International Phenomenological Society

On the Pseudo-Concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy

Author(s): Guenther Stern (Anders)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Mar., 1948), pp. 337-371
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2103208
Accessed: 28/10/2010 13:40

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ips.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

International Phenomenological Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

http://www.jstor.org
 ON THE PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS OF HEIDEGGER'S
PHILOSOPHY
I. HEIDEGGER CUTS ACROSS THE ALTERNATIVE
"NATURALISM-SUPRANATURALISM")

If thereis a formulaapt to definethe locusofHeidegger'sExistential

Philosophyandto clarify
thecauseofitsintricacy and itspowerofattrac-
tion,the formulawould read: Heidegger'sphilosophycuts across thetradi-
"Naturalism-Supranaturalism."It matterslittlethat
tionalalternatives
nosuchcharacterization can be foundin Heidegger's works. Whatdo we
meanby"cutting across"?
Setting asideintermezzos,thehistory ofmodernphilosophy, particularly
thatofthepost-Hegelian period,hadbeena history of"Naturalizations"-
ofnaturalization ofman,ofmorals,ofthestate,andso on. The provinces
wonfromChristian philosophy automatically had accruedto therealmof
"Nature." Yet in the last century"atheism"and "naturalism"were
interchangeable terms.
Notso forHeidegger.Although he inheritedatheismfromnaturalism,
particularlyfromitsnineteenth century variant,be keepshisdistancefrom
naturalism-adistancebarelyshorterthanthe gulfthatexistsbetween
Christian anthropology and materialism.True,the "Dasein"l-the topic
ofHeidegger's philosophy-is"hiesig,"belongsto 'ro-rco T Kitc6os,but it is
not"nature,"muchless "life"in its biologicalsense:forin Heidegger's
philosophy the word"Nature"alreadydesignatesa "Seinsweise," i.e., a
modus existendiamongothermodi,andNature"is" only"for"a "Dasein."s2
Thoughnotnature,"Dasein" is farfrombeingsomething ofthesupra-
natural order:thereis justas little"Beyond"in Heidegger's philosophy as
thereis inmodernscienceorin historical materialism.Even in thatdis-
gutised
formwhichthe philosophy ofbourgeoissocietyhad invented:in
theform of"Oughtto be" or as "worldofwralues" the "Beyond"does not
' Thisterm(seebelow)designates thespecific
modum existendi
ofman,the"being
there";notthefactof his existence.Beinguntranslatable the Germantermwill
beadopted throughoutthisarticle.
I Itmayseemsuperfluous tostressthatthis"for"is notidentical
withtheclassical
"for"in the"Genesis"according to whichNaturehas beencreatedforman. We
considerit,however,important to emphasize theinfluenceoftheJewish-Christian
"For"inthehistory ofphilosophy.Asa matteroffact,it represents theultimate,
thoughsecret,basisforall variantsof "Transcendental Philosophy"according to
which manis not"parsinterpartesmundi"';buttheworldrather a "correlate"or
a 'product" ora "Datum"(derived from"dare"!)ora "property" ofman.
M37
338 PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

enterhis dimension
"Dasein." His objectiveseemsto be a newplane-
a plane that requiresa new approach,a new vocabulary,new categories
Let us admitfromtheoutset:The philosophical"draught,"('"Tiefgang"'
andtheeffects ofhisphilosophy"outsidethecustomaryalternatives"have
to be takenmostseriously.Heidegger's philosophy mustnotbe compared
withthosemerely verbal"syntheses," all those"Real-Idealisms" or"Ideal-
Realisms"whichhadaccumulated inthecourseofthelastcentury.
Firstofall: fromthepurelylogicalangle,his"neutrality" has itsmerits.
Onceonepartofa logicalalternative is abandoned, itscounterpart,owing
itsmeaning to itsverycounterposition, cannotclaimto a meaningeither.
Oncethe conceptof "Supra-natural" is dropped,the concept"Natural"
cannotremainintacteither. Obviouslythephilosophers ofthelast cen-
turyhad notdrawnthisnecessary conclusion.By stressing "naturalism,"
theywerepreserving a systemofconcepts thatstilldependedon thecoun-
terconcept theyhad abolished.
It isneedless tosaythatHeidegger's stepoutofthealternative Wasnotan
absolutely firststep. It had its pre-history, or ratherits pre-histories
of
verydiverse ancestries.
The one attemptto start "outside"the alternativewas the post-
Hegelian"Philosophy ofMNind" (example:Dilthey)according to whichthe
lifeof "Mind" or "History"was notany longerdirectedby Providence,
althoughtheywerenot concededas belonging to therealmof "Nature"
either. In hisalreadythoroughly forgotten bookontheGrenzen dernatur-
wissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, Rickert, in a wholly epigonicandinsuffi-
cientway,had triedto givethisdimension itslogicalarticulation.
Furthermore, in all hisphenomenological works, Husserlhad undertaken
the task of exploring a "region"outsidethe alternative: when,afterhis
attackon "Psychologism," i.e., naturalism in psychology and logic,he
startedto describethe so-called"intentionalen Strukturen," he neither
aimedat "Metaphysics ofMind" (although his attemptwas temporarily,
evenbyhimself, mistaken as a sortofnewPlatonism) norat a psychology;
but,as it is sufficiently known,at some"neutral"province, whichhe was
rightin givinga newlabel,namely"phenomenology." Afterall,Husserl
had startedfrommathematics, whosesubjects,thoughnot supranatural,
do notbelongto therealmofNatureeither. He hadbeenabsolutely con-
sistentwhenhe nevertiredin requiring fromhisreadersan uncustomary
approach(alltoooften misrepresented as "Mysticism") without whichthey
would be utterlyunable to focusthe objects or to verifythe truthof his
descriptions.The strangefact,that despiteits programmatic soberness
and the drabnessof its subjects("Aleaning,""Perception,""Memory,"
etc.) Husserl'sphenomenology could exertsuch a fascination
upon his
philosophical
contemporaries,is easilyexplainedby thisveryfactthathe
 OF HEIDEGGER'SPHILOSOPHY
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS 339

opened a provincebeyond metaphysicsas well as beyond empiricalre-

search:the "life" or "stream"of consciousness thathe described in his
analysesofthe"actsmeaningorhavingtheirobjects,"wasso neutral, that
he believedhe couldmethodically consolidate
hisdescriptionsby meansof
theproxy, thus,by thesuspension ofthequestionas to whether hisobjects
''areorarenot."
Thisemphasison rhrox' maycausetheimpression thatHusserlhad cut
offtheontological and thatthejumpfromHusserlto
questionaltogether,
Heidegger is nothingshortofa miracle-which impression, however, will
ariseonlyif oneunderstands by "Sein" ("being")exclusivelyReality,as
meantin NaturalScience. Althoughhe safeguarded his "Gegenstand-
bereich,"the"provinceofintentional objects,"by meansofthe rhrox', he
certainlydidnotmeanhisobjectstobe phantoms.Somehow hemeanthis
objectsas 6vra,to speakwithPlato'sParmenides.What,however wasthe
meaningof "6v" here?
It was Heidegger's,or morecorrectly,one ofHeidegger'stasks to answer
this question,at least, to formulatethe questionof the "Seins-Sinn"and
themeaning acts. Asa matter
of"being"inthe intentional offact,despite
thewholly moodandpurposeofHeidegger's
different philosophy,to a large
extent his"thematic byHusserl:forthe"Dasein"3
field"hadbeenpre-tilled
whichHeidegger withthe"Vorhandensein"4
contrasts (whichalreadyhad
beenbracketed inby Husserlby meansofthei7roxj),is defined
by Heideg-
geras "Sorge."5 Now, "Sorge"meaning "beingaftersomething" ("Aussein
aufetwas"),differing fromthis"something" in thesamewayas Husserl's
"intentional act" had differedfromits "object,"represents to a cer-
taindegreethecommon ofHusserl'sandHeidegger's
denominator philoso-
phies. Strangeas itmaysound,Englishreadersmayunderstand thetran-
sitionfrom Husserlto Heidegger
moreeasilythanGermanreaders, because
of the connotations,"tendency,"or "intention"conjuredup by the word
Husserl,however,
"Intentionality": whenusingthefamousterm,had im-
pliednothingwhatsoever akinto "tendency" or "intention"-andthisall
theless,as themodel-acts of "in-
whichhe used forhis characterization
(as the acts of "perception,"
tentionality" or "thinking,"
"recollection,"
borrowedfromtraditionalpsychology), revealthe "relation"between"act"
and its "object" in a purely"structural,"a whollyunpragmaticway.
Had Husserlchosenhungeras modelof "intentional
acts"-of course,
a purely
academicassumption hisplaceinthehistory
considering ofscience
3 V.S. footnote1.
4 This equals the naked "esse" ofobjectsof Nature; resp.resexistences.
6 This termwhich combinesthe connotationsof "cura," "worrying,""caring
for.. I," and "takingcare of," wouldbe besttranslatedby "interest,"ifunderstood
in its broadestmeaningalthoughthe word,unfortunately, lacks the gloomynuance
ofthe Germanoriginal. Thus we will keep Heidegger'swordagain.
340 PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

and his "polemicdependence"on the psychologyofperceptionand recollec-

tionaround1895-phenomenology wouldhavelookedverydifferent.Had
he chosen"hunger"as "Modellakt"and its adequation(or better"satis-
faction")insteadof "imagination" and its "adequation"or "fulfillment,"
he wouldhavebeencompelled to engageinthediscussion ofstrictly "onto-
logical"problems insteadofembarking uponthedescription ofthe"pure"
and "bracketed in" fluxorcontextof"intentional relations"inwhich,from
thetimeofhisbookIdeenon,hesawthefieldofhisresearch; he wouldhave
beenforcedintoaskingthefollowing questions:"Is Proxy stilllegitimatein
face of an intentional act as 'hunger'which(althoughstructurally "con-
taining"its "immanent" object)is whatit is,becauseit precisely doesnot
containits object(food)? Is the ontological neutralityoftheintentional
act's "immanent" objecta genuine"immanence" and "neutrality"?Does
not "neutrality" ratherindicatethe "not-having"?Could the Proxy)be
maintained in faceofan act whose"agent"(thelivingbeingorman) has
no otherinterest but to actuallyseize and literallyconsumehis object?
Couldit be maintained in faceofan "act" whoseagentcannotbearliving
orlivewithout it?"
These,of course,werenot Husserl'squestions. Had he focussedthis
problemof"without," theproblemofactual"want"and "incorporation,"
theywouldhavedrawnhimout ofthetranscendental sphere;theywould
haveforcedhimintoan exploration ofwhat"being"meansin faceofthe
first"absent"and then,materialistically speaking,"immanent"object;
and finallyintothe interpretation of what"being"meansin faceof the
"agent"oftheact-thehungry one,forwhomtheobject(food)is a question
of"being"or "notbeing." In short,Husserlwouldhavebeencompelled
toresume theclassicalproblem of"want"or"need,"thediscussion ofwhich
nosmaller idealists thanPlato(inhisPhilebos) andHegel(from hisJenenser
Logicon) had prepared in a mostprofound way.
We admitthatHusserlcouldnotask thesequestions;afterall,hisulti-
mateinterestcenteredin theoretical structures,exactlyas that of Neo-
Kantianism had;itwastheoretical actsthatheusedas modelsforhistheory
ofactsin general, and it is fromtheTheoryofSciencethathe had started
outas a philosopher.It is this"defect,"thisdent,intowhichHeidegger
drovehis axe, although-we have to stressthatpointfromtheveryoutset-
he cautiously
abstainedfromsplittingthetrunk:Heidegger tookoverat
theboundary lineofHusserl'sprovincewithoutactuallyreachingor even
wishingto reachthe problemjust sketched,in whichthe "battleof the
books,"thediscussionbetween-'idealism
and materialism,
becomesreally
acute. We willsee later on, that he knewwhathe was doingwhenhe took
a longrun,butmadebuta shortjumpwhichlandedhimonlyontheground
ofExistentialism.
 OF HEIDEGGER'SPHILOSOPHY
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS 341

But we are anticipating. Heideggerrightlyfeltthat dealingexclusively

withtheoretical actsrepresented anunbearable narrowing ofthephilosoph-
ical task. No one can denythatHeidegger was drawnintophilosophiz-
ingnotbyacademic"problems," butbythemostelementary philosophical
terrors; besides,the broadproblemsof classicalphilosophy and theology
whosehorizons embraced farmorethantheproblems of"meaning," "per-
ception," and"evidence," hadbeenhisdailyfoodfromhisstudent dayson.
Thus,whenherecognized Husserl's"intentionality," thispeculiarformofa
"livingrelation," he had to seeit as a structure offarbroader, ofevenuni-
versalapplication;he had to take it out ofthedimension whichHusserl,
following thetradition, stillhad labelled"consciousness."True,Scheler
had preceded himby examining non-theoretical acts (as thoseof"evaluat-
ing,"orthoseof"sympathy"); but,despiteundeniably profound insights,
he had justdealtwithother"species"ofacts; thoughhe evenutilizedhis
resultsforhis "Metaphysics," he certainly had not revisedhis conceptof
"being"on thestrength ofhis findings.That is whereHeidegger differs
from him.
As a matteroffact,Heidegger saw thestructure of "intentionality"
in
thewholeofpre-theoretical life,"in theentire7rpaits,in the"making"' of
things, in "dealing"withthem,inusingthem-notonlyin "imagining" or
"meaning"or "perceiving" them;and it wouldhave amounted to a com-
pleteannihilation ofthe "meaning"oftheterm"consciousness." had he
classified"making"or "dealingwith"as "acts of consciousness."6 By
rightly universalizingthe Husserlian"intentionality," he suddenlyfound
himself droppedon terraincognita: whathe was describing was the way,
"oneis in theworld"-notornotexclusively in acts ofconsciousness,7but
in all those acts of everydaylife which,usuallyunfitforthe societyof
philosophical themes,at best are casuallytoucheduponby thisor that
science. In short,he foundhimselfin that provincethat he called
"Dasein." Since,however, this"Dasein"-not any longerclassifiable as
consciousness-was markedby "intentionality," thusas a typeof"Sein,"8
distinguished by its "Aus-sein-auf-etwas" (its "beingaftersomething")
aftersomething, thatisnotthisbeingitself-"world" becameforhimsome-
thinglikean ontological attributeof"Dasein." While"nature"(as far
as somethinglike "nature" occurs in Heidegger'sphilosophy)just "is,"
6 Thus,eventhe term"act" has been abandonedby Heidegger. We used it here
solelyto clarifythe transitionfromHusserl to Heidegger.
7Just as little in "subconscious" acts. Heidegger's position cuts across this
dubiousalternative,too.
8 In Heidegger'sontologythe distinctionbetween elovtu and OP,"Sein" and
"Seiendem,"is of capital importance;while the Englishlanguage disposes but of
he oneparticipe"being,"we will have to keep thisGermanterm,too,at least where
he substantivation of theverb "to be" is in question.
342 RESEARCH
PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

sentenced,as it were,to just dumbbeing,"Dasein" is a sortof"to be in the

world," which findsits actuality as "Sorge" and "Besorgnis," i.e., in a
thousanddealingswiththeworld. However, Heidegger wouldargue,the
factof"in derWeltsein,"is notdue to theworld-relationofouracts (of
doing,dealing,communicating,takingcare of.. .perceiving...) but the
otherwayround:onlybecauseour "Sein,"as distinguished fromthings
just "being,"is "in der Welt sein" or "Sorge,"our acts are aiming
at "world." The examinationofthis "Sein," called "Dasein," thus "Her-
desDaseins"is thetaskofhis,oraccording
meneutik to him,ofphilosophy
toutsimple. Why the examinationof just thistype of "Sein"? Because,
mayreply,we are thistypeof"Sein,"whichfactmightincur
Heidegger
thatanyothertypeof "Sein" is, whatit is, onlysubspecieDasein,only
"for"theDasein. On the otherhand,Heidegger just because
continues,
Dasein is a sort of "Being in. . ." ("In-sein") it is so exclusivelymade for
an-dconcerned withthefieldin whichit moves(world,objects,etc.)thatit
is sortofblindfolded whenfacedwithits ownspecific difference-justas
the eye,thatseeseverything, is notmadeforseeingthe object"seeing."
Sincehowever, "Dasein" is notjusta sortof"to be," buta "beingthere,"
a-"beingpresent";sinceit says "hereI am" or "I am there";sinceit is
livingin thelightofthis"I am" and notonly"existsabout,"(herumexis-
tiert)obscurely and unmentioned, the factorwhichformerly was called
"Bewusstsein," nowbecomesthe specificum ofthismodusexistendi; in a
traditional waywe couldputit: conscious-
and,we admit,stillinsufficient
nessis embeddedby himintobeing.9
It shouldbe noted here that Heideggerintroducesa pluralityof "Seinsarten"
(modorum existendi),while in traditionalphilosophy"plurality",is used to apply
only to "Seiendem" (to genera,species, individua rerumexistentium). In Sein
und Zeitoccur(a.e.) the following"Seinsarten":
1) The "facticity"which is the contingentfact that there is somethinglike
"there is."
2) The "Zuhandensein" (being at man's disposal), the modusexistendiof the
"Zeug" ("stuff"the everydaytools ofthe "Sorge").
3) The "Vorhandensein"(of Nature,not elaboratedon by H).
4) The "Dasein" (withits variants):
a) "Uneigentlichsein"(beingunauthentically), "man."
b) "Eigentlichsein"(beingauthentically)whichequals Selbstsein.
It is obviousthat the introductionof modiexistendiincursthe abandonementof
thephilosophicalidea ofoneworld(Universe),whichimplication,however,mustnot
necessarilybe wrong. Since,however,"Dasein" is not an elementum mundi,rather
mundus,an elementofthe"In derWeltsein," it is obviousthatHeideggermaintains,
thoughin ontologicalterms,the divisioninto specificprovinces,on whichdivision
Neo-Kantianism(disguisingthe divisionof labor, i.e., of methods)had insistedso
emphatically. Thus, the idea of a philosophicalsystem,as it had existedfromthe
Timaioson, as imageofthe Cosmos,is givenup in Heideggersphilosophytoo, again
not a necessarilyfalse step. No doubt Heideggerwas fullyaware of this fact; yet
 PSEUDO-CONCRETENESSOF HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY 343

By embracingall practicaldealingsin thehorizonofintentionality

called
"Sorge,"Heideggerobviously-wascast intothe vicinityof naturalistic

its philosophicalimplicationsare not properlytakeninto account,and this all the

less as he furnishessomethinglike a "system" himselfthoughwithoutclarifying
the questionwhat "system" could mean afterthe abandonmentof the conceptof
Cosmos. As to thepeculiarsubstantivation"das Dasein" whichdesignatesa modus
existendias well as somethingthat is, originallyHeideggerhad introducedit for
positive,to be moreprecise,forprophylacticreasons,namely,in orderto make a
start withoutsuch ontologicallyunverifiedtermsas "Ego," or "individual," or
"conscioussness,"and the like, all of whichstill conceal a dubiousconceptof sub-
stance,exactlythat conceptof ousia whichHeideggerwishesto revisethroughhis
new ontology. If we may expressit in classical terminology, in that of Plato and
Parmenides,Heideggerused the deliberatelyfoggytermsin orderto suspend the
decisionof the questionas to whetherel'vatmustnecessarilybe embodied in indi-
vidual 6praor egos. As a matterof fact,Heidegger,insteadof startingout, as it is
usually done, fromthe "Ich," opens with the question: who is the Dasein? As
longas this questionis not answered,the substantivicverb "Dasein" (3) means the
amorphousnessand anonymityof everydaylife, the so-called "man": what one
thinks,does, says; in short,whatsociologyinsufficientlyhad labelled "public opin-
ion" or what Kierkegaard,moralisticallyand anti-democratically had foughtas
"Publikum." As we will see later on, this "man," althoughbeinga firststage of
"Dasein" is farfromrepresenting "Dasein's" highestdegree;it is ratherthe back-
ground,the "Unmittelbarkeit,"for a second stage in whichthe "Dasein" makes
itselfidentical with itself:for Heidegger'sphilosophy(therebysharply differing
fromHegel's) knows only of two stages, very understandably so, for the hidden
motorofthe wholeis Moralismthatcannotknowbut ofthe dualityofevil and good.
However,by introducingthe "man" as an aprioricmodalityof the "Dasein,"
Heideggersaves himselfthe troubleof exploringthe historicalcauses. responsible
forthis strangephenomenonof an elvat withoutan identifiableGv. Nor does he
ask whetherthe relationsthat in othersocietiesor civilizationsmay exist between
the collective"Dasein" and the individualone complywithhis schemaof "man"
and "Self." Finally,he does not even touch upon the capital questionof whether
the "Dasein" called "man" (i.e., average man, livingin the doxa and feedingon
averageand pre-chewedvocabularyand emotion)could be abolishedor changed.
It doesnotenterhis mindthatwhathe calls "man" mightbe a deterioratedremnant
of genuine"mores,"genuinesociality;or whetherit could be just a by-productof
massproduction. He is opposedto mores(withoutsupplantingthemby "morality"
as classical GermanPhilosophyhad done), and economicconsiderations would fall
shortof his high ontologicalstandards. Consequently,his interestcentersex-
clusivelyaround the question of, how "Dasein" or he, Heideggerhimself,could
escapethe "man." Moreover,thisquestionof howto escape replacesin his philos-
ophy all classical problemsof "individuation"whichformerly had pertainedto
philosophyof Nature. Never does he formulatethe question of how "Dasein"
becomes"Daseiende" (elvatbecomes6pra), this questionis being avoided like all
questionsthat borderon biology. The onlyindividuationhe knowsof is the "exis-
tential"one in whichthe "Dasein" raisesitself,transforms itselfintoa Self. There-
fore"Dasein" veryoftenhas theby-meaning ofthepre-self-stage.
The fact that the word simultaneouslycontainsthose different meanings,one
344 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

theories-ofpragmatism, operationalism, historicalmaterialism.Yet,

as mentionedabove, all his. relationsto naturalismare of a some-
howequivocalnature. Wherever Heidegger introduces a quasi-pragmatic
concreteness, he getsstuckin theveryintroduction.As a matteroffact,
he startswitha detaileddescription oftherelationthatexistsbetweenthe
"Dasein" and its "Zeug," i.e., the tools,by meansof whichit runsthe
householdof his world. And he is still on the righttrackwhen he
considers thosepracticaldealingsas promoting or "revealing"truth:not
by staringat a hammer do we knowwhatit is,butby hammering.And
onlyin "Sorge"-acts theworld"revealsitself."So far,so good. It sounds
extremely concrete. But whatwiththeapplication to the
of thisinsight
tools of today? Aremodernmachinesreally"revealing"themselves by
theiroperation? Is theirproducttheirpurpose? Is not theirpurpose
tobe seenonlybymaking transparent muchmorethanthemachines them-
selves? Does not an illegitimate idea of directness lie at thebottomof
Heidegger'sthesis? As a matteroffact,self-revelation of"Zeug" occurs
onlyin thoseactswhose"Vermittelung" ("mediation")is ofextreme sim-
plicity,i.e., wherethe producing and the product,the "dealer"and the
"dealt with,"the consumer and the good,formone simple,transparent,
functional unit,as it maybe the case in shoemaking or in apple-eating.
Operating a modernmachine,doesnotrevealit at all; its "alienation"is
obviously reckoned within present-day societyandin itsdivisionoflabor.
Alreadythispreliminary exampleprovesthatat thepointwhereHeidegger
seemsto become"concrete" or "pragmatic," he is mostobsolete, shows,so
to speak,a machine-smashing forall hisexamplesaretakenfrom
attitude,
the provincialshoemaker workshop.The alienationproducedprecisely
by thosetoolsthatare supposedto be revealing, is aliento him. All the
morepuzzlingis thefactthatin a way "alienation"playsa fundamental
rolein his experiences; but,wherever it appears,it does so in a harmless
disguise,as a "metaphysical alienation,"e.g.,as so-called"Nichten"ofthe
world.'0

blendinginto the other,is an extraordinary chanceformakingobscurestatements,

of whichchanceHeideggerneverfailsto take advantage.
10There is no such intransitiveword as "Nichten," only the transitive one
"vernichten." What Heideggermeans is: to become nothing,to vanish. Likely
his new word is just his translationof Pascal's "s'andantir." The metaphysical
brimming of the phenomenonof "reification"or "alienation" can be tracedback to
Bergsonwho mooredthe phenomenon in his theoryofmatter,whereby"matter" is
the elementresistingthe "6lan vital." Thus he describedthe alien characterof
the metaphysicalraw materialinsteadof the alienationof life's own products. It
is hardlya coincidencethat Bergson,by making"alienation" a metaphysicalchar-
acter, arrived at the discussionof the "Neant" long beforeHeideggeror Sartre
did. (L'idhe de NMant,"1901, later used in EvolutionCrkatrice.) Incidentally,
 PSEUDO-CONCRETENESSOF HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY 345

II. THE FACT "HUNGER. TIME AS FALL BETWEEN NOT-HAVING

AND HAVING. THE PROBLEM OF "'CONSTITUTION''
Far moreimportant, however, thattheemission ofthe"self-alienating"
Zeug whosecontextformsour world,is the ambiguity of the concept
"Sorge"itself, whichconceptis supposedto giveHeidegger's philosophy its
veryconcreteness.
We had called"Sorge"the centralHeideggerian categoryof "Dasein."
By thatformula wemeanthat"Sorge"designates both:"Dasein'srelation
to itself:it is a "Sein," "dem es um es selbstgeht"(a "modusexistendi
characterized byitsconcern to itsworldof
foritself");as wellas itsrelation
"Umgang"("dealing"and communications).Thus it is "interest" in the
broadestsense of the wordthat is made the fundamental featureof
"Daseini." It certainly is no coincidence thatthe "Beingin the world"
or "beingin" ("In-sein")almost-literally rendersthe latinword"inter-
esse." We said"interest initsbroadestsense,"for,whatHeidegger hasin
mind,is neither thatformof "interest" whichMarx,standingup forthe
"interest" ofan unprivileged class,considered themotor ofhistory;northe
interestinthe"moralsituation," Kierkegaard's soleobject;norsimplythe
biological "interest"ofthelivingbeingin self-preservation. Whilein the
worksofMarxorKierkegaard theterm"interest" designatestheiractual
interestin theiractual cause,Heidegger's originalequationof "Dasein"
and "Interest"at firstis but a ratherdisinterested ontologicalstatement,
meantneitherin its purelymoralnorin its merelyeconomicsense. Its
economic meaning particularly remains utterly vague. The simple ques-
tion:whytheDaseinthrows in all its" Sorge"occupations,
itself whyitbusies
aroundday and night,thisquestionwhoseconcernis not the"Bedingungder
MAglichkeit,"but the "Bedingung der N6tigkeit"(derSorge),is simply
embezzled.No wonder, forthisquestionwouldhavepulledHeidegger out
oftheallegedlyconcreteanalysisofpractical"Umgang"intoan analysisof
hungerandwant,thusintoproblems connected withmaterialism.
Heideggerwas discreetenoughnot to betrayBergsonin whoseworkmuch of his
ownthoughtswereundulyanticipated. Ofcourse,Heidegger'semphasison "aliena-
tion"has social rootstoo,althoughreasonsfardifferent fromtheusual ones. SinceX
as we willsee lateron, Heideggerretiresinto the cloisterofhis ownSelf,in orderto
become"authenticDasein"; since he does not knowof any way of becoming"au-
thentic"withina definiteworld,a society;since, on the otherhand he can't help
continuing to live in thisworldwhich,so to speak, continues"in spite," it is bound
to become"alien" to him: i.e., again and again it will have to "nichten" (vanish).
All the same it is remarkablethat his theoryof the metaphysicaland ontological
(at least not economicallymotivated) "alienation" of the world,was recognized
by the world. As a matterof fact,it was Heideggerand Kafka who conjuredup
that apotheoticaffirmation of "Weltfremdheit" which FrenchExistentialismhas
madetheprogramof nihilism.
346 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

This seemsto be a rathersharpreproof.Arewe entitledto it? After

all, does not Heideggerdenyhis "Dasein" any Hegelianabsoluteness?
Does he notlimitthe Dasein soberlyto its proportio humana? Is nothis
philosophy a Kantianizing "critique"ofthe"DaseinsGrenzen"?
It is and it is not. Whynot? Becausewherever he describesman's
limitations, he is doingit in a harmlesswayby denying himdivinequali-
ties. True,"Dasein" is finite-thusnot eternal:its experience is no in-
tuitusoriginarius, thusnotcreative. For thefacthowever, that"Dasein"
ishungry, or,inmorecustomary words,thatmenarehungry, we arelooking
in vain.11If Husserldid nottake "hunger"intoaccount,he was rightin
his deliberately confined province. Heideggeris not,forhis wholecriti-
cismof philosophy centersaroundthis problem. Husserlwas standing
outsideit. Heidegger, althoughconstantly movingin its vicinity, is sup-
pressing it,andthereby leaveshiswholearchitecture basisless;for"hunger"
or "Xwant" in its broadestsense,dependence on theworld,"starving forthe
world"-thatactuallydefines"Dasein's" finiteness.As a matterof fact,
itis notonly"Sorge"whichbythisomission remains incomprehensible, but
manyotherfundamental featuresof Heidegger's"Dasein" withit. To
mention justa few:"Intentionality" = prosecution oftheprey;the"noth-
ingness"(=standingvisd visde rien)-are evidently "rooted"in hunger.
Even man'sX6'yos mustremaina puzzleto us, as longas we failto retrace
its underlying conditosine qua non,"want": forthe first"generality of
notion"is thecorrelate of"hunger"(orwantn"or"need"). Obviously the
intentional objectofhunger is a "such,"(nothoc,buttale);hunger"means"
something to eat in general, something to drinkin general. The "this"
(hoc)doesnotbecomea "such"by meansoftheX)oyos ortheX&yos-articu-
lated perception, not by meansof the "Etwasals etwasansprechen," as
Heidegger putsit, but in the courseofhunger-propelled processofchase,
capture,and consumption.Thoughbroadening the conceptof "Inten-
tionality," thoughtransforming it intothatof"Sorge,"Heidegger does not
retrace "Sorge"to itslastbasis,orto thelastbasislessness oftheliving being.
If he had doneso,he wouldhavebeenledto theactualgenealogy ofX&et'Ev
fromneed,to a sortof "naturalistic logic"or "idealisticmaterialism"-
thusto a stepfromwhicha thousandsocialconsiderations had to holdhim
back.12
11It is, of course,farmorethancoincidencethat"hunger"is notHeidegger's
sole omission.All wantis wanting;thussex,too. It wouldbe worthwhile to ex-
aminewhichfeatures of"Dasein" Heidegger
admittedas fitforontological
society,
whichcriteria he chosefortheomissions
ofa philosophyareitsearmarks.
12 On theother hand,no variantofmaterialism
has evertakenthisstepeither,
and, considering its far fromarticulatedconceptof "reality,"materialism
wouldnothavebeenable to takethisstepeitherfor"Hunger"is nota pieceof
 or HEIDEGGER'SPHILOSOPHY
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS 347

Thus,although seeingthrough thedependence oftheconceptof"world"

or "object"("Zeug") on the 7rpait, Heideggerdid not call the spade a
spade;neitherdidhe callthemotorof"Sorge,""Hunger," byitsname,nor
the main-made "Sorge-tools"of today,the economicsystems, industry,
machines.The province ofHeidegger's beginsbehindhunger
concreteness
and endsbeforeeconomyand machine:in themiddle"Dasein" is sitting
around,hammering its "Zeug" and therebydemonstrating "Sorge"and
therenaissanceofontology.
* * *

Thereexistsa veryclose connection betweenHeidegger's omissionof

'want"and theintertwined linesofhis philosophyoftime. As everyone
knows,Heidegger's mainopusis entitledSein undZeit. As a matterof
fact,"time"quitelegitimately playssuchan important r6leinhisontology
thatit couldappearin thetitle,connected with"Sein"byjust an "and."
Thus"time"is not,as inmanyvarietiesoftranscendental philosophy,just
coordinated with"space,"butis ofquiteanotherontological
weight.
It is all themoreoppressingthat(despiteprofounddetail-interpretations
whichsurpassnearlyeverything writtensinceHegel about "time")the
relation between"Sein" and "Zeit,"i.e.,theirmutualfoundation,remains
opaque throughoutmostofthe book.
This opaqueness,however,is the consequenceofthe indecisivecharacter
ofhisanalysisof"Sorge,"i.e.,ofthefactthatthe problem of"want"re-
mainshiddenunderneath the "Sorge." The outlineof a "genealogyof
time"(if thisparadoxialfigureof speechbe allowed),the deductionof
"time"fromthe fact "want"wouldnot have beenso difficult.Such a
deduction wouldhavehad to takeapproximately thefollowing
course:
is "needy"(andthatitis constantly,
So faras a creature sinceitdepends
on world), it has not what it should have. True, there are classes of
disposal:air, for
"needed"thingsthat are at the creature'simmediate
example. Otherthings,
however, areabsent,orareseparated
fromitbya
certaindistance. Now want,by insistingon havingits "object,"insistson
thedistance.The livingbeingis after
annihilating itsprey,inorderto have
it,to consume it,and thusto continue living. ("Es stelltdemvorgestell-
ten Gegenstande nach.") This "to be after,"this act of prosecution
i.e.,theextension
fillsa certainextension,
necessarily equalto the distance
between "nothaving"and themoment of"having"orof"capture."'3 It
matter. Of the fact that the concept of "idea" (with it "idealism") stemsfrom
ordinarymaterialismis
practicallife (as patternof the object to be manufactured),
just as unawareas idealismof the fact that the "generality"of its logos is related
to "need."
13This distanceis far frombeing a merelyspatial one: nothingwould be more
348 PHLSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

is thisextension thatis called"time." It is littlewonder thatthoseactivi-

tiesthatconsistin direct(distance-less) supplying oftheneededmaterial
(as, e.g.,breathing) do not "constitute"time,but onlythoseactivities
thathaveto overcome thedistancefrom theprey.14Then"time"is rolling
byor,as theGerman languageputsit,"running."Butitisnotwewhorun
withit (as a rhyme byW. Buschjokingly tellsus), buttimethatrunswith
us. Oncetheneededobjectis reached,timeceasesto elapse:thesatisfied
babysleepsandis "timeless." DenGlfwklichen schldgtkeineStunde. This
is thebasicmodel ofthegenealogyoftimeoutofwant,a genealogy whichhad to
remainobscurein Heidegger'sdeductions, becausethe deductionof the
ontologicalcharacter "time"fromtheonticinsufficiency ofthelivingbeing
(orofmanas a livingbeing)wouldhaveshattered theprimacy andtheself-
sufficiencyoftheontological sphere. It is needlesstostressthatourdeduc-
tionis but a firststep. In it thedifference betweenanimalicand human
timeis notyettakenaccountof;justas littleas thequestionas to howthe
continuity oftimedevelopsout ofthisprimitive formin whichtime,as it
were,breaksoutin temporary fits,to die downagain.' Thisis,however,
nottheplacetofollow up thosequestions.
As littleas Heidegger, thoughconnecting "time"with"Sorge,"clarifies
thefactthat"time"is the"fall"("Gefaelle")between wantandsatisfaction,
just as littledoeshe clearup thelimitation oftheconcept"Dasein." No-
where-againin spiteof "Sorge"-is theretheslightest hintthatit could
be theonticcondition ofman,morecorrectly: hisonticdefectthatmightbe
the "Bedingung derM6glichkeit" ofhisbeing"ontological."'6Nowhere,
futilethandeducingthe phenomenaof temporaldistancefroma purelyspatial one.
The distanceembodiesthe entiretyof relationsbetweenpersecutorand persecuted,
theirrelationof strength, courage,etc.
14 Thereis an interestingconnectionbetweenHeidegger'somissionofthis problem
of distanceand his (to a considerableextentlegitimate)ridiculingof the episteino-
logical questionof how to get at the "outer world." PrimarilyHeideggersees the
feature"beingin theworld,"but hardlythe distancesfromthe objectswhichhave
not been inventedby mediocrephilosophersbut that existon the strengthof "indi-
viduation"separatingone beingfromthe other,and on the strengthof "hunger,"
whichhas to bridgea metaxu in orderto "have" and to "be." Entirelysuppressed
by Heideggeris the thirdfact that "Dasein" is (part of the natural) world. Only
by simultaneously dealingwiththe threefeatures:Being in, beingin distance,and
beinga partoftheworld,can one claimontologicalcompleteness. (See myremarks
on "Integrations-Koeffizient" in "Une interpretation de l'Aposteriori,"Recherches
Philosophiques, 1934-35).
15 A
patternthatmakesunderstandablethe changeofthe wakingand sleeping.
16 It would be tempting, indeed, thus to reverseHeidegger'sordo rerum. Not
selfsufficient,as he is, man, in orderto be at all, is compelledto be "In der Welt
sein"; to be "there" (the "Da" of "Dasein") when and because want awakens
him. As a matteroffact,it is.onlythewaking"Dasein" thatis really"da" whilefor
Heideggerthis character"da" belongsto Dasein independentlyfromwant. The
 PSEUDO-CONCRETESES OF HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY 349

thatDaseinhas (oris) a body;nowhere,

is it mentioned thatit has,as it
wascalledinmorethantwothousand yearsofphilosophy, a twofoldnature.
All thisHeidegger passesoverin silence,despitehis livingnextdoorto
theories.
naturalistic
line,we had announced
In theopening thatHeidegger, althoughavoid-
ingall things
supra-natural, neverreaches"nature." Thisthesisseemsto
be confirmednowinfull. As a matteroffact,hisDaseindoesnotknowof
ofanyinstinct,
any concupiscentia, ofanytooth-ache.Verysoonwe will
or duties,or the
see.thatit knowsjust as littleofcaritas,or friendliness,
state. Doomedto thisdoublymultilated it is notprecisely
condition, an
enviablespecies. One is temptedto varythe famousFrenchword"ni
hommeni femme, c'estun capucin"into:"ni homme, ni'capucin, c'estun
Dasein."
* * *

Since"beingin theworld"is a character

of the "Dasein," "world"is,
roughly,an elementof "beingin theworld"-hencethewholesystemof
pragmatic"Sorge," "In der Welt sein," is, as it were,the transcendental
conditionoftheworld. Thisoddsounding thesismeansthatthe"Dasein"
has supplantedtranscendentalconsciousness which,as we know,was sup-
itsobjects. As a matter
posedto "constitute" offact,Heideggerhasblown
up theconceptof"consciousness" bymeansofhispragmatic cartridges,to
maketheresultofhisexplosion a sortof"Consciousness" again. Trhe,one
couldnot go so faras to state,thatHeidegger's"Dasein" constitutes its
world. Thatitdoesnotdo; neither inthesenseofthewordusedbyKant,
norinthatofFichte,Cohen,orHusserl. The "constitutional relation"as
describedforone hundredand fifty yearsby metaphors as "grfinden,"
"setzen,""schaffen,"or "konstituieren" ("founding," "positing,""crea-
ting,""constituting")has lost its activecharacterin Heidegger'sphilos-
ophy. This notwithstanding, he does not startwithrecognition of the
"world"either-itis the"In derWeltsein,"thatis his basis. Againhis
philosophycuts acrossthe ordinaryalternative.This timeacrossthat
of"realism"and "idealism."
But whydidhe notcontinue withtheidealisticidea of "constitution"?
Whydid he deprivethestillsomehow"transcendental" relationbetween
"Dasein"and "Welt"ofitsactivistic character?Did he do it forpurely
reasons? Hardly.
philosophical
to Fichte,the "ego))"posits"himself,
If,according thisstrangeact of
betweenwakingand sleepingis omittedas so many others. Obviously
difference
thesleeping"Dasein" is neither"da" noris it "man," nora "self." These problems
did notinterestHeideggerwhose"Dasein," it is true,maybotheraboutthe "Zeug'
bed,but willneverlie downin it.
350 PHLOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

selfconstitution,orratherthisterm,represented thetranslation ofa non.

speculative activityintospeculativelanguage:by "positing"himself, the
ego positedhimself as a freelegislator("setztsichals Gesetzgeber"); by
"positing" theNicht-Ich, it positedorcreated"its"world,namelyitsself-
madecitoyen's state,its "constitution," its "Satzung"(law.)"7 If Fichte's
strange"positing" evenembraces"Nature"(and notonlytheconstitution
of Society),thisphilosophical "overstatement" represents an exampleof
harmless and academic"universalization," thatwas boundto takeplace
becauseeventheparticular aim(political"Setzung")wasdoomedtoremain
purelyacademic. Not admitted to "positing" himself as politically
active
citoyen orto shapinga "constitution," he looksforvengeance by"positing"
Natureand by theoretical self-deificationofthe "Ego." Stirner, whoin
so manypointsanticipated Heidegger, is a caricaturistic
exampleforsuch
harmless radicalization.
Yet,although Heidegger's "Dasein"doesnotposititsworld,itdefinitely
positsor constitutes itself. His makinghimself, and makinghimself an-
swerableforhimself, takestheplaceofthe "gesetzteSatzung"(the"con-
stitution"of societymade by "subjects"). This meansthat interest in
moralorpoliticalparticipation oraction(whichhad beenembodiedin the
concept"Setzen") has becomeextinctin Heidegger'sphilosophy.The
onlything, the"Dasein"takesintoitsownhands,is theDaseinitself;each
individual in hisindividual hands-in spiteoftheworld. Thisfact,that
the "Dasein"'does not positthe worldany longer,but solelythe "self,"
is easilyunderstood.The politicaloptimism oftherisingbourgeoisie one
hundred and fiftyyearsago,whichhad hopedto buildup a worldoftheir
own,was whollyunknown to thepetit-bourgeois around1920. It minded
"constitutions.""Democracy"seemedto themto incarnatefirstthe
principle oftheGermandefeat,thenthebloton Germanhonor;therefore,
"world"didnotassumetheroleofa "product oflife"anylonger, butthatof
a somehow neutralcorrelate oflife. Thesoleproduct remains the"Self"-
at least virtually-i.e.,the humanbeing,who drags himselfout of
the anonymity of "man,"to boldly("verwegen")riska Daseinin social
nothingness ("Nichts")as a lonelyand stubborn self-made man.
Incidentally,whatholdsgoodforHeidegger, applies,in a way,to the
whole and much praised returnto realismand metaphysics(thus
to "Sein")thattookplacein Germany in theyearsbetweenthecollapsein
1918and thatin 1933. This development can be derivedfromthefact,
thatthe philosophers had abandonedthe fundamental categoryofbour-
17 The othersourcesof the idea of "constitution"as f.i.,the "geneticdefinition"
which"makes" its objects by constructing them;or modernsciencewhich,by con-
structingthe experimentalmodel, "realizes" naturallaw-are of no importancein
thiscontext.
 PSEUDO-CONCRETENESSOF HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY 351

geois revolution:"Making" which had circumscribed

the participationin
themaking ofa societyoffreesubjectsbyfreesubjects('of thepeople,by
thepeople")."8Now theyeitherlet "things"slideortheywerewilling to
recognize"power"ortheworldofpowerthatwasnotmadeby themselves.
Eitherattitudelendsitselfmarvelously to translation
into"Realismus."19
The diversemetaphysical variantsofthisperiodreflect partlybourgeois
defeatism,partlyapotheosisof power. The pathosof Neo-Kantism, ac-
cordingto which"world"is nota "datum"buta "dandum"(nicht"Gege-
benes,"sondern"Aufgegebenes") had thinnedout miserably; as a matter
offact,it was voicedonlyby two or threeKantianizing "Kulturphiloso-
phen,"representativesofthewhollyunrepresentative "Deutsch-demokrat-
ischePartei,"and at bestcorrespondedto theshort-lived
pseudo-optimism
in Germany around1927.20
* * *

III. INDICATIVUSAND CONJT3NCTIVUS.THE PROBLEMOF FREEDOM. THE

ACOSMISTICSELF-MADE MAN
"Habeo,nonhabeor"
(Aristippos)
We saidthatHeidegger
doesnotask forthe"Bedingung
derN6tigkeit,"
but onlyforthe "BedingungderMiiOglichkeit."21
As a matteroffact,it is a
decisivemarkofidealism(ultimately
a Stoicheritage)thatit re-coins
every
"must"intoa "can,"everyfeatureofexistenceintoa markoffreedom; that
it assertsmanas allegedly
beingfree,because(no matterwhatthe actual
circumstanceslook like) he could befree;that it passes offthe ontic con-
junctivusof freedomas an ontologicalindicativus. It is far more than a
18It is very characteristic
that the philosophersopposed to the FrenchRevolu-
tion,as Bonald,saw veryearlytheimplicationsofthiscategoryand violentlyfought
it.
19It is no coincidencethatDiltheywho,by recognizing "Widerstand"(resistance)
as the criterionof Reality,opposed the idea of a "constituted"object, politically
was moreconservativethanthe earlytranscendental philosophers.
WOn the otherhand the patheticidea of "makingthe world"was still,or again,
alive in groupsof the socialistmovements. However,by maintainingthe natural-
istic conceptof worldas formulatedin the nineteenthcentury,those groupswere
preventedfromseeing the "Konstitutionsproblem."It is needless to add that
Germanacademic philosophycame in contact with socialist theoriesfor passing
momentsonly,in the years precedingand followingthe revolutionof 1918. (Ex-
ample: Natorp.)
21 It is very characteristic
that the two greatestpost-HegelianGermanphilos-
ophers,Marx and Nietzsche,whoseothersimilaritiesare not exactlystriking;both
have transformedthe traditionalquestion for the "Mbglichkeit"into that of
'N6tigkeit"without,however,expressesverbs, opposingtheirway of thinkingto
theRantianformula.
352 PIWSoP AND PBENOMENOLOGICALRz8ARcH

coincidencethat, in the post-Kantianphase of German idealism,Kant's

moral and politicalconcept of "freedom"became, as it were, "de-human-
ized," i.e., deprivedof its exclusivelyanthropologicaland moral meaning;
that freedomwas transformedinto a sort of "being"-into (natural)
"potency" by Schelling,into "history" by Hegel. Selling downright
formulated that "freedom"is "Seyn" as opposedto "Seyendem."12
If Heideggermakes "K6nnen" the fundamentalcategoryof "Dasein,"
he findshimselfin respectablesociety,althoughin a traditionwhich,by
"ontologifying" libertyhas renouncedthe idea ofactuallyliberatingman.
Now, one could easily assume that Heideggerwould grantto "K6nnen"
a smallerscope than the post-Kantianphilosopherswhohad made freedom
a cosmological,at least a universalprincipleand, by thus broadeningthe
concept,had deprivedit of its actual moral momentum. Afterall, there
is nothingakin to Hegel's W{1eltgeist developingtowardfreedomnor Schel-
ling'snaturanaturans beto found in Heidegger'sphilosophy.
This assumption,however,is deceptive. True, it is only "Dasein" that
"kann" (not nature or history);but whateverit is doing,its doings pass
forproofof its potentiality;whateveroccursto it, it seemsto be "Dasein"
itselfthat makes it occur. As a matterof factHeidegger'strickconsistsin
re-coining everypossibilitasintopotestas,everyMb16glichkeit
intoMacht. The
entireprocess of becomingoneself(the kernelof Heidegger'sphilosophy
and, no doubt, the exclusive duty of every better class of "Dasein") is
composedof a seriesof "occupations,"the wholeappears as an "occupatio
fati," if we thus may disfigurethe classical figureof speech "amor fati."23
It is very characteristic,indeed, that the words "Eigentum" (property)
and "Eigentlichsein"(being proper,authenticbeing) stem fromthe same
root. The "Dasein" that, accordingto Heidegger,firstfinds itself as
strandedgood ("cast into the world") becomesauthenticby makingitself
its ownproprietor.
One should not overlookthe featuresdenied in such a processof total
self-appropriation: any formof"belongingto" (to the world,groups,duties,
friends)seems, thoughsilently,excluded. Nevertheless,can therebe no
doubt that he means this descriptionof self-adoption as his moralphiloso-
phy,althoughhe does not dissociatethe moralpart of philosophyfromhis
theoreticalontology. Thus, he leaves it open, no doubt deliberately,
" On theotherhand,it is no coincidenceeitherthatthetheoretical apostlesof
sociallibertyregardedthemselves as "determinists," althoughit was theywho
wantedto buildup actualfreedom.Thisobservation heldgoodforspokesmen of
theearlybourgeois revolutionas wellas forsocialists.
""Amor fati,"properlyspeaking doesnotplayanyrole. The "Dasein's"consent
to itselfis notinducedbyamor,ratherdictatedbya sortof"so what,"ofstubbor-
ness. "SinceIam whoI am,I willpunish thecontingency bymaking "
it 'existence,'
it seemsto speak.
 PSEUDO-CONCRETEBESSOF HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY 353

whether his self-transformation

of the "Dasein" into"existence"is sup-
posedto represent an ontologicalfactoran "oughttobe." Apparently we
are confronted herewitha newneutralization or,morecorrectly, witha
newambiguity.
The self-adoption startsoutin a stateofindignation: as response to the
metaphysical scandalof"facticity";thismeansthatas response tothescan-
dal that"Dasein" findsitselfas beingthere(notordered, as it were,by
and as beingX or Y ofall peoplewhichfact"Dasein"cannothelp
itself),
recognizing.We say it "can not." Thus the primordial conditionof
"Dasein" is stigmatized as totallack of freedom.In a way,the whole
lifethatnow follows,represents a drawn-out act of vengeance.After
havingfacedtheprimordial scandal,"Dasein" "can" everything ifit only
wantsto,fortheonlythingit wantsto be is to becomea self,oritself, or
neverceasingto outbidhimself, his own "Self." Now he shoulders his
contingent "facticity"(hisbeingtherewithout havingdispatched himself)
decidesto existas ifhe had beenthereofhisfreewill,takesoverhispossi-
bilitiesand, in a way,becomeshis own father. This undertaking it
achievespartly bymeansofstubbornness, partlybymeansofan ontological
punt; fornow,by usingthe "Wurfkraft" of the "GeworfolieiL,"DLain
transforms "Geworfenheit" intoan "Entwurf": by usingthemomentum
ofits "beingthrown intotheworld"it "throwsitselfintoplanning life."
Generally speaking thisdescriptionis a truism:Onlyonthestrength ofour
beingthere,can we takelifein ourownhands. It shouldbe noted,how-
ever,thatHeidegger's as it stands,presupposes
description, that"Dasein"
comesto theworldas a nobody, andthat,whathappenstoit,is up tonone
buttoitself-inshort:itappliestothehistorical typeoftheself-made man,
notto manin general-though to a self-made manwhohas no longerthe
opportunity toriseintheworld, thusto an acosmistic self-mademan.26
Yet,it is notonlythe"facticity" ofitsbeingtherebutthe"locus"into
whichitwascast,too,thatscandalizes "Dasein." It hasfounditselfas an
24Of course,this metaphordoes not occurin Heidegger's
writings. Since,how-
ever,the "cast" "Dasein" is ancestorless,the Self supplantshis ancestryand be-
comeshis ownmaker. See my article,"Nihilismusund Existenz,"Neue Ruizdchau
(October,1946).
N It is hardlypossible to convey the ethymologicalconnotationsthat pervade
the Germanphilosophicalidiom. In it profundity and pun are strangelyblended.
This appliesnot onlyto Heidegger-farfromit; it ratherhas its sourcein an attitude
towardsLanguagewhichhad beengeneral:sincetheRomanticmovement Language,
was not consideredsolelyas a meansto conveythoughts,but as a livingsourceor
reservoirof thoughtsand truths. Since, for Heidegger(and quite legitimately)
"Sprache" is one of the "Existenzialien"of "Dasein," "Dasein" has to listen to
its wordsto knowsomethingabout itself.
2 On the conceptof "Self-mademan" hiddenin His philosophysee the above
article,"Nihilismusund Existenz."
354 IPHILOSOPHY
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

amorphousbeing,drownedin the mush of what one says, what one uses to

do, what one uses to claim,in short:drownedin what Heideggercalls the
"one," the "man." Expressed in more positive words,one findsoneself
carriedby anonymousothers,not sentencedto doing,judging,shouldering
everything all by oneself. However,forHeidegger,whodoes not belongto
any group,thisfact of one's not onlybeing oneself,impliesno connotation
of reliefwhatsoever. The others,doxa, prejudice,customs,are nothing
but the loam stickingto the self's foot and hinderinghis being himself.
It is out of this loam of "Mian," that "Dasein" has to drag itself,
like Miinchhausenseizinghimselfby his own hair. Only if and when it
succeedsin this performance, it has become "Existence," onlythen has it
attained that status of "Lnbedingtheit,"of not being conditionedby, in
which"Dasein" is the realizationof its own possibilities.
If we translatethis action fromthe ontologicalidiom into everyday
language,it turnsout to circumscribe quite familiarphenomena:emancipa-
tionand social rise,emancipationfromthat social anonymityin whichone
is born,and rise to anotherone, withthe exception,though,that Heideg-
ger's "Dasein" considersits originas such an indelibleblot, that it has to
cover it up completely.-Not bcingborn,but "cast," it comes (like an out-
cast) fromnowhere,and remainsan outcast as long as it does not succeed
in bestowingon itselfthe titleof "existence."
However,it is not "Geworfenheit" and the "Man" onlythat limit"Da-
sem's"urgefortotalfreedom. Mortalitybeingits otherlimit,death has to
be adopted or occupied likewise. Therefore"existence," according to
Heidegger,consistsofusurpingdeath, of makingit a "momentum"of life,
a "SeimzurnTode"(beingtowarddeath)-a self-transforma-
of-becawming
tionwhereby,in a way death,despiteits ever-present threat,is made rather
harmless,fornow it is becominga propertyor an attributeof life itself.
Thus, therestrictions of "Dasein's" freedomseem to be located exclusively
outside the two ends of life, in its arrival and its departure, and
eitherofthemseemsto limit"Dasein" onlyto be victoriouslydefeatedand
appropriatedby the Self. Those powers,however, thatin courseof actual
life,deprive"Dasein" ofitsfreedom:therealpowersthatbe,are notworthwhile
mentioning in Heidegger'sphilosophy. N ot once are theyalluded to. And
whentheyactuallyenteredthe scene,Heideggerdid not tryto fightthem
like "Geworfenheit" or "death," but kowtowedto them. What a philoso-
phyoffreedom! No wordis utteredto build up orto "constitute"a world,
no crumbis leftofthepoliticalconceptof "Freedom" as formulatedby the
greatspeakersof bourgeoisrevolution. "Autonomy"has turnedto mere
stubbornness, has becomethatasocial semblanceof"freedom"to own one's
originand one's owndeath. True, no one can denythatthe gloominessof
this "Being toward death" is presentedvery impressively,gloominessis
 PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS OF HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY 355

neithera meritnor a proofof truth. If Heideggerbases his identification

of "Being a Self" and "Being towarddeath" on the implicationthat death
be theonesituationutterlyexcludingany possiblesubstitutionby anybody
else (and therefore, in a way,"moremine" thananythingelse), thisimplica-
tionis dubious:just as littlesubstitutionis possiblein everylivingrelation
or rapportbetweenhumanbeings. Moreover,it is not a fact,but the prej-
udice of the totallyde-solidarizedbeing,to consider"replacability"a fea-
ture of necessarilynegativevalue. Granted even, that nothingis "more
mine" than my own death, Heideggertransforms thegrammatical possessive
pronouninto an actual titledeedwhich is meant to consolehim the same
way as the moriturusin the ArabianNightswho,by shouting"my heads-
man!" suddenly,by the very power of the uttered possessive pronoun,
ownedhimas his slave.
We see: Heidegger's"being towarddeath" is, despite the macabre ring
oftheformula,a newpseudo-radicalism, ultimatelyeven a sortofescapism.
Fearingdeathhe escapes intothesham-freedom of"Sterbenk6nnen"(potes-
tatemmoriendi)als "eigensterMfglichkeit." What a miserable,what a
desperateformoffreedom,to live towarddeath instead oflikingto live or
insteadoflivingfora cause. To object to such a desperado-situation from
a givenset ofvalues, would be idle, of course. The Self whoselifelives for
nothing("ins Nichtshineingehalten"as, in anothercontext,he puts it) is
sufficiently punishedby the desperadosituationitself. Still, punishment
is no meriteither;neitheris it proofof truth. Incomparablytruerand
more dignifiedappears to be what classic philosophyhad to say about
hopelesssituations. The Stoics nevertired of stressingthat the last and
the last consolingact of freedomis suicide. If the nihilisticphilosopher
keepson livingin spite of all, and ifhe even makestheoriesofjustification,
thenhe oughtto admitthat,in spiteofall, helikestolive,or,sincehe prefers
generalstatements,that life is worthwhile livingafterall-whatever this
word"worthwhile living"may mean. Then he oughtto fitthis statement
"worthwhile" as decisiveelementintohis analysisofthe "Dasein." How-
ever,althoughthefact-ofhis "keepingon living"demonstrates lifeas being
worthwhileliving,the professionally grave Existentialistcannot edge his
way throughto this fundamentalstatement:it would sound to him too
frivolous, at least too superficial. Thus, he mustfindor inventsomething
betweenlifeand suicide. And that is exactlywhat Heidegger's"Self" is
doing:it presentslifeitselfas a sortof suicide. By voluntarilyand inces-
santly shoulderingits death, Heidegger's "existence" commits lifelong
suicide,a pitifuldeath which,nonetheless,sinceit lasts as longas lifeitself,
offers certainundeniableadvantages.
Thus,thefreesubject,who,in the epoch ofKant and Fichte,had wanted
to participatein the buildingof a societyoffreecitizens,has reducedhim-
356 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENONOLOGICAL RESEARCH

selfto therankofa stockholder ofhis ownend. The movablesceneryof

hopes,that had formedthe background
ethico-political of the self-con-
stitutingEgo,istakendown(forhistory itselfhadalreadytakendownthat
hope);thereis no aim,no idea ofhappiness, onecouldfindas themotorof
Heidegger'saction. Nor is the Ego occupiedwithKant's moralacts
("Handlungen")orHegel's"RealityoftheMind"-solelyand exclusively
withitself. Since "Dasein" stillinterprets itselfas "Kbnnen,"thusas
dynamic, since,on theotherhand,it doesnotact anylonger, theactivity
of "Dasein" reducesitselfto a meremoralself-treatment, to theincessant
maintenance of its existentialcondition.Its categorical imperative(in-
herent, thoughnotformulated by Heidegger)wouldnot openanylonger
withtheKantianword"act" or "do"-what sanctimoniousness! it would
confine tothenaked"be!,"atbesttoa "beyourself!"
itself a harmlesscommand
thatlifecan complywithwhilesittingat thedesk. In a way,compliance
withthis imperative even consistsin philosophizing sincephilosophy is
ofthe "Dasein" as a self; and since "Philoso-
&Xatwfv, thus self-revelation
phy" and "Dasein" sharein the same object,"Wesen" (essence)-for
"Existenzist das Wesendes Daseins." Now,at last,do we understand
fullythatHeidegger's philosophy is theoreticalandpracticalphilosophy at
thesametime. Thusbeingeitherone simultaneously, he is likean anar-
chistwhohasmadeita rulenottoleavehisstudio,who,inhisphilosophical
acts resolves-no,not to do thisor that,but to be,to be resolved. The
allegedlyboldjumpoutofthe"generality" oftheoryintotheconcreteness
ofexistence endsas a purelytheoretical existence,as thepure"mood"of
"resoluteness fiberhaupt"("viverepericolosamente").Thus,inspiteofhis
harshlyanti-aesthetic pathos,as a purelyaesthetic phenomenon.If his
philosophy causestheimpression ofbeingenormously "activistic," ifphilos-
ophyseemstobe re-transformed intoactivelife-mereappearance, for,but
forthisphilosophic activitythereis noneto whichexistence is boundor
called. His philosophy is thatactivebecauseall actionhasbecome philosophy
as Hegel's "Geist" is that concrete, becauseeverything concretehas
become"Geist." The activistic vehemence ofhisphilosophizing is nothing
butthereverse ofthefactthatheneither postulatesnorclaimstheslightest
moralorpoliticalactionin thisworld,thereverseofthefactthathe (like
themajority ofGermanpetitbourgeoisie) carried through a moralandpoliti-
cal sit-domrn-strike.
Littlewonderthathe hadno principle whatsoever, no
social idea, in short:nothing, whenthe trumpetof NationalSocialism
startedblaringintohismoralvacuum:he becamea Nazi.
ILV. HEIDEGGER 'S LACK OF SYNCHRONIZATION. CONCEPT OF
" GESCHICHTLICHKEIT ")

However,this disgraceof the moralpretensionsof the "existential"

is farremovedfromtheoriginalmotivesofhisphilosophy.If
philospher
 PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS OF HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY 357

we take no account ofhis nakedly opportunisticreasons,Heidegger'sat-

can be understoodonlyfromthefact
temptat fallingin line,his conformism
thathis starthad been an unusuallyand vehementlynon-conformisticone;
for,when he was workingon S&in und Zeit Heideggerfoundhimselfin
ofstillbeinga heretic-in
thepeculiarsituation thesecular-
a periodin which
izationofboththeinnerand theouterlifehadbeena matter ofcourseformany
generations. He is a marvelousillustrationof the facthowlittlehistory is
"synchronzied" withitself. He grewup a Provincial-not surroundedby
"modernlife,"social problems,industrialization. His first"Bildungswelt"
was Christianityand Greek-Christian ontology-whilehis contemporaries
weremovingin the mostdiverseplanes of secularization, in a worldarticu-
latedby techniqueand naturalscience.'-7He had to denyGod oncemore-
ina period,inwhichno oneeventhoughtofhisindifference longer;he had to
get rid ofthe conceptof a "created" world,in a period,in whicheven the
idea of a becoming worldhad alreadylost its interest-and that he did by
inventingthe negativeidea of "Geworfenheit" (beingcast into) whichdoes
not implyany "Werfenden"(anyone who did cast man into the world).
Though excludinganythingsupranatural,this notion obviously rejects
natural "descendance" likewise. Our first thesis according to which
Heidegger'sphilosophycuts acrossthe alternative"Natural-Supranatural"
findsits confirmation again. Once more he had to recoverLuther'sstep
which,in his life,played the same vehement,even liberatingrole which,
formany of his contemporaries, events of theirdays mighthave played.
It is no wonderthat he designatesthe trueapproachto "History"as "WVie-
derholen"-which world, when accentuated on its firstsyllable,denotes
"re-covering," whenaccentuatedon its thirdone, "repeating." It wNas not
the
from presentday, with whichhe was so poorly synchronized, that his
historicalroad led him to this or that locus historicus-heratherworked
himself outfromthepastin whichhe was farmoreat home,climbingthrough
the diversefloorsofhistoryup to the roofsof our days onlyto differ again,
thistimefromthe roof-dwellers whowerelivingon top ofthefloorswithout
actually knowingthem. Whatever he broughtup fromtheir forgotten
floors,they regardedas somethingnew: e.g., the theologicalremnantsof
hisatheismwhich,in theireyes,seemedto be thegermsofthe metaphysics

27It is no coincidencethatmanyofHeidegger's pupilsin thetwenties

weresi-
multaneously fascinatedbyAntonBruckner, forBrucknerwhowasstill(thoughin
thealreadysecularformofsymphonies) a genuinely
Christiancomposer,
had been
just as "anachronistic"as Heidegger was. If ourconceptof "Historynotsyn-
chronized thereadermaythinkofBruckner
withitself"needsan illustration, saying
hisprayer onthetomboftheFeuerbach-disciple Richard
Wagner whoseownprayers
werefarfromChristian and whoseconceptof redemption had becomea wholly
secular,evenan eroticone.
358 PMLOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

to come; or the total blendingof philosophyand anthropology28 which,

formulatedby Feuerbach a hundredyears before,had meanwhilebeen
buriedagain underotherstrataofphilosophy. In short,his anachronistic
origingave rise to his triptowardthepresent,where,because ofhis travel-
experiences, he foundhimselfagain an anachronisticand lonelycreature.
So far,biographically, his approachto historyis plausibleand consistent.
Unanswered,however,remains,if we may use this obsolete word, the
"epistemological"questionofwhether is possible. As a matterof
repetition
fact,thescope ofthings"repeatable"is limited,except as we are willingto
dilutethe compactrealityofthingspast withhwhichwe are obviouslynot
identical)intosomethingthat can become "one's own existence."
Now, timeand again,we had had the opportunity to noticethat Heideg-
ger'seffortspointin thedirectionof"Owning,"ofappropriating and owning
even the event absolutelyremovedfromour sphereof power: death, by
transforming it into "Sein zum Tode." In quite a similarway Heidegger
appropriates"History." Being,as it were,a "Daseins-Monist,"recogniz-
ingnothingbut "Dasein," he dilutesthe "Vergangenheit"into "Gewesen-
heit," the past eventsto "Dasein that has been," into realizedpossibilities
of "Dasein," therebydeprivingthe continuumof "ontic" events,political
systems,etc., of theirundeniableweightin favorof the "Dasein that has
been." Obviouslythe key of interpretation shows the Hegelian making,
though with the two fundamentaldifferences, that Heideggeromits all
"ObjektivenGeist" and that he neutralizes,even reverses,the idea of pro-
gressingpossibilities,in such a way as to sometimesmakinghistorylook
like the historyof its own decay or self-burials("VerschUttungen"),in
short:likea re-qress.29
Now, the deliberatevagueness of the term "Dasein" and Heidegger's
failureto give it a definitehypostasis,allows him to call both himselfand
history"Dasein." To put it clumsily,eitheris made out ofthe same onto-
logical vXtq. Being "Dasein," being "geschichtlichesDasein" himself,he
can "repeat" history. The famousGoethe-word"Waer nicht das Auge
21Whenemphasizing,nevertheless,
thathis "Hereneutikdes Daseins" doesnot
simplyamountto a new "PhilosophicalAnthropology,"Heidegger meansto say
thatwhiletheanthropologist
naivelydealswith"men"as an "ontic"speciesamong
otherswithoutso muchas entering
thediscussionof "Sein,"he is examininghim
ontologically."
29In this,again, he is a secularizedChristian. For he comes forwardas a sort
of re-formulator of the once apparenttruth(ontology). That is whyfindingtruth
equals forhim&xjtebeai,whichwordhe takes literacyas "uncoverthe coveredup."
This applies at least to the firstpart of Sein und Zeit in which he unburiesthe
Greekontologicalquestion,chokedup and coveredwiththesand ofcenturies. Since
he is doingthisuncovering withthenowadayswhollyunusual pathos ofthereformer,
he could not help beingmistaken(even by himself)as a sort of philosophicalrevo
lutionary.
 OF HEIDEGGER'SPHIILOSOPH
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS 359

sonnenhaft..." could be varied: "waer Dasein nichtgeschichtehaft...'

However, by becoming his,historylosesits compactrealityand becomes
meretonality of"Dasein": "Geschichtlichkeit."30
Afterthat one would.easilyexpectfromHeideggera universalistic
Hegelianreadiness foreverything
and susceptibility humanthathas been,
is, or mightbe. This expectationis againdeceptive. Heidegger repeats
onlythathistory thathas orallegedly has madehimnothing buttheline
ofhisownancestors.Sincehe has no interest but theone,to annihilate
it into a natumesse. Changingthe
he re-transforms
his "Geworfenheit,"
unendorsed checkofhisownfacticityintothehardmoneyofhisancestors,
he triesto "erwerben" in orderto"ownA"
history it,inordertobe it. ("Was
du ererbtvondeinenViternhast,erwirbes, umr es zu besitzen.") Thus,
history is forhimeo ipso,"myhistory," wherebythepossessive pronoun
"my"displaysagaintheirridescence to whichwe had calledattention be-
fore. It denotesthingsthatowemejust as wellas thingsI owe. Heidegger
alwaysre-coinsthefirstmeaningintothesecondone. To be moreconcrete,
Heidegger confines
thehistorical
"Dasein"withwhichhe identifies himself,
totheboundaries oftheGreek-Christian-European andonlyto its
history,
sector. His is an attitude
"geistesgeschichtlichen" ofdeliberate
self-provin-
cialization,farthest
away fromany philosophical seafarer-attitude.It is
onlyinthedepthsofhistory thathe takeshissoundings.Historyno one
cantakeawayfrom him. No interestwhatsoever leadshimintooecumenic
broadness,into"oneworld,"into"foreign,"nottomention primitiveciviliza-
tions. Accordingto him,they are merelyobjects of curiosity,never our
business. ObviouslythisretreatparallelsthatofGermany's retreatinto
herselfafterthedefeat,thelossofherfleetand hercoloniesin 1918. It
goestogether withsuspicionand xenophobia his
that,lateron,facilitated
inlinewithNationalSocialism.
falling
Thus, Heidegger'spositionis a very intricateone. On the one hand,
History is beingre-transformed ofDasein,in sucha way
intoa possibility
as to enableman,beingequally"Dasein,"to re-experience it as his own
"M\I6glichkeit."On theotherhand,man,beinghistory, but onlyhis own
history,recognizesonlyhis ownpre-history as history.Obviouslythis
doubleormutualmooring of"History"and "Dasein"bringsabouta two-
foldnarrowing oftheconceptofHistory.
By re-translating "past" into "havingbeen," "Vergangenheit" into
"Gewesensein,"Heideggeragain makes mankindappear "free"in a higher
degreethanit actuallyis. He passesoverin silencethedecisivefactthat
(ifnotall,at leastthemajority of)historical
situationsdonotdirectly repre-
10It was GeergSimmelwhopreceededHeideggerbydefining
historyas themedium
in which"Subjekt" and "Objekt" are of the same "nature." Heideggerbetrays
prematureformulation
Simunel's as littleas mostphilosophers
fromDiltheyon.
360 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

sentpositivepossibilities ofman,but extremely indirect responses ofman

to objectiveconditions ofworldorsociety. Theseconditions arefarfrom
beingprovided forby "humannature"(ifthereis sucha thing);to many
ofthem"humannature"is evenwhollyunableto liveup, to makethem
theirown. To say theleast,it wouldbe uselessto interpret (example1)
thefascistworld,certainly a historical phenomenon as a genuine M6glich-
keitof "Dasein." Mostly"Dasein" does not knowhowto masterthis
world,although it is man-made, and ifthere is a "Dasein"corresponding to
it,thistypeof"Dasein" is nota "megliches Dasein" properly speaking,but
often "Dasein's"forced response toitsownproduct, which product hasbecome
bigger thanitsproducer.In short,as littleas Heidegger takesintoaccount
"Nature"(thenon-human factorinman)as littledoeshe accountforhis-
toryas a medium transcend ensproportioned humanam, as "objective mind,"
objektivenGeistor Un-geist.The onlyfeature transcending thisproportion
he dealswithis the"one" (theaveragepublicity ofno oneand everyone)
which,however, is a purelynegativepattern: State,economy, slavery,
law
-nothingofit is so muchas mentioned in Heidegger's philosophy ofhis-
tory.
As we have just remarked, Heidegger's interpretation of "History"as
"Gewesensein" is closelyconnected withhis impliedtheoryof freedom.
Thefactthatthemajorportion ofhistory is history ofpower,thushistory
oftheun-free, history imposed uponpeople,is totallysuppressed.'Now,
thihssuppression has themostimportant consequences fortheconceptof
"repetition."If a historical situation is determined notonlyby "Dasein,"
but by objectivefactorsimposedupon man,the sole factof my being
"Dasein" does not suffice, does not enableme to repeatthe situation.
"Gewesenheit" has notnecessarily to do withthe"Wesen"of "Dasein" as
Heidegger seemsto imply.As a matteroffact,thetreatment ofthewords
"Wesen"and "Gewesen"as twinwords,as we findit timeand againin
Germanmetaphysics, had alwaysa conservative ring(example2). Is
it possible,e.g.;to repeatthetypeof"Gewesenheit" as it is investedin a
concept as the Kantion "autonomy"? It would be a truismto stressthat
"autonomy" was notsimplyan emanation of"Dasein,,"at leastit was too
theechoof"Dasein"to an irrevocably passedworldto thatofrising bour-
geoisie. The answerto ourquestionhasbeengiventhoughin an indirect
way,byHeidegger himself, for,as wehaveemphasized before, Heidegger has
notrepeatedthe "cityen-motives" inherentin bourgeoisrevolutionary
philosophy.Livingin a thoroughly changedworldin which"republic"
anddefeatseemedto be equivocal,he justcouldnotrepeattheconceptof
"world"thatwasimplied intheKantianterm. Andprecisely becausesuch
repetitionwas impossible, Heidegger's undertaking dissolvesin complete
nihilism.Our example"autonomy"was not accidental. As we know,
 PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS OF HIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY 361

Heidegger, too,had startedin a wayfroma sortof"autonomy" or "eman-

cipation"(e.g.,from"belief"). Since,however,in the worldof a disin-
tegratingsocietyit was outofthequestionto marchforward in thatdirec-
tionin which the speakersofemancipation ofthe troisibme Etatoncehad
pointed,Heidegger's pre-secularpositionswitched, likethespark in a short
directly
circuit, into that ofnihilism
without passingthrough theintermediate
moralisticor politicalstages,without
dwelling on secularizedin-between sta-
tions. lWhen he wantedto be "himself" (i.e.,freefromauthoritiesand the
contingence ofhisorigin), whenhe wantedto be in the"truth"(insteadof
drowning in "dexa" and "man")FreedomorTruthas meantinthepolitico-
philosophical ethicsof Germanidealismcouldnot conveyany positive
meaning to him. True,he freedhimself, but onlyoutof a bondage,not
intoanothercondition.Whilethe Kantianand Fichtean"subject"had
spoken inthenameofgroups, Heideggerspokeforno groupunlesswerecog-
nizehimas themouthpiece oftheadmittedly considerable numberofGer-
mansafter1918whosegroup-consciousness had becomeequivocalor even
imaginary.Grantedeven,he was speakingforthem,he was doingit the
way feverspeaks for illness: characteristic
he may have beenfor them,bw
notdoinganything
forthem, devisingno positivemoralorpoliticalplansor
"for"them. Sincehe triedto "repeat"historyor "Gewesen-
postulates
sein"insteadofpassingthemoralwatchword ofhisdays,as truephiloso-
phershad done,thereexistsa systematicbondbetweenhis philosophy of
andtheemptiness
history ofhismoralrigorism.
V. PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE HOSTILE TO LIFE. EXISTENCE-BASHFUL ETERNITY

threetypesof "Morality":(1) Beingmoralin the

If onedistinguishes
given world,(2) Buildingup a "moralworld,"(3) Making one-
recognized
selfmoralwithoutregardoftheworld,Heidegger belongsto
unequivocally
thethirdtype. Sincethefellow-being forinhisprocessof
is notaccounted
"Becoming oneself"(neitheras "proximus"noras "stranger," neitheras
partneroflovenorofdutynorofpolitics)theonlygoalleftis to becomea
homonovus3' thoughone lacking caritas as well as social responsibilities.
things. The conceptof
To call sucha lack "omission"is understating
is broughtto sucha pointthatit has becometheexclusively
"individuality"
bindingcontentwhileformerly, it hadbeenonly
intheformofconscience,
theultimateandbinding thevoiceofconscience
voice. To be moreprecise,
playsa parthardlyinferior orKantianism,
to thatin Christianity butit is
31In thefirstyearsfollowing the GermanRevolutionof 1918,the harmlessly
word"NeuerMensch"was a pet phrasein thosecircleswhichbeingneither
extremist
outspokenlyChristiannor socialist feltthat somethingunheardof was due in the
newsituation. The wordwhosemeaningwas purepretense,neitherdenoted"belief"
nor"revolution."Heidegger's"self" is the ironcladbrotherof this "new man."
362 PHILOSOPHYANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

thevoiceoftheSelfexhorting theSelf(orthe"Dasein")tobehisSelf. Thus,

making theSelfspeaking tothe"Dasein,"Heidegger maintainsthroughout
the Dualismof Christianity althoughGod or Spiritin theircustomary
meaningare shutout. It is hardlynecessary to remindthereaderonce
moreoftheformula ofouropeningparagraph.Againhe cutsacrossthe
alternative"Natural-Supra-natural."
We hadsaidto be "myself" is thesolecontent oftheSelf'sexhortation.
True,"Mit-sein"(to be withothers),and "FUrsorge" (takingcareofthe
other)arementioned in SeinundZeit;however, theyarebarelymorethan
Aristotelianreminiscences (rCOovOrXLrLKO'V, unableto compete
qvg,8ovXe~etv)
withthevehement pathosofthe"Selbst-werden."Theyremaindryfoot-
notesofhissystem. ThismeansforHeidegger's "Dasein"itsown"Leben"
(qua existence)is "der Guterhkchstes" (summumbonum). Yet, while
usually(at leastup to thefirstworldwvar) thewatchword "Das Lebenist
derGfiterh6chstes" expressed eithersomething utilitarian
orEpicurianor
Dionysic("fulllife,""Denn alle Lust willEwigkeit"), Heidegger's lifeis,
thoughthesole good,farfromenjoyingitself. As a matterof fact,his
philosophyis thefirstand uniquesampleof thespecies"philosophy of life
hoetileto life." His "Dasein" still suffersfromthe Christianbad
conscience,evenfromtheadditional bad conscience ofhavingthrown over-
boardtheChristian conceptofsin afterall. This doublyevilconscience
makesHeidegger's "Dasein" so vile that it begrudges itselfall joy. If
3ieleggerneitherappointedgrudgenor stubborness as "Existenzialien,"
thisomission canonlybe explained by thefact,that,despitehispassionate
searchforaletheia,he suppressed the motivesofhis philosophizing alto-
gether.No man couldbestowa worsetreatment on his fellow-man than
Heidegger's"Dasein"bestows onitself. Whether thetreatment is sadisticor
masochistic thisquestionis hardto decidesincethe socialpartnersare
Siamesetwins. When"Dasein" sleeps,it wakesitselfup, ifit wantsto
read the paper it tearsthis"tool of mediocrity and average-life" from
its own hands. It excludes itself fromleisure,friendship,friendliness,
in short,fromculture. Its exercitia fillthe twenty-four hours of the
day,its drudgery to marchtowarddeathlaststhe wholelife. Perhaps,
onceit has reacheditsend,"Dasein"willsay "I madeit afterall,"thenit
mighthaveenoughofit,but it willcertainly notbe "lebenssatt" as it is
saidofthepatriarchs wholivedtheirfill. The doublybad conscience gives
hisphilosophy sucha stonysternness,sucha lackofSocraticirony,suchan
inabilityat "frohliche
Wissenschaft,"
thatthemere factofonesinglelaughter
wouldgivethelietothegeneralvalidity
ofhisanalysisof"Dasein."
Despiteits utterlack ofcaritas,thenihilistic
procedure through which
"Dasein"worksitswayto "Existence"showsa Christian, to be morecon-
cise,a Paulinicstructure,
fortheonlythingthatmatters, theonlyissueat
 OF HEIDEGGER'SPMLOSOPHY
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS 363

thus in a status
stakeconsistsin salvation, not in "law" orin "ac-
ofbeing,
tion." ThismeansthePaulinicconceptof"Belief"reappearsin Heideg-
ger'sphilosophy, though mododiabolico,
andwiththelabel"existence."
As everybody knows,in Paulinism"belief"is meantas thestatuswhich
enablesmanto fulfill theLaw. Thus,"belief"is rangedaboveobedience
andtheactionsthatflowoutofbelief. Now,inHeidegger's de-Christian-
izedtheology, the"statusrangedaboveactions"is beingretained, though
Christian nowbybeliefin oneself
beliefis supplanted as saviorof"Dasein"
and as redeemer fromdeath. WhilePaulinebeliefpurported thatbelief
rendersthe commanding of good workssuperfluous, becausethesewill
followfrombelief,in Heidegger's philosophy goodworksthemselves be-
come(though, ofcourse,notexpressesverbis)
superfluous,oncethestateof
"Existence" isarrivedat-at leastat noplaceareweadvisedofthem.
It is notas easyas thatto drawtheword"blasphemy" fromthemouth
of a non-believer. I can hardlysee, however,how this total reversalof
the originalmeaningofPaulinismcould be labelledotherwise.
* * *

Whenwe spokeof the maltreatment

of the "Dasein" by the "Self,"
we saw that the chase of the Selfafterhimselfis an exceedinglytorturous
operation. Since, as the title Sein und Zeit indicates,"Dasein" is tem-
poral,ithas "extension": thus,whenever "Dasein,"travellingthrough time,
and seizedby missing-panic, triesto catchitselfas a wholered-handed,
the preywillalwaysslip fromits fingers; "Dasein" willcatchjust one
moment ofitselfinstead,alwaysthisor thatcontingent travelingstation
ofitscontinuous journey, neveritswholetrack. Hence,unableto seizeor
to be itselfin itsextensive "wholeness" ("Gaenzedes Dasein"),it has to
findor inventan intensive way ofbeingas a whole. As a matteroffact,
thismissing panicis one ofthefundamental motivesforHeidegger to in-
troducethe conceptof "Existence"whichis the intensive wholenessof
"Dasein." Betterthanfromanyotherpoint,do weunderstand from here
thefunction ofdeathforthe"Existence." Since,ina way,it is deaththat
limitsordefinestheextension oflifeso as to makeit a whole,Heidegger
retainsit and ordersit to maketheintensive wholenessoflife. Heideg-
ger'sastonishing requestforthe"GaenzedesDaseins"is thedesperado re-
questoftheonewhois mortally afraidofcontinuallymissing theonlycapi-
tal in hishands,his "Dasein,"because,beingtemporal, thisDasein con-
tinuallyreducesitselfto something un-occupiable andunseizable.33 Thus,
31The connection betweenfinis and definitie
has hardlyeverbeentakenas seriously
as in Heidegger'sphilosophy.
3 It is astonishingthat this philosophicalmotive (thoughshowingall the marks
ofa genuinephilosophicalpanic) nonethelessseemsto be thevariationof a classical
364 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICALRESEARCH

theultimate, though never admittedgoalof"Sein undZeit"is theconquest of

one'sownSeindespite itstimeorthedissolving oftimeintothe"Intensivum"
oftheexistential stateofDaseinwhich,seenfromthisangle,might be called
the"eternity ofDasein." In a way,Heidegger's word,according to which
"Existenzist das Wesendes Daseins" corroborates this interpretation:
afterall, in thehistoryofEuropeanthoughteversincePlato,thenotion
"Wesen" (essence)had alwaysimpliedthe connotation of timelessness.
True,Heidegger avoidsprofessing thisinheritance fromGreekand Chris-
tianmetaphysics or to call it by its propername. Beingan anti-super-
naturalist, he is,in a way,"ashamed ofeternity."
It is obviousthatthisideaof"eternity," at leastofneutralizationoftime,
is nota complete novum in modernphilosophy: theHegelianconceptofan
"end of Philosophy";the Marxianthesisaccordingto whichhistoryis
nothing but a pre-history ofan extra-historical stage;theNietzschean idea
of"eternalrecurrence"-allofthemare attempts a sortof
at establishing
"eternity" withintime,precisely because "time"had becomethe axis of
philosophical thinking in a farhigherdegreethanit had everbeenin the
antiqueworld.
Although standing in a broadtradition, Heidegger againstandsapartby
makinghis "eternity" (i.e.,his "existence,"embracing thewholeness oflife
and death)a totally private affairwhereby itbecomesan oddvariant. His
"existence" is buta life-long eternitylockedup in theindividual.Being
furthermore an eternitydenudedof God, of a realmof "validity,"of
"ideas,"ofnaturalor morallaws,ofhappinessor a socialaetasaurea,in
short,deprivedofall accessories and contents which,in thecourseofthe
history ofreligionandphilosophy had accruedto theconceptof"eternity,"
it is againa nothingness, just theemptyobjectofthefanaticwishnotto
getdrowned inthefluidelement, lifetheonlyproperty leftto him.14It is
needlessto stressagainthatwe cannottakeexception to thefactthat,for
Heidegger, thevalidityofall contents formerly connected with"eternity"
had evaporated. Oncethenihilistic situation whichhad beenbreeding for
text. In his well-knowndiscussionof Happiness, (NIC. Eth., 1100a 1) Aristotle
disputesthe child the possibilityof being happy-since it has not or has not yet
reachedits completenessof life; a fewlines later, Aristotlequotes Solon's question
of whetherone could be happyaltogetherbeforedeath,onlyto rejectit. The con-
nectionbetweenHeidegger'sproblemof "Gaenze" and thispassage is beyonddoubt.
ApparentlyHeidegger's"Bildungserlebnisse"and "Urerlebnisse"are inextricably
intertwined.
3 There is an obvious connectionbetweenthis intensitydenuded of contentand
the programmatic, programlessness of the Germanpre-warMouthmovementwhich
formsan importantpartofHeidegger'slife. It was intoit thathe escaped fromthe
"Man" of his surroundings.The difference consistsin the fact that Heidegger's
intensity,called "existence,"lacks all dionysicconnotations.
 OF HEIDEGGER'SPHILOSOPHY
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS 365

a longtime,becomesacute, it is, of course,out ofthe questionjust to order

values back in line. It is ratherhis attemptat concealingthe nihilistic
natureofhis Nihilismthat seems to us objectionable,the factthat he pre-
sentsit as "ontology,"and that he tries,despitethe completeannihilation
ofvalues,to perform
a sortof "Verewigungs-Ritual."
VI. ISOLATION-THE CONDITION OF ONTOLOGY

Althoughat firstsightit maybe surprising thatHeidegger presents his

"Trotz-Ritual" as ontology, theconnection is farfromaccidental.
As we had seen,his elementary actionhad consisted in breaking out of
thecontingent situationintowhichhe felthimself cast; thisact did not
implyanypositivestepforhisonlyaimwastherecovery ofhisSelf. Hence
hisactionhad,bynecessity, to carryhimintoextreme isolation, intoa situa-
tionin whichhe facedthenaked"I am" and inwhichhewasnot"this"or
"that"anylonger("this"or "that"alwaysbeingsociallyrecognized func-
tions)butjust "there." As a matteroffact,extreme isolation is theconditio
sinequa nonfordiscovery of "Sein" as differingfrom"Seiendem"(elva&as
from
differing o6)andthus,thecondition.of whatHeidegger, in theopening
paragraphs of Sein undZeitannounced as the epochalre-simptinD of thp
Platonic-Parmenidean distinction.The ontological consternation at the
"facts"thatthere"is" thisor that,thatthereexistssomething likea "there
is something" cannotstrikeintoeverybody; it can alarmonlythebeing
totallyisolatedfromthe world,thebeing,forwhomtheexistence ofthe
worldis no matterof course,forwhomits non-existence is "thirnkable."35
The distinctionbetween"thingsthatare" and the"beingofthings"orig-
inatesonlyifandwhentheexisting worldhasbecomecontingent andalien;
thusifand whenI am notboundto it anylonger. Thisappliesto one's
own"Dasein" just as wellas to "Sein" in general. Onlythehopelessly
maroonedhumanis amazed thathe himselfis-a keeneranalysiswould
showthatontology is rathera theory
ofthis"consternation-that" thana theory
of"Sein". True,onecouldobject,thatthis"deduction" oftheontological
approachis ofno consequence forthetruth ofontology; that,afterall,each
andeverydiscovery needsa definite situationwithout whichit couldnever
be made;thata river'ssourcedoesnotrefute itsmouth. Generally speak-
ing,thisobservation maybe true. Not,however, wherediscoveries inthe
provinceof "Dasein" are at stakebecausetheveryactofphilosophizing on
"Dasein" is a symptom of a specialsortof "Dasein"-not to speakofits
changingeffecton Dasein. Therefore the existential philosopher doesnot

3sAs paradoxical oftheworldis not

as it maysound,onlybecausetheexistence
a matterofcourseforHeidegger,he had to emphasize
the"to be in theworld"as
a matterofcourse.
366 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

philosopher.Sua res
discover"Dasein,"but "Dasein" oftheexistential
agitur. Sola sua.
VII. SELF-MUTILATION
Be thatas itmay,is Heidegger rightwhenhe contends to be thefirstto
havelaidopentheage-long buriedontological question?
Although it is beyonddoubtthatParmenides', Plato's,Aristotles', style
ofaskingontological questions was abandonedforcenturies, it is question-
able whether thisappliesto ontology altogether.Modernontology gave
itselfanothername,thatof"Transcendental Philosophy."It is a truism
to stressthatKantorFichtedidnotclassify thesubjectas "Erscheinung"
or just as a beingobjectamong6vrca. The innumerable metaphorsin
whichthe subjectwas circumscribed as "spontaneity" or as "sourceof
causality"oras "unbedingt" provesthat,to use Heidegger's term,it was
the "Seinsart,"the speciesexistendi of "Subjectivity" thathad beenthe
exclusivethemeoftranscendental philosophy.It was Heidegger himself
who,in his admittedly deepKant-Interpretation, has presented the con-
nection exceptforthefactthatheturned therelation upsidedown. Trans-
.rendenal Pphiloozaphy(i.e.,philosophyoffreedom) is not,as it appearstobe
according toHeidegger, an ontologynotyetfullyunderstanding itself;rather is
"Ontology ofDasein"a philosophy offreedom which doesnotunderstand itself
anylonger, namelya philosophy offreedom withoutfreedom.Although we
had toucheduponthisproblem beforewhenwe discussedthecategories of
and "potestas,"
"possibilitas" wehaveto resumeit oncemore.
In theverymoment inwhichthe"freesubject,"despiteallhis"boldness"
("Verwegeniheit;" Heidegger's word!)has renounced usingthisfreedom ef-
fectively,in theverymoment in whichhe doesnot,or willnot,or cannot
utilizeit as freedomof action,it discoversitselfas a sort of Jilia.
Resembling Lessing's"Raphaelwithout hands,"theexistential philosopher
is a freemanwithout handsbutonewho,aftermutilating himself, registers
hisintensepainin theamputated limband hisstilllivingimpulsetoward
actionand freedom as a sortof "Sein." Increasingly it becomesunder-
standablethatsucha philosophy had to originate in a periodoftotalpas-
sivity(afterthedefeatof1918),thatitwastheexpression ofan immobilized
groupandthatit was the workofa manwhoscornfully declinedto solid-
arizehimselfwithwhatcause so ever,and increasingly understandable,
that"Dasein,"afterhavingrenounced its truevocation,"freedom,i' was
boundsomehow to realizeit nonetheless: it had to becomeunscrupulous.
Wearedeliberately usingthisword,callingforth theconnotation ofa philo-
sophicalanarchist forthat'swhatthe"Self"reallyis-exceptforthefact
thatit remains totallyacademicandtame,thatit doesnottestify itsaver-
sionofauthorities or moralobligations by physicalterroror annihilation
 PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS OF HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY 367

("Vernichtung")as thedesperate and actuallyboldRussiannihilistofthe

lastcenturyhad done,but onlyby "nihilation" ("Nichtung", Heideggei's
term,beingjustas littlepartoftheGermanlanguageas "nihilation" ofthe
endangering
English). The "Self"is a bloodlessanarchist himself
neither
northeworld. If its advocateprocured chairfromexactly
hisuniversity
thatworldWhich he heldin suchcontempt, it was the premium forthe
ofhisaction.
bloodlessness
VIII. SKEPTICAL CHRISTIAN AND CHRISTIAN SKEPTIC

"Daseinist ein Sein,demes urnes selbstgeht...."6 "It is a species

existendi characterized by the interestit takesin itself. . ." or morepre-
cisely:"characterized by thefactthatit is at stakeforitself." In a way
thisformulais the commondenominator forthe wholeof Heidegger's
philosophy, forit appliesto boththenon-authentic Dasein ("man") and
theauthentic one ("Selbst"). Afterall, it is just by takingthisprinciple
seriously that"Dasein"makesitself"authentic."
It is quiteobviousthatthisformula is meantto refer thereaderbackto
the fatherofExistentialphilosophy, Kierkegaard,37whowas the firstto
use the term"Existenz"and whoseleadingcategorywas "Interest."
Thus,thecontinuity is obviouslymaintained by Heidegger.However,is
it notcontradictory that"Existence"or "interest" shouldbecomepartof
something like a philosophical system? Had not Kierkegaardused.his
categories as weaponsagainstthe veryidea of a systematic philosophy?
Has notHeidegger, bymaking a system-like Existential
philosophy, despite
his outspoken suspension ofall religiousquestions,madesomething theo-
logicaloutofKierkegaard's religiousundertaking?
Asitis wellknown, Kierkegaard's accusation againstHegelrunsaboutas
follows: Philosophy (as systemof"being"or"becoming") omits
necessarily
me,meanrem, myunexchangeable situation;ina way,Kierkegaard charges
thatphilosophy (i.e.,Hegel'ssystem)amountsto a vast and vastlycom-
plicatednetthat,thoughcovering thewhole,allowseveryindividual thing
or situation to slip through, thusme too. "Mfe,"however,does neither
36 The expression"es gehtum" is a deliberatelyblunt,extra-academic,
"concrete"
wordimplyingsomethingof an ultimatum. (See: 'Es geht urnLeben und Tod,'
'es gehturndie Wurst.')
37 The Existentialismwhichcomesto Americatoday as "derniercri" is a dernier
cri, indeed,-the cry of a fourthgeneration-Kierkegaard,Strindberg,Heidegger,
Sartre-one hundredyearsof dernierscris-to say nothingof the fifthand sixth,of
Chateaubriand, Herder,Hamann,orRousseau. Thereseemsto be a farcrybetween
the cri d'avanthierand the day on whichit arrivesin the most advanced,country.
So far,Americahas not been in need of thosecries. Now, theremightexistcertain
extra-philosophical reasonsforthe fashionwhich,so far,however,does not amount
to muchmorethanto a ceaselessprintingof the wordin magazines.
368 PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

designate the"Ichheit"oftranscendental philosophy,norme,empirically;

rathertheinescapablemoralsituationwithwhichI happento be identical
and inwhichI can'thelpmakingdecisions;or,in moreChristian terms;I,
confronting God orconfronted byGod-thus,I withregardtomysalvation
which,accordingto Christianity, is the Self'sexclusive"interest."No
philosophy neglecting this situation thatI am, can,according to Kierke-
gaard,claimto thetitleofbeingphilosophy.It is obviousthat,thus,in a
way,Kierkegaard re-moors philosophy in "Sein" and thathe attempts to
force"interest"backintotheory, although, as Kierkegaard knewperfectly
well,themaincharacteristic oftheoryhad precisely consisted in "suspen-
sionofinterest," called"objectivity."a
Now,Kierkegaard is usuallyregardedas havinginaugurated a wholly
newconceptof "Sein" by introducing the conceptof "Existenz,"which
makestheungeneralizable (mycase)as contrasted withthemostgeneral, the
uniqueobjector task of philosophy.This versionis, to say the least,
equivocal. If "one'sbeing"was formulated by Kierkegaard in a farmore
keythaneverbefore,thereasonforthisrigorism
rigoristic is his despair;
despairaboutthe factthatthetraditional "status"inwhichnothing is at
stakebut "one-self" orone'ssalvation:belief-found itselfina deadlycrisis.
It is not onlyagainstthe background of "system"(Hegel) thathe had
formulated hisanti-conceptual conceptofexistence; notonlyagainstthat
ofrisingpositivism whichfailedto tellanybodyanything abouthimself;
not onlyagainstthe lack of judgmentand conviction of the press,nor
againstthe petit-bourgeois adulteration ofmanwho couldnot genuinely
understand anything anylonger, since,as "Publikum," it kneweverything
anyhow:his undertaking is, to at least the same degreetheattackof the
Christian beliefon "knowing";or the philosophical attemptof one,not
believingin his ownbelievinganymore,to "philosophize
firmly back"
himself
tobelief,
a sortofa "dubiteergosum,"theattemptofa skepticto make
his veryskepticism the "pibcede resistance"ofhis religioussituation-
an attack,though,by a mandonning his enemy'sweapons,makinguse of
.thelanguageofphilosophy, carriedforward witha maximalphilosophical
furor,and disguisedinto the aphoristicrags of despairand paradox.
Seen fromthisangle,his existentialism
represents of a
a rescuing-device
newstyleforceduponhimby thecrisisofthechurch, growing evermore
acuteand by thevanishing which(as "absolutesWissen")had
ofreligion
been drawnand swallowedby Hegel'sPhilosophy.Thus,Kierkegaard's
originality so muchin thecauseheadvocated
didnotconsist as (ifoneunder-
standsthewordin its broadestmeaning)in themethod he had toapplyto
I8 It is needlessto stressthatMarxwhenre-mooring Philosophy in "Sein" and
"Interest"had verydifferent conceptsin mind;stilla certainparallelismbetween
theircriticalundertakings
is undeniable.
 OF HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY
PSEUDO-CONCRETENESS 369

keepalivean old or,as he admitswithoutshame,"eternal"cause.39 Hence

Kierkegaard is far moreof a re-former than of an innovatoror of a
philosophical revolutionary--which factcouldnotbe properly recognized
in thenineteenth century sincethe conceptof"progress" was necessarily
thwarting the veryunderstanding of thishistorical category"re-form."
His "method"was "existence"; hiscause:salvation, as oldas Christianity
itself. It is,thus,notforprimarily ontological reasons,thatKierkegaard
wasinterested in the "I am"; at bestfor"negatively reasons:
ontological"
in orderto stallthe omnipotency ofphilosophy's of
concept "being"-ul-
timately,however,for purelyChristianmotives. The last Christian,
smashedby theweightoftheequallylast,theHegelianmetaphysics, for-
mulateshisthreatened positionby meansoftheinstruments oftheenemy:
the philosopher, in orderto demonstrate the philosopher's incompetency
forhis own position:Belief. He philosophizes againstphilosophy.Pas-
sionately, andmostlikely,successfully, Kierkegaard wouldhave defended
himself againstthepraiseofhis"newness." New,indeed,ishisattempt to
transfer hispolemicagainstphilosophy intotheprovince ofphilosophy it-
self,whichundertaking, however, was not entirely unique,since,in a way,
all post-Hegelian philosophyconsistedof criticism of the competency of
philosophy: eachand any ofthemwas a philosophically formulated anti-
philosophy.The factthat Kierkegaard's uniqueundertaking was bound
to becomedecisiveforHeidegger, is obvious. It lacksplausibility only
whenone introduces Heidegger as Husserl'ssuccessor, as we had donefor
external reasons. Theiraffinity restsin thefollowing facts:
(1) SinceKierkegaard felthimself to be a "Korrektiv gegendie Zeit"
and a last Christian he had to livein a vacuumnotso different fromthe
vacuumin whichHeidegger's"Self" is doomedto live; and had to go
throughthe same moods connectedwith isolation(as anxiety)which
Heidegger is describing.
(2) WhileKierkegaard isa skepticalChristianwhoworksup evenhisdoubts
forhisChristian purposes-Heidegger is a Christian Skeptic whoconsumes
evenhis Christian dowry(as "guilt,"etc.) forhis non-religious purpose.
Eitherofthemstandsinan equivocalsituation (ifthetwosituations do not
actuallycoincide witheachother)buttheyareinterpreting itfromopposite
directions.Eitherphilosopher offersa philosophy of salvation,Kierke-
gaardstillclinging to a conceptofsalvationhandedto himby tradition,
whileHeidegger inventsa newone. Both,however, arefocusing onlythe
influence ofthecrisisontheindividual-while movements offarlargersize
triedto solvethecrisisor pretended to solveit. As a matteroffact,the
39 It is evidentthatsuchundertakings
are alwaysdoomedto certaindialectical
turns.By introducing a newrescuing-device
foran old cause,one can not help
engendering a newcause. (Mostimpressive
example:NationalSocialism.)
370 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICALRESEARCH

inventionofthe conceptof "existence"is onlythereplyto thefactthat

"things"and institutions
had overpowered man and deprivedhim of
"being."
IX. STUFFID NIHILISM
We had producedancestorsofthemostdiverseprovenience: Greekon-
tology,Christianity, phenomenology, pragmatism, transcendental philoso-
phy,Kierkegaard-andone couldhaveaddedmanymore,suchas, Dilthey,
Nietzsche,Bergson. This abundanceof ancestorsis surprising, indeed.
It is nottheleastreasonforthefactthatHeidegger hasbecomethesourceof
an undeniable fascination.As a matteroffacthe has digested a larger
part
of the historyof the Europeanmindthan any philosophy sinceHegel.
Whilewe have calledHeidegger's Existentialism theuniquesampleofthe
species"Philosophy oflifehostileto life,"we cannowadd thatit is thesole
exampleofthespecies"Stuffed Nihilism"(Farcierter Nihilismus)whereby
we meanthatit is, despiteit nihilistic tendency, bursting withall motives
ofHistory.This"stuffing," however isnotsimplyanaesthetic phenomenon,
as abundance hadbeeninRomanticism; itis rathertheresultofthe"Self's"
willto power,of its omnivorous urgeto appropriate everything.Nietz-
sche'swords:"If therewerea God,howcouldI bearnotto be God?"seem
tobe transformed into"If thereis History, howcouldI bearnottobe His-
tory?"
The desperatemottoofall activedesperados, "all or nothing,"changed
underthe handsof the existential one intoan "all and nothing," which
makesit wellunderstandable thatthebookthatcontinues hisworkis not
entitledTo beornottobe,butEtreetNMant.
GUENTHER STERN (ANDERS).
NEW YORKCITY.
EXTRACTO
En estearticulose muestracomoHeidegger, al situarseentrealternatives
producela impresion
clAsicas, de establecerun pianofilos6fico enteramente
neuvo:"Dasein" comotema,no de la investigation "6ntica,"sinode la
"Ontologica." Por ejemplo,Heideggercortaa trav6sde la alternative
"Naturalismo-Sobrenaturalismo": su filosofia,a pesarde sertanatea como
el materialism,no reconoceninguna"naturaleza." Comparadocon el
conceptoacad6micode "conciencia," su "Dasein" pareceextraordinaria-
menteconcreto, debidoen particular a su "Sorge"("cura"); sinembargo,
Heidegger prescindede la raizverdadera de la "Sorge,"delefectivo "menes-
ter" del hombre(y de todoslos seresvivientes), se
pues al interpretarlo
hubiesesituadoen la peligrosa vecindaddelmaterialismy estole hubiese
 PSEUDO-COTNCRETENESSOF HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY 371

obligadoa consideraral hombrecomo un ente necesitadode otrosentes

"materiales," sinlos cualesno es capaz de existir.Y es precisamente esta
omision del "menester" o necesidadlo que le permite estableeer, Comoun
supuestoplanonuevo,el plano"ontologico," diferenciado del planopura-
mente"ontico."
Aunqueno es naturalist,su filosoffa tampocoes idealist. Los ideales
moralesy politicosque, desdeKant,motivaron el idealism,ya no apare-
cenen 61. Su concepto de libertades enteramente mientras
solipsista, que
su Etica esta separadatan completamente del obrarefectivo en el mundo
social,que para 61este"obrar"se reducea una especiede operacion sobre
si mismo(la "Eigentlich-werden"). Este hechoha producido una neuva
neutralizaci6n:la dela alternativeentrefilosofia
teor6ticayfilosofia practica.
De hecho,el filosofar se presentacomola "accion"del "Dasein"; porotro
lado,toda"aut6ntica" acci6ndel "Dasein" consiste enfilosofar,porcuanto
la filosofia
es el caminopara "liberarse"del prejuicio de la opinionpublica
("man")y parallegara serun "Yo mismo."