Criminal Law Review (1st Assignment)
BASIC PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL LAW privately financing those who desperately need petty
1. Magno v. CA (1992)
Facts:
Oriel Magno wanted to start a car repair business.
Lacking in funds, he approached Corazon Teng, who
was the Vice President of Mancor Industries, a
distributor of car repair equipment. Teng, in turn,
referred Magno to LB Finance to provide credit
facilities. LB Finance asked for a warranty deposit
equivalent to 30% of the total value of the pieces of
equipment to be purchased amounting to P29,790.
Since Magno could not pay the amount, he requested
LB Finance to look for a third party who could lend him
such amount. Unknown to Magno, it was Teng who
advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the
same would be paid as a short term loan at 3%
interest.
To pay for the warranty deposit, Magno issued 6
postdated checks, two of which were cleared but the
rest bounced. Magno eventually found out that Teng
was the one who advanced the amount for the
warranty deposit. Thereafter, Teng filed a complaint for
violation of BP 22 against Magno.
The RTC, affirmed by the CA, convicted Magno,
primarily citing BP 22s nature as malum prohibitum.
Issue: Whether or not Magno is guilty of violation of BP
22.
Held: No. By the nature of the "warranty deposit"
amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to 30% of the
"purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject of
the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash out" made
by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was just
paying rentals for the equipment. It would have been
different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of
equipment on or about the termination of the lease-
purchase agreement in which case he had to pay the
additional amount of the warranty deposit which
should have formed part of the purchase price. As the
transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but remained
a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned
equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor
(Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue paying
possibly due to economic constraints or business
failure, then it is lawful and just that the warranty
deposit should not be charged against the petitioner. To
charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty
deposit" which he did not withdraw as it was not his
own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to
even make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the least,
since petitioner did not receive the amount in question.
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want
the petitioner to know that it was she who
"accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez,
to source out the needed funds for the "warranty
deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is
shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful
legality. It is in simple language, a scheme whereby
Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the equipment in the name
of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or
lease" its goods as in this case, and at the same time,
accommodations as this one.
For all intents and purposes, the law was devised
to safeguard the interest of the banking system and
the legitimate public checking account user. It did not
intend to shelter or favor nor encourage users of the
system to enrich themselves through manipulations
and circumvention of the noble purpose and objective
of the law.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory"
in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function of
punishment is the protective (sic) of society against
actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear
whether petitioner could be considered as having
actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in
the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be
safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng
amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose
operations should also be clipped at some point in time
in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey
to such a vicious transaction. Corollary to the above
view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law
is founded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of
actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental
(or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend
the existence and progress of human society. This
disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that
morality is generally founded and built upon a certain
concurrence in the moral opinions of all.
Defining warranty deposit makes it even more
clear why petitioner should not be convicted: The act
of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker,
for safety or convenience, to be withdrawn at the will
of the depositor or under rules and regulations agreed
on. Also, the money so deposited, or the credit which
the depositor receives for it. Deposit, according to its
commonly accepted and generally understood among
bankers and by the public, includes not only deposits
payable on demand and for which certificates, whether
interest-bearing or not, may be issued, payable on
demand, or on certain notice or at a fixed future time.
Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time
of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason . . . is inversely applied
in this case. From the very beginning, petitioner never
hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which
to put up the warranty deposit and as a matter of fact,
he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the
transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom petitioner was
introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if
this predicament was not communicated to all the
parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement
the financing of which was covered by L.S. Finance
Management.
ARTICLE 3
2. Roque v. People (2015)
Facts:
 Criminal Law Review (1st Assignment)
On Nov. 22, 2001, brothers Reynaldo and Rodolfo
Marquez were celebrating the Thanksgiving Day of
Barangay Masagana, Pandi, Bulacan. They spotted
Rogelio dela Cruz and shouted to him to join them. The
accused, Rogelio Roque, who happened to be passing
by, thought that the shout was directed at him. For
some reason, Roque took offense to this and even
threatened the brothers. Bothered, Rodolfo went to the
house of Barangay Chairman Pablo Tayao to ask for
assistance in settling the misunderstanding,
meanwhile, Reynaldo went to Roques house to
apologize. However, Roque shot Reynaldo in the nape
and even kicked him. Reynaldo was immediately
brought to the hospital and miraculously recovered.
Charged with frustrated murder, Roque had his
own version of the story. According to him, the brothers
were harassing him and challenged him to a gun duel.
The gun shot, according to Roque, was made as an act
of self-defense.
The RTC and the CA convicted him.
Issue: Whether or not Roque is guilty of frustrated
murder.
Held: Yes. It is worth highlighting that the victim
received two gunshot wounds in the head. Indeed the
location of the wounds plus the nature of the weapon
used are ready indications that the accused-appellant's
objective is not merely to warn or incapacitate a
supposed aggressor. Verily, had the accusedappellant
been slightly better with his aim, any of the two bullets
surely would have killed him outright. Also, the intent
to kill is further exhibited by the fact that the accused-
appellant even prevented barangay officials from
intervening and helping x x x the bleeding victim.
Indeed, the fact that Reynaldo Marquez was
miraculously able to live through the ordeal and
sustain only modicum injuries does not mean that the
crime ought to be downgraded from frustrated
homicide to less serious physical injuries. After all, as
was mentioned above, what should be determinative of
the crime is not the gravity of the resulting injury but
the criminal intent that animated the hand that pulled
the trigger.
3. De Guzman v. People (2014)
Facts:
On Dec. 24, 1997 at about 10 PM, Alexander Flojo
was fetching water when he was suddenly hit in the
nape by the accused, Alfredo De Guzman, Jr., and later
on at around midnight, Alexander again fetched water.
Suddenly, Alfredo appeared in front of Alexander and
stabbed him on his left face and chest. Alexander
survived thanks to timely medical intervention.
Charged with frustrated homicide, Alfredo denied
having stabbed Alexander. According to him, he passed
by Alexander who was then fixing his motorcycle and
accidentally hit his back. Alexander then cursed at him,
and a fight between them ensued. The stabbing,
according to Alfredo, could have been made by
someone else.
The RTC and the CA convicted Alfredo. On appeal,
he argued that intent to kill, the critical element of the
crime charged, was not established.
Issue: Whether or not Alfredos intent to kill was
established.
Held: Yes. The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1)
the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested
by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the
victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die
because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of
the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present.
The essential element in frustrated or attempted
homicide is the intent of the offender to kill the victim
immediately before or simultaneously with the
infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that
the State must allege in the information, and then
prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as
differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is
presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.
Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the
courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the
acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the
assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People,
we considered the following factors to determine the
presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the means used
by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the
conduct of the malefactors before, during, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the
circumstances under which the crime was committed
and the motives of the accused. We have also
considered as determinative factors the motive of the
offender and the words he uttered at the time of
inflicting the injuries on the victim.
Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed
that intent to kill was present. We concur with them.
Contrary to the petitioners submission, the wounds
sustained by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks
inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a
fistfight between them. The petitioner wielded and
used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical
records indicate, indeed, that Alexander sustained two
stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest
and the other on the left side of his face. The
petitioners attack was unprovoked with the knife used
therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his
submission, and firmly proving the presence of intent
to kill. There is also to be no doubt about the wound on
Alexanders chest being sufficient to result into his
death were it not for the timely medical intervention.
4. Rivera v. People (2006)
Facts:
Former taxi driver Ruben Rodil was walking down
the store one evening with his three-year-old daughter
when suddenly, Esmeraldo and his two brothers Ismael
and Edgardo (all surnamed Rivera) ambushed Ruben
and mauled him with fist blows and he fell to the
ground. In that helpless position, Edgardo hit Ruben
three times with a hollow block on the parietal area.
They continued mauling him until the police arrived,
 Criminal Law Review (1st Assignment)
and they all fled. Ruben sustained lacerated wounds on
the parietal area, cerebral concussion or contusion,
hematoma on the left upper buttocks, multiple
abrasions on the left shoulder and hematoma
periorbital left. The doctor said that the lacerated
wound in the parietal area was slight and superficial
and would heal from one to seven days.
Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo were all charged
with attempted murder. They claimed that it was
Ruben who challenged them to a fight. Moreover, they
argued that the fact that Ruben merely suffered
superficial injuries negate their intent to kill. They were
convicted by the RTC and the CA.
Issue: Whether or not Rubens superficial injuries
negate the accuseds intent to kill.
Held: No. The essential elements of an attempted
felony are as follows:
1. The offender commences the commission of
the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony;
3. The offenders act be not stopped by his own
spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution
was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance.
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists
of two elements, namely: (1) That there be external
acts; (2) Such external acts have direct connection with
the crime intended to be committed. An overt or
external act is defined as some physical activity or
deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular
crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by
external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance
of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen
into a concrete offense.
In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in
concert, commenced the felony of murder by mauling
the victim and hitting him three times with a hollow
block; they narrowly missed hitting the middle portion
of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would
surely have died.
Also, treachery was proven in this case,
considering that Ruben was attacked in a sudden and
unexpected manner as Ruben was walking with his
daughter. Obviously, he had no chance to defend
himself.
5. Villareal v. People (2012)
Facts:
Several freshmen Ateneo law students signified
their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity
(Aquila). One of them was Lenny Villa. They were
subjected to a three-day initiation rite some time in
1991. On the third day, Lenny Villa died of cardiac
failure resulting from his several injuries. Thirty-five
Aquilans were charged with homicide.
In 1993, the trial court convicted 26 them of
homicide, while the trial against the other 9 was held in
abeyance. In 2002, the CA set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court and modified the criminal
liability of each of the accused according to individual
participation (one of the accused had by then passed
away): 19 of the accused were acquitted as their
individual guilt was not established by proof beyond
reasonable dount; 4 of the accusedVincent Tecson,
Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Almeda and Renato
Bantug, Jr.were found guilty of slight physical injuries
and sentence to 20 days of arreso menor; and 2 of the
accused were found guilty of homicide.
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari, saying that the CA committed grave abuse
of discretion in holding that the four accused were
guilty of slight physical injuries.
Issues:
1. Whether or not four of the accused are only
guilty of slight physical injuries; and
2. Whether or not the accused are guilty of
homicide.
Held:
1. No. The appellate court relied on our ruling in
People v. Penesa in finding that the four accused
should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries.
According to the CA, because of the death of the
victim, there can be no precise means to determine the
duration of the incapacity or medical attendance
required. The reliance on Penesa was utterly
misplaced. A review of that case would reveal that the
accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical
injuries, because the victims injuries neither caused
incapacity for labor nor required medical attendance.
Furthermore, he did not die. His injuries were not even
serious. Since Penesa involved a case in which the
victim allegedly suffered physical injuries and not
death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently
inapplicable. On the contrary, the CAs ultimate
conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were
liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly
contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the
court, the four accused were found to have inflicted
more than the usual punishment undertaken during
such initiation rites on the person Article 4(1) of the
Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall
be liable for the consequences of an act, even if its
result is different from that intended. Thus, once a
person is found to have committed an initial felonious
act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries
that results in the death of the victim, courts are
required to automatically apply the legal framework
governing the destruction of life. This rule is
mandatory, and not subject to discretion.of Villa.
2. No. In holding that the fraternity members had
no intent to kill, the Supreme Court discussed the
nature and history of hazing rites.
The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that
are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to
Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act
results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight,
or lack of skill. Reckless imprudence or negligence
 Criminal Law Review (1st Assignment)

consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from room at night, they should knock first and identify
which an immediate personal harm, injury or material themselves; and (3) There was no indication that Ah
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of Chong had any motives to kill Pascual as they
precaution or advertence on the part of the person appeared to had been in good terms prior to the
committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and incident.
consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast,
Article 8 of the old penal code provided that a
simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act
person acting in self-defense incurs no criminal liability,
done without grave fault, from which an injury or
provided the following requisites are present: (1) Illegal
material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of
aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means
foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of
immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. The
sufficient provocation on the part of the person
test for determining whether or not a person is
defending himself.
negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent
man in the position of the person to whom negligence Under these provisions we think that there can be
is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete
reasonable consequence of the course about to be exception from criminal liability for the death of the
pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open
take precaution against the mischievous results of the the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief
act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence. or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No
one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of
of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion,
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall cover
and the thief having forced open the door
only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon.
notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning
Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five
to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder
accused fraternity members would have all been
if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned
convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by
that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with
reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment). Since there was
no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him
no law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died,
despite his warnings defendant would have been
we are constrained to rule according to existing laws at
wholly justified in using any available weapon to
the time of his death. The CA found that the
defend himself from such an assault, and in striking
prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his
Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction
whereabouts and deliver the first blow. But the
of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa. As to accused
evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a
Villareal, his criminal liability was totally extinguished
thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his
by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the
property nor any of the property under his charge was
Revised Penal Code.
in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal
6. US v. Ah Chong (1910) blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on
the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he
Facts: was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real
"necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his
Ah Chong worked as a cook at Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal.
person or his property or the property under his
One night, Ah Chong was awakened by someone trying
charge. The question then squarely presents it self,
to force open the door of the room. The door had no
whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
permanent lock, so a chair was placed against it. He
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts,
called out twice and threatened the person that he
does an act for which he would be exempt from
would kill him if he entered, but there was no answer.
criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them
At that moment he was struck just above the knee by
to be, but which would constitute the crime of
the edge of the chair which had been placed against
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the
the door. In the darkness and confusion, Ah Chong
true state of the facts at the time when he committed
thought he was being attacked, so he grabbed a
the act. To this question we think there can be but one
kitchen knife and stabbed the purported intruder, who
answer, and we hold that under such circumstances
turned out to be his roommate, Pascual Gualberto. Ah
there is no criminal liability, provided always that the
Chong was arrested, and Pascual was brought to the
alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to
hospital but died the following day.
negligence or bad faith.
Ah Chong was charged with the crime of
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable
assassination, and found guilty by the trial court of
element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as
simple homicide and sentenced to six years and one
shows the act committed to have proceeded from no
day. Ah Chong admitted that he stabbed his roommate
sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor
but did so under the impression that he was a ladron.
from criminal liability provided always there is no fault
Issue: Whether or not Ah Chong is criminally liable. or negligence on his part.
Held: No. The following circumstances were A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in
considered: (1) Prior to the incident, there have been the case at bar convinces us that the defendant
several reported incidents of robbery; (2) Ah Chong Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the
and Pascual had an agreement that when entering the information in the firm belief that the intruder who
 Criminal Law Review (1st Assignment)
forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief,
from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of
his life and of his property and of the property
committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented
themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in
good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the
belief that he was doing no more than exercising his
legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been
as he believed them to be he would have been wholly
exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and
that he can not be said to have been guilty of
negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in
falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means
adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent
danger which he believe threatened his person and his
property and the property under his charge.
7. Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan (2012)
Facts:
Several police officers were charged with murder,
multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder in
connection with a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in
Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga which
caused the death of Leodevince Licup and injured Noel
Villanueva. The police officers opened fire on a Toyota
Tamaraw jeepney carrying Licup and Villanueva along
with some San Miguel Corporation employees.
Of all the accused, only Salvador Yapyuco took the
stand. According to him, he went to Barangay
Quebiawan upon Pamintuans instruction concerning a
reported presence of armed NPA members in the area.
The Toyota Tamaraw happened to be the target vehicle.
Yapyuco claimed that they flagged down the vehicle
(which the defense denied), and when it failed to pull
over, the police suddenly opened fire with their M16.
The Sandiganbayan convicted them of homicide
(for the death of Licup) and attempted homicide (for
the injuries sustained by Villanueva).
Among the accuseds defenses were: (1) the
justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful
exercise of a right or office under Art. 11(5) of the
Revised Penal Code; and (2) mistake of fact.
Issue: Whether or not the accuseds defenses are
meritorious.
Held: Nope. The availability of the justifying
circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of
a right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised
Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in
the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of
his right or office, and (b) the injury caused or the
offense committed is the necessary consequence of
the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office.
Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the
law. Only absolute necessity justifies the use of force,
and it is incumbent on herein petitioners to prove such
necessity. We find, however, that petitioners failed in
that respect. Although the employment of powerful
firearms does not necessarily connote unnecessary
force, petitioners in this case do not seem to have been
confronted with the rational necessity to open fire at
the moving jeepney occupied by the victims. No
explanation is offered why they, in that instant, were
inclined for a violent attack at their suspects except
perhaps their over-anxiety or impatience or simply
their careless disposition to take no chances. Clearly,
they exceeded the fulfillment of police duties the
moment they actualized such resolve, thereby inflicting
Licup with a mortal bullet wound, causing injury to
Villanueva and exposing the rest of the passengers of
the jeepney to grave danger to life and limb all of
which could not have been the necessary consequence
of the fulfillment of their duties.
With respect to mistake of fact, a proper invocation
of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest
and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c)
that it negate the culpability required to commit the
crime or the existence of the mental state which the
statute prescribes with respect to an element of the
offense.
8. Loney v. People (2006)
Facts:
The petitionersJohn Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid
and Pedro Hernandezwere officers of Marcopper
Mining Corporation, a mining corporation based in
Marinduque. They had been storing tailings from its
operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduqe. At the
base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the
Boac and Maklupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper
had placed a concreted plug at the tunnels end. On
March 24, 1994, tailings gushed out of near the
tunnels end. A few days later, the Mt. Tapian pit had
discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and
Maklupnit rivers.
Two years later, the Department of Justice
separately charged petitioners with violation of the
following: (1) the Water Code; (2) National Pollution
Control Decree; (3) Philippine Mining Act; and (4)
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
Petitioners filed a motion to quash on the ground
that the Informations were duplicitous. Acting on
petitioners motion, the MTC held that they should be
charged only with the violation of the Mining Act and
Art. 365 of the RPC. According to the MTC, violations of
the Water Code and the National Pollution Control
Decree are deemed absorbed by the violation of the
Mining Act. The RTC, which sustained by the CA,
reversed the MTCs order, holding that there could be
no absorption as the acts penalized by these laws are
separate and distinct from each other. Petitioners main
theory is that all the charges proceed from and are
based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac
and Makalpnit rivers, adding that the acts complained
of for violation of the three environmental laws are the
very same acts complained of in the charge for
violation of Art. 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the
former.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners should be charged
only with Reckless Imprudence.
 Criminal Law Review (1st Assignment)
Held: No. A single act or incident might offend against
two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions
of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for
more than one offense. Moreover, each of the crimes
petitioners committed has one element not present in
the others, to wit:
1. In the Philippines Water Code, the gravamen is
the absence of the proper permit to dump the
mine tailings;
2. In the Anti-Pollution Law, the gravamen is the
pollution itself;
3. In the Philippine Mining Act, the gravamen is
the willful violation and gross neglect to abide
by the terms and conditions of the
Environment Compliance Certificate; and
4. In Art. 365 of the RPC, the gravamen is the lack
of necessary or adequate precaution,
negligence, recklessness and imprudence on
the part of the accused to prevent damage to
property.
Petitioners reliance in the case of People v. Relova
is also misplaced. The issue in Relova is whether the
act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in charging one
Manuel Opulencia (Opulencia) with theft of electric
power under the RPC, after the latter had been
acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the
unauthorized installation of electrical wiring, violated
Opulencias right against double jeopardy. We held that
it did, not because the offenses punished by those two
laws were the same but because the act giving rise to
the charges was punished by an ordinance and a
national statute, thus falling within the proscription
against multiple prosecutions for the same act under
the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. Thus, Relova is no authority for
petitioners claim against multiple prosecutions based
on a single act not only because the question of double
jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as the
Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted
for an act or incident punished by four national
statutes and not by an ordinance and a national
statute.
9. Garcia v. CA (2006)
Facts:
Based on a complaint by Aquilino Pimentel, Jr.,
petitioner Arsenia Garcia, an election officer in the
Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and several
others, were charged with the violation of Sec. 27(b) of
RA 6646. It was alleged that the accused conspired
with each other to reduce Pimentels vote from 6,998
to 1,921. The RTC acquitted everyone except Garcia. In
her defense, Garcia said there was no motive on her
part to reduce the votes of Pimentel.
Issue: Is a violation of Sec. 27(b) of RA 6646 classified
under mala in se or mala prohibita.
Held: Mala in se. Sec. 27(b) punishes Any member of
the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers
who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes
received by a candidate in any election or any member
of the board who refuses, after proper verification and
hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such
tampered votes. Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section
27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and
mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue
would be punishable.
Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of
the person who executes an act which the law
punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. Thus,
whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the
burden of proving its existence.
Nevertheless, the circumstances of this case
negate Garcias claim of good faith: Neither the
correctness of the number of votes entered in the
Statement of Votes (SOV) for each precinct, nor of the
number of votes entered as subtotals of votes received
in the precincts listed in SOV Nos. 008417 to 008422
was raised as an issue. At first glance, however, there
is a noticeable discrepancy in the addition of the
subtotals to arrive at the grand total of votes received
by each candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No.
008423. The grand total of the votes for private
complainant, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, was only 1,921
instead of 6,921, or 5,000 votes less than the number
of votes private complainant actually received. This
error is also evident in the Certificate of Canvass (COC)
No. 436156 signed by petitioner, Viray and Romero.
During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she
was indeed the one who announced the figure of
1,921, which was subsequently entered by then
accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the board.
Petitioner likewise admitted that she was the one who
prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though it was not her
duty. To our mind, preparing the COC even if it was not
her task, manifests an intention to perpetuate the
erroneous entry in the COC. Neither can this Court
accept petitioners explanation that the Board of
Canvassers had no idea how the SOV (Exhibit "6") and
the COC reflected that private complainant had only
1,921 votes instead of 6,921 votes. As chairman of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioners concern
was to assure accurate, correct and authentic entry of
the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency
and fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure but
also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal
responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law.
ARTICLE 4
10. Garcia v. People (2009)
Facts:
One night, Amado Garcia was having a drinking
spree with his friends, when Manuel Chy, who lived
nearby, requested the group to quiet down as the noise
from the videoke machine was blaring. It was only after
Manuels second request when the group obliged. But
apparently, Amado was mad AF and bore a grudge
against Manuel. Three days later, Amado confronted
Manuel and suddenly punched him in the face. Amado
kept on assaulting him. Manuel managed to escape
with the help of Amados companion, Foz. Manuel ran
towards his house and phoned his wife Josefina, to call
the police. When the police reached Manuels home,
there was no answer. Josefina arrived minutes later,
 Criminal Law Review (1st Assignment)
unlocked the door and found Manuel lying unconscious.
He died of myocardial infarction.
Amado was charged with homicide and was
convicted thereof by the RTC as affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not Amado is liable for the death of
Manuel.
Held: Yes. Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states
that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended. The
essential requisites for the application of this provision
are: (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting
act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit
graver wrong was primarily caused by the actors
wrongful acts. In this case, petitioner was committing a
felony when he boxed the victim and hit him with a
bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted
with a heart ailment does not alter petitioners liability
for his death. Where death results as a direct
consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere
fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the
injured person contributed to his death, does not
relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.
In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is
responsible for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is
different from the one he intended. Thus, the
circumstance that petitioner did not intend so grave an
evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him
from criminal liability. Since he deliberately committed
an act prohibited by law, said condition simply
mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) of
the Revised Penal Code. Nevertheless, we must
appreciate as mitigating circumstance in favor of
petitioner the fact that the physical injuries he inflicted
on the victim, could not have resulted naturally and
logically, in the actual death of the victim, if the latters
heart was in good condition.
11. People v. Ulep (1988)
Facts:
Macario Ulep was charged with parricide for the
killing of his wife, Asuncion. The spouses had a fight,
and Ulep elbowed Asuncion in the chest at around 5:30
pm. She vomited and then went to bed. At around 9
pm, Asuncion died of a heart attack. Autopsy showed
that Asuncion suffered several fractures in the ribs.
Ulep claimed that a year before, while his wife went to
have their palay milled, their bullcart loaded with sacks
of rice turned upside down and pinned his wife on her
breast, thus, according to Ulep, the gradual weakening
of the heart due to a long standing illness of the body
system caused the cardiac arrest which claimed the life
of Asuncion. To bolster his bullsh*t, he pointed out the
fact that there were no contusions on the chest of the
victim, indicating that the elbow blows could not have
fractured the ribs.
Issue: Whether or not Ulep is guilty of parricide.
Held: Yes. Even if the victim is suffering from an
internal ailment, liver or heart disease, or tuberculosis,
if the blow delivered by the accused (a) is the
efficient cause of death; or (b) accelerated his death;
or (c) is the proximate cause of death; then there is
criminal liability. Apropos to all these is that time-
respected doctrine: "He who is the cause of the cause
is the cause of the evil caused." This is the rationale in
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
"criminal liability shall be incurred by a person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended." Again,
We elucidated that: even though a blow with the fist or
a kick does not cause any external wound, it may
easily produce inflammation of the spleen and
peritonitis and cause death, and even though the
victim may have been previously affected by some
internal malady, yet if the blow with the fist or foot
accelerated death, he who caused such acceleration is
responsible for the death as the result of an injury
willfully and unlawfully inflicted.
12. Belbis, Jr. v. People (2012)
Facts:
Petitioners Rodolfo Belbis and Alberto Crucales
were charged with homicide for the killing of Jose
Bahillo who was a Barangay Tanod of Barangay, Naga,
Twi, Albay. On Dec. 9 1997 at around 10 pm, petitioners
were loitering outside a store when Jose told them to
go home. Petitioners claimed that Jose went after
them, and thrust a nightstick on Rodolfo. The nightstick
turned out to be a bolo sheathed on a scabbard.
Rodolfo managed to take the bolo from Jose and
stabbed the latter. When Jose went home, he told his
live-in partner, Veronica what happened, that he was
held by Alberto and stabbed by Rodolfo. Jose was taken
to a hospital and his wounds were treated. He was
supposed to return to the hospital but did not do so
due to financial restraints. On Jan. 1, 1998, Veronica
brought Jose back to the hospital as he was
complaining of urinary retention and pains in his
lumbar regions. He was diagnosed by Dr. Corral as
having advanced Pyelonephritis, his kidney was
inflamed and with pus formation and scarring. On
January 8, Jose died.
The RTC convicted petitioners of homicide but
applied the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
defense. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs ruling
but took away the mitigating circumstance.
Petitioners contended that the stab wounds were
not the proximate cause of the Joses death.
Issue: Whether or not the stab wounds were the
proximate cause of Joses death.
Held: Yes. What really needs to be proven in a case
when the victim dies is the proximate cause of his
death. Proximate cause has been defined as "that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred." The autopsy report indicated that the cause
of the victim's death is multiple organ failure.
According to Dr. Wilson Moll Lee, the doctor who
conducted the autopsy, the kidneys suffered the most
serious damage. Although he admitted that autopsy
alone cannot show the real culprit, he stated that by
 Criminal Law Review (1st Assignment)
having a long standing infection caused by an open
wound, it can be surmised that multiple organ failure
was secondary to a long standing infection secondary
to stab wound which the victim allegedly sustained.
What is important is that the other doctors who
attended to the wounds sustained by the victim,
specially those on the left and right lumbar area,
opined that they affected the kidneys and that the
wounds were deep enough to have caused trauma on
both kidneys.
The Court also did not give much weight to the
testimony of the doctor for the defense as he merely
examined Joses cadaver as compared to the doctors
who treated Jose when he was still alive.
13. Urbano v. IAC (1988)
Facts:
At around 8 am of Oct. 23, 1980, Filomeno Urbano
went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan and was surprised that the place where he
stored his palay was flooded with water coming from
the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed.
Marcelo Javier, who was nearby, admitted that it was
his fault. Urbano got angry and hacked Javier with a
bolo in his hand and leg. Urbano stopped upon the plea
of his daughter. Urbano and Javier eventually had an
amicable settlement before the barangay. But on Nov.
14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the hospital as he had
lockjaw and was having convulsions. The doctor found
that Javiers condition was caused by tetanus toxin.
Charged with homicide, Urbano argued that the
proximate cause of the death of Javier was his own
negligence as Javier got infected with tetanus when
after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his
tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound
to harmful elements like tetanus germs. The lower
courts convicted Urbano, ruling that Javiers death was
the natural and logical consequences of Urbanos
unlawful act.
Issue: Whether or not Urbanos guilt was proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
Held: No. The rule is that the death of the victim must
be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since
we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof
that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The
medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause later or between the
time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the
crime. Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that
the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the
proximate cause of Javier's death with which the
petitioner had nothing to do.
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of
an action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of
the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act
or defective condition sets into operation the instances
which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause (Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo).
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear
aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the
very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting
slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's
criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the
victim's own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano
and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to
effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave
Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of
Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed
under the express provisions of Presidential Decree
G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3).
14. People v. Villacorta (2011)
Facts:
On January 22, 2002, Danilo Cruz went to a sari-
sari store to buy bread. Out of nowhere, Orlito
Villacorta appeared and thereafter stabbed the left part
of the body of Cruz with a sharpened bamboo stick.
After that, Villacorta fled. Cruz was helped by
bystanders and he was brought to a nearby hospital
where he was treated as out-patient. He was
discharged on the same day but on February 14, 2002,
or 21 days after the stabbing incident, he returned to
the same hospital where he was treated for severe
tetanus. The next day on February 15, 2002, Cruz died.
The medical report states that Cruz died of tetanus
infection secondary to stab wound.
The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals
convicted Villacorta for murder.
Issue: Whether or not Villacorta is guilty for murder.
Held: No. In this case, the proximate cause of the
death is not the stabbing done by Villacorta upon Cruz.
There was an efficient intervening cause which
appeared between the time of the stabbing and the
time of the death of Cruz. In explaining this, the
Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that
severe tetanus (the kind of tetanus which causes
immediate death) has an incubation period of 14 days
or less. In this case, the stabbing made by Vilalcorta
could not have caused the tetanus infection as 22 days
already lapsed from the time of the stabbing until the
date of death of Cruz. Something else caused the
tetanus other than the stabbing in short, Cruz
acquired the tetanus 14 days or less before February
15, 2003 and not on the date of stabbing.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the
direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victims death must convince a
 Criminal Law Review (1st Assignment)
rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that
the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time [Cruz] was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
Villacorta is however guilty of slight physical
injuries based on the facts. Neither is he guilty of
attempted nor frustrated murder, his intent to kill was
not proven by the prosecution.
15. People v. Acuram (2000)
Facts:
At around 7 pm, Rolando Manabat along with
others were waiting for a ride home. They flagged
down an approaching jeepney, which, however,
swerved dangerously towards them. Rolando shouted
at the jeep, and one passenger shouted back.
Immediately thereafter, two gunshots came from the
front side of the jeepney and hit Rolando on the right
knee. Rolando was brought to the hospital at round 11
pm. He underwent surgery at around 5 am but he died
at 11 am on the same day. The doctor said that he died
of massive loss of blood due to gunshot wound.
The passenger who shot Rolando happened to be a
police officer named Orlando Acuram. He was seated at
the front, right side of the jeepney. Charged with
murder, Acurams defense, among others, was that the
delay in giving proper medical attendance to the victim
constitutes an efficient intervening cause which
exempts him from criminal responsibility. The trial
court convicted him of murder.
Issue: Whether or not the delay in giving proper
medical attendance constitutes an efficient intervening
cause.
Held: No. Appellant never introduced proof to support
his allegation that the attending doctors in this case
were negligent in treating the victim. On the contrary,
Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr., testified that the attending doctor
at the Cagayan de Oro Medical Center tried his best in
treating the victim by applying bandage on the injured
leg to prevent hemorrhage. He added that the victim
was immediately given blood transfusion at the
Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital when the doctor
found out that the victim had a very low blood
pressure. Thereafter, the victim's blood pressure
stabilized. Then, the doctor operated the victim as the
main blood vessel of the victim's right leg was cut,
thereby causing massive loss of blood. The surgery was
finished in three hours. Unfortunately, the victim died
hours later. We cannot hold the attending doctors liable
for the death of the victim. The perceived delay in
giving medical treatment to the victim does not break
at all the causal connection between the wrongful act
of the appellant and the injuries sustained by the
victim. It does not constitute efficient intervening
cause. The proximate cause of the death of the
deceased is the shooting by the appellant. It is settled
that anyone inflicting injuries is responsible for all the
consequences of his criminal act such as death that
supervenes in consequence of the injuries. The fact
that the injured did not receive proper medical
attendance would not affect appellant's criminal
responsibility. The rule is founded on the practical
policy of closing to the wrongdoer a convenient avenue
of escape from the just consequences of his wrongful
act. If the rule were otherwise, many criminals could
avoid just accounting for their acts by merely
establishing a doubt as to the immediate cause of
death.
16. People v. Talampas (2011)
Facts:
Ernesto Matic (a tricycle driver who sidelines in a
band) along with Eduardo Matic and Jose Sevillo were
infront of Joses house, repairing a tricycle. Suddenly,
Virgilio Talampas y Matic who was riding a bicycle
alighted. He brought out a short gun and fired at but
missed Eduardo who took refuge behind Ernesto.
Talampas again fired 3 more times, one shot hitting
Ernesto at the right portion of his back and the other
hitting Eduardo on his nape. Thereafter, Tampas ran
away, and the victims were brought to the hospital.
Eduardo managed to survived, but Ernesto died.
According to the doctor, the shot to Ernesto was fatal
as it involved the major organs such as the lungs, liver
and the spinal column which caused Ernestos death.
Charged with homicide, Talampas interposed self-
defense and accident. According to him, Eduardo tried
to hit him with a monkey wrench, so they grappled for
it. Meanwhile, Talampas noticed that Eduardo had a
gun, so he tried to grabbed it, and in doing so, the gun
accidentally fired. Moreover, he pointed out that his
enemy had been Eduardo and not Ernesto.
The RTC and the CA convicted Talampas of
homicide.
Issue: Whether or not it matters that Eduardo, and not
Ernesto, was Talampass target.
Held: No. The fact that the target of Talampas assault
was Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not excuse his hitting
and killing of Ernesto. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was
the natural and direct consequence of Talampas
felonious deadly assault against Eduardo. Talampas
poor aim amounted to aberratio ictus, or mistake in the
blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him from
criminal responsibility nor mitigated his criminal
liability. Lo que es causa de la causa, es causa del mal
causado (what is the cause of the cause is the cause of
the evil caused). Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
17. People v. Flora (2000)
Facts:
During a dance party to celebrate the birthday of
Jeng-jeng Malubago, Hermogenes Flora, allegedly a
suitor of Jeng-jeng, attended the party with his brother,
Edwin. At around 1:30 am, Hermo fired his revolver
twice: The first shot grazed the right shoulder of Flor
Espinas, then hit Emerita Roma, below her shoulder.
The second shot hit Ireneo Gallarte. As a result of the
incident, Ireneo and Emerita died, while Flor suffered
 Criminal Law Review (1st Assignment)
injuries. It so happened that days before the incident,
Hemo had a violent altercation with a certain Oscar
Villanueva, and it was Oscars uncle, Ireno, who
pacified them.
Hermo and Edwin were charged with double
murder and attempted murder. The RTC convicted
them as charged.
Issue: Whether or not Hermo and Edwin are guilty of
double murder and attempted murder, considering that
their target was only Ireneo.
Held: Yes. In the present case, when Hermogenes
Flora first fired his gun at Ireneo, but missed, and hit
Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas instead, he became
liable for Emeritas death and Flors injuries.
Hermogenes cannot escape culpability on the basis of
aberratio ictus principle. Criminal liability is incurred by
any person committing a felony, although the wrongful
act be different from that which he intended.
However, Edwin was acquitted of the murder of
Ermita and Flor, because evidence shows only
conspiracy to kill Ireneo and no one else.
18. People v. Violin (1997)
Facts:
There was a party in Brg. San Jose, Catbalogan,
Samar. In attendance were the victims Dioscoro Jr.
and Darmo Astorgaand the accusedAntonio Violin,
Remegio Yazar, Cessar Allego and Eutiquio Cerriguene.
Later that evening, Dioscoro wanted to go home but
was not able to due to lack of transportation, so he and
Darmo just stayed at Allegos house. At around 4 am,
Dioscoro and Darmo were roused from their sleep by
Allego who invited them for food and liquor. They were
gathered in the kitchen. After a few rounds, Allego
asked Violin to buy more beer. Violin left followed by
Cherriguene and Yazar. Meanwhile, Dioscoro asked to
use the comfort room but was told by Allego to urinate
outside. Darmo, who was left alone in the kitchen,
heard gunshots. He tried to go outside but was met by
a bloodied Dioscoro who told him to hide. Darmo
crawled and hid himself under a table measuring about
3 feet wide, 7 feet long and 2 fee and 4-1/2 inches tall.
While in hiding, Darmo witness the killing of his
brother. A stray bullet also grazed the right side of
Darmos head.
The killing was apparently politically motivated.
Dioscoro and Darmo were the sons of the Daram city
mayor, with Dioscoro, Jr. being groomed to replace his
father. The accused were fanatics and avid followers of
the mayors political rival, Miguel Figueroa.
The accused were charged with murder and
frustrated murder. Allego has remained at large. Also
charged with the same crimes were Miguel Figueroa
and Catalino Figueroa, the one who contracted the
hitmen. The RTC convicted them as charged.
Issue: Whether or not the charge of frustrated murder
for the injuries sustained by Darmo proper.
Held: No. The crime of slight physical injuries, not
frustrated murder, was committed against Darmo
Astorga. Antonio Violin fired at Dioscoro Astorga Jr. and
not at Darmo. There is not the slightest indication that
at that time Violin knew that Darmo was hiding under a
table. Darmo himself admitted that he was injured by a
stray bullet which grazed the right parietal region of his
head. The wound was diagnosed as superficial and
required treatment only for three (3) days.
19. People v. Adriano (2015)
Facts:
A speeding blue Toyota Corolla overtook a maroon
Honda CRV. When the Corolla reached alongside the
CRV, the passenger on the front seat of the Corolla hot
the CRV and caused the CRV to swerve and fall in the
canal in the road embankment. Four armed men ten
suddenly alighted the Corolla and started shooting at
the driver of the CRV, who was later identified as
Danilo Cabiedes. A stray bullet also hit a bystander,
Ofelia Bulanan. Danilo died on the spot, while Ofelia
was brought to the hospital but eventually also died.
The Corolla was registered under the name of Antonio
Rivera who was actually engaged in the car rental
business. That particular Toyota Corolla was leased to
Rolly Adriano.
Adriano, and four others who remained at large,
were charged with murder.
The RTC convicted Adriano. the CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC that Adriano's claim that he was in
Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at the time of the
incident does not convince because it was not
impossible for Adriano to be physically present at the
crime scene, in Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva
Ecija, which can be reached by car in less than an hour.
Issue: Whether or not Adriano is also liable for the
death of Ofelia, who hit by a stray bullet.
Ruling: Yes. Criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act be
different from that which is intended. One who
commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the
consequences which may naturally or logically result
therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. The
rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, 'el que es
causa de la causa es causa del mal causado ', or he
who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused.
Finally, we ask, may treachery be appreciated in
aberratio ictus? Although Bulanan's death was by no
means deliberate, we shall adhere to the prevailing
jurisprudence pronounced in People v. Flora, where the
Court ruled that treachery may be appreciated in
aberratio ictus. In Flora, the accused was convicted of
two separate counts of murder: for the killing of two
victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the
victim killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery,
qualified both killings to murder. The material facts in
Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus, we follow the
Flora doctrine.
20. People v. Sales (2011)
Facts:
 Criminal Law Review (1st Assignment)
On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and
Junior, then nine and eight years old, respectively, left
their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady
of Peafrancia without the permission of their parents.
They did not return home that night. When their
mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the
next day, she found them in the nearby Barangay of
Magsaysay. Afraid of their fathers rage, Noemar and
Junior initially refused to return home but their mother
prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached home
a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then
whipped them with a stick which was later broken so
that he brought his kids outside their house. With
Noemars and Juniors hands and feet tied to a coconut
tree, appellant continued beating them with a thick
piece of wood.
When the beating finally stopped, the three walked
back to the house, Noemar collapsed and lost
consciousness. Maria then told appellant to call a
quack doctor. He left and returned with one, who told
them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital.
Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious
Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle to take
them to a hospital. As there was no vehicle and
because another quack doctor they met at the junction
told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant
brought his son back to their house.
Appellant was charged with parricide and slight
physical injuries.
Appellant denied that his son died from his beating
since no parent could kill his or her child. He claimed
that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing.
In fact, he never complained of the whipping done to
him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was
brought to a hospital more than a year before
September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak
heart.
On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar
suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from
epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But
he would regain consciousness after 15 minutes. His
seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or
when scolded.
The trial court charged the accused guilty of
parricide and slight physical injuries. Accused argued
that he merely intended to discipline Noemar and not
kill him.
Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty of parricide.
Ruling: Yes. In order that a person may be criminally
liable for a felony different from that which he intended
to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was
committed and (b) that the wrong done to the
aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the
crime committed by the perpetrator.20 Here, there is
no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and
inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a
felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered
by the child, he expired. Appellants criminal liability
for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.
Appellants claim that it was Noemars heart ailment
that caused his death deserves no merit. This
declaration is self-serving and uncorroborated since it
is not substantiated by evidence. While Dr. Salvador
Betito, a Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur issued a death certificate indicating that
Noemar died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest, the same
is not sufficient to prove that his death was due mainly
to his poor health. It is worth emphasizing that
Noemars cadaver was never examined. Also, even if
appellant presented his wife, Maria, to lend credence to
his contention, the latters testimony did not help as
same was even in conflict with his testimony. Appellant
testified that Noemar suffered from a weak heart which
resulted in his death while Maria declared that Noemar
was suffering from epilepsy. Interestingly, Marias
testimony was also unsubstantiated by evidence.
All the elements of the crime of parricide is present
in this case. Parricide is committed when: (1) a person
is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3)
the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of accused.
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming
evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person
was killed. There is likewise no doubt as to the
existence of the second element that the appellant
killed the deceased. It is sufficiently established by the
positive testimonies of Maria and Junior. As to the third
element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased
is his child.
As to the charge of Physical injuries, the victim
himself, Junior testified that he, together with his
brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein
appellant, while they were tied to a coconut tree. He
recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg
and to have been examined by a physician thereafter.
Maria corroborated her sons testimony.
21. Intod v. CA (1992)
Facts:
Sulpicio Intod and four others met with Aniceto
Dumalagan who instructed them to kill Bernardina
Palangpangan with whom Dumalagan had a land
dispute. The five men went to the house of Bernardina.
They identified Bernardinas bed room and opened
fired. It so happened that no one was at the room at
that time, and no one was hurt.
Convicted by the RTC of attempted murder, Intod
argued that he is liable only for an impossible crime
under Art. 4(2) of the RPC.
Issue: Whether or not Intod is guilty of attempted
murder.
Held: No. In the United States, where the offense
sought to be committed is factually impossible or
accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal
liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit
the substantive crime where the elements of attempt
are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is
penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an
attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where
the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment,
the actor cannot be held liable for any crime neither
 Criminal Law Review (1st Assignment)
for an attempt not for an impossible crime. The only
reason for this is that in American law, there is no such
thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only
recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge
that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our
jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The
impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not
merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself.
Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is
found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes
no distinction between factual or physical impossibility
and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a
physical impossibility which rendered the intended
crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article
4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is
sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. To
uphold the contention of respondent that the offense
was Attempted Murder because the absence of
Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of
the actor's will, will render useless the provision in
Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an
act "which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances
which prevented the consummation of the offense will
be treated as an accident independent of the actor's
will which is an element of attempted and frustrated
felonies.
22. Jacinto v. People (2009)
Facts:
A certain Baby Aquino handed petitioner Gemma
Jacinto a BDO check postdated July 14, 1997 in the
amount of P10,000. The check was payment for Babys
purchases from Mega Foam Intl., Inc. Gemma was then
a collector for Mega Foam. The check was, however,
deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso
Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Captle; the latter is
the sister of Gemma and used to be a Mega Foam
employee. The check, however, bounced.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca received a call from
a customer who asked if she could issue checks
payable to the account of Mega Foam instead of to
CASH, because apparently the customer was
instructed by Jac to make the checks payable to CASH.
Thereafter, Rowena again received a call, this time
from a Landbank employee who was looking for
Generoso concerning the bounced check. Because
Generoso and Jac had no landline, Rowena called Anita
Valencia, a neighbor of Generoso and Jac and also a
former Mega Foam employee. Valencia told Rowena
that the check came from Baby, and instructed Rowena
to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told
Rowena of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally
into four: for herself, Rowena, Gemma and Jac.
Rowena wisely reported the matter to Mega Foams
owner, who, in turn, coordinated with Baby and filed a
complaint with the NBI which planed an entrapment
operation. Ten pieces of P1,000 bills were marked and
dusted with fluorescent powder and were given to
Rowena, who was tasked to pretend that she was going
along with Valencias plan.
And so, Rowena met with Gemma, Jac and
Valencia. Rowena was given the BDO check and was
instructed to request Baby to replace it with cash.
Rowena pretended to get cash from Baby and brought
the pre-marked P10,000 to Gemma and Valencia. Jac
was not with them, because for her, shopping is life.
While they were dividing the money, Gemma and
Valencia were arrested.
Gemma, Valencia and Jac were charged with
Qualified Theft. The RTC convicted them as charged,
but the CA reduced Valencias penalty to 4 months
arresto mayor and acquitted Jac.
Issue: Whether or not a worthless check can be the
object of theft.
Held: No. The personal property subject of the theft
must have some value, as the intention of the accused
is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further
bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that
the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent
on the value of the thing stolen. In this case, petitioner
unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega
Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it
was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question
arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was
actually produced. The Court must resolve the issue in
the negative.
Applying the principle laid down in Intod v. CA, the
Supreme Court held that Petitioner's evil intent cannot
be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the
check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain
or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the
check bounced, she would have received the face
value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore,
it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the
check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at
the time, that prevented the crime from being
produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner
turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the
check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had
received the cash to replace the value of said
dishonored check.
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped
receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which she
thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored
check, is of no moment. Under the definition of theft in
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, there is only one
operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft
the taking of personal property of another. The
circumstance of petitioner receiving the P5,000.00
cash as supposed replacement for the dishonored
check was no longer necessary for the consummation
of the crime of qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to
convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for
the check was hatched only after the check had been
dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of
theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of
receiving the cash replacement should not be
considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the
fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked
 Criminal Law Review (1st Assignment)
money was merely corroborating evidence to
strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
23. People v. Tan (1993)
Facts:
Enrico Paulo Agra, an eight-year old child, was
walking with a classmate when he was approached by
Pablito who requested his assistance in getting his
fathers signature on a medical certificate. But instead
of going to the hospital, the man flagged a minibus and
forced Enrico inside. When they alighted, Pablito talked
to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope
addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boys father. They
took a tricycle, and the driver noticed that Enrico was
crying frantically, so he immediately reported the
matter to two barangay tanods. The tanods chased
Pablito, who left Enrico behind. Enrico was able to get
home safely. Meanwhile, his father noticed that the
handwriting of the letter looked familiar, and tests by
NBI revealed that it was written by Dr. Samson Tan, a
resident physician in the hospital owned by Enrique.
Pablito and Tan were charged with kidnapping with
serious illegal detention. The RTC convicted them as
charged. Tan argued that the crime alleged is not
kidnapping with serious illegal detention as no
detention in an enclosure was involved. If at all, it
should be denominated and punished only as grave
coercion.
Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding
that the sending of the ransom note was an impossible
crime which he says is not punishable. His reason is
that the second paragraph of Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be
incurred "by any person performing an act which would
be an offense against persons or property, were it not
for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or
on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means." As the crime alleged is not against
persons or property but against liberty, he argues that
it is not covered by the said provision.
Issue: Whether or not Pablito and Tan are lowlife
kidnappers.
Held: Yes. Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his
liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted
more than five days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating
public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; of if threats to kill him shall have
been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a
minor, female or a public officer. The penalty
shall be death where the kidnapping or
detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person; even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the
commission of the offense.
Contrary to Tan's submission, this crime may
consist not only in placing a person in an enclosure but
also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of
his liberty. In the case at bar, it is noted that although
the victim was not confined in an enclosure, he was
deprived of his liberty when Domasian restrained him
from going home and dragged him first into the
minibus that took them to the municipal building in
Gumaca, thence to the market and then into the
tricycle bound for San Vicente. The detention was
committed by Domasian, who was a private individual,
and Enrico was a minor at that time. The crime clearly
comes under Par. 4 of the above-quoted article.
As to the issue on impossible crime, Tan
conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same
article, which clearly applies to him, thus: By any
person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended. Even before the ransom note was received,
the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention
had already been committed. The act cannot be
considered an impossible crime because there was no
inherent improbability of its accomplishment or the
employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The
delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the
victim did not extinguish the offense, which had
already been consummated when Domasian deprived
Enrico of his liberty. The sending of the ransom note
would have had the effect only of increasing the
penalty to death under the last paragraph of Article
267 although this too would not have been possible
under the new Constitution.
The motive for the offense is not difficult to
discover. According to Agra, Tan approached him six
days before the incident happened and requested a
loan of at least P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds
at that moment and Tan did not believe him, angrily
saying that Agra could even raise a million pesos if he
really wanted to help. The refusal obviously triggered
the plan to kidnap Enrico and demand P1 million for his
release.
ARTICLE 6
24. People v. Lamahang (1935)
Facts:
Aurelio Lamahang was caught by the police
opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap
goods. He was able to break one board and in
unfastening another from the wall before the police
showed up.
Lamahang was charged and convicted by the CFI of
attempted robbery.
Issue: Whether or not Lamahang is guilty of attempted
robbery.
Held: No. The attempt to commit an offense which the
Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation
to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the
beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts
of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and
 Criminal Law Review (1st Assignment)
consummation. It is necessary to prove that said
beginning of execution, if carried to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Thus, in case
of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by
means of force or violence another person's dwelling
may be considered an attempt to commit this offense,
it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to
take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some
personal property belonging to another. In the instant
case, there is nothing in the record from which such
purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred.
From the fact established and stated in the decision,
that the accused on the day in question was making an
opening by means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu's
store, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion
that his evident intention was to enter by means of
force said store against the will of its owner. That his
final objective, once he succeeded in entering the
store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the
inmates, or to commit any other offense, there is
nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.
Therefore, Lamahang is guilty only of attempted
trespass to dwelling.
25. Baleros v. People (2006)
Facts:
UST Med student Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou)
was sleeping in her dorm when she was awakened by
the smell of chemical on a piece of cloth pressed on
her face. Somebody was pinning her down on the bed,
holding her tightly. She was able to grab hold of his sex
organ which she then squeezed causing the man to let
go. Malou called for help, but the man was able to
escape. Later on, the man was identified by the dorms
security guard to be Renato Baleros (Chito), a rejected
suitor of Malou.
Chito was charged with attempted rape and was
convicted by the RTC and the CA. Chitos alibi was that
he was at a fraternity party in Greenhills.
Issue: Whether or not Chito is guilty of attempted
rape.
Ruling: No. Overt or external act has been defined as
some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention
to commit a particular crime, more than a mere
planning or preparation, which if carried out to its
complete termination following its natural course,
without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by
the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of
this case, it would be too strained to construe
petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in
the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as
an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen
into rape. As it were, petitioner did not commence at
all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or
attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized
that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no
attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch
her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the
complainant unconscious, if that was really his
immediate intention, is anybodys guess. s. The CA
maintained that if the petitioner had no intention to
rape, he would not have lain on top of the complainant.
Plodding on, the appellate court even anticipated the
next step that the petitioner would have taken if the
victim had been rendered unconscious. At bottom then,
the appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a
practice disfavored under the rule on evidence in
criminal cases. For, mere speculations and probabilities
cannot substitute for proof required to establish the
guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.
In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act
of execution to produce the felony. Thus, for there to be
an attempted rape, the accused must have
commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to
the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance, the
penetration, however, slight, is not completed.
Chito was instead convicted by the Supreme Court
of light coercion.
26. People v. Lizada (2003)
Facts:
Rose Orillosa separated with her husband. She took
her childrenAnalia, Jepsy and Rosselwith her. To
make both ends meet, Rose worked as a waitress in
Manila. Rose met Fredie Lizada, and they decided to
live together as husband and wife. However, from the
years 1996 to 1998, Lizada sexually abused and even
raped Roses daughter, Analia. These acts were kept
from Rose as Lizada threatened to kill Analia. But on
Nov. 9, 1998, Rossel caught Lizada on top of Analia.
Eventually, Analia broke down and told her mother
everything.
Lizada was charged with four counts of qualified
rape under four separate informations. The RTC
convicted him as charged.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC was correct in
convicting Lizada of for counts of qualified rape.
Held: No (hes still a rapist tho). With respect to the
three charges of rape, the Court held that only simple
rape was committed, since the qualifying circumstance
of Analias age, which was 13 years, was not alleged in
the Information.
With respect to the other charge of rape (the one
committed on Nov. 9, 1998), the Court held that Lizada
is guilty of only attempted rape: In light of the
evidence of the prosecution, there was no introduction
of the penis of accused-appellant into the aperture or
within the pudendum of the vagina of private
complainant. Hence, accused-appellant is not
criminally liable for consummated rape.[36] The issue
that now comes to fore is whether or not accused-
appellant is guilty of consummated acts of
lasciviousness defined in Article 336 of the Revised
Penal Code or attempted rape under Article 335 of the
said Code, as amended in relation to the last
paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. In
light of the evidence on record, we believe that
 Criminal Law Review (1st Assignment)
accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape and not
of acts of lasciviousness.
Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony
should be distinguished from preparatory acts which
consist of devising means or measures necessary for
accomplishment of a desired object or end. One
perpetrating preparatory acts is not guilty of an
attempt to commit a felony. However, if the
preparatory acts constitute a consummated felony
under the law, the malefactor is guilty of such
consummated offense.
It must be borne in mind, however, that the
spontaneous desistance of a malefactor exempts him
from criminal liability for the intended crime but it does
not exempt him from the crime committed by him
before his desistance. In light of the facts established
by the prosecution, we believe that accused-appellant
intended to have carnal knowledge of private
complainant. The overt acts of accused-appellant
proven by the prosecution were not mere preparatory
acts. By the series of his overt acts, accused-appellant
had commenced the execution of rape which, if not for
his spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the crime of
rape. Although accused-appellant desisted from
performing all the acts of execution however his
desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to
do so only because of the sudden and unexpected
arrival of Rossel. Hence, accused-appellant is guilty
only of attempted rape.
27. Abella v. People (2013)
Facts:
Petitioner Fe Abella was fighting with Alejandro
Tayrus and Dioniso Ybanes. Abellas brother, Benigno,
pacified Abella and convinced him to go home. Benigno
went to Alejandros house to apologize, when suddenly
Abella arrived bringing with him two scythes, one in
each hand. Benigno tried to block Abella but was
hacked in the neck. He fell to the ground, while Abella
ran after Alejandro. Benigno survived after being
treated in the hospital.
Abella was charged with frustrated homicide, and
the RTC and CA convicted him as charged. He argued
that there was no intent to kill, because after the single
hacking blow was delivered to Benigno, he ran after
Alejandro.
Issue: Whether or not Abella is guilty of frustrated
homicide.
Held: Yes. the use of a scythe against Benignos neck
was determinative of the petitioners homicidal intent
when the hacking blow was delivered. It does not
require imagination to figure out that a single hacking
blow in the neck with the use of a scythe could be
enough to decapitate a person and leave him dead.
While no complications actually developed from the
gaping wounds in Benignos neck and left hand, it
perplexes logic to conclude that the injuries he
sustained were potentially not fatal considering the
period of his confinement in the hospital. A mere
grazing injury would have necessitated a lesser degree
of medical attention. This Court likewise finds wanting
in merit the petitioners claim that an intent to kill is
negated by the fact that he pursued Alejandro instead
and refrained from further hacking Benigno. What
could have been a fatal blow was already delivered and
there was no more desistance to speak of. Benigno did
not die from the hacking incident by reason of a timely
medical intervention provided to him, which is a cause
independent of the petitioners will.
28. People v. Labiaga (2013)
Facts:
Gregorio Conde and his two daughters, Judy and
Glenelyn, were at their home. Gregorio went outside
and was shot by Regie Labiaga. When the two girls
rushed to Gregorios aid, Judy was shot in the
abdomen. Gregorio and Judy was rushed to the
hospital. Gregorio, who suffered merely small wounds
in his forearm and shoulder, recovered, but Judy did
not make it.
Regie and two others (Balatong Barcenas and
Cristy Demapanag) who were with him were charged
with murder and frustrated murder. Regie claimed self-
defense. According to him, Gregorio pulled out a
shotgun and tried to shoot him, but the shotgun
jammed. He claimed that he tried to wrest the shotgun,
and during the struggle, the shotfun fired.
The RTC convicted Regie as charged but acquitted
Cristy due to lack of evidence, while Barcenas
remained at large. The CA affirmed the RTCs ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the charge of frustrated murder
for the wounds inflicted to Gregoio proper.
Held: No. Regie should be convicted of attempted
murder. We distinguished a frustrated felony from an
attempted felony in this manner:
1.) In a frustrated felony, the offender has
performed all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony as a consequence;
whereas in an attempted felony, the offender
merely commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts and does not perform all
the acts of execution.
2.) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-
accomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator; on
the other hand, in an attempted felony, the
reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a
cause or accident other than the offenders
own spontaneous desistance.
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence
showing that the wound would have been fatal were it
not for timely medical intervention. If the evidence fails
to convince the court that the wound sustained would
have caused the victims death without timely medical
attention, the accused should be convicted of
attempted murder and not frustrated murder. In the
instant case, it does not appear that the wound
sustained by Gregorio Conde was mortal.
29. Valenzuela v. People (2007)
Facts:
 Criminal Law Review (1st Assignment)
At SM North Edsa, a security guard saw petitioner
Aristotel Valenzuela haling a push cart with cases of
Tide detergent. Aristotel unloaded these cases in a
parking space where Jovy Calderon was waiting.
Aristotel haled a taxi and loaded the cartons inside.
Meanwhile, the security guard approached the two and
asked for a receipt of the merchandise, and they
reacted by fleeing on foot. They were eventually
apprehended.
Aristotel and Jovy were charged with theft. The RTC
convicted both of them as charged. In his appeal with
the CA, Aristotel argued that he should only be
convicted of frustrated theft, citing old cases People v.
Dio and People v. Flores, both of which were decided
by the CA. In Dio and Flores, it was held that the ability
of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen
is a constitutive element of the crime of theft.
The CA affirmed the RTCs ruling.
Issue: Whether or not there is such a crime as
frustrated theft.
Held: No. The elements of the crime of theft as
provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2)
that said property belongs to another; (3) that the
taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking
be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that
the taking be accomplished without the use of violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.
In this case, the moment petitioner obtained
physical possession of the cases of detergent and
loaded them in the pushcart, such seizure motivated
by intent to gain, completed without need to inflict
violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon
things, and accomplished without the consent of the
SM Super Sales Club, petitioner forfeited the
extenuating benefit a conviction for only attempted
theft would have afforded him.
30. Canceran v. People (2015)
Facts:
On or about October 6, 2002, Ompoc (a security
guard) saw Jovito Caneeran approach one of the
counters in Ororama; that Caneeran was pushing a cart
which contained two boxes of Magic Flakes for which
he paid P1,423.00; that Ompoc went to the packer and
asked if the boxes had been checked; that upon
inspection by Ompoc and the packer, they found out
that the contents of the two boxes were not Magic
Flakes biscuits, but 14 smaller boxes of Ponds White
Beauty Cream worth P28,627.20; that Caneeran
hurriedly left and a chase ensued; that upon reaching
the Don Mariano gate, Caneeran stumbled as he
attempted to ride a jeepney; that after being
questioned, he tried to settle with the guards and even
offered his personal effects to pay for the items he
tried to take; that Arcenio refused to settle; and that
his personal belongings were deposited in the office of
Arcenio.
Canceran was charged with Frustrated Theft.
However, the RTC convicted him of Consummated
Theft, which was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not Canceran can be convicted of
Consummated Theft.
Held: No. Canceran was charged with Frustrated Theft,
which was held in Valenzual v. People (2007) to be non-
existent. An accused cannot be convicted of a higher
offense than that with which he was charged in the
complaint or information and on which he was tried.
Hence, he can be held liable only for Attempted Theft,
which is necessarily included in Consummated Theft
and lower than Frustrated Theft if there is such a crime.
31. People v. Quinanola (1999)
Facts:
Catalina Carciller (15 years old), along with her
cousin Rufo and another male companion Richard,
went to attend a dance at around 10 pm in Cebu. As
they were on their way home, the accused Agapito
Quinanola and Eduardo Escuadro, who were both
armed with guns, held them up and announced that
they were NPA members. Eduardo watched over Rufo
and Richard who were able to run away. Meanwhile,
Agapito took Catalina at a secluded place and had
carnal knowledge with her. Eduardo joined them and
did the same to Catalina. Thereafter, Catalina went
home and told her mother what happened.
A report by the medico-legal officer of the NBI who
examined Catalina concluded that there was no
extragenital injuries and her hymenal orifice was so
small that an erect average-size penis would not have
completely penetrated it, causing laceration.
Agapito and Eduardo were charged with rape, but
the RTC convicted them of frustrated rape, citing the
doctrine laid down People v. Erinia (1927) which was
actually abandoned in a later case, People v. Orita.
Issue: Whether or not there is a crime of frustrated
rape.
Held: No. In the context it is used in the Revised Penal
Code, "carnal knowledge" unlike its ordinary
connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily
require that the vagina be penetrated or that the
vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured.
The crime of rape is deemed consummated even when
the man's penis merely enters the labia or lips of the
female organ or, as once so said in a case, by the
"mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis
capable of consummating the sexual act.
32. People v. Orande (2003)
Facts:
The accused in this case was Arnulfo Orande, a
pedicab driver, who was the common law husband of
Girle Castro. Girlie, who worked as a fish vendor, had
three children, one of which was Jessica. Girlie had two
more children by Orande.
Between the 1994 and 1996, Orande had raped
Jessica for four times whenever Girlie was away. Jessica
was only 9 years old when she was first raped, 11 on
the second, and 12 on the third and fourth.
It was Jessicas teacher, Mrs. Adoracion Mojica, who
noticed unusual treatment of Jessica by the appellant.
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When confronted by Mrs. Mojica, Jessica told her what
Orande has been doing to her. This eventually led to
the filing of four Informations of rape against Orande.
The RTC convicted Orande of simple rape for the
first three rapes but convicted him only of frustrated
rape for the last rape, because Orandes penis only
slightly penetrated her vagina.
Issue: Whether or not the conviction for frustrated
rape was proper.
Held: No. Thus, it was error for the trial court to
convict appellant of frustrated rape. Besides, after a
careful review of the records, we find that the rape was
in fact consummated. Jessica initially testified that,
although appellant did not succeed in inserting his
penis in her vagina, she felt his sex organ touch hers
and she saw and felt semen come out of his penis and
smear her vagina. In response to the
clarificatoryquestions asked by the prosecutor, Jessica
testified that the appellant was able to slightly
penetrate her because she felt pain and her vagina
bled. It has been held that, to be convicted of rape,
there must be convincing and sufficient proof that the
penis indeed touched the labia or slid into the female
organ, and not merely stroked the external surface
thereof. Nevertheless, we have also ruled in cases
where penetration is not established that the rape is
deemed consummated if the victim felt pain, or the
medico-legal examination finds discoloration in the
inner lips of the vagina, or the labia minora is already
gaping with redness, or the hymenal tags are no longer
visible. In the present case, the victim testified that she
felt pain and her vagina bled, indisputable indications
of slight penetration or, at the very least, that the penis
indeed touched the labia and not merely stroked the
external surface thereof. Thus, the appellant should be
found guilty of (consummated) rape and not merely
frustrated or attempted rape.
33. People v. Pareja (2012)
Facts:
At around 3:30 a.m. of June 16, 2003, AAA was
sleeping beside her two-year old nephew, BBB, on the
floor of her sisters room, when the appellant hugged
her and kissed her nape and neck. AAA cried, but the
appellant covered her and BBB with a blanket. The
appellant removed AAAs clothes, short pants, and
underwear; he then took off his short pants and briefs.
The appellant went on top of AAA, and held her hands.
AAA resisted, but the appellant parted her legs using
his own legs, and then tried to insert his penis into her
vagina.8 The appellant stopped when AAAs cry got
louder; AAA kicked the appellants upper thigh as the
latter was about to stand up. The appellant put his
clothes back on, and threatened to kill AAA if she
disclosed the incident to anyone. Immediately after,
the appellant left the room. AAA covered herself with a
blanket and cried.
AAA narrated to her sister what had happened, and
eventually they went to the Women and Childrens
Desk of the Mandaluyong City Police Station to report
the incident.
Pareja was charged with rape and was convicted by
the RTC. The CA affirmed the RTC decision, explaining
that a slight penetration of the labia by the male organ
is sufficient to constitute rape, and that a slight
penetration took place when the appellants penis
touched AAAs vagina as he was trying to insert it.
In his appeal before the Supreme Court, Pareja
argued that the prosecution failed to prove even the
slightest penetration.
Issue: Whether or not Pareja is guilty of consummated
rape.
Held: No, he is guilty merely of attempted rape. Based
on AAAs testimony, it appeared that the appellants
penis did not penetrate, but merely touched (i.e.,
naidikit), AAAs private part. In fact, the victim
confirmed on cross-examination that the appellant did
not succeed in inserting his penis into her vagina.
Significantly, AAAs Sinumpaang Salaysay also
disclosed that the appellant was holding the victims
hand when he was trying to insert his penis in her
vagina. This circumstance coupled with the victims
declaration that she was resisting the appellants
attempt to insert his penis into her vagina makes
penile penetration highly difficult, if not improbable.
Significantly, nothing in the records supports the CAs
conclusion that the appellants penis penetrated,
however slightly, the victims female organ.
Simply put, rape is consummated by the slightest
penile penetration of the labia majora or pudendum of
the female organ. Without any showing of such
penetration, there can be no consummated rape; at
most, it can only be attempted rape [or] acts of
lasciviousness.
34. Cruz v. People (2014)
Facts:
Norberto and Belinda Cruz were engaged in the
selling of plastic and glass wares in different localities
around the country. They employed AAA, 15 years old,
and BBB to help them sell their wares in Bangar, La
Union which was then celebrating its fiesta. When they
reached Bangar in the evening, they set up camp.
Belinda went back to Manila to get more goods. At
around 1 AM, Norberto stripped off the clothes of AAA
who was awakened from her sleep. Norberto touched
her private parts, and later on he did the same to BBB.
The two girls reported the incident to the police.
Norberto was charged with (1) attempted rape for
the acts he committed against AAA and (2) acts of
lasciviousness for the acts he committed against BBB.
The RTC convicted Norberto for both crimes. The CA
affirmed the conviction for attempted rape but
acquitted Norberto of acts of lasciviousness for lack of
evidence.
Issue: Whether or not Norberto was guilty of
attempted rape.
Held: No, he was guilty merely of acts of
lasciviousness.
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an
offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which
 Criminal Law Review (1st Assignment)
has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense;
that, which is the beginning of the execution of the
offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading
directly to its realization and consummation. The
attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch
as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is
not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal
Code. xxxx But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of
imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively
performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it
is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection,
like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its
effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation,
will develop into one of the offenses defined and
punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said
beginning of execution, if carried to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is
rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of
execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest
penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape,
and rape in its attempted stage requires the
commencement of the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts without the offender performing
all the acts of execution that should produce the
felony, the only means by which the overt acts
performed by the accused can be shown to have a
causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to
make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the
female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is
beyond the sphere of criminal law, that showing must
be through his overt acts directly connected with rape.
He cannot be held liable for attempted rape without
such overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie with the
female. In short, the State, to establish attempted
rape, must show that his overt acts, should his criminal
intent be carried to its complete termination without
being thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen
into rape, for, as succinctly put in People v. Dominguez,
Jr.: "The gauge in determining whether the crime of
attempted rape had been committed is the
commencement of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e.,
penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the
interruption."
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim,
and was already touching her genitalia with his hands
and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from
his clutches and effectively ended his designs on her.
Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and
no other, was his intended felony would be highly
unwarranted.
We clarify that the direct overt acts of the
petitioner that would have produced attempted rape
did not include equivocal preparatory acts. The former
would have related to his acts directly connected to
rape as the intended crime, but the latter, whether
external or internal, had no connection with rape as the
intended crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the
preparatory acts would not render him guilty of an
attempt to commit such felony. His preparatory acts
could include his putting up of the separate tents, with
one being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the other
for himself and his assistant, and his allowing his wife
to leave for Manila earlier that evening to buy more
wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no direct
connection to rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not
punishable under the Revised Penal Code for as long as
they remained equivocal or of uncertain significance,
because by their equivocality no one could determine
with certainty what the perpetrators intent really was.
Norberto was guilty, however, of acts of
lasciviousness, the elements of which are: (a) the
offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness
upon another person of either sex; and (b) the act of
lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either (i) by
using force or intimidation; or (ii) when the offended
party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
or (iii) when the offended party is under 12 years of
age. In that regard, lewd is defined as obscene, lustful,
indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality
that has relation to moral impurity; or that which is
carried on a wanton manner.