs the sum of P3,
000.00 as attorney s fees and to pay the costs of suit. The defendant insurance
company is ordered to reimburse defendant Destrajo whatever amounts the latter s
hall have paid only up to the extent of its insurance coverage. SO ORDERED. Peti
tioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the second paragraph of the di
spositive portion of the decision contending that AFISCO should not merely be he
ld secondarily liable because the Insurance Code provides that the insurer s lia
bility is "direct and primary and/or jointly and severally with the operator of
the vehicle, although only up to the extent of the insurance coverage." Hence, t
hey argued that the P20,000.00 coverage of the insurance policy issued by AFISCO
, should have been awarded in their favor. ISSUE: Whether AFISCO should not mere
ly be held secondarily liable but direct and primary and/or jointly and severally
with the operator of the vehicle. HELD. Yes. The particular provision of the in
surance policy on which petitioners base their claim is as follows: Sec. 1 LIABI
LITY TO THE PUBLIC 1. The Company will, subject to the Limits of Liability, pay
all sums necessary to discharge liability of the insured in respect of (a) death
of or bodily injury to any THIRD PARTY (b) . . . . 2. . . . .
3. In the event of the death of any person entitled to indemnity under this Poli
cy, the Company will, in respect of the liability incurred to such person indemn
ify his personal representatives in terms of, and subject to the terms and condi
tions hereof. The above-quoted provision leads to no other conclusion but that A
FISCO can be held directly liable by petitioners. As this Court ruled in Shafer
vs. Judge, RTC of Olongapo City, Br. 75, "[w]here an insurance policy insures di
rectly against liability, the insurer s liability accrues immediately upon the o
ccurrence of the injury or even upon which the liability depends, and does not d
epend on the recovery of judgment by the injured party against the insured." 8 T
he underlying reason behind the third party liability (TPL) of the Compulsory Mo
tor Vehicle Liability Insurance is "to protect injured persons against the insol
vency of the insured who causes such injury, and to give such injured person a c
ertain beneficial interest in the proceeds of the policy . . ." 9 Since petition
ers had received from AFISCO the sum of P5,000.00 under the no-fault clause, AFI
SCO s liability is now limited to P15,000.00. However, we cannot agree that AFIS
CO is likewise solidarily liable with Destrajo. In Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v
. Court of Appeals, this Court had the opportunity to resolve the issue as to th
e nature of the liability of the insurer and the insured vis-avis the third part
y injured in an accident. We categorically ruled thus: While it is true that whe
re the insurance contract provides for indemnity against liability to third pers
ons, such third persons can directly sue the insurer, however, the direct liabil
ity of the insurer under indemnity contracts against third party liability does
not mean that the insurer can be held solidarily liable with the insured and/or
the other parties found at fault. The liability of the insurer is based on contr
act; that of the insured is based on tort. In the case at bar, petitioner as ins
urer of Sio Choy, is liable to respondent Vallejos (the injured third party), bu
t it cannot, as incorrectly held by the trial court, be made "solidarily" liable
with the two principal tortfeasors, namely respondents Sio Choy and San Leon Ri
ce Mill, Inc. For if petitioner-insurer were solidarily liable with said, two (2
) respondents by reason of the indemnity contract against third party liability
under which an insurer can be directly sued by a third party this will result in
a violation of the principles underlying solidary obligation and insurance cont
racts. The Court then proceeded to distinguish the extent of the liability and m
anner of enforcing the same in ordinary contracts from that of insurance contrac
ts. While in solidary obligations, the creditor may enforce the entire obligatio
n against one of the solidary debtors, in an insurance contract, the insurer und
ertakes for a consideration to indemnify the insured against loss, damage or lia
bility arising from an unknown or contingent event. Thus, petitioner therein, wh
ich, under the insurance contract is liable only up to P20,000.00, can not be ma
de solidarily liable with the insured for the entire obligation of P29,013.00 ot
herwise there would result "an evident breach of the concept of solidary obligat
ion." Similarly, petitioners herein cannot validly claim that AFISCO, whose liab
ility under the insurance policy is also P20,000.00, can be held solidarily liab
le with Destrajo for the total amount of P53,901.70 in accordance with the decis
ion of the lower court. Since under both the law and the insurance policy, AFISC
O s liability is only up to P20,000.00, the second paragraph of the dispositive
portion of the decision in question may have
unwittingly sown confusion among the petitioners and their counsel. What should
have been clearly stressed as to leave no room for doubt was the liability of AF
ISCO under the explicit terms of the insurance contract. In fine, we conclude th
at the liability of AFISCO based on the insurance contract is direct, but not so
lidary with that of Destrajo which is based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. A
s such, petitioners have the option either to claim the P15,000 from AFISCO and
the balance from Destrajo or enforce the entire judgment from Destrajo subject t
o reimbursement from AFISCO to the extent of the insurance coverage. While the p
etition seeks a definitive ruling only on the nature of AFISCO s liability, we n
oticed that the lower court erred in the computation of the probable loss of inc
ome. Using the formula: 2/3 of (80-56) x P12,000.00, it awarded P28,800.00. Upon
recomputation, the correct amount is P192,000.00. Being a "plain error," we opt
to correct the same. Furthermore, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,
the death indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00. WHEREFORE, premises consi
dered, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The award of P28,800.00 represent
ing loss of income is INCREASED to P192,000.00 and the death indemnity of P12,00
0.00 to P50,000.00. 173. CONRADO AGUILAR, SR. vs. COMMERCIAL SAVINGS BANK FACTS:
Petitioner Conrado Aguilar, Sr. is the father of Conrado Aguilar, Jr., the vict
im in a vehicular accident involving a Lancer car registered in the name of resp
ondent bank, but driven by co-respondent Ferdinand G. Borja. Aguilar, Jr. and hi
s companions, among them Nestor Semella, had just finished their snack along Zap
ote-Alabang Road. As they crossed the road, a Lancer and driven by Ferdinand Bor
ja, overtook a passenger jeepney. In so doing, the Lancer hit Aguilar and Semell
a. Aguilar was thrown upwards and smashed against the windshield of the Lancer,
which did not stop. Aguilar was pronounced dead on arrival when brought to the h
ospital. Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondents in the Reg
ional Trial Court. Borja did not file his answer within the reglementary period,
hence, he was declared in default by the trial court. At the trial, respondent
bank admitted that the Lancer was registered in its name at the time of the inci
dent. Petitioners counsel also showed that Borja was negligent in driving the car
. The Trial Court held defendants liable for Aguilars death on the ground that Bo
rjas negligence, carelessness, and imprudence caused the victims death. It also fo
und that Borja was an assistant vice president of respondent bank at the time of
the incident. It held that under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the negligence of
the employee is presumed to be that of the employer, whose liability is primary
and direct; and that respondent bank failed to exercise due diligence in the se
lection of its employees. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Respondent Bank
before it can apply Art. 2180 on which private respondent anchored its claim of
the banks negligence, petitioner must first establish that Borja acted on the oc
casion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him by his employer. The appel
late court found no evidence that Borja had
acted as respondent banks assistant vice-president at the time of the mishap. The
Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision. ISSUE: Whether respondent b
ank, as the Lancers registered owner, is liable for damages. HELD: Yes. Registere
d owner of any vehicle, even if not for public service, is primarily responsible
to third persons for deaths, injuries and damages it caused (BA Finance Corpora
tion vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 715). This is true even if the vehicle is le
ased to third persons. Registration is required not to make said registration th
e operative act by which ownership in vehicles is transferred, as in land regist
ration cases, because the administrative proceeding of registration does not bea
r any essential relation to the contract of sale between the parties (Chinchilla
vs. Rafael and Verdaguer, 39 Phil. 888), but to permit the use and operation of
the vehicle upon any public highway (section 5 [a], Act No. 3992, as amended.)
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if a
ny accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on th
e public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual
, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public
highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without p
ositive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of iden
tification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudici
al to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in
the interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries
caused on public highways. The above policy and application of the law may appe
ar quite harsh and would seem to conflict with truth and justice. We do not thin
k it is so. A registered owner who has already sold or transferred a vehicle has
the recourse to a third-party complaint, in the same action brought against him
to recover for the damage or injury done, against the vendee or transferee of t
he vehicle. The inconvenience of the suit is no justification for relieving him
of liability; said inconvenience is the price he pays for failure to comply with
the registration that the law demands and requires. In synthesis, we hold that
the registered owner, the defendant-appellant herein, is primarily responsible f
or the damage caused to the vehicle of the plaintiff-appellee, but he (defendant
-appellant) has a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amo
unt that he may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaint
iffappellant. 174. EQUITABLE LEASING CORP. VS. LUCITA SUYON FACTS: A Fuso Road T
ractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into the house cum store of Myrna Tamayo loca
ted at Pier 18, Vitas, Tondo, Manila. A portion of the house was destroyed. Pinn
ed to death under the engine of the tractor were Respondent Myrna Tamayos son, Re
niel Tamayo, and Respondent Felix Oledans daughter, Felmarie Oledan. Injured were
Respondent Oledan himself, Respondent Marissa Enano, and two sons of Respondent
Lucita Suyom.
Tutor was charged with and later convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in m
ultiple homicide and multiple physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 296094-SA,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 12. Upon verification with the Land T
ransportation Office, respondents were furnished a copy of Official Receipt and
Certificate of Registration showing that the registered owner of the tractor was
Equitable Leasing Corporation/leased to Edwin Lim. Respondents filed against Raul
Tutor, Ecatine Corporation (Ecatine) and Equitable Leasing Corporation (Equitable)
a Complaint for damages. The trial court, upon motion of plaintiffs counsel, issu
ed an Order dropping Raul Tutor, Ecatine and Edwin Lim from the Complaint, becau
se they could not be located and served with summonses. On the other hand, in it
s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already been
sold to Ecatine and that the former was no longer in possession and control the
reof at the time of the incident. It also claimed that Tutor was an employee, no
t of Equitable, but of Ecatine. After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its
Decision ordering petitioner to pay actual and moral damages and attorneys fees t
o respondents. It held that since the Deed of Sale between petitioner and Ecatin
e had not been registered with the Land Transportation Office (LTO), the legal o
wner was still Equitable. Thus, petitioner was liable to respondents. ISSUES: 1.
Whether petitioner is liable for damages suffered by private respondents in an
action based on quasi delict for the negligent acts of a driver who [was] not th
e employee of the petitioner. 2. Whether moral damages be awarded to private res
pondents despite their failure to prove that the injuries they suffered were bro
ught by petitioners wrongful act. HELD: 1. Yes. Petitioner contends that it should
not be held liable for the damages sustained by respondents and that arose from
the negligence of the driver of the Fuso Road Tractor, which it had already sol
d to Ecatine at the time of the accident. Not having employed Raul Tutor, the dr
iver of the vehicle, it could not have controlled or supervised him. We are not
persuaded. In negligence cases, the aggrieved party may sue the negligent party
under (1) Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, for civil liability ex delicto;
or (2) under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, for civil liability ex quasi delic
to. Furthermore, under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers may be h
eld subsidiarily liable for felonies committed by their employees in the dischar
ge of the latters duties. This liability attaches when the employees who are conv
icted of crimes committed in the performance of their work are found to be insol
vent and are thus unable to satisfy the civil liability adjudged. On the other h
and, under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, an action
predicated on quasi delict may be instituted against the employer for an employ
ees act or omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of the subordinate
is direct and primary, but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the sel
ection and supervision of the employee. The enforcement of the judgment against
the employer for an action based on Article 2176 does not require the employee t
o be insolvent, since the liability of the former is solidary -- the latter bein
g statutorily considered a joint tortfeasor. To sustain a claim based on quasi d
elict, the following requisites must be proven: (a) damage suffered by the plain
tiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, and (c) connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred
by the plaintiff. These two causes of action (ex delicto or ex quasi delicto) ma
y be availed of, subject to the caveat that the offended party cannot recover dam
ages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes. Since these two civ
il liabilities are distinct and independent of each other, the failure to recove
r in one will not necessarily preclude recovery in the other. In the instant cas
e, respondents -- having failed to recover anything in the criminal case -- elec
ted to file a separate civil action for damages, based on quasi delict under Art
icle 2176 of the Civil Code. The evidence is clear that the deaths and the injur
ies suffered by respondents and their kins were due to the fault of the driver o
f the Fuso tractor. Dated June 4, 1991, the Lease Agreement between petitioner a
nd Edwin Lim stipulated that it is the intention of the parties to enter into a F
INANCE LEASE AGREEMENT. Under such scheme, ownership of the subject tractor was t
o be registered in the name of petitioner, until the value of the vehicle has be
en fully paid by Edwin Lim. Further, in the Lease Schedule, the monthly rental for
the tractor was stipulated, and the term of the Lease was scheduled to expire o
n December 4, 1992. After a few months, Lim completed the payments to cover the
full price of the tractor. Thus, on December 9, 1992, a Deed of Sale over the tr
actor was executed by petitioner in favor of Ecatine represented by Edwin Lim. H
owever, the Deed was not registered with the LTO. We hold petitioner liable for
the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered owner o
f the tractor at the time of the accident on July 17, 1994. The Court has consis
tently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered o
wner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerne
d; consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences o
f its operation. In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the em
ployer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered as merel
y its agent. The same principle applies even if the registered owner of any vehi
cle does not use it for public service. Since Equitable remained the registered
owner of the tractor, it could not escape primary liability for the deaths and t
he injuries arising from the negligence of the driver. The finance-lease agreeme
nt between Equitable on the one hand and Lim or Ecatine on the other has already
been superseded by the sale. In any event, it does not bind third persons. Furt
her, petitioners insistence on FGU Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals is misplac
ed. First, in FGU Insurance, the registered vehicle owner, which was engaged in
a
rent-a-car business, rented out the car. In this case, the registered owner of t
he truck, which is engaged in the business of financing motor vehicle acquisitio
ns, has actually sold the truck to Ecatine, which in turn employed Tutor. Second
, in FGU Insurance, the registered owner of the vehicle was not held responsible
for the negligent acts of the person who rented one of its cars, because Articl
e 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable. We held that no vinculum juris as e
mployer and employee existed between the owner and the driver. In this case, the
registered owner of the tractor is considered under the law to be the employer
of the driver, while the actual operator is deemed to be its agent. Thus, Equita
ble, the registered owner of the tractor, is -- for purposes of the law on quasi
delict -- the employer of Raul Tutor, the driver of the tractor. Ecatine, Tutors
actual employer, is deemed as merely an agent of Equitable. True, the LTO Certi
ficate of Registration, dated 5/31/91, qualifies the name of the registered owner
as EQUITABLE LEASING CORPORATION/Leased to Edwin Lim. But the lease agreement betw
een Equitable and Lim has been overtaken by the Deed of Sale on December 9, 1992
, between petitioner and Ecatine. While this Deed does not affect respondents in
this quasi delict suit, it definitely binds petitioner because, unlike them, it
is a party to it. We must stress that the failure of Equitable and/or Ecatine t
o register the sale with the LTO should not prejudice respondents, who have the
legal right to rely on the legal principle that the registered vehicle owner is
liable for the damages caused by the negligence of the driver. Petitioner cannot
hide behind its allegation that Tutor was the employee of Ecatine. This will ef
fectively prevent respondents from recovering their losses on the basis of the i
naction or fault of petitioner in failing to register the sale. The non-registra
tion is the fault of petitioner, which should thus face the legal consequences t
hereof. 2. Petitioner further claims that it is not liable for moral damages, be
cause respondents failed to establish or show the causal connection or relation
between the factual basis of their claim and their wrongful act or omission, if
any. Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate an
d alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliatio
n, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages must nevertheless be somehow proportional to and in a
pproximation of the suffering inflicted. This is so because moral damages are in
the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury
suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. Viewed as an action for quas
i delict, the present case falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219 (2)
, which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi delict. Havi
ng established the liability of petitioner as the registered owner of the vehicl
e, respondents have satisfactorily shown the existence of the factual basis for
the award and its causal connection to the acts of Raul Tutor, who is deemed as
petitioners employee. Indeed, the damages and injuries suffered by respondents we
re the proximate result of petitioners tortious act or omission. Further, no proo
f of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the
amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court. The evidence giv
es no ground for doubt that such discretion was properly and judiciously
exercised by the trial court. The award is in fact consistent with the rule that
moral damages are not intended to enrich the injured party, but to alleviate th
e moral suffering undergone by that party by reason of the defendants culpable ac
tion. 175. FIRST MALAYAN LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS FA
CTS: While Vitug s car was at a full stop at the intersection of New York Street
and (EDSA) in Cubao, Quezon City, northward-bound, the on-coming Isuzu cargo tr
uck bumped, a Ford Granada car behind him with such force that the Ford car was
thrown on top of Vitug s car crushing its roof. The cargo truck thereafter struc
k Vitug s car in the rear causing the gas tank to explode and setting the car ab
laze. Stunned by the impact. Vitug was fortunately extricated from his car by so
licitous bystanders before the vehicle exploded. However, two of his passengers
were burned to death. Vitug s car, valued at P70,000, was a total loss. At the t
ime of the accident on December 14, 1983, the Isuzu cargo truck was registered i
n the name of the First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (FMLFC). However
, FMLFC denied any liability, alleging that it was not the owner of the truck ne
ither the employer of the driver Crispin Sicat, because it had sold the truck to
Vicente Trinidad on September 24. 1980, after the latter had paid all his month
ly amortizations under the financing lease agreement between FMLFC and Trinidad.
ISSUE: Whether the FMLFC is liable despite the fact that it is not the actual o
wner of the car. HELD. Yes. This Court has consistently ruled that regardless of
who the actual owner of a motor vehicle might be, the registered owner is the o
perator of the same with respect to the public and third persons, and as such, d
irectly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. In cont
emplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, th
e actual operator and employer being considered merely as his agent (MYC-Agro-In
dustrial Corporation vs. Vda. de Caldo, 132 SCRA 10. citing Vargas vs. Langcay.
6 SCRA 174; Tamayo vs. Aquino. 105 Phil. 949). In order for a transfer of owners
hip of a motor vehicle to be valid against third persons. it must be recorded in
the Land Transportation Office. For, although valid between the parties, the sa
le cannot affect third persons who rely on the public registration of the motor
vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership. In law, FMLFC was the owner and ope
rator of the Izusu cargo truck, hence, fully liable to third parties injured by
its operation due to the fault or negligence of the driver thereof. 176. NOSTRAD
AMUS VILLANUEVA VS. DOMINGO FACTS: Priscilla R. Domingo is the registered owner
of a silver Mitsubishi Lancer Car bearing plate No. NDW 781 91 with [co-responden
t] Leandro Luis R. Domingo as authorized driver. [Petitioner] Nostradamus Villan
ueva was then the registered owner of a green Mitsubishi Lancer bearing Plate No.
PHK 201 91.
On 22 October 1991 at about 9:45 in the evening, following a green traffic light
, [respondent] Priscilla Domingos silver Lancer car with Plate No. NDW 781 91 then
driven by [co-respondent] Leandro Luis R. Domingo was cruising along the middle
lane of South Superhighway at moderate speed from north to south. Suddenly, a g
reen Mitsubishi Lancer with plate No. PHK 201 91 driven by Renato Dela Cruz Ocfem
ia darted from Vito Cruz Street towards the South Superhighway directly into the
path of NDW 781 91 thereby hitting and bumping its left front portion. As a resu
lt of the impact, NDW 781 91 hit two (2) parked vehicles at the roadside, the sec
ond hitting another parked car in front of it. Nostradamus Villanueva claimed th
at he was no longer the owner of the car at the time of the mishap because it wa
s swapped with a Pajero owned by Albert Jaucian/Auto Palace Car Exchange who was
the employer of Renato Dela Cruz Ocfemia. ISSUE: Whether the registered owner o
f a motor vehicle be held liable for damages arising from a vehicular accident i
nvolving his motor vehicle while being operated by the employee of its buyer wit
hout the latters consent and knowledge. HELD. Yes. We have consistently ruled tha
t the registered owner of any vehicle is directly and primarily responsible to t
he public and third persons while it is being operated. Whether the driver is au
thorized or not by the actual owner is irrelevant to determining the liability o
f the registered owner who the law holds primarily and directly responsible for
any accident, injury or death caused by the operation of the vehicle in the stre
ets and highways. To require the driver of the vehicle to be authorized by the a
ctual owner before the registered owner can be held accountable is to defeat the
very purpose why motor vehicle legislations are enacted in the first place. Cas
es 168-176 CASIL, LEO ANGELO P. 177. ABELARDO LIM VS CA FACTS: Private responden
t Donato Gonzales purchased a passenger jeepney from Gomercino Vallarta, holder
of a certificate of public convenience for the operation of public utility vehic
les. While private respondent Gonzales continued offering the jeepney for public
transport services he did not have the registration of the vehicle transferred
in his name nor did he secure for himself a certificate of public convenience fo
r its operation. While the jeepney was running northbound, it collided with a te
n-wheeler truck owned by petitioner Abelardo Lim and driven by his co-petitioner
Esmadito Gunnaban. Gunnaban owned responsibility for the accident, explaining t
hat while he was traveling towards Manila the truck suddenly lost its brakes. To
avoid colliding with another vehicle, he swerved to the left until he reached t
he center island. However, as the center island eventually came to an end, he ve
ered farther to the left until he smashed into a Ferroza automobile, and later,
into private respondent s passenger jeepney driven
by one Virgilio Gonzales. The impact caused severe damage to both the Ferroza an
d the passenger jeepney and left one (1) passenger dead and many others wounded.
Petitioner Lim shouldered the costs for hospitalization of the wounded, compens
ated the heirs of the deceased passenger, and had the Ferroza restored to good c
ondition. He also negotiated with private respondent and offered to have the pas
senger jeepney repaired at his shop. Private respondent however did not accept t
he offer so Lim offered him P20,000.00, the assessment of the damage as estimate
d by his chief mechanic. Again, petitioner Lim s proposition was rejected; inste
ad, private respondent demanded a brand-new jeep or the amount of P236,000.00. L
im increased his bid to P40,000.00 but private respondent was unyielding. Under
the circumstances, negotiations had to be abandoned; hence, the filing of the co
mplaint for damages by private respondent against petitioners. RULING OF THE TRI
AL COURT: The trial court upheld private respondent s claim and awarded him P236
,000.00 with legal interest from 22 July 1990 as compensatory damages and P30,00
0.00 as attorney s fees. In support of its decision, the trial court ratiocinate
d that as vendee and current owner of the passenger jeepney private respondent s
tood for all intents and purposes as the real party in interest. Even Vallarta h
imself supported private respondent s assertion of interest over the jeepney for
, when he was called to testify, he dispossessed himself of any claim or pretens
ion on the property. Gunnaban was found by the trial court to have caused the ac
cident since he panicked in the face of an emergency which was rather palpable f
rom his act of directing his vehicle to a perilous streak down the fast lane of
the superhighway then across the island and ultimately to the opposite lane wher
e it collided with the jeepney. On the other hand, petitioner Lim s liability fo
r Gunnaban s negligence was premised on his want of diligence in supervising his
employees. It was admitted during trial that Gunnaban doubled as mechanic of th
e ill-fated truck despite the fact that he was neither tutored nor trained to ha
ndle such task. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: Petitioners appealed to the Co
urt of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In upholding the
decision of the court a quo the appeals court concluded that while an operator u
nder thekabit system could not sue without joining the registered owner of the v
ehicle as his principal, equity demanded that the present case be made an except
ion. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the decis
ion of the trial court despite their opposition to the well-established doctrine
that an operator of a vehicle continues to be its operator as long as he remain
s the operator of record. 2. Whether or not an award of P236,000.00 is inconceiv
ably large and would amount to unjust enrichment. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
1. The kabit system is an arrangement whereby a person who has been granted a ce
rtificate of public convenience allows other persons who own motor vehicles to o
perate them under his license, sometimes for a fee or percentage of the earnings
.
In the early case of Dizon v. Octavio the Court explained that one of the primar
y factors considered in the granting of a certificate of public convenience for
the business of public transportation is the financial capacity of the holder of
the license, so that liabilities arising from accidents may be duly compensated
. The kabit system renders illusory such purpose and, worse, may still be availe
d of by the grantee to escape civil liability caused by a negligent use of a veh
icle owned by another and operated under his license. If a registered owner is a
llowed to escape liability by proving who the supposed owner of the vehicle is,
it would be easy for him to transfer the subject vehicle to another who possesse
s no property with which to respond financially for the damage done. Thus, for t
he safety of passengers and the public who may have been wronged and deceived th
rough the banefulkabit system, the registered owner of the vehicle is not allowe
d to prove that another person has become the owner so that he may be thereby re
lieved of responsibility. Subsequent cases affirm such basic doctrine. It would
seem then that the thrust of the law in enjoining the kabit system is not so muc
h as to penalize the parties but to identify the person upon whom responsibility
may be fixed in case of an accident with the end view of protecting the riding
public. The policy therefore loses its force if the public at large is not decei
ved, much less involved. In the present case it is at once apparent that the evi
l sought to be prevented in enjoining the kabit system does not exist. First, ne
ither of the parties to the pernicious kabit system is being held liable for dam
ages. Second, the case arose from the negligence of another vehicle in using the
public road to whom no representation, or misrepresentation, as regards the own
ership and operation of the passenger jeepney was made and to whom no such repre
sentation, or misrepresentation, was necessary. Thus it cannot be said that priv
ate respondent Gonzales and the registered owner of the jeepney were in estoppel
for leading the public to believe that the jeepney belonged to the registered o
wner. Third, the riding public was not bothered nor inconvenienced at the very l
east by the illegal arrangement. On the contrary, it was private respondent hims
elf who had been wronged and was seeking compensation for the damage done to him
. Certainly, it would be the height of inequity to deny him his right. In light
of the foregoing, it is evident that private respondent has the right to proceed
against petitioners for the damage caused on his passenger jeepney as well as o
n his business. Any effort then to frustrate his claim of damages by the ingenui
ty with which petitioners framed the issue should be discouraged, if not repelle
d. 2. In awarding damages for tortuous injury, it becomes the sole design of the
courts to provide for adequate compensation by putting the plaintiff in the sam
e financial position he was in prior to the tort. It is a fundamental principle
in the law on damages that a defendant cannot be held liable in damages for more
than the actual loss which he has inflicted and that a plaintiff is entitled to
no more than the just and adequate compensation for the injury suffered. His re
covery is, in the absence of circumstances giving rise to an allowance of puniti
ve damages, limited to a fair compensation for the harm done. The law will not p
ut him in a position better than where he should be in had not the wrong happene
d. In the present case, petitioners insist that as the passenger jeepney was pur
chased in 1982 for only P30,000.00 to award damages considerably greater than th
is amount would be improper and unjustified. Petitioners are at best reminded th
at indemnification for damages comprehends not only the value of the loss suffer
ed but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. In other wor
ds,
indemnification for damages is not limited todamnum emergens or actual loss but
extends to lucrum cessans or the amount of profit lost. Had private respondent s
jeepney not met an accident it could reasonably be expected that it would have
continued earning from the business in which it was engaged. Private respondent
avers that he derives an average income of P300.00 per day from his passenger je
epney and this earning was included in the award of damages made by the trial co
urt and upheld by the appeals court. The award therefore of P236,000.00 as compe
nsatory damages is not beyond reason nor speculative as it is based on a reasona
ble estimate of the total damage suffered by private respondent, i.e. damage wro
ught upon his jeepney and the income lost from his transportation business. Peti
tioners for their part did not offer any substantive evidence to refute the esti
mate made by the courts a quo. However, we are constrained to depart from the co
nclusion of the lower courts that upon the award of compensatory damages legal i
nterest should be imposed beginning 22 July 1990, i.e. the date of the accident.
Upon the provisions of Art. 2213 of the Civil Code, interest "cannot be recover
ed upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be establishe
d with reasonable certainty." It is axiomatic that if the suit were for damages,
unliquidated and not known until definitely ascertained, assessed and determine
d by the courts after proof, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
should be from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the qua
ntification of damages may be deemed to be reasonably ascertained). In this case
, the matter was not a liquidated obligation as the assessment of the damage on
the vehicle was heavily debated upon by the parties with private respondent s de
mand for P236,000.00 being refuted by petitioners who argue that they could have
the vehicle repaired easily for P20,000.00. In fine, the amount due private res
pondent was not a liquidated account that was already demandable and payable. On
e last word. We have observed that private respondent left his passenger jeepney
by the roadside at the mercy of the elements. Article 2203 of the Civil Code ex
horts parties suffering from loss or injury to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in
question. One who is injured then by the wrongful or negligent act of another s
hould exercise reasonable care and diligence to minimize the resulting damage. A
nyway, he can recover from the wrongdoer money lost in reasonable efforts to pre
serve the property injured and for injuries incurred in attempting to prevent da
mage to it. However we sadly note that in the present case petitioners failed to
offer in evidence the estimated amount of the damage caused by private responde
nt s unconcern towards the damaged vehicle. It is the burden of petitioners to s
how satisfactorily not only that the injured party could have mitigated his dama
ges but also the amount thereof; failing in this regard, the amount of damages a
warded cannot be proportionately reduced. WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision awa
rding private respondent Donato Gonzales P236,000.00 with legal interest from 22
July 1990 as compensatory damages and P30,000.00 as attorney s fees is MODIFIED
. Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be computed from the
time the judgment of the lower court is made until the finality of this Decision
. If the adjudged principal and interest remain unpaid
thereafter, the interest shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from t
he time judgment becomes final and executory until it is fully satisfied.1wphi1.nt
Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. 178. CARPIO VS DOROJA FACTS: Accused-resp
ondent Edwin Ramirez, while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney owned and operated b
y Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the street, as
a consequence of which the latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle as ref
lected in the medico-legal certificate and sustained injuries which required med
ical attention for a period of (3) three months. An information for Reckless Imp
rudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries was filed against Edwin Ramirez w
ith the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City. The accused voluntarily pleaded
guilty to a lesser offense and was accordingly convicted for Reckless Imprudenc
e Resulting to Less Serious Physical Injuries under an amended information punis
hable under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. When a Writ of Execution was
served upon the accused, it was unsatisfied by reason of insolvency. Hence, Thus
, complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the subsidiary li
ability of the owner-operator of the vehicle. The same was denied by the trial c
ourt on two grounds, namely, the decision of the appellate court made no mention
of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo Toribio, and the nature of the accident
falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and not culpa-contractual." A motion for reconside
ration of the said order was disallowed for the reason that complainant having f
ailed to raise the matter of subsidiary liability with the appellate court, said
court rendered its decision which has become final and executory and the trial
court has no power to alter or modify such decision. DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
: WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDWIN RAMIREZ y WEE guilty as a principal beyon
d reasonable doubt of the Amended Information to which he voluntarily pleaded gu
ilty and appreciating this mitigating circumstance in his favor, hereby sentence
s him to suffer the penalty of One (1) month and One (1) day to Two (2) months o
f Arresto Mayor in its minimum period. The accused is likewise ordered to indemn
ify the complainant Dionisio A. Carpio the amount of P45.00 representing the val
ue of the 1/2 can of tomatoes lost; the amount of P200.00 which complainant paid
to the Zamboanga General Hospital, to pay complainant the amount of Pl,500.00 a
s attorney s fees and to pay the cost of this suit. SO ORDERED. ISSUE: Whether o
r not the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same
criminal proceeding against the driver where the award was given, or in a separ
ate civil action. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: The law involved in the instant
case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, both of the Revised Penal Code,
which reads thus: Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The su
bsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall apply to empl
oyers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for f
elonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees
in the discharge of their duties.
Respondent contends that the case of Pajarito v. Seneris cannot be applied to th
e present case, the former being an action involving culpa-contractual, while th
e latter being one of culpa-aquiliana. Such a declaration is erroneous. The subs
idiary liability in Art. 103 should be distinguished from the primary liability
of employers, which is quasidelictual in character as provided in Art. 2180 of t
he New Civil Code. Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a delict. On the
other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa-aquiliana. The pre
sent case is neither an action for culpa-contractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. Th
is is basically an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime unde
r Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case can this be regarded as a civil
action for the primary liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New Civ
il Code, i.e., action for culpa-aquiliana. In order that an employer may be held
subsidiarily liable for the employee s civil liability in the criminal action,
it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industr
y, (2) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties an
d (3) that he is insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The
subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of t
he employee in the criminal action. All these requisites present, the employer b
ecomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee s conviction and upon pr
oof of the latter s insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all t
hese requirements. Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator has
been deprived of his day in court, because the case before us is not one wherei
n the operator is sued for a primary liability under the Civil Code but one in w
hich the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his employee
s criminal negligence is sought to be enforced. Considering the subsidiary liabi
lity imposed upon the employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party
to the criminal case. Ergo, the employer s subsidiary liability may be determine
d and enforced in the criminal case as part of the execution proceedings against
the employee. This Court held in the earlier case of Pajarito v. Seneris, supra
, that "The proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may
be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A ca
se in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that al
l proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question
that the court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control ov
er its process of execution, and this power carries with it the right to determi
ne every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution." The a
rgument that the owner-operator cannot be held subsidiarily liable because the m
atter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and in like manner, the a
ppellate court s decision made no mention of such subsidiary liability is of no
moment. As already discussed, the filing of a separate complaint against the ope
rator for recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary since his liability
is clear from the decision against the accused. Such being the case, it is not i
ndispensable for the question of subsidiary liability to be passed upon by the a
ppellate court. Such subsidiary liability is already implied from the appellate
court s decision. In the recent case of Vda. de Paman v. Seneris, 115 SCRA 709,
this Court reiterated the following pronouncement: "A judgment of conviction sen
tencing a defendant employer to pay an indemnity in the absence of any collusion
between the defendant and the offended party, is conclusive upon the employer i
n an action for the enforcement of the latter s subsidiary liability not only wi
th regard to the civil liability, but also with regard to its amount." This bein
g the case, this Court stated in Rotea v. Halili, 109 Phil. 495, "that the court
has no other function
than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case an
d has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has been co
mmitted in the decision. A separate and independent action is, therefore, unnece
ssary and would only unduly prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim." Final
ly, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to grant the motio
n for subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to amend its decision whic
h has already become final and executory cannot be sustained. Compelling the own
eroperator to pay on the basis of his subsidiary liability does not constitute a
n amendment of the judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised P
enal Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the employer be
comes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such be
ing the case, the subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where th
e award was given, and this does not constitute an act of amending the decision.
It becomes incumbent upon the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of ex
ecution (but only after the employer has been heard), upon conviction of the emp
loyee and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to the employee s insolven
cy. WHEREFORE, the order of respondent court disallowing the motion for subsidia
ry writ of execution is hereby SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is directed to hear an
d decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner-op
erator of the passenger jitney. Costs against private respondent. 179. FRANCO VS
IAC FACTS: Macario Yuro, the driver of Franco Bus, swreved to the left side of
MacArthur Highway at Capas, Tarlac to avoid hitting the trailer truck parked alo
ng the cemented pavement of the said highway. Thereby, taking the lane of an inc
oming mini bus being driven by Magdaleno Lugue, resulting to the collision opf t
he two vehicles. The collision resulted in the deaths of the two drivers Macario
Yuro and Magdaleno Lugue, and two (2) passengers of the mini bus, Romeo Bue and
Fernando Chuay. Consequently, the registered owner of the mini bus, Antonio Rey
es and Mrs. Susan Chuay, the wife of victim Fernando Chuay, and Mrs. Lolita Lugu
e, the wife of drivervictim Magdaleno Lugue,filed an action for damages through
reckless imprudence before the CFI of Pampanga in Angeles City against the owner
s and operators of Franco Transpoortation Company. In answer to the complaint, d
efendants set up, among others, the affirmative defense that as owners and opera
tors of the Franco Transportation Company, they exercised due diligence in the s
election and supervision of all their employees, including the deceased driver M
acario Yuro. DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT: Said defense was, however, rejected by
the trial court in its decision 1 dated May 17, 1978, for the reason that the a
ct of the Franco Bus driver was a negligent act punishable by law resulting in a
civil obligation arising from Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code and not fro
m Article 2180 of the Civil Code. It said: "This is a case of criminal negligenc
e out of which civil liability arises, and not a case of civil negligence and th
e defense of having acted like a good father of a family or having
trained or selected the drivers of his truck is no defense to avoid civil liabil
ity." On this premise, the trial court ruled as follows: WHEREFORE, premises con
sidered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, Antonio Reyes,
Lolita Lugue, and Susan Chuay, and against the defendants Mr. and Mrs. Federico
Franco, ordering the latter: (1) To pay Antonio Reyes, actual and compensatory d
amages in the amount of P90,000.00 for the Isuzu Mini Bus; (2) To pay Lolita Lug
ue, the widow of Magdaleno Lugue, actual and compensatory damages in the total s
um of P18,000.00; (3) To pay Susan Chuay, the widow of Fernando Chuay, actual an
d compensatory damages in the total sum of P24,000.00; and (4) To pay attorney s
fee in the amount of P5.000.00; All with legal interests from the filing of thi
s suit on November 11, 1974 until paid; and the costs of this suit. SO ORDERED.
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: On appeal by herein petitioners as defendantsa
ppellants, respondent appellate court, agreeing with the lower court, held that
defendants-appellants driver who died instantly in the vehicular collision, was
guilty of reckless or criminal imprudence punishable by law in driving appellan
ts bus; that the civil obligation of the appellants arises from Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code resulting in the subsidiary liability of the appellants u
nder the said provisions, that the case subject of appeal is one involving culpa
ble negligence out of which civil liability arises and is not one of civil negli
gence; and that there is nothing in Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Co
de which requires a prior judgment of conviction of the erring vehicle driver an
d his obligation to pay his civil liability before the said provisions can be ap
plied. Respondent appellate court increased the award of damages granted by the
lower court as follows: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified
as follows: 1. To pay Susan Chuay, widow of Fernando Chuay, the sum of P30,000.
00 for the latter s death and P112,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; 2. To pa
y Lolita Lugue, widow of Magdaleno Lugue, the sum of P30,000.00 for the latter s
death and P62,000.00 for loss of earning capacity. The rest of the judgment app
ealed from is affirmed. Costs against defendants-appellants. SO ORDERED. The def
endants-appellants then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid deci
sion of the respondent appellate courts decision, but the same was denied. ISSUES
: 1. whether the action for recovery of damages instituted by herein private res
pondents was predicated upon crime or quasi-delict; 2. whether respondent appell
ate court in an appeal filed by the defeated parties, herein petitioners, may pr
operly increase the award of damages in favor of the private respondents Chuay a
nd Lugue, prevailing parties in the lower court, who did not appeal said court s
decision. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: 1. We find merit in this contention of
herein private respondents as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2154 unequivocally c
laim that the former as the employers of
Macario Yuro, the driver of the Franco Bus who caused the vehicular mishap, are
jointly and severally liable to the latter for the damages suffered by them whic
h thus makes Civil Case No. 2154 an action predicated upon a quasi-delict under
the Civil Code subject to the defense that the employer exercised all the dilige
nce of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their emplo
yees Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the employer
under the Revised Penal Code and the employer s primary liability under the Civ
il Code which is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. The first type of lia
bility is governed by Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code which provi
de as follows: Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern-keeper
s and proprietors of establishments. In default of the persons criminally liable
, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civi
lly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a vi
olation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulations sh
all have been committed by them or their employees. Innkeepers are also subsidia
rily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their
houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, pro
vided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or
the person representing him, of the deposits of such goods within the inn; and s
hall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his repres
entative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such go
ods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intim
idation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper s employees. Art. 103. Subs
idiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in
the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, an
d corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by the ser
vants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duti
es; While the second kind is governed by the following provisions of the Civil C
ode: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negli
gence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is c
alled a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Art. 217
7. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirel
y separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under t
he Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act o
r omission of the defendant. Art. 2180. The obligations imposed by article 2176
is demandable not only for one s own acts or omissions, but also for those of pe
rsons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the damages cau
sed by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their as
signed tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry
,
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herei
n mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a fam
ily to prevent damage. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability or
iginates from a delict committed by the employee who is primarily liable therefo
r and upon whose primary liability his employer s subsidiary liability is to be
based. Before the employer s subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it i
s imperative that there should be a criminal action whereby the employee s crimi
nal negligence or delict and corresponding liability therefor are proved. If no
criminal action was instituted, the employer s liability would not be predicated
under Article 103. In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted becaus
e the person who should stand as the accused and the party supposed to be primar
ily liable for the damages suffered by private respondents as a consequence of t
he vehicular mishap died. Thus, petitioners subsidiary liability has no leg to
stand on considering that their liability is merely secondary to their employee
s primary liability. Logically therefore, recourse under this remedy is not poss
ible. On the other hand, under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, liabili
ty is based on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable for tor
tious acts of its employees subject, however, to the defense that the former exe
rcised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and super
vision of his employees. Respondent appellate court relies on the case of Arambu
lo, supra, where it was held that the defense of observance of due diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of employees is not a
pplicable to the subsidiary liability provided in Article 20 of the Penal Code (
now Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code). By such reliance, it would seem that
respondent appellate court seeks to enforce the subsidiary civil liability of t
he employer without a criminal conviction of the party primarily liable therefor
. This is not only erroneous and absurd but is also fraught with dangerous conse
quences. It is erroneous because the conviction of the employee primarily liable
is a condition sine qua non for the employer s subsidiary liability 10 and, at
the same time, absurd because we will be faced with a situation where the employ
er is held subsidiarily liable even without a primary liability being previously
established. It is likewise dangerous because, in effect, the employer s subsid
iary liability would partake of a solidary obligation resulting in the law s ame
ndment without legislative sanction. The Court in the aforecited M.D. Transit ca
se went further to say that there can be no automatic subsidiary liability of de
fendant employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code where his employee
has not been previously criminally convicted. Having thus established that Civil
Case No. 2154 is a civil action to impose the primary liability of the employer
as a result of the tortious act of its alleged reckless driver, we confront our
selves with the plausibility of defendants-petitioners defense that they observ
ed due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision o
f their employees.
On this point, the appellate court has unequivocally spoken in affirmation of th
e lower court s findings, to wit: Anyway, a perusal of the record shows that the
appellants were not able to establish the defense of a good father of a family
in the supervision of their bus driver. The evidence presented by the appellants
in this regard is purely self-serving. No independent evidence was presented as
to the alleged supervision of appellants bus drivers, especially with regard t
o driving habits and reaction to actual traffic conditions. The appellants in fa
ct admitted that the only kind of supervision given the drivers referred to the
running time between the terminal points of the line (t.s.n., September 16, 1976
, p. 21). Moreover, the appellants who ran a fleet of 12 buses plying the Manila
-Laoag line, have only two inspectors whose duties were only ticket inspection.
There is no evidence that they are really safety inspectors. Basically, the Cour
t finds that these determinations are factual in nature. As a painstaking review
of the evidence presented in the case at bar fails to disclose any evidence or
circumstance of note sufficient to overrule said factual findings and conclusion
s, the Court is inclined to likewise reject petitioners affirmative defense of
due diligence. The wisdom of this stance is made more apparent by the fact that
the appellate court s conclusions are based on the findings of the lower court w
hich is in a better position to evaluate the testimonies of the witnesses during
trial. As a rule, this Court respects the factual findings of the appellate and
trial courts and accord them a certain measure of finality. Consequently, there
fore, we find petitioners liable for the damages claimed pursuant to their prima
ry liability under the Civil Code. 2. On the second legal issue raised in the in
stant petition, we agree with petitioners contention that the Intermediate Appe
llate Court (later Court of Appeals) is without jurisdiction to increase the amo
unt of damages awarded to private respondents Chuay and Lugue, neither of whom a
ppealed the decision of the lower court. While an appellee who is not also an ap
pellant may assign error in his brief if his purpose is to maintain the judgment
on other grounds, he cannot ask for modification or reversal of the judgment or
affirmative relief unless he has also appealed. For failure of plaintiffs-appel
lees, herein private respondents, to appeal the lower court s judgment, the amou
nt of actual damages cannot exceed that awarded by it. 14 Furthermore, the recor
ds show that plaintiffs-private respondents limited their claim for actual and c
ompensatory damages to the supposed average income for a period of one (1) year
of P6,000.00 for the driver Magdaleno Lugue and P12,000.00 for the Chinese busin
essman Fernando Chuay. We feel that our award should not exceed the said amounts
. However, the increase in awards for indemnity arising from death to P30,000.0
0 each remains, the same having been made in accordance with prevailing jurispru
dence decreeing such increase in view of the depreciated Philippine currency. WH
EREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified decreasing the
award to private respondents of actual and compensatory damages for loss of aver
age income for the period of one year to P6,000.00 for the deceased Magdaleno Lu
gue and P12,000.00 for the deceased Fernando Chuay. The rest of the judgment app
ealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against the private respondents. This decis
ion is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
180. YONAHA VS CA FACTS: Elmer Ouano while driving a Toyota Tamaraw duly registe
red under the name of Raul Cabahug and owned by EK Sea Products feloniously mane
uver and operate it in a negligent and reckless manner, without taking the neces
sary precaution to avoid injuries to person and damage to property, as a result
thereof the motor vehicle he was then driving bumped and hit Hector Caete, which
caused the latters instantaneous death, due to the multiple severe traumatic inju
ries at different parts of his body; was charged with the crime of Reckless Impr
udence Resulting to Homicide after pleading guilty on the said information. DECI
SION OF THE TRIAL COURT: Finding therefore the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged against him and taking into account the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty which the prosecuting fi
scal readily accepted, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer and unde
rgo an imprisonment of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months and to pay the he
irs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of the victim; P30,000.00
for actual damages incurred in connection with the burial and the nightly prayer
of the deceased victim and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees. However, the Writ of Ex
ecution was returned unsatisfied for the reason that Elmer Ouano was unable to p
ay the monetary obligation. Forthwith, the private repondents filed a Motion for
Subsidiary Execution with neither notice of hearing or notice to petitioner whi
ch was granted by the trial court. It was then, allegedly for the first time, th
at petitioner was informed of Ouanos conviction. Petitioner filed a motion to sta
y and to recall the subsidiary writ of execution principally anchored on the lac
k of prior notice to her and on the fact that the employers liability had yet to
be established. Private respondents opposed the motion. The trial court denied p
etitioners motion; petitioners plea for reconsideration of the denial was likewise
rejected. Petitioner promptly elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals for r
eview. The appellate court initially restrained the implementation of the assail
ed orders and issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a P10,0
00.00 bond. Ultimately, however, the appellate court, in its decision, dismissed
the petition for lack of merit and thereby lifted the writ of preliminary injun
ction. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated: We are not unmindful of the ruling in t
he aforecited case of Lucia Pajarito vs. Seneris, supra. - that enforcement of t
he secondary or subsidiary liability of employer may be done by motion in the sa
me criminal case, a recourse which presupposes a hearing. But even assuming that
issuance of writ of subsidiary execution requires notice and hearing, we believ
e a hearing in the present case would be sheer rigmarole, an unnecessary formali
ty, because, as employer, petitioner became subsidiarily liable upon the convict
ion of her accused driver, Elmer Ouano, and proof of the latters insolvency. And
if she had any defense to free herself from such subsidiary liability, she could
have ventilated and substantiated the same in connection with her (petitioners)
motion to stay and recall the writ of subsidiary execution in question. But from
her said motion, it can be gleaned that except for the protestation of violatio
n of
due process, and absence of notice to her of the motion for issuance of a writ o
f subsidiary execution, petitioner intimated no defense which could absolve her
of subsidiary liability under the premises. Then, too, after the denial of her m
otion to stay and recall subject writ, petitioner moved for reconsideration but
in her motion for reconsideration, she averred no exculpatory facts which could
save her from subsidiary liability, as employer of the convicted Elmer Ouano. ISS
UE: Whether or not Ouanos conviction was not the result of a finding of proof bey
ond reasonable doubt but from his spontaneous plea of guilt. DECISION OF THE SUP
REME COURT: We find merit in the petition. The statutory basis for an employers s
ubsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. This Cour
t has since sanctioned the enforcement of this subsidiary liability in the same
criminal proceedings in which the employee is adjudged guilty, on the thesis tha
t it really is a part of, and merely an incident in, the execution process of th
e judgment. But, execution against the employer must not issue as just a matter
of course, and it behooves the court, as a measure of due process to the employe
r, to determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the lega
l applicability and propriety of the employers liability. The requirement is mand
atory even when it appears prima facie that execution against the convicted empl
oyee cannot be satisfied. The court must convince itself that the convicted empl
oyee is in truth in the employ of the employer; that the latter is engaged in an
industry of some kind; that the employee has committed the crime to which civil
liability attaches while in the performance of his duties as such; and that exe
cution against the employee is unsuccessful by reason of insolvency. The assumpt
ion that, since petitioner in this case did not aver any exculpatory facts in he
r motion to stay and recall, as well as in her motion for reconsideration, which c
ould save her from liability, a hearing would be a futile and a sheer rigmarole
is unacceptable. The employer must be given his full day in court. To repeat, th
e subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Cod
e requires (a) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; (b) that the
employer is engaged in some kind of industry; (c) that the employee is adjudged
guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discha
rge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits while in the discharge o
f such duties); and (d) that said employee is insolvent. The judgment of convict
ion of the employee, of course, concludes the employer] and the subsidiary liabi
lity may be enforced in the same criminal case, but to afford the employer due p
rocess, the court should hear and decide that liability on the basis of the cond
itions required therefor by law. WHEREFORE, finding the order, dated 29 May 1992
, as well as the order of 24 August 1992 to have been improvidently issued, said
orders are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner shall be given the right to a hearing o
n the motion for the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution filed by private
respondents, and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceeding
s conformably with our foregoing opinion. No costs. 181. GUILATCO VS CITY OF DAG
UPAN
FACTS: Plaintiff Florentina Guilatco while she was about to board a motorized tr
icycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the control
and supervision of the City of Dagupan) accidentally fell into a manhole located
on said sidewalk, thereby causing her right leg to be fractured. As a result th
ereof, she had to be hospitalized, operated on, confined, at first at the Pangas
inan Provincial Hospital, from July 25 to August 3, 1978 (or for a period of 16
days). She also incurred hospitalization, medication and other expenses to the t
une of P 8,053.65 (Exh. H to H-60) or a total of P 10,000.00 in all, as other re
ceipts were either lost or misplaced; during the period of her confinement in sa
id two hospitals, plaintiff suffered severe or excruciating pain not only on her
right leg which was fractured but also on all parts of her body; the pain has p
ersisted even after her discharge from the Medical City General Hospital on Octo
ber 9, 1978, to the present. Despite her discharge from the Hospital plaintiff i
s presently still wearing crutches and the Court has actually observed that she
has difficulty in locomotion. From the time of the mishap on July 25, 1978 up to
the present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter, as s
he has difficulty of locomotion in going up the stairs of her office, located ne
ar the city hall in Dagupan City. She earns at least P 720.00 a month consisting
of her monthly salary and other means of income, but since July 25, 1978 up to
the present she has been deprived of said income as she has already consumed her
accrued leaves in the government service. She has lost several pounds as a resu
lt of the accident and she is no longer her former jovial self, she has been una
ble to perform her religious, social, and other activities which she used to do
prior to the incident. DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT (1) Ordering defendant City o
f Dagupan to pay plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P 15,924 (namely P8,0
54.00 as hospital, medical and other expenses [Exhs. H to H-60], P 7,420.00 as l
ost income for one (1) year [Exh. F] and P 450.00 as bonus). P 150,000.00 as mor
al damages, P 50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P 3,000.00 as attorney s fees,
and litigation expenses, plus costs and to appropriate through its Sangguniang
Panglunsod (City Council) said amounts for said purpose; (2) Dismissing plaintif
fs complaint as against defendant City Engr. Alfredo G. Tangco; and (3) Dismissi
ng the counterclaims of defendant City of Dagupan and defendant City Engr. Alfre
do G. Tangco, for lack of merit. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: On appeal by
the respondent City of Dagupan, the appellate court reversed the lower court fin
dings on the ground that no evidence was presented by the plaintiff- appellee to
prove that the City of Dagupan had "control or supervision" over Perez Boulevar
d. ISSUE: Whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City
of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordan
ce with article 2189 of the Civil Code. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: condition
of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows: Article 2189. Provinces, ci
ties and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injurie
s suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets
, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or super
vision.
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the provi
nce, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires tha
t either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter o
f Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer who has the following dutie
s: Sec. 22. The City Engineer--His powers, duties and compensation-There shall b
e a city engineer, who shall be in charge of the department of Engineering and P
ublic Works. He shall receive a salary of not exceeding three thousand pesos per
annum. He shall have the following duties: xxx (j) He shall have the care and c
ustody of the public system of waterworks and sewers, and all sources of water s
upply, and shall control, maintain and regulate the use of the same, in accordan
ce with the ordinance relating thereto; shall inspect and regulate the use of al
l private systems for supplying water to the city and its inhabitants, and all p
rivate sewers, and their connection with the public sewer system. There is, ther
efore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over the
public works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner un
der article 2198 of the Civil Code is clear. Be all that as it may, the actual d
amages awarded to the petitioner in the amount of P 10,000.00 should be reduced
to the proven expenses of P 8,053.65 only. The trial court should not have round
ed off the amount. In determining actual damages, the court can not rely on "spe
culation, conjecture or guess work as to the amount. Without the actual proof of
loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous. On the other hand, moral da
mages may be awarded even without proof of pecuniary loss, inasmuch as the deter
mination of the amount is discretionary on the court. Though incapable of pecuni
ary estimation, moral damages are in the nature of an award to compensate the cl
aimant for actual injury suffered but which for some reason can not be proven. H
owever, in awarding moral damages, the following should be taken into considerat
ion: (1) First, the proximate cause of the injury must be the claimee s acts. (2
) Second, there must be compensatory or actual damages as satisfactory proof of
the factual basis for damages. (3) Third, the award of moral damages must be pre
dicated on any of the cases enumerated in the Civil Code. In the case at bar, th
e physical suffering and mental anguish suffered by the petitioner were proven.
Witnesses from the petitioner s place of work testified to the degeneration in h
er disposition-from being jovial to depressed. She refrained from attending soci
al and civic activities. Nevertheless the award of moral damages at P 150,000.00
is excessive. Her handicap was not permanent and disabled her only during her t
reatment which lasted for one year. Though evidence of moral loss and anguish ex
isted to warrant the award of damages, the moderating hand of the law is called
for. The Court has time and again
called attention to the reprehensible propensity of trial judges to award damage
s without basis, resulting in exhorbitant amounts. Although the assessment of th
e amount is better left to the discretion of the trial court under preceding jur
isprudence, the amount of moral damages should be reduced to P 20,000.00. As for
the award of exemplary damages, the trial court correctly pointed out the basis
: To serve as an example for the public good, it is high time that the Court, th
rough this case, should serve warning to the city or cities concerned to be more
conscious of their duty and responsibility to their constituents, especially wh
en they are engaged in construction work or when there are manholes on their sid
ewalks or streets which are uncovered, to immediately cover the same, in order t
o minimize or prevent accidents to the poor pedestrians. Too often in the zeal t
o put up "public impact" projects such as beautification drives, the end is more
important than the manner in which the work is carried out. Because of this obs
ession for showing off, such trivial details as misplaced flower pots betray the
careless execution of the projects, causing public inconvenience and inviting a
ccidents. Pending appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan from the trial court
to the appellate court, the petitioner was able to secure an order for garnishme
nt of the funds of the City deposited with the Philippine National Bank, from th
e then presiding judge, Hon. Willelmo Fortun. This order for garnishment was rev
oked subsequently by the succeeding presiding judge, Hon. Romeo D. Magat, and be
came the basis for the petitioner s motion for reconsideration which was also de
nied. We rule that the execution of the judgment of the trial court pending appe
al was premature. We do not find any good reason to justify the issuance of an o
rder of execution even before the expiration of the time to appeal . WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the respondent
Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial
court, dated March 12, 1979 and amended on March 13, 1979, is hereby REINSTATED
with the indicated modifications as regards the amounts awarded: (1) Ordering t
he defendant City of Dagupan to pay the plaintiff actual damages in the amount o
f P 15,924 (namely P 8,054.00 as hospital, medical and other expenses; P 7,420.0
0 as lost income for one (1) year and P 450.00 as bonus); P 20,000.00 as moral d
amages and P 10,000.00 as exemplary damages. The attorney s fees of P 3,000.00 r
emain the same. SO ORDERED. 182. PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL VS IAC FACTS: Theness Uy
was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the
house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Str
eet in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was tre
ated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" 1 and administered an antir
abies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was
readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, on Aug
ust 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumo
nia. Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils wer
e liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually k
illed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog be
longed to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in a
ny case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT: After
trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained
the defendants and dismissed the complaint. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: On
appeal, the decision of the court a quo was reversed in favor of the Uys. The r
espondent court arrived at a different conclusion when the case was appealed. 5
It found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so sho
uld be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused
by the dog. It also held that the child had died as a result of the dog bites an
d not for causes independent thereof as submitted by the appellees. Accordingly,
the Vestils were ordered to pay the Uys damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for
the death of Theness, P12,000.00 for medical and hospitalization expenses, and
P2,000.00 as attorney s fees. ISSUE: Whether or not Purita Vestil is liable for
the damages caused by the dog owned by her deceased father. DECISION OF THE SUPR
EME COURT: What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly
was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or
of the house. Article 2183 reads as follows: The possessor of an animal or whoev
er may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, al
though it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case t
he damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has s
uffered damage. While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house,
which was still part of Vicente Miranda s estate, there is no doubt that she and
her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. She wa
s the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care o
f the property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. Moreover, ther
e is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once
or twice weekly, according to at least one witness, and used it virtually as a s
econd house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with Thene
ss when the little girl was bitten by the dog. The dog itself remained in the ho
use even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the inc
ident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners offered t
o assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she kn
ew them only casually. The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they w
ere the possessors of the dog that bit Theness there was no clear showing that s
he died as a result thereof. On the
contrary, the death certificate 17 declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia,
which had nothing to do with the dog bites for which she had been previously hos
pitalized. the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified
cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our rulin
g in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the death certificat
e is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death. I
ndeed, the evidence of the child s hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that
she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated
a different cause of death. The petitioner s contention that they could not be
expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Artic
le 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "
escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter ei
ther that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely prov
oked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animal
s but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged pro
vocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the ti
me she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done t
o the animal. It is worth observing that the above defenses of the petitioners a
re an implied rejection of their original posture that there was no proof that i
t was the dog in their father s house that bit Theness. According to Manresa the
obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the neglig
ence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal
causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of socia
l interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service mu
st answer for the damage which such animal may cause. We sustain the findings of
the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards except only as to the medi
cal and hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for
in the complaint. While there is no recompense that can bring back to the privat
e respondents the child they have lost, their pain should at least be assuaged b
y the civil damages to which they are entitled. WHEREFORE, the challenged decisi
on is AFFIRMED as above modified. The petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioners. It is so ordered. 183. THE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION OF EL DEPOSITO,
BARRIO CORAZON DE JESUS, SAN JUAN RIZAL VS LOOD FACTS: Petitioners filed motions
for of a writ of preliminary injunction to stay the demolition and removal of t
heir houses and structures on a parcel of public land in barrios Corazon de Jesu
s and Halo Halo in San Juan, Rizal, (more popularly known as "El Deposito" from
the Spanish times), which was denied by the repondent court. Petitioners action
below was one for declaratory relief to declare as null and void as ex post fac
to legislation, municipal ordinance No. 89, as amended, of respondent Municipali
ty of San Juan, prohibiting squatting on public property and providing a penalty
therefor, under which ordinance, petitioners claimed, respondents were summaril
y demolishing and removing their houses and improvements.
On April 20, 1970, upon issuance of summons requiring respondents to answer the
petition, the Court issued a temporary restraining order restraining respondents
, until further orders, "from proceeding with the summary destruction, removal a
nd demolition of all other houses found in the premises of the land in barrio Co
razon de Jesus and barrio Halo Halo, San Juan, Rizal, by reason of Ordinance No.
89-Amd. as amended, passed by the Municipal Council of San Juan, Rizal, on Apri
l 26, 1968 ... ." Respondents filed their answer in due course and the case was
thereafter submitted for decision with the filing by the parties of their respec
tive memoranda in lieu of oral argument. Hence this action for certiorari. ISSUE
: Whether respondent judge "exceeded his authority and jurisdiction and gravely
abused his discretion" in issuing the questioned orders of February 9, and March
30, 1970, denying the preliminary injunction sought to stay demolition and remo
val of petitioners houses and structures. SUPREME COURTS DECISION: On the main i
ssue at bar, the Court is satisfied that by no means may respondent court be sai
d to have exceeded its authority or gravely abused its discretion in issuing its
questioned orders denying petitioners motion below for a writ of preliminary i
njunction allegedly "to maintain the status quo" and stay demolition and removal
of their illegal constructions found to be public nuisances per se and serious
hazards to public health, by virtue of the following principal considerations: 1
. As found in respondent court s extended two-page order of February 9, 1970 and
ten-page order of March 30, 1970 denying reconsideration, petitioners motions
to maintain the alleged status quo were based on the same grounds already reiter
ated before and denied by then Judge (now appellate associate justice) Andres Re
yes who was then presiding over respondent court in an order dated September 19,
1968, which was upheld in a similar action for certiorari by the Court of Appea
ls in its decision of February 4, 1969. 2. In both said proceedings before Judge
Reyes and the Court of Appeals, petitioners succeeded in obtaining restraining
orders or preliminary writs of injunction to stay demolition, which were dissolv
ed upon said court s handing down their order or decision on the merits of the i
njunction petitions submitted by petitioners. With petitioners definitely having
lost their bid to reopen the cadastral proceedings to pursue their alleged clai
ms of ownership over the lands occupied by their constructions, supra, no furthe
r reason or justification exists to continue the stay order against the removal
and demolition of their constructions. 3. As was well stated in then Judge Reyes
order of September 19, 1968, petitioners failed after several hearings "to sho
w that they have even a color of title to entitle them to exercise the right of
possession to the premises in question. On the other hand, the land is admittedl
y public land and consequently the petitioners have no right to possession there
of....." 4. Petitioners lack of right to the injunction sought by them was furt
her shown in the Court of Appeals decision of February 4, 1969, where it noted
that "their very evidence, their documentary proof, would justify that their hou
ses were built upon land of the Metropolitan Water District, that is to say, of
the Philippine Government, therefore,
such tax declarations of petitioners houses themselves are the best proof of th
eir admission that their possession of the lands they occupy was not and could n
ot be adverse" and that "their shanties pose a veritable danger to public health
." 5. No error, much less abuse of authority or discretion, could be attributed
to respondent court s statements and reasons for denying the injunction sought b
y petitioners, as per its order of March 30, 1970, denying reconsideration, as f
ollows: ... The issues raised by the pleadings to determine whether or not the p
etitioners are entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, or a status quo, in
the words of the petitioners, had been resolved several times not only by this
Court but also by the Court of Appeals, and this Court believes that insofar as
the same grounds are concerned, they are res judicata xxx xxx xxx Lastly, the Co
urt does not lose sight of the fact that the land in question is public land, in
the sense that it is untitled. However, as the government now contends, the lan
d in question is clothed with a public purpose to be utilized for public service
by the government. This fact has not been denied and as a matter of fact, the p
etitioners admit that the land in question is public land. ... 6. The question o
f validity or unconstitutionality of municipal ordinance No. 89Amended need not
be resolved in this proceeding, as it should first properly be submitted for res
olution of the lower court in the action below. Suffice it to note that the Soli
citor General appears to have correctly stated the actual situation in that peti
tioners do not dispute the authority of the San Juan council to pass ordinances
providing for the summary abatement of public nuisances, and that the ordinance
in question may not be faulted for being ex post facto in application since it "
does not seek to punish an action done which was innocent before the passage of
the same. Rather, it punishes the present and continuing act of unlawful occupan
cy of public property or properties intended for public use." At any rate, the d
ecisive point is that independently of the said ordinance, petitioners construc
tions which have been duly found to be public nuisances per se (without provisio
n for accumulation or disposal of waste matters and constructed without building
permits contiguously to and therefore liable to pollute one of the main water p
ipelines which supplies potable water to the Greater Manila area) may be abated
without judicial proceedings under our Civil Code. As stated in Sitchon vs. Aqui
no, the police power of the state justifies the abatement or destruction by summ
ary proceedings of public nuisances per se. No error, much less any abuse of dis
cretion, grave or otherwise, may therefore be attributed against respondent cour
t in having issued its orders denying for imperative reasons of public health an
d welfare the preliminary injunction sought again by petitioners to allow them t
o continue occupying the land in question with their condemned constructions and
structures. ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the petition. T
he temporary restraining order heretofore issued on April 20, 1970 is hereby dis
solved and such dissolution is declared immediately executory. No pronouncement
as to costs. 184. FARRALES VS CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO
FACTS: Plaintiff was the holder of a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-s
ari goods. When the temporary building where she had her stall was demolished in
order that the city might construct a permanent building, Plaintiff was ordered
to move her goods to another temporary place until the permanent building was c
ompleted. Instead, Plaintiff built a temporary shack at one end of the Rice Sect
ion, Baguio City Market without seeking prior permit from any city official. Whe
n the police threatened to demolish the shack, Plaintiff sought an injunction be
fore the CFI which asked her that she present proper permit. Upon failure of pet
itioner to comply with the order, the CFI denied the petition for injunction, an
d the police then demolished the shack. DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT: Denied the
petition for injunction for lack of necessary permits. DECISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS: Court of Appeals and subsequently certified to the Supreme Court for th
e reason that only questions of law are involved. ISSUES: (1) WON the shack or t
emporary stall was a nuisance; (2) WON the police officers are liable for damage
s in extrajudicially abating the nuisance. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT Judgmen
t Affirmed. (1) The SC held that the shack was a nuisance. In the first place sh
e had no permit to put up the temporary stall in question in the precise place w
here she did so. In the second place, its location on the cement passageway at t
he end of the Rice Section building was such that it constituted an obstruction
to the free movement of people. (2) According to Article 707 of the CC, a public
official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for damages in only
two cases: (a) if he causes unnecessary injury; or (b) if an alleged nuisance i
s later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance. In the case at bar, no
unnecessary injury was caused to the appellant, and not only was there no judic
ial declaration that the alleged nuisance was not really so but the trial court
found that it was in fact a nuisance. Indeed it may be said that the abatement t
hereof was not summary, but through a judicial proceeding. The denial of petitio
ners petition for injunction was in effect an authority for the police to carry o
ut the act which was sought to be enjoined. 185. SANGALANG VS IAC FACTS: On Febr
uary 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring, among other things, Atty
. Sangco to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt "for using int
emperate and accusatory language." On March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an expla
nation. DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT: To be sure, Atty. Sangco is entitled to his
opinion, but not to a license to insult the Court with derogatory statements an
d recourses to argumenta ad hominem. In that event, it is the Court s duty "to a
ct to preserve the honor and dignity ... and to safeguard the morals and ethics
of the legal profession."
We are not satisfied with his explanation that he was merely defending the inter
ests of his clients. As we held in Laureta, a lawyer s "first duty is not to his
client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client s success
is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics." And while a lawyer must advocate his client s caus
e in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at libe
rty to resort to arrogance, intimidation, and innuendo. ISSUE: Whether or not At
ty. Sangco should be charged for contempt DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: The Cou
rt finds Atty. Sangco s remarks in his motion for reconsideration, disparaging,
intemperate, and uncalled for. His suggestions that the Court might have been gu
ilty of graft and corruption in acting on these cases are not only unbecoming, b
ut comes, as well, as an open assault upon the Court s honor and integrity. In r
endering its judgment, the Court yielded to the records before it, and to the re
cords alone, and not to outside influences, much less, the influence of any of t
he parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an inferior court, should know be
tter that in any litigation, one party prevails, but his success will not justif
y indictments of bribery by the other party. He should be aware that because of
his accusations, he has done an enormous disservice to the integrity of the high
est tribunal and to the stability of the administration of justice in general. A
s a former judge, Atty. Sangco also has to be aware that we are not bound by the
findings of the trial court (in which his clients prevailed).lwph1.t But if we did
not agree with the findings of the court a quo, it does not follow that we had a
cted arbitrarily because, precisely, it is the office of an appeal to review the
findings of the inferior court. In our "show-cause" Resolution, we sought to ho
ld Atty. Sangco in contempt, specifically, for resort to insulting language amou
nting to disrespect toward the Court within the meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71
, of the Rules of Court. Clearly, however, his act also constitutes malpractice
as the term is defined by Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
s follows: CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE C
OURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS. R
ule 11.01... Rule 11.02... Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, of
fensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. Rule 11.04-A lawyer
should not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no m
ateriality to the case. Rule 11.05... Thus, aside from contempt, Atty. Sangco fa
ces punishment for professional misconduct or malpractice. WHEREFORE Atty. J. Ce
zar Sangco is (1) SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months effect
ive from receipt hereof, and (2) ORDERED to pay a fine of P 500.00 payable from
receipt hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in his record.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Cases 177-185 RODRIGUEZ-ARORONG, LALAINE 186. COCA-COLA BOTTLE
RS PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Respondent Lydia Geronimo was
the proprietess of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen, engaged in the sale of soft
drinks and other goods to the students of Kindergarten Wonderland and to the pub
lic. On August 12, 1989, some parents of the students complained that the Coke a
nd Sprite soft drinks contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances.
She discovered the presence of some fiber-like substances in the contents of som
e unopened Coke bottles and a plastic matter in the contents of an unopened Spri
te bottle. The Department of Health informed her that the samples she submitted
are adulterated. Her sales of soft drinks plummeted, and not long after that, sh
e had to close shop. She became jobless and destitute. She demanded from the pet
itioner the payment of damages but was rebuffed by it. She then filed a complain
t before the RTC of Dagupan City, which granted the motion to dismiss filed by p
etitioner, on the ground that the complaint is based on contract, and not on qua
sidelict, as there exists pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
Thus, on the basis of Article 1571, in relation to Article 1562, the complaint
should have been filed within six months from the delivery of the thing sold. Th
e CA reversed the RTC decision and held that Geronimos complaint is one for quasi
-delict because of petitioners act of negligently manufacturing adulterated food
items intended to be sold for public consumption; and that the existence of cont
ractual relations between the parties does not absolutely preclude an action by
one against the other for quasi-delict arising from negligence in the performanc
e of a contract. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: The honorable court of appeals com
mitted a grave and reversible error in ruling that article 2176, the general pro
vision on quasi-delicts, is applicable in this case when the allegations of the
complaint clearly show that private respondent s cause of action is basedon brea
ch of a seller s implied warranties under our law on sales. Corrolarily, the hon
orable court of appeals committed a grave and reversible error in overruling pet
itioner s argument that private respondent s cause of action had prescribed unde
r article 1571 of the civil code. HELD: DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT: Trial court
granted the motion to dismiss. It ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of admi
nistrative remedies does not apply as the existing administrative remedy is not
adequate. It also stated that the complaint is based on a contract, and not on q
uasi-delict, as there exists pre-existing contractual relation between the parti
es; thus, on the basis of Article 1571, in relation to Article 1562, the complai
nt should have been filed within six months from the delivery of the thing sold.
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS : The public respondent annulled the questione
d orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings in Civil Case
No. D9629. In holding for the private respondent, it ruled that:
Petitioner s complaint being one for quasi-delict, and not for breach of warrant
y as respondent contends, the applicable prescriptive period is four years. It s
hould be stressed that the allegations in the complaint plainly show that it is
an action or damages arising from respondent s act of "recklessly and negligentl
y manufacturing adulterated food items intended to be sold or public consumption
" (p. 25, rollo). It is truism in legal procedure that what determines the natur
e of an action are the facts alleged in the complaint and those averred as a def
ense in the defendant s answer (I Moran 126; Calo v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445; Alger
Electric, Inc. v. CA, 135 SCRA 340). Secondly, despite the literal wording of A
rticle 2176 of the Civil code, the existence of contractual relations between th
e parties does not absolutely preclude an action by one against the other forqua
si-delict arising from negligence in the performance of a contract. In Singson v
. Court of Appeals (23 SCRA 1117), the Supreme Court ruled: It has been repeated
ly held: that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the c
ommission of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of
damages therefor . . . . Thus in Air France vs. Carrascoso, . . . (it was held t
hat) although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is "contractual bot
h in origin and in nature the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort. S
ignificantly, in American jurisprudence, from which Our law on Sales was taken,
the authorities are one in saying that he availability of an action or breach of
warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of defective goods. Its mot
ion for the reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the public res
pondent in its Resolution of 14 May 1993, the petitioner took his recourse under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: The petit
ioner insists that a cursory reading of the complaint will reveal that the prima
ry legal basis for private respondent s cause of action is not Article 2176 of t
he Civil Code on quasi-delict for the complaint does not ascribe any tortious or
wrongful conduct on its part but Articles 1561 and 1562 thereof on breach of a
seller s implied warranties under the law on sales. It contends the existence of
a contractual relation between the parties (arising from the contract of sale)
bars the application of the law on quasi-delicts and that since private responde
nt s cause of action arose from the breach of implied warranties, the complaint
should have been filed within six months room delivery of the soft drinks pursua
nt to Article 171 of the Civil Code. In her Comment the private respondent argue
s that in case of breach of the seller s implied warranties, the vendee may, und
er Article 1567 of the Civil Code, elect between withdrawing from the contract o
r demanding a proportionate reduction of the price, with damages in either case.
She asserts that Civil Case No. D-9629 is neither an action for rescission nor
for proportionate reduction of the price, but for damages arising from a quasi-d
elict and that the public respondent was correct in ruling that the existence of
a contract did not preclude the action for quasi-delict. As to the issue of pre
scription,
the private respondent insists that since her cause of action is based on quasi-
delict, the prescriptive period therefore is four (4) years in accordance with A
rticle 1144 of the Civil Code and thus the filing of the complaint was well with
in the said period. We find no merit in the petition. The public respondent s co
nclusion that the cause of action in Civil Case No. D-9629 is found on quasi-del
ict and that, therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescrib
es in four (4) years is supported by the allegations in the complaint, more part
icularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless and neglige
nt manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consump
tion." The vendee s remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties aga
inst hidden defects of or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to th
ose prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 1567. In t
he case of Articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and 1566, the vendee may elect betwee
n withdrawing from the contract and demanding a proportionate reduction of the p
rice, with damages either case. The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the
contract upon proof of error or fraud, in which case the ordinary rule on oblig
ations shall be applicable. Under the law on obligations, responsibility arising
from fraud is demandable in all obligations and any waiver of an action for fut
ure fraud is void. Responsibility arising from negligence is also demandable in
any obligation, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to
the circumstances. Those guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay in the performanc
e of their obligations and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof
are liable for damages. The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict und
er Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon may be brought by
the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the par
ties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, t
he liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts whi
ch breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. Thus, in Singson vs. Bank of
the Philippine Islands, this Court stated: We have repeatedly held, however, tha
t the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of
a tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages ther
efor. Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recen
t case. Thus, inAir France vs. Carrascoso, involving an airplane passenger who,
despite hi first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class ac
commodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held en
titled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the l
atter s part, for, although the relation between the passenger and a carrier is
"contractual both in origin and nature . . . the act that breaks the contract ma
y also be a tort. Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist desp
ite the presence of contractual relations. Under American law, the liabilities o
f a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on negligence
, breach of warranty, tort, or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepres
entation. Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is
known in Spanish legal treaties asculpa aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or
cuasi-delitos) is homologous but not identical to tort under the common law, whi
ch includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as ass
ault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. It must be made clear that our
affirmance of the decision of the public respondent should by no means be unders
tood as suggesting that the private respondent s claims for moral damages have s
ufficient factual and legal basis. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant pet
ition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. SO
ORDERED. 187. VIRGILIO M. DEL ROSARIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: The Del Rosari
os complaint, filed on November 21, 1990, charged MFC with a violation of Secti
on 3 of Act No. 3740, "An Act to Penalize Fraudulent Advertising, Mislabeling or
Misbranding of Any Product, Stocks, Bonds, etc. After due proceedings, the DTI
rendered judgment declaring that MFC had indeed misrepresented its product becau
se "as the records showed," strong winds actually blew off part of the structure
/roof of the Del Rosario Spouses and the same acted in when strong winds blew, a
part remaining while another part was blown off. MFC was accordingly sentenced
to pay an "administrative fine of P10,000.00", otherwise its "business name and
registration. . . would be deemed suspended and its establishment closed until t
he fine was fully paid." As already stated, the decision of the DTI (of May 29,
1991) was, on appeal, affirmed in toto by the Office of the President on April 3
0, 1993; and the latter judgment was in turn affirmed by this Court on August 28
, 1995 with a modification solely as to the fine, which was reduced to P5,000.00
. In said judgment of August 28, 1995, this Court, stressing that the factual fi
ndings of such administrative bodies as the Office of the President are generall
y to be accorded respect, if not indeed invested with finality, pronounced as co
rrect that Office s ruling. It appears that MFC replaced and repaired the roof f
ree of charge, evidently acknowledging that the damage was covered by its one-ye
ar warranty on the materials and the installation. The repair work was observed
and analyzed by the Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc., which was engaged by th
e Del Rosarios to determine the cause of the destruction. 3 The repair; work was
begun on October 23, 1989, with the delivery of replacement tiles, and complete
d on November 7, 1989. Thereafter the Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc. submit
ted its report to the Del Rosarios, dated November 8, 1989, 4 in which it made t
he following conclusion: MFC however declined to concede liability for the other
damages claimed by the Del Rosario Spouses to have been caused to the interior
of their home. This prompted the latter to commence a civil action against MFC o
n April 16, 1990 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. ISSUE: Whether or not th
ere is a privity of contract between the parties.
whether or not upon the facts established by the evidence, MFC is answerable to
the Del Rosarios for the damage caused to the latter s residence when its roof,
made of shingles purchased from and installed by the former, was blown away by a
typhoon. HELD: DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT: The Trial Court held the corporatio
n liable for breach of its contract for the supply and installation of the roofi
ng materials in the Del Rosarios residence. According to the Court: The followi
ng facts were duly established from the evidence supporting plaintiffs claim fo
r damages: "1 There was actually serious damages caused on plaintiffs house on
account of faulty or inferior installation; "2. Defendant himself admitted its l
iability by making partial repairs of the roofing of "Banawe" shingles, free of
charge, after the typhoon. . . (Ruping); "3. There was an expressed warranty spe
cified in the brochure that there should be two (2) metal screws for one (1) cle
at but the same was violated by the defendant who only used one (1) 1-inch nail
or a combination of one (1) metal screw to one (1) cleat; "4. There is ample evi
dence including the testimony of Engr. Puno that it was defendant Metal Forming
Corporation who. . . (had) a contract with the plaintiffs for the supply and ins
tallation of roofing materials in plaintiffs residential house located at No. 1
7 Tabuena Street, Corinthian Gardens, Quezon City; and "5. There was a declared
warranty by the defendants relied upon by the plaintiffs and that the defendant
was guilty of fraud and/or breach of warranty." DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
: In its Decision promulgated on June 29, 1994. 14 said Court reversed the Trial
Court s judgment, It ruled that there was no privity of contract between the De
l Rosarios and MFC, for the following reasons: a. The contracts for the supply o
f materials and installation of the roof were signed by Engr. Puno. On the face
of the contracts, it does not appear that the Del Rosarios were parties to it or
that it was entered into for their benefit. It does not also appear that Engr.
Puno acted as agent of the Del Rosarios nor of the corporation. b. The holding o
f the trial court that Engr. Puno was an agent of the corporation is not borne o
ut by the records. There is no evidence, apart from Engr. Puno s testimony, to s
how that any agency exists. c. The nature of the relationship between the Del Ro
sarios and Engr. Puno is also not clear from the records of the case. d. While i
t may be implicit in the complaint of the Del Rosarios that there was a contract
between them and the corporation, this is not supported by the evidence present
ed. There being no such privity, according to the Court of Appeals, the Del Rosa
rios had no cause of action against MFC for breach of warranties, there being no
law allowing them to proceed directly against those whom their contractor had s
ubcontracted to furnish materials and do part of the work that the latter was en
gaged to perform. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: The Court rules that it is. The
facts on record including those set forth in the final judgment of the Court En
Banc involving the same parties, adverted to in the opening paragraph of this o
pinion, supra. 18 of which judgment official cognizance may properly be, as it i
s hereby, taken constitute adequate basis for a verdict against MFC. These are t
he following:
1. MFC was engaged in the business of selling to the public roofing materials kn
own as "Banawe" shingles or metal tiles, and through extensive advertisements in
media and in its brochures, made representations respecting the durability of i
ts tiles and the sturdiness of roofing installed in accordance with its particul
arly described method, These representations included statements that the shingl
es are "STRUCTURALLY SAFE AND STRONG" and that the "BANAWE METAL TILEstructure a
cts as a single unit against wind and storm pressure due to the strong hook acti
on on its overlaps." 2. After reading MFC s brochures and advertisements, the De
l Rosario Spouses instructed their contractor, Engineer Puno, to use the "Banawe
" shingles or metal tiles in the roofing of their house then under construction.
3. In other words, paraphrasing Article 1546 of the Civil Code, MFC, as seller
to the general public had made a affirmations of fact and promises relating to i
ts advertised product, the "Banawe" tiles, the natural tendency of which was to
induce the buyers, as infact it did induce the Del Rosarios, to purchase the sam
e, relying thereon. 4. Pursuant to the Del Rosarios instructions. Puno placed o
rders with MFC and signed the pertinent contracts for the purchase of the shingl
es, accepted deliveries thereof and signed corresponding invoices, and made paym
ents thereon with the spouses funds. 20 5. Deliveries of the "Banawe" metal tile
s or shingles were made by MFC s employees to the construction site of the Del R
osarios residence; and installation of the metal tiles in the roof of the Del R
osario s house was made by MFC s workers. 6. MFC "acted in bad faith and/or with
gross negligence in failing to deliver the necessary accessories for the proper
installation of the structure. . . and actually installed inferior roofing mate
rials at (private respondents ) residence, in violation of the proper installati
on procedure expressly specified in the former s brochures and advertisements fo
r installation, i.e., the metal tile attached to the roof panels should be by tw
o (2) self-drilling screws for one (1) metal cleat. . . (but) instead of conform
ing with this procedure, (petitioner) attached some of the metal cleats with onl
y one (l)-inch ordinary nail each and others were fastened with only one (1) woo
d screw each. . ." 7. As a result, barely two (2) months after completion of the
installation of the roof by MFC s workers, portions thereof were blown away by
the winds of typhoon "Ruping," 8. MFC replaced the roof free of charge, in ackno
wledgment of its one-year warranty on the materials and their installation. All
the quibbling about whether Engineer Puno acted as agent of MFC or of the spouse
s, is pointless. The matter is not a factor in determining MFC s liability for i
ts workers use of inferior materials and their defective installation of the "B
anawe" metal tiles in the roof of the latter s residence, Prescinding from the p
ersuasive proof on record that at all times material and with regard to the acqu
isition and installation of the metal tiles or shingles, Puno was in truth actin
g as contractor of the Del Rosarios and on their instructions, 22 ascertainment
of the definite identity of the person who actually ordered the shingles from MF
C is utterly inconsequential it might just as well have been a construction fore
man, a trusted domestic, or any friend or acquaintance of the Del Rosarios in vi
ew of the indisputable fact not only (1) that the tiles were delivered to the De
l Rosarios and used in fabricating the roof of their home, but also (2) that it
was the employees and workers of MFC who (a) delivered the shingles or metal til
es to the construction site of the Del Rosarios home, and (b) undertook and com
pleted the installation thereof These they did in bad faith, using inferior mate
rials and assembling them in a manner contrary to MFC s express representations
in its brochures and advertisements circulated and broadcast to the general publ
ic which representations had, in the first place, induced the Del Rosarios to ch
oose the metal tiles in question for
their roofing. In fine, since MFC, in bad faith and with gross negligence, infri
nged the express warranty made by it to the general public in connection with th
e "Banawe" tiles brought to and set up in the house of the Del Rosarios who had
relied on the warranty, and thereby caused them considerable injury, the identit
y of the individual who actually dealt with MFC and asked the latter to make suc
h delivery and installation is of little moment. Turning now to the matter of da
mages, it is the Del Rosarios contention that the pecuniary detriment to their
home amounted to P1,008,003.00, covering not only the destruction of the roof, b
ut also substantial harm to the electrical wiring, ceiling, fixtures, walls, wal
lpaper, wood parquet flooring and furniture. 23 They rely on the Report of the E
steban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc., 24 to which the Regional Trial Court accorde
d full credit. But that report contains no statement whatever of the amount of t
he damage. Indeed, the testimony of Engineer Abril, the representative of the Es
teban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc., is that his firm had been retained only to de
termine the cause of the damage, not to estimate and assess it. 25 A similar ari
dity as to the amount of the damage, unfortunately characterizes the testimony o
f Atty. Virgilio Del Rosario and the rest of the spouses proofs. There is there
fore no evidentiary foundation upon which to lay an award of actual damages. The
Trial Court s grant thereof must be struck down. Lufthansa German Airlines vs.
CA, et al., promulgated on April 21, 1995, inter alia ruled that: Actual or comp
ensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved and proved with rea
sonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or
guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent
proof that they have (been) suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereo
f. Its grant of moral and exemplary damages was justified by the Trial Court as
follows: Form the evidence presented, plaintiffs sufferings have been duly and
substantially proven by the defendant s fraudulent actuation and breach of warra
nty, and thereby entitled for the claim of damages and litigation costs as enunc
iated by the testimony of the plaintiff... that the damages to his house caused
sufferings and feelings of shock. helplessness, fears, embarrassment and anger,
thereby entitling him to Moral Damages which should be assessed at P500,000.00.
"The moral damages. . . . (are awarded) for indemnity or reparation not punishme
nt or correction, that is, an award to entitle the injured party to obtain means
(of) diversions and amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings
he has undergone by reason of defendant s culpable action. (RNB Surety and Ins.
Co. v. IAC, G.R No. 64515, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 745)." That MFC did in truth
act with bad faith, in flagrant breach of its express warranties made to the ge
neral public and in wanton disregard of the rights of the Del Rosarios who relie
d on those warranties, is adequately demonstrated by the recorded proofs. The la
w explicitly authorizes the award of moral damages "in breaches of contract wher
e the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith." 28 There being, moreover, s
atisfactory evidence of the psychological and mental trauma actually suffered by
the Del Rosarios, the grant to them of moral damages is warranted. Over a perio
d of about a month. they experienced "feelings of shock, helplessness, fear, emb
arrassment and
anger." 29 As declared by this Court in Makabili v. Court of Appeals, 30 among o
ther precedents: It is essential. . . . in the award of damages that the claiman
t must have satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of the factual
basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant s acts. This is so b
ecause moral damages though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the catego
ry of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered an
d not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer (Enervida v. De la Torre, 55 SCRA 340
[1974.] and are allowable only when specifically prayed for in the complaint. (
San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. Magno, 21 SCRA 292 [1968]) As reflected in the recor
ds of the case, the Court of Appeals was in agreement with the findings of the t
rial court that petitioners suffered anguish, embarrassment and mental suffering
s due to the failure of private respondent to perform its obligation to petition
ers. According to the Court of Appeals, private respondent acted in wanton disre
gard of the rights of petitioners. These pronouncements lay the basis and justif
ication for this Court to award petitioners moral and exemplary damages." This C
ourt also agrees with the Trial Court that exemplary damages are properly exigib
le of MFC, "Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such damages may be imp
osed by way of example or correction for the public good, While exemplary damage
s cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they need not be proved, although pl
aintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damage
s before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages
should be awarded." 31 "Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party o
r impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incent
ive to curb socially deleterious actions." However, the same statutory and juris
prudential standards just mentioned dictate reduction of the amounts of moral an
d exemplary damages fixed by the Trial Court. There is, to be sure, no hard and
fast rule for determining what would be a fair amount of moral (or exemplary) da
mages, each case having to be governed by its attendant particulars, Generally,
the amount of moral damages should be commensurate with the actual loss or injur
y suffered. In the case of PNB v. C.A, just cited, 33 this Court quoted with app
roval the following observation fromRCPI v. Rodriguez, viz.: . . . Nevertheless,
we find the award of P100,000.00 as moral damages in favor of respondent Rodrig
uez excessive and unconscionable. In the case of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transpo
rt System,Inc. (148 SCRA 440 [1987]) we said: ". . . [I]t is undisputed that the
trial courts are given discretion to determine the amount of moral damages (Alc
antara v. Surro, 93 Phil. 472) and that the Court of Appeals can only modify or
change the amount awarded when they are palpably and scandalously excessive "so
as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the
part of the trial court" (Gellada v. Warner Barnes & Co., Inc., 57 O.G. [4] 734
7, 7358; Sadie v. Bacharach Motors Co., Inc., 57 O.G. [4] 636 and Adone v. Bacha
rach Motor Co., Inc., 57 O.G. 656). But in more recent cases where the awards of
moral and exemplary damages are far too excessive compared to the actual loses
sustained by the aggrieved party, this Court ruled that they should be reduced t
o more reasonable amounts. In other words, the moral damages awarded must be com
mensurate with the loss or injury suffered.
In the same case (PNB v. CA), this Court 35 found the amount of exemplary damage
s required to be paid (P1,000,000.00) "too excessive" and reduced it to an "equi
table level" (P25,000.00). . . . (T)he award of P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages
is also far too excessive and should likewise be reduced to an equitable level.
Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but
to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially dele
terious actions. In another case involving strikingly analogous facts decided in
1994, Geraldez vs. CA., 36 where no actual damages were adjudicated but moral a
nd exemplary damages in similar amounts (P500.000.00 and P300,000.00, respective
ly) were awarded by the Trial Court, as in this case, this Court reduced the amo
unt of moral damages to P100,000.00 and of exemplary damages to P50,000.00. The
Court sees no reason to adopt a different treatment in the case at bar, and acco
rdingly reduces the moral damages from P500,000.00 to P100,000.00, and the exemp
lary damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00. Finally, like the adjudication of a
ctual or compensatory damages, the award of attorney s fees must be deleted. The
matter was dealt with only in the dispositive portion of the Trial Court s deci
sion. Since the judgment does not say why attorney s fees are awarded, there is
no basis for such award, which should consequently be removed. So did this Court
rule, for instance, in Scott Consultants and Resource Development Corp., Inc. v
s.CA, et al.: It is settled that the award of attorney s fees is the exception r
ather than the rule and counsel s fees are not to be awarded every time a party
wins. The power of the court to award attorney s fees under Article 2208 of the
Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot
be left to speculation or conjecture. Where granted. the court must explicitly
state in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion there
of, the legal reason for the award of attorney s fees. WHEREFORE, the challenged
Decision of the Court of Appeals of June 29, 1994 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE; an
d the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of November 18, 1991 is REINSTATED AN
D AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award of actual damages and attorney
s fees is deleted, and the moral and exemplary damages awarded are reduced from
P500,000.00 to P100,000.00, and from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00, respectively. 18
8. PHILIP S. YU VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Petitioner, the exclusive distributo
r of the House of Mayfair wallcovering products in the Philippines, cried foul w
hen his former dealer of the same goods, herein private respondent, purchased th
e merchandise from the House of Mayfair in England through FNF Trading in West G
ermany and sold said merchandise in the Philippines. Both the court of origin an
d the appellate court rejected petitioner s thesis that private respondent was e
ngaged in a sinister form of unfair competition within the context of Article 28
of the New Civil Code.
In the suit for injunction which petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Cour
t of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed at Manila, petitioner presse
d the idea that he was practically by-passed and that private respondent acted i
n concert with the FNF Trading in misleading Mayfair into believing that the goo
ds ordered by the trading firm were intended for shipment to Nigeria although th
ey were actually shipped to and sold in the Philippines. Private respondent prof
essed ignorance of the exclusive contract in favor of petitioner. Even then, pri
vate respondent responded by asserting that petitioner s understanding with Mayf
air is binding only between the parties thereto. ISSUE: Whether or not responden
t appellate court correctly agree with the lower court in disallowing the writ s
olicited by herein petitioner HELD: DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT: Resolving plain
tiff s motion embodied in the complaint for the issuance of a writ of preliminar
y injunction after hearing, but without prejudging the merits of the case, and f
inding from the evidences adduced by the plaintiff, that the terms and condition
s of the agency agreement, Exhibit "A-inj." between the plaintiff and The House
of Mayfair of England for the exclusive distributorship by the plaintiff of the
latter s goods, apertain to them; that there is no privity of contract between t
he plaintiff and the defendant; that the controversy in this case arose from a b
reach of contract by the FNF Trading of Germany, for having shipped goods it had
purchased from The House of Mayfair to the Philippines: that as shown in Exh. "
J-inj.", the House of Mayfair was demanding payment of 4,500.00 from the FNF Tra
ding for restitution of plaintiff s alleged loss on account of the shipment of t
he goods in question here in the Philippines and now in the possession of the de
fendant; it appears to the Court that to restrain the defendant from selling the
goods it has ordered from the FNF Trading of Germany, would be without legal ju
stification. WHEREFORE, the motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary inj
unction to restrain the defendant from selling the goods it has ordered from the
FNF Trading of Germany is hereby DENIED. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS : Acc
ording to the appellate court, petitioner was not able to demonstrate the unequi
vocal right which he sought to protect and that private respondent is a complete
strangervis-a-vis the covenant between petitioner and Mayfair. Apart from these
considerations, the reviewing authority noted that petitioner could be fully co
mpensated for the prejudice he suffered judging from the tenor of Mayfair s corr
espondence to FNF Trading wherein Mayfair took the cudgels for petitioner in see
king compensation for the latter s loss as a consequence of private respondent s
scheme DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: Did respondent appellate court correctly
agree with the lower court in disallowing the writ solicited by herein petitione
r? That the exclusive sales contract which links petitioner and the House of May
fair is solely the concern of the privies thereto and cannot thus extend its cha
in as to bind private respondent herein is, We believe, beside the point. Verily
, injunction is the appropriate remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with c
ontracts by strangersto such contracts where the legal remedy is insufficient an
d the resulting injury is irreparable (Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, 29 Phil. 542 [1915];
4-A Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1988 Ed., p. 90). The liability of private r
espondent, if any, does not emanate from the
four corners of the contract for undoubtedly, Unisia Merchandising Co., Inc. is
not a party thereto but its accountability is "an independent act generative of
civil liability" (Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 5
87 [1919]; 4 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1981 10th Ed., p. 4
39; 4 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, 1986 Ed., p.
439). These observations, however, do not in the least convey the message that W
e have placed the cart ahead of the horse, so to speak, by pronouncing private r
espondent s liability at this stage in view of the pendency of the main suit for
injunction below. We are simply rectifying certain misperceptions entertained b
y the appellate court as regards the feasibility of requesting a preliminary inj
unction to enjoin a stranger to an agreement. To Our mind, the right to perform
an exclusive distributorship agreement and to reap the profits resulting from su
ch performance are proprietary rights which a party may protect (30 Am. Jur. Sec
tion 19, pp. 71-72: Jurado, Comments and Jurisprudence on Obligations and Contra
cts, 1983 8th Rev. Ed., p. 336) which may otherwise not be diminished, nay, rend
ered illusory by the expedient act of utilizing or interposing a person or firm
to obtain goods from the supplier to defeat the very purpose for which the exclu
sive distributorship was conceptualized, at the expense of the sole authorized d
istributor (43 C.J.S. 597). Another circumstance which respondent court overlook
ed was petitioner s suggestion, which was not disputed by herein private respond
ent in its comment, that the House of Mayfair in England was duped into believin
g that the goods ordered through the FNF Trading were to be shipped to Nigeria o
nly, but the goods were actually sent to and sold in the Philippines. A ploy of
this character is akin to the scenario of a third person who induces a party to
renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract, thereby entitling the oth
er contracting party to relief therefrom (Article 1314, New Civil Code). The bre
ach caused by private respondent was even aggravated by the consequent diversion
of trade from the business of petitioner to that of private respondent caused b
y the latter s species of unfair competition as demonstrated no less by the sale
s effected inspite of this Court s restraining order. This brings Us to the irre
parable mischief which respondent court misappreciated when it refused to grant
the relief simply because of the observation that petitioner can be fully compen
sated for the damage. A contrario, the injury is irreparable where it is continu
ous and repeated since from its constant and frequent recurrence, no fair and re
asonable redress can be had therefor by petitioner insofar as his goodwill and b
usiness reputation as sole distributor are concerned. Withal, to expect petition
er to file a complaint for every sale effected by private respondent will certai
nly court multiplicity of suits (3 Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, 1985 Editi
on, p. 261). WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Cour
t of Appeals dated January 13, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 16019 and the Order dated
October 16, 1988 issued by the magistrate at the court of origin are hereby REVE
RSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be remanded to the court of origin for issuanc
e of a writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioner s posting of a bond in the
sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos to be approved by said court, to remai
n effective during the trial on the merits until final determination of the case
. The manager of private respondent. Frank Sia, is hereby ordered to pay to the
Clerk of Court within five (5) days from notice hereof the fine of P500.00, as p
reviously imposed on him, with a warning that failure to do so will be dealt wit
h more severely.
Upon issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the restraining order issue
d on March 13, 1989 by this Court shall be deemed automatically lifted. SO ORDER
ED. 189. SO PING BUN vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: SO In 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co,
through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered into lease agreements with l
essor Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI). Subjects of four (4) lease contracts wer
e premises located at Nos. 930, 930-Int., 924-B and 924-C, Soler Street, Binondo
, Manila. Tek Hua used the areas to store its textiles. The contracts each had a
one-year term. They provided that should the lessee continue to occupy the prem
ises after the term, the lease shall be on a month-to-month basis. When the cont
racts expired, the parties did not renew the contracts, but Tek Hua continued to
occupy the premises. In 1976, Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved. Later, the ori
ginal members of Tek Hua Trading Co. including Manuel C. Tiong, formed Tek Hua E
nterprising Corp., herein respondent corporation. So Pek Giok, managing partner
of Tek Hua Trading, died in 1986. So Pek Gioks grandson, petitioner So Ping Bun,
occupied the warehouse for his own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing. On
August 1, 1989, lessor DCCSI sent letters addressed to Tek Hua Enterprises, info
rming the latter of the 25% increase in rent effective September 1, 1989. The re
nt increase was later on reduced to 20% effective January 1, 1990, upon other le
ssees demand. Again on December 1, 1990, the lessor implemented a 30% rent incre
ase. Enclosed in these letters were new lease contracts for signing. DCCSI warne
d that failure of the lessee to accomplish the contracts shall be deemed as lack
of interest on the lessees part, and agreement to the termination of the lease.
Private respondents did not answer any of these letters. Still, the lease contr
acts were not rescinded. On March 1, 1991, private respondent Tiong sent a lette
r to petitioner, which reads as follows: March 1, 1991 Mr. So Ping Bun 930 Soler
Street Binondo, Manila Dear Mr. So, Due to my closed (sic) business associate (
sic) for three decades with your late grandfather Mr. So Pek Giok and late fathe
r, Mr. So Chong Bon, I allowed you temporarily to use the warehouse of Tek Hua E
nterprising Corp. for several years to generate your personal business. Since I
decided to go back into textile business, I need a warehouse immediately for my
stocks. Therefore, please be advised to vacate all your stocks in Tek Hua Enterp
rising Corp. Warehouse. You are hereby given 14 days to vacate the premises unle
ss you have good reasons that you have the right to stay. Otherwise, I will be c
onstrained to take measure to protect my interest.
Please give this urgent matter your preferential attention to avoid inconvenienc
e on your part. Very truly yours, (Sgd) Manuel C. TiongPresident Petitioner refu
sed to vacate. On March 4, 1992, petitioner requested formal contracts of lease
with DCCSI in favor Trendsetter Marketing. So Ping Bun claimed that after the de
ath of his grandfather, So Pek Giok, he had been occupying the premises for his
textile business and religiously paid rent. DCCSI acceded to petitioners request
. The lease contracts in favor of Trendsetter were executed. ISSUE: WHETHER THE
APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION FINDING SO PING BUN
GUILTY OF TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE OF CONTRACT? WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED
IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES OF P200,000.00 IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. HELD:
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT: After trial, the trial court ruled: WHEREFORE, jud
gment is rendered: 1. Annulling the four Contracts of Lease (Exhibits A, A-1 to
A-3, inclusive) all dated March 11, 1991, between defendant So Ping Bun, doing b
usiness under the name and style of Trendsetter Marketing, and defendant Dee C.
Chuan & Sons, Inc. over the premises located at Nos. 924-B, 924-C, 930 and 930,
Int., respectively, Soler Street, Binondo Manila; 2. Making permanent the writ o
f preliminary injunction issued by this Court on June 21, 1991; 3. Ordering defe
ndant So Ping Bun to pay the aggrieved party, plaintiff Tek Hua Enterprising Cor
poration, the sum of P500,000.00, for attorneys fees; 4. Dismissing the complain
t, insofar as plaintiff Manuel C. Tiong is concerned, and the respective counter
claims of the defendant; 5. Ordering defendant So Ping Bun to pay the costs of t
his lawsuit; This judgment is without prejudice to the rights of plaintiff Tek H
ua Enterprising Corporation and defendant Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. to negotiate
for the renewal of their lease contracts over the premises located at Nos. 930,
930-Int., 924-B and 924-C Soler Street, Binondo, Manila, under such terms and c
onditions as they agree upon, provided they are not contrary to law, public poli
cy, public order, and morals. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court. On motion for reconsideration, the appellate court modi
fied the decision by reducing the award of attorneys fees from five hundred thou
sand (P500,000.00) pesos to two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) pesos. DECISION O
F THE SUPREME COURT: The foregoing issues involve, essentially, the correct inte
rpretation of the applicable law on tortuous conduct, particularly unlawful inte
rference with contract. We have to begin, obviously, with certain fundamental pr
inciples on torts and damages. Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results f
rom injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damag
e suffered. 6 One becomes liable
in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another s interest in
the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other has property rights and
privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the invasio
n is substantial, (c) the defendant s conduct is a legal cause of the invasion,
and (d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and
actionable under general negligence rules. The elements of tort interference ar
e: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third per
son of the existence of contract; and (3) interference of the third person is wi
thout legal justification or excuse. A duty which the law of torts is concerned
with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may
be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person of the enjoyment by t
he other of his private property. This may pertain to a situation where a third
person induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract.
In the case before us, petitioner s Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execut
e lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent c
orporation of the latter s property right. Clearly, and as correctly viewed by t
he appellate court, the three elements of tort interference above-mentioned are
present in the instant case. Authorities debate on whether interference may be j
ustified where the defendant acts for the sole purpose of furthering his own fin
ancial or economic interest. One view is that, as a general rule, justification
for interfering with the business relations of another exists where the actor s
motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where his sole m
otive is to cause harm to the other. Added to this, some authorities believe tha
t it is not necessary that the interferer s interest outweigh that of the party
whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic interest
that is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious mo
tives are negatived, for he acts in self-protection. Moreover justification for
protecting one s financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison
of his economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. It is suffi
cient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather th
an in wrongful motives. As early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, we held that where ther
e was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one s
conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a pa
rty cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financiall
y interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that he
is an officious or malicious intermeddler. In the instant case, it is clear tha
t petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his ente
rprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though petitioner took interest
in the property of respondent corporation and benefited from it, nothing on rec
ord imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him. Sec. 1314 of the Civil
Code categorically provides also that, "Any third person who induces another to
violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party
." Petitioner argues that damage is an essential element of tort interference, a
nd since the trial court and the appellate court ruled that private
respondents were not entitled to actual, moral or exemplary damages, it follows
that he ought to be absolved of any liability, including attorney s fees. It is
true that the lower courts did not award damages, but this was only because the
extent of damages was not quantifiable. We had a similar situation in Gilchrist,
where it was difficult or impossible to determine the extent of damage and ther
e was nothing on record to serve as basis thereof. In that case we refrained fro
m awarding damages. We believe the same conclusion applies in this case. While w
e do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude i
nto existing contracts at the expense of others, however, we find that the condu
ct herein complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory aw
ard for damages in the absence of any malice. The business desire is there to ma
ke some gain to the detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice, howeve
r, precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability
for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The respondent
appellate court correctly confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification o
f the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding
damages. The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury caus
ed by petitioner s interference. Lastly, the recovery of attorney s fees in the
concept of actual or compensatory damages, is allowed under the circumstances pr
ovided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. One such occasion is when the defe
ndant s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third perso
ns or to incur expenses to protect his interest. But we have consistently held t
hat the award of considerable damages should have clear factual and legal bases.
In connection with attorney s fees, the award should be commensurate to the ben
efits that would have been derived from a favorable judgment. Settled is the rul
e that fairness of the award of damages by the trial court calls for appellate r
eview such that the award if far too excessive can be reduced. This ruling appli
es with equal force on the award of attorney s fees. In a long line of cases we
said, "It is not sound policy to place in penalty on the right to litigate. To c
ompel the defeated party to pay the fees of counsel for his successful opponent
would throw wide open the door of temptation to the opposing party and his couns
el to swell the fees to undue proportions." Considering that the respondent corp
oration s lease contract, at the time when the cause of action accrued, ran only
on a month-to-month basis whence before it was on a yearly basis, we find even
the reduced amount of attorney s fees ordered by the Court of Appeals still exor
bitant in the light of prevailing jurisprudence. Consequently, the amount of two
hundred thousand (P200,000.00) awarded by respondent appellate court should be
reduced to one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos as the reasonable award or a
ttorney s fees in favor of private respondent corporation. WHEREFORE, the petiti
on is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeal
s in CA-G.R. CV No. 38784 are hereby AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION that the award
of attorney s fees is reduced from two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) to one hun
dred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 190
. GARCIA vs. CORONA
FACTS: On November 5, 1997, this Court in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department o
f Energy and Lagman, et al., v. Hon.Ruben Torres, et al., 1 declared Republic Ac
t No. 8180, entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Ot
her Purposes", unconstitutional, and its implementing Executive Order No. 392 vo
id. R.A. 8180 was struck down as invalid because three key provisions intended t
o promote free competition were shown to achieve the opposite result. More speci
fically, this Court ruled that its provisions on tariff differential, stocking o
f inventories, and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition, encourage monopol
istic power, and interfere with the free interaction of the market forces. Congr
ess enacted Republic Act No. 8479, a new deregulation law without the offending
provisions of the earlier law. Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia, a member of Congres
s, has now brought this petition seeking to declare Section 19 thereof, which se
ts the time of full deregulation, unconstitutional. After failing in his attempt
s to have Congress incorporate in the law the economic theory he espouses, petit
ioner now asks us, in the name of upholding the Constitution, to undo a violatio
n which he claims Congress has committed. Petitioner contends that Section 19 of
R.A. 8479, which prescribes the period for the removal of price control on gaso
line and other finished products and for the full deregulation of the local down
stream oil industry, is patently contrary to public interest and therefore uncon
stitutional because within the short span of five months, the market is still do
minated and controlled by an oligopoly of the three (3) private respondents, nam
ely, Shell, Caltex and Petron. The objective of the petition is deceptively simp
le. It states that if the constitutional mandate against monopolies and combinat
ions in restraint of trade is to be obeyed, there should be indefinite and open-
ended price controls on gasoline and other oil products for as long as necessary
. This will allegedly prevent the "Big 3" Shell, Caltex and Petron from price-fi
xing and overpricing. Petitioner calls the indefinite retention of price control
s as "partial deregulation". The grounds relied upon in the petition are: A. Sec
. 19 OF R.A. NO. 8479 WHICH PROVIDES FOR FULL DEREGULATION FIVE (5) MONTHS OR EA
RLIER FOLLOWING THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE LAW, IS GLARINGLY PROOLIGOPOLY, ANTI-COMP
ETITION AND ANTI-PEOPLE, AND IS THEREFORE PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING IN
GROSS AND CYNICAL CONTRAVENTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY AND COMMAND EMBODI
ED IN ARTCLE XII, SECTION 19 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AGAINST MONOPOLIES AND COM
BINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE. B. SAID SECTION 19 OF R.A. No. 8479 IS GLARINGL
Y PRO-OLIGOPOLY, ANTICOMPETITION AND ANTI-PEOPLE, FOR THE FURTHER REASON THAT IT
PALPABLY AND CYNICALLY VIOLATES THE VERY OBJECTIVE AND PURPOSE OF R.A. NO. 8479
, WHICH IS TO ENSURE A TRULY COMPETITIVE MARKET UNDER A REGIME OF FAIR PRICES. C
. SAID SECTION 19 OF R.A. No. 8479, BEING GLARINGLY PRO-OLIGOPOLY, ANTICOMPETITI
ON AND ANTI-PEOPLE, BEING PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND BEING PALPABLY VIOLATIVE
OF THE LAW S POLICY AND PURPOSE OF ENSURING A TRULY COMPETITIVE MARKET UNDER A
REGIME OF FAIR PRICES, IS A VERY GRAVE AND
GRIEVOUS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH
ES OF GOVERNMENT. D. PREMATURE FULL DEREGULATION UNDER SECTION 19 OF R.A. NO. 84
79 MAY AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID EVEN AS THE REST OF ITS PR
OVISIONS REMAIN IN FORCE, SUCH AS THE TRANSITION PHASE OR PARTIAL DEREGULATION W
ITH PRICE CONTROLS THAT ENSURES THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST BY PREVENT
ING THE BIG 3 OLIGOPOLY S PRICE-FIXING AND OVERPRICING. ISSUE: The issue is the
timeliness or the wisdom of the date when full deregulation should be effective.
HELD: Our ruling in Tatad is categorical that the Constitution s Article XII, S
ection 19, is anti-trust in history and spirit. It espouses competition. We have
stated that only competition which is fair can release the creative forces of t
he market. We ruled that the principle which underlies the constitutional provis
ion is competition. Thus: Sec. 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust
in history and in spirit. It espouses competition. The desirability of competit
ion is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for
the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for regulation of unmiti
gated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of section 19, Ar
ticle XII of our Constitution which cannot be violated by R.A. No. 8180. We subs
cribe to the observation of Prof. Gellhorn that the objective of anti-trust law
is "to assure a competitive economy, based upon the belief that through competit
ion producers will strive to satisfy consumer wants at the lowest price with the
sacrifice of the fewest resources. Competition among producers allows consumers
to bid for goods and services, and thus matches their desires with society s op
portunity costs." He adds with appropriateness that there is a reliance upon "th
e operation of the "market" system (free enterprise) to decide what shall be pro
duced, how resources shall be allocated in the production process, and to whom t
he various products will be distributed. The market system relies on the consume
r to decide what and how much shall be produced, and on competition, among produ
cers to determine who will manufacture it." In his recital of the antecedent cir
cumstances, petitioner repeats in abbreviated form the factual findings and conc
lusions which led the Court to declare R.A. 8180 unconstitutional. The foreign o
ligopoly or cartel formed by respondents Shell, Caltex and Petron, their indulgi
ng in price-fixing and overpricing, their blockade tactics which effectively obs
tructed the entry of genuine competitors, the dangers posed by the oil cartel to
national security and economic development, and other prevailing sentiments are
stated as axiomatic truths. They are repeated in capsulized context as the curr
ent background facts of the present petition. The empirical existence of this de
plorable situation was precisely the reason why Congress enacted the oil deregul
ation law. The evils arising from conspiratorial acts of monopoly are recognized
as clear and present. But the enumeration of the evils by our Tatad decision wa
s not for the purpose of justifying continued government control, especially pri
ce control. The objective was, rather, the opposite. The evils were emphasized t
o show the need for free competition in a deregulated industry. And to be
sure, the measures to address these evils are for Congress to determine, but the
y have to meet the test of constitutional validity. The Court respects the legis
lative finding that deregulation is the policy answer to the problems. It bears
stressing that R.A. 8180 was declared invalid not because deregulation is uncons
titutional. The law was struck down because, as crafted, three key provisions pl
ainly encouraged the continued existence if not the proliferation of the constit
utionally proscribed evils of monopoly and restraint of trade. In sharp contrast
, the present petition lacks a factual foundation specifically highlighting the
need to declare the challenged provision unconstitutional. There is a dearth of
relevant, reliable, and substantial evidence to support petitioner s theory that
price control must continue even as Government is trying its best to get out of
regulating the oil industry. The facts of the petition are, in the main, a gene
ral dissertation on the evils of monopoly. Petitioner overlooks the fact that Co
ngress enacted the deregulation law exactly because of the monopoly evils he men
tions in his petition. Congress instituted the lifting of price controls in the
belief that free and fair competition was the best remedy against monopoly power
. In other words, petitioner s facts are also the reasons why Congress lifted pr
ice controls and why the President accelerated the process. The facts adduced in
favor of continued and indefinite price control are the same facts which suppor
ted what Congress believes is an exercise of wisdom and discretion when it chose
the path of speedy deregulation and rejected Congressman Garcia s economic theo
ry. The petition states that it is using the very thoughts and words of the Cour
t in its Tatad decision. Those thoughts and words, however, were directed agains
t the tariff differential, the inventory requirement, and predatory pricing, not
against deregulation as a policy and not against the lifting of price controls.
A dramatic, at times expansive and grandiloquent, reiteration of the same backg
round circumstances narrated inTatad does not squarely sustain petitioner s nove
l thesis that there can be deregulation without lifting price controls. Petition
er may call the industry subject to price controls as deregulated. In enacting t
he challenged provision, Congress, on the other hand, has declared that any indu
stry whose prices and profits are fixed by government authority remains a highly
regulated one. Petitioner, therefore, engages in a legal paradox. He fails to s
how how there can be deregulation while retaining government price control. Dere
gulation means the lifting of control, governance and direction through rule or
regulation. It means that the regulated industry is freed from the controls, gui
dance, and restrictions to which it used to be subjected. The use of the word "p
artial" to qualify deregulation is sugar-coating. Petitioner is really against d
eregulation at this time. Petitioner states that price control is good. He claim
s that it was the regulation of the importation of finished oil products which l
ed to the exit of competitors and the consolidation and dominion of the market b
y an oligopoly, not price control. Congress and the President think otherwise.
The argument that price control is not the villain in the intrusion and growth o
f monopoly appears to be pure theory not validated by experience. There can be n
o denying the fact that the evils mentioned in the petition arose while there wa
s price control. The dominance of the so-called "Big 3" became entrenched during
the regime of price control. More importantly, the ascertainment of the cause a
nd the method of dismantling the oligopoly thus created are a matter of legislat
ive and executive choice. The judicial process is equipped to handle legality bu
t not wisdom of choice and the efficacy of solutions. Petitioner engages in anot
her contradiction when he puts forward what he calls a selfevident truth. He sta
tes that a truly competitive market and fair prices cannot be legislated into ex
istence. However, the truly competitive market is not being created or fashioned
by the challenged legislation. The market is simply freed from legislative cont
rols and allowed to grow and develop free from government interference. R.A. 847
9 actually allows the free play of supply and demand to dictate prices. Petition
er wants a government official or board to continue performing this task. Indefi
nite and open-ended price control as advocated by petitioner would be to continu
e a regime of legislated regulation where free competition cannot possibly flour
ish. Control is the antithesis of competition. To grant the petition would mean
that the Government is not keen on allowing a free market to develop. Petitioner
s "self-evident truth" thus supports the validity of the provision of law he op
poses. New players in the oil industry intervened in this case. According to the
m, it is the free market policy and atmosphere of deregulation which attracted a
nd brought the new participants, themselves included, into the market. The inter
venors express their fear that this Court would overrule legislative policy and
replace it with petitioner s own legislative program. The factual allegations of
the intervenors have not been refuted and we see no reason to doubt them. Their
argument that the co-existence of many viable rivals create free market conditi
ons induces competition in product quality and performance and makes available t
o consumers an expanded range of choices cannot be seriously disputed. On the ot
her hand, the pleadings of public and private respondents both put forth the arg
ument that the challenged provision is a policy decision of Congress and that th
e wisdom of the provision is outside the authority of this Court to consider. We
agree. As we have ruled in Morfe v. Mutuc (I)t is well to remember that this Co
urt, in the language of Justice Laurel, "does not pass upon question or wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation." As expressed by Justice Tuason: "It is no
t the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bou
nds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislati
ve concern." There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justi
ce Montemayor: "As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the
Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wi
se or salutary." For they, according to Justice Labrador, "are not supposed to o
verride legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into the wisdom of the law." I
t is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commiss
ion on Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of
the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as
it ought to be: The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely all
ocated the respective
authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. The
re would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter l
eft to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its
own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last o
ffender should be the courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their
controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and p
rescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise in
sofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent, on its wisdom cannot
be sustained. In this petition, Congressman Garcia seeks to revive the long set
tled issue of the timeliness of full deregulation, which issue he had earlier su
bmitted to this Court by way of a Partial Motion for Reconsideration in the Tata
dcase. In our Resolution dated December 3, 1997, which has long become final and
executory, we stated: We shall first resolve petitioner Garcia s linchpin conte
ntion that the full deregulation decreed by R.A. No. 8180 to start at the end of
March 1997 is unconstitutional. For prescinding from this premise, petitioner s
uggests that "we simply go back to the transition period, price control will be
revived through the automatic pricing mechanism based on Singapore Posted Prices
. The Energy Regulatory Board . . . would play a limited and ministerial role of
computing the monthly price ceiling of each and every petroleum fuel product, u
sing the automatic pricing formula. While the OPSF would return, this coverage w
ould be limited to monthly price increases in excess of P0.50 per liter. We are
not impressed by petitioner Garcia s submission. Petitioner has no basis in cond
emning as unconstitutional per se the date fixed by Congress for the beginning o
f the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Our Decision merely faul
ted the Executive for factoring the depletion of OPSF in advancing the date of f
ull deregulation to February 1997. Nonetheless, the error of the Executive is no
w a non-issue for the full deregulation set by Congress itself at the end of Mar
ch 1997 has already come to pass. March 1997 is not an arbitrary date. By that d
ate, the transition period has ended and it was expected that the people would h
ave adjusted to the role of market forces in shaping the prices of petroleum and
its products. The choice of March 1997 as the date of full deregulation is a ju
dgment of Congress and its judgment call cannot be impugned by this Court. Reduc
ed to its basic arguments, it can be seen that the challenge in this petition is
not against the legality of deregulation. Petitioner does not expressly challen
ge deregulation. The issue, quite simply, is the timeliness or the wisdom of the
date when full deregulation should be effective. In this regard, what constitut
es reasonable time is not for judicial determination. Reasonable time involves t
he appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and ec
onomic. They are not within the appropriate range of evidence in a court of just
ice. It would be an extravagant extension of judicial authority to assert judici
al notice as the basis for the determination. We repeat that what petitioner dec
ries as unsuccessful is not a final result. It is only a beginning. The Court is
not inclined to stifle deregulation as enacted by Congress from its very start.
We leave alone the program of deregulation at this stage. Reasonable time will
prove the wisdom or folly of the deregulation program for which Congress and not
the Court is accountable.
Petitioner argues further that the public interest requires price controls while
the oligopoly exists, for that is the only way the public can be protected from
monopoly or oligopoly pricing. But is indefinite price control the only feasibl
e and legal way to enforce the constitutional mandate against oligopolies? Art.
186 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes as a felony the creation of
monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade. The Solicitor General, on the
other hand, cites provisions of R.A. 8479 intended to prevent competition from
being corrupted or manipulated. Section 11, entitled "Anti-Trust Safeguards", de
fines and prohibits cartelization and predatory pricing. It penalizes the person
s and officers involved with imprisonment of three (3) to seven (7) years and fi
nes ranging from One million to Two million pesos. For this purpose, a Joint Tas
k Force from the Department of Energy and Department of Justice is created under
Section 14 to investigate and order the prosecution of violations. Sec. 8 and 9
of the Act, meanwhile, direct the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Ind
ustry, and Energy to undertake strategies, incentives and benefits, including in
ternational information campaigns, tax holidays and various other agreements and
utilizations, to invite and encourage the entry of new participants. Section 6
provides for uniform tariffs at three percent (3%). Sec. 13 of the Act provides
for "Remedies", under which the filing of actions by government prosecutors and
the investigation of private complaints by the Task Force is provided. Sections
14 and 15 provide how the Department of Energy shall monitor and prevent the occ
urrence of collusive pricing in the industry. It can be seen, therefore, that in
stead of the price controls advocated by the petitioner, Congress has enacted an
ti-trust measures which it believes will promote free and fair competition. Upon
the other hand, the disciplined, determined, consistent and faithful execution
of the law is the function of the President. As stated by public respondents, th
e remedy against unreasonable price increases is not the nullification of Sectio
n 19 of R.A. 8479 but the setting into motion of its various other provisions. F
or this Court to declare unconstitutional the key provision around which the law
s antitrust measures are clustered would mean a constitutionally interdicted di
strust of the wisdom of Congress and of the determined exercise of executive pow
er. Having decided that deregulation is the policy to follow, Congress and the P
resident have the duty to set up the proper and effective machinery to ensure th
at it works. This is something which cannot be adjudicated into existence. This
Court is only an umpire of last resort whenever the Constitution or a law appear
s to have been violated. There is no showing of a constitutional violation in th
is case. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. II. 1. DAMAGES PEOPLE
vs. BALLESTEROS
FACTS: In the warm summer evening of May 28, 1991, Carmelo Agliam, his half-brot
her Eduardo Tolentino, Ronnel Tolentino, Vidal Agliam, his brother Jerry Agliam,
Robert Cacal, Raymundo Bangi and Marcial Barid converged at a carinderia owned
by Ronnel Tolentino at Ganayao, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte. They proceeded to the ba
rangay hall at Carusipan to attend a dance. The group did not tarry for long at
the dance because they sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and his companions
who were giving them dagger looks. In order to avoid trouble, especially during
the festivity, they decided to head for home instead of reacting to the perceive
d provocation of Galo and his companions. The group had barely left when, within
fifty meters from the dance hall, their owner jeep was fired upon from the rear
. Vidal Agliam was able to jump out from the eastern side of the "topdown" jeep
and landed just beside it. He scurried to the side of the road and hid in the ri
cefield. His younger brother Jerry also managed to jump out, but was shot in the
stomach and died. Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino sustained i
njuries in the right foot, back of the right thigh, and legs and thighs, respect
ively. The stunned Eduardo Tolentino was not even able to move from his seat and
was hit with a bullet which punctured his right kidney. He did not survive. The
precipitate attack upon the jeep left two people dead and four others injury. A
ll pleaded not guilty. Paraffin tests conducted on Galo and Ballesteros produced
positive results. Bulusan was not tested for nitrates. In his testimony, Galo c
laimed that he did not even talk to Bulusan or any of his companions at the bask
etball court, as alleged by the complainants. Having been found with gunpowder r
esidue in his hands, Galo attempted to exculpate himself from the results by con
fessing that he had been a cigarette smoker for the past ten years and had, in f
act, just consumed eight cigarette sticks prior to the test. He further asserted
that paraffin tests are not infallible, and that his hand may have been contami
nated by a nitrogenous compound, the source of which is urine. Lastly, he said t
hat he was not even present at the crime scene when the firing incident took pla
ce; hence, he could not have been one of those who strafed the jeep. For his par
t, Ballesteros interposed the defense of alibi, narrating to the court that, on
May 28, 1991, at around 7:00 o clock in the evening, he went to a nearby store t
o purchase some cigarettes. He returned home within thirty minutes and cleaned h
is garlic bulbs before retiring at 9:00 o clock. The next morning, he busied him
self with some chores, which included fertilizing his pepper plants with sulfate
. He handled the fertilizers without gloves. To counter the finding of traces of
nitrates on his left hand, Ballesteros maintained that he uses his left hand in
lighting cigarettes, as it was very painful for him to use his right hand. He l
ikewise informed the trial court that he had no motive to kill the victims. Bulu
san echoed the defense of alibi of Galo and Ballesteros, stating that he saw onl
y Galo on the evening of the dance but did not talk to him. He denied joining th
e two later that night because after the dance, he went straight to the house of
Michael Viloria, where he spent the night he went to work at 7:00 o clock in th
e morning of the following day ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court is correct
in finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Whether or not the
award of damages is correct
HELD: DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT: the Regional Trial Court of Bangui, Ilocos No
rte, Branch 19, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qu
alified by treachery, as charged under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, to wit: WHEREFORE, the Court finds the three accused guilty beyond rea
sonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged, defined and penaliz
ed under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and applying Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code hereby sentences them toreclusion perpetua, with
all the accessory penalties provided by law, and further sentencing them to pay
jointly and solidarily 1. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), moral damages in the amount of TWEN
TY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), and actual damages in the amount of THIRTY FIVE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE PESOS (P35,755.00), with interest; 2. The heir
s of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr., compensatory damages in the amount of FIFT
Y THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), moral damages in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PE
SOS (P20,000.00), and actual damages in the total amount of SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND S
EVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE PESOS (P61,785.00), with interest; 3. Carmelo Agliam, a
ctual damages in the amount of TWO THOUSAND AND THREE PESOS AND FORTY CENTAVOS (
P2,003.40), and moral damages in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00),
with interest; 4. Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino, moral dam
ages in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) each, with interest. 5. Th
e costs. The accused shall be credited in the service of their sentence the full
time during which they had undergone preventive imprisonment, if they agreed vo
luntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convic
ted prisoners, otherwise, they shall be credited in the service thereof with onl
y four-fifths of the time during which they had undergone preventive imprisonmen
t. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT We answer in the affirmative. Accused-appellant
s insist that the trial court erred in finding that Carmelo and Vidal Agliam rec
ognized them as the assailants. This claim is unmeritorious. In their testimonie
s, Carmelo and Vidal Agliam both described the area to be well illumined by the
moon. The shooting took place on a small road in the mountainous terrains of Ilo
cos Norte, where the air is free from darkening elements and turbidity. It being
a summer evening, there could not have been any fog to becloud the atmosphere a
nd hamper the vision of the victims, which would have prevented them from clearl
y seeing their assailants. They pinpointed the location of the malefactors to be
approximately three meters from where they stood. Considering the luminescence
of the moon and the proximity between them, the victims could distinctly identif
y their assailants. It must be noted that Carmelo was acquainted with Galo and h
is brother, a butcher, since he used to deal with them in his business of buying
and selling cattle. Bulusan was a classmate of Vidal at Cadaratan School. Gener
ally, people in rural communities know each other both by face and name. Bulusan
and Agliam were, not only townmates, but former classmates as well. The constan
t interaction between them through the years would
necessarily lead to familiarity with each other such that, at the very least, on
e would have been able to recognize the other easily. That accused-appellants ha
d no motive in perpetrating the offense is irrelevant. A distinction is herein t
imely made between motive and intent. Motive is the moving power which impels on
e to action for a definite result. Intent, on the other hand, is the purpose to
use a particular means to effect such result. Motive alone is not proof of a cri
me. In order to tip the scales in its favor, intent and not motive must be estab
lished by the prosecution. Motive is hardly ever an essential element of a crime
. A man driven by extreme moral perversion may be led to commit a crime, without
a real motive but a just for the sake of committing it. Along the same line, a
man who commits a crime with an apparent motive may produce different results, f
or which he is punished. As held in a line of cases, the rule is well-settled th
at the prosecution need not prove motive on the part of the accused when the lat
ter has been positively identified as the author of the crime. Lack or absence o
f motive for committing the crime does not preclude conviction thereof where the
re were reliable witnesses who fully and satisfactorily identified the accused a
s the perpetrator of the felony. Accused-appellant s attempt to offer wild excus
es regarding the source of the gunpowder traces found on their hands is futile.
Experts confirm the possibility that cigarettes, fertilizers and urine may leave
traces of nitrates, but these are minimal and, unlike those found in gunpowder,
may be washed off with tap water. The hackneyed defense of alibi interposed by
accused-appellants must likewise fail. As consistently enunciated by this Court,
the established doctrine is that, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accu
sed must prove, not only that he was at some other place at the time of the comm
ission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. This accused-appellants fai
led to satisfactorily prove. On the night of May 28, 1991, Galo and Bulusan atte
nded the dance at the barangay hall. After the dance, they went their separate w
ays but remained within the barangay. Galo lingered in the premises. Bulusan sle
pt over at the house of Michael Viloria, which was within walking distance from
the dance hall. The defense of alibi must be established by positive, clear and
satisfactorily evidence, the reason being that it is easily manufactured and usu
ally so unreliable that it can rarely be given credence. This is especially true
in case of positive identification of the culprit by reliable witnesses, which
renders their alibis worthless. Positive identification prevails over denials an
d alibis. Accused-appellants are under the common misconception that proof beyon
d reasonable doubt requires total freedom from any quantum of doubt. This is not
so. Under Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, (p)roof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, p
roduces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Absolute certainty of g
uilt is not demanded by law to convict a person of a criminal charge. The doubt
to the benefit of which an accused is entitled in a criminal trial is a reasonab
le doubt, not a whimsical or fanciful doubt based on imagined but wholly improba
ble possibilities and unsupported by evidence. Reasonable doubt is that engender
ed by an investigation of the whole proof and inability, after such
investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. A precise
example would be the uncorroborated alibi of accused in the case at bar where ac
cusedappellants individually interposed the wavering defense of alibi. Galo fail
ed to elucidate on his whereabouts after the dance, whereas Bulusan claimed to h
ave slept in the house of one Michael Viloria. Ballesteros attested that he was
not at the dance hall at all. None of them, however, attempted to corroborate th
eir alibi through the testimony of witnesses. In fact, they never attempted to p
resent as witnesses those who would have testified to having seen them elsewhere
on the night in question. Had they done so, the presentation of corroborative t
estimony would have reenforced their defense of alibi. As held in People vs. Lig
otan, an alibi must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested wi
tnesses, and where such defense is not corroborated, it is fatal to the accused.
The Court correctly ruled in finding that the offense was qualified by treacher
y. Under Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, "(t)here is treache
ry when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person employing mean
s, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially t
o insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which th
e offended party might make." The requisites of treachery are twofold: (1) (t)ha
t at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself
; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or
form of attack employed by him. As regards the second requisite, the accused mus
t make some preparation to kill his victim in such a manner at to insure the exe
cution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to
defend himself or retaliate. There must be evidence that such form of attack was
purposely adopted by the accused. Here, it is obvious that the accusedappellant
s had sufficient opportunity to reflect on their heinous plan. The facts show th
at the attack was well-planned and not merely a result of the impulsiveness of t
he offenders. Manifestations of their evil designs were already apparent as earl
y as the time of the dance. They were well-armed and approached the homebound vi
ctims, totally unaware of their presence, from behind. There was no opportunity
for the latter to defend themselves, the attack being so sudden and Eduardo Tole
ntino was shot right where he sat. The trial court was also correct in the award
of damages to the heirs of the victims. Damages may be defined as the pecuniary
compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherw
ise expressed, the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach o
f some duty or the violation of some right. Actual or compensatory damages are t
hose awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained,
whereas moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has experienced menta
l anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so forth, and ha
d furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offender s wrong
ful act or omission. In granting actual or compensatory damages, the party makin
g a claim for such must present the best evidence available, viz., receipts, vou
chers, and the like, as corroborated by his testimony. Here, the claim for actua
l damages by the heirs of the victims is not controverted, the same having been
fully substantiated by receipts accumulated by them and presented to the court.
Therefore, the award of actual damages is proper. However, the order granting co
mpensatory damages to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. must b
e amended. Consistent with the policy of this Court, the amount of fifty thousan
d pesos (P50,000.00) is given to the heirs of the victims by way of indemnity, a
nd not as compensatory damages. As regards moral damages, the amount of psycholo
gical pain, damage and
injury caused to the heirs of the victims, although inestimable, may be determin
ed by the trial court in its discretion. Hence, we see no reason to disturb its
findings as to this matter. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appeale
d from is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. No pronouncement as to costs. SO OR
DERED. 1. BARITUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: The facts show that on June 26, 19
89 private respondent Roy R. Domingo, represented by his attorney-in-fact, Crisp
in A. Domingo, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Resales, Pangasin
an a complaint against petitioner Jose Baritua as owner and operator of the J.B.
Bus Lines. Private respondent sought to recover actual and exemplary damages af
ter a bus owned by petitioner rammed private respondent s car along the Maharlik
a Highway, Sto. Tomas, Batangas on January 19, 1988. In his complaint, private r
espondent alleged that: 1. He is a Filipino, of legal age, married and a residen
t of Poblacion Resales, Pangasinan before he went to the United States where he
now lives at 4525 Leata Lane, La Cantada LA 91011. He is being represented by hi
s attorney-in-fact Crispin A. Domingo, a Filipino, of legal age, married and res
ident of No. 47 Yale St., Cubao, Quezon City. Defendant is also a Filipino, of l
egal age, married and doing business under the business name "J.B. Bus Lines" wi
th business address at Tramo Street, Pasay City where said defendant could be se
rved summons. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint for improper venue. He a
lleged that since private respondent was not a resident of the Philippines, the
complaint should be filed in the place where petitioner, the defendant, resides
which is in Gubat, Sorsogon. Petitioner claims that: A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPE
ALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PE
TITION DESPITE PETITIONER S OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE THAT THE VENUE OF PRIVATE RESP
ONDENT S ACTION (CIVIL CASE NO. 915-R) WAS IMPROPERLY LAID; B. INSPITE ALSO OF T
HE ADMITTED FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT ROY DOMINGO HAS REMAINED AN ACTUAL RESI
DENT OF 4525 LEATA LANE, LA CANTADA, LA 91011, U.S.A., AT LEAST SINCE FEBRUARY 1
8, 1988, UP TO THE PRESENT. ISSUE: Whether private respondent had his actual res
idence in Rosales, Pangasinan or in Los, Angeles, California at the time the com
plaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Resales, Pangasinan HELD: DE
CISION OF THE TRIAL COURT: The trial court denied the motion to dismiss after fi
nding that private respondent was merely temporarily out of the country and did
not lose his legal residence in Rosales, Pangasinan
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COU
RT: It is undisputed that private respondent left for the United States on April
25, 1988 before the complaint was filed on June 26, 1989. This fact is expressl
y admitted in the complaint itself where private respondent states that he "is [
sic] . . . a resident of Poblacion Rosales, Pangasinan before he went to the Uni
ted States where he now lives in 4525 Leata Lane, La Cantada, LA 91011." Further
more, the special power of attorney in favor of Crispin A. Domingo was drawn and
executed by private respondent on February 18, 1988 before the Philippine Consu
l in Los Angeles, California. In said special power of attorney, private respond
ent declared that he was a resident of Los Angeles, California. Private responde
nt was not a mere transient or occasional resident of the United States. He fixe
d his place of abode in Los Angeles, California and stayed there continuously an
d consistently for over a year at the time the complaint was filed in Rosales, P
angasinan. Contrary to the lower courts finding, the temporary nature of privat
e respondent s "working non-immigrant" visa did not make him a non-resident of t
he United States. There is no showing as to the date his temporary employment in
the United States ended. There is likewise no showing, much less any allegation
, that after the filing of the complaint, private respondent actually returned t
o the Philippines and resumed residence in Rosales, Pangasinan. In fact, petitio
ner s claim that private respondent resided in the United States continuously an
d consistently since 1988 until the present has not been refuted. We previously
held that: We are fully convinced that private respondent Coloma s protestations
of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his manifested intention to
return there after the retirement of his wife from government service to justify
his bringing of an action for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Iloco
s Norte, is entirely of no moment since what is of paramount importance is where
he actually resided or where he may be found at the time he brought the action,
to comply substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of
Court, on venue of personal actions. It is fundamental that the situs for bringi
ng real and personal civil actions is fixed by the rules to attain the greatest
convenience possible to parties litigants and their witnesses by affording them
maximum accessibility to the courts of justice. The choice of venue is given to
the plaintiff but is not left to his caprice. It cannot unduly deprive a residen
t defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court. When the com
plaint was filed in Rosales, Pangasinan, not one of the parties was a resident o
f the town. Private respondent was a resident of Los Angeles, California while h
is attorney-in-fact was a resident of Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioner s "business
address" according to private respondent is in Pasay City, although petitioner
claims he resides in Gubat, Sorsogon The venue in Rosales, Pangasinan was indeed
improperly laid. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and the decision of t
he Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20737 is reversed and set aside. The compl
aint in Civil Case No. 915-R is dismissed for improper venue. No costs. SO ORDER
ED.
2. HEIRS OF SIMEON BORLADO vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: The records show that pla
intiffs-appellants (petitioners) are the heirs of Simeon Borlado whose parents w
ere Serapio Borlado and Balbina Bulan. The original owner of the lot in question
, Lot No. 2097 of the Pontevedra Cadastre, Maayon, Capiz, was Serapio Borlado, g
randfather of petitioners. On 15 April 1942, Serapio sold the lot to Francisco B
acero for Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00). After the death of Francisco on 26 Febr
uary 1948, his widow Amparo Dionisio Vda. de Bacero, in her capacity as legal gu
ardian of her minor children, namely: Nicolas, Valentin and Luzviminda, all surn
amed Bacero and forced heirs of Francisco Bacero sold it (the lot) to the Spouse
s Bienvenido Bulan and Salvacion Borbon, through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 2
7 August 1954 Upon the execution of the Deed of Sale and even prior thereto, act
ual possession of Lot No. 2057 was with the vendees-spouses Bulans in view of a
loan obtained by Francisco Bacero from them in December 1947. Exercising their r
ight of ownership under the Deed of Sale, Salvacion Borbon Vda. de Bulan declare
d the lot in her name in 1900 for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 22
32 Salvacion and her co-defendantsappellees possession of the lot was continuou
s, peaceful, uninterrupted, adverse and exclusive until November 4, 1972, when p
etitioners forcibly entered and wrested physical possession thereof from them. O
n 23 November 1972, respondents filed with the Municipal Court of Maayon, Capiz
a complaint for ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. A-1, against petitioners. T
he ejectment case was decided in favor of the respondents whereby the petitioner
s, their agents, tenants, privies and members of their families were ordered to
vacate Lot No. 2079 and deliver possession to the respondents together with all
improvements and standing crops; to pay said respondents One Hundred (100) cavan
s of palay annually from 1972 to the present or in the total amount of One Thous
and One Hundred (1,100) cavans of palay; and to pay the sum of Five Thousand (P5
,000.00) Pesos as reimbursement for the amount respondents had paid their lawyer
to protect their rights; and, the costs of suit (Exh. "57", pp. 256-261, id.).
Instead of appealing the adverse decision to the Court of First Instance (now RT
C), on 8 November 1983, petitioners filed the present case with the Regional Tri
al Court, Branch 18, Roxas City, docketed as Civil Case No. V-4887. ISSUE: The i
ssue raised is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents wer
e the owners of the lot in question. HELD: DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT: This cas
e was dismissed for lack of cause of action in a decision, the decretal portion
of which was quoted earlier. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: the Court of Appe
als affirming the decision of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered dismissing plaintiffs complaint for lack of ca
use of action and ordering as vacated the restraining order and writ of prelimin
ary injunction issued in this case; and "1. Plaintiffs to be jointly and solidar
ily liable to defendants the quantity of one hundred (100) cavans of palay every
year from 1972 until plaintiffs vacate the premises of the land in question; "2
. Declaring defendants as owner of the land and entitled to possession; "3. Orde
ring plaintiffs to pay defendants the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney s fees and th
e sum of P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and "4. To pay the costs of the suit.
"SO ORDERED. "Roxas City, Philippines, March 18, 1988. "(Sgd.) JONAS A. ABELLAR
"Judge" DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: We deny the petition. The issue is factu
al. In an appeal via certiorari, we may not review the findings of fact of the C
ourt of Appeals. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not revi
ewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the exceptions to the r
ule. Petitioner failed to prove that the case falls within the exceptions. The S
upreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is not our function to review, examine
and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented. A question
of fact would arise in such event. Questions of fact cannot be raised in an appe
al via certiorari before the Supreme Court and are not proper for its considerat
ion. Nevertheless, as a matter of law, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
erred in holding petitioners liable to pay respondents one hundred (100) cavans
of palay every year from 1972 until they vacate the premises of the land in ques
tion. The one hundred cavans of palay was awarded as a form of damages. We canno
t sustain the award. "Palay" is not legal tender currency in the Philippines. El
Fallo del Tribunal WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the dec
ision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 18980 with modification that pet
itioners liability to pay respondents one hundred (100) cavans of palay every y
ear from 1972 until petitioners vacate the land in question is deleted, for lack
of basis. No costs. SO ORDERED. 3. CUSTODIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Respond
ents owned a parcel of land wherein a two-door apartment was erected. Said prope
rty was surrounded by other immovables owned by petitioners, spouses Custodio an
d spouses Santos. As an access to P. Burgos Street from the subject property, th
ere are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one mete
r wide and is about 20 meters distant from Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street.
Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses.
The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabas
as residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said pas
sageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 mete
rs in length, has to be traversed. Petitioners constructed an adobe fence in the
first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constr
ucted by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first
passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said
fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. As a result, the te
nants left the apartment because there was no longer a permanent access to the p
ublic street. Respondents then filed an action for the grant of an easement of r
ight of way. The trial court ordered the petitioner to give respondents a perman
ent access to the public street and that in turn, the respondent will pay a sum
of Php 8,000.00 to the petitioner as an indemnity for the permanent use of the p
assageway. On appeal by the respondent to the CA, the decision of the trial cour
t was affirmed, such that a right of way and an award of actual, moral and exemp
lary damages were given to the respondents. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether
or not the award of damages is proper? HELD: DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT: the t
rial court, with this dispositive part: Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered
as follows: 1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff per
manent access ingress and egress, to the public street; 2) Ordering the plaintif
f to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,0
00) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. The parties to shoulde
r their respective litigation expenses DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS : On Jul
y 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner s motion for reconsideration.6
Petitioners then took the present recourse to us, raising two issues, namely, w
hether or not the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper,
and whether or not the award of damages is in order. DECISION OF THE SUPREME CO
URT: With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from
raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a q
uo granting private respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be
satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of th
e trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of
way has already been laid to rest. For failure to appeal the decision of the tr
ial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain any affirmative rel
ief other than those granted in the decision of the trial court. That decision o
f the court below has become final as against them and can no longer be reviewed
, much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whene
ver an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed
may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what
was granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee can only advance an
y argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the appellant s claim or to upho
ld the decision
that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if such is require
d to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. These assigned errors, i
n turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed
decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or modifying th
e judgment in the appellee s favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs. How
ever, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court
of Appeals erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The award
of damages has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Cou
rt of Appeals will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact t
hat the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unre
alized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the clo
sure of the passageway. However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losse
s does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of d
amages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage
, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages
are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong
. There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the ille
gal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results f
rom the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the d
amage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in w
hich the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These s
ituations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may
maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish tha
t such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the p
laintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by th
e person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the p
remise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must
first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach
before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should
be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering.
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which
cause damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other p
erson, and consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, t
he consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no re
medy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury o
r wrong. In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act caus
ing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnu
m et injuria. If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage,
that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal in
jury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the dam
age is regarded as damnum absque injuria. In the case at bar, although there was
damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents
, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right
. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of
the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites con
cur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There wa
s damage or injury to the plaintiff. The act of petitioners in constructing a fe
nce within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not con
trary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner
the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those
established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose
and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very
owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, liv
e or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constitu
ted thereon." At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subj
ect to any servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private
respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents ha
d no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision o
f the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after paymen
t of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents
the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and impo
sed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said
right. Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over th
eir property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which th
ey may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right. To repeat,
whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by rea
son of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria
. A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, acc
ording to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually a
pplied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done
by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such
acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damag
e or loss is damnum absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use thereof
in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fenci
ng or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been inj
ured, because the incovenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere
consequence of community life. The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot con
stitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the act may result
in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may use any lawfu
l means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause da
mage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter s favor. An injury or d
amage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redres
s for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to a
chieve a lawful means. WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises
, the appealed decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SE
T ASIDE and the judgment of the trial court is correspondingly REINSTATED. Cases
186-190, 1, 1-3
PUBLICO, LOVELI ANNE B. 4. PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB, vs. BONIFACIO FACTS: This is
a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals relieving respondent
s from the civil liability ascribed to them by the trial court. In a race held a
t the Sta. Ana Hippodrome belonging to the Philippine Racing Club, Inc. on July
23, 1950, the competing horses went off to a faulty start. When the winning hors
es as well as the corresponding dividends were announced, the betting public sho
wed its disapproval of the result. A commotion resulted which reached the knowle
dge of the members of the Commission on Races who were then seated in the dining
room of the club. When they noticed the uproar and were informed of its cause,
they sent for the stewards and made an on the spot investigation. Convinced that
the start of the race was faulty, they decided to cancel it and had their decis
ion announced to the public. In the meantime, while the investigation was going
on, the holders of the winning the tickets were able to cash the same at the tic
ket windows. The result was that while the club paid the dividends on the winnin
g tickets it had to refund to the holders of the losing ones the sum of P5,032.0
0. ISSUE: The remaining question, therefore, that needs to be determined is whet
her the action of the Board of Stewards in not cancelling the race notwithstandi
ng the bad start which raised a howl of protest from the public was final and ir
revocable in the sense that it could no longer be revised by the Commission on R
aces in the exercise of the power of supervision it has over all horse races in
the Philippines. HELD: The law governing the operation of horse races in the Phi
lippines is Republic Act No. 309. This Act creates a Commission on Races which i
s charged with the supervision and regulation of horse races in the Philippines.
Under said Act, the Commission is charged with the supervision and regulation o
f horse races in the Philippines. Under said Act, the Commission is charged with
the duty to enforce the laws, rules and regulations relating to horse races, to
require that race tracks be properly constructed and maintained, and in general
, "it shall have supervision over all race track or racing club officials or emp
loyees authorized or required to be appointed under this Act and over all horse
races" (Section 2). The Commission may also exercise such other powers as may be
prescribed by law or regulation (Section 2). We are, therefore, of the opinion
that the action taken by the Commission on Races cancelling or annulling the rac
e held on July 23, 1950 for the reason that there was a faulty start on the part
of some horses was in excess of the authority granted to it by law. It is true,
as already stated, that the Commission on Races has the supervision over all ho
rse races and over all race officials and employees having connection with their
operations, but such power of supervision cannot be extended to functions which
belong to other officials as delimited by law. As defined by this Court, superv
ision only means overseeing or the power or authority to see that subordinate of
ficers perform their duties. It is different from control which includes the pow
er to alter, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer may do in the perfo
rmance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the superior for
that of his subordinate (Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz., [6] 2
884). This power of control has been withheld from the Commission.
However, considering that respondents have acted in their official capacity in t
he honest belief that they had such power as in fact they acted on the matter on
ly after an on the spot investigation, we hold that they cannot be held liable f
or damages. In this sense, the decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirm
ed. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs. 5. AUYONG
HIAN vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS FACTS: Motion for reconsideration filed by respond
ent Consolidated Tobacco Industries of the Philippines, Inc. (CTIP) of the decis
ion in this case promulgated on September 12, 1974 insofar only as said decision
refrains from ruling on the matter of the refund to said respondent of the stor
age charges alleged to have been advanced by it in order to secure the release o
f the tobacco sold to it at the public auction sale thereof after having been se
ized and confiscated by the government, the same having been illegally imported,
as ruled in the very decision in this case, and directs that said matter be pro
secuted administratively. It is prayed that such directive be withdrawn and that
the Court itself decide the issue of whether or not movant is entitled to said
refund. ISSUE: whether or not movant is entitled to said refund. HELD: The Gover
nment contends also that it would not be equitable to make the Bureau of Customs
hable for the refund demanded by movant, since the auction sale netted only P1.
5 M, whereas if the importation were allowed in 1961, the Government would have
realized not less than P3 M. The argument is not persuasive, if only because the
Court has precisely found the importation to be illegal We cannot see how any c
onsideration of inequity can be predicated on the hypothesis that something judi
cially declared illegal was legal Quite the other way around, the stand of the G
overnment is what appears to be inequitable, for whereas, the amount of P1.5 M p
aid by movant fully covers all the items enumerated in Section 2605, including t
he amount paid by movant for private storage fees, still the Government refuses
to refund movant, notwithstanding that the provisions just cited expressly ordai
ns that the said amount for storage fees is deductible from the accepted bid pri
ce. In effect, the Government is trying to unjustly enrich itself at the expense
of movant. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of this Court in the abov
e-entitled case of September 12, 1974 is hereby modified only in the sense that
the administrative remedy therein suggested for the refund of storage fees above
discussed is hereby declared unnecessary and the Collector of Customs and/or th
e Commissioner of Customs are hereby ordered to refund to movant Consolidated To
bacco Industries of the Philippines, Inc. CTIP the amount of Eight Hundred Twent
y-Three Thousand Seven Hundred SixtyEight Pesos and Twenty Centavos (P823,768.20
) paid by said movant to Luzon Stevedoring Corporation on September 13, 1967, wi
thout interest. In all other respects, the said decision stands. 6. FAROLAN vs.
SOLMAC MARKETING CORPORATION FACTS: Private respondent Solmac Marketing Corporat
ion is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. I
t was the assignee, transferee, and
owner of an importation of Clojus Recycling Plastic Products of 202,204 kilogram
s of what is technically known as polypropylene film, valued at US$69,250.05. Th
e subject importation, consisting of seventeen (17) containers, arrived in Decem
ber, 1981. Upon application for entry, the Bureau of Customs asked SOLMAC for it
s authority from any government agency to import the goods described in the bill
of lading. SOLMAC presented a Board of Investment (BOI) authority for polypropy
lene film scrap. However, upon examination of the shipment by the National Insti
tute of Science and Technology (NIST), it turned out that the fibers of the impo
rtation were oriented in such a way that the materials were stronger than OPP fi
lm scrap. In other words, the Clojus shipment was not OPP film scrap, as declare
d by the assignee SOLMAC to the Bureau of Customs and BOI Governor Lilia R. Baut
ista, but oriented polypropylene the importation of which is restricted, if not
prohibited, under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 658-B. Considering that the s
hipment was different from what had been authorized by the BOI and by law, petit
ioners Parayno and Farolan withheld the release of the subject importation. ISSU
E: whether or not the petitioners acted in good faith in not immediately releasi
ng the questioned importation, or, simply, can they be held liable, in their per
sonal and private capacities, for damages to the private respondent. HELD: When
a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds himself to perform the dutie
s of his office faithfully and to use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act
primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of his duties,
he is to use that prudence, caution, and attention which careful men use in the
management of their affairs. In the case at bar, prudence dictated that petition
ers first obtain from the BOI the latter s definite guidelines regarding the dis
position of the various importations of oriented polypropylene (OPP) and polypro
pylene (PP) then being withheld at the Bureau of Customs. These cellophane/film
products were competing with locally manufactured polypropylene and oriented pol
ypropylene as raw materials which were then already sufficient to meet local dem
ands, hence, their importation was restricted, if not prohibited under LOI 658-B
. Consequently, the petitioners can not be said to have acted in bad faith in no
t immediately releasing the import goods without first obtaining the necessary c
larificatory guidelines from the BOI. As public officers, the petitioners had th
e duty to see to it that the law they were tasked to implement, was faithfully c
omplied with. Whatever damage they may have caused as a result of such an errone
ous interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria.
Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not actionable absent any c
lear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to
bad faith. After all, "even under the law of public officers, the acts of the p
etitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith. Petition GRANTED. 7.
SABA VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Pedro de la Cruz is a grantee of a lease of a p
ortion of marshy land in Laoang, Northern Samar awarded to him by the Bureau of
Lands under Miscellaneous Lease Application No. 810 for 2,050 square meters. The
award of lease was granted in 1934 (TSN, Nov. 8, 1976, p. 5). The award of leas
e to Pedro de la Cruz was not presented in court but its existence was not dispu
ted by the parties. In 1939, Gregoria Nalazon, wife of Pedro de la Cruz, died an
d the estate became the subject of an intestate estate proceeding in Special Pro
ceedings No. 2 of the CFI of Laoang, Northern Samar. The
leasehold (MLA No. 810) was included in this special proceeding wherein 50% ther
eof was adjudicated pro-indiviso to Pedro de la Cruz while the other 50% was adj
udicated pro-indiviso to the children, namely: Jesus, Alfredo, Lourdes, Amada, J
osefa, Genaro, Eufemio and Ramon, all surnamed de la Cruz. The improvements intr
oduced by Pedro de la Cruz consisted of rock fillings and three warehouses. In 1
953, private respondent Jose Ongchuan leased the warehouse from Pedro de la Cruz
(Exhibit K). In 1959 or so, the seven children of Pedro de la Cruz, namely: Jesus
, Alfredo, Amada, Josefa, Genaro, Eufemio and Ramon, all surnamed de la Cruz sol
d their leasehold rights (7/8 of the 50% of MLA 810) to private respondent Emil
Ong, while Lourdes C. Agbayani sold her leasehold right (1/8) pro-indiviso to pe
titioner Isidro V. Saba in March 1966 (Exhibit J). In 1961, the warehouse which wa
s being leased by private respondent Jose Ongchuan was levelled to the ground by
fire (TSN, May 18, 1976, p. 13). After the fire, private respondent Emil Ong co
nstructed a new building on the same area formerly occupied by the burned wareho
use (TSN, March 25, 1983, p. 3). Later, Lourdes C. Agbayani sent a letter to pri
vate respondents notifying them of the sale of her 1/8 share in the leasehold to
petitioner and requested that payment of rentals be given to the new owner inst
ead of her. Private respondents did not heed the request. Petitioner reiterated
the demand of Lourdes C. Agbayani several times yet private respondents ignored
said demand. ISSUE: whether or not (1) petitioner has a cause of action against
private respondents and (2) the award of damages is proper. HELD: As aforestated
, the award of lease was granted to Pedro de la Cruz in 1934. The Secretary of A
griculture and Commerce set the maximum period of his lease at fifteen (15) year
s (Exhibit 16). Therefore, the period of lease was up to 1949 only. There is no ev
idence on record of renewal of the term of the lease. Evidently, when Lourdes C.
Agbayani sold her leasehold right (1/8) pro-indiviso to petitioner in 1966, there
was no longer a leasehold right that she conveyed. Corollarily, petitioner did
not acquire any right from her that can be enforced against the private responde
nts or anybody for that matter. In this regard, the affirmance of the dismissal
of the complaint was correct. Moral damages may be awarded to compensate one for
diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feeling
s and social humiliation. It is however not enough that such injuries have arise
n; it is essential that they have sprung from a wrongful act or omission, fraud,
malice, or bad faith which was the proximate cause thereof (see Guita v. Court
of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 60409, November 11, 1985, 139 SCRA 576 cited in Sua
rio v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 50459, August 25, 1989;
R & B Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R.
No. 64515, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 736). The adverse result of an action does n
ot per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to make payment of dama
ges, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litiga
te (Rubio v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 50911, March 12, 1986, 141 SCRA
488). One who exercises his rights does no injury. Qui jure suo utitur nullum da
mnum facit. If damage results from a persons exercising his legal rights, it is d
amnumabsque injuria (Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-287
82, September 12, 1974, 59 SCRA 110 cited in The Ilocos Norte Electric Company v
. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 53401, November 6, 1989). Petitioner w
as in good faith when he filed the collection suit against private respondents.
He thought that by virtue of the sale of Lourdes C. Agbayanis leasehold
right to him (Exhibit J), her right to 1/8 pro-indiviso of the property has alread
y been transferred to him, which includes the right to collect rentals. Lourdes
C. Agbayani even notified the private respondents that the property being rented
by them has been sold to petitioner and effective April 1, 1966, petitioner bec
ame the proprietor of her property (Exhibit N). The failure by private respondents
to pay the rentals prompted petitioner to file a complaint against them. A pers
on may have erred but error alone is not a ground for moral damages (Lagman, et
al. v. Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 72281, October 2
8, 1988, 166 SCRA 734). And although cases were previously filed one after anoth
er by petitioner against private respondents, no evidence was adduced that these
cases were baseless and intended merely to harass private respondents. The acts
performed by petitioner cannot be said to have disparaged the reputation of pri
vate respondents (see Litam v. Espiritu, et al., 100 Phil. 364). Lastly, whateve
r worries, anxieties and expenses private respondents may have suffered were onl
y such as are usually caused to a party haled into court as a defendant in a lit
igation (see Philippine National Bank v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. L-45770, March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA 433). Clearly, there is no sufficient jus
tification for the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
We find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by petitioner, being e
xtraneous to the present case. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTE
D. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is MODIFIED insofar as the aw
ard of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees is concerned, which is
DELETED. 8. SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: T
he plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon sit
uated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. Said pro
perty may be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defend
ants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of reference, on the left side
, going to plaintiffs property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of def
endants Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Sant
os and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant Rosa
lina Morato and then a Septic Tank (Exhibit D). As an access to P. Burgos Street f
rom plaintiffs property, there are two possible passageways. The first passagewa
y is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasas r
esidence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously men
tioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and lengt
h from plaintiff Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In
passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic
tank and with 5-6 meters in length has to be traversed. Sometime in February, 19
82. one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to
see the premises, he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first p
assageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by
defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passagew
ay. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in
such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed (Exhibit 1-Santoses and Custo
dios, Exh. D for plaintiff, Exhs. 1-C, 1-D and I -E) And it was then that the rema
enants of said apartment vacated the area.
ISSUE:1.) whether or not the grant of right of way to herein private respondents
is proper, and 2.) whether or not the award of damages is in order. HELD: With
respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising t
he same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo grantin
g private respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied
with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial co
urt as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has a
lready been laid to rest. However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered los
ses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of
damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by th
e defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without dama
ge, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damage
s are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wro
ng. There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the il
legal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results
from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in
which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff ma
y maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish t
hat such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by
the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the
premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there mus
t first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that brea
ch before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there shoul
d be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and sufferin
g). WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed deci
sion of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the jud
gment of the trial court is correspondingly REINSTATED. 9. CASTRO vs. ACRO TAXIC
AB CO., INC. FACTS: This a petition for certiorari and habeas corpus, the pertin
ent facts, as disclosed by the record, are as follows: 1. That petitioner-appell
ant had been originally accused, on May 17, 1945, in the municipal court of the
City of Manila, of the crime of qualified theft of eight (8) cases of storage ba
tteries of the total value of P40. Said petitioner had been released on bail sin
ce May 15, 1945. 2. At the trial of the case, a witness for the prosecution test
ified that the value of said storage batteries, which were not produced in court
, could have been P240, and not P40, as alleged in the information. ISSUE: wheth
er or not, under existing law, the municipal court of the City of Manila has jur
isdiction to try cases of qualified theft, when the value of the property allege
d to have been stolen is P40, or does not exceed P200.
HELD: That the municipal court of the City of Manila has jurisdiction to try cas
es of qualified theft, as long as the amount involved does not exceed P200, is a
question which has been settled, in the affirmative by this Court, in several c
ases, because it is the value of the property stolen, and not the punishment tha
t may be meted out, that has been made the basis of jurisdiction (People vs. De
Leon, 49 Phil. 437; People vs. Kaw Liong, 57 Phil. 839, 841, 842; People vs. Ach
a, 40 O.G. 2d Supp., No. 5, p. 252; People vs. Del Mundo, SC-G. R. No. 46531, Oc
t. 18, 1939; People vs. San Juan, 40 O.G. 6th Supp., No. 10, p. 48). (See also 2
Moran, Rules of Court, pp. 763, 764.) Petitioner-appellant also contends that,
as there is evidence that the value of the property stolen could have been P240,
and not P40, as alleged in the information, the municipal court of the City of
Manila had no jurisdiction to try and decide this case. As already stated, the r
espondent municipal judge found herein petitioner-appellant guilty of the crime
of qualified theft, as charged, impliedly and evidently finding that the value o
f the stolen property was P40, as alleged in the information, after considering
the facts and circumstances of the case, using its own discretion (U. S. vs. Gal
anco, 11 Phil. 575); as the testimony given by the witness concerning the value
of the stolen property is not binding upon the courts. Furthermore, said finding
made by the respondent municipal judge is more properly reviewable in an appeal
than in a certiorari petition. The petition is dismissed. 10. PNOC SHIPPING AND
TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: M/V Maria Efigenia XV, o
wned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, collided with the
vessel Petro parcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corpor
ation (LSC).- After investigation was conducted by the Board of Marine Inquiry,
Philippine Coast Guard Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro rendered a decision findin
g the Petro parcel at fault. Based on this finding by the Board and after unsucc
essful demands on petitioner private respondent sued the LSC and the Petro parce
l captain, Edgardo Doruelo, before the then CFI of Caloocan City. In particular,
private respondent prayed for an award of P692,680.00,allegedly representing th
e value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV
. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, PNOC Shipping and Transport Corpor
ation sought to besubstituted in place of LSC as it had already acquired ownersh
ip of the Petro parcel.Private respondent later sought the amendment of its comp
laint on the ground that the original complaint failed to plead for the recovery
of the lost value of the hull of M/V Maria Efigenia XV. Accordingly, in the ame
nded complaint, private respondent averred that M/V Maria Efigenia XV had an act
ual value of P800,000.00 and that, after deducting the insurance payment of P200
,000.00, the amount of P600,000.00should likewise be claimed. Furthermore, on ac
count of the sinking of the vessel, private respondent supposedly incurred unrea
lized profits and lost business opportunities that would thereafter be proven.-
The lower court its decision in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P6,438,0
48.00 representing the value of the fishing boat with interest from the date of
the filing of the complaint at the rate of 6% per annum. HELD: Under Article 219
9 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfa
ction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed
from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has be
en done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In
actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural
and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. There are two ki
nds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already
possesses (dao emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit t
hat which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). Thus: "Where goods are de
stroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant the plaintiff is entitled to their
value at the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he w
ould have to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar goods, plus
in a proper case damages for the loss of use during the period before replacemen
t. In other words, in the case of profit-earning chattels, what has to be assess
ed is the value of the chattel to its owner as a going concern at the time and p
lace of the loss, and this means, at least in the case of ships, that regard mus
t be had to existing and pending engagements. If the market value of the ship re
flects the fact that it is in any case virtually certain of profitable employmen
t, then nothing can be added to that value in respect of charters actually lost,
for to do so would be pro tanto to compensate the plaintiff twice over. On the
other hand, if the ship is valued without reference to its actual future engagem
ents and only in the light of its profit-earning potentiality, then it may be ne
cessary to add to the value thus assessed the anticipated profit on a charter or
other engagement which it was unable to fulfill. What the court has to ascertai
n in each case is the
capitalized value of the vessel as a profit-earning machi
ne not in the abstract but in view of the actual circumstances, without, of cou
rse, taking into account considerations which were too remote at the time of the
loss." - Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation arising from law, cont
racts, quasicontracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or
in every case where property right has been invaded.[Arts. 2222 & 1157, Civil Co
de.] Under Article 2223 of the Civil Code, "(t)he adjudication of nominal damage
s shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory quest
ions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns.
" 11. INTEGRATED PACKAGING CORP vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Plaintiff Lydia Cuba
is a grantee of a Fishpond Lease Agreement. She obtained loans from DBP. As sec
urity for said loans, plaintiff Lydia P. Cuba executed two Deeds of Assignment o
f her Leasehold Rights.- Plaintiff failed to pay her loan. Without foreclosure p
roceedings, DBP appropriated the leasehold Rights of Cuba over the fishpond in q
uestion. After which defendant DBP, in turn, executed a Deed of Conditional Sale
of the Leasehold Rights in favor Cuba over the same fishpond.- In the negotiati
on for repurchase, plaintiff Lydia Cuba addressed two letters to the Manager DBP
, Dagupan City thereafter accepted the offer to repurchase in a letter addressed
to CUBA.- After the Deed of Conditional Sale was executed in favor of Cuba, a n
ew Fishpond Lease Agreement was issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food .
- Cuba failed to pay the amortizations stipulated in the Deed of Conditional Sal
e. After which she entered with the DBP a temporary arrangement whereby inconsid
eration for the deferment of the Notarial Rescission of Deed of Conditional Sale
, Cuba promised to make certain payments as stated in temporary Arrangement.- DB
P thereafter sent a Notice of Rescission thru Notarial Act and which was receive
d by Cuba. After the Notice of Rescission, DBP took possession of the Leasehold
Rights of the fishpond in question;That after defendant DBP took possession of t
he Leasehold Rights over the fishpond in
question, DBP thereafter executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of Caperal
.Thereafter, Caperal was awarded Fishpond Lease Agreement by the Ministry of Agr
iculture and Food.- CUBA filed complaint questioning the act of DBP in appropria
ting to itself CUBA s leasehold rights over the fishpond in question without for
eclosure proceedings. TC ruled in favor of petitioner and granted actual damages
in the amount of P1,067,500 representing lost equipment and dead fish due to DB
Ps forecloseure of fishpond and ejectment of laborers.- CA regarding damages gran
ted ruled that CUBA was not entitled to loss of profits for lack of evidence, bu
t agreed with the trial court as to the actual damages of P1,067,500. It, howeve
r, deleted the amount of exemplary damages and reduced the award of moral damage
s from P100,000 to P50,000 and attorney s fees, from P100.00 to P50,000 ISSUE: W
ON the damages granted to CUBA are valid HELD: NO- Article 2199 provides:Except
as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensatio
n only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compe
nsation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages- Actual or compensatory
damages cannot be presumed, but must be proved with reasonable degree of certai
nty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fa
ct and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have be
en suffered by the injured party and on the best obtainable evidence of the actu
al amount thereof.- In the present case, the trial court awarded in favor of CUB
A P1,067,500 as actual damages consisting of P550,000 which represented the valu
e of the alleged lost articles of CUBA and P517,500 which represented the value
of the 230,000 pieces of bangus allegedly stocked in 1979 when DBP first ejected
CUBA from the fishpond and the adjoining house.- We find that the alleged loss
of personal belongings and equipment was not proved by clear evidence. Other tha
n the testimony of CUBA and her caretaker, there was no proof as to the existenc
e of those items before DBP took over the fishpond in question. As pointed out b
y DBP, there was no "inventory of the alleged lost items before the loss which i
s normal in a project which sometimes, if not most often, is left to the care of
other persons." Neither was a single receipt or record of acquisition presented
.- in her complaint dated 17 May 1985, CUBA included "losses of property" as amo
ng the damages resulting from DBP s take-over of the fishpond. Yet, it was only
in September 1985 when she came to know of the alleged loss of several articles.
Such claim for "losses of property," having been made before knowledge of the a
lleged actual loss, was therefore speculative. The alleged loss could have been
a mere afterthought or subterfuge to justify her claim for actual damages With r
egard to the award of P517,000 representing the value of the alleged 230,000 pie
ces of bangus which died when DBP took possession of the fishpond in March 1979,
the same was not called for. Such loss was not duly proved; besides, the claim
there for was delayed unreasonably. From 1979 until after the filingof her compl
aint in court in May 1985, CUBA did not bring to the attention of DBP the allege
d loss- The award of actual damages should, therefore, bestruck down for lack of
sufficient basis.- In view however, of DBP s act of appropriating CUBA s leaseh
old rights which was contrary to law and public policy, as well as its false rep
resentation to the then Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources that it ha
d "foreclosed the mortgage," an award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000-
Exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of P25,000 should likewise be awa
rded by way of example or correction for the public good. 20 There being an awar
d of exemplary damages, attorney s fees are also recoverable.
12. KIERULF vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS - About 7:45 pm, 28 Feb 1987: a Pantranco
bus was traveling along EDSA from Congressional Avenue towards Clover Leaf, Bal
intawak. Before it reached the corner of Oliveros Drive, the driver lost control
of the bus, causing it to swerve to the left, and then to flyover the center is
land occupying the east-bound lane of EDSA. The front of the bus bumped the fron
t portion of an Isuzu pickup driven by Porfirio Legaspi, which wasmoving along C
ongressional Avenue heading towards Roosevelt Avenue.- As a result, the points o
f contact of both vehicles were damaged and physical injuries were inflicted on
Legaspi and his passenger Lucila Kierulf. The bus also hit and injured a pedestr
ian who was then crossing EDSA.- Despite the impact, said bus continued to move
forward and its front portion rammed against a Caltex gasoline station, damaging
its building and gasoline dispensing equipment.- As a consequence of the incide
nt, Lucila sufferedinjuries which required major surgeries and prolonged treatme
nt by specialists. Legaspi also suffered injuries. The front portion of the pick
up truck, owned by Spouses Kierulf was smashed to pieces. (cost of repair estima
ted at P107,583.50.)- The victims of the vehicular mishap pray for an increase i
n the award of damages, over and above those granted by the appellate court. Vic
tor, husband of Lucila, claims compensation/damages for the loss of his right to
marital consortium which, according to him, has been diminished due to the disf
igurement suffered by his wife.- Pantranco asks for exoneration by invoking an a
lleged fortuitous event as the cause of the mishap. They say that while bus driv
en by Jose Malanum was cruising along EDSA, a used engine differential accidenta
lly and suddenly dropped from a junk truck in front of the bus. Said differentia
l hit the under chassis of the bus, throwing Malanum off his seat and making him
lose control of said bus. The bus swerved to the left, hit the center island, a
nd bumped the pickup of the spouses. ISSUES: 1. WON the bus driver was negligent
and such negligence (and not a fortuitous event) was the proximate cause of the
accident 2. WON Victors claim for deprivation of the right to marital consortium
as a factor for the award of moral damages is proper 3. WON social and financia
l standing of Lucila can be considered in awarding moral damages 4. WON exemplar
y damages should be awarded 5. WON loss of earnings may be a component of damage
s in this case 6. WON the 10% reduction of the estimated actual damages on the p
ickup was proper HELD: 1. Negligence and proximate cause are factual issues whic
h SC can not pass upon in the absence of conflict between the findings of the tr
ial court and the CA. 2. NO- For lack of factual basis, such claim of deprivatio
n of the right to consortium cannot be ruled upon by this Court at this time.- P
etitioners cited a California case, Rodriguez vs .Bethlehem Steel Corporation as
authority for the claim of damages by reason of loss of marital consortium, i.e
. loss of conjugal fellowship and sexual relations. In the Rodriguez case ,it wa
s ruled that when a person is injured to the extent that he/she is no longer cap
able of giving love, affection, comfort and sexual relations to his or her spous
e, that spouse has suffered a direct and real personal loss. The loss is immedia
te and consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable; it is personal to
the spouse and separate and distinct from that of the injured person.- Whether R
odriguez may be cited as authority to support the award of moral damages to Vict
or &/or Lucila Kierulf for "loss of consortium" cannot be properly considered in
this case. Victor s claim, although argued before CA, is not supported by the e
vidence on record. 3. NO- The social and financial standing of a claimant of mor
al damages may be considered in awarding moral damages only if he or she was sub
jected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender s knowledge of his or her so
cial and financial standing. - But, it is still proper to award moral damages to
Lucila for her physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and
wounded feelings. She sustained multiple injuries on the scalp, limbs and ribs.
She lost all her teeth. She had to undergo several corrective operations and tr
eatments. She suffered sleepless nights and shock as a consequence of the vehicu
lar accident. And it has taken 10yrs to prosecute the complaint and this appeal!
4. YES- in view of CAs finding of gross negligence on the part of Pantranco: "Pu
blic utility operators like the defendant, have made a mockery of our laws, rule
s and regulations governing operations of motor vehicles and have ignored either
deliberately or through negligent disregard of their duties to exercise extraor
dinary degree of diligence for the safety of the travelling public and their pas
sengers."-Batangas Transportation Company vs. Caguimbal: "it is high time to imp
ress effectively upon public utility operators the nature and extent of their re
sponsibility in respect of the safety of their passengers and their duty to exer
cise greater care in the selection of drivers. Exemplary damages are designed to
permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences,
and its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of
an offender. However, it cannot be recovered as a matter of right. It is based e
ntirely on the discretion of the court. 5. For Lucila, NO.- CA already considere
d this when it stated that the award of P25k included compensation for "mental a
nguish and emotional strain of not earning anything with a family to support."-
Lucila s claim of loss of earning capacity has not been duly proven with ITRs. T
he alleged loss must be established by factual evidence for it partakes of actua
l damages. A party is entitled to adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss
actually suffered and duly proved. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not onl
y be capable of proof, but must actually be shown with a reasonable degree of ce
rtainty.- For Legaspi, YES. Pantranco failed to rebut the claim of Legaspi that
he had been incapacitated for 10months and that during said period he did not ha
ve any income. 6. YES- SC takes judicial notice of the propensity of motor repai
r shops to exaggerate their estimates. An estimate is not an actual expense incu
rred or to be incurred in the repair. The reduction made by respondent court is
reasonable considering that in this instance such estimate was secured by the co
mplainants themselves Cases 4-12 BARONA, SHERIELYN 13. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE P
HILIPPINES, vs.COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: On July 20, 1981, herein petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (
DBP) executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale" in favor of respondent spouses Celebrada
and Abner Mangubat over a parcel of unregistered land .On June 8, 1964, Luciano
Sarmiento sold the land to Pacifico Chica.On April 27, 1965, Pacifico Chica mor
tgaged the land to DBP to secure a loan of P6,000.00. However, he defaulted in t
he payment of the loan, hence DBP caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mo
rtgage. Pacifico Chica failed to redeem the property, and DBP consolidated its o
wnership over the same.On October 14, 1980, respondent spouses offered to buy th
e property for P18,599.99. DBP made a counter-offer of P25,500.00 which was acce
pted by respondent spouses. The parties further agreed that payment was to be ma
de within six months thereafter for it to be considered as cash payment. On July
20, 1981, the deed of absolute sale, which is now being assailed herein, was ex
ecuted by DBP in favor of respondent spouses. Said document contained a waiver o
f the seller s warranty against eviction. Thereafter, respondent spouses applied
for an industrial tree planting loan with DBP. The latter required the former t
o submit a certification from the Bureau of Forest Development that the land is
alienable and disposable. However, on October 29, 1981, said office issued a cer
tificate attesting to the fact that the said property was classified as timberla
nd, hence not subject to disposition. The loan application of respondent spouses
was nevertheless eventually approved by DBP in the sum of P140,000.00, despite
the aforesaid certification of the bureau, on the understanding of the parties t
hat DBP would work for the release of the land by the former Ministry of Natural
Resources. To secure payment of the loan, respondent spouses executed a real es
tate mortgage over the land on March 17, 1982, which document was registered in
the Registry of Deeds pursuant to Act No. 3344.The loan was then released to res
pondent spouses on a staggered basis. After a substantial sum of P118,540.00 had
been received by private respondents, they asked for the release of the remaini
ng amount of the loan. It does not appear that their request was acted upon by D
BP, ostensibly because the release of the land from the then Ministry of Natural
Resources had not been obtained.On July 7, 1983, respondent spouses, as plainti
ffs, filed a complaint against DBP in the trial court 4 seeking the annulment of
the subject deed of absolute sale on the ground that the object thereof was ver
ified to be timberland and, therefore, is in law an inalienable part of the publ
ic domain. They also alleged that petitioner, as defendant therein, acted fraudu
lently and in bad faith by misrepresenting itself as the absolute owner of the l
and and in incorporating the waiver of warranty against eviction in the deed of
sale. RULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS -On May 25, 1990, the tria
l court rendered judgment annulling the subject deed of absolute sale and orderi
ng DBP to return the P25,500.00 purchase price, plus interest; to reimburse to r
espondent spouses the taxes paid by them, the cost of the relocation survey, inc
idental expenses and other damages in the amount of P50,000.00; and to further p
ay them attorney s fees and litigation expenses in the amount of P10,000.00, and
the costs of suit. -As substantially stated at the outset, respondent Court of
Appeals rendered judgment modifying the disposition of the court below by deleti
ng the award for damages, attorney s fees, litigation expenses and the costs, bu
t affirming the same in all its other aspects. 9 On April 7, 1993, said appellat
e court also denied petitioner s motion for reconsideration. ISSUES BEFORE THE S
UPREME COURT
1. Whether or not private respondent spouses Celebrada and Abner Mangubat should
be ordered to pay petitioner DBP their loan obligation due under the mortgage c
ontract executed between them and DBP; and 2. Whether or not petitioner should r
eimburse respondent spouses the purchase price of the property and the amount of
P11,980.00 for taxes and expenses for the relocation Survey. RULING OF THE SUPR
EME COURT: Considering that neither party questioned the legality and correctnes
s of the judgment of the court a quo, as affirmed by respondent court, ordering
the annulment of the deed of absolute sale, such decreed nullification of the do
cument has already achieved finality. We only needThe Court of Appeals, after an
extensive discussion, found that there had been no bad faith on the part of eit
her party, and this r, therefore, to dwell on the effects of that declaration of
nullity.emains uncontroverted as a fact in the case at bar. Correspondingly, re
spondent court correctly applied the rule that if both parties have no fault or
are not guilty, the restoration of what was given by each of them to the other i
s consequently in order. This is because the declaration of nullity of a contrac
t which is void ab initio operates to restore things to the state and condition
in which they were found before the execution thereof. We also find ample suppor
t for said propositions in American jurisprudence. The effect of an application
of the aforequoted rule with respect to the right of a party to recover the amou
nt given as consideration has been passed upon in the case of Leather Manufactur
ers National Bank vs. Merchants National Bank where it was held that: "Whenever
money is paid upon the representation of the receiver that he has either a certa
in title in property transferred in consideration of the payment or a certain au
thority to receive the money paid, when in fact he has no such title or authorit
y, then, although there be no fraud or intentional misrepresentation on his part
, yet there is no consideration for the payment, the money remains, in equity an
d good conscience, the property of the payer and may be recovered back by him."T
herefore, the purchaser is entitled to recover the money paid by him where the c
ontract is set aside by reason of the mutual material mistake of the parties as
to the identity or quantity of the land sold. And where a purchaser recovers the
purchase money from a vendor who fails or refuses to deliver the title, he is e
ntitled as a general rule to interest on the money paid from the time of payment
. A contract which the law denounces as void is necessarily no contract whatever
, and the acts of the parties in an effort to create one can in no wise bring ab
out a change of their legal status. The parties and the subject matter of the co
ntract remain in all particulars just as they did before any act was performed i
n relation thereto. An action for money had and received lies to recover back mo
ney paid on a contract, the consideration of which has failed. As a general rule
, if one buys the land of another, to which the latter is supposed to have a goo
d title, and, in consequence of facts unknown alike to both parties, he has no t
itle at all, equity will cancel the transaction and cause the purchase money to
be restored to the buyer, putting both parties in status quo.Thus, on both local
and foreign legal principles, the return by DBP to respondent spouses of the pu
rchase price, plus corresponding interest thereon, is ineluctably called for. Pe
titioner likewise contends that the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals
erred in ordering the reimbursement of taxes and the cost of the relocation surv
ey, there being no factual or legal basis therefor. It argues that private respo
ndents merely submitted a "list of damages" allegedly incurred by them, and not
official receipts of expenses for taxes and said survey. Furthermore, the same l
ist has allegedly not been identified or even presented at any stage of the proc
eedings, since it was vigorously objected to by DBP.Contrary to the claim of pet
itioner, the list of damages was presented in the trial court and was correspond
ingly marked as "Exhibit
P." The said exhibit was, thereafter, admitted by the trial court but only as pa
rt of the testimonial evidence for private respondents, as stated in its Order d
ated August 16, 1988. However, despite that admission of the said list of damage
s as evidence, we agree with petitioner that the same cannot constitute sufficie
nt legal basis for an award of P4,000.00 and P7,980.00 as reimbursement for land
taxes and expenses for the relocation survey, respectively. The list of damages
was prepared extrajudicially by respondent spouses by themselves without any su
pporting receipts as bases thereof or to substantiate the same. That list, per s
e, is necessarily self-serving and, on that account, should have been declared i
nadmissible in evidence as the factum probans.In order that damages may be recov
ered, the best evidence obtainable by the injured party must be presented. Actua
l or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved, and so pr
oved with a reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend up
on competent proof that they have been suffered and on evidence of the actual am
ount thereof. If the proof is flimsy and unsubstantial, no damages will be award
ed. Turning now to the issue of whether or not private respondents should be mad
e to pay petitioner their loan obligation amounting to P118,540.00, we answer in
the affirmative.In its legal context, the contract of loan executed between the
parties is entirely different and discrete from the deed of sale they entered i
nto. The annulment of the sale will not have an effect on the existence and dema
ndability of the loan. One who has received money as a loan is bound to pay to t
he creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.The fact that the annul
ment of the sale will also result in the invalidity of the mortgage does not hav
e an effect on the validity and efficacy of the principal obligation, for even a
n obligation that is unsupported by any security of the debtor may also be enfor
ced by means of an ordinary action. Where a mortgage is not valid, as where it i
s executed by one who is not the owner of the property, or the consideration of
the contract is simulated or false, the principal obligation which it guarantees
is not thereby rendered null and void. That obligation matures and becomes dema
ndable in accordance with the stipulations pertaining to it. Under the foregoing
circumstances, what is lost is only the right to foreclose the mortgage as a sp
ecial remedy for satisfying or settling the indebtedness which is the principal
obligation. In case of nullity, the mortgage deed remains as evidence or proof o
f a personal obligation of the debtor, and the amount due to the creditor may be
enforced in an ordinary personal action. It was likewise incorrect for the Cour
t of Appeals to deny the claim of petitioner for payment of the loan on the grou
nd that it failed to present the promissory note therefor. While respondent cour
t also made the concession that its judgment was accordingly without prejudice t
o the filing by petitioner of a separate action for the collection of that amoun
t, this does not detract from the adverse effects of that erroneous ruling on th
e proper course of action in this case.The fact is that a reading of the mortgag
e contract executed by respondent spouses in favor of petitioner, dated March 17
, 1982, will readily show that it embodies not only the mortgage but the complet
e terms and conditions of the loan agreement as well. The provisions of said con
tract, specifically paragraphs 16 and 28 thereof, are so precise and clear as to
thereby render unnecessary the introduction of the promissory note which would
merely serve the same purpose. Furthermore, respondent Celebrada Mangubat expres
sly acknowledged in her testimony that she and her husband are indebted to petit
ioner in the amount of P118,000.00, more or less. Admissions made by the parties
in the pleadings or in the
course of the trial or other proceedings do not require proof and can not be con
tradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake. Th
us, the mortgage contract which embodies the terms and conditions of the loan ob
ligation of respondent spouses, as well as respondent Celebrada Mangubat s admis
sion in open court, are more than adequate evidence to sustain petitioner s clai
m for payment of private respondents aforestated indebtedness and for the adjud
ication of DBP s claim therefor in the very same action now before us.It is also
worth noting that the adjustment and allowance of petitioner s demand by counte
rclaim or set-off in the present action, rather than by another independent acti
on, is favored or encouraged by law. Such a practice serves to avoid circuitry o
f action, multiplicity of suits, inconvenience, expense, and unwarranted consump
tion of the time of the court. The trend of judicial decisions is toward a liber
al extension of the right to avail of counterclaims or set-offs.The rules on cou
nterclaim are designed to achieve the disposition of a whole controversy of the
conflicting claims of interested parties at one time and in one action, provided
all parties can be brought before the court and the matter decided without prej
udicing the rights of any party. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
MODIFIED, by deleting the award of P11,980.00 as reimbursement for taxes and ex
penses for the relocation survey, and ordering respondent spouses Celebrada and
Abner Mangubat to pay petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines the amount
of P118,540.00, representing the total amount of the loan released to them, with
interest of 15% per annum plus charges and other expenses in accordance with th
eir mortgage contract. In all other respects, the said judgment of respondent Co
urt of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. 14. LUFTHANZA GERMAN AIRLINES VS. COURT
OF APPEALS FACTS: On 16 May 1985, plaintiff-appellee (Don Ferry) purchased from
the defendantappellant a San Francisco/ New York/ Paris/ Frankfurt/Manila first
class open dated ticket. There was no carrier indicated for the San Francisco/Ne
w York/Paris portions of the journey. On June 3, 1985, plaintiff-appellee went t
o Lufthansa s San Francisco office allegedly to get Lufthansa to endorse the San
Francisco/New York portion of his journey to Trans World Airlines. But, there w
as no need to secure said endorsement since no carrier was indicated in the tick
et for the San Francisco/New York leg of the journey. Instead of going to TWA as
advised, plaintiff requested Mrs. Egger for a different routing which omitted t
he New York/Paris leg of his original itinerary. Said new routing would require
the endorsement of the ticket. Hence, Mrs. Egger advised the plaintiff-appellee
that she would need to get an authorization from Lufthansa s Manila office in or
der to endorse plaintiff-appellee s ticket, She also explained to plaintiff-appe
llee the procedure for obtaining the authorization and the reason why it was req
uired. Upon being advised that securing the necessary authorization could possib
ly take a day or more, plaintiffappellee advised Mrs. Egger that he could not wa
it. Thereafter. plaintiff-appellee settled on a new routing. On June 12, 1985, p
laintiff-appeIlee went to the Frankfurt Airport. The CPA ticket agent informed t
he plaintiff that an endorsement from the defendantappellant Lufthansa was requi
red for him to travel on CPA. aintiff-appellee then proceeded to the Lufthansa s
ticket counter at the Frankfurt Airport. Plaintiff-appellee met with Miss Petra
Wilhelm, Lufthansa s ticket agent therein. Miss Wilhelm reiterated Ms. Egger s
previous advise that due to currency restrictions, authorization from Lufthansa
s Manila office was required before she could endorse plaintiffs ticket to CPA.
The reason for the need to get an endorsement from Lufthansa s Manila office and
the
procedure for obtaining such endorsement was fully explained to the plaintiff-ap
pellee for the second time by Miss Wilhelm. Since it would take Miss Wilhelm som
etime to communicate and obtain the endorsement from the defendant s Manila offi
ce, it was obvious at that time that plaintiff-appellee would be unable to board
the CPA flight which he booked. Consequently, upon plaintiff-appellee s request
Miss Wilhelm booked him on a Lufthansa flight leaving Frankfurt Airport in the
afternoon of the same day, 12 June 1985 for Bangkok and for the Bangkok/Manila p
ortion of his journey, Miss Wilhelm booked plaintiff on a Thai Airways flight. P
laintiff-appellee was able to depart Frankfurt Airport in the afternoon of 12 Ju
ne 1985 on the Lufthansa flight and was able to board the Thai Airways flight fr
om Bangkok to Manila, arriving thereat in the afternoon of the following day. Ev
idently in the belief that the facts created a right of action in his favor, Don
Ferry filed a complaint against Lufthansa on April 1,1986 in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, for recovery of damages arising from breach of contract. RULIN
GS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS -On July 25, 1988, the trial court re
ndered its decision earlier adverted to, awarding to private respondent the amou
nt of damages prayed for in his complaint. - The decision was affirmed in toto b
y the Court of Appeals. ISSUES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT: Whether or not the Cour
t of Appeals committed errors of law RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: The establishe
d rule is that the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesse
s are accorded much respect, if not indeed conclusive effect, save only in those
exceptional instances where they are clearly shown to be arbitrary. 5 In the ca
se at bench, the Trial Court refused to accord any credit to petitioner Airline
s "three (3) foreign witnesses" because they are "all long-time employees of def
endant which also shouldered all their expenses" (in coming to this country to g
ive evidence) and hence, their testimonies "are tained polluted and should be se
en with disfavor. While it may be true, as the trial court opines, "that testimo
ny of employees of a party is of course open to the criticism that they would n
aturally testify, as far as they possibly could in favor of their employers; and
in weighing testimony such a relation between a witness and a party is frequent
ly noticed by the court, 7 it is equally true that the fact that the witness is
an employee or an overseer of a party is not of itself sufficient to discredit h
is testimony. This Court has intensively analyzed the testimonies of petitioner
s saidthree (3) witnesses and found them to be clear, straightforward and convinc
ing. They spoke authoritatively of their respective lines of work, and candidly
of their dealings with private respondent, without betraying any trace of falseh
ood or partiality, or any attempt to exculpate petitioner from the alleged breac
h of contract; in fact, it may even be said that some of their statements were s
omewhat damaging to their employer s cause.That petitioner paid for its witnesse
s expenses in coming to the Philippines to testify, is not a valid cause for dis
believing their testimonies; it seems but natural and reasonable under the pecul
iar circumstances of the case that petitioner should do so. For the record, howe
ver, only the expenses of Mrs. Ingrid Egger and Mrs. Petra Wilhelm were shoulder
ed by petitioner, the third witness, Mr. Berndt Loewe, then being based in Manil
a as petitioner s passenger sales manager. Considering the known disinclination
of persons to be involved in court litigations, even if it be only as witnesses.
it is hardly reasonable to expect petitioner s witnesses to agree to bear the c
ost of flying to and staying in Manila to testify in the case. At any rate, ther
e is no showing whatever that petitioner s witnesses were otherwise so materiall
y benefited by their travel to the Philippines, or were so
fanatically loyal to Lufthansa, as to be motivated to distort the thruth and tes
tify falsely in the latter s favor.The trial court as well as the appellate cour
t gravely erred therefore, in totally disregarding the testimonies of petitioner
s witnesses on the basis alone of the employment relationship between them. The
ir factual findings cannot consequently be accorded binding effect, and this Cou
rt is thus constrained to itself weigh and evaluate the evidence presented by th
e parties.To begin with, private respondent was bound by the conditions of the c
ontract of carriage purchased by him from Lufthansa. The ticket did not indicate
any carrier for the San Francisco/New York leg of respondent Ferry s journey. H
e was therefore free to choose his airline for that leg. With respect, however,
to the Paris/Frankfurt /manila portion of his journey, private respondent was de
emed to have agreed to fly Lufthansa as shown by the letters "LH" written on the
carrier box.Thus, in San Francisco, when private respondent chose to take a TWA
flight to New York, no endorsement from petitioner Airline was required because
, as just mentioned, his ticket did not indicate any carrier for the San Francis
co/New York leg. It was only in the Paris/Frankfurt/Manila leg that an endorseme
nt was needed if private respondent desired to fly with an airline other than Lu
fthansa. The reason no endorsement was given was that there was no requirement f
or such endorsement. At this point, petitioner Airline did not refuse to give hi
m an endorsement being required by TWA. It is one thing to say that petitioner a
irline refused to give a required endorsement, and another to say that since no
endorsement was needed, none was given.The same cannot, however, be said with re
spect to the Frankfurt/Manila portion of respondent Ferry s journey. Petitioner
s witness, Mr. Berndt Loewe, admitted that the Baden-Baden GMBH was a Lufthansa-
appointed travel agent, authorized to make reservations and confirmations, Priva
te respondent having previously obtained a flight confirmation from a Lufthansaa
ppointed travel agent, there was no reason why the Frankfurt Lufthansa office sh
ould not give the endorsement needed by private respondent fly Cathay Pacific Ai
rways. That confirmation necessarily carried with it the prior approval of Lufth
ansa for private respondent to employ another airline so that all that was neede
d was the actual, physical signification of said approval through an endorsement
which should have been given as a matter of course. Petitioner s failure in thi
s regard constituted breach of its contract of carriage with private respondent.
The breach was not attended by fraud or bad faith, however. When Petra Wilhelm;
petitioner airline s ticket agent at its Frankfurt Airport office, informed priv
ate respondent that an authorization from Manila was needed before she could giv
e an endorsement, what was foremost in her mind was the policy regarding currenc
y restrictions in effect at that time, which was made known and explained to pri
vate respondent in San Francisco. Apparently, the significance of the previously
confirmed reservation completely escaped Mrs. Wilhelm on that occasion. The omi
ssion or failure of petitioner airline then to give private respondent the requi
red endorsement was thus evidently due to a misappreciation of the significance
of private respondent s previously confirmed reservation, and not to any willful
desire to deny private respondent the night to utilize another airline.Where th
e defendant is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith in breaching
the contract, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable cons
equences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties had foreseen or
could reasonably have foreseen. In such a case, liability would not include the
payment of moral and exemplary damages. Under Article 2232 of the Civil Code, in
a contractual or quasi-contractual relationship, moral or exemplary damages may
be awarded only if the defendant had acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, o
ppressive or malevolent manner. 20The trial Court s award of actual damages for
unrealized profits in the amount of US$75,000.00, must also be disallowed, priva
te respondent s claim thereto being highly speculative. The realization of profi
ts by respondent Ferry from a real estate development project in
Foster City was not a certainty, but depended on a number of factors, foremost o
f which was his ability to invite investors and to win the bid. Actual or compen
satory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved, and proved with reas
onable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjecture or g
uesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent pr
oof that they have (been) suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereof.
" 22There is no room to doubt that some species of injury was caused to private
respondent because of petitioner airline s failure to endorse his ticket to Cath
ay Pacific Airways. In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffe
red, private respondent is "entitled to nominal damages which, as the law says,
is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated o
r invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the pu
rpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered." 23 We consider the a
mount of P50,000.00 just and reasonable under the circumstances.An award of P20,
000.00 for and as attorney s fees is likewise just and equitable, private respon
dent having been compelled to incur expenses to protect his interests. WHEREFORE
, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22494 dated January 29,
1993 is hereby MODIFIED by the deletion of the awards of actual, moral and exem
plary damages, as well as the interest thereon. Petitioner Lufthansa German Airl
ines is hereby ORDERED to pay private respondent Don Ferry the amount of P50,000
.00 as nominal damages and the amount of P20,000.00 as and for attorney s fees.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 15. BARZAGA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACT
S: The Fates ordained that Christmas 1990 be bleak for Ignacio Barzaga and his f
amily. On the nineteenth of December Ignacio s wife succumbed to a debilitating
ailment after prolonged pain and suffering. Forewarned by her attending physicia
ns of her impending death, she expressed her wish to be laid to rest before Chri
stmas day to spare her family from keeping lonely vigil over her remains, but he
r last wish did not happened because the delivery of the supplies has not been d
elivered on the said date hence the filing of the case in the trial court. RULIN
GS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS - the trial court ordered respondent
Alviar to pay petitioner (a) P2,110.00 as refund for the purchase price of the m
aterials with interest per annum computed at the legal rate from the date of the
filing of the complaint, (b) P5,000.00 as temperate damages, (c) P20,000.00 as
moral damages, (d) P5,000.00 as litigation expenses, and (e) P5,000.00 as attorn
ey s fees. - Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and ruled that there was
no contractual commitment as to the exact time of delivery since this was not in
dicated in the invoice receipts covering the sale ISSUES BEFORE THE SUPREME COUR
T: Whether or not there is contractual commitment as to the exact time of the de
livery since it was not indicated in the receipts.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: We sustain the trial court. An assiduous scrutiny o
f the record convinces us that respondent Angelito Alviar was negligent and incu
rred in delay in the performance of his contractual obligation. This sufficientl
y entitles petitioner Ignacio Barzaga to be indemnified for the damage he suffer
ed as a consequence of delay or a contractual breach. The law expressly provides
that those who in the performance of their obligation are guilty of fraud, negl
igence, or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are l
iable for damages. Contrary to the appellate court s factual determination, ther
e was a specific time agreed upon for the delivery of the materials to the cemet
ery. Petitioner went to private respondent s store on 21 December precisely to i
nquire if the materials he intended to purchase could be delivered immediately.
But he was told by the storekeeper that if there were still deliveries to be mad
e that afternoon his order would be delivered the following day. With this in mi
nd Barzaga decided to buy the construction materials the following morning after
he was assured of immediate delivery according to his time frame. The argument
that the invoices never indicated a specific delivery time must fall in the face
of the positive verbal commitment of respondent s storekeeper. Consequently it
was no longer necessary to indicate in the invoices the exact time the purchased
items were to be brought to the cemetery. In fact, storekeeper Boncales admitte
d that it was her custom not to indicate the time of delivery whenever she prepa
red invoices. Private respondent invokes fortuitous event as his handy excuse fo
r that "bit of delay" in the delivery of petitioner s purchases. He maintains th
at Barzaga should have allowed his delivery men a little more time to bring the
construction materials over to the cemetery since a few hours more would not rea
lly matter and considering that his truck had a flat tire. Besides, according to
him, Barzaga still had sufficient time to build the tomb for his wife.This is a
gratuitous assertion that borders on callousness. Private respondent had no rig
ht to manipulate petitioner s timetable and substitute it with his own. Petition
er had a deadline to meet. A few hours of delay was no piddling matter to him wh
o in his bereavement had yet to attend to other pressing family concerns. Despit
e this, respondent s employees still made light of his earnest importunings for
an immediate delivery. As petitioner bitterly declared in court " x x x they (re
spondent s employees) were making a fool out of me."We also find unacceptable re
spondent s justification that his truck had a flat tire, for this event, if inde
ed it happened, was forseeable according to the trial court, and as such should
have been reasonably guarded against. The nature of private respondent s busines
s requires that he should be ready at all times to meet contingencies of this ki
nd. One piece of testimony by respondent s witness Marina Boncales has caught ou
r attention - that the delivery truck arrived a little late than usual because i
t came from a delivery of materials in Langcaan, Dasmarias, Cavite. Significantly
, this information was withheld by Boncales from petitioner when the latter was
negotiating with her for the purchase of construction materials. Consequently, i
t is not unreasonable to suppose that had she told petitioner of this fact and t
hat the delivery of the materials would consequently be delayed, petitioner woul
d not have bought the materials from respondent s hardware store but elsewhere w
hich could meet his time requirement. The deliberate suppression of this informa
tion by itself manifests a certain degree of bad faith on the part of respondent
s storekeeper.The appellate court appears to have belittled petitioner s submis
sion that under the prevailing circumstances time was of the essence in the deli
very of the materials to the grave site. However, we find petitioner s assertion
to be anchored on solid ground. The niche had to be constructed at the very lea
st on the twenty-second of December considering that it would take about two (2)
days to finish the job if the interment was to take place on the twenty-fourth
of the month. Respondent s delay in
the delivery of the construction materials wasted so much time that construction
of the tomb could start only on the twenty-third. It could not be ready for the
scheduled burial of petitioner s wife. This undoubtedly prolonged the wake, in
addition to the fact that work at the cemetery had to be put off on Christmas da
y.This case is clearly one of nonperformance of a reciprocal obligation. In thei
r contract of purchase and sale, petitioner had already complied fully with what
was required of him as purchaser, i.e., the payment of the purchase price of P2
,110.00. It was incumbent upon respondent to immediately fulfill his obligation
to deliver the goods otherwise delay would attach.We therefore sustain the award
of moral damages. It cannot be denied that petitioner and his family suffered w
ounded feelings, mental anguish and serious anxiety while keeping watch on Chris
tmas day over the remains of their loved one who could not be laid to rest on th
e date she herself had chosen. There is no gainsaying the inexpressible pain and
sorrow Ignacio Barzaga and his family bore at that moment caused no less by the
ineptitude, cavalier behavior and bad faith of respondent and his employees in
the performance of an obligation voluntarily entered into.We also affirm the gra
nt of exemplary damages. The lackadaisical and feckless attitude of the employee
s of respondent over which he exercised supervisory authority indicates gross ne
gligence in the fulfillment of his business obligations. Respondent Alviar and h
is employees should have exercised fairness and good judgment in dealing with pe
titioner who was then grieving over the loss of his wife. Instead of commiserati
ng with him, respondent and his employees contributed to petitioner s anguish by
causing him to bear the agony resulting from his inability to fulfill his wife
s dying wish.We delete however the award of temperate damages. Under Art. 2224 o
f the Civil Code, temperate damages are more than nominal but less than compensa
tory, and may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has bee
n suffered but the amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with ce
rtainty. In this case, the trial court found that plaintiff suffered damages in
the form of wages for the hired workers for 22 December 1990 and expenses incurr
ed during the extra two (2) days of the wake. The record however does not show t
hat petitioner presented proof of the actual amount of expenses he incurred whic
h seems to be the reason the trial court awarded to him temperate damages instea
d. This is an erroneous application of the concept of temperate damages. While p
etitioner may have indeed suffered pecuniary losses, these by their very nature
could be established with certainty by means of payment receipts. As such, the c
laim falls unequivocally within the realm of actual or compensatory damages. Pet
itioner s failure to prove actual expenditure consequently conduces to a failure
of his claim. For in determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on mere
assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent
proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding the actual amount of loss.We
affirm the award of attorney s fees and litigation expenses. Award of damages,
attorney s fees and litigation costs is left to the sound discretion of the cour
t, and if such discretion be well exercised, as in this case, it will not be dis
turbed on appeal. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED an
d SET ASIDE except insofar as it GRANTED on a motion for reconsideration the ref
und by private respondent of the amount of P2,110.00 paid by petitioner for the
construction materials. Consequently, except for the award of P5,000.00 as tempe
rate damages which we delete, the decision of the Regional Trial Court granting
petitioner (a) P2,110.00 as refund for the value of materials with interest comp
uted at the legal rate per annum from the date of the filing of the case; (b) P2
0,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; (d) P5,000.00 as
litigation expenses; and (4) P5,000.00 as attorney s fees, is AFFIRMED. No cost
s. SO ORDERED.
16. PEOPLE vs. GUTIERREZ FACTS: That on or about the 14th day of December 1989 i
n Kalookan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Cour
t, the above-named accused, motivated by a desire for revenge, with deliberate i
ntent to cause damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously s
et fire to the house of one JOSEFA ARROYO y ALANO, thereby causing damage to the
front wooden-made walling located at the groundfloor thereof in the amount of P
500.00, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the amount of P500.00. Acco
rding to Joselito Arroyo, Josefa s son, it was his eldest sister, Carolina, who
lodged the complaint with the police. Carolina informed the witness that a carpe
nter placed the cost for the repair of the house at P500.00. Rulings of the Tria
l Court and Court of Appeals -In its 28th February 1991 decision, the trial cour
t found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged; it co
ncluded: WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment CONVICTING the herein accused EDG
AR GUTIERREZ y CORTEZ for the crime of Arson punishable under the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 1613 and sentences him to suffer the max
imum penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to pay the owner of the house Josefa Arroyo
the sum of Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos as actual damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. ISSUES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT: Whether or not corpus delicti of th
e crime of arson has been established. RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: Proof of the
corpus delicti, indeed, is indispensable in the prosecution of arson as in all
kinds of criminal offenses as well. Corpus delicti means the substance of the cr
ime; it is the fact that a crime has actually been committed. In arson, the corp
us delicti rule rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of t
he fire and of its having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated tes
timony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus de
licti and to warrant conviction. In this case, the charge against appellant was
amply supported in evidence by the eyewitness accounts of Felipe Enriquez and Ma
rio Alano. Also offered in evidence were copies of the police "blotters" of two
barangays reflecting the report that appellant had thrown a bag of gasoline at t
he house of Mario Alano, then lit it and, after setting a portion of the house o
n fire, fled. As regards appellant s identity, Enriquez testified that he and ap
pellant s brother and sister were near a Meralco post when appellant went past t
hem 15 Enriquez followed appellant and saw how the latter threw the substance he
was carrying at Alano s house. The conditions of visibility were favorable. Ind
eed, even the recognition by Mario Alano of appellant s voice could have suffice
d to pin down culpability. The evidence against appellant is simply too overwhel
ming for it to be easily overcome by an invocation of alibi. Besides, the essent
ial requirements of distance and the impossibility of an accused being at the sc
ene of the crime at the crucial time must be attendant so as to give this defens
e any serious consideration.Appellant assails the credibility of Enriquez by an
assertion that his testimony is "ill-motivated." The Court itself has reviewed E
nriquez s testimony, and it is satisfied that his statements disclose frankness,
cohesiveness, and an absence of any serious dissemblance or inconsistency.
Moreover, the trial court s assessment on the credibility of the witnesses, whic
h has had the opportunity of observing how they have comported themselves at the
witness stand, cannot just be ignored. The information charges appellant with "
violation of P.D. 1613" without specifying the particular provision breached. T
he information having failed to allege whether or not the burnt house is inhabit
ed, and not having been established that the house is situated in a populated or
congested area, appellant should be deemed to have only been charged with plain
arson under Section 1 of the decree. Kalookan City might be a densely populated
part of the metropolis but its entire territory cannot be said to be congested.
Although the whole 2-storey wood and galvanized iron house has not been complet
ely gutted by the fire, the crime committed is still consummated arson. It is en
ough that a portion thereof is shown to have been destroyed. Under Section 1 of
the decree, the offense of simple arson committed is punishable by prision mayor
. The Court feels that the trial court should not have appreciated the "special"
aggravating circumstance, under Section 4(3) of the decree, of the offender hav
ing been "motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the prop
erty burned." The prosecution does not dispute the mauling of appellant by a son
of Mario Alano just a few hours before the incident. It would appear to us to b
e more of impulse, heat of anger or risen temper, rather than real spite or hatr
ed, that has impelled appellant to give vent to his wounded ego.The prosecution
tried to establish the actual amount of damage caused to the house through the t
estimony of Joselito Arroyo, the owner s son, who apparently was only told by hi
s sister that, according to a carpenter, the repair of the house would cost some
P500.00. The evidence, being clearly hearsay, may not be a basis for an award.T
here being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances to consider, the pre
scribed penalty is the medium period of prision mayor or from 8 years and 1 day
to 10 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the prison term that may b
e imposed on appellant is anywhere within the range of prision correccional from
6 months and 1 day to 6 years, as minimum. up to anywhere within the medium per
iod of prision mayor from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years, as maximum. WHEREFORE,
the questioned decision finding appellant Edgar Gutierrez y Cortez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of arson is AFFIRMED; however, the sentence impos
ed on him by the court a quo is MODIFIED in that appellant should now instead su
ffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from a minimum of 2 years, 4 mont
hs and 1 day of prision correccional to a maximum of 8 years and 1 day of prisio
n mayor. The award made by the trial court of P500 by way of actual damage in fa
vor of Mario and/or Josefa Arroyo is deleted. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERE
D. 17. GATCHALIAN V DELIM FACTS: On July 11, 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalia
n boarded as paying passenger a minibus owned by respondents. While the bus was
running along the highway, a snapping sound was heard, and after a short while, th
e bus bumped a cement flower pot, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. The passe
ngers were confined in the hospital, and their bills were paid by respondents spo
use on July 14. Before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers sign an a
lready prepared affidavit waiving their claims against respondents. Petitioner w
as among those who signed. Notwithstanding the said document, petitioner filed a
claim to recover actual and moral damages for loss of employment opportunities,
mental suffering and inferiority complex caused by the scar
on her forehead. Respondents raised in defense force majeure and the waiver sign
ed by petitioner. The trial court upheld the validity of the waiver and dismisse
d the complaint. The appellate court ruled that the waiver was invalid, but also
that the petitioner is not entitled to damages. Rulings of the Trial Court and
Court of Appeals - The trial court upheld the validity of the waiver and dismiss
ed the complaint - The appellate court ruled that the waiver was invalid, but al
so that the petitioner is not entitled to damages. ISSUES BEFORE THE SUPREME COU
RT (1) Whether there was a valid waiver (2) Whether the respondent was negligent
(3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to actual and moral damages RULING OF TH
E SUPREME COURT: We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held tha
t no valid waiver of her cause of action had been made by petitioner. The releva
nt language of the Joint Affidavit may be quoted again: That we are no longer in
terested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owne
r of the said Thames, because it was an accident and the said driver and owner o
f the said Thames have gone to the extent of helping us to be treated upon our i
njuries. (Emphasis supplied) A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the fi
rst place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to t
he intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to
him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof
do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in s
uch person. The degree of explicitness which this Court has required in purporte
d waivers is illustrated in Yepes and Susaya v. Samar Express Transit (supra), w
here the Court in reading and rejecting a purported waiver said: . . . It appear
s that before their transfer to the Leyte Provincial Hospital, appellees were as
ked to sign as, in fact, they signed the document Exhibit I wherein they stated
that "in consideration of the expenses which said operator has incurred in prope
rly giving us the proper medical treatment, we hereby manifest our desire to wai
ve any and all claims against the operator of the Samar Express Transit." Even a
cursory examination of the document mentioned above will readily show that appe
llees did not actually waive their right to claim damages from appellant for the
latter s failure to comply with their contract of carriage. All that said docum
ent proves is that they expressed a "desire" to make the waiver which obviously
is not the same as making an actual waiver of their right. A waiver of the kind
invoked by appellant must be clear and unequivocal (Decision of the Supreme Cour
t of Spain of July 8, 1887) which is not the case of the one relied upon in this
appeal. (Emphasis supplied) If we apply the standard used in Yepes and Susaya,
we would have to conclude that the terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant c
ase cannot be regarded as a waiver cast in "clear and unequivocal" terms. Moreov
er, the circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner G
atchalian need to be considered. Petitioner testified
that she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident, having be
en in the hospital for only three days, when the purported waiver in the form of
the Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while reading the sa
me, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had also
suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read t
he Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances there appear
s substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint
Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she signed and
whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against priva
te respondent. Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a comm
on carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a com
mon carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such pur
ported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid
and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good cu
stoms. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured p
assenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dil
ute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from c
ommon carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. We believe such
a purported waiver is offensive to public policy. Petitioner Gatchalian also arg
ues that the Court of Appeals, having by majority vote held that there was no en
forceable waiver of her right of action, should have awarded her actual or compe
nsatory and moral damages as a matter of course. We have already noted that a du
ty to exercise extraordinary diligence in protecting the safety of its passenger
s is imposed upon a common carrier. In case of death or injuries to passengers,
a statutory presumption arises that the common carrier was at fault or had acted
negligently "unless it proves that it [had] observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." In fact, because of this statutory presu
mption, it has been held that a court need not even make an express finding of f
ault or negligence on the part of the common carrier in order to hold it liable.
To overcome this presumption, the common carrier must slow to the court that it
had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the injuries. The standard of
extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers is considerably more demand
ing than the standard of ordinary diligence, i.e., the diligence of a good pater
familias established in respect of the ordinary relations between members of soc
iety. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely" as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious pe
rson, with due regard to all the circumstances". Thus, the question which must b
e addressed is whether or not private respondent has successfully proved that he
had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the mishap involving his mini-
bus. The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that respon
dent had exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. Curiously, respo
ndent did not even attempt, during the trial before the court a quo, to prove th
at he had indeed exercised the requisite extraordinary diligence. Respondent did
try to exculpate himself from liability by alleging that the mishap was the res
ult of force majeure. But allegation is not proof and here again, respondent utt
erly failed to substantiate his defense of force majeure. To exempt a common car
rier from liability for death or physical injuries to passengers upon the ground
of force majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only that the efficient cau
se of the casualty was entirely
independent of the human will, but also that it was impossible to avoid. Any par
ticipation by the common carrier in the occurrence of the injury will defeat the
defense of force majeure. In Servando v. Philippine Steam Navigation Company, 1
2 the Court summed up the essential characteristics of force majeure by quoting
with approval from the Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola: Thus, where fortuitous even
t or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor
is exempt from liability non-performance. The Partidas, the antecedent of Artic
le 1174 of the Civil Code, defines "caso fortuito" as an event that takes place
by accident and could not have been foreseen. Examples of this are destruction
of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of robber. In its dissertation o
n the phrase "caso fortuito" the Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola says: In legal se
nse and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a "caso fortuito" presents
the following essential characteristics: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and un
expected occurence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligatio
n, must be independent of the human will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee t
he event which constitutes the "caso fortuito", or if it can be foreseen, it mus
t be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it imposs
ible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the ob
ligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resul
ting to the creditor. Upon the other hand, the record yields affirmative evidenc
e of fault or negligence on the part of respondent common carrier. In her direct
examination, petitioner Gatchalian narrated that shortly before the vehicle wen
t off the road and into a ditch, a "snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one pa
rt of the bus. One of the passengers, an old woman, cried out, "What happened?"
("Apay addan samet nadadaelen?"). The driver replied, nonchalantly, "That is onl
y normal" ("Ugali ti makina dayta"). The driver did not stop to check if anythin
g had gone wrong with the bus. Moreover, the driver s reply necessarily indicate
d that the same "snapping sound" had been heard in the bus on previous occasions
. This could only mean that the bus had not been checked physically or mechanica
lly to determine what was causing the "snapping sound" which had occurred so fre
quently that the driver had gotten accustomed to it. Such a sound is obviously a
lien to a motor vehicle in good operating condition, and even a modicum of conce
rn for life and limb of passengers dictated that the bus be checked and repaired
. The obvious continued failure of respondent to look after the roadworthiness a
nd safety of the bus, coupled with the driver s refusal or neglect to stop the m
ini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm
from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety
of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his
driver. We turn to petitioner s claim for damages. The first item in that claim
relates to revenue which petitioner said she failed to realize because of the ef
fects of the vehicular mishap. Petitioner maintains that on the day that the min
i-bus went off the road, she was supposed to confer with the district supervisor
of public schools for a substitute teacher s job, a job which she had held off
and on as a "casual employee." The Court of Appeals, however, found that at the
time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school since, being
a casual employee and not a Civil Service eligible, she had been laid off. Her
employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon
the availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. In view of her employment
status as such, the Court of Appeals held that she could not be said to have in
fact lost any employment after and by reason of the accident. 13 Such was the f
actual
finding of the Court of Appeals, a finding entitled to due respect from this Cou
rt. Petitioner Gatchalian has not submitted any basis for overturning this findi
ng of fact, and she may not be awarded damages on the basis of speculation or co
njecture. Petitioner s claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the
scar on her forehead, is another matter. A person is entitled to the physical in
tegrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual
injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessab
le. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the
condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of
the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of b
odily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her condi
tio ante. If the scar is relatively small and does not grievously disfigure the
victim, the cost of surgery may be expected to be correspondingly modest. In Ara
neta, et al. vs. Areglado, et al., this Court awarded actual or compensatory dam
ages for, among other things, the surgical removal of the scar on the face of a
young boy who had been injured in a vehicular collision. The Court there held: W
e agree with the appellants that the damages awarded by the lower court for the
injuries suffered by Benjamin Araneta are inadequate. In allowing not more than
P1,000.00 as compensation for the "permanent deformity and something like an inf
eriority complex" as well as for the "pathological condition on the left side of
the jaw" caused to said plaintiff, the court below overlooked the clear evidenc
e on record that to arrest the degenerative process taking place in the mandible
and restore the injured boy to a nearly normal condition, surgical intervention
was needed, for which the doctor s charges would amount to P3,000.00, exclusive
of hospitalization fees, expenses and medicines. Furthermore, the operation, ac
cording to Dr. Dio, would probably have to be repeated in order to effectuate a c
omplete cure, while removal of the scar on the face obviously demanded plastic s
urgery. The father s failure to submit his son to a plastic operation as soon as
possible does not prove that such treatment is not called for. The damage to th
e jaw and the existence of the scar in Benjamin Araneta s face are physical fact
s that can not be reasoned out of existence. That the injury should be treated i
n order to restore him as far as possible to his original condition is undeniabl
e. The father s delay, or even his negligence, should not be allowed to prejudic
e the son who has no control over the parent s action nor impair his right to a
full indemnity. . . . Still, taking into account the necessity and cost of corre
ctive measures to fully repair the damage; the pain suffered by the injured part
y; his feelings of inferiority due to consciousness of his present deformity, as
well as the voluntary character of the injury inflicted; and further considerin
g that a repair, however, skillfully conducted, is never equivalent to the origi
nal state, we are of the opinion that the indemnity granted by the trial court s
hould be increased to a total of P18,000.00. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner esti
mated that the cost of having her scar surgically removed was somewhere between
P10,000.00 to P15,000.00. 16 Upon the other hand, Dr. Fe Tayao Lasam, a witness
presented as an expert by petitioner, testified that the cost would probably be
between P5,000.00 to P10,000.00. 17 In view of this testimony, and the fact that
a considerable amount of time has lapsed since the mishap in 1973 which may be
expected to increase not only the cost but also very probably the difficulty of
removing
the scar, we consider that the amount of P15,000.00 to cover the cost of such pl
astic surgery is not unreasonable. Turning to petitioner s claim for moral damag
es, the long-established rule is that moral damages may be awarded where gross n
egligence on the part of the common carrier is shown. 18 Since we have earlier c
oncluded that respondent common carrier and his driver had been grossly negligen
t in connection with the bus mishap which had injured petitioner and other passe
ngers, and recalling the aggressive manuevers of respondent, through his wife, t
o get the victims to waive their right to recover damages even as they were stil
l hospitalized for their injuries, petitioner must be held entitled to such mora
l damages. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have
suffered as a result of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on h
er forehead, we believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable awar
d. Petitioner s claim for P1,000.00 as atttorney s fees is in fact even more mod
est. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 24 October 1980, as w
ell as the decision of the then Court of First Instance of La Union dated 4 Dece
mber 1975 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Respondent is hereby ORDERED to pay
petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian the following sums: 1) P15,000.00 as actual or co
mpensatory damages to cover the cost of plastic surgery for the removal of the s
car on petitioner s forehead; 2) P30,000.00 as moral damages; and 3) P1,000.00 a
s attorney s fees, the aggregate amount to bear interest at the legal rate of 6%
per annum counting from the promulgation of this decision until full payment th
ereof. Costs against private respondent. SO ORDERED. 18. RAAGAS vs TRAYA FACTS:
- spouses Raagas filed a complaint with the CFI Leyteagainst spouses Traya and B
ienvenido Canciller.- Complaint alleges that on or about April 9, 1958, whileCan
ciller was "recklessly" driving a truck owned by the Traya spouses, the vehicle
ran over the Raagas three-year old son Regino, causing his instantaneous death.
Rulings of the Trial Court and Court of Appeals - On June 24 it rendered a judg
ment on the pleadings,condemning the defendants, jointly and severally, topay da
mages, attorneys fees and costs of suit. -The Court of Appeals certified thecase
to SC because the issues raised are purely of law ISSUES BEFORE THE SUPREME COUR
T : Whether or not the court a quo acted correctly when it rendered judgment on
the pleadings RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: The plaintiffs claim for actual, mor
al, nominal and corrective damages, was controverted by the avermentin the answe
r to the effect that the defendants "haveno knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations" as to such damages,"the tru
th of the matter being that the death of ReginoRaagas was occasioned by an unfor
eseen event and/orby the fault of the small boy Regino Raagas or hisparents." Su
ch averment has the effect of tendering avalid issue.In a long line of cases, SC
has consistently held thateven if the allegations regarding the amount of damag
es in the complaint are not specifically denied in the answer, such damages are
not deemedadmitted.in no uncertain terms that actual
damages must beproved, and that a court cannot rely on "speculation,conjecture o
r guesswork" as to the fact and amountof damages, but must depend on actual proo
f thatdamages had been suffered and on evidence of theactual amount.although an
allegation is not necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, 19. FUEN
TES VS COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: At four o clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 Ju
lieto Malaspina together with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling,
was at a benefit dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Petitioner
called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of the latter saying,
Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have a short hair.[2] Suddenly pet
itioner stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to
the ground and his companions rushed to his side. Petitioner fled. Before the v
ictim succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen he muttered that Alejandro Fu
entes, Jr., stabbed him. Rulings of the Trial Court and Court of Appeals - The R
egional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, found petitioner guilty of m
urder qualified by treachery and imposed on him an indeterminate prison term of
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) yea
rs and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, to indemnify the heirs
of the victim Julieto Malaspina the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay P8,300.00 as
actual damages plus costs. - Court of Appeals affirmed ISSUES BEFORE THE SUPREM
E COURT 1. Whether or not the appellate court erred when it held that petitioner
was positively and categorically identified asthe killer of Malaspina, in affir
ming the judgnment of conviction 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
holding petitioner liable for damages to the heirs of the victim RULING OF THE
SUPREME COURT: One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pert
aining to declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules o
f Court provides that (t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to t
estify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the decla
ration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarants own interest, th
at a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless h
e believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his suc
cessors in interest and against third persons. The admissibility in evidence of s
uch declaration is grounded on necessity and trustworthiness.There are three (3)
essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (
a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must conc
ern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it
improbable that a motive to falsify existed.In the instant case, we find that t
he declaration particularly against penal interest attributed to Zoilo Fuentes J
r. is not admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. We are not
unaware of People Toledo,[12] a 1928 case, where Justice Malcolm writing for th
e Court endeavored to reexamine the declaration of third parties made contrary t
o their penal interest. In that case, the protagonists Holgado and Morales engag
ed in a bob duel. Morales was killed almost instantly. Holgado who was seriously
wounded gave a sworn
statement (Exh. 1) before the municipal president declaring that when he and Mor
ales fought there was nobody else present. One (1) month later Holgado died from
his wounds. While the Court was agreed that Toledo, who reportedly intervened i
n the fight and dealt the mortal blow, should be exonerated on reasonable doubt,
the members did not reach an accord on the admissibility of Exh. 1. One group w
ould totally disregard Exh. 1 since there was ample testimonial evidence to supp
ort an acquittal. The second group considered Exh. 1 as part of the res gestae a
s it was made on the same morning when the fight occurred. A third group, to whi
ch Justice Malcolm belonged, opined that the court below erred in not admitting
Exh. 1 as the statement of a fact against penal interest. For all its attempt to
demonstrate the arbitrariness behind the rejection in certain cases of declarat
ions against penal interest, the Toledo case cannot be applied in the instant ca
se which is remarkably different. Consider this factual scenario: the alleged de
clarant Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a cousin of accused-appellant, verbally admitted to t
he latter, and later to their common uncle Felicisimo Fuentes, that he (Zoilo) k
illed the victim because of a grudge, after which he disappeared. One striking f
eature that militates against the acceptance of such a statement is its patent u
ntrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to accused-appellant had every motive to
prevaricate. The same can be said of accused-appellant and his uncle Felicisimo.
Secondly, we need not resort to legal rhetorics to find that the admission of s
uch a statement may likewise be, according to Wigmore, shocking to the sense of j
ustice. Let us assume that the trial court did admit the statement of Zoilo and
on that basis acquitted accused-appellant. Let us assume further that Zoilo was
subsequently captured and upon being confronted with his admission of guilt read
ily repudiated the same. There is nothing, absolutely nothing, that can bind Zoi
lo legally to that statement.But more importantly, the far weightier reason why
the admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is t
hat the declarant is not unable to testify. There is no showing that Zoilo is eith
er dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviousl
y contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso fa
cto unavailable under this rule.[14] For it is incumbent upon the defense to pro
duce each and every piece of evidence that can break the prosecution and assure
the acquittal of the accused. Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-ap
pellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina,
the records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Z
oilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for the admissi
on of evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the real culpr
it. But this can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial statement is not ev
en authenticated thus increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made
to persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether cl
ear that the declarant himself is unable to testify. Thus, for this case at leas
t, exclusion is the prudent recourse as explained in Toledo -The purpose of all
evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the ext
rajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving th
is purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoo
ds, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be closed
to such evidence. The Court of Appeals as well as the trial court correctly dete
rmined the crime to be murder qualified by treachery. The suddenness of the atta
ck, without any provocation from the unsuspecting victim, made the stabbing of M
alaspina treacherous. However, the court a quo erred in imposing an indeterminat
e prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to s
eventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Murder
under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to death. Since aside from
treachery qualifying the crime to murder there is no other modifying circumstanc
e proved, the medium period of the penalty, i.e. reclusion perpetua, should have
been imposed on petitioner. Petitioner maintains that assuming that he committe
d the crime it is error to hold him answerable for P8,300.00 as actual damages o
n the basis of the mere testimony of the victims sister, Angelina Serrano, withou
t any tangible document to support such claim. This is a valid point. In crimes
and quasi-delicts, the defendant is liable for all damages which are the natural
and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. To seek recover
y for actual damages it is essential that the injured party proves the actual am
ount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof a
nd on the best evidence available. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, con
jecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. The award by
the court a quo of P8,300.00 as actual damages is not supported by the evidence
on record. We have only the testimony of the victims elder sister stating that s
he incurred expenses of P8,300.00 in connection with the death of Malaspina.Howe
ver, no proof of the actual damages was ever presented in court. Of the expenses
alleged to have been incurred, the Court can only give credence to those suppor
ted by receipts and which appear to have been genuinely expended in connection w
ith the death of the victim. Since the actual amount was not substantiated, the
same cannot be granted. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from finding petitioner
ALEJANDRO FUENTES JR. guilty of MURDER and directing him to indemnify the heirs
of Julieto Malaspina in the amount of P50,000.00 plus costs is AFFIRMED with th
e modification that the penalty imposed should be as it is corrected to reclusio
n perpetua, and the award of actual damages is deleted. SO ORDERED. 20. SUMMA IN
SURANCE CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On November 22, 1981, the S/S Gal
leon Sapphire, a vessel owned by the National Galleon Shipping Corporation (NGSC)
, arrived at Pier 3, South Harbor, Manila, carrying a shipment consigned to the
order of Caterpillar Far East Ltd. with Semirara Coal Corporation (Semirara) as n
otify party. The shipment, including a bundle of PC 8 U blades, was covered by ma
rine insurance under Certificate No. 82/012-FEZ issued by petitioner and Bill of
Lading No. SF/MLA 1014. The shipment was discharged from the vessel to the cust
ody of private respondent, formerly known as E. Razon, Inc., the exclusive arras
tre operator at the South Harbor. Accordingly, three good-order cargo receipts w
ere issued by NGSC, duly signed by the ships checker and a representative of priv
ate respondent.On February 24, 1982, the forwarder, Sterling International Broke
rage Corporation, withdrew the shipment from the pier and loaded it on the barge
Semirara 8104. The barge arrived at its port of destination, Semirara Island, on
March 9, 1982. When Semirara inspected the shipment at its warehouse, it discove
red that the bundle of PC8U blades was missing.On March 15, 1982, private respon
dent issued a shortlanded certificate stating that the bundle of PC8U blades was
already missing when it received the shipment from the NGSC vessel. Semirara th
en filed with petitioner, private respondent and NGSC its claim for P280,969.68,
the alleged value of the lost bundle.On September 29, 1982, petitioner paid Sem
irara the invoice value of the lost shipment. Semirara thereafter executed a rel
ease of claim and subrogation receipt.
Consequently, petitioner filed its claims with NGSC and private respondent but i
t was unsuccessful. Petitioner then filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Co
urt Rulings of the Trial Court and Court of Appeals - On August 2, 1984, the tri
al court rendered a decision absolving NGSC from any liability but finding priva
te respondent liable to petitioner. - On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified t
he decision of the trial court and reduced private respondents liability to P3,50
0.00 as follows1[3]: WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is MODIFIED in that de
fendant Metro Port Service, Inc., is ordered to pay plaintiff Summa Insurance Co
rporation: (1) the sum of P3,500.00, with legal interest from November 22, 1982,
until fully paid; and (2) the sum of P7,000.00, as and for attorneys fees. Costs
against defendant Metro Port Service, Inc. ISSUES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT (1) Is
the private respondent legally liable for the loss of the shipment in question?
(2) If so, what is the extent of its liability? RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT The
First Issue: Liability for Loss of Shipment Petitioner was subrogated to the ri
ghts of the consignee. The relationship therefore between the consignee and the
arrastre operator must be examined. This relationship is much akin to that exist
ing between the consignee or owner of shipped goods and the common carrier, or t
hat between a depositor and a warehouseman. In the performance of its obligation
s, an arrastre operator should observe the same degree of diligence as that requ
ired of a common carrier and a warehouseman as enunciated under Article 1733 of
the Civil Code and Section 3(b) of the Warehouse Receipts Law, respectively. Bei
ng the custodian of the goods discharged from a vessel, an arrastre operators dut
y is to take good care of the goods and to turn them over to the party entitled
to their possession. In this case, it has been established that the shipment was
lost while in the custody of private respondent. We find private respondent lia
ble for the loss. This is an issue of fact determined by the trial court and res
pondent Court, which is not reviewable in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. The Second Issue: Extent of Liability In the performance of its job, a
n arrastre operator is bound by the management contract it had executed with the
Bureau of Customs. However, a management contract, which is a sort of a stipula
tion pour autrui within the meaning of Article 1311 of the Civil Code, is also b
inding on a consignee because it is incorporated in the gate pass and delivery r
eceipt which must be presented by the consignee before delivery can be effected
to it. The insurer, as successor-in-interest of the consignee, is likewise bound
by the management contract. Indeed, upon taking delivery of the cargo, a consig
nee (and necessarily its successor-in- interest) tacitly accepts the provisions
of the management contract, including those which are intended to limit the liab
ility of one of the contracting parties, the arrastre operator.
However, a consignee who does not avail of the services of the arrastre operator
is not bound by the management contract. Such an exception to the rule does not
obtain here as the consignee did in fact accept delivery of the cargo from the
arrastre operator. Section 1, Article VI of the Management Contract between priv
ate respondent and the Bureau of Customs1[9] provides: 1. Responsibility and Lia
bility for Losses and Damages - The CONTRACTOR shall, at its own expense handle
all merchandise in the piers and other designated places and at its own expense
perform all work undertaken by it hereunder diligently and in a skillful workman
like and efficient manner; that the CONTRACTOR shall be solely responsible as an
independent CONTRACTOR, and hereby agrees to accept liability and to promptly p
ay to the steamship company, consignee, consignor or other interested party or p
arties for the loss, damage, or non-delivery of cargoes to the extent of the act
ual invoice value of each package which in no case shall be more than Three Thou
sand Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500.00) for each package unless the value of the imp
ortation is otherwise specified or manifested or communicated in writing togethe
r with the invoice value and supported by a certified packing list to the CONTRA
CTOR by the interested party or parties before the discharge of the goods, as we
ll as all damage that may be suffered on account of loss, damage, or destruction
of any merchandise while in custody or under the control of the CONTRACTOR in a
ny pier, shed, warehouse, facility or other designated place under the supervisi
on of the BUREAU, x x x Interpreting a similar provision in the management contr
act between private respondents predecessor, E. Razon, Inc. and the Bureau of Cus
toms, the Court said in E. Razon Inc. vs. Court of Appeals Indeed, the provision
in the management contract regarding the declaration of the actual invoice value
before the arrival of the goods must be understood to mean a declaration before t
he arrival of the goods in the custody of the arrastre operator, whether it be d
one long before the landing of the shipment at port, or immediately before turn-
over thereof to the arrastre operators custody. What is essential is knowledge be
forehand of the extent of the risk to be undertaken by the arrastre operator, as
determined by the value of the property committed to its care that it may defin
e its responsibility for loss or damage to such cargo and to ascertain compensat
ion commensurate to such risk assumed. In the same case, the Court added that th
e advance notice of the actual invoice of the goods entrusted to the arrastre op
erator is for the purpose of determining its liability, that it may obtain compen
sation commensurable to the risk it assumes, (and) not for the purpose of determ
ining the degree of care or diligence it must exercise as a depository or wareho
useman since the arrastre operator should not discriminate between cargoes of sub
stantial and small values, nor exercise care and caution only for the handling o
f goods announced to it beforehand to be of sizeable value, for that would be sp
urning the public service nature of its business. On the same provision limiting
the arrastre operators liability, the Court held in Northern Motors, Inc. v. Pri
nce Line: Appellant claims that the above quoted provision is null and void, as i
t limits the liability of appellee for the loss, destruction or damage of any me
rchandise, to P500.00 per package, contending that to sustain the validity of th
e limitation would be to
encourage acts of conversion and unjust enrichment on the part of the arrastre o
perator. Appellant, however, overlooks the fact that the limitation of appellees
liability under said provision, is not absolute or unqualified, for if the value
of the merchandise is specified or manifested by the consignee, and the corresp
onding arrastre charges are paid on the basis of the declared value, the limitat
ion does not apply. Consequently, the questioned provision is neither unfair nor
abitrary, as contended, because the consignee has it in his hands to hold, if h
e so wishes, the arrastre operator responsible for the full value of his merchan
dise by merely specifying it in any of the various documents required of him, in
clearing the merchandise from the customs. For then, the appellee arrastre oper
ator, by reasons of the payment to it of a commensurate charge based on the high
er declared value of the merchandise, could and should take extraordinary care o
f the special or valuable cargo. In this manner, there would be mutuality. What
would, indeed, be unfair and arbitrary is to hold the arrastre operator liable f
or the full value of the merchandise after the consignee has paid the arrastre c
harges only (on) a basis much lower than the true value of the goods. In this cas
e, no evidence was offered by petitioner proving the amount of arrastre fees pai
d to private respondent so as to put the latter on notice of the value of the ca
rgo. While petitioner alleged that prior to the loss of the package, its value h
ad been relayed to private respondent through the documents the latter had proce
ssed, petitioner does not categorically state that among the submitted documents
were the pro forma invoice value and the certified packing list. Neither does p
etitioner pretend that these two documents were prerequisites to the issuance of
a permit to deliver or were attachments thereto. Even the permit to deliver, up
on which petitioner anchors its arguments, may not be considered by the Court be
cause it was not identified and formally offered in evidence. In civil cases, th
e burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given
on either side. Said party must establish his case by a preponderance of evidenc
e, which means that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to t
hat of the other. Petitioner having asserted the affirmative of the issue in thi
s case, it should have presented evidence required to obtain a favorable judgmen
t. On the other hand, on top of its denial that it had received the invoice valu
e and the packing list before the discharge of the shipment, private respondent
was able to prove that it was apprised of the value of the cargo only after its
discharge from the vessel, ironically through petitioners claim for the lost pack
age to which were attached the invoice and packing list. All told, petitioner fa
iled to convince the Court that the requirement of the management contract had b
een complied with to entitle it to recover the actual invoice value of the lost
shipment. Anent the attorneys fees, we find the award to be proper considering th
at the acts and omissions of private respondent have compelled petitioner to lit
igate or incur expenses to protect its rights. However, as to the amount of the
award, we find no reason to reexamine the appellate courts determination thereon
in view of the amount of the principal obligation. Otherwise, we would be disreg
arding the doctrine that discretion, when well exercised, should not be disturbe
d. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the decision o
f the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
21. TALISAY SILAY V ASSOCIACION FACTS: On 15 February 1966, Talisay-Silay Millin
g Co., Inc.("TSMC") and TalisaySilay Industrial CooperativeAssociation, Inc. ("T
SICA") instituted an action fordamages against defendants Asociacion de Agricult
oresde Talisay-Silay, Inc. ("AATSI"), et. al.- On 4 March 1972 Rulings of the Tr
ial Court and Court of Appeals - the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered i
ts decision condemning the defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff Tal
isaySilayIndustrial Cooperative Association the amount of P6,609,714.32 and to p
laintiff Talisay-Silay Milling Co.,Inc. the sum of P8,802,612.89 with legal rate
of interestfrom the filing of the complaint until fully paid. - The Court of Ap
peal rendered a decision affirmingwith modification the decision of the court a
quo byreducing the amount of damages due plaintiffs-appellees TSMC and TSICA fro
m approximately P15.4million to only P1 million. ISSUES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
: WON the reduction of damages was proper RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: In reduci
ng the amount of damages awarded by thecourt a quo to petitioners TSMC and TSICA
from roughlyP15.4 million to only P1 million, the Court of Appeals,citing Malay
an Insurance Co.. Inc. v. Manila Port Servicereasoned that the reduction was dic
tated by the failureor TSMC and TSICA to comply with Section 5, Rule 10 of the R
ule of Court, i.e., TSMC and TSICA s failure toamend their complaint to conform
to the evidencepresented during trial which showed that TSMC and TSICA suffered
damages amounting to more than P1million by virtue of the illegal transfer of ex
port sugarquota from TSMC to FFMCI. We are unable to agreewith the Court of Appe
als on this point.- A court may rule and render judgment on the basis of the evi
dence before it even though the relevantpleading had not been previously amended
, so long asno surprise or prejudice is thereby caused to theadverse party. Put
a little differently, so long as the basic requirements of fair play had been me
t, as wherelitigants were given full opportunity to support theirrespective cont
entions and to object to or refute eachother s evidence, the court may validly t
reat thepleadings as if they had been amended to conform tothe evidence and proc
eed to adjudicate on the basis of all the evidence before it.- The record of the
instant case shows that TSMC and TSICA formally offered as evidence documents w
hichset out in detail the estimated unrealized incomesuffered by TSMC and TSICA
during four (4) consecutivecrop years, i.e., (CYs) 1964-1965, 1965-1966, 1966-19
67 and 1967-1968, the failure of realization beingattributed to the transfer by
AATSI, et al. of their sugarquota to FFMCI. These documents, along with thecorro
borative testimony of one Ricardo Yapjoco, aCertified Public Accountant and Inte
rnal Auditor of TSMC, were the basis of the trial court s award of P8,802,612.89
to TSMC and of P6,609,714.32 to TSICA.It is noteworthy that the joint record on
appeal revealsthat AATSI, et al. objected to the Offer of Evidence of TSMC and
TSICA not on the basis that such evidencefell outside the scope of the issues as
defined in thepleadings as they then stood, but rather on the basisthat such ev
idence was "incompetent" and speculativein character, i.e., as "being mere estim
ates prepared bywitness Yapjoco" and constituting merely his "opinion."It should
also be noted that the testimony of Mr. Yapjoco was subjected to extensive cros
s-examinationby counsel for AATSI, et al. The trial court did notexpressly overr
ule
AATSI, et al. s objection to the Offerof Evidence of TSMC and TSICA; it is never
theless clearthat the trial court did not accord much weight to thatobjection.-
The point that may be here underscored is that AATSI,et al., having been given t
he opportunity and having infact been able to register their objections to theev
idence formally offered by TSMC and TSICA were notin any way prejudiced by the d
iscrepancy between theallegations in the complaint filed and the propositionswhi
ch the evidence submitted by TSMC and TSICAtended to establish. We conclude that
the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to treat the amended andsupplemental
complaint of TSMC and TSICA as if suchcomplaint had in fact been amended to conf
orm to theevidence, and when it limited the damages due to TSMC and TSICA to the
amount prayed for in theiroriginal complaint. A review of the damages actually
awarded to TSMCand TSICA by the trial court on the one hand and theCourt of Appe
als on the other, reveals the need for amore careful and thorough examination of
the matter. As earlier noted, the Court of Appeals award of P1million based si
mply on the amount set out in theoriginal complaint of TSMC and TSICA must be di
scarded. Upon the other hand, the award by the trialcourt of damages to TSMC and
TSICA was arrived atmerely by totalling up the unrealized income sustainedby TS
MC and TSICA over the relevant four (4) crop yearperiod:- "Because on the refusa
l of the defendants planters toreturn to TSMC, plaintiff TSMC [and TSICA] suffer
ed anunrealized profit; of P1,934,847.73 in 1964-65 while for1965-66 crop year,
in the amount of P3,033,301.16, for1966-67 in the amount of P4,656,643.20, and f
or 19671968, in the amount of P4,805,472.12.- The plaintiff TSMC failed to reali
ze P3,015,077.77 andplaintiff TASICA failed to realize P6,609,714.32 or atotal o
f P9,624,792.09. In 1967-68 after the lease to TASICA has expired, TSMC failed t
o realize a net incomeof P4,805,514.12."- We believe, in other words, that the f
igures andcomputations utilized by the trial court in its award ondamages need f
urther examination and refinement. Forinstance, the award of damages rendered by
the trialcourt took into account the loss of income suffered by TSMC and TSICA
when AATSI, et al. transferred two (2)of sugar quota: the "domestic quota" and t
he "exportquota." The consent of the sugar central was notrequired for the valid
ity of a transfer of the domesticsugar quota. Accordingly, the transfer by AATSI
, et al.of their domestic sugar quota must be regarded asvalid and the loss of i
ncome attributable to the transferof such domestic sugar quota from TSMC and TSI
CA toFFMCI must be deducted from the aggregate amount of damages due to TSMC and
TSICA. A second example:Exhibits "P-1" and "W-1" embody figures relating to"mol
asses." Molasses are a by-product of milled sugar,whether that sugar be covered
by a "domestic quota"or by an "export quota." The amount of income losttraceable
to molasses that would have been extractedfrom domestic sugar must be deducted
from theaggregate damages due to TSMC and TSICA. Disposition Decision and Resolu
tion of the Court of Appeals MODIFIED insofar as the award of actualdamages due
Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. and Talisay-Silay Industrial Cooperative Associa
tion, Inc. areconcerned. Subject to the rulings referred to herein,this case is
REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for thedetermination, with all deliberate dispa
tch, of theamount of damages due Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc.and Talisay-Sila
y Industrial Cooperative Association,Inc. Cases 13-21 HIRANG, LEOMARIE F.
22. DAYWALT vs. LA CORPORACION DE LOS PADRES AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS FACTS OF THE CA
SE: Teodorica Endencia obligated herself to sell a parcel of land to the plainti
ff. It was agreed that the final deed of sale will be executed when the land was
registered in Endencias name. Subsequently, the Torrens Title for the land was i
ssued in her favor but in the course of the proceedings for registration it was
found that the land involved in the sale contained a greater area than what Ende
ncia originally thought and she became reluctant to consummate the sale of the l
and to the plaintiff. This reluctance was due to the advice of the defendant whi
ch exercised a great moral influence over her. However, in advising Endencia tha
t she was not bound by her contract with the plaintiff, the defendant was not ac
tuated with improper motives but did so in good faith believing that, under the
circumstances, Endencia was not really bound by her contract with the plaintiff.
In view of Endencias refusal to make the conveyance, the plaintiff instituted a
complaint for specific performance against her and, upon appeal, the Supreme Cou
rt held that she was bound by the contract and she was ordered to make the conve
yance of the land in question to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then instituted an
action against the defendant to recover the following damages: (1) The amount o
f Pesos 24,000.00 for the use and occupation of the land in question by reason o
f the pasturing of cattle therein during the period that the land was not convey
ed by Endencia to the plaintiff; (2) The amount of Pesos 500,000.00 for plaintif
fs failure to sell the land in question to a sugar growing and milling enterprise
. The lower court held that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff for the us
e and occupation of the land in question and condemned the defendant to pay the
plaintiff Pesos 2,497.00 as damages. The Supreme Court affirmed this adjudicatio
n of the lower court. With respect to the claim of Pesos 500,000.00 damages, the
Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the damages which the plaintiff seeks to recover
under this head are too remote and speculative to be the subject of recovery. RU
LING: The discussion contained in the opinion of the court in that case leads to
the conclusion that the damages recoverable in case of the breach of a contract
are two sorts, namely, (1) the ordinary, natural, and in a sense necessary dama
ge; and (2) special damages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual lOrdin
ary damages is found in all breaches of contract where there are no special circ
umstances to distinguish the case specially from other contracts. The considerat
ion paid for an unperformed promise is an instance of this sort of damage. In al
l such cases the damages recoverable are such as naturally and generally would r
esult from such a breach, "according to the usual course of things." In case inv
olving only ordinary damage no discussion is ever indulged as to whether that da
mage was contemplated or not. This is conclusively presumed from the immediatene
ss and inevitableness of the damage, and the recovery of such damage follows as
a necessary legal consequence of the breach. Ordinary damage is assumed as a mat
ter of law to be within the contemplation of the parties.chanroblesvirtualawlibr
ary Special damage, on the other hand, is such as follows less directly from the
breach than ordinary damage. It is only found in case where some external condi
tion, apart from the actual terms to the contract exists or intervenes, as it we
re, to give a turn to affairs and to increase damage in a way that the promisor,
without actual notice of that external condition, could not reasonably be expec
ted to foresee. Concerning this sort of damage, Hadley vs. Baxendale (1854) [sup
ra] lays down
the definite and just rule that before such damage can be recovered the plaintif
f must show that the particular condition which made the damage a possible and l
ikely consequence of the breach was known to the defendant at the time the contr
act was made.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The state
ment that special damages may be recovered where the likelihood of such damages
flowing from the breach of the contract is contemplated and foreseen by the part
ies needs to be supplemented by a proposition which, though not ennciated in Had
ley vs. Baxendale, is yet clearly to be drawn from subsequent cases. This is tha
t where the damage which a plaintiff seeks to recover as special damage is so fa
r speculative as to be in contemplation of law remote, notification of the speci
al conditions which make that damage possible cannot render the defendant liable
therefor. To bring damages which would ordinarily be treated as remote within t
he category of recoverable special damages, it is necessary that the condition s
hould be made the subject of contract in such sense as to become an express or i
mplied term of the engagement. Horne vs. Midland R. Co. (L. R., 8 C. P., 131) is
a case where the damage which was sought to be recovered as special damage was
really remote, and some of the judges rightly places the disallowance of the dam
age on the ground that to make such damage recoverable, it must so far have been
within the contemplation of the parties as to form at least an implied term of
the contract. But others proceeded on the idea that the notice given to the defe
ndant was not sufficiently full and definite. The result was the same in either
view. The facts in that case were as follows: The plaintiffs, shoe manufacturers
at K, were under contract to supply by a certain day shoes to a firm in London
for the French government. They delivered the shoes to a carrier in sufficient t
ime for the goods to reach London at the time stipulated in the contract and inf
ormed the railroad agent that the shoes would be thrown back upon their hands if
they did not reach the destination in time. The defendants negligently failed t
o forward the good in due season. The sale was therefore lost, and the market ha
ving fallen, the plaintiffs had to sell at a loss. In the preceding discussion w
e have considered the plaintiff s right chiefly against Teodorica Endencia; and
what has been said suffices in our opinion to demonstrate that the damages laid
under the second cause of action in the complaint could not be recovered from he
r, first, because the damages laid under the second cause of action in the compl
aint could not be recovered from her, first, because the damages in question are
special damages which were not within contemplation of the parties when the con
tract was made, and secondly, because said damages are too remote to be the subj
ect of recovery. This conclusion is also necessarily fatal to the right of the p
laintiff to recover such damages from the defendant corporation, for, as already
suggested, by advising Teodorica not to perform the contract, said corporation
could in no event render itself more extensively liable than the principle in th
e contract. Our conclusion is that the judgment of the trial court should be aff
irmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.c 23. CHING vs. CO
URT OF APPEALS FACTS OF THE CASE: On May 1960, spouses Nofuente and Lumandan was
issued a TCT covering a parcel of land at Rizal which was reconveyed to the Nof
uentes. On September 1961 by virtue of sale the ownership was transferred to Chi
ng Leng and the original TCT cancelled.
On October 1965 Ching Leng died so his Son Alfredo Ching became the administrato
r of his estate. 13 years after Ching Lengs death, a suit against him was commenc
ed by Pedro Asedillo with the RTC of Rizal for reconveyance of abovesaid propert
y and since Ching is nowhere to be found and after due publication, the court al
lowed presentation of evidence ex-parte. On june 15 1979, a judgement by default
against Ching was rendered by the RTC. Upon knowledge of Alfredo Ching, he file
d a motion before the trial court but was denied. He then filed a petition for c
ertiorari but same was dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of substance in a way probably not in accord with law or wit
h the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. RULING: The petition is impress
ed with merit. An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, rea
l property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole world, like a
land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in person
am, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly
impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in person
am and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific pe
rsons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thi
ng or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as
against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action
but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only altho
ugh it concerns the right to a tangible thing (Ang Lam v. Rosillosa,supra).chanr
oblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Private respondent s action
for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the judgment in q
uestion is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the decease
d defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years aft
er the latter s death. As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Produ
cts, Inc. (70 SCRA 475 [1976]) the decision of the lower court insofar as the de
ceased is concerned, is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was no
t, and he could not have been validly served with summons. He had no more civil
personality. His juridical personality, that is fitness to be subject of legal r
elations, was lost through death (Arts. 37 and 42 Civil Code). The same conclusi
on would still inevitably be reached notwithstanding joinder of Ching Leng s est
ate as co-defendant. it is a well-settled rule that an estate can sue or be sued
through an executor or administrator in his representative capacity (21 Am. Jr.
872). Contrary to private respondent s claims, deceased Ching Leng is a residen
t of 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City as shown in his death certificate and T. C.
T. No. 91137 and there is an on-going intestate proceedings in the same court, B
ranch III commenced in 1965, and notice of hearing thereof duly published in the
same year. Such misleading and misstatement of facts demonstrate lack of candor
on the part of private respondent and his counsel, which is censurable. The com
plaint for cancellation of Ching Leng s Torrens Title must be filed in the origi
nal land registration case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal, sitting as a land registration co
urt in accordance
with Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) not in C
FI Pasay City in connection with, or as a mere incident in Civil Case No. 6888-P
(Estanislao v. Honrado, 114 SCRA 748 [1982]). Section 112 of the same law requi
res "notice to all parties in interest." Since Ching Leng was already in the oth
er world when the summons was published he could not have been notified at all a
nd the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The ex-parte pro
ceedings for cancellation of title could not have been held (Estanislao v. Honra
do, supra). The cited case of Perkins v. Dizon, supra is inapplicable to the cas
e at bar since petitioner Perkins was a non-resident defendant sued in Philippin
e courts and sought to be excluded from whatever interest she has in 52,874 shar
es of stocks with Benguet Consolidated Mining Company. The action being a quasi
in rem summons by publication satisfied the constitutional requirement of due pr
ocess. The petition to set aside the judgment for lack of jurisdiction should ha
ve been granted and the amended complaint of private respondent based on possess
ion and filed only in 1978 dismissed outrightly. Ching Leng is an innocent purch
aser for value as shown by the evidence adduced in his behalf by petitioner here
in, tracing back the roots of his title since 1960, from the time the decree of
registration was issued. The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has bee
n wrongfully or erroneously registered in another s name-after one year from the
date of the decree-is not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in t
he ordinary court of justice for damages if the property has passed unto the han
ds of an innocent purchaser for value (Sy, Sr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 66742; Teoville Development Corporation v. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75011,
June 16, 1988). Failure to take steps to assert any rights over a disputed land
for 19 years from the date of registration of title is fatal to the private res
pondent s cause of action on the ground of laches. Laches is the failure or negl
ect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising due dilig
ence could or should have been done, earlier; it is negligence or omission to as
sert a right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party en
titled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Bailon-Cas
ilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988; Villamor v. Court of A
ppeals, G.R. No. 41508, June 27, 1988). The real purpose of the Torrens system i
s to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. On
ce a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of wa
iting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid
the possibility of losing his land (National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA
388 [1988]). A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership
of the land referred to therein (Section 49, Act 496). A strong presumption exi
sts that Torrens titles are regularly issued and that they are valid. A Torrens
title is incontrovertible against any "information possessoria" or title existin
g prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the title (Salamat Vda. de Medi
na v. Cruz, G.R. No. 39272, May 4, 1988).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the instant petition is hereby GRANTED; (2) the appeale
d decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; (3) the tri
al court s decision dated June 15, 1979 and the Order dated September 2, 1980 re
instating the same are hereby declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction an
d (4) the complaint in Civil Case No. 6888-P is hereby DISMISSED.chan 24. LUZON
CONCRETE PRODUCTS, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS OF THE CASE: On June 29, 196
6, private respondents Eutiquiano M. Baula and twelve others filed a Complaint f
or rescission of contract, stating that the corporation would issue shares of st
ocks to the plaintiffs the value of which would be commensurate to the contribut
ion of the plaintiffs to the corporation and in addition, the corporation would
assume the payments and amortizations on the obligation of the plaintiffs to the
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES in the amount of P165,000.00 in turn of the
ir contributions (including properties) to the corporation, before the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga against Luzon Concrete Products, Inc., and its incorp
orators, all petitioners herein. Petitioners-defendants moved to dismiss for lac
k of cause of action and the non existence of any pre-incorporation agreement, m
uch less a commitment to issue corporation shares in favor of the Heirs but was
denied by the trial court. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs resc
inding the contract and sentencing the defendants jointly and severally to pay r
easonable compensation or rent for the use of the said properties, to pay the DB
P, return the said properties, attorneys fees, and legal rates of interest. After
the petitioners motion for reconsideration before the trial was denied twice, th
ey filed a petition before the CA but was also denied. So they filed a petition
before this court. ISSUE: Whether or not the amounts granted by the trial court
were justifiable. RULING: The fairness of the award made by the Trial Court in f
avor of the Heirs also calls for appellate determination, for, with the "reasona
ble compensation" of P880,000.00 ordered paid for the period from August, 1964 t
o November, 1971, plus the monthly rentals of P10,000.00 required to be paid the
reafter until physical possession is delivered to the Heirs, the total collectib
le amount would reach the staggering amount of P2,450,000.00 as of December 1984
(245 months from August, 1964, excluding interest, for machineries originally w
orth P165,000.00 and which must have outlived their lifetime). The judgment also
orders the return of the machineries to the Heirs "in the same good operating c
ondition" that they were at the time petitioners-defendants took possession ther
eof, or approximately 20 years ago, which is an impossible condition. All told,
in addition to procedural considerations, the broader interests of substantial j
ustice would be better subserved if the appeal were allowed.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is granted and this case is hereby ordered remanded to
the now Intermediate Appellate Court for determination of petitioners-defendant
s appeal on the merits. 25. KAIRUZ vs. PACIO FACTS OF THE CASE: On or before Ap
ril of 1950 the plaintiffs spouse had a timber concession granted by the Governm
ent which was managed by the wife, Elena Pacio. During the first days of April,
1950, plaintiff Elena S. Pacio and defendant Miguel Kairuz entered into verbal c
ontract by virtue of which Kairuz delivered to Pacio a G.M.C. motor engine and s
ome spare parts to be used by Pacio in hauling logs from the timber concession o
n condition that she would sell the logs thus cut and hauled to Kairuz at the ra
te of P12.50 per cubic meter. When the motor was delivered it was not in good co
ndition but was then repaired at the cost of Kairuz. Pacio then commenced with h
er business and started cutting logs and from April 22, 1950 to May 21, 1951 sol
d them to Kairuz. The total amount that Elena S. Pacio was indebted to petitione
r Kairuz, corresponding to the value of the motor including the repairs formerly
paid by Kairuz was paid by Elena on May 21,1951 for a total of P1,552.95. On Ju
ne 28, 1951 Kairuz took possession of said motor upon learning that Elena S. Pac
io was selling her logs or posts to another person thus suspending the operation
of their timber concession for 161 days, and were able to resume their logging
operations only on November 5, 1951, when they acquired a new motor. So the case
for recovery and for damages was filed. The trial court and the CA rendered jud
gment in favor of Elena Pacio. ISSUES: Whether or not additional actual and comp
ensatory damage, are highly speculative, contingent and arbitrary. RULING: The C
ourt of Appeals in justifying its award of these damages of P7.00 per day indulg
es in a quite extensive commentary or discussion, citing various provisions of t
he Civil Code. And petitioner-appellant to counteract and meet that commentary a
nd discussion, also now saw fit to devote many pages of his brief to extensive c
itations of authorities. After a careful study of the legal issue involved, we f
ind no extensive discussion or commentary necessary, and we agree with counsel f
or petitionerappellant that the damages at the rate of P7.00 a day from November
5, 1951 until the motor engine was returned or its value of P1,552.95 was paid
to plaintiff-respondents, are highly speculative, contingent, arbitrary and unju
st. Just to show how speculative and uncertain that amount of P10.00 is, at the
hearing before the trial court plaintiff declared that she could have rented the
motor engined at the rate of P20.00 a day, and what she suffered as damages for
the loss of said engine. The Court of Appeals did not believe her and fixed the
said amount at P10.00 a day. On motion for reconsideration, this amount further
reduced to P7.00 by the Court of Appeals itself. There is no reliable basis for
fixing said amount of the damages. The plaintiffs had no use for said engine ev
en if they had it in their possession because they already had a new one. Neithe
r could they have possibly rented it out to another party because it was used on
ly in a timber concession for hauling logs, and not yet everyone has have their
own motor engines for hauling timber from the forest, and probably new ones at t
hat. The petitioner-appellant himself could not have used the motor engine becau
se he was not a timber concessionaire. So, in all probability, he just kept or d
umped it in a corner. Furthermore, the motor engine in question is not too valua
ble a property. It was surplus property which Kairuz had acquired for P150.00 an
d which he sold to the plaintiff for
P245.00 To put it in good running condition, many spare parts had to be bought a
nd placed in it and the services of a mechanic had to be availed of. So all in a
ll, it came to cost P1,552.95. That was in 1950 and it had been used by plaintif
f herself for over a year. Machinery, specially engines, deteriorate fast and th
eir rate of depreciation is quite high. That is the reason why car owners from e
xperience find it more profitable after using a car for two or three years, to t
rade it in or sell it and buy a new one because the repair and overhauling of an
old car, specially and old model, would in the long run cost more than acquirin
g a new one. That is the reason why assuming that if the plaintiffs had this mot
or engine in their possession on November 5, 1951, and assuming further that the
y could have rented it to another party, the amount of the rent would have been
hard to determine, much more the period for the lease because running a motor en
gine everyday, as already stated, could not last forever. Spare parts have to be
bought or it may have to be overhauled, and the time will come when the engine
itself will be completely useless. That is the reason why damages awarded on thi
s basis are highly speculative, contingent, and arbitrary. And to give an idea o
f the injustice of the award of damages on said basis, according to counsel for
petitioner, as of the writing on his brief on December 20, 1958, the damages wou
ld amount to over P18,000.00. And as of the writing of this opinion, at the rate
of P7.00 a day from November 5, 1951, the damages would amount to over P24,000.
00. The most practical basis for assessing damages would to the payment of legal
interest on the value of the engine. It will be remembered that the judgment ag
ainst defendantpetitioner was to return the motor engine or to pay its value of
P1,552.95. This form or basis of damages is widely accepted and employed. When a
piece of personal property, say, a jeep, is the subject of estafa or theft, the
accused if found guilty, is sentenced to return to property stolen or misapprop
riated, or to pay its value. Even interest is seldom, if at all, ordered. And wh
en a party defendant is declared liable to pay a certain amount of money which h
e owes, he sentenced to pay said amount with legal interest from the date that h
e was supposed to have paid the same, or when the action to collect was brought
in court. No speculative damages as to the profit money, its investment, etc., i
s allowed. In the present case, the petitioner-appellant should and is hereby or
dered to pay legal interest from November 5, 1951 on the amount of P1,552.25 unt
il the motor engine is returned or its value of P1,552.25 is paid to respondent-
appellee. This is in lieu of the payment of P7.00 a day from November 5, 1951, o
rdered in the appealed decision. 26. ROGELIO E. RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS
: Erlinda Ramos, 47, was normal except for her experiencing occasional pain due
to the presence of stone in her gall bladder. She was advised to undergo an oper
ation for its removal. The results in the examinations she underwent indicate th
at she was fit for the operation. She and her husband Rogelio met Dr. Hosaka, on
e of the defendants, who advised that she should undergo cholecystectomy. Dr. Ho
saka assured them that he will get a good anaesthesiologist. At 7:30 a.m. on the
day of the operation at Delos Santos Medical Center, Herminda Cruz, Erlindas sis
ter-in-law and the dean of the College of Nursing in Capitol Medical Center, was
there to provide moral support. Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez was to administer the an
aesthesia. Dr. Hosaka arrived only at 12:15 p. m. Herminda saw Dr. Gutierrez int
ubating the patient, and heard the latter say Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali ya
ta ang pagkakapasok. O, lumalaki ang tiyan. Herminda saw bluish discoloration of
the nailbeds of the patient. She heard Dr. Hosaka issue an
order for someone to call Dr. Calderon. The doctor arrived and placed the patien
t in trendelenburg position, wherein the head of the patient is positioned lower
than the feet, which indicates a decrease of blood supply in the brain. Hermind
a knew and told Rogelio that something wrong was happening. Dr. Calderon was abl
e to intubate the patient. Erlinda was taken to the ICU and became comatose. Rog
elio filed a civil case for damages. The trial court ruled in his favor, finding
Dr. Gutierrez, Dr. Hosaka, and the hospital, guilty of negligence, but the Cour
t of Appeals reversed the decision. ISSUE: Whether a surgeon, an anaesthesiologi
st, and a hospital, should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition
of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy. RULING: Res ipsa loquitur is a Lati
n phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself."
The phrase "res ipsa loquitur is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the oc
currence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an i
nference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff s prima f
acie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanat
ion. Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under
the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in o
rdinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or con
trol use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanat
ion by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendan
t s want of care. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experie
nce and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be d
educed from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. However, much has been s
aid thatres ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does no
t create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. Mere invo
cation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of
proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such proof, permitti
ng the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident, enough of the
attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presump
tion of negligence, and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going fo
rward with the proof. Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the f
ollowing requisites must be satisfactorily shown. (1) The accident is of a kind
which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone s negligence; (2) It i
s caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and (3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the
plaintiff responsible is eliminated. Medical malpractice cases do not escape th
e application of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur has been applied when th
e circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to
justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that harm. Although generall
y, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a
physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard med
ical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plainti
ff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury i
tself provides the proof of negligence. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loqui
tur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon pro
per proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where t
he court from its fund
of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. When the doctrine
is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the parti
cular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the cus
tody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical test
imony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed
because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the
patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him. Res ipsa loquitur is not
a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautious
ly applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. A distinction must be
made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something mor
e unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed
the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. The real ques
tion, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordi
nary incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which
is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such operatio
ns, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man a
s the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. We find the doctrin
e of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. Erlinda submitted herself
for cholecystectomy and expected a routine general surgery to be performed on h
er gall bladder. On that fateful day she delivered her person over to the care,
custody and control of private respondents who exercised complete and exclusive
control over her. At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound an
d, except for a few minor discomforts, was likewise physically fit in mind and b
ody. However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performan
ce of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, withou
t undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room already decerebrate and
totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an
injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation.
In fact, this kind of situation does not in the absence of negligence of someon
e in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube. Furth
ermore, the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the
endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private respondents,
who are the physicians-in-charge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have be
en guilty of contributory negligence because she was under the influence of anes
thetics which rendered her unconscious. Negligence of the Anaesthesiologist The
pre-operative evaluation of a patient prior to the administration of anesthesia
is universally observed to lessen the possibility of anesthetic accidents. Respo
ndent Dra. Gutierrez act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour
before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional n
egligence and professional irresponsibility. Her failure to follow this medical
procedure is, therefore, a clear indicia of her negligence. Erlinda s case was e
lective and this was known to respondent Dra. Gutierrez. Thus, she had all the t
ime to make a thorough evaluation of Erlinda s case prior to the operation and p
repare her for anesthesia. However, she never saw the patient at the bedside. Sh
e herself admitted that she had seen petitioner only in the operating room, and
only on the actual date of the cholecystectomy. She negligently failed to take a
dvantage of this important opportunity. As such, her attempt to exculpate hersel
f must fail.
Opinion of Expert Witness An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced b
ronchospasm properly falls within the fields of anesthesia, internal medicine-al
lergy, and clinical pharmacology. The resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to
the field of neurology. While admittedly, many bronchospastic-mediated pulmonar
y diseases are within the expertise of pulmonary medicine, Dr. Jamora s field, t
he anesthetic drug-induced, allergic mediated bronchospasm alleged in this case
is within the disciplines of anesthesiology, allergology and pharmacology. On th
e basis of the foregoing transcript, in which the pulmonologist himself admitted
that he could not testify about the drug with medical authority, it is clear th
at the appellate court erred in giving weight to Dr. Jamora s testimony as an ex
pert in the administration of Thiopental Sodium. Generally, to qualify as an exp
ert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the subject matter abou
t which he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized authorities o
n the subject or by practical experience. Clearly, Dr. Jamora does not qualify a
s an expert witness based on the above standard since he lacks the necessary kno
wledge, skill, and training in the field of anesthesiology. Oddly, apart from su
bmitting testimony from a specialist in the wrong field, private respondents in
tentionally avoided providing testimony by competent and independent experts in
the proper areas. Proximate Cause Proximate cause has been defined as that which
, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening caus
e, produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. An inj
ury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it a
ppears from the evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substant
ial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that th
e injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequen
ce of the act or omission. Instead of the intended endotracheal intubation what
actually took place was an esophageal intubation. During intubation, such disten
tion indicates that air has entered the gastrointestinal tract through the esoph
agus instead of the lungs through the trachea. Entry into the esophagus would ce
rtainly cause some delay in oxygen delivery into the lungs as the tube which car
ries oxygen is in the wrong place. That abdominal distention had been observed d
uring the first intubation suggests that the length of time utilized in insertin
g the endotracheal tube (up to the time the tube was withdrawn for the second at
tempt) was fairly significant. Due to the delay in the delivery of oxygen in her
lungs Erlinda showed signs of cyanosis. Responsibility of the Surgeon As the so
-called "captain of the ship," it is the surgeon s responsibility to see to it t
hat those under him perform their task in the proper manner. Respondent Dr. Hosa
ka s negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in
not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In
fact, no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified
if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it doe
s not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a
different hospital at the same time as Erlinda s cholecystectomy, and was in fac
t over three hours late for the latter s operation. Because of this, he had litt
le or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia deliv
ery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his pa
tient. Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erl
inda s condition.
Responsibility of the Hospital Hospitals hire, fire and exercise real control ov
er their attending and visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not,
technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all
responsibility for the patient s condition, the control exercised, the hiring,
and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an
employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. In
assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determ
ining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose
of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee r
elationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians. The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the neg
ligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which conside
rs a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others b
ased on the former s responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. Suc
h responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they hav
e observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. In th
e instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its responsi
bility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exe
rcised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision
of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervi
sion which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof,
or proof of a similar nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge it
s burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. Having failed to do this, res
pondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for
Erlinda s condition. Damages At current levels, the P8000/monthly amount establi
shed by the trial court at the time of its decision would be grossly inadequate
to cover the actual costs of home-based care for a comatose individual. The calc
ulated amount was not even arrived at by looking at the actual cost of proper ho
spice care for the patient. What it reflected were the actual expenses incurred
and proved by the petitioners after they were forced to bring home the patient t
o avoid mounting hospital bills. And yet ideally, a comatose patient should rema
in in a hospital or be transferred to a hospice specializing in the care of the
chronically ill for the purpose of providing a proper milieu adequate to meet mi
nimum standards of care. Given these considerations, the amount of actual damage
s recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the corre
ct minimum cost of proper care, not the cost of the care the family is usually c
ompelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy. Our rules on actual or compen
satory damages generally assume that at the time of litigation, the injury suffe
red as a consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and that the cos
t can be liquidated. However, these provisions neglect to take into account thos
e situations, as in this case, where the resulting injury might be continuing an
d possible future complications directly arising from the injury, while certain
to occur, are difficult to predict. Temperate damages can and should be awarded
on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chroni
c and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibi
lity arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. The reason
is that these damages cover two distinct phases. As it would not be equitable -
and certainly not in the best interests of the administration of justice - for t
he victim in such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke their ai
d in seeking adjustments to the
compensatory damages previously awarded - temperate damages are appropriate. The
amount given as temperate damages, though to a certain extent speculative, shou
ld take into account the cost of proper care. In the instant case, petitioners w
ere able to provide only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient who has
remained in that condition for over a decade. Having premised our award for comp
ensatory damages on the amount provided by petitioners at the onset of litigatio
n, it would be now much more in step with the interests of justice if the value
awarded for temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal care fo
r their loved one in a facility which generally specializes in such care. They s
hould not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home
without the aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate
. Under the circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would
therefore be reasonable. Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when th
e incident occurred. She has been in a comatose state for over fourteen years no
w. The burden of care has so far been heroically shouldered by her husband and c
hildren, who, in the intervening years have been deprived of the love of a wife
and a mother. Meanwhile, the actual physical, emotional and financial cost of th
e care of petitioner would be virtually impossible to quantify. Even the tempera
te damages herein awarded would be inadequate if petitioner s condition remains
unchanged for the next ten years. The husband and the children, all petitioners
in this case, will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of the patient s
illness, knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. They have fashioned thei
r daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner, altering their long term go
als to take into account their life with a comatose patient. They, not the respo
ndents, are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. The
family s moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. For the
foregoing reasons, an award of P2,000,000.00 in moral damages would be appropri
ate. Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00
are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are
of the opinion that attorney s fees valued at P100,000.00 are likewise proper.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are
hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against p
rivate respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages computed as
of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8,000.0
0 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives;
2) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages; 4) P1
00,000.00 each as exemplary damages and attorney s fees; and, 5) the costs of th
e suit. 27. SPOUSES RENATO S. ONG VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On February 9, 198
7, petitioners boarded as paying passengers an Inland bus which was owned and op
erated by Inland Trailways under a Lease Agreement with Philtranco. Around 3:50
in the morning of said date, when the Inland bus slowed down to avoid a stalled
cargo truck in Tiaong, Quezon, it was bumped from the rear by another bus, owned
and operated by Philtranco, causing injuries to the spouses.
On December 22, 1988, petitioners filed an action for damages against Philtranco
and Inland presenting documentary evidence of their expenses but failed to pres
ent the police report as evidence. On May 7, 1991, the trial court rendered its
judgment in favor of the petitioners absolving Inland Trailways, Inc., from any
liability whatsoever, and against Philtranco Service Enterprise, Inc. based on c
ulpa aquiliana which was amended by the Court of Appeals absolving Philtranco Se
rvice Enterprise, Inc. from liability instead against Inland based on culpa cont
ractual and reducing the amount of moral damages, medical and miscellaneous expe
nses and disallowing the award of unearned income. ISSUES: (1) Whether the Polic
e Report, which was not formally offered in evidence, could be used to establish
a claim against Philtranco based on culpa aquiliana. (2) Whether the reduction
in the amounts of damages awarded was proper. RULING: First Issue: Requirement o
f Formal Offer of Evidence Petitioners take exception to the rule requiring docu
ments to be formally offered in evidence before they can be given any probative
value, arguing that the parties agreed to submit the case for resolution based o
n the July 5, 1989 Order of the trial court. Because of the agreement, petitione
rs assumed that all the pieces of documentary evidence, including the Complaint
and its Annexes, as well as those in the respective Answers of the private respo
ndents, were deemed admitted. We disagree. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, provides that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been for
mally offered. A formal offer is necessary, since judges are required to base th
eir findings of fact and their judgment solely and strictly upon the evidence of
fered by the parties at the trial. To allow parties to attach any document to th
eir pleadings and then expect the court to consider it as evidence, even without
formal offer and admission, may draw unwarranted consequences. Opposing parties
will be deprived of their chance to examine the document and to object to its a
dmissibility. On the other hand, the appellate court will have difficulty review
ing documents not previously scrutinized by the court below. In adhering to this
rule, the appellate court cannot be faulted with reversible error, as it held.
The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff in establishing fault or negligence
on the part of the defendant (Ong vs. Metropolitan Water). This, however, plaint
iff-appellees failed to establish. Albeit, there was a police investigation repo
rt finding the driver of PHILTRANCO negligent which became the basis of the cour
t a quo holding PHILTRANCO liable, this piece of evidence was merely attached as
Annex 1 of INLANDs answer, nothing more. It was not presented and even offered
as evidence by INLAND nor utilized by plaintiffs-appellees. Thus, even assuming
arguendo that the same had been identified in court, it would have no evidentiar
y value. Identification of documentary evidence must be distinguished from its f
ormal offer as an exhibit. The first is done in the course of the trial and is a
ccompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit. The second is done only
when the party rests its case and not before. The mere fact that a particular d
ocument is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean it will be or has b
een offered as part of the evidence of the party. The party may decide to offer
it if it believes
this will advance the cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all (P
eople vs. Santito, Jr., 201 SCRA 87). In the case at bar, the defendant INLAND a
nd plaintiffs-appellees did not identify the said Annex 1 or the Police Investig
ation Report as evidence. Thus, under Section 35 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rule
s on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. Corollary, the Police Investigation Report of Annex 1 cannot be given a
ny evidentiary value. Absent Annex 1 which was the basis of the trial court in f
inding PHILTRANCO liable, the latter is thus exonerated from liability. Petition
ers similarly erred in presuming that said Annex was admitted in evidence by vir
tue of the Order of July 5, 1989. Their presumption has no basis. The Order requ
ired counsel for the petitioners to submit his formal offer of evidence, furnish
ing copies thereof to defendants who shall have five (5) days from their receipt
within which to submit comments after which the same shall be deemed submitted
for resolution. In compliance, petitioners filed a written offer of evidence on
July 12, 1989. Such offer led the trial court, in its Order of August 2, 1989, t
o formally admit in evidence Exhibits A-O. Clearly, the Police Report was neithe
r offered by the petitioners nor admitted by the trial court. Moreover, the peti
tioners allegations in their Complaint did not establish a cause of action again
st Philtranco. They similarly failed to make any reference to said Police Report
during the presentation of their case. This is precisely why Respondent Philtra
nco opted not to present further evidence. A document or an article is valueless
unless it is formally offered in evidence, and the opposing counsel is given an
opportunity to object to it and to cross-examine any witness called to present
or identify it. Evidence not formally offered before the trial court cannot be c
onsidered on appeal, for to consider them at such stage will deny the other part
ies their right to rebut them. There is no agreement to submit the case based on
the pleading, as contended by the petitioners. The parties had no such intentio
n, nor did said Order evince such an agreement. Second Issue: Damages Require Ev
idence Petitioners aver that there was grave abuse of discretion when the amount
of actual damages awarded was reduced from P10,000 to P3,977, even if the origi
nal amount did not even include the medical expenses that Francia continued to i
ncur; and when the award of P48,000 as unrealized income was deleted despite her
testimony which was given credence by the trial court. The Court disagrees. Gra
nting arguendo that there was an agreement to submit the case for decision based
on the pleadings, this does not necessarily imply that petitioners are entitled
to the award of damages. The fundamental principle of the law on damages is tha
t one injured by a breach of contract (in this case, the contract of transportat
ion) or by a wrongful or negligent act or omission shall have a fair and just co
mpensation, commensurate with the loss sustained as a consequence of the defenda
nts acts. Hence, actual pecuniary compensation is the general rule, except where
the circumstances warrant the allowance of other kinds of damages.
Actual damages are such compensation or damages for an injury that will put the
injured party in the position in which he had been before he was injured. They p
ertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of
measurement. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled t
o adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as he has duly proven. To b
e recoverable, actual damages must be pleaded and proven in Court. In no instanc
e may the trial judge award more than those so pleaded and proven. Damages canno
t be presumed. The award thereof must be based on the evidence presented, not on
the personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, specu
lative and nonsubstantial proof. Article 2199 of the Civil Code expressly mandat
es that except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequ
ate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly pro
ved. The lack of basis for such award was patent in the trial court Decision: Th
e records will show that from the documentary evidence, petitioners have jointly
spent the sum of P3,977.00. Respondent, Philtranco has not presented any eviden
ce that it has advanced any amount for medicine, hospitalization and doctors fee
s, but on the contrary, petitioners have testified that they paid for their expe
nses except at the initial stage wherein a representative of respondent Philtran
co went to the hospital to get the receipts of medicines only and paid. Consider
ing the claim of the petitioners, as alleged in their complaint they spent P10,0
00.00 representing medical and miscellaneous expenses considering that they have
gone for consultation to at least two (2) different doctors, this Court may tak
e judicial notice of the fact that miscellaneous expenses [are] bound to be incu
rred to cover transportation and food, and therefore, finds the amount ofP10,000
.00 as actual damages to be reasonable. Damages, after all, are not intended to
enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant. Moral Damages and Diminu
tion of Use of Francias Arm Petitioners protest the deletion of the amount of P5
0,000 earlier awarded by the trial court because of the diminution of the use of
Francias right arm, arguing that she stated during direct examination that it c
ould no longer perform its normal functions, and that private respondents implie
dly admitted this matter when they failed to present controverting evidence. A p
erson is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body, and if that inte
grity is violated, damages are due and assessable. However, physical injury, lik
e loss or diminution of use of an arm or a limb, is not a pecuniary loss. Indeed
, it is not susceptible of exact monetary estimation. Thus, the usual practice i
s to award moral damages for physical injuries sustained. In Mayo v. People, the
Court held that the permanent scar on the forehead and the loss of the use of t
he right eye entitled the victim to moral damages. The victim, in said case, was
devastated by mental anguish, wounded feelings and shock, which she experienced
as a result of her false eye and the scar on her forehead. Furthermore, the los
s of vision in her right eye hampered her professionally for the rest of her lif
e. In the case at bar, it was sufficiently shown during the trial that Francias
right arm could not function in a normal manner and that, as a result, she suffe
red mental anguish and
anxiety. Thus, an increase in the amount of moral damages awarded, from P30,000
to P50,000, appears to be reasonable and justified. Renato also suffered mental
anxiety and anguish from the accident. Thus, he should be separately awarded P30
,000 as moral damages. In some instances, the Court awards the cost of medical p
rocedures to restore the injured person to his or her former condition. However,
this award necessitates expert testimony on the cost of possible restorative me
dical procedure. In Gatchalian v. Delim, the Court, reasoning that a scar result
ing from the infliction of injury on the face of a woman gave rise to a legitima
te claim for restoration to her conditio ante, granted P15,000 as actual damages
for plastic surgery. It bears emphasis that the said amount was based on expert
testimony. In another case, the Court granted actual or compensatory damages in
the sum of P18,000 for the surgical intervention necessary to arrest the degene
ration of the mandible of a young boy. Again, there was an expert testimony that
such medical procedure would cost P3,000 and would have to be repeated several
times to restore him to nearly normal condition. In the case at bar, petitioner
failed to present evidence regarding the feasibility or practicability and the c
ost of a restorative medical operation on her arm. Thus, there is no basis to gr
ant her P48,000 for such expense. Unrealized Income Protesting the deletion of t
he award for Francias unrealized income, petitioners contend that Francias injur
ies and her oral testimony adequately support their claim. The Court disagrees.
Although actual damages include indemnification for profits which the injured pa
rty failed to obtain (lucro cesante or lucrum cesans), the rule requires that sa
id person produce the best evidence of which his case is susceptible. The bare a
nd unsubstantiated assertion of Francia that she usually earned P200 a day from
her market stall is not the best evidence to prove her claim of unrealized incom
e for the eight-month period that her arm was in plaster cast. Her testimony tha
t it was their lessor who filed their income tax returns and obtained business l
icenses for them does not justify her failure to present more credible evidence
of her income. Furthermore, after her ten-day confinement at the San Pablo Hospi
tal, she could have returned to her work at the public market despite the plaste
r cast on her right arm, since she claimed to have two nieces as helpers. Clearl
y, the appellate court was correct in deleting the award for unrealized income,
because of petitioners utter failure to substantiate her claim. Attorneys Fees C
ounsel for petitioner deeply laments the reduction in the award of attorneys fee
s. He alleges that he had to use his own money for transportation, stenographic
transcriptions and other court expenses, and for such reason, avers that the awa
rd of 25 percent attorneys fees made by the trial court was proper. Under the Ci
vil Code, an award of attorneys fees is an indemnity for damages ordered by a co
urt to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party, based on any of the
cases authorized by law. It is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unle
ss the two
have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensatio
n or as part thereof. The Court has established a set of standards in fixing the
amount of attorneys fees: (1) [T]he amount and character of the services render
ed; (2) labor, time and trouble involved; (3) the nature and importance of the l
itigation or business in which the services were rendered; (4) the responsibilit
y imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the
controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called f
or in the performance of the services; (7) the professional character and social
standing of the attorney; (8) the results secured, it being a recognized rule t
hat an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than
when it is not. Counsels performance, however, does not justify the award of 25
percent attorneys fees. It is well-settled that such award is addressed to soun
d judicial discretion and subject to judicial control. We do not see any abuse t
hereof in the case at bar. In fact, the appellate court had been generous to pet
itioners counsel, considering that the nature of the case was not exceptionally
difficult, and he was not required to exert Herculean efforts. All told, his han
dling of the case was sorely inadequate, as shown by his failure to follow eleme
ntary norms of civil procedure and evidence. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Renato and Francia Ong are separately award
ed moral damages in the amount of P30,000 and P50,000, respectively. The ten per
cent (10%) attorneys fees shall be based on the total modified award. 28. MANZAN
ARES vs. MORETA FACTS OF THE CASE: On the morning of March 5, 1916, a male child
, 8 or 9 years of age, was run over along Solana Street by an automobile driven
and managed by the defendant causing his death. The mother of the dead boy is a
widow, a poor washerwoman. She brings action against the defendant to recover da
mages for her loss in the amount of P5,000. Without there having been tendered a
ny special proof of the amount of damages suffered, the trial court found the de
fendant responsible and condemned him to pay to plaintiff the sum of P1,000. Fro
m this judgment, an appeal was taken by the defendant after his motion for a new
trial had been overruled, and the case is now before this court by bill of exce
ptions. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the defendant was negligent. (2) Whether or n
ot the amount granted by the trial court was equitable. RULING: 1st issue: If it
were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street
, had to stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles
which were going along the latter street or were coming from the opposite direct
ion along Solana street, it is to be believed that, when he against stated to ru
n his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way along Solana Street n
orthward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating u
ntil he had fully crossed Real
Street and had completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the chil
d was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this acci
dent could not have occurred, if the auto had been running at a slow speed, asid
e form the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and en
tering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in the
act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the
left; and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the automobile
had run over the body of the child, and the child s body had already been stretc
hed out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 me
ters, this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street
form Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant having blown the horn.
If these precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident wh
ich caused the death of the child would not have occurred. 2nd Issue: As may be
seen, this jurisprudence (of Spain) is in accordance with the legal precept of t
he code that only those damages actually caused may be awarded, and, therefore,
to enable the court to decide what damages have been caused, it is necessary to
prove the real existence of the damages and the corresponding facts from which t
he court can deduce the amount thereof. Of course, the plaintiff makes a claim o
nly for herself for pecuniary loss sustained by her on account of the death of h
er son, and the boy himself does not make any claim because he did not live to d
o so; hence the mother would never have been entitled to any other damages than
those arising out of the loss of the services of her son, and never to those dam
ages which he himself might have been entitled to claim had he not died, or aris
ing from the injuries that he himself might have suffered on account of the acci
dent. The damages which would give the plaintiff in this case a right to recover
y against the defendant are only the loss of support, or contributions thereto,
which the son was accustomed to make to his mother from his earnings and of whic
h she may have been deprived by his death. But does the evidence introduced by t
he plaintiff support her claim to recover such damages? We are of the opinion th
at it does not, because she has not proven that her son was really earning the a
mount alleged in the complaint, nor any other sum whatever, no alleged in the co
mplaint, nor any other sum whatever, nor alleged in the complaint, nor any other
sum whatever, nor how much money he was earning preceding his death or at any t
ime. And we are of the opinion that this is a necessary requisite, because, as t
he Civil Code declares that recovery may be had for the damage caused, the damag
es accruing to the plaintiff must be shown so that the trial judge may have data
on which to base his decision. To force the plaintiff to prove her loss exactly
would be to ask the impossible - would be in effect to return to the old common
law rule which prohibits a recovery. Physical and gross criteria, as the hewing
of wood and carrying of water, are indeed no standards at all. Even if the case
was to be reopened, the plaintiff could with extreme difficulty present any bet
ter evidence than that now before us. As we have the basis of satisfactory facts
from which to infer the amount of damage, as the law presumes a pecuniary loss
because of the death, and as the trial judge has made an intelligent computation
, we should rest here, with knowledge that, within the ken of human wisdom, just
ice has been done.
On a careful consideration of the entire field of the law on the subject of dama
ges, we come to the conclusion that the amount, in the nature of an indemnity al
lowed by the trial court, is neither excessive nor immoderately inadequate, and
should stand.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law lJudgment, theref
ore, should be affirmed. 29. GREGORIO PESTAO V. SPOUSES PAZ FACTS: At around 2:00
o clock on the afternoon of August 9, 1986, Ananias Sumayang was riding a motor
cycle along the national highway in Ilihan, Tabagon, Cebu. Riding with him was h
is friend Manuel Romagos. As they came upon a junction where the highway connect
ed with the road leading to Tabagon, they were hit by an overtaking passenger bu
s driven by Gregorio Pestao and owned by Metro Cebu Autobus Corporation, which ha
d tried to overtake them, sending the motorcycle and its passengers hurtling upo
n the pavement causing their death. Apart from the institution of criminal charg
es against Gregorio Pestao, the heirs of Ananias Sumayang, filed a civil action f
or damages against Gregorio Pestao, as driver of the passenger bus, Metro Cebu, a
s owner and operator of the said bus, and Perla Compania de Seguros, as insurer
of Metro Cebu which was consolidated upon motion of petitioner. In judgment, the
lower court found petitioners liable to the respondents. Pestao to have been neg
ligent in driving the passenger bus that hit the deceased and Metro Cebu directl
y and primarily liable, along with Pestao, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code f
or allowing the bus to ply its route despite the defective speedometer. the Cour
t of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision and increasing the indemnity for
death of the victim from P30,000 to P50,000. ISSUES: (1) Whether the CA erred 1
in applying Section 45 of RA 4136 when it ruled that negligence in driving was t
he proximate cause of the accident. (2) Whether or not the CA erred in increasin
g the civil indemnity from P30,000 to P50,000. (3) Whether or not the CA erred i
n using the life expectancy of the deceased instead of the life expectancies of
respondents. RULING: First Issue: Negligence Petitioners contend that Pestao was
not under any obligation to slow down when he overtook the motorcycle, because t
he deceased had given way to him upon hearing the bus horn. Seeing that the left
side of the road was clearly visible and free of oncoming traffic, Pestao accele
rated his speed to pass the motorcycle. Having given way to the bus, the motorcy
cle driver should have slowed down until he had been overtaken. They further con
tend that the motorcycle was not in the middle of the road nearest to the juncti
on as found by the trial and the appellate courts, but was on the inner lane. Th
is explains why the damage on the bus were all on the right side - the right end
of the
bumper and the right portion of the radiator grill were bent and dented. Hence,
they insist that it was the victim who was negligent. We disagree. Petitioners a
re raising a question of fact based on Pestao s testimony contradicting that of E
yewitness Ignacio Neis and on the location of the dents on the bumper and the gr
ill. Neis testified that as the two vehicles approached the junction, the victim
raised his left arm to signal that he was turning left to Tabagon, but that the
latter and his companion were thrown off the motorcycle after it was bumped by
the overspeeding bus. These contentions have already been passed upon by the tri
al and the appellate courts. We find no cogent reason to reverse or modify their
factual findings. The CA agreed with the trial court that the vehicular collisi
on was caused by Pestao s negligence when he attempted to overtake the motorcycle
. As a professional driver operating a public transport bus, he should have anti
cipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous maneuver and should thus ha
ve exercised extreme caution. Factual findings of the CA affirming those of the
trial court are conclusive and binding on this Court. Petitioners failed to demo
nstrate that this case falls under any of the recognized exceptions to this rule
.Indeed, the issue of negligence is basically factual and, in quasi-delicts, cru
cial in the award of damages. Petitioners aver that the CA was wrong in attribut
ing the accident to a faulty speedometer and in implying that the accident could
have been avoided had this instrument been properly functioning. This contentio
n has no factual basis. Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, owners a
nd managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees. When an injur
y is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee, the master or employe
r is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of t
hat employee. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing th
at the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a famil
y in the selection and the supervision of its employee. The CA said that allowin
g Pestao to ply his route with a defective speedometer showed laxity on the part
of Metro Cebu in the operation of its business and in the supervision of its emp
loyees. The negligence alluded to here is in its supervision over its driver, no
t in that which directly caused the accident. The fact that Pestao was able to us
e a bus with a faulty speedometer shows that Metro Cebu was remiss in the superv
ision of its employees and in the proper care of its vehicles. It had thus faile
d to conduct its business with the diligence required by law. Second Issue: Life
Indemnity Petitioners aver that the CA erred in increasing the award for life i
ndemnity from P30,000 to P50,000, without specifying any aggravating circumstanc
e to justify the increment as provided in the Civil Code. This contention is unt
enable. The indemnity for death caused by a quasi-delict used to be pegged at P3
,000, based on Article 2206 of the Civil Code. However, the amount has been grad
ually increased through the years because of the declining value of our currency
. At present, prevailing jurisprudence fixes the amount at P50,000.
Third Issue: Loss of Earning Capacity Petitioners cite Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v
. Court of Appeals, which held: "The determination of the indemnity to be awarde
d to the heirs of a deceased person has therefore no fixed basis. . . . The life
expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an i
mportant factor . . . " They contend that the CA used the wrong basis for its co
mputation of earning capacity. We disagree. The Court has consistently computed
the loss of earning capacity based on the life expectancy of the deceased, and n
ot on that of the heir. Even Villa Rey Transit did likewise. The award for loss
of earning capacity is based on two factors: (1) the number of years on which th
e computation of damages is based and (2) the rate at which the loss sustained b
y the heirs is fixed. The first factor refers to the life expectancy, which take
s into consideration the nature of the victim s work, lifestyle, age and state o
f health prior to the accident. The second refers to the victim s earning capaci
ty minus the necessary living expenses. Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable
is that portion of the earnings of the deceased which the beneficiary would hav
e received the net earnings of the deceased. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED a
nd the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners. 30.
MONZON, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FACTS OF THE CASE: Prior to April 8, 19
67, a Piper Aztec aircraft PI-C766, owned by Dole Philippines met a slight accid
ent during a landing causing the bending of the blades of its left propeller. Th
e pilot, Jose Quimpo, together with his companions, straightened the bent blades
with the use of hammers. On April 8, 1967, Quimpo brought the plane to the main
tenance shop of respondent Theo H. Davies & Co., Far East Ltd. (Davies for short
) at the Manila Domestic Airport and had it repaired, then proceeded to its ordi
nary course of business. On September 13, 1967, at around 7:00 o clock in the mo
rning, the plane crashed killing all 6 passengers including the pilot and Arturo
Monzon causing the petitioners to file a case against Dole and Davies. Dole ent
ered into a compromise agreement while Davies proceeded with the case. The trial
court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and upon motion granted the following: P
12,000.00 for indemnity; P5,691,726.84 for loss of earning capacity; both sums t
o earn interest at 6% per annum from December 26, 1969 up to and including July
28, 1974, and at 12% per annum from July 29, 1974 until fully paid; ; P2,250,000
.00 for moral damages; P250,000.00 for exemplary damages; and P100,000.00 for at
torney s fees and expenses of litigation. On appeal, the respondent court reduce
d the amounts from P5,691,726.84 to P2,500,000.00; P2,250,000.00 to P350,000.00
and P250,000.00 to P50,000.00 and striking out the order to pay 12% interest. Up
on denial of motion of the plaintiffs, hence the present appeal by certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reduction of the amounts of damages and the exoneratio
n of the payment of interest on compensatory damages was proper. RULING: We find
the instant petition impressed with merit. It is worth noting that Arturo Monzo
n, at the time of his death, was 40 years old and in good health. He left a wido
w and 8 children with ages from 5 to 19. He had a flourishing legal practice, sp
ecializing in taxation and was retained by a number of large companies. He had a
total net income, as formally declared in his tax returns, P213,493.13 for the
year 1967. Pursuant to the formula established and repeatedly applied by this Co
urt (Villa Rey Transit v. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 511; Davila vs. Philippine A
irlines, 49 SCRA 497; Abeto v. Philippine Airlines, 115 SCRA 389; Philippine Air
lines v. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 391), the loss of earning capacity (as provi
ded for in Article 2206, New Civil Code) arising from the death of Arturo Monzon
was computed by the trial court in the following manner: Loss of earning capaci
ty equals 2/3 x [80-40] x P 213,493.13 equals P5,691,726.84. Inevitably, We cann
ot disturb the findings of the lower court as to the amount of compensatory dama
ges recoverable by petitioners for the same were in accordance with the law and
jurisprudence. In trying to justify the reduction of damages, respondent court s
tated in its decision that plaintiffs-appellees (petitioners herein) previously
asked for a lower compensation than in their later demand in the lower court How
ever, respondent court failed to point out that the request was made "by way of
amicable settlement." (p. 11, Rollo) Obviously, the complaint which was filed wi
th the lower court subsequent to respondent Davies refusal to enter into an ami
cable settlement would represent a higher amount. In further attempting to justi
fy its reduction of damages, respondent court went on to say: Moreover, the dete
rmination of life expectancy of a person who perishes in an accident like the ca
se at bar cannot be definite as it fluctuates with several factors and for this
reason the amount always lies within the discretion of the courts (Bernabe vs. P
hil. National Railways, 66 OG Nov. 15, 1970). The deceased in this case was a pr
acticing lawyer. True he was bright and still young, but he did not have a fixed
income; it depended largely on cases that come in and their outcome. We have no
fixed standard or yardstick for accurately measuring more or less his expected
income had he lived except some rough estimate based on experience and expectati
on. The income tax returns may give an Idea of the earning capacity of a person
for a particular year, but such return is by no means fixed or permanent for the
many uncertain years that follow later. (p. 4 respondent court s Resolution pro
mulgated on August 29, 1985, Annex III attached; p. 12, Rollo) We agree with res
pondent court in saying that life expectancy "fluctuates with several factors" (
p. 72, Rollo) but it is for that very reason that a generally accepted formula c
ited earlier was established by this court in a long line of cases. Otherwise st
ated, while respondent court suggests that Arturo Monzon might have lived for le
ss than 26.4 years more, or until the age of 66, there is also the possibility t
hat he would have lived for
much more than 26.4 years. Hence, the need of the formula by way of arriving at
a logical and workable average. Furthermore, it would be most unfair and illogic
al for respondent court to have reduced the compensation due petitioners for the
loss of the earning capacity of Arturo Monzon by discarding the well establishe
d formula by taking a pessimistic and depressed view of every situation instead
of an average standard. Moreover, as a man grows older, and gains more experienc
e, his income generally increases, with each passing year. Respondent court like
wise premised the reduction of the amount representing the loss of earning capac
ity by more than 50 per centum to the fact the petitioners agreed to compromise
with Dole where the latter paid One Million (P l,000,000.00) Pesos to the former
in effect sustaining the claim of respondent Davies that the amount paid by Dol
e must be credited to its account. However, such position does not hold water. R
espondent Davies and Dole are not joint tortfeasors. There was no evidence whats
oever that Dole was responsible with respondent Davies for quasi-delict, nor did
respondent Davies pursue its cross-claim against Dole.chanroblesvirtualawlibrar
y chanrobles virtual law lSimilarly, respondent court erred in reducing the awar
d of moral and exemplary damages to petitioners. While it is true that the amoun
t of moral and exemplary damages may be discretionary upon the court, the circum
stances attendant in the case at bar such as the wanton negligence of respondent
Davies; its repeated violations of law and aircraft industry established practi
ce; the social standing of the deceased and his heirs; and the present lack of p
urchasing power of the peso more than justify the restoration of the damages to
the original amounts. In this light, the pronouncement of the trial court in awa
rding moral and exemplary damages of P2,250,000.00 and P250,000.00 respectively
is of equal importance: Plaintiff Ramon Monzon estimates the sum of half a milli
on peso for each of the plaintiffs for the extreme mental anguish and sorrow inf
licted on them for the death of the deceased on whom they were dependent for sup
port and maintenance and whose death suddenly necessarily deprived plaintiffs of
his support and maintenance, consortium and companionship, as well as guidance,
protection, care and comfort. Considering, however, that the compensatory damag
es awarded is already substantial, the Court believes that a reasonable figure f
or moral damages would be only P250,000.00 for each plaintiff." (p. 21, Rollo) T
hus, the flight of the widow and her eight (8) children resulting from the untim
ely death of Arturo Monzon present a case deserving of moral and exemplary damag
es. c Finally, the elimination of the interest on the various damages from the d
ate of the filing of the suit was clearly unwarranted. It must be borne in mind
that interest begins to accrue upon demand, extrajudicial or judicial. A complai
nt is a judicial demand. WHEREFORE, We hereby REINSTATE the dispositive portion
of the decision of the trial court with the modification that the death indemnit
y of P12,000.00 is hereby increased to P30,000.00 conformably with recent jurisp
rudence (People v. Managquil, 132 SCRA 196). Cases 22-30 BALAGOT, JESSIE C.
31. PEOPLE VS SUITOS FACTS: In the afternoon of September 5, 1987, accused Wilso
n Suitos, Alvaro Suitos alias Barang and Boy Villar, all armed with short firear
ms, approached the deceased and without any word, Wilson Suitos shot Jesus Ylard
e on the forehead. Thereupon, Alvaro Suitos fired at the victim followed by Boy
Villar. After the three accused fired their guns they ran towards the west direc
tion, and moments thereafter, Vic Suitos and Rey Suitos riding in a tricycle fol
lowed them towards the same direction. The Regional Trial Court found the accuse
d Alvaro Suitos guilty of the crime of murder and, to indemnify the heirs of Jes
us Ylarde, the sum of P20,000.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as the amount of
support they receive or would have received from the deceased had he not died a
s a result of the killing and P30,000.00 as moral damages, without subsidiary im
prisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. The others are at large.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in the computation of damages? RULING: After
reviewing the records of the case, We find that a modification in the indemnity
awarded is in order. Actual damages were proved in the amount of P11,575 and no
t P20,000 as found by the trial court. In determining the loss of earning capaci
ty of 49 year old Ylarde, We use the formula for life expectancy adopted in Davi
la v. CA: 2/3 x (80-49) = life expectancy of 20 years. This figure is multiplied
by the annual net income of the deceased (P16,000), equivalent to P320,000 to f
ix the amount of loss of earning capacity. Death indemnity in the amount of P50.
000 is also awarded. The award of indemnity to the heirs of Jesus Ylarde is modi
fied and accused is hereby ordered to pay: actual damages in the amount of P11,5
75; death indemnity in the amount of P50,000; loss of earning capacity in the am
ount of P320,000; and moral damages in the amount of P20,000 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. 32. PEOPLE VS CORDERO FACTS: Edgar Cordero,s
ecurity guard of GP building where Gary Salvosa lived, together with Ernesto Pin
lac, Jimmy Salazar, Elpidio Batac, Domingo Batac, Sales Sabadao, Marlon Angco, F
red Batac, Ben Balocon, and other John Does conspired to rob Gary Salvosa. Gary
arrived at the GP Building on board his Nissan pickup. Cordero opened the gate a
nd padlocked it. Cordero then poked a gun at Gary and ordered to lie down or be
killed. At that instance, Fred Batac, Domingo Batac, Salazar, and Marlon appeare
d. Domingo also poked his .45 caliber pistol at Gary. With the help of Fred, he
frisked Gary. Domingo got from Gary an Uzi and his wallet. Fred took Gary s 9 mm
.45 caliber pistol. Salazar got Gary s wristwatch but Domingo snatched it from
him and wore it. Salazar tied Gary s arms at the back with a clothesline wire. C
ordero, Domingo and Fred led Gary upstairs. They ordered Salazar to stay downsta
irs to drive the victim s Nissan pickup. Cordero went downstairs and instructed
Salazar to start the pickup s engine. Fred killed Gary to prevent his identifica
tion.
The RTC found Cordero, Pinlac, Salazar, Domingo Batac and Fred Batac guilty as p
rincipal, while, Sales Sabado was held Liable as accomplice. Elpidio Batac was a
cquitted for insufficiency of evidence. All appellants were also adjudged civill
y liable and ordered to return the stolen property. Also To indemnify jointly an
d solidarily the legal heirs for consequential damages as follows: P950,000.00 r
epresenting lost earnings of the victim for 19 years, since he was only 41 years
old when killed and the life expectantly of an average Filipino is now 60 years
old. At P50,000.00 income a year, for Gary Salvosa alone, times 19 years, equal
s P950,000.00; P86,371.00 representing actual and compensatory damages; P1,000,0
00.00 as moral damages; and 100,000.00 as exemplary damages. ISSUE: Whether or n
ot the RTC erred in computing the loss of earning capacity when the judge fixed
at sixty the life expectancy of the victim. RULING: The computation is erroneous
. The formula consistently used by this Court in determining life expectancy is
(2/3 x [80 - age of the victim at the time of death]). Thus, the victim s income
of P50,000.00 should be multiplied by twenty six (26) years, not nineteen (19)
years. Accordingly, the award for loss of earning capacity should be P1,300,000.
00. The actual damages awarded in the amount of P86,371.00 should also be correc
ted because some of the expenses included in the computation are not in accord w
ith the guidelines set in People vs. Degoma and Taborada. We disallow the amount
of P9,000.00 spent by Ray Dean Salvosa, brother of the victim, in connection wi
th the investigation of the case, and the amount of P42.00 representing snacks f
or lawyers. Thus, the award for actual damages is reduced to P77,329.00. In Dego
ma, we held: . . . Of the expenses allegedly incurred, the Court can only give c
redence to those supported by receipt and which appear to have been genuinely in
curred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim. Thus, the Cou
rt cannot take account of receipts showing expenses incurred before the date of
the slaying of the victim; those incurred after a considerable lapse of time fro
m the burial of the victim and which do not have any relation to the death, wake
or burial of the victim; those incurred for purely aesthetic or social purposes
, such as the lining with marble of the tomb of the victim; those which appear t
o have been modified to show an increase in the amount of expenditure . . . ; th
ose expenditures which could not be reasonably itemized or determined to have be
en incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim; those wh
ich, nonetheless, would have been incurred despite the death, wake and burial of
the victim, the death, wake and burial being merely incidental; and those which
were not in fact shouldered by the immediate heirs of the victim, such as plane
tickets by relatives or in-laws. . . 33. PEOPLE VS ARINGUE FACTS: On August 5,
1989, the victim Nicomedes A. Salas, together with his wife Leticia and daughter
Lotlot attended a school party at St. Joseph Institute of Technology (SJIT) of
which he was President. In the evening, they left SJIT and proceeded to their je
ep. Outside SJIT, Mrs. Salas was about to board the jeep when she heard a gunsho
t coming from her left side. She turned her head towards that direction and saw
her husband fall on the ground face down. At the same time, she noticed Percivir
ando Pitao running
away. In a split second, Michael Cabal, pointed his gun at her. The man did not
shoot her, but fired at Mr. Salas, hitting him on the chest. Amora also saw the
shooting. They brought Mr. Salas to Santos Clinic where he died. Cabal stated th
at, Guillermo A. Aringue paid him and Pitao P5,000 to kill Nicomedes A. Salas be
cause allegedly he refused to deliver his share in the profits in SJIT. The RTC
found Cabal and Pitao guilty of murder and to indemnify, jointly and severally,
the heirs of the victim Nicomedes A. Salas in the sum of P536,113 as actual dama
ges and lumped together the awards of moral damages, attorney s fees and lost ea
rnings of the victim for a total sum of two P2,000,000.Accused Guillermo Aringue
is acquitted on reasonable doubt. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC judge commit an
error in his decision to lumped together the awards of moral damages, attorneys
fees and lost of earnings and awarding an actual damages? RULING: This is an err
or, for the aforementioned awards are different in nature, and hence require sep
arate determination. Leticia Salas testified that the victim was 49 years old at
the time he died. He was serving the first year of his three-year term, as memb
er of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, for which he received a monthly salary of P1
4,185.00. His gross income for the next three years would be P553,215.00. Allowi
ng a deduction of 50% from his gross income as his reasonable and necessary livi
ng expense, his lost earnings as councilor for three years would be P276,607.50.
As president and founder of San Jose Institute of Technology (SJIT), the victim
received an income of P5,000.00 a month. His gross annual income would amount t
o P65,000. Applying the formula: net earning capacity = life expectancy x [gross
annual income - reasonable and necessary living expenses (50%)], we determine h
is lost earnings to be P671,666.64. In its totality, the lost earnings of the vi
ctim amount to P948,274.14. We set aside the award of P536,113.00 as actual dama
ges for lack of basis. During the trial, private complainant Leticia Salas testi
fied that the following amounts were spent as a consequence of her husband s unt
imely death: P33,000.00 for food during the eleven (11) days of prayer; P70,000.
00 for the funeral parlor; P30,000.00 for food during the burial; P500.00 for th
e fees to the church; P5,000.00 for mourning clothes; P20,000.00 for food during
the 40th day service; P5,000.00 for tomb construction; P1,000.00 for gasoline;
P495.00 for the hospitalization of Nicomedes Salas; and P200.00 for telegrams. T
hese expenses totalled P165,195.00. We find the award of P2,000,000.00 as moral
damages to be excessive. Although no proof of pecuniary loss is required in the
assessment of moral damages, the award is essentially by way of indemnity or rep
aration. Moral damages are not awarded to punish the defendant but to compensate
the victim.The award is not meant to enrich the victim at the expense of the de
fendant. We find that an award of P50,000.00 is commensurate to the emotional su
ffering of the victim s heirs. Additionally, we award P50,000.00 as indemnity by
reason of the death of the victim in accord with Article 2206 of the Civil Code
and prevailing jurisprudence. The award of attorney s fees is set at P25,000.00
which is reasonable considering that the proceedings at the lower court lasted
four years.
34. PEOPLE VS GALVEZ FACTS: At midnight of April 30, 1993, while Venus, 14 years
old, was sleeping at their house together with her brothers, she was awakened b
ecause she felt Rodrigo Galvez, her father, on top of her. She noticed that the
latter was removing or pulling down her panty. She resisted but Rodrigo succeede
d in removing her panty. Thereafter, he inserted his penis inside her vagina. On
June 25, 1994, evening, she was again awakened from her sleep when she felt her
father on top of her. By then, she noticed that her panty was already removed a
nd he inserted his penis inside her vagina. He threatened her not to report what
happened to anybody, especially to her mother and neighbors, otherwise, somethi
ng bad will happen to her and to those who will be told. Virginia, her mother, n
oticed that Venus monthly periods had stopped coming and she was becoming healt
hy. Virginia then confronted her daughter and Venus revealed that it was Rodrigo
Galvez who raped her several times and thus she was pregnant. A complaint was f
iled against Rodrigo. The RTC found him guilty of rape and ordered to pay Venus
P50,000.00 as moral damages in each case. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in
awarding only moral damages? RULING: The Court notes that while the trial court
awarded moral damages, it did not award any civil indemnity which is mandatory
upon the finding of rape. Civil indemnity is distinct from and should not be den
ominated as moral damages which are based on different jural foundations and ass
essed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion. Current case law fixes i
ndemnity ex delicto in case of simple rape at P50,000.00. Given the prevailing f
acts of this case, exemplary damages in each case of rape, pegged at P25,000.00
in line with controlling case law and recently reiterated in People v. Catubig,
must likewise be awarded to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies and abe
rrant sexual behavior from preying upon and sexually abusing their daughters. 35
. PLEYTO VS LOMBOY FACTS:On May 16, 1995, Pleyto tried to overtake Esguerras tric
ycle but hit it instead. Pleyto then swerved into the left opposite lane. Coming
down the lane, a car driven by Arnulfo Asuncion with his passengers, Rhino, Ric
ardo Lomboy and her daughter Carmela Lomboy. The bus driven by Pleyto smashed he
ad-on the car driven by Asuncion, killing Arnulfo and Ricardo instantly. Carmela
and Rhino suffered injuries, but only Carmela required hospitalization. On Nove
mber 29, 1995, Maria and Carmela Lomboy filed an action for damages against PRBL
and its driver, Pleyto, with the RTC of Dagupan City. The Lomboys prayed that t
hey be indemnified for the untimely death of Ricardo Lomboy, his lost earnings,
the medical and hospitalization expenses of Carmela, and moral damages.
RTC rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants ordering the
defendants to pay solidarily Maria and Carmela. The RTC also found Pleyto neglig
ent and lacking in precaution. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court,
with modification in award for actual damages from P59,000.00 to P39,550.00 for
funeral and religious services and for medical expenses of Carmela Lomboy from P
52,000.00 to P27,000.00; and the award for loss of earning capacity is according
ly corrected from P1,642,521.00 to P1,152,000.00. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA e
rred in pegging the monthly living expenses at 50% of gross earnings; and Whethe
r or not documentary evidence is indispensable to a claim for loss of earning ca
pacity. RULING: In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an element
of damages, the net earnings, which is computed by deducting necessary expenses
from the gross earnings, and not the gross earnings, is to be utilized in the co
mputation. Note that in the present case, both the Court of Appeals and the tria
l court used net earnings, not gross earnings in computing loss of earning capac
ity. The amount of net earnings was arrived at after deducting the necessary exp
enses (pegged at 50% of gross income) from the gross annual income. This computa
tion is in accord with settled jurisprudence, including the Villa Rey case. Peti
tioners claim that no substantial proof was presented to prove Ricardo Lomboys gro
ss income lacks merit. Failure to present documentary evidence to support a clai
m for loss of earning capacity of the deceased need not be fatal to its cause. T
estimonial evidence suffices to establish a basis for which the court can make a
fair and reasonable estimate of the loss of earning capacity. Hence, the testim
ony of respondent Maria Lomboy, Ricardos widow, that her husband was earning a mo
nthly income of P8,000 is sufficient to establish a basis for an estimate of dam
ages for loss of earning capacity. It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the
factors that should be taken into account in determining the compensable amount
of lost earnings are: (1) the number of years for which the victim would otherwi
se have lived; and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased.
Jurisprudence provides that the first factor, i.e., life expectancy, is computed
by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American Exp
ectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of Mortali
ty. As to the second factor, it is computed by multiplying the life expectancy b
y the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses neces
sary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incide
ntal expenses. The net earning is ordinarily computed at fifty percent (50%) of
the gross earnings. Thus, the formula used by this Court in computing loss of ea
rning capacity is: Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 age at time of death) x (gr
oss annual income reasonable and necessary living expenses)]. It was established
that Ricardo Lomboy was 44 years old at the time of his death and is earning a
monthly income of P8,000 or a gross annual income (GAI) of P96,000. Using the ci
ted formula, the Court of Appeals correctly computed the Loss of Net Earning Cap
acity as P1,152,000, net of and after considering a reasonable and necessary liv
ing
expenses of 50% of the gross annual income or P48,000. A detailed computation is
as follows: NET EARNING CAPACITY (X) X X X X GROSS LIFE EXPECTANCY ANNUAL = [2/
3 (80-age at the x INCOME time of death)] (GAI) = [2/3 (80-44)] = [2/3 (36)] = 2
4 = P 1,152,000.00 x [P96,000 x [P96,000 x 48,000 LIVING EXPENSES (50% of GAI) (
50% P96,000) x
48,000]
Thus, no reversible error may be attributed to the court a quo in fixing the los
s of earning capacity at said amount. We likewise sustain the reduction of the a
ward of actual damages from P59,550 for funeral and burial expenses of Ricardo a
nd P52,000 for medical expenses of Carmela Lomboy to P39,550 and P27,000, respec
tively, as only these latter amounts were duly supported by receipts. To justify
an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount
of loss, credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receip
ts. However, while the award of P50,000 as moral damages to Carmela Lomboy is su
stained, the award for moral damages of P500,000 to the heirs of Ricardo Lomboy
should be reduced for being excessive. Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the
spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of t
he deceased. However, we must stress that moral damages, though incapable of pec
uniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the cl
aimant for actual injury and are not meant to enrich complainant at the expense
of defendant. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain me
ans, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering h
e/she has undergone, by reason of the defendants culpable action. Its award is ai
med at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus
it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Under the circumstances of
this case, an award of P100,000 to the heirs of Ricardo Lomboy would be justifie
d and in keeping with the purpose of the law and jurisprudence in allowing moral
damages. The indemnification award of P50,000 is also sustained. 36. PEOPLE VS
MATARO FACTS: On October 23, 1992, SPO 1 Enrique Castillo, Jr., stop a light bro
wn Toyota Corona. Mataro and Perucho disembarked and talked to Castillo. After a
while, Mataro and Perucho went to their car and returned with an armalite and a
.45 cal. firearm.
Castillo raised his hands and motioned the two accused to move along and forget
their citation. The two accused shot him instead. And as a result Castillo died.
RTC found them guilty of murder and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of E
nrique Castillo the following: P725,000.00 as actual damages; P1,000,000.00 as m
oral damages; and to pay the cost. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC correctly award
the above-mentioned damages and may temperate damages be awarded? RULING: In ou
r view, the amount of damages awarded must be modified. An appeal in a criminal
case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised b
y the parties. The trial court awarded P725,000.00 as actual damages and P1,000,
000.00 as moral damages. In arriving at P725,000.00 as actual damages, the trial
court added the loss of earning capacity of the victim which it computed to be
P660,000.00 and the other expenses incurred by the heirs of the victim as a resu
lt of his death. We agree that the life expectancy formula should be applied. Ho
wever, the loss of earning capacity should not be based on the net monthly incom
e of the deceased. The proper computation should be based on the gross annual in
come of the victim minus the necessary and incidental living expenses which the
victim would have incurred if he were alive, estimated at 50% of the gross annua
l income. The prosecution proved through the Certification of Employment and Com
pensation that the gross annual income (including 13th month pay and bonus) of t
he deceased is P65,906.00. Deducting from this the estimated necessary and incid
ental living expenses, the net annual income is P32,953.00. Multiplying this by
the computed life expectancy of the victim which is 22 years, the amount of loss
of earning capacity should be P724,966.00. With respect to actual damages, we h
ave consistently ruled that the recovery of actual damages must be premised upon
competent proof and best evidence obtainable by the injured party showing the a
ctual expenses incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the vict
im. Courts cannot simply assume that damages are sustained by the injured party,
nor can it rely on speculation or guesswork in determining the fact and amount
of damages. In this case, of the expenses summarized by the injured party, only
the one incurred for funeral services amounting to P25,000.00 is duly evidenced
by a receipt. The trial court s award of P1,200.00 for hospital bills, P43,800.0
0 for funeral services and P20,000.00 for transportation and representation expe
nses lacks sufficient basis and should be deleted. In line with People vs. Supli
to, 314 SCRA 493 (1999), however, temperate damages may be awarded, it appearing
that the victim s heirs had suffered pecuniary losses other than the actual dam
age but the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty. Taking into consider
ation the medical and burial services for the victim, an award of P30,000.00 by
way of temperate damages should suffice in this regard. The award of P1,000,000.
00 as moral damages should be reduced, bearing in mind that the purpose for maki
ng such award is not to enrich the heirs of the victim but to compensate them ho
wever inexact for injuries to their feelings. In line with current jurisprudence
on moral damages, an award of P50,000.00 is in order. Likewise, based on
prevailing case laws P50,000.00 is awarded as indemnity for wrongful death. Atto
rney s fees of P24,000.00 is also proper. 37. PEOPLE VS NULLAN FACTS: On July 26
, 1995, the Hi-Ace van which would fetch Benito Gotanci from his office-store ar
rived and parked in front. Minutes later Benito Gotanci emerged from his office-
store. As Benito Gotanci was about to board his vehicle Alberto Nullan and Edgar
Maligaya surreptitiously approached Benito from behind, and Nullan shot twice B
enito Gotanci from his handgun and fled the scene together with Maligaya. Benito
was rushed to the hospital but declared dead on arrival. RTC found them guilty
of murder and ordered to pay jointly and solidarily the sum of P92,851.96 for ac
tual damages; the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity; P1,000,000.00 for los
s of earning capacity; and P100,000.00 for moral damages. ISSUE: Whether or not
RTC erred in determining the facts and amount of damages? RULING: With respect t
o damages, the recovery of actual damages must be premised upon competent proof
and best evidence obtainable by the injured party showing the actual expenses in
curred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim. Courts cannot
simply assume that damages are sustained by the injured party, nor can it rely
on speculation or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. In th
e case at bench, the Court accepts as having been incurred the amount of P52,851
.96 for doctor fees, hospital bills, funeral cremation, burial services and the
cost of the tomb of the victim for which supporting receipts are on record. The
alleged reasonable miscellaneous expenses of P40,000.00 are disallowed for not h
aving been sufficiently proved. The actual damages awarded by the trial court sh
ould be thus reduced to only P52,851.96. Relative to the amount of damages for l
oss of earnings, the trial court has fixed the amount of P1,000,000.00 based on
the victim s life expectancy of 65 years. This Court has consistently used the f
ormula: [2/3 x (80 - age of the victim at the time of death)] in determining lif
e expectancy. The victim in this case therefore can be said to have had a life e
xpectancy of [2/3 x (80 - 46)] 23 years. The trial court has aptly estimated his
annual income to be close to P120,000.00 from which amount should be deducted t
he necessary and incidental expenses which the victim would have incurred if he
were alive, estimated at 50%, to about a balance of P60,000.00 net annual income
. In computing the loss of earning capacity of the victim, several factors are c
onsidered besides the mathematical computation of annual income times life expec
tancy. Allowance are also made for circumstances which could reduce the computed
life expectancy of the victim like the nature of his work, his lifestyle, age a
nd state of health prior to his death, and the rate of loss sustained by the hei
rs of the victim. All taken, the sum of P1,000,000.00 for loss of earning capaci
ty of the deceased victim awarded by the trial court must be increased to P1,380
,000.00. The award of moral damages of P100,000.00 arising from the mental angui
sh suffered by the surviving spouse, Julie Gotanci, and testified to by her, is
reasonable. The award of the civil indemnity ex-delicto of P50,000.00 to the hei
rs of the victim is consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, except for the reduction of actual damages from P92,851.96 to P52,851
.96, and the increase of the loss of earning capacity from P1,000,000.00 to P1,3
80,000.00, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED in all respects. 38. PEOP
LE VS LISTERIO FACTS: On August 14, 1991, a group composed of Agapito Listerio,
Samson dela Torre, George dela Torre, Marlon dela Torre and Bonifacio Bancaya, b
locked the path and attacked Jeonito Araque and Marlon Araque, with lead pipes a
nd bladed weapons. Agapito Listerio, Marlon dela Torre and George dela Torre, wh
o were armed with bladed weapons, stabbed Jeonito Araque from behind and Marlon
Araque was hit in the head by Samson dela Torre and Bonifacio Bancaya with lead
pipes and momentarily lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness, Jeonit
o was already dead and their assailants fled. Marlon sustained injuries in the a
rm and back and was brought to a hospital. The RTC found Listerio Guilty and was
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Jeonito Arague and damages sustained by Marlo
n Arague including moral damages of P5,000. Samson dela Torre escaped during the
presentation of the prosecutions evidence and he was not tried in absentia and t
he others are at large. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC is correct in awarding mor
al damages? RULING: The award for moral damages must be struck down as the victi
m himself did not testify as to the moral suffering he sustained as a result of
the assault on his person. For lack of competent proof such an award is improper
. The award for exemplary damages must, however, be retained considering that un
der Article 2230 of the Civil Code, such damages may be imposed when the crime is
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Finally, this Court has ob
served that the trial court did not render judgment against accused Samson dela
Torre, notwithstanding that he was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to both char
ges. Under the circumstances, he should be deemed to have been tried in absentia
and, considering the evidence presented by the prosecution against him, convict
ed of the crime charged together with appellant Agapito Listerio. 39. PEOPLE VS
SANCHEZ FACTS: On April 13, 1991, Malabanan, Peradillas, Averion and Corcolon wa
ited for Penalosa during a party near the house of Dr. Velicina. When Penalosa w
as leaving riding his jeep, The group followed him Corcolon ordered Averion to o
vertake Pealosa s jeep. As the car overtook the jeep, Peradillas and Corcolon fir
ed at Pealosa s jeep, using M-16 and baby armalite rifles, executed in automatic
firing mode. Rickson Pealosa, son of Nelson Pealosa, fell from the jeep. The jeep,
however, continued running in a zigzag position until it overturned in front of
Irais Farm. After the shooting, the accused proceeded to the house of mayor San
chez and reported to mayor Sanchez that Pealosa was already dead.
RTC found them guilty of murder and odered to pay jointly and severally, the hei
rs of the victims each the sum of P100,000.00 for the death of Nelson Pealosa and
Rickson Pealosa, P50,000.00 as actual damages and moral damages of P50,000.00 an
d exemplary damages of P30,000.00 and to pay the costs. ISSUE: Whether or not th
e RTC was correct in awarding actual damages and loss of capacity of earnings in
the absent of proofs; Whether or not the common law wife is entitled to share i
n the award of moral damages. RULING: The P50,000.00 award as actual damages sho
uld be deemed as indemnity for the untimely demise of the victims. We have held
that only expenses supported by receipts and which appear to have been actually
expended in connection with the death of the victims may be allowed. No proof wa
s presented to sustain the award of actual damages. Similarly, we can not award
damages for loss of earning capacity. All that was presented in evidence was the
testimony of the common law wife, Adelina Pealosa, that Nelson earned P1,000,000
.00 a year. We have held that "for lost income due to death, there must be unbia
sed proof of the deceased s average income. Self-serving, hence unreliable state
ment, is not enough." Considering the attendance of aggravating circumstances, w
e sustain the award of exemplary damages of P30,000.00, per victim, in accordanc
e with Article 2230 of the Civil Code. As regards moral damages, we affirm the P
50,000.00 awarded to the heirs of Rickson Pealosa. His mother, Adelina Pealosa, te
stified to the suffering caused by his death. We also sustain the award of moral
damages to the heirs of Nelson Pealosa. His common law wife testified to the men
tal anguish suffered by the family due to Nelson s death. Under Article 2206 of
the Civil Code, the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendancts and ascenda
nts of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased. However, the common law wife is not entitled to share in
the award of moral damages. Cases 31-39 BASUNGIT, ANTONIO JR. 40.PEOPLE vs. EFR
EN MINDANAO FACTS: On October 2, 1993, at around twelve o clock in the morning,
Apolonio Hornilla a meat vendor, was weighing meat at his stall in the Urbano Ve
lasco Public Market in Pasig, Metro Manila. In the area was Perfecto de Jesus wh
o was waiting for his turn to buy meat. While Apolonio was weighing beef, Perfec
to saw a man approach Apolonio from Apolonio s left side.The man pulled out a gu
n and fired at Apolonio twice, hitting him on the nape. Apolonio collapsed. The
assailant left. Perfecto approached Apolonio and brought him to the Rizal Medica
l Center. After taking Apolonio to the hospital, Perfecto
went to buy medicine. Along the way, Perfecto learned that policemen apprehended
Apolonio s assailant. Perfecto proceeded to the police precinct and identified
accused from a line-up of around ten (10) detainees. On October 2, 1994, Perfect
o executed a sworn statement before the police investigators. In the statement,
he identified accused as the person who shot Apolonio. On October 5, 1993, Third
Assistant City Prosecutor Quezon B. Alejandro filed with the Regional Trial Cou
rt, Pasig, an information for frustrated murder and an information for illegal p
ossession of firearms against accused. On November 4, 1993, accused was arraigne
d for violation of P. D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms) and frustrated mu
rder. He pleaded "not guilty" to both charges. Apolonio was hospitalized in Pasi
g for a month. He was transferred to the Batangas Regional Hospital where he sta
yed for twenty-seven (27) days. On December 23, 1993, Apolonio died. On February
2, 1994, the prosecution amended the information murder due to Apolonio s super
vening death. On March 17, 1994, accused entered a plea of "not guilty" to the a
mended charge. At the trial, accused s defense was alibi and denial. He averred
that when the shooting occurred, he was unloading vegetables from a jeep. His te
stimony was uncorroborated. The trial court did not believe him. On June 26, 199
5, the trial court rendered a decision convicting accused of murder and acquitti
ng him of illegal possession of firearms sentenced the accuseds to Reclusion Perp
etua in its medium period or an imprisonment ranging from Twenty-Six (26) Years,
Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day, as minimum, to Thirty-Three (33) Years and Fo
ur (4) Months, as maximum; to indemnify the offended party in the aggregate amou
nt of P222,748.22; to suffer all the accessory penalties provided for by law; an
d to pay the costs.. On July 26, 1995, accused filed a notice of appeal. However
, the notice was erroneously forwarded to the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether o
r not the award of damages by the trial court is meritorious. SC RULING: The tri
al court awarded damages in the amount of P222,748.22. This is erroneous. We gra
nt an award of civil indemnity, in the amount of P50,000.00, automatically to th
e heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the fact of commission of
the crime. We also grant actual damages. For Apolonio s hospitalization from Oc
tober 2 to November 27, 1993, Lucia spent a total of P78,526.27. This expense is
supported by receipts. Other receipts show that the family spent P8,000.00 for
funeral
services,P3,222.00 for the tomb and the amount of P10.00 for the municipal buria
l permit. The expenses evidenced by all the receipts amount to P89,758.27. The a
mount of P15,000.00 for "other expenses", which Apolonio s heirs claimed were in
curred during Apolonio s confinement at the Rizal Medical Center and the Batanga
s Provincial Hospital were not covered by receipts and must be disallowed. Every
pecuniary loss must be established by credible evidence before it may be awarde
d. The award of attorney s fees is likewise erroneous. There is no record that v
ictim s family hired a private prosecutor. All throughout the proceedings public
prosecutors represented them. In line with current jurisprudence, we further aw
ard moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. When Apolonio died, he left his w
idow Lucia with three children aged five, three and one, hurt and destitute. The
award is therefore adequate and reasonable, taking the pain and anguish of the
victim s family into consideration. Damages for loss of earning capacity cannot
be granted. The prosecution did not present income tax returns or receipts. The
testimony of the victim s wife as to her husband s income is not competent proof
. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 167, Pasig dated J
une 26, 1995 is AFFIRMED insofar as it finds accused-appellant Efren Mindanao y
Gumabao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder for the killing of Apolonio Hor
nilla. However, the decision is MODIFIED as follows: (a) accused-appellant shall
suffer the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalt
ies of the law; (b) he is ORDERED to pay to the heirs of the victim civil indemn
ity for the death of Apolonio Hornilla in the amount of P50,000.00, actual damag
es in the amount of P89,758.27 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. Th
e award of attorney s fees is DELETED. With costs. 41.PEOPLE vs. VERDE FACTS: Fr
ancisco Gealon was shot dead at around 9 oclock in the evening, on March 19, 1991
, while sleeping inside his tricycle in front of the house of Jose Bandiola in B
inalbagan, Negros Occidental. He was taken to the Himamaylan Hospital where he w
as pronounced dead on arrival. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charg
e upon being arraigned on November 25, 1991. Trial then ensued, with the prosecu
tion presenting its first witness. For his defense, accused-appellant interposed
alibi. On May 11, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive po
rtion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby finds acc
used Mariano Verde GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sen
tences him to a prison term of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
the victim in the amount of
P100,000.00 as compensatory damages and P100,000.00 as moral damages without sub
sidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the award of d
amages by the trial court amounting to two hundred thousand is correct. SC RULIN
G: The award of damages is modified. There is, however, a need to modify the awa
rd of damages made by the trial court to the heirs of the victim. The indemnity
for death under our current ruling is P50,000.00. Consequently, the award ofP100
,000.00 made by the trial court is excessive and should be correspondingly reduc
ed. The award of P100,000.00 as moral damages should likewise be reduced, bearin
g in mind that the purpose for making such award is not to enrich the heirs of t
he victim but to compensate them for injuries to their feelings. For this reason
, an award of P50,000.00 would be adequate and reasonable. In addition, the heir
s of the victim should be ordered paid P50,000.00 by way of actual damages for t
he funeral and burial expenses they have incurred and which are amply supported
by receipts (Exhs. C-2 and D-1). The heirs are also entitled to damages for the
loss of earning capacity of the deceased Francisco Gealon. The fact that the pro
secution did not present documentary evidence to support its claim for damages f
or loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of said d
amages. The testimony of the victims wife, Delia Gealon, as to the earning capaci
ty of her husband Francisco Gealon sufficiently establishes the basis for making
such an award. It was established that Francisco Gealon was 48 years old at the
time of his death in 1991. His average income was P200.00 a day. Hence, in acco
rdance with the American Expectancy Table of Mortality adopted in several cases
decided by this Court, the loss of his earning capacity is to be calculated as f
ollows: Net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x expenses(50% of gross annua
l income) Finally, the victims heirs should be ordered paid P24,000.00 as attorne
ys fees. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED,
with the modification that accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim: death indemnity moral damages actual damages loss of earning capacity at
torneys fees SO ORDERED. 42. PEOPLE VS. PEDRO PERRERAS FACTS: On the night of 21
July 1998 in Bacayao Norte, Dagupan City, Pedro Perreras and Boy Fernandez, his
nephew, approached Leonardo Salazar who was engaged in idle banter with some bar
riomates at the neighborhood waiting shed. Pedro asked Leonardo
if Manoling Pastoral was home. When Leonardo nodded, Pedro asked for directions
to go to Manoling s house. Feeling almost suffocated in the crowded waiting shed
, Leonardo excused himself and walked towards the house of Estanislao Salo ten (
10) meters away for some refreshing air. Soon after Pedro and Boy followed, each
holding a bottle of beer. The two (2) approached the son of Estanislao by the n
ame of Joel and asked him also for Manoling s house. Pedro then stopped by the w
indow of the Estanislao s house which was just adjacent to the house of Manoling
. The place was lighted by a mercury lamp about twelve (12) meters from the hous
e of Estanislao. As soon as Pedro saw Estanislao, he rolled up his sleeves, drew
a gun from his waist, and fired at Estanislao, hitting him on the head. Leonard
o had a clear view of Estanislao sitting on a chair and watching TV when fired u
pon as he was only about ten (10) meters away from the shooter and the victim. F
earing for his life, Leonardo hid behind a chair. Leonora Salo, Estanislao s wif
e, heard the gunshot. She rushed to the living room and saw her husband slumped
on the floor. She looked out the window and saw Pedro Perreras alias "Pepot" hol
ding a gun staring at her husband s body. After Pedro and Boy left, Leonardo Sal
azar ran to the house of Saturnino Maramba, a barangay councilor, and reported t
o him, in between gasps, the shooting and narrated the details of what he had wi
tnessed. Estanislao was rushed to the Villaflor Hospital for treatment but it wa
s too late. He died at 5:30 the following morning, 22 July 1998. On 22 August 19
98 accused-appellant was arrested while in hiding in Echague, Isabela. The Regio
nal Trial Court finding accused-appellant PEDRO PERRERAS alias "Pepot" guilty of
murder, imposing on him the death penalty and ordering him to pay the heirs of
ESTANISLAO SALO P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P91,803.59 in actual and compensa
tory damages, P1,728,000.00 in lost earnings, and P100,000.00 in moral damages.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the award of the trial court regarding the amount of damag
es is correct. SC RULING: The award of damages was modified. Of the amount of P9
1,803.59 awarded for actual damages, only P61,813.15 may be granted as only so m
uch for medical and burial expenses are supported by the evidence on record. Act
ual damages must be substantiated by documentary evidence, such as receipts, in
order to prove expenses incurred as a result of the death of the victim. The hei
rs of the deceased may recover damages for loss of earning capacity. Although th
e prosecution did not present documentary evidence to support this claim, testim
onial evidence is sufficient to establish a basis for which the court can make a
fair and reasonable estimate of damages for loss of earning capacity, and the u
nrebutted testimony of Leonora Salo is sufficient basis for the award. She testi
fied that the victim was fifty (50) years old at the time of his death and earne
d a basic salary of P130.00 a day but including tips as waiter in a restaurant h
e was earning a total average of P9,000.00 per month. Under the American Expecta
ncy Table of Mortality adopted by this Court in several cases, loss of earning c
apacity is computed according to the following formula:
Net Earning Capacity (X) = Life Expectancy x Gross Annual Income - Living Expens
es (50% of Gross Annual Income) where life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 - [age of dece
ased]); and Gross Annual Income = Monthly Earnings x number of months (12) There
fore, The award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is reduced to P50,000.00 since
murder was not qualified by any circumstance under which the death penalty is au
thorized. The testimony of Leonora that she suffered sleepless nights and mental
anxiety as a result of her husband s murder sufficiently justifies moral damage
s, although the award of P100,000.00 may be considered excessive hence must be l
owered to P50,000.00 to conform with current jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the Decis
ion of the Regional Trial Court in Crim. Case No. 98- 02303-D finding accused-ap
pellant PEDRO PERRERAS alias "Pepot" guilty of murder, imposing on him the death
penalty and ordering him to pay the heirs of ESTANISLAO SALO P75,000.00 as civi
l indemnity, P91,803.59 in actual and compensatory damages, P1,728,000.00 in los
t earnings, and P100,000.00 in moral damages is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant PEDR
O PERRERAS is found guilty of murder and sentenced instead to reclusion perpetua
and to pay the heirs of ESTANISLAO SALO P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P61,813.
15 as actual damages, P1,080,000.00 in lost earnings and P50,000.00 as moral dam
ages. No costs. 43. PEOPLE vs. UGANAP FACTS: On January 6, 1990, in the City of
Davao, Felix Uganap, Salvador Uganap, Faustino Uganap, Nonoy Panday, Tirso Arang
, and four John Does, armed with firearm and a bladed weapon, stabbed and shot w
ith said weapons Pedro Arang. The cause of the conflict between Faustino Uganap
and the victim was a piece of land. Pedro wanted to build his house therein but
Faustino opposed it. All the accused interposed denials and alibis. They denied
that they were together on the night of the incident, or that they went to the h
ouse of Pedro Arang. Faustino said he was making copra with his nephew, Margarit
o Arang. Nonoy Panday and Tirso Arang said that they were not in town. Accused-a
ppellant stated that he reported to work at Crown Fruits, where he remained on d
uty as a guard the whole night. Faustino Uganap, Nonoy Panday, and Tirso Arang f
or failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy as against them, the RTC held
that only Felix Uganap and Salvador Uganap were proved culpable. As to accused F
elix Uganap, his guilt having been established beyond reasonable doubt of the cr
ime of Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced t
o suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused Felix Uganap is further ordere
d to indemnify the family of Pedro Arang the following:
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Pedro Arang; 2. For loss of income, what was prov
ed on record is that the victim, at the time of his death, was 36 years old, in
good health, and working at a hacienda with wage of P1,000.00 per month. Hence,
using the formula repeatedly adopted by the Supreme Court: [2/3 x (80 age of vic
tim at time of death) x a reasonable portion of the net income which would have
been received by the heirs as support], this Court fixes the award for loss of e
arning capacity of the victim at P90,000.00; and 3. P5,000.00 for burial expense
s. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the damages was properly imposed by the trial court in
computing loss of earning capacity. RULING: On the damages awarded for loss of e
arning capacity, we are inclined to grant the same despite the non-availability
of documentary evidence. In People vs. Dizon, we stated that oral testimony will
suffice to prove net earning capacity where the victim was employed as a daily
wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. Pedro A
rang, a hacienda worker receiving wages of P1,000.00 a month, was certainly earn
ing far less than the minimum wage. The trial court correctly adopted the formul
a used by this Court in computing loss of earning capacity. Thus: Net earning ca
pacity = [2/3 x (80 age at time of death) x (gross annual income reasonable and
necessary living expenses)] As there is no proof of living expenses of the decea
sed, the net income is estimated to be 50% of the gross annual income. Hence, in
the instant case, the damages payable for loss of earning capacity is computed
as follows: Net earning capacity = [2/3 x (80 - 36) x (P12,000.00 P6,000.00)] =
2/3 x 44 x P6,000.00 = P176,000.00 Based on the foregoing, the damages represent
ing loss of earning capacity is set at P176,000.00. The award of P5,000.00 as ac
tual damages, representing burial expenses, is sustained. WHEREFORE, the appeale
d decision is AFFIRMED with the above modifications. Accused-appellant Felix Uga
nap is hereby declared guilty of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of r
eclusion perpetua. He is further required to pay the heirs of Pedro Arang P50,00
0.00 as death indemnity, P176,000.00 as damages for loss of earning capacity, an
d P5,000.00 as actual damages. SO ORDERED. 44. SMITH BELL DODWELL SHIPPING AGENC
Y CORPORATION vs. CATALINO BORJA FACTS: On September 23, 1987, Smith Bell filed
a written request with the Bureau of Customs for the attendance of the latters in
spection team on vessel M/T King Family which was due to arrive at the port of M
anila on September 24, 1987. Said vessel contained 750 metric tons of alkyl benze
ne and methyl methacrylate monomer.
On the same day, Supervising Customs Inspector Manuel Ma. D. Nalgan instructed C
atalino Borja to board said vessel and perform his duties as inspector upon the
vessels arrival until its departure. At that time, Borja was a customs inspector
of the Bureau of Customs receiving a salary of P31,188.25 per annum."At about 11
oclock in the morning on September 24, 1987, while M/T King Family was unloading
chemicals unto two (2) barges owned by ITTC, a sudden explosion occurred settin
g the vessels afire. Upon hearing the explosion, Borja, who was at that time ins
ide the cabin preparing reports, ran outside to check what happened. Again, anot
her explosion was heard.Seeing the fire and fearing for his life, Borja hurriedly
jumped over board to save himself. However, the water was likewise on fire due
mainly to the spilled chemicals. Despite the tremendous heat, Borja swam his way
for one (1) hour until he was rescued by the people living in the squatters area
and sent to San Juan De Dios Hospital.After weeks of intensive care at the hospi
tal, his attending physician diagnosed Borja to be permanently disabled due to t
he incident. Borja made demands against Smith Bell and ITTC for the damages caus
ed by the explosion. However, both denied liabilities and attributed to each oth
er negligence. The trial court (RTC) ruled in favor of Respondent Borja and held
petitioner liable for damages and loss of income. The RTC disposed as follows: WH
EREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering [Petitioner]
Smith Bell Dodwell [S]hipping Agency Corporation to pay [Borja]: 1.The amount of
P495,360.00 as actual damages for loss of earning capacity: 2.The amount of P10
0,000.00 for moral damages; and 3.The amount of P50,000.00 for and as reasonable
attorneys fees. The cross-claim of [Petitioner] Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agenc
y Corporation against co-defendant International Towage and Transport Corporatio
n and the latters counterclaim against [Borja] and cross-claim with compulsory co
unterclaim against Smith Bell are hereby ordered dismissed. Contrary to the claim
of petitioner that no physical evidence was shown to prove that the explosion h
ad originated from its vessel, the CA held that the fire had originated from M/T
King Family. This conclusion was amply supported by the testimonies of Borja an
d Eulogio Laurente (the eyewitness of International Towage and Transport Corpora
tion or ITTC) as well as by the investigation conducted by the Special Board of
Marine Inquiry and affirmed by the secretary of the Department of National Defen
se. On the other hand, the RTC, which the CA sustained, had not given probative
value to the evidence of petitioner, whose sole eyewitness had not shown up for
crossexamination ISSUE: Assuming without admitting that Respondent Catalino Borj
a is entitled to damages, whether Respondent Borja is entitled to the amount of
damages awarded to him by the trial court. SC RULING: The amount recoverable is
not the loss of the entire earning, but rather the loss of that portion of the e
arnings which the beneficiary would have received. Hence, in fixing the amount of
the said damages, the necessary expenses of the deceased
should be deducted from his earnings. Only net earnings, not gross earnings, are
to be considered; that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in
the creation of such earnings or income, less living and other incidental expen
ses. When there is no showing that the living expenses constituted a smaller per
centage of the gross income, we fix the living expenses at half of the gross inc
ome. To hold that one would have used only a small part of the income, with the
larger part going to the support of ones children, would be conjectural and unrea
sonable. Counsel for Respondent Borja is also correct in saying that life expect
ancy should not be based on the retirement age of government employees, which is
pegged at 65. In Negros Navigation Co, Inc. v. CA, the Court resolved that in c
alculating the life expectancy of an individual for the purpose of determining l
oss of earning capacity under Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code, it is assumed t
hat the deceased would have earned income even after retirement from a particula
r job.Respondent Borja should not be situated differently just because he was a
government employee. Private employees, given the retirement packages provided b
y their companies, usually retire earlier than government employees; yet, the li
fe expectancy of the former is not pegged at 65 years. Petitioner avers that Res
pondent Borja died nine years after the incident and, hence, his life expectancy
of 80 years should yield to the reality that he was only 59 when he actually di
ed. We disagree. The Court uses the American Experience/Expectancy Table of Mort
ality or the Actuarial or Combined Experience Table of Mortality, which consiste
ntly pegs the life span of the average Filipino at 80 years, from which it extra
polates the estimated income to be earned by the deceased had he or she not been
killed. Respondent Borjas demise earlier than the estimated life span is of no m
oment. For purposes of determining loss of earning capacity, life expectancy rem
ains at 80. Otherwise, the computation of loss of earning capacity will never be
come final, being always subject to the eventuality of the victims death. The com
putation should not change even if Borja lived beyond 80 years. Fair is fair.Bas
ed on the foregoing discussion, the award for loss of earning capacity should be
computed as follows: Loss of earning = [2 (80-50)] x [(P2,752x12)-16,512] capac
ity 3 = P330,240 Having been duly proven, the moral damages and attorneys fees aw
arded are justified under the Civil Codes Article 2219, paragraph 2; and Article
2208, paragraph 11, respectively. WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: petitioner is o
rdered to pay the heirs of the victim damages in the amount ofP320,240 as loss o
f earning capacity, moral damages in the amount of P100,000, plus another P50,00
0 as attorneys fees. Costs against petitioner. 45. PEOPLE vs. ELGER GUZMAN FACTS:
Elmer Aquino was married to Rodalyn Aquino, who was in Singapore. They have two
(2) children. Elmer Aquino was a farmer earning Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P14,00
0.00) per cropping.
On November 18, 1995, in Ilagan, Isabela, Philippines, Elger Guzman , unlawfully
, assault, attack and stab with a Fan Knife (Balisong) Elmer Aquino, inflicting
upon him a stab wound on his body, which directly caused his death. Dr. Rodelmar
De Leon, Municipal Health Officer of San Isidro, Isabela, conducted an autopsy
of the victim and found one stab wound on the upper lobe of the victims left lung
, which was fatal. The cause of death was hypovolemic shock secondary to massive
bleeding. There was also a four-centimeter incised wound at the base of the rig
ht thumb of the victim, which could have been caused by a sharp object like a kn
ife. When arraigned on July 29, 1997, accused-appellant Elger Guzman, assisted b
y counsel, pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. On Septem
ber 30, 1997, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment, the dispositive portio
n of which reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and consideration
s, the prosecution having proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doub
t for the offense charged, and there being no aggravating nor mitigating circums
tance to consider, the Court hereby sentences the accused to RECLUSION PERPETUA,
with all the accessory penalties provided for by law; to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased victim the sum of P20,000.00 for funeral expenses; P600,000.00 for
lost earnings and an additional P300,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damag
es, and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the Trial Court corre
ctly award the proper amount of damages. RULING: The court a quo correctly award
ed actual damages to the heirs of the victim in the total amount of Twenty Thous
and Pesos (P20,000.00) as the defense admitted that the victims family incurred f
uneral expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) and expenses for the nine-day
wake in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Although, the court a qu
o awarded the heirs of the victim loss of earning capacity of the deceased, the
amount of Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00) should be reduced to Three Hu
ndred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P370,000.00). Thefather of the victim, Salcedo Aqu
ino, testified that Elmer Aquino was a farmer who earned Fourteen Thousand Pesos
(P14,000.00) per cropping but failed to adduce evidence to substantiate his cla
im. Nevertheless, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides, the defendant shall be
liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter x x x unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capac
ity at the time of his death. In the instant case, since there is no indication t
hat the deceased had no earning capacity at the time of his death, we are inclin
ed to give credit to Salcedo Aquinos testimony. Salcedo Aquino, however, did not
testify regarding the number of croppings the deceased victim had in a year. Non
etheless, the court a quo ruled that [e]arning about Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,0
00.00) a year as a tiller is considered reasonable x x x. Adopting the lower cour
ts assessment that the deceased earned about Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00),
we deduct therefrom his necessary and incidental expenses estimated at fifty per
cent
(50%), leaving a balance of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). We then multiply hi
s net annual income of P10,000.00 by his life expectancy of 37 years to arrive a
t the amount of Three Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P370,000.00), which repres
ents the loss of earning capacity of the deceased. The court a quo also awarded
moral damages and exemplary damages in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Peso
s (P300,000.00) to the heirs of the victim. While moral damages under Article 22
06, paragraph 3, of the Civil Code may be awarded by the court for the mental an
guish suffered by the heirs of the victim by reason of the victims death, which w
as testified to by the father of the victim, the amount should, however, be redu
ced to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) in accordance with prevailing jurisprud
ence. The purpose for making such an award is not to enrich the heirs of the vic
tim but to compensate them for injuries to their feelings. With regard to the aw
ard of exemplary damages, Article 2230 of the Civil Code provides that in crimin
al offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed w
hen the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. In the i
nstant case, no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime; h
ence, the award of exemplary damages should be deleted. Further, appellant shoul
d be made to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,00
0.00) as civil indemnity, which is granted without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court in Criminal Case No. 2527 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-a
ppellant Elger Guzman is found guilty of homicide only, and is hereby sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate prison term ranging from six (6) years and eight (8)
months of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of rec
lusion temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant is also ordered to pay the heirs
of the victim, Elmer Aquino, Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as actual damage
s; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P
50,000.00) as moral damages; Three Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P370,000.00)
as loss of earning capacity of the deceased; and to pay the costs. 46. PEOPLE vs
. MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ FACTS: The RTC found accused Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis
Corcolon y Fadialan, Landrito "Ding" Peradillas and Artemio Averion guilty beyo
nd reasonable doubt of murder committed Nelson Pealosa and Rickson Pealosa. On Apr
il 13, 1991, accused Mayor Sanchez ordered the three other accused to kill Nelso
n Pealosa, one of the political leaders of Dr. Virvilio Velecina, the latter bein
g Sanchezs opponent in the mayoralty seat. On the same night, while Nelson and Ri
ckson Pealosa were leaving the birthday party of Dr. Velecina, the accused fired
at the victims while they were pursuing the Pealosas. Inside the pursuing car wer
e Peradillas, Averion, Corcolon and the witness, Vivencio Malabanan. Later, both
the victims died of gunshot wounds. The trial court considered the crime as a c
omplex crime of double murder punishable under Article 48 of the Revised Penal C
ode. The Regional Trial Court rendered the following decision:
. . . to suffer the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the seven o
ffenses or a total of seven reclusion perpetua for each accused. In addition, th
e Court hereby orders all the accused to jointly and severally pay the victims re
spective families the following sums by way of civil indemnity: ISSUE: WHETHER O
R NOT the award of damages by the lower court is properly computed. SC RULING: T
he Court, in its decision dated January 25, 1999, affirmed in toto the decision
of the lower court. However, we also ordered each accused-appellant to pay the r
espective heirs of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez an additional indemnity of P3
50,000.00 each, stating that since each accused-appellant had been found guilty
of seven counts of rape with homicide, jurisprudence dictated that for each coun
t, each accused-appellant is liable for civil indemnity of P50,000.00, or a tota
l of P350,000.00. Since the trial courts award of actual damages to the Gomez and
Sarmenta families already included civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00,
to order each accusedappellant to pay an additional P350,000.00 as civil indemn
ity would be double recovery of damages on the part of the Gomez and Sarmenta fami
lies for the same act or omission. Thus, the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the
trial court must each be deducted from the amount of actual damages due to the
Gomez and Sarmenta families. As for funeral expenses, the Court had occasion to
declare in People vs. Timon (281 SCRA 577 [1997]) that burial expenses, which are
by nature actual expenses must be proved. Since no proof of burial expenses was
ever presented in the instant case, its award will not be allowed. It is a settl
ed rule that there must be proof that actual or compensatory damages have been s
uffered and evidence of its actual amount (People vs. Nablo, 319 SCRA 784 [1999]
). While the funeral expenses incurred by the Sarmenta family were supported by
the appropriate receipts, the same is not true for the funeral expenses incurred
by the Gomez family. Not having been duly receipted, the amount of P74,000.00 a
warded to the Gomez family as funeral expenses must, perforce, be deleted. Howev
er, as the heirs of Allan Gomez clearly incurred funeral expenses, P10,000.00 by
way of nominal damages should be awarded. This award is adjudicated so that a r
ight which has been violated may be recognized or vindicated,and not for the pur
pose of indemnification (see People vs. Candare, 333 SCRA 338 [2000]). The award
of P3,276,000.00 and P3,360,000.00, representing the alleged loss of earning ca
pacity of Sarmenta and Gomez, respectively, also merit review. Eileen Sarmenta,
at the time of her death, was a graduating student of the College of Agriculture
of the University of the Philippines at Los Baos (UPLB), majoring in Food and Nu
trition for Large Animals. Allan Gomez was likewise a senior student of the Coll
ege of Agriculture of UPLB, majoring in Beef Production. The trial court, using
the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, pegged the life expectancy of Sarmen
ta, 21 years old at the time of her death, and Gomez, 19 years old at the time o
f his death, at 39.1 and 40.6 years, respectively. Believing that the victims wo
uld have earned a monthly salary of P15,000.00 and incurred living expenses of P
8,000.00 per month, the trial court awarded P3,276,000.00 and P3,360,000.00 as t
he amount recoverable by the Sarmenta and Gomez families, respectively, for the
loss of the earning capacity of Eileen and Allan.
While accused-appellant Sanchez contends that the awards of P3,276,000.00 and P3
,360,000.00 are baseless in fact and law, no evidence having been adduced to pro
ve that the victims had any actual income at the time of their demise, it is wel
l-settled that to be compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not necessa
ry that the victim, at the time of injury or death, be gainfully employed. Compe
nsation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for loss of capac
ity to earn money (People vs. Teehankee, supra). Likewise, the fact that the pro
secution did not present documentary evidence to support its claim for damages f
or loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of the sa
me (People vs. Quilang, 312 SCRA 314 [1999]; People vs. Verde, 302 SCRA 690 [199
9]). On the part of Eileen Sarmenta, her mother testified that Eileen had an off
er for employment from Monterey Farms. On the other hand, Allan Gomezs mother tes
tified that her deceased son planned to work on a private farm after graduation.
Moreover, in Cariaga et al. vs. LTB and Manila Railroad Co. (110 Phil. 346 [196
0]), the Court awarded compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity to
Edgardo Cariaga, a 4th year medical student at UST, stating that while his schol
astic record may not have been first rate, it was, nevertheless, sufficient to j
ustify the assumption that he could have finished the course, would have passed
the board in due time, and that he could have possibly earned as a medical pract
itioner the minimum monthly income of P300.00. Both Sarmenta and Gomez were seni
or agriculture students at UPLB, the countrys leading educational institution in
agriculture. As reasonably assumed by the trial court, both victims would have g
raduated in due course. Undeniably, their untimely death deprived them of their
future time and earning capacity. For these deprivation, their heirs are entitle
d to compensation. Difficulty, however, arises in measuring the value of Sarment
as and Gomezs lost time and capacity to earn money in the future, both having been
unemployed at the time of death. While the law is clear that the deceased has a
right to his own time which right cannot be taken from him by a tortfeasor with
out compensation the law is also clear that damages cannot be awarded on the spe
culation, passion, or guess of the judge or the witnesses. In this case, Eileen
Sarmentas mother testified that for a new graduate of UPLB, the basic salary was
more or less P15,000.00 per month. Allan Gomezs mother, on the other hand, testif
ied that her son could have easily gotten P10,000.00 to P15,000.00 per month. Cl
early, the testimony of said witnesses are speculative, insufficient to prove th
at in 1993, Sarmenta and Gomez would have indeed earned P15,000.00 a month had t
hey managed to graduate. However, considering that Sarmenta and Gomez would have
graduated in due time from a reputable university, it would not be unreasonable
to assume that in 1993 they would have earned more than the minimum wage. All f
actors considered, the Court believes that it is fair and reasonable to fix the
monthly income that the two would have earned in 1993 at P8,000.00 per month (or
P96,000.00/year) and their deductible living and other incidental expenses at P
3,000.00 per month (or P36,000.00/year). Hence, in accordance with the formula a
dopted by the Court in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. CA (31 SCRA 511 [1970]), and
using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, the loss of Sarmenta and Gomezs
earning capacity is to be computed as follows: Net earning capacity = Life expe
ctancy x (Gross Annual Income Living Expenses) where:
Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 the age of the deceased) Heirs of Eileen Sarmenta: = 2
/3 (80-21) x (96,000 36,000) = 39.353 x 60,000 = P2,361,180.00 Heirs of Allan Go
mez: = 2/3 (80-19) x (96,000 36,000) = 40.687 x 60,000 = P2,441,220.00 As to the
award of P2,000,000.00 each as moral damages to the Sarmenta and Gomez families
, these must also be reduced, the same being excessive. While the assessment of
moral damages is left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstan
ces of each case (Article 2216, Civil Code), the purpose of moral damagesis esse
ntially indemnity or reparation, not punishment or correction. Moral damages are
emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant
; they are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions
or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone
by reason of the defendants culpable action. In other words, the award of moral d
amages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spir
itual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted (Dela Serna vs. CA, 233 SCRA 325 [1994]). The intensity of the pain ex
perienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of af
fection for him and bears no relation whatever with the wealth or the means of t
he offender. The death caused by a beggar is felt by the parents of the victim a
s intensely as that caused by the action of a wealthy family. The Court, in the
exercise of its discretion, thus reduces the amount of moral damages awarded to
the heirs of Eileen Gomez and Allan Sarmenta to P1,000,000.00 each. As to the aw
ard of attorneys fees and litigation expenses, the same is reasonable and justifi
ed, this case having dragged on for over eight years. WHEREFORE, premises consid
ered, we AFFIRM the conviction of accused- appellants for seven counts of rape w
ith homicide and the sentence of reclusion perpetua imposed upon them for each o
f said counts, with MODIFICATION that the accused be ordered to pay the heirs of
the victims as follows: To the heirs of Eileen Sarmenta: 1. Death indemnity 2.
Moral damages 3. Funeral expenses 4. Loss of earning capacity 5. Attorneys fees &
litigation expenses P 350,000.00 1,000,000.00 106,650.00 2,361,180.00 164,250.0
0 ---------------------Total To the heirs of Allan Gomez:
1. Death indemnity P350,000.00 2. Moral damages 1,000,000.00 3. Nominal damages
10,000.00 4. Loss of earning capacity 2,441,220.00 5. Attorneys fees & litigation
expenses ---------------------Total SO ORDERED. 47. PESTAO vs. Spouses SUMAYANG
FACTS: At around 2:00 oclock on the afternoon of August 9, 1986, Ananias Sumayang
was riding a motorcycle along the national highway in Ilihan, Tabagon, Cebu. Ri
ding with him was his friend Manuel Romagos. As they came upon a junction where
the highway connected with the road leading to Tabagon, they were hit by a passe
nger bus driven by Gregorio Pestao and owned byMetro Cebu Autobus Corporation (Me
tro Cebu), which had tried to overtake them, sending the motorcycle and its pass
engers hurtling upon the pavement. Both Ananias Sumayang and Manuel Romagos were
rushed to the hospital in Sogod, where Sumayang was pronounced dead on arrival.
Romagos was transferred to the Cebu Doctors Hospital, but he succumbed to his in
juries the day after. The lower court found petitioners liable to the respondent
s, in the amounts of P30,000.00 for death indemnity, P829,079 for loss of earnin
g capacity of the deceased Ananias Sumayang, and P36,000.00 for necessary interm
ent expenses. The CA affirmed respondents liability for the accident and for Suma
yangs death. Pestao was negligent when he tried to overtake the victims motorcycle
at the Tabagon junction. As a professional driver operating a public transport v
ehicle, he should have taken extra precaution to avoid accidents, knowing that i
t was perilous to overtake at a junction, where adjoining roads had brought abou
t merging and diverging traffic. The appellate court opined that Metro Cebu had
shown laxity in the conduct of its operations and in the supervision of its empl
oyees. By allowing the bus to ply its route despite the defective speedometer, s
aid petitioner showed its indifference towards the proper maintenance of its veh
icles. Having failed to observe the extraordinary diligence required of public t
ransportation companies, it was held vicariously liable to the victims of the ve
hicular accident. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the CA raised to
P50,000 the granted indemnity for the death of the victim. It also affirmed the
award of loss of earning capacity based on his life expectancy. Such liability w
as assessed, not as a pension for the claiming heirs, but as a penalty and an in
demnity for the drivers negligent act. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the life expectancy
of the deceased or life expectancies of respondents would be used as basis for t
he computation of loss of earning capacity. P 3,992,220.00
SC RULING: Petitioners cite Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, which h
eld: The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased
person has therefore no fixed basis. x x x The life expectancy of the deceased o
r of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an important factor. x x x.They co
ntend that the CA used the wrong basis for its computation of earning capacity.
We disagree. The Court has consistently computed the loss of earning capacity ba
sed on the life expectancy of the deceased, and not on that of the heir. Even Vi
lla Rey Transit did likewise. The award for loss of earning capacity is based on
two factors: (1) the number of years on which the computation of damages is bas
ed and (2) the rate at which the loss sustained by the heirs is fixed. The first
factor refers to the life expectancy, which takes into consideration the nature
of the victims work, lifestyle, age and state of health prior to the accident. T
he second refers to the victims earning capacity minus the necessary living expen
ses. Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is that portion of the earnings of
the deceased which the beneficiary would have received -- the net earnings of t
he deceased. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Res
olution AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners. 48. CONSOLIDATED DAIRY PRODUCTS CO v
s. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On November 13, 1974, Dexco wrote Consolidated Philip
pines that it was cancelling effective January 25, 1975 the license granted to C
onsolidated Philippines to use the tradename Darigold . Mr. Augusto Syjuco, in h
is behalf and in behalf of Syjuco, Inc., the minority stockholder in Consolidate
d Philippines, protested the cancellation of the license. Subsequently, Dr. Loui
s Arrigoni, speaking as President of Consolidated Seattle, offered Syjuco, Inc.
to sell Consolidated Seattle s share in Consolidated Philippines for P 1.00 or t
o buy Syjuco, Inc. s share in Consolidated Philippines or to file bankruptcy pro
ceedings for Consolidated Philippines. Left with no better choice, Syjuco, Inc.
chose to sell its 49% equity in Consolidated Philippines to Consolidated Seattle
. Consequently, on October 8, 1976, Syjuco, Inc. executed a memorandum agreement
by virtue of which it agreed to sell to Consolidated Seattle all its Interest i
n Consolidated Philippines and to dissolve Consolidated Philippines, subject to
the condition that the right of plaintiff to submit claims it may have shall be
respected in case Consolidated Philippines is not dissolved. Accordingly, Consol
idated Seattle bought the entire interest of Syjuco, Inc. and its stockholdings
Consolidated Philippines and proceeded to dissolve Consolidated Philippines.
Before Consolidated Philippines could be dissolved, however, Dexco theMwholly ow
ned subsidiary of Consolidated Seattle took over the marketing activities of Con
solidated Philippines and proceeded to sell milk under the tradename Darigold up
on the dissolution of Consolidated Philippines. Earlier, however, on November 3,
1976, E.L. Benitez, then general manager of Consolidated Philippines, notified
plaintiff that it was cancelling the can supply contract of April 2, 1959, promp
ting plaintiff to demand reimbursement for the separation pay of the employees c
oncerned due to the cessation of their operation on November 15, 1976 in the amo
unt of P1,022,472.59 and payment of unrealized profits Since plaintiff s demands
were rejected, it was constrained to file this case and t engage the services o
f counsel for 25% of all recoveries. After the parties presented their respectiv
e evidence, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Standard. The disposit
ive portion of which reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court hereby orders t
he defendants, namely, Consolidated Dairy Products Company of Seattle, Washingto
n, U.S.A. and/ or its alter ego Dairy Export Company Inc., as well as Consolidat
ed Philippines. Inc. (represented by its Acting Trustees Jesus B. Bito and Feder
ico B. Guilas) to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the following: a) P1,022
,472.59 representing the separation pay that plaintiff had to pay its employees
plus 6% interest per annum computed from the date of the filing of this case on
April 4, 1977 until the defendants fully pay their obligation; b) P8,107,931.13
representing plaintiff s aggregate unrealized profit from the years 1974 to 1981
plus 6% interest per annum computed from April 4, 1977, the date of the filing
of this case until defendants fully pay their obligation; c) Pl,150,197.80 repre
senting inventory losses suffered by plaintiff plus 6% interest per annumcompute
d from April 4, 1977 until defendants fully settle their obligation; and d) Pl,0
00,000.00 as exemplary damages, considering the damages caused the plaintiff and
the fraudulent scheme used by the defendants, plus 25% of all the abovementione
d amounts as attorney s fees. The counterclaim of the defendants Consolidated Ph
ilippines and Dexco are denied for lack of merit. Not satisfied with the decisio
n of the trial court, Consolidated Seattle and Consolidated Philippines, thru it
s acting trustees, appealed to the Court of Appeals. On April 19, 1991, the Cour
t of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the decision of the trial court in to
to. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the lower court correctly imposed the award of damages
against the herein petitioner. SC RULING: We now go to the propriety of the awa
rd of damages. The trial court received evidence to support private respondent s
claim for damages. It should be emphasized here that the damages claimed by pri
vate respondents do not refer to claims which were already due from the can supp
ly contract. The claims here are for damages caused by the fraudulent terminatio
n by petitioners of the can supply contract four (4) years before the end of its
term and for such a short notice. We reproduce
herein the findings of the trial court and adopt them with modifications as rega
rds the amount: Plaintiff s first claim is for reimbursement for the separation
pay it paid its employees due to the termination of the can supply agreement in
the amount of Pl,022,472.59. The evidence supports plaintiff s claim above. The
amount actually paid by plaintiffs to the separated employee is P929,520.54. To
this was added 10% since 10% must be added to costs of production, thus making t
he total of P1,022,472.59. There is no question that Standard paid these amounts
to their separated employees. It was obliged to do so by virtue of the CBA it s
igned with the employees. The second claim of plaintiff is for unrealized profit
amounting to P8,101,931.13. In support of this claim plaintiff showed that from
1971 to 1975 It made an aggregate profit of P 8,107,931.13), and argued that si
nce the can supply contract had another five (5) years to go (1977 to 1981) plai
ntiff would have earned that much. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend
not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the
obligee failed to obtain (Art. 2200 NCC). The presumption that Standard would ea
rn exactly the same profit as it did five (5) years before its closure is specul
ative. A more reasonable amount would be the average of the yearly profit for th
e five years preceding the closure (1971-1975) multiplied by the number of years
remaining as provided for in the contract. The average yearly profit for 1971 t
o 1975 is P1,041,095.76 . This amount multiplied by five (years) amounts to P5,2
05,478.80. We also affirm the findings of the appellate court on inventory losse
s as it is sufficiently supported by evidence, to wit: The financial statement o
f plaintiff further shows that it incurred inventory losses in the year 1977 due
to cans which rusted and could not have been disposed of, administrative expens
es connected with the cost of the cans, cost of raw materials and depreciated po
rtion of the machinery all amounting to P1,150,197.80. These losses were due to
the cancellation of the can supply contract before its agreed expiration date.It
is only right that defendants be held liable for them. There is no doubt that t
he breach committed by the petitioners was made in a wanton and fraudulent manne
r. There was no reason for petitioners to terminate the can supply contract with
Standard. The latter was purposely organized for the benefit of Consolidated Ph
ilippines. Neither was there a need to close Consolidated Philippines because Co
nsolidated Seattle had all the intentions of continuing its business only this t
ime to be undertaken by its sole subsidiary, Dexco to the prejudice of Standard.
Where a defendant violates a contract with plaintiff, the court may award exemp
lary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressiv
e and malevolent manner (Art. 2232, Civil Code). The claim for attorney s fees o
f 25% percent of all recoveries is unconscionable. It is hereby reduced to 15%.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is affirmed with modifi
cation on the amount of damages awarded as discussed above. SO ORDERED. Cases 40
-48 PIAGA, RICHARD S. 49. ALGARRA VS. SANDEJAS FACTS: The case involves the dete
rmination of the damages to be allowed since the negligence of the defendant who
was driving his car was not questioned. Plaintiff claims that his earning capac
ity was P50 per month but because of the injuries he sustained it was reduced to
P15 per month. He also paid for his medical treatment in the hospital and after
discharged he attended by private practitioner where he spent P8 and P2 for the
medicine. All in all amounting to P110 and claimed two months payment would be
sufficient for the actual lost of his work. Resolution of the lower court: The l
ower court, while recognizing the justness of the claim, refused to allow him an
ything for injury to his business due to his enforced absence thereof. The trial
court s opinion appears to be based upon the following quotation from Viada (vo
l. 1 p. 539), quoted in that decision: ". . . with regard to the offense of lesi
ones, for example, the civil liability is almost always limited to indemnity for
damage to the party aggrieved for the time during which he was incapacitated fo
r work; . . ." and there were no evidence offered by the plaintiff. ISSUE: Wheth
er or not the lower was correct in not allowing damages for plaintiffs lost of bu
siness due to his absence thereof because of the injuries sustained. RESOLUTION
OF THE SC: The case at bar involves actual incapacity of the plaintiff for two m
onths, and loss of the greater portion of his business. As to the damages result
ing from the actual incapacity of the plaintiff to attend to his business there
is no question. They are, of course, to be allowed on the basis of his earning c
apacity, which in this case, is P50 per month. The difficult question in the pre
sent case is to determine the damage which has results to his business through h
is enforced absence. In Sanz vs. Lavin Bros. (6 Phil. Rep., 299), this court, ci
ting numerous decisions of the supreme court of Spain, held that evidence of dam
ages "must rest upon satisfactory proof of the existence in reality of the damag
es alleged to have been suffered." But, while certainty is an essential element
of an award of damages, it need not be a mathematical certainty. That this is tr
ue is adduced not only from the personal injury cases from the supreme court of
Spain which we have discussed above, but by many cases decided by this court, re
ference to which has already been made. As stated in Joyce on Damages, section 7
5, "But to deny the injured party the right to recover any actual damages in cas
es f torts because they are of such a nature a cannot be thus certainly measured
, would be to enable parties to profit by and speculate upon their own wrongs; s
uch is not the law." We are of the opinion that the lower court had before it su
fficient evidence of the damage to plaintiff s business in the way of prospectiv
e loss of profits to justify it in calculating his damages as to his item. That
evidence has been properly elevated to this court of review. Under section 496 o
f the Code of Civil Procedure, we are authorized to
enter final judgment or direct a new trial, as may best sub serves the ends of j
ustice. We are of the opinion that the evidence presented as to the damage done
to plaintiff s business is credible and that it is sufficient and clear enough u
pon which to base a judgment for damages. Plaintiff having had four years exper
ience in selling goods on commission, it must be presumed that he will be able t
o rebuild his business to its former proportions; so that at some time in the fu
ture his commissions will equal those he was receiving when the accident occurre
d. Aided by his experience, he should be able to rebuild this business to its fo
rmer proportions in much less time than it took to establish it as it stood just
prior to the accident. One year should be sufficient time in which to do this.
The profits which plaintiff will receive from the business in the course of its
reconstruction will gradually increase. The injury to plaintiff s business begin
s where these profits leave off, and, as a corollary, there is where defendant s
liability begins. Upon this basis, we fix the damages to plaintiff s business a
t P250. The judgment of the lower court is set aside, and the plaintiff is award
ed the following damages; ten pesos for medical expenses; one hundred pesos for
the two months of his enforced absence from his business; and two hundred and fi
fty pesos for the damage done to his business in the way of loss of profits, or
a total of three hundred and sixty pesos. No costs will be allowed in this insta
nce. 50. QUIRANTE VS. IAC FACTS: In a suit filed by the late DR. Casasola thru h
is counsel atty. John Quirante for a breach of contract against contractor Norma
n Guerrero and Philippine American General Insurance Com. Inc. (Philamgen) actin
g as a bondsman.teh lower court favored Dr.Casaola and ordered Guerrero and Phil
amgen to pay the plaintiff actual, moral, exemplary and attorneys fees. On appea
l to the CA Dr. Casasola died leaving his widow and some children as his survivo
rs. Later, atty. Quirante filed with the trial court for the confirmation his At
torneys fees by virtiue of an oral agreement with the late Dr. Casasola and whic
h was confirmed in writing by the widow and some children of Dr. Casasola. Resol
ution of the lower court: The trial court granted the motion despite opposition.
However, it ruled that such is premature because of a petition for review on ce
rtiorari filed by Philamgen may or may not ultimately result in the granting to
the casasola family of the total amount of damages awarded by the court. ISSUE:
whether or not there is a pre mature confirmation of attorney fees. RESOLUTION O
F THE SC: What is being claimed here as attorney s fees by petitioners is, howev
er, different from attorney s fees as an item of damages provided for under Arti
cle 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant,
not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor
who may enforce the judgment for attorney s fees by execution. Here, the petitio
ner s claims are based on an alleged contract for professional services, with th
em as the creditors and the private respondents as the debtors. In filing the mo
tion for confirmation of attorney s fees, petitioners chose to assert their clai
ms in the same action. This is also a proper remedy under our jurisprudence. Nev
ertheless, we agree with the respondent court that the confirmation of attorney
s
fees is premature. As it correctly pointed out, the petition for review on certi
orari filed by PHILAMGEN in this Court (G.R. No. 64834) "may or may not ultimate
ly result in the granting to the Casasola (sic) family of the total amount of da
mages" awarded by the trial court. This especially true in the light of subseque
nt developments in G.R. No. 64334. In a decision promulgated on May 21, 1987, th
e Court rendered judgment setting aside the decision of May 4, 1983 of the Inter
mediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. 00202 and ordering the respondent Regiona
l Since the main case from which the petitioner s claims for their fees may aris
e has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and
the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure gains added validi
ty in the light of the rule that the remedy for recovering attorney s fees as an
incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the
client. Thus, it was ruled that: ... an attorney s fee cannot be determined unt
il after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of recovery is at
the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney s fee only arises when som
ething has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid. It is further observ
ed that the supposed contract alleged by petitioners as the basis for their fees
provides that the recovery of the amounts claimed is subject to certain conting
encies. It is subject to the condition that the fee shall be P30,000.00 in case
of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, plus an additional amount in case th
e award is in excess of said P120,000.00 bond, on the sharing basis hereinbefore
stated. With regard to the effect of the alleged confirmation of the attorney s
fees by some of the heirs of the deceased. We are of the considered view that t
he orderly administration of justice dictates that such issue is likewise determ
ined by the court a quo inasmuch as it also necessarily involves the same contin
gencies in determining the propriety and assessing the extent of recovery of att
orney s fees by both petitioners herein. The court below will be in a better pos
ition, after the entire case shall have been adjudicated, inclusive of any liabi
lity of PHILAMGEN and the respective participations of the heirs of Dr. Casasola
in the award, to determine with evidentiary support such matters like the basis
for the entitlement in the fees of petitioner Dante Cruz and as to whether the
agreement allegedly entered into with the late Dr. Casasola would be binding on
all his heirs, as contended by petitioner Quirante. We, therefore, take exceptio
n to and reject that portion of the decision of the respondent court which holds
that the alleged confirmation to attorney s fees should not adversely affect th
e non-signatories thereto, since it is also premised on the eventual grant of da
mages to the Casasola family, hence the same objection of prematurity obtains an
d such a holding may be pre-emptive of factual and evidentiary matters that may
be presented for consideration by the trial court. WHEREFORE, with the foregoing
observation, the decision of the respondent court subject of the present recour
se is hereby AFFIRMED. 51. AGUSTIN VS. CA FACTS: Plaintiff-appellee, being a sub
division developer agreed to sell said parcel of land to defendants-appellants o
n a package deal together with a residential house per House Plan Model B-203 to
be constructed thereon for the sum of P202, 980.00 . As therein
stipulated, the defendants-appellants were to pay P42, 980.00 as equity-P30, 133
.00 as down payment and the balance of P12, 847.00 upon completion and de very o
f the property, the other P160,000.00 to have been funded through a Pag-Ibig Fun
d loan to be applied for by defendants-appellants. One agreed in the stipulation
is that there will be an ipso facto cancellation of the contract upon failure o
f the vendee to comply with its obligation and if transferred in the latters name
then it will automatically revert to the vendor. The plaintiff now filed civil
case for reconveyance and damages. Resolution of the trial court: It ruled in fa
vor of the plaintiff ordered defendant to pay including the following damages; t
o pay plaintiff the sum of P20, 000.00 as exemplary damages; to pay plaintiff th
e sum of P5,000.00 as attorney s fees, plus costs of the suit. The CA affirmed t
he decision but deleted the award of exemplary damages ISSUE: whether or not exe
mplary damages and attorneys fees awarded is proper. RESOLUTION OF THE SC: The aw
ard to private respondent of attorney s fees, however, must be disallowed consid
ering that the award of exemplary damages was eliminated by respondent court and
the text of the decision of the trial court, which was aimed by the Court of Ap
peals, is bereft of any findings of fact and law to justify such award. The acce
pted rule is that the reason for the award of attorney s fees must be stated in
the text of the court s decision; otherwise, if it is stated only in the disposi
tive portion of the decision, the same must be disallowed on appeal. The award o
f attorney s fees being an exception rather than the general rule, it is necessa
ry for the court to make findings of facts and law that would bring the case wit
hin the exception and justify the grant of such award. WHEREFORE, except for the
award of attorney s fees which is hereby deleted, the decision of respondent Co
urt of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. 52. BICARME VS. CA FACTS: In a suit involving
parcels of land (corn and rice land) Cristina Bicarme sued her aunt Maria Bicar
me from her hereditary share from those lands. Plaintiff Cristina obtained a fav
orable judgment and was awarded attorneys fees by the lower court. ISSUE: whethe
r or not the award of attorneys fees is proper. RESOLUTION OF THE SC: We eliminat
e the award on attorney s fees in the absence of any specific allegation thereon
in her complaint, or that the same is covered by any of the eleven (11) excepti
ons enumerated in Art. 2208 of the New Civil Code. Even if We were to concede ex
ercise of judicial discretion in the award of attorney s fees under Art. 2208, p
ar. 11, this provision "demands a factual, legal or equitable justification. Wit
hout such justification, the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis
being improperly left to speculation and conjecture." (Mirasol v. De la Cruz, G.
R. L-32552, July 31, 1978; 84 SCRA 337.) Likewise, "the matter of attorney s fee
s cannot be touched once and only in the dispositive portion of the decision. Th
e text itself must expressly state the reason why attorney s fees are being awar
ded" (ibid). In the present case, the
matter of such fees was touched but once and appears only in the dispositive por
tion of the decision. ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review is DENIED and the app
ealed decision as affirmed by the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the m
odification that the award on attorney s fees is eliminated. Cost against petiti
oner. This decision is immediately executory. 53. PEOPLE VS. BERGANTE FACTS: In
a criminal case filed against the defendant Bergante et al. the lower court awar
ded the following damages; on the strength of the testimonies of the witnesses f
or the prosecution and of the victim s dying declaration, the trial court, in it
s decision of 26 December 1994, convicted all the three appellants of murder and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs
of the victim in the sum of P80,000 as actual damages and P100,000 as moral and
exemplary damages, plus costs. It also convicted appellant Rex Bergante of ille
gal possession of firearms and sentenced him to suffer 18 years of imprisonment.
ISSUE: whether or not the trial court erred in not awarding civil indemnity. RE
SOLUTION OF THE SC: The trial court erred in not awarding in favor of the victim
s heirs civil indemnity under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, which current jur
isprudence has fixed at P50,000. In Criminal Case No. 86-6371 the trial court or
dered the appellants to pay the heirs of the late Donato Genanda, Sr., in the am
ount of P80,000 as actual damages and P100,000 as moral and exemplary damages. T
hese awards stand modification. The victim s widow, Leonora Genanda, declared th
at she spent more or less P12,000 for the wake; P16,000 for "transporting the bo
dy"; P24,000 for fares in going to and from the court for the hearing of the cas
es; P20,000 for attorney s fees; P2,000 for her lawyer s travel expenses; and P8
,000 for her lawyer s appearance fees. The aggregate of these is P82,000. The re
covery of attorney s fees in the concept of actual or compensatory damage is all
owed under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, one
of which is when the court deems it just and equitable that attorney s fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered. The award should, therefore, be inc
reased to P82,000. The trial court should have specified how much of the P100,00
0 was for moral damages and how much was for exemplary damages. These damages ar
e distinct from each other. Moral damages are governed by Articles 2217 to 2220,
inclusive, of the Civil Code; while exemplary damages are governed by Articles
2229 to 2235 thereof. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, s
ocial humiliation, and similar injury. Under Article 2206(3) the spouse, and the
legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may dema
nd moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased resul
ting from a crime.
In the instant case, Leonora Genanda, then 70 years old when she testified, 25 d
eclared that because of her husband s death, she "suffered very much," had sleep
less nights, and could not eat. The victim s son, Donato Genanda, Jr., did not t
estify on the moral damages he might have suffered. Hence, only the victim s wid
ow may be entitled to moral damages, and an award of P25,000 would be adequate.
As to exemplary damages, the same may be granted in criminal cases as part of th
e civil liability if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circum
stances. As stated earlier, more than one generic aggravating circumstance atten
ded the killing of Donato Genanda, Sr. An award of P25,000 as exemplary damages
in favor of the heirs of the victim is in order. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the assailed d
ecision of Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan in Criminal Case No.
86-6371 convicting REX BERGANTE, RODITO BERGANTE, and LEO BERGANTE of the crime
of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpet
ua is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that the said accused are her
eby ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, (1) the heirs of Donato Genanda, Sr.,
in the sum of P50,000 as indemnity and P25,000 as exemplary damages; and (2) Le
onora Genanda, in the sum of P25,000 as moral damages. The decision in Criminal
Case No. 86-6548 for violation of P.D. No. 1866 is SET ASIDE, and appellant REX
BERGANTE is ACQUITTED thereof. 54. CRISMINA GARMENTS, INC., VS. CA FACTS: Petiti
oner was engaged in the export of girls denim pants, contracted the services of
the respondent the sole proprietress of the D Wilmar Garments, for the sewing o
f 20,762 pieces of assorted girls[ ] denims supplied by the [petitioner] under P
urchase Orders Nos. 1404. At first, the respondent was told that the sewing of s
ome of the pants was defective. She offered to take delivery of the defective pa
nts. However, she was later told by petitioner s representative that the goods w
ere already good. She was told to just return for her check of P76,410.00. Howev
er, the petitioner]failed to pay her the aforesaid amount. This prompted her to
hire the services of counsel and demand payment of the aforesaid amount within t
en 10 days from receipt thereof. the [petitioner] s [v]ice-[p]resident wrote a l
etter to [respondent] s counsel, averring, inter alia, that the pairs of jeans s
ewn by her, numbering 6,164 pairs, were defective and that she was liable to the
[petitioner] for the amount of P49,925.51 which was the value of the damaged pa
irs of denim pants and demanded refund of the aforesaid amount. Later, the respo
ndent filed her complaint against the petitioner with the [trial court] for the
collection of the principal amount of P76,410.00. . Resolution of the lower cour
t: After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the resp
ondent against the petitioner and odred plaintiff to pay including the sum of P5
,000 as attorney s fees; and The CA affirmed the lower courts decision but delete
d attorneys fees. ISSUE: whether or not the award or attorneys fees was proper. R
ESOLUTION OF THE SC: (The sc discussed more on the issue of the proper interest
rate.)
The appealed Decision of the CA is MODIFIED. (So it means that it maintained the
deletion of the attorneys fees awarded by the lower court). The rate of interest
shall be six percent (6%) per annum, computed from the time of the filing of th
e Complaint in the trial court until the finality of the judgment. If the adjudg
ed principal and the interest (or any part thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, th
e interest rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time t
he judgment becomes final and executory until it is fully satisfied. No pronounc
ement as to costs. 55. BAUTISTA VS. MANGALDAN RURAL BANK, INC FACTS: Plaintiff C
risteta Bautista mortgaged her conjugal share of 1/2 of the land covered by TCT
No. 1507 for P2,000.00 to defendant Mangaldan Rural Bank The inscription at the
back of the title specifically states that only 1/2 portion of the subject land
is mortgaged The said mortgage was foreclosed extra-judicially, for failure of p
laintiff to pay the principal obligation and the other charges with the defendan
t as the highest bidder. After the plaintiff failed to redeem the mortgaged prop
erty within the reglementary period, ownership over the whole parcel of land ins
tead of the 1/2 portion which was mortgaged, was consolidated in the name of def
endant bank. Defendant bank sold for and in consideration of the sum of P3,385.0
0 and executed a deed of absolute sale over the whole property covered by TCT No
. 130847 in favor of its co-defendant Fred Rodriguez.Plaintiffs filed a complain
t against herein defendants for the annulment and/or cancellation of the followi
ng: 1) deed of absolute sale 2) entry no. 492278 on OCT No. 1507; 3) consolidati
on of ownership dated 18 July 1979; 4) entry no. 592279 on OCT No. No. 1507; 5)
TCT No. 130847; and 6) deed of sale dated 18 December 1979. Resolution of the lo
wer court: It ruled in favor of plaintiffs against defendants likewise, ordered
to pay plaintiffs damages in the sum of P5,000.00; attorney s fees in the sum of
P11,750.00 and the litigation expenses in the sum of P5,000.00 and to pay doubl
e costs. The Ca set aside the awards of damages in favor of plaintiffs-appellees
in the amount of P5,000.00; attorney s fees of P11,750.00 and litigation expens
es in the sum of P5,000.00. ISSUE: whether or not the petitioners are entitled t
o recover damages as well as attorney s fees as a result of the admitted mistake
of respondent bank in selling the entire lot, instead of only-half thereof, to
respondent Efren Rodriguez. RESOLUTION OF THE SC: In the present case, we find t
hat the respondent court not only gravely abused its discretion but also misappr
ehension the facts when it set aside the lower court s awards for damages and at
torney s fees in favor of petitioners. Prudence dictates that a person signing a
document in his official capacity (as bank manager in this case) must closely r
ead and meticulously study the contents of the said document affixing his signat
ure thereon. A bank is not without a legal staff or lawyer who prepares document
s concerning its business. The mistake committed by the bank s staff, which was
admitted by respondent Jimenez, was not a slight or minor infraction. It deprive
d petitioners of their property which could ultimately result in their ejectment
there from. Moreover, the bank s manager, Dr. Jimenez, could not even explain wh
y the mistake occurred. Moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant
but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered. 5 In the
present case, we believe that moral damages are proper for there can be no doubt
that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety and wound
ed feelings upon learning that they had lost the remaining one-half of their pro
perty on which their house is built due to the negligence of respondent bank. Ar
ticle 20 of the Civil Code is a cannon of conduct which every person must observ
e in his relation with another. The initial carelessness of the rural bank in co
nsolidating the ownership of the entire property instead of only one-half thereo
f in its name, its sale of the entire property to respondent Efren Rodriguez, an
d the lack of promptness to rectify the mistake after its discovery, constitute
after its discovery, constitute gross negligence and bad faith. These were suffi
ciently established by the evidence. Indeed, the bank and its manager were gross
ly negligent in handling the business transaction involved herein and later show
ing bad faith by refusing to rectify the wrong done to petitioners . As for resp
ondent Efren Rodriguez, his adamant refusal to return one-half of the land to th
e lawful owner after having been informed of the error committed by the bank sho
wed bad faith and served to aggravate the sorry plight of the petitioners. It is
, however, the Court s view that he was himself a victim of the bank s gross neg
ligence before he was apprised of the mistake. From this viewpoint, the Court be
lieves that he should not be imposed exemplary damages. For the mental anguish,
sleepless nights and serious anxiety suffered by the petitioners, respondent are
liable jointly and severally for moral damages which the Court believes should
be raised to P10,000.00. To serve as deterrent for respondent bank from repeatin
g similar acts, this Court likewise awards exemplary damages against it in the s
um of P10,000.00. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET AS
IDE. The trial court s decision is reinstated with the above-mentioned modificat
ions. Costs against private respondents. 56. ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION. VS. C
A FACTS: Private respondent Lawrence Fernandez insured his car for "own damage"
under private car Policy No. 50459 with petitioner Zenith Insurance Corporation.
Later, the car figured in an accident and suffered actual damages in the amount
of P3, 640.00. After allegedly being given a run around by Zenith for two month
s, Fernandez filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for sum of
money and damages resulting from the refusal of Zenith to pay the amount claimed
. Aside from actual damages and interests, Fernandez also prayed for moral damag
es in the amount of P10,000.00, exemplary damages of P5,000.00, attorney s fees
of P3,000.00 and litigation expenses of P3,000.00.
Resolution of the lower court: It favored respondent Fernandez and awarded the f
ollowing damages; The amount of P3,640.00 representing the damage incurred plus
interest at the rate of twice the prevailing interest rates; The amount of P20,0
00.00 by way of moral damages; The amount of P20,000.00 by way of exemplary dama
ges; The amount of P5,000.00 as attorney s fees; The amount of P3,000.00 as liti
gation expenses; and Costs. The CA affirmed in toto the lower courts decision. IS
SUE: whether or not the award of attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages was
proper. RESOLUTION OF THE SC: It is clear that under the Insurance Code, in case
of unreasonable delay in the payment of the proceeds of an insurance policy, th
e damages that may be awarded are: 1) attorney s fees; 2) other expenses incurre
d by the insured person by reason of such unreasonable denial or withholding of
payment; 3) interest at twice the ceiling prescribed by the Monetary Board of th
e amount of the claim due the injured; and 4) the amount of the claim. As regard
s the award of moral and exemplary damages, the rules under the Civil Code of th
e Philippines shall govern. "The purpose of moral damages is essentially indemni
ty or reparation, not punishment or correction. Moral damages are emphatically n
ot intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant, they are awar
ded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements t
hat will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of th
e defendant s culpable action. While it is true that no proof of pecuniary loss
is necessary in order that moral damages may be adjudicated, the assessment of w
hich is left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of ea
ch case (Art. 2216, New Civil Code), it is equally true that in awarding moral d
amages in case of breach of contract, there must be a showing that the breach wa
s wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted fraudently or i
n bad faith. in the instant case, there was a finding that private respondent wa
s given a "runaround" for two months, which is the basis for the award of the da
mages granted under the Insurance Code for unreasonable delay in the payment of
the claim. However, the act of petitioner of delaying payment for two months can
not be considered as so wanton or malevolent to justify an award of P20,000.00 a
s moral damages, taking into consideration also the fact that the actual damage
on the car was only P3,460. In the pre-trial of the case, it was shown that ther
e was no total disclaimer by respondent. The reason for petitioner s failure to
indemnify private respondent within the two-month period was that the parties co
uld not come to an agreement as regards the amount of the actual damage on the c
ar. The amount of P10,000.00 prayed for by private respondent as moral damages i
s equitable. On the other hand, exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by w
ay of example or correction for the public good (Art. 2229, New Civil Code of th
e Philippines). In the case of Noda v. Cruz-Arnaldo, G.R. No. 57322, June 22,198
7; 151 SCRA 227, exemplary damages were not awarded as the insurance company had
not acted in wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. The same is true in the c
ase at bar.
The amount of P5,000.00 awarded as attorney s fees is justified under the circum
stances of this case considering that there were other petitions filed and defen
ded by private respondent in connection with this case. As regards the actual da
mages incurred by private respondent, the amount of P3,640.00 had been establish
ed before the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court. Respondent appell
ate court correctly ruled that the deductions of P250.00 and P274.00 as deductib
le franchise and 20% depreciation on parts, respectively claimed by petitioners
as agreed upon in the contract, had no basis. Therefore, the award of moral dama
ges is reduced to P10,000.00 and the award of exemplary damages is hereby delete
d. The awards due to private respondent Fernandez are as follows: 1) P3,640.00 a
s actual claim plus interest of twice the ceiling prescribed by the Monetary Boa
rd computed from the time of submission of proof of loss;2) P10,000.00 as moral
damages;3) P5,000.00 as attorney s fees;4) P3,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
5) Costs. 57. COMPAIA MARITIMA VS. ALLIED FREE WORKERS UNION FACTS: Compania mari
tima entered into a written contract with the free allied workers union for arra
stre and stevedoring services of the latter. It was stipulated that the company
will revoke the contract before the expiration of the contract if the workers do
not provide for proper services. At the time the contract was made the union ju
st been organized and requested the company to recognize it as he exclusive barg
aining unit. However, the company ignored the request tending the union to file
with the CIR praying that it be recognized as such. Later, the company entered i
nto another arrastre and stevedoring contract with another party (Iligan arrastr
e and stevedoring association). The free allied union workers picketed for 9 day
s preventing the Iligan arrastre and stevedoring association to perform their fu
nction. For this reason the company sued the union for the rescission of the con
tract and for damages in the CFI of Lanao. Resolution of the trial court: It ren
dered a decision (1) declaring the arrastre and stevedoring contract terminated;
(2) dismissing the union s counterclaim; (3) ordering the union and its officer
s to pay solidarily to the company P520,000 as damages, with six percent interes
t per annum from September 9, 1954, when the complaint. was filed; (4) permanent
ly enjoining the union from performing any arrastre and stevedoring work for the
company at Iligan City, and (5) requiring the union to post a supersedeas bond
in the sum of P520,000 to stay execution. ISSUE: whether or not the damages (act
ual, moral and attorneys fees) awarded by the trial court in favor of the compan
y were proper based from the testimony of the two accountants. RESOLUTION OF THE
SC: The trial court erred in ordering the union and its officials to pay the am
ount of the said expenses as damages, to the company.
The trial court did not bother to make a breakdown of the alleged damages, total
ing P450,000. The reports of the two hired accountants, Demetrio S. Jayme and M.
J. Siojo, show the following alleged damages, in the aggregate amount of P349,2
45.37 (not P412,663.17, as erroneously added by the consignees. counsel, 161,163
-4 tsn March 11, 1960): We have already stress that, on the basis of the reports
of the two accountants, the damages, claimed by the complaint as a matter of si
mple addition, does not reach the sum of P 450,000 fixed by the trial court. The
damages shown in the accountants reports and in the statement made by the consi
gnees chief clerk (who did not testify) amount to P349,245.37, or much less than
P450,000. It would not be proper to allow Jayme s estimates as recoverable dama
ges. They are not supported by reliable evidence. They can hardly be sanctioned
by the "generally accepted auditing standards" alluded to in Jayme s report. The
pertinent records of the company should have been produced in court. The purser
and steward did not testify. Our conclusion is that an injustice would be perpe
trated if the damages, aggregating P178,579 computed and estimated in the report
of Jayme, a biased witness, should be accepted at their face value. Moral damag
es and attorney s fees. - Considering that the consignees claim for moral damage
s, was based on the same facts on which it predicated its claim for actual deduc
tion which we have found to be groundless, it follows that the company, a juridi
cal person, is not entitled to moral damages. Anyway, the company did not plead
and prove moral damages. It merely claimed moral damages, in the prayer of its c
omplaint. That is not sufficient (Darang vs. Ty Belizar, L19487, January 31, 196
7, 19 SCRA 214, 222). Under the facts of this case, we do not find any justifica
tion for awarding attorney s considering to the company. Hence, the trial court
s award of P20,000 as attorney s Considering is set aside. Appellants first ass
ignment of error, although not properly argued by their counsel, should be susta
ined.WHEREFORE, that portion of the trial court s judgment declaring the arrastr
e and stevedoring contract terminated, permanently enjoining the union and its o
fficials from performing arrastre and stevedoring work for the vessels of the Co
mpaia Maritima, and dismissing defendants counterclaim is affirmed. The lower co
urt s award of damages is reversed and set aside. Cases 49-57 APIDCOR, EMERSON P
. 58. DEL ROSARIO VS COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Sps. Del Roario commenced a civil a
ction against Metal Forming Corporation (MFC) in the RTC of Manila. They sought
to recover damages resulting when their residence roof, made of shingles bought/
purchased from and installed by the MFC, was blown away by typhoon Ruping barel
y after 2months. The Sps. Also contended that
aside from the destruction of the roof of their house, injury was also caused to
its electrical wiring, ceiling, fixtures, walls, wall paper, wood parquet floor
ing and furniture. Thus the plaintiff Sps. Prayed for an actual damages of 1,008
,003.00 pesos-representing the estimated cost of the repair, restoration and/ or
replacement of the damaged areas and items in plaintiffs house and the cost of
the inspection. They also prayed for an award of moral damages in the sum of 3M,
exemplary damages- 1M, and attorneys fees- 1M. The RTC rendered judgment in favo
r of the Del Rosarios. MFC appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the Trial Courts d
ecision. It ruled that there was no privity of contract between the Del Rosarios
and MFC hence, the Del Rosarios had no course of action against MFC for breach of
warranties. ISSUE: WON MFC is answerable to the Del Rosarios for the damages cau
sed to the latters residence when its roof, made of shingles purchased from and i
nstalled by the former, was blown away by a typhoon. HELD: Actual or compensator
y damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved and proved with reasonable
degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guessw
ork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof t
hat they have (been) suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereof. This
Court also agrees with the Trial Court that exemplary damages are properly exig
ible of MFC, "Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such damages may be i
mposed by way of example or correction for the public good. While exemplary dama
ges cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they need not be proved, although
plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory dama
ges before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damag
es should be awarded. The award of P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages is also far t
oo excessive and should likewise be reduced to an equitable level. Exemplary dam
ages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a
deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actio
ns Finally, It is settled that the award of attorney s fees is the exception rat
her than the rule and counsel s fees are not to be awarded every time a party wi
ns. The power of the court to award attorney s fees under Article 2208 of the Ci
vil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot b
e left to speculation or conjecture. Where granted, the court must explicitly st
ate in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof
, the legal reason for the award of attorney s fees. WHEREFORE, the challenged D
ecision of the Court of Appeals of June 29, 1994 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of November 18, 1991 is REINSTATED AND
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award of actual damages and attorney s
fees is deleted, and the moral and exemplary damages awarded are reduced from P5
00,000.00 to P100,000.00, and from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00, respectively. IT I
S SO ORDERED 59. PEOPLE VS BUGAYONG
FACTS: On October 15, 1994 at MRR Queen of Peace Baguio City, accused RODELIO BU
GAYONG had ARLENE hold his penis inside the room he share[d] with Leticia, At th
at time CATHERINE BUGAYONG who was six (6) years old was also inside the same ro
om and her father, the accused was letting her sleep. Bugayong threatened to mai
m Arlene if she [did] not hold his penis. When the penis was already hard and st
iff, he placed it inside the mouth of Arlene and a white substance came out from
the penis. The young girl CATHERINE BUGAYONG saw this incident. Arlene testifie
d that her stepfather had been doing the same act when she was still in Grade 3
and was nine years old. She also said that there were occasions when BUGAYONG pl
ayed first with his penis then touched her vagina with his penis until a white s
ubstance [came] out [of] it and that was the time BUGAYONG would pull back his p
enis, or in the words of Arlene "idinidikit at pag may lumabas saka inilalayo. W
hen asked to explain what she meant by "idinidikit", Arlene said that the penis
of BUGAYONG partly entered [her] vagina and she got hurt. In any event, when LET
ICIA arrived home that day, CATHERINE reported to her that her father, RODELIO B
UGAYONG, had Arlene hold his penis and put it inside the mouth of the former. Le
ticia called for RODELIO BUGAYONG and they talked. While the two (2) were talkin
g, Alberto, the elder brother of Arlene, called for the latter and they went to
the house of their grandmother ANITA YU at Slaughter Compound for fear that some
thing [would] happen. Arlene reported the incident to her grandmother. Anita Yu
told Arlene that she [would] not allow her to go to her mother and that she (YU)
[would] file a case against Bugayong. The Trial Court convicted Bugayong for th
e crime of statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness. Likewise awarded damages t
o the victim Arlene Cauan. In the instant appeal, he asserts that this allegatio
n regarding the date of the commission of the offense violated his constitutiona
l right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him."
The trial court held that the accused raped the victim in 1993, not in 1994. Not
withstanding the rather encompassing allegation in the Information that the crim
e was committed "before and until October 15, 1994," the trial court ruled that
it could legally convict the accused for the crime committed in 1993. The primor
dial consideration in determining the sufficiency of the averment in the Informa
tion as to time is whether the accused was accorded the opportunity to prepare a
defense. In this case, the trial court observed that he was not so deprived. Fu
rthermore, it noted that the Information charged more than one offense, but that
the accused failed to interpose an opposition. ISSUE: WON The Trial Court erred
in convicting the appellant the crime of rape and acts of lasciviousness as wel
l as the award of damages HELD: The foregoing shows that appellant sexually assa
ulted complainant in 1993 when she was 10 years old. Thus, the trial court corre
ctly convicted him of statutory rape under Article 335 (3) of the Revised Penal
Code. Moreover, appellant is also guilty of acts of lasciviousness committed on
October 15, 1995. The trial court correctly awarded P50,000 as indemnity ex deli
cto, an amount which is automatically granted to the offended party without need
of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of rape.
Consistent with recent jurisprudence, appellant should also be ordered to pay th
e victim the additional amount of P50,000 as moral damages. In People v. Prades,
23 the Court resolved that "moral damages may additionally be awarded to the vi
ctim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems just, without
the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the
practice." WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is A
FFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that Appellant Rodelio Bugayong is ordered to pay
Complainant Arlene Cauan P50,000 as indemnity and the additional amount of P50,
000 as moral damages, or a total of P100,000. Costs against the appellant. SO OR
DERED. 60. ST. PETER MEMORIAL PARK, INC. VS CLEOFAS FACTS: Plaintiff Regino Cleo
fas and his mother Lucia Dela Cruz filed a complaint against the St. Peter Memor
ial Park, Inc. et al. an prayed to be declared the rightful owners and entitled
to the possession of lot 719 of the Piedad Estate. Lot no. 719 of the Piedad est
ate forms part of the land covered by Original Certificate of title No. 614 of t
he Registry of deeds, in the name of the Government of the Philippine Island. Re
gino Cleofas has been consistent in their contention that lot no. 719 belongs to
them in ownership, as heirs of Antonio Cleofas, original awardee of said lot th
e title to which in the name of said predecessor in interest is said to have bee
n burnt in fire in 1933. Defendant Memorial Park, however, claims to have derive
d its title to lot 719 through a series of transfers ultimately traced back to a
n alleged assignment made by Antonio Cleofas on July 15, 1921 over sales certifi
cate number 923 in favor o Aniceto Mrtin and Trino Narciso. But there is no reco
rd in the Registry of Deed about the assignment and the alleged sale of the said
lot by Trino Narciso in favor of the defendant Memorial Park. The Trial Court a
warded the lot to the heirs of Antonio Cleofas at the same tme ordered the defen
dant Memorial Park to pay 40k as damages and the amount of 10k as attorneys fees
plus cost. ISSUE: WON the Trial Court erred in awarding damages and attorneys fee
s to respondents-apellees Cleofas. HELD: The Trial Court awarded damages in the
amount of 40k without stating the concept thereof. It appearing that the petitio
ner St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. and the defendants Francisco M. Bautista and B
asilia Roque had acted in evident bad faith, the said amount maybe considered as
moral and exemplary damages. By the same token, the award of 10k as attorneys fe
es is justified. The St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. had disregard in a wanton man
ner he rights of the respondents. WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 19,1977 ap
pealed from is hereby affirmed, with the qualification that the amount of 40k is
awarded as moral and exemplary damages, without pronouncement as to costs.
61. EXPERT TRAVEL AND TOURS, INC. VS COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Expertravel & Tours
, Inc., ("Expertravel"), a domestic corporation engaged in the travel agency bus
iness, issued to private respondent Ricardo Lo four round-trip plane tickets for
Hongkong, together with hotel accommodations and transfers, for a total cost of
P39,677.20. Alleging that Lo had failed to pay the amount due, Expertravel caus
ed several demands to be made. Since the demands were ignored by Lo, Expertravel
filed a court complaint for recovery of the amount claimed plus damages. Respon
dent Lo explained, in his answer, that his account with Expertravel had already
been fully paid. The outstanding account was remitted to Expertravel through its
then Chairperson, Ms. Ma. Rocio de Vega, who was theretofore authorized to deal
with the clients of Expertravel. The payment was evidenced by a Monte de Piedad
Check No. 291559, dated 06 October 1987, for P42,175.20 for which Ms. de Vega,
in turn, issued City Trust Check No. 417920 in favor of Expertravel for the amou
nt of P50,000.00, with the notation "placement advance for Ricardo Lo, etc." Per
its own invoice, Expertravel received the sum on 10 October 1987. The Trial Cou
rt, affirmed in toto by the appellate court (CA) held that the payment made by L
o was valid and binding on the petitioner Expert Travel. It ordered the plaintif
f to pay defendant Lo moral damages in the amount of 30K; attys fees- 10k and to
pay the cost of the suit. ISSUES: Can moral damages be recovered in a clearly un
founded suit? Can moral damages be awarded for negligence or quasi-delict that d
id not result to physical injury to the offended party? HELD: Moral damages are
not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way
the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched repu
tation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury un
justly caused to a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral da
mages, nevertheless, must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the
suffering inflicted. Such damages, to be recoverable, must be the proximate res
ult of a wrongful act or omission the factual basis for which is satisfactorily
established by the aggrieved party. Although the institution of a clearly unfoun
ded civil suit can at times be a legal justification for an award of attorney s
fees, such filing, however, has almost invariably been held not to be a ground f
or an award of moral damages. The rationale for the rule is that the law could n
ot have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. The anguish suffered
by a person for having been made a defendant in a civil suit would be no differ
ent from the usual worry and anxiety suffered by anyone who is haled to court, a
situation that cannot by itself be a cogent reason for the award of moral damag
es. If the rule were otherwise, then moral damages must every time be awarded in
favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful plaintiff. The Court
confirms, once again, the foregoing rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the award of moral damages to respondent
Ricardo Lo under the assailed decision is DELETED. In its other aspects, the app
ealed decision shall remain undisturbed. No costs.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED. 62. J MARKET
ING CORPORATION VS SIA JR. FACTS: J. Marketing Corporation, a company engaged in
the business of appliances and motorcycles, received from Kawasaki Motors (Phil
s.) a brand new Kawasaki motorcycle, color Blue, Mode HD-11 (1985) with Engine N
o. G7E-04848 and Chassis No. KG-805535. Upon receipt, petitioners representative
placed motorcycle in the bodega of YKS Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Tacloban City. Howev
er, Petitioner found out that the motorcycle unit was missing in the bodega and
the loss immediately reported to the police authorities. Subsequently, (petition
er) tried to trace the lost motor cycle to one Felicidad Sia, Jr., herein (priva
te respondent), who bought a motorcycle from one Renato Pelande, Jr. on May 25,
1987. Allegedly, petitioners representative went to the house of the private resp
ondent and examined the chassis and motor numbers of the motorcycle in his (priv
ate respondent) possession, and found out that the chassis and motor numbers of
the motorcycle in private respondents possession have been tampered to jibe with
the chassis and motor numbers of the motorcycle unit previously purchased by Ren
ato Pelande, Jr. from petitioner. When petitioners representative confronted priv
ate respondent at the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group office anent the questio
nable motorcycle, private respondent refused to return the said motorcycle to pe
titioner and instead told petitioners representative to file a case in court. Hen
ce, on September 24, 1987, petitioner filed a complaint for replevin with damage
s against private respondent Felicidad C. Sia, Jr. before the Regional Trial Cou
rt of Tacloban City, Branch 8. On April 14, 1988, private respondent Felicidad C.
Sia Jr. filed a third party complaint against Renato Pelante Jr. from whom he p
urchased his motorcycle. Said third party defendant was subsequently declared as
in default. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing petition
ers complaint but awarded damages and attorneys fees to private respondent. On app
eal, the CA affirmed the decision of the court a quo. ISSUE: WON the award of at
torneys fees and damages (moral and exemplary) is proper. HELD: A persons right to
litigate should not be penalized by holding him liable for damages. This is esp
ecially true when the filing of the case is to enforce what he believes to be hi
s rightful claim against another although found to be erroneous. In this case, p
etitioner precisely instituted the replevin case against private respondent base
d on the latters own challenge to the former that if they really had a right on t
he motorcycle, then they should institute the necessary case in court. When peti
tioner did sue private respondent and filed a third party complaint against the
person from whom private respondent claims to have brought the motorcycle, it ca
nnot be said that the institution of the replevin suit was tainted with gross an
d evident bad faith or was done maliciously to harass, embarrass, annoy or ridic
ule private respondent. Moreover, the adverse result of an action dismissal of p
etitioners complaint does not per se make an act unlawful and subject the actor t
o the payment of moral damages. It is not a sound public policy to place a premi
um on the right to litigate. No
damages can be charged on those who may exercise such precious right in good fai
th, even if done erroneously. The award of exemplary damages has likewise no fac
tual basis. It is a requisite that the act must be accompanied by bad faith or d
one in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent manner - circumstances which are absent
in this case. In addition, exemplary damages cannot be awarded as the requisite
element of compensatory damages was not present. With respect to the attorneys fe
es, an adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award thereof to the win
ning party. All indications point to the fact that petitioner honestly thought t
hat they had a good cause of action, so notwithstanding the dismissal of their c
ase, no attorneys fees can be granted to private respondent. Considering that the
latter claims to be the owner of the motorcycle, petitioner was compelled to su
e him. When the former necessarily became a party defendant no attorneys fees and l
itigation expenses can automatically be recovered even if he should win, a it is
not the fact of winning alone that entitles recovery of such items but rather t
he attendance of special circumstances - the enumerated exceptions in Article 22
08 of the New Civil Code. There being no bad faith reflected in petitioners persi
stence in pursuing its case, other than an erroneous conviction of the righteous
ness of its cause, attorneys fees cannot be recovered as cost. WHEREFORE, premise
s considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICA
TION that the award of damages, attorneys fees and cost to private respondent is
deleted. SO ORDERED. 63. INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE CO. VS PABLO BONDAD FACTS: The pre
sent Petition finds its roots in an incident which involved three vehicles: a Ga
lant Sigma car driven by Grace Ladaw Morales (Vehicle 1), a packed passenger jee
pney originally driven by Ligorio Bondad (Vehicle 2), and a DM Transit Bus drive
n by Eduardo Mendoza (Vehicle 3). V-3 (D.M. Transit Bus) was traveling along Sou
th Expressway coming from Alabang towards the general direction of Makati. When
upon reaching a place at KM Post 14 [in front] of Merville Subd., said V-3 hit a
nd bumped the rear left side portion of V-1 [Bondads jeepney] which was then at
[stop] position due to flat tire[;] due to the severe impact cause by V-3 it sw
erved to the left and collided with the right side portion of V-2 [Morales car]
which was travelling [in] the same direction taking the innermost lane[;] V-2 w
as dragged to its left side and hit the concrete wall. All vehicles incurred dam
ages and sustaining injuries to the occupant of V-1 and the passengers of V-3. V
ictims were brought to the hospital for treatment. Before the Regional Trial Cou
rt of Makati, Petitioner Industrial Insurance Company, Inc. and Grace Ladaw Mora
les filed a Complaint for damage against DM Transit Corporation, Eduardo Diaz, P
ablo Bondad and Ligorio Bondad. Petitioner contended that it had paid Morales P2
9,800 for the damages to her insured car. It also asserted that the December 17,
1984 accident had been caused "solely and proximately" by the "joint gross and
wanton negligence, carelessness and imprudence
of both defendant drivers Eduardo Diaz y Mendoza and Ligorio Bondad y Hernandez,
who failed to exercise and observe the diligence required by law in the managem
ent and operation of their respective vehicles and by their defendant employers;
D.M. Transit Corporation and Pablo Bondad, respectively, for their failure to e
xercise the diligence required of them by law in the selection and supervision o
f their employees including their aforementioned involved drivers. Respondents P
ablo and Ligorio Bondad filed their Answer denying any responsibility or liabili
ty to petitioner and Morales. They asserted that their vehicle was on full stop
because of a flat tire. Thus, it was the bus which hit Morales car. In their Co
unterclaim, they contended that petitioner had acted in bad faith in impleading
them and that, contrary to its allegation, no prior demand had been made upon th
em. In its October 14, 1991 Decision, the trial court exculpated the Bondads and
ordered petitioner to pay them actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney s fees. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
ruling of the trial court with modification. Hence, this Petition for Review. I
SSUE: WON the award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees are
proper. HELD: We agree. Attorney s fees may be awarded by a court if one who cl
aims it is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to prot
ect one s interests by reason of an unjustified act or omission on the part of t
he party from whom it is sought. In this case, the records show that petitioner
s suit against respondents was manifestly unjustified. In the first place, the c
ontact between the vehicles of respondents and of Morales was completely due to
the impact of the onrushing bus. This fact is manifest in the police investigati
on report and, significantly, in the findings of facts of both lower courts. In
the case at bar, it has been shown that the petitioner acted in bad faith in com
pelling respondents to litigate an unfounded claim. As a result, Respondent Ligo
rio Bondad "could no longer concentrate on his job." Moreover, Pablo Bondad beca
me sick and even suffered a mild stroke. Indeed, respondents anxiety is not dif
ficult to understand. They were innocently attending to a flat tire on the shoul
der of the road; the next thing they knew, they were already being blamed for an
accident. Worse, they were forced to commute all the way from Laguna to Makati
in order to attend the hearings. Under the circumstances of this case, the award
of moral damages is justified. Likewise, we affirm the award of exemplary damag
es because petitioner s conduct needlessly dragged innocent bystanders into an u
nfounded litigation. Indeed, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or c
ompensatory damages. In sum, the Court affirms the award of moral damages, exemp
lary damages, attorney s fees and litigation expenses. The facts of this case cl
early show that petitioner was motivated by bad faith in impleading respondents.
Indeed, a person s right to litigate, as a rule, should not be penalized. This
right, however, must be exercised in good faith.
64. TRIPLE EIGHT INTEGRATED SERVICES INC. VS. NLRC FACTS: Private respondent Osd
ana was recruited by petitioner for employment with the latters principal, Gulf C
atering Company, a firm based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Under the original
employment contract, Osdana was engage to work as food server for a period of 36
months with salary of 550 Saudi Rials. Subsequently, petitioner asked Osdana to
sign another Contractor-Employment Agreement which provided that she would be empl
oyed as waiter for 12 months with a salary of 280 US$. Osdana left for Riyadh, S
audi Arabia, and commenced working for GCC. Contrary to the terms and conditions
of the employment contract, was made to wash dishes, cooking pots, and utensils
, perform janitorial works and other task which were unrelated to her job design
ation as waitress. Making matters worse was the fact that she was made to work a
grueling 12 hour shift without overtime pay. Because of long hours and strenuou
s nature of her work, she was diagnosed as having Bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndro
me, a conditon precipitated by activities requiring repeated flexion, pronation a
nd supinaion of the wrist and characterize by excruciating pain and numbness in
the arms.Because of this she was dismissed from work allegedly on the ground of i
llness. She was not given any separation pay and she was not compensated for her
salaries while on the hospital and for some works rendered. Upon her return to
the Philippines, Osdana sought the help of the petitioner, but no avail. She was
thus constrained to file a complaint against petitioner. The Labor Arbiter rule
d in favor of Osdana and ordered to pay the complainant for the unexpired portio
n of the contract and likewise ordered to pay the complainant 50k oral damages,
and 20k exemplar damages and 10% of the monetary award as attorneys fees. Petiti
oner appealed to the NLRC but the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbite
r. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence this petition for certi
orari. ISSUE: WON the NLRC committed abuse of discretion in awarding of salaries
for the unexpired portion of the employment contract, unpaid salaries and summa
ry differential granted by public respondents to Osdana as well as the award of
damages for being contrary to law. HELD: With respect to the award of moral and
exemplary damages, the same is likewise proper but should be reduced. Worth reit
erating is the rule that moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of th
e employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive t
o labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public pol
icy. Likewise exemplary damages maybe awarded if the dismissal was effected in a
wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. Since the employer is deemed to have a
cted in bad faith, the award of attorneys fees is likewise upheld.
Petitioner is ordered to paybthe private respondent 30k in oral damages, 10k in
exemplary damages and 10% attorneys fees. This decision is without prejudice to a
ny remedy or claim for reimbursement or contribution petitioner may institute ag
ainst its foreign principal, Gulf Catering Company. O pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 65. NESCITO C. HILARIO VS NLRC FACTS: Petitioner Nescito C. Hilario
seeks to modify the Decision1 of public respondent National Labor Relations Com
mission, which reversed and set aside the decision of Labor Arbiter Salimathar V
. Nambi, National Capital Region. Petitioner was hired by private respondent Rey
nolds Philippines, Inc. (Reynolds) through the Bob Garon Consultancy, Inc. as pe
rsonnel manager of its Cavite plant on December 1, 1984. Sometime in June 1985 h
e was transferred to the Head Office to handle various legal matters. On Novembe
r 29, 1985, petitioner was handed a letter by Reynolds personnel informing him t
hat the company had been incurring financial losses and that, as a result, his e
mployment would be terminated on the ground of retrenchment, effective January 1
, 1986. While there are records submitted relative to the financial status of th
e respondent company is concerned in support of its claim of severe business rev
erses, the complainant has, however, established the contrary. It has not be (si
c) substantially refuted the fact that after the complainants pull out from the D
asmarinas plant, his salary was increased by One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per
month; that after his termination, Atty. George Molina who took over his positio
n as Plant Manager also enjoyed an increase and even Atty. George Molinas success
or was given a much higher salary than his predecessors. On December 5, 1985 pet
itioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement, b
ackwages and damages with Labor Arbiter Nambi. On December 15, 1992, the Labor A
rbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint but ordering Reynolds to pay
petitioner his unpaid salary for December 1985, Christmas bonus and separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month salary. Petitioner appealed to the National Labo
r Relations Commission. Finding the appeal meritorious, on March 7, 1995, the NL
RC reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and declared petitio
ners dismissal as illegal. ISSUE: WON the employer is liable for moral and exempl
ary damages. HELD: The employer may be liable for damages if, in terminating the
employment, it also committed an anti-social and oppressive abuse of its right
to investigate and dismiss its employee in violation of Article 1701 of the Civi
l Code which prohibits oppression by either capital or labor against the other.
After a meticulous examination of the records in this case, it is not shown that
Reynolds acted in a wanton or oppressive manner against petitioner or in gross
bad faith in
terminating his employment. However, as the NLRC pointed out, there is evident b
ad faith in the respondent companys termination of petitioner on the ground of re
trenchment, since his salary was increased after his pullout from the Dasmarias p
lant and those appointed after his termination were given salaries much higher t
han what petitioner used to enjoy while connected with the company. In no case m
ay this be considered as gross bad faith or wanton or oppressive act on the part
of the company; hence an award of P20,000.00 as moral damages is sufficient. WH
EREFORE, the decision of the NLRC is hereby MODIFIED. Private respondent Reynold
s Philippines, Inc. is hereby ordered to pay petitioner his backwages for three
(3) years fromJanuary 1, 1986 to January 1, 1989 without deduction or qualificat
ion; his unpaid salary for December 1985, as well as his Christmas bonus and sep
aration pay equivalent to one months salary for roughly one years service. However
, the award of moral damages is reduced to P20,000.00 SO ORDERED. 66. ARCONA VS.
COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: At around 7:30 in the evening of June 27, 1986, Napoleo
n Ong and Edgardo Talanquines were walking along the national highway at Baranga
y Labog, Brookes Point, Palawan, on their way home after coming from a birthday p
arty. When they were near the house of Jerry Boston, Edgardo heard a loud thud.
He turned around saw Napoleon slump to the ground. Suddenly, someone hit Edgardo
from behind with a piece of bamboo, causing him to fall. He saw no one in the i
mmediate premises except petitioner. Edgardo then stood up and ran towards the h
ouse of Cesar Umapas to ask for help. Prosecution witness Leo Zaragoza testified
that he was standing in front of Jerry Boston house, about seven (7) meters away
, when he saw petitioner (Carlos Arcona) stab Napoleon. Carlos Arcona contended
that he acted in self defense but failed to persuade the court. Napoleon expired
on the way to the hospital. Dr. Joaquin Fabellon, who conducted the autopsy on
Napoleons body, certified that the cause of death was the stab wound sustained at
the stomach area just above the waistline. The RTC Convicted Carlos Arcona(Peti
tioner) for the crime of homicide and slight physical injury and awarded damages
as follows: For the case of Homicide, to indemnify the heirs of Napoleon Ong th
e amount of 30k for his death, 10k as actual damages, 10k as moral damages. For
the crime of slight physical injury, to indemnify Edgardo Talanquines the sum of
10k as actual damages. Petitioner appealed to the CA but the Ca affirmed the de
cision of the RTC but increased the Civil indemnity to 50k. Feeling aggrieved, t
he petitioner filed instant petition for review. He maintains that he acted in s
elf defense when he stabbed Napoleon and hit Edgardo with a bamboo stick. ISSUE:
WON the increased of Civil indemnity from 10k to 50k is proper. HELD: The Court
of Appeals was correct in increasing the amount of civil indemnity to P50,000.00
, in line with existing jurisprudence. In cases of murder, homicide, parricide
and rape, civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is automatically granted t
o the offended party or his heirs in case of his death, without need of further
evidence other than the fact of the commission of the crime. On the other hand,
the award of moral damages in the sum of P 10,000.00 must be increased to P50,00
0.00. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably an
d necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims
family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a
loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death
or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious l
ife, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves
them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this
reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and
proof of the heirs emotional suffering. Finally, the award of actual damages in t
he amount of P10,000.00 does not appear to have been substantiated. Only those e
xpenses which are duly proven, or those that appear to have been genuinely incur
red in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim, will be recogniz
ed in court. Hence, the same must be deleted. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoin
g, the petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals, find
ing petitioner Carlos Arvuna y Morban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide
, attended by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and sentencing
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of pri
sion mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and one (1) day of reclusion temp
oral, as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Napoleon Ong the sum of P
50,000.00 as civil indemnity, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petiti
oner is further ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased moral damages in the in
creased amount of P50,000.00. The award of actual damages is deleted for lack of
factual and legal basis. SO ORDERED. 67. GREGORIO FULE VS. COURT OF APPEALS FAC
TS: Petitioner Gregorio Fule, a banker by profession and a jeweler at the same t
ime, acquired a 10-hectare property in Tanay, Rizal (hereinafter Tanay property),
which used to be under the name of Fr. Antonio Jacobe. The latter had mortgaged
it earlier to the Rural Bank of Alaminos (the Bank), Laguna, Inc. to secure a lo
an in the amount of P10,000.00, but the mortgage was later foreclosed and the pr
operty offered for public auction upon his default. Petitioner, as corporate sec
retary of the bank, asked Remelia Dichoso and Oliva Mendoza to look for a buyer
who might be interested in the Tanay property. The two found one in the person o
f herein private respondent Dr. Ninevetch Cruz. It so happened that at the time,
petitioner had shown interest in buying a pair of emerald-cut diamond earrings
owned by Dr. Cruz but the latter declined petitioners offer. Second offer was ma
de at the lobby of the Prudential Bank and then made a sketch thereof for twenty
to forty minutes, petitioner gave them back to Dr. Cruz who again refused to se
ll them.
Subsequently, however, negotiations for the barter of the jewelry and the Tanay
property ensued. Dr. Cruz requested herein private respondent Atty. Juan Belarmi
no to check the property. Atty. Belarmino accordingly caused the preparation of
a deed of absolute sale while petitioner and Dr. Cruz attended to the safekeepin
g of the jewelry The following day, petitioner, together with Dichoso and Mendoz
a, arrived at the residence of Atty. Belarmino to finally execute a deed of abso
lute sale. The actual consideration of the sale was 200k but since the jewelry w
as appraised only at 160k, the parties agreed that the balance of 40k would just
be paid in cash. Petitioner together with Dichoso and Mendoza headed to the ban
k to get the jewelry. At 5:55pm Dr. Cruz and the cashier then opened the safety
deposit box, the former retrieving a transparent plastic or cellophane bag with
the jewelry inside and handing over the same to petitioner. The latter took the
jewelry from the bag, went near the electric light at the banks lobby, held the j
ewelry against the light and examined it for ten to fifteen minutes. After a whi
le, Dr. Cruz asked, Okay na ba iyan? Petitioner expressed his satisfaction by nodd
ing his head. at about 8:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, petitioner arr
ived at the residence of Atty. Belarmino complaining that the jewelry given to h
im was fake. He then used a tester to prove the alleged fakery. The lower court
and the CA upheld the validity of the sale and genuineness of the jewelry since
the element of a contract were all consummated and petitioner is stopped to come
back after the lapse of considerable length of time to claim what he got is fak
e. The court also awarded damages to the respondent. Petitoner elevated the case
to the SC fro the principal reason of mitigating the mount of damages warded to
both the private respondents which he considers as exhorbitant. ISSUE: WON the Tr
ial Court erred in awarding moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees in fav
or of defendants and against the plaintiff. HELD: While, as a rule, moral damage
s cannot be recovered from a person who has filed a complaint against another in
good faith because it is not sound policy to place a penalty on the right to li
tigate, the same, however, cannot apply in the case at bar. The factual findings
of the courts a quo to the effect that petitioner filed this case because he wa
s the victim of fraud; that he could not have been such a victim because he shou
ld have examined the jewelry in question before accepting delivery thereof, cons
idering his exposure to the banking and jewelry businesses; and that he filed th
e action for the nullification of the contract of sale with unclean hands, all d
eserve full faith and credit to support the conclusion that petitioner was motiv
ated more by ill will than a sincere attempt to protect his rights in commencing
suit against respondents. We do not have here, therefore, a situation where pet
itioners complaint was simply found later to be based on an erroneous ground whic
h, under settled jurisprudence, would not have been a reason for awarding moral
and exemplary damages. Instead, the cause of action of the instant case appears
to have been contrived by petitioner himself. In other words, he was placed in a
situation where he could not honestly evaluate whether his cause of action has
a semblance of merit, such that it would require the expertise of the courts to
put it to a test. His insistent pursuit of such case then coupled with circumsta
nces showing that he himself was guilty in bringing about the supposed wrongdoin
g on which he anchored his cause of action would render him
answerable for all damages the defendant may suffer because of it. This is preci
sely what took place in the petition at bar and we find no cogent reason to dist
urb the findings of the courts below that respondents in this case suffered cons
iderable damages due to petitioners unwarranted action. WHEREFORE, the decision o
f the Court of Appeals dated October 20, 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Dr. Cr
uz, however, is ordered to pay petitioner the balance of the purchase price of P
40,000.00 within ten (10) days from the finality of this decision. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED. Cases 58-67 PACIO, MANUEL 68. SUMALPONG, vs.COURT OF AP
PEALS FACTS: At around 10:00 o clock. In the evening of August 6, 1992, while co
mplainant and his wife were on their way home from their ricefield in the interi
or, they saw the petitioner standing by the road beside a house under constructi
on. When they came near him, the petitioner inquired from Leonarda if she knew t
he identity of the persons who had stoned his house, and when the latter denied
any knowledge thereof, the petitioner told her that the people from the interior
were abusive. To that comment Leonarda retorted that the petitioner should firs
t identify the persons responsible for stoning his house, otherwise, she will br
ing the matter to the attention of the Barangay Captain. Angered by Leonarda s r
eply, the petitioner asked, "why are you angry, are you the wife of that person"
? , and simultaneously slapped Leonarda s face causing the latter to fall to the
ground. While Leonarda was on her hands and knees, the petitioner drew his gun
and shot her at the back of her head. The complainant then rushed towards the pe
titioner who shot him twice but missed. The petitioner and the complainant grapp
led for the possession of the gun and fell into a nearby canal. In the course of
the struggle, the petitioner bit the complainant s right forearm and left ear t
hereby causing a mutilation of the latter. According full faith and credence to
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court rendered a decisio
n convicting the petitioner of the crime of attempted homicide and sentencing hi
m to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from six (6) months and one (1) day of a
rresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of pri
son correccional as maximum. The petitioner was likewise ordered to indemnify th
e complainant in the amount of: (a) P16,800.00 for the loss of his crops due to
his failure to attend to his farmwork because of the injuries inflicted upon him
by the petitioner; (b) P2,000.00 for hospitalization expenses; and c) P5,000.00
by way of moral damages. The petitioner s conviction was affirmed on appeal to
the Court of Appeals which, however, modified the award of damages to the compla
inant, deleting the awards for loss of crops and hospitalization expenses, incre
asing the moral damages to P10,000.00, and awarding nominal damages in the same
amount. This Court upholds the Court of Appeals ruling on the matter. Eliminati
ng the award of actual or compensatory damages in the form of hospitalization ex
penses and loss of income, the Court of Appeals cited the failure of the complai
nant to offer any proof of
the same. To justify a grant of actual or compensatory damages, it is necessary
to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof an
d on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party, the actual amount of los
s. ISSUE : Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in deleting the actual
or compensatory damages HELD : Although the authority to assess damages or inde
mnity in criminal cases is vested in trial courts, it is so only in the first in
stance. On appeal, such authority passes to the appellate court. Thus, this Cour
t has, in many cases, increased the damages awarded by the trial court, although
the offended party had not appealed from said award, and the only party who sou
ght a review of the decision of said court was the accused. The Court finds the
award of nominal and moral damages both in the amount of P10,000.00 justified un
der the circumstances. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of
the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindi
cated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for a
ny loss suffered by him. 21 In other words, whenever there has been a violation
of an ascertained legal right, although no actual damages resulted or none are s
hown, the award of nominal damages is proper. There is no room to doubt that som
e species of injury was caused to the complainant because of the medical expense
s he incurred in having his wounds treated, and the loss of income due to his fa
ilure to work during his hospitalization. However, in the absence of competent p
roof of the amount of actual damages, the complainant is entitled only to nomina
l damages. Anent the increase in the amount of moral damages awarded, suffice it
to state that the nature of the injuries and the degree of physical suffering e
ndured by the complainant warrants the same. The tragic incident caused a mutila
tion of complainant s left ear and a permanent scar on his right forearm. These
injuries have left indelible marks on the complainant s body and will serve as a
constant reminder of this traumatic experience. WHEREFORE, the assailed decisio
n of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED. 69. PRODUCERS
BANK OF THE PHILS V CA (SPS CHUA) FACTS: Sometime in April, 1982, respondent Sal
vador Chua was offered by Mr. Jimmy Rojas, manager of Producers Bank of the Phil
ippines, to transfer his account from Pacific Banking Corporation to herein peti
tioner bank. Respondent spouses opened and maintained substantial savings and cu
rrent deposits with, and likewise obtained various loans from petitioner bank, o
ne of which was a loan for P2,000,000.00 which was secured by a real estate mort
gage and payable within a period of three (3) years or from 1982 to 1985.
On January 20, 1984, private respondents deposited with petitioner bank the tota
l sum of P960,000.00, which was duly entered in private respondents savings acc
ount passbook. Petitioner bank failed to credit this deposit due to the fact tha
t its Branch Manager absconded with the money of the bank s depositors. Conseque
ntly, petitioner bank dishonored the checks drawn out by private respondents in
favor of their various creditors on the ground of insufficient funds, despite th
e fact that at that time, the balance of private respondents deposit was in the
amount of P1,051,051.19. Private respondents requested for copies of their ledg
ers covering their savings and current accounts, but petitioner bank refused. Pr
ivate respondents instituted on January 30, 1984 an action for damages against p
etitioner bank On the other hand, petitioner bank filed with the City Sheriff of
Bacolod a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate Private res
pondents filed a complaint for injunction and damages, alleging that the petitio
n for extrajudicial foreclosure was without basis and was instituted maliciously
in order to harass private respondents. On April 26, 1988, the trial court rend
ered its decision on the latter case, in favor of the spouses Chua, awarding the
sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, and the sum of P250,000.00 as exemplary
damages, among others. On October 31, 1991, upon appeal by petitioner bank, the
Court of Appeals modified the decisionone of the changes was the award of the sum
of P500,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. Petitioner moved for a considera
tion but the same was denied, hence, this petition ISSUE: WON the petitioner ban
k is liable for moral damages HELD: The decision of the Court of Appeals is affi
rmed with modification only as to the award of damages YES, Moral and exemplary
damages may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss. In awarding such damages
, the court shall take into account the circumstances obtaining in the case and
assess damages according to its discretion. As borne out by the record of this c
ase, private respondents are engaged in several businesses, such as rice and cor
n trading, cement dealership, and gasoline proprietorship. The dishonor of priva
te respondents checks and the foreclosure initiated by petitioner adversely aff
ected the credit standing as well as the business dealings of private respondent
s as their suppliers discontinued credit lines resulting in the collapse of thei
r businesses.
In the case of Leopoldo Araneta vs. Bank of America, it was held that: "The fina
ncial credit of a businessman is a prized and valuable asset, it being a signifi
cant part of the foundation of his business. Any adverse reflection thereon cons
titutes some financial loss to him." The damage to private respondents reputati
on and social standing entitles them to moral damages. Article 2217, in relation
to Article 2220, of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "moral damages incl
ude physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched repu
tation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury."
Obviously, petitioner bank s wrongful act caused serious anxiety, embarrassment,
and humiliation to private respondents for which they are entitled to recover m
oral damages in the amount of P300,000.00 which we deem to be reasonable. 69. PR
ODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILS V CA (SPS CHUA) FACTS: Strebels side: As a lessee of a
lot situated in Santa Mesa, Manila, plaintiff Strebel subleased part thereof to
the Standard Vacuum Oil Company; that the latter constructed thereon a Mobilgas
Station which was operated by Eustaquio & Co., a partnership organized by said p
laintiff and one Primo Eustaquio, that, "out of spite and with a view to the eve
ntual acquisition of the said property for himself and his men," defendant Jose
Figueras "tried all he could to built a drainage through" the aforementioned pro
perty; that, in order to accomplish this purpose, and, using his official and po
litical influence, defendant Figueras, then Under-Secretary of Labor, caused. hi
s co-defendant Cornelio S. Ruperto, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, to prepa
re an opinion which was signed by the City Fiscal, holding that the City of Mani
la has a right to construct said drainage, and, to this effect, make the necessa
ry excavations at the boundary line of said lot leased to Strebel and the lot be
longing to Figueras Plaintiff Strebel also claims that defendant Figueras "by ma
king use of his official and political connections," was able to induce the Secr
etary of Justice to transfer temporarily, from the Bureau of Immigration to the
Bureau of Prisons, one Dr. Manuel Hernandez, the husband of plaintiff s step dau
ghter; Plaintiff asked Secretary Nepomuceno to mediate between them and Under-Se
cretary of Labor to forget about past family problems. Plaintiff later on claims
that Figueras still didnt forget about the past and "making use of his official
and political influence," and with the cooperation of his former secretary, defe
ndant Cornelio S. Ruperto, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, as well as "in co
nnivance with the Director of Labor" which office was then held by defendant Fel
ipe E. Jose, "and other employees in the Department and Bureau of Labor," defend
ant Figueras succeeded in securing the institution, against plaintiff Strebel, a
nd his partner, Primo Eustaquio, of Criminal Case No. 11005 of the Court of Firs
t Instance of Manila, for allegedly compelling several employees to work more th
an eight (8) hours a day, in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 444, in relation
to Commonwealth Act No. 303, although before the filing of the information "the
defendants collectively and singly knew that the allegations therein are false;"
that said criminal case was subsequently
dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Manila for failure of the prosecutio
n "to establish even a prima facie case against the accused"; Through the forego
ing series of acts, the defendants have "caused moral and mental suffering to th
e . . . plaintiff, his wife, and his entire family, and damage to his business i
n the amount of P15,000.00 besides actual damages in the amount of P1,500.00 pai
d to his attorney in defending himself from the malicious charge," ISSUE: WON Pl
aintiff may recover damages for moral and mental suffering HELD: NO, The plan to
built said drainage was seemingly abandoned before plaintiff s property rights
could be violated. There was nothing wrong, either legally or morally, in the de
sire of Figueras to seek an outlet for the water coming from his property. On th
e contrary, it is required by the elementary principles of health and sanitation
. Besides, there is no allegation that any lot other than that of plaintiff Stre
bel was better suited for the purpose. Neither could he have any arising from th
e assignment of his wife s son-in-law from the Bureau of Prisons - to which he h
ad been previously assigned temporarily to the Bureau of Immigration, for 1.The
authority of the Secretary of Justice to make the assignment in question and the
validity thereof, under said legal provision, are submitted. Hence, it is not c
laimed that said officer may be held civilly liable for the aforementioned assig
nment. This being the case, how can such responsibility be exacted from Figueras
who, it is urged, merely instigated said assignment? 2.Even if we assumed the a
ct complained of to be wrong or to have caused injury, the right of action hypot
ethically resulting therefrom, if any on which we need not, and do not, express
any opinion would have accrued in favor of Dr. Hernandez who is not a party in t
he present action not plaintiff herein. "As a general rule, the right of recover
y for mental suffering resulting from bodily injuries is restricted to the perso
n who has suffered the bodily hurt, and there can be no recovery for distress ca
used by sympathy for another s suffering, or for fright due to a wrong against a
third person. So the anguish of mind arising as to the safety of others who may
be in personal peril from the same cause cannot be taken into consideration. .
. . damages are not recoverable for fright or shock even when sustained as resu
lt of wilful act, unless such act was directed toward person or property or pers
on seeking recovery; hence plaintiff is not entitled to recover against administ
ratrix of sister s murderer for fright or shock caused by viewing mutilated body
of murdered sister. The rule on this point, as stated in the American Jurisprud
ence, is: "Injury or Wrong to Another. In law mental anguish is restricted as a
rule, to such mental pain or suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the
person himself, as distinguished from that form of mental suffering which is the
accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another s suffering or which arises fro
m a contemplation of wrongs committed on the person of another. Pursuant to the
rule stated, a husband or wife cannot recover for mental suffering caused by his
or her sympathy for the other s suffering." It should be noted that plaintiff i
s not even related to Dr. Hernandez. The latter s wife is a daughter of Mrs. Str
ebel by a previous marriage. Hence Dr. Hernandez is merely related by affinity,
not to Strebel, but to a relative by affinity of said plaintiff.
- Another allegation made by plaintiffs in arguing their cause of action to reco
ver damages, they said that "with a view to further injuring" him "and besmirchi
ng his good name in the community and waging a cleavage in the harmonious relati
on between Eustaquio & Co. and its laborers," defendants Felipe E. Jose and Corn
elio S. Ruperto issued a press statement to the effect that plaintiff Strebel an
d his partner, Eustaquio had flagrantly violated the provisions of the Eight-Hou
r Law and that said Criminal Case had been dismissed by the court on a flimsy gr
ound; and that this statement had "caused moral and mental suffering to the here
in plaintiff and damage to his business in the amount of P5,000.00," The Supreme
Court said that this news item mentions, neither the number of the case referre
d to, nor the names of the persons accused therein. Moreover, it merely contains
a criticism of the action taken by the court. The reference, therein imputed to
the Director of Labor, to the flagrant violation of the eight-hour labor law by
the accused, was a mere reiteration of the theory of the Bureau of Labor, which
the prosecution had adopted by filing the information in said case. Being a mat
ter of court record, which had been taken up at the hearing held publicly, and s
ettled in a decision already promulgated, said theory was open for public consum
ption, and, hence, an allusion thereto or statement thereof, in order to justify
said criticism, is not actionable. As regards the malicious prosecution point r
aised by Strebel, by specific mandate of Article 2219 of the Civil Code of the P
hilippines, however, moral damages may not be recovered in cases of crime or tor
t, unless either results or causes "physical injuries," which are lacking in the
case at bar. Although the same article permits recovery of said damages in case
s of malicious prosecution, this feature of said provision may not be availed of
by the plaintiff herein, inasmuch as the acts set forth in the complaint took p
lace in 1949, or before said Code became effective (laws shouldnt have retroactiv
e effect). 71. ABS-CBN V CA FACTS: ABS-CBN, by virtue of contract with VIVA, had
an exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films. ABS-CBN had a right of first ref
usal. VIVA gave ABS-CBN 3 packages (36 titles) to choose from. VP for ABS Charo
Santos-Concio wrote VIVA that they are not accepting the list because there were
only 10 titles there that they could potentially purchase. ABS asked for anothe
r list, saying they had quite an attractive offer to make. VIVA gave ABS a new l
ist: 52 original movie titles (never before aired on TV) and 104 reruns. VIVAs pr
oposal was P60M (P30M cash, P30M TV spots) for 52 originals and 52 reruns. Del R
osario (VIVAs rep) and Eugenio Lopez III had a meeting regarding this in Tamarind
Grill Restaurant. According to ABSCBN, the meeting culminated in Del Rosario ac
cepting ABSCBNs offer of P35M for 52 of the films VIVA was selling for P60M plus M
aging Sino Ka Man. VIVA said this wasnt their agreement and that they refuse to se
ll anything less the 104movie package for P60M. In the meantime, RBS bought the
104-film package (which included Maging Sino Ka Man) for P60M. There were ads in t
he newspapers for the airing of the movie on Channel 7.
ABSCBN filed a case in RTC to enjoin RBS from airing 14 VIVA films, including Ma
ging Sino Ka Man. RTC granted a preliminary injunction; but lifted the same afte
r RBS put up a counterbond. ABSCBN filed a petition in the CA to challenge the R
TC decision. CA granted TRO, but eventually dismissed ABSCBNs petition and made t
hem pay for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attys fees to RBS, and attys f
ees to VIVA. ISSUE: WON (RBS) republic Broadcasting Corporation may recover dama
ges from ABSCBN HELD: NO ACTUAL DAMAGES Except as provided by law or by stipulat
ion, one is entitled to compensation for actual damages only for such pecuniary
loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. The indemnification shall comprehend
not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits that the
obligee failed to obtain. In contracts and quasi-contracts the damages which may
be awarded are dependent on whether the obligor acted with good faith or otherw
ise. In case of good faith, the damages recoverable are those which are the natu
ral and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation and which the part
ies have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time of the constitut
ion of the obligation. If the obligor acted with fraud, bad faith, malice, or wa
nton attitude, he shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably a
ttributed to the nonperformance of the obligation. In crimes and quasi-delicts,
the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of, whether or not such damages
have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. Actu
al damages may likewise be recovered for loss or impairment of earning capacity
in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury, or for injury to the plainti
ff s business standing or commercial credit. RBS claims actual damages based on
Arts 19-21 for the injunction for having to put up a counterbond. The SC said th
at since ABS had not posted a bond and was in fact still challenging it, RBS did
nt have to put up the counterbond. RBS also claims actual damages for the adverti
sements for the airing of Maging Sino Ka Man. The SC said that ABS is not liable f
or lack of sufficient basis. The prelim injunction was lifted by RTC upon RBS pa
ying the counterbond, and not on any legal and factual basis. ATTYS FEES As regar
ds attorney s fees, the law is clear that in the absence of stipulation, attorne
y s fees may be recovered as actual or compensatory damages under any of the cir
cumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. The general rule is t
hat attorney s fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy
that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to
be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attor
ney s fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justificatio
n. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his rights, still attorney s fees may not be awarded where n
o sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party s persistence in
a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. MO
RAL DAMAGES Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate
the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wron
gdoer. The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the expense of the de
fendant, but to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion, or amusemen
ts that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone. It is aimed
at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status q
uo ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The award of mo
ral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an artifi
cial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings
, no emotions, no senses. It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering an
d mental anguish which can be experienced only by one having a nervous system. T
he award for damages must be set aside, since RBS is a corporation. EXEMPLARY DA
MAGES These are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. They are reco
verable in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was comm
itted with one or more aggravating circumstances; in quasi-delicts, if the defen
dant acted with gross negligence; and in contracts and quasi-contracts, if the d
efendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent mann
er. The claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based on contract, quasi-contract, d
elict, or quasi-delict. The claims for moral and exemplary damages can only be b
ased on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. Arts 19-21 have at their very
core the common element of malice or bad faith. Such intentional design to do a
wrongful act must be proved by evidence. Here, ABSCBN was honestly convinced of
the merits of its cause after it had undergone serious negotiations culminating
in its formal submission of a draft contract. Settled is the rule that the adve
rse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the
actor to damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the r
ight to litigate. If damages result from a person s exercise of a right, it is d
amnum absque injuria. Disposition Petition Granted. CA decision reversed, except
to unappealed award of Attys damages of Viva Films. 72. NPC v PHILIPP BROTHERS O
CEANIC
FACTS: The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) issued invitations to bid for th
e supply and delivery of 120,000 metric tons of imported coal for its Batangas C
oal-Fired Thermal Power Plant in Calaca, Batangas. The Philipp Brothers Oceanic,
Inc. (PHIBRO) prequalified and was allowed to participate as one of the bidders
. After the public bidding was conducted, PHIBRO s bid was accepted. NAPOCOR s a
cceptance was conveyed in a letter. PHIBRO sent word to NAPOCOR that industrial
disputes might soon plague Australia, the shipment s point of origin, which coul
d seriously hamper PHIBRO s ability to supply the needed coal. PHIBRO again appr
ised NAPOCOR of the situation in Australia, particularly informing the latter th
at the ship owners therein are not willing to load cargo unless a "strike-free"
clause is incorporated in the charter party or the contract of carriage. In orde
r to hasten the transfer of coal, PHIBRO proposed to NAPOCOR that they equally s
hare the burden of a "strike-free" clause. NAPOCOR refused. Subsequently, PHIBRO
received from NAPOCOR a confirmed and workable letter of credit. Instead of del
ivering the coal on or before the thirtieth day after receipt of the Letter of C
redit, as agreed upon by the parties in the July contract, PHIBRO effected its f
irst shipment only on November17,1987. Consequently, in October 1987, NAPOCOR on
ce more advertised for the delivery of coal to its Calaca thermal plant. PHIBRO
participated anew in this subsequent bidding. On November 24, 1987, NAPOCOR disa
pproved PHIBRO s application for pre-qualification to bid for not meeting the mi
nimum requirements. Upon further inquiry, PHIBRO found that the real reason for
the disapproval was its purported failure to satisfy NAPOCOR s demand for damage
s due to the delay in the delivery of the first coal shipment. This prompted PHI
BRO to file an action for damages with application for injunction against NAPOCO
R with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati City. In its complaint, PHIBR
O alleged that NAPOCOR s act of disqualifying it in the October 1987 bidding and
in all subsequent biddings was tainted with malice and bad faith. PHIBRO prayed
for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney s fees. In its answer, NAP
OCOR averred that the strikes in Australia could not be invoked as reason for th
e delay in the delivery of coal because PHIBRO itself admitted that as of July 2
8, 1987 those strikes had already ceased. And, even assuming that the strikes we
re still ongoing, PHIBRO should have shouldered the burden of a "strike-free" cl
ause because their contract was "C and F Calaca, Batangas, Philippines," meaning
, the cost and freight from the point of origin until the point of destination w
ould be for the account of PHIBRO. Furthermore, NAPOCOR claimed that due to PHIB
RO s failure to deliver the coal on time, it was compelled to purchase coal from
ASEA at a higher price. NAPOCOR claimed for actual damages in the amount of P12
,436,185.73, representing the increase in the price of coal, and a claim of P500
,000.00 as litigation expenses. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The tria
l court decided in favor of PHIBRO. Unsatisfied, NAPOCOR elevated the case to th
e Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming in toto t
he Decision of the Regional Trial Court. ISSUE: Whether or not NAPOCOR acted wro
ngfully or with bad faith in disqualifying PHIBRO from participating in the subs
equent public bidding and is PHIBRO entitled to damages
HELD: Since there is no evidence to prove bad faith and arbitrariness on the par
t of the petitioners in evaluating the bids, we rule that the private respondent
s are not entitled to damages representing lost profits." (Emphasis supplied) Ve
rily, a reservation of the government of its right to reject any bid, generally
vests in the authorities a wide discretion as to who is the best and most advant
ageous bidder. The exercise of such discretion involves inquiry, investigation,
comparison, deliberation and decision, which are quasi-judicial functions, and w
hen honestly exercised, may not be reviewed by the court A court cannot merely r
ely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of dama
ges. Thus, while indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value
of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to
obtain,43 it is imperative that the basis of the alleged unearned profits is not
too speculative and conjectural as to show the actual damages which may be suff
ered on a future period. This Court has laid down the rule that in the absence o
f stipulation, a winning party may be awarded attorney s fees only in case plain
tiff s action or defendant s stand is so untenable as to amount to gross and evi
dent bad faith.50 This cannot be said of the case at bar. NAPOCOR is justified i
n resisting PHIBRO s claim for damages. As a matter of fact, we partially grant
the prayer of NAPOCOR as we find that it did not act in bad faith in disapprovin
g PHIBRO s pre-qualification to bid. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of App
eals in CA-G.R. CV No. 126204 dated August 27, 1996 is hereby MODIFIED. The awar
d, in favor of PHIBRO, of actual, moral and exemplary damages, reimbursement for
expenses, cost of litigation and attorney s fees, and costs of suit, is DELETED
. SO ORDERED. 73. GERALDEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: With reference to Civil Ca
se No. Q-90-4649 of the RTC of Quezon City, Petitioner Geraldez filed an action
for damages against Respondent Kenstar Travel Corporation for breach of contract
with antecedent facts as follows: Petitioner opt a 22-day Europe tour travel pa
ckage offered by Respondent Corporation paying 2,990dollars as consideration. Th
e tour did not end up as expected by herein petitioner, it did not as represente
d in the brochure: no European tour manager, hotels were not 1st class and the F
ilipino tour guide who is supposed to accompany them is a 1st timer. Petitioner
then filed a breach of contract against Respondent Corporation for committing ac
ts of representations constituting fraud in contracting the obligation. RTC rend
ered judgment ordering Respondent Corporation to pay petitioner 500,000 as moral
damages, P 200,000 as nominal damages, 300,000 as exemplary damages and 50,000
as litigation and attorney s fees (all in pesos). On appeal, award for moral and
exemplary damages were deleted and a reduction of nominal damages to 40,000 pes
os, this on account that the Respondent has substantially complied with the pres
tation and no malice or bad faith is imputable as a consequence. Hence, the peti
tion
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent acted in bad faith or with gross neglig
ence in discharging its obligation under contract. HELD: On the foregoing consid
erations, respondent court erred in deleting the award for moral and exemplary d
amages which may be awarded in breaches of contract where fraud is evident. Priv
ate respondent faulted with fraud in the inducement, which is employed by a part
y to a contract in securing the consent of the other. In the case at bar, the Pr
ivate respondent has committed either dolo causante or dolo incidente by making
false misrepresentation. Either which oblige a person to indemnify damages. Wher
efore, premises considered, the decision of Respondent Court of Appeals is hereb
y set aside, and another one rendered, ordering private respondent Kenstar Trave
l Corporation to pay petitioner Lydia Geraldez the sums of P 100,000 by way of m
oral damages, P 50,000 as exemplary damages, and P 20,000 as attorneys fees with
litigation cost against private respondent. The nominal award of damages is here
by deleted. 74. PEOPLE vs. CRISTOBAL FACTS : Such was the case of Cherry Tamayo,
a married woman. She was twenty-eight years old, with one child and another on
the way, when tragedy struck. She was sexually assaulted on 31 March 1986. Fortu
nately, the life in her womb survived. She accused Rogelio Cristobal of rape in
a sworn complaint2 filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Maddela, Quirin
o, on 8 April 1986. In the morning of 31 March 1986, Cherry Tamayo, a resident o
f Barangay San Dionisio I, Maddela, Quirino, went to the nearby Bilala Creek to
wash her family s clothes. She was alone. At around midday, between the hours of
12:00 and 1:00 and after accomplishing her task, she decided to take a bath in
the creek. She was about to start when somebody held her neck from behind and th
ereafter forcibly laid her down the ground. Only then did she recognize her atta
cker, the accused Rogelio Cristobal. Cherry managed to stand up and run away, bu
t Rogelio caught up with her and delivered two fistblows to her stomach. Not con
tent with this, Rogelio, while viciously holding her hair, pressed down Cherry s
face into the water. Rogelio then took her three meters away from the creek and
forcibly laid her down on the ground. Because of her weakened and pregnant stat
e, Cherry could not struggle any further. Rogelio removed her clothes and pantie
s. He then went on top of her, inserted his private organ into hers, and succeed
ed in satisfying his lust on her.Afterwhich, he slapped and threatened Cherry wi
th death if she would talk. The threat went unheeded as Cherry, upon reaching he
r home, immediately told her husband of what had happened to her. Her husband ac
companied her to the police station of Maddela, Quirino, to report the incident
and then to Dr. Mercedita Erni-Reta for medical examination. It has long been se
ttled that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts w
ill generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the
latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesse
s themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the t
rial. It has been aptly said:
In the resolution of the factual issues, the Court relies heavily on the trial c
ourt for its evaluation Of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the oppor
tunity to observe them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that some
times thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading o
f the impersonal record by the reviewing court. Only the judge trying the case c
an see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and
reasoned verdict. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the complainant is wort
hy of full faith and credit. HELD :This rule admits of exceptions, such as when
the evaluation was reached arbitrarily, when the trial court overlooked, misunde
rstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which
could affect the result of the case. None of these exceptions exists in this cas
e. It is also settled that when a woman Says that she has been raped, she says i
n effect all that is necessary to show that she has been raped, and if her testi
mony meets the test of credibility the accused may be convicted on the basis the
reof. The accused failed to establish physical impossibility because the alibi p
laces him within only three kilometers from where the crime was committed, a man
ageable distance to travel in a few minutes. Additionally, no married woman in h
er right mind, like Cherry Tamayo, would subject herself to public scrutiny and
humiliation in order to perpetuate a falsehood. Neither would she take the risk
of being alienated from her husband and her family. If Cherry Tamayo then resolv
ed to face the ordeal and relate in public what many similarly situated would ha
ve kept secret, she did so simply to obtain justice. For sexually assaulting a p
regnant married woman, the accused has shown moral corruption, perversity, and w
ickedness. He has grievously wronged the institution of marriage. The imposition
then of exemplary damages by way of example to deter others from committing sim
ilar acts or for correction for the public good is warranted. We hereby fix it a
t P25,000.00. Pursuant to the current policy of this Court, the moral damages aw
arded by the trial court should be increased from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00. WHER
EFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the decision of Branch 32 of the Reg
ional Trial Court of Cabarroguis, Quirino, in Criminal Case No. 604 convicting t
he accused ROGELIO CRISTOBAL of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED, subject to the fo
regoing modifications. As modified, the award of moral damages is increased from
P30,000.00 to P40,000.00, and the accused is further ordered to pay exemplary d
amages in the amount of P25,000.00. Costs against the accused. SO ORDERED. 75. P
EOPLE VS. MATRIMONIO
FACTS : Rowena Matrimonio, a girl of fourteen (14) years in December of 1985, wa
s unlike many of the youths of her age in our country. She was the first to be b
orn into a common-law relationship between a man and a woman who did not think o
f legalizing their union despite the succeeding births of four (4) more children
. She was no stranger to poverty; both her father and mother were itinerant vend
ors he of sweepstakes tickets and she of children s toys. As if these adverse ci
rcumstances were not enough, she underwent, at such a tender and innocent age, a
most painful, terrifying and horrifying experience the memory of which will for
ever haunt her. She was sexually molested not once but twice by her own natural
father, the herein appellant, in their own home in Sampaloc, Manila. The first a
ssault occurred on 27 December 1985. As a consequence of this most unnatural and
revolting act, she became pregnant. The second took place on 5 April 1986. On b
oth occasions, she had no choice but yield her body and honor because he had thr
eatened to kill her, her mother and her siblings. It was only after the second i
ncident that she decided to reveal his bestial deeds. Appellant moved for a cons
olidation of Criminal Case No. 86-46286 in Branch 47 with Criminal Case No. 86-4
6285 in Branch 45, which was granted, subject to the conformity of the Presiding
Judge of Branch 45, in the Order of 9 September 1986. 9 The latter did not obje
ct to the consolidation. As a result, the two (2) cases were jointly tried in Br
anch ISSUE: Whether or not the victim is entitled to moral damages that the lowe
r court failed to impose. HELD: RTC DECISION: In a Decision dated 5 October 1987
10 but promulgated on 28 October 1987, the trial court found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 335 of the Revised P
enal Code in both criminal cases, and sentenced him: . . . to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the first rape on December 27, 1985 and the same pena
lty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the second rape on April 5, 1986. 11 A day after t
he promulgation, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal wherein he manifeste
d his intention to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals. COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION: The Court of appeals sustain the trial court for the prosecution s ev
idence proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant intimidated Rowena into
consummating the sexual acts with him on 27 December 1985 and 5 April 1986. He
conveniently availed of two (2) forms of intimidation: threats and his overpower
ing moral influence. SUPREME COURT DECISION: The affirmance of the appellant s c
onvictions in the two (2) cases subject of this appeal is inevitable. He should,
however, be condemned to pay moral and exemplary damages which the trial court
failed to impose. It must be imposed for the circumstances in these cases warran
t the award of moral damages under Article 2219(3) in relation to Article 2217 o
f the Civil Code. We hereby fix the award at P50,000.00 in each of the two (2) a
ppealed cases. As for exemplary damages, provided for under Article 2229 of the
same Code. P25,000.00 in each of the said cases. Exemplary damages are herein im
posed to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavio
r from sexually abusing their own daughters.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Man
ila in Criminal Case No. 86-46285 and Criminal Case No. 86-46286 is hereby AFFIR
MED subject to the modification above indicated. As modified, moral and exemplar
y damages, in the amounts of P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively, are awarde
d to the offended party, ROWENA I. MATRIMONIO, in each of the said cases. Costs
against the appellant. SO ORDERED. 76. SARMIENTO VS. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMI
SSION FACTS : The late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the National Power C
orporation in Quezon City as accounting clerk in May 1974. At the time of her de
ath on August 12, 1981 she was manager of the budget division. The deceaseds illn
ess was a cancer known as differential squarrous cell carcinoma, and sought treatm
ent in various hospitals. And on August 12, 1981, she succumbed to cardio respir
atory arrest due to parotid carcinoma, and she was 20 years old. Believing that
the deceaseds fatal illness having been contracted during her employment was serv
ice-connected, Jose B. Sarmiento filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626.
On September 9, 1982, the GSIS, through its Medical Services Center, denied the
claim. It was pointed out that the illness of Flordeliza was not caused by emplo
yment and employment conditions. Dissatisfied with the respondents decision of de
nial, Jose Sarmiento wrote a letter to the GSIS requesting that the records of t
he claim be elevated to the Employees Compensation Commission for review pursuant
to the law and the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. The respondent Commi
ssion affirmed the GSIS decision, it found that the deceaseds death is not compens
able because she did not contract nor suffer from the same reason of her work bu
t by reason of embryonic rests and epithelial growth. ISSUE : Whether or not the
deceaseds illness under PD 626, compensable? HELD : Under PD 626, a compensable
illness means illness accepted as an occupational disease and listed by the Empl
oyees Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to pro
of by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions The respondent prays for the application of the Old Workmen s Compen
sation Act which provided for a presumption of compensability whenever an ailmen
t supervened during the course of the employment. We dismiss the petition. Given
the preceding medical evaluations, we affirm the findings of the public respond
ents which found no proof that the deceased s working conditions have indeed cau
sed or increased the risk of her contracting her illness. WHEREFORE, the petitio
n is DISMISSED. The decisions of the Government Service Insurance System and the
Employees Compensation Commission denying the claim are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Cases 68-76 BAYTAN, ROGELIO