Topicality

The Resolution
Resolved: The United States federal government should

substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic
engagement with the Peoples Republic of China.
Resolved:
Resolved = Policy/Legislative
Resolved denotes a proposal to be enacted by law
Words and Phrases 1964 Permanent Edition
Definition of the word resolve, given by Webster is to express an opinion or
determination by resolution or vote; as it was resolved by the legislature; It is of
similar force to the word enact, which is defined by Bouvier as meaning to
establish by law.
Resolved means a determination reached by voting

Websters Revised Unabridged 98 dictionary.com
Resolved: 5. To express, as an opinion or determination, by resolution and vote;
to declare or decide by a formal vote; -- followed by a clause; as, the house resolved
(or, it was resolved by the house) that no money should be appropriated (or, to
appropriate no money).
Resolved means to settle formally by voting

Websters Law 96 "resolved." Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law. Merriam-
Webster, Inc. 01 Jul. 2007. <Dictionary.com
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved>.
resolve transitive verb 1 : to deal with successfully : clear up <resolve a dispute> 2
a : to declare or decide by formal resolution and vote b : to change by
resolution or formal vote <the house resolved itself into a committee> intransitive
verb : to form a resolution
Resolved = Firm Decision/Certainty
Resolved means a firm decision
American Heritage 2k The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language: Fourth Edition, http://www.bartleby.com/61/87/R0178700.html
Resolve TRANSITIVE VERB:1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To cause (a person) to
reach a decision. See synonyms at decide. 3. To decide or express by formal vote.
Resolved implies a specific course of action

American Heritage 2k
(The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language: Fourth Edition,
http://www.bartleby.com/61/87/R0178700.html)
INTRANSITIVE VERB:1. To reach a decision or make a determination: resolve on a
course of action. 2. To become separated or reduced to constituents. 3. Music To
undergo resolution.
Resolved means certain or fixed

OED 89 Oxford English Dictionary, Resolved, Volume 13, p. 725
a. of the mind, etc.: Freed from doubt or uncertainty, fixed, settled. Obs.
AT: Resolved = Certainty/Immediacy
Resolved doesnt require certainty
Merriam Webster 2009 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved
# Main Entry: 1resolve # Pronunciation: \ri-zlv, -zolv also -zv or -zov\ # Function: verb # Inflected Form(s):
resolved; resolving 1 : to become separated into component parts; also : to become reduced by dissolving or
analysis 2 : to form a resolution : determine 3 : consult, deliberate
Resolved doesnt require immediacy

Online Plain Text English Dictionary 2009 http://www.onelook.com/?
other=web1913&w=Resolve
Resolve: To form a purpose; to make a decision; especially, to determine after reflection; as, to
resolve on a better course of life.
:
Colon- the business follows it

Websters Guide to Grammar and Writing 2000
http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm
Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand
by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on If the introductory
phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon
represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a
capital letter.
Colon- the second clause elaborates on the first

Encarta World Dictionary, 07
(http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?
refid=1861598666
punctuation mark: the punctuation mark (:) used to divide distinct but related
sentence components such as clauses in which the second elaborates on the
first, or to introduce a list, quotation, or speech. A colon is sometimes used in U.S.
business letters after the salutation. Colons are also used between numbers in
statements of proportion or time and Biblical or literary references.
The United States federal
government
The
The is used to denote specific persons or things
Ammer in 2000 (Christine, renowned linguist & author of 20 popular reference
bks, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 4th ed.
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/the)
Used before singular or plural nouns and noun phrases that denote particular, specified
persons or things.
The is used to denote a specific entity

American Heritage 00 (Fourth Edition,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/the)
the1 P (th before a vowel; th before a consonant) def.art. Used before singular or
plural nouns and noun phrases that denote particular, specified persons or things:
the baby; the dress I wore.
USFG
USfg is the three branches
The Free Dictionary 4(Thefreedictionary.com, April 6 2004)
The executive and legislative and judicial branches of the federal government of
the United States
USfg is the three branches

USLegal 9(definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government,
September 23 2009)
The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution.
The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual
governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i)
the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and
Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of
separation of powers and checks and balances for the smooth functioning of all the
three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the
Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the
Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.
National govt, not the states

Blacks Law 99 (Dictionary, Seventh Edition, p.703)
A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller
political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the
right to participate in national political matters
Federal government is the central government

Websters 76
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED, 1976, p. 833.
Federal government. Of or relating to the central government of a nation, having
the character of a federation as distinguished from the governments of the
constituent unites (as states or provinces).
Should
Should = Ought/Obligation
Should is used to express obligation and expediency
Merriam-Websters Collegiate Dictionary 2002 (Merriam-Websters
Inc., Tenth Ed., http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary)
Used in auxiliary function to express obligation, propriety, or expediency
Should means ought

Dictionary.com 6(Dictionary.com: definitions, 6/3/2006,
dictionary.reference.com)
must; ought (used to indicate duty, propriety, or expediency): You should not do
that.
Should indicates a desirable condition

Oxford 10(Oxford dictionaries online,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/should, May 22 2010)
1 used to indicate obligation, duty, or correctness, typically when criticizing
someone's actions: he should have been careful I think we should trust our people more
you shouldn't have gone indicating a desirable or expected state: by now pupils
should be able to read with a large degree of independence used to give or ask advice or
suggestions: you should go back to bed what should I wear? (I should) used to give
advice: I should hold out if I were you.
Should = Immediate/Certain
Should means immediate requirement
Summer 94 (Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court, Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food
Warehouse of Durant, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?
CiteID=20287#marker3fn14)
4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in
the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The
answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be
governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial
language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the
turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an
expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an
in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be
garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 5 Nisi prius orders should
be so construed as to give effect to every words and every part of the text, with a
view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.17 The order's
language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by
the document's signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase to
be interpreted is used.18 When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons
impel my conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti
resolution of Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly
appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by
the judge.19 True minutes20 of a court neither call for nor bear the approval of the
parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this
context "should" is impliedly followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is",
makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now
so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by the
statutory policy of this State. [Continues To Footnote] 14 In praesenti means
literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal
parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective,
as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in
futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201
(1882).
Should isnt Mandatory
Should isnt mandatory
Taylor and Howard, 05 - Resources for the Future, Partnership to Cut Hunger
and Poverty in Africa (Michael and Julie, Investing in Africa's future: U.S.
Agricultural development assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa, 9/12,
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001784/5-US-agric_Sept2005_Chap2.pdf)
Other legislated DA earmarks in the FY2005 appropriations bill are smaller and more
targeted: plant biotechnology research and development ($25 million), the
American Schools and Hospitals Abroad program ($20 million), womens leadership
capacity ($15 million), the International Fertilizer Development Center ($2.3
million), and clean water treatment ($2 million). Interestingly, in the wording of the
bill, Congress uses the term shall in connection with only two of these eight
earmarks; the others say that USAID should make the prescribed amount available.
The difference between shall and should may have legal significanceone is clearly
mandatory while the other is a strong admonitionbut it makes little practical
difference in USAIDs need to comply with the congressional directive to the best of
its ability.
Should isnt mandatoryits a persuasive recommendation

Words and Phrases, 2002 (Words and Phrases: Permanent Edition Vol. 39
Set to Signed. Pub. By Thomson West. P. 370)
Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1976. Term should, as used in statutory provision that motion to
suppress search warrant should first be heard by magistrate who issued warrant, is
used in regular, persuasive sense, as recommendation, and is thus not mandatory
but permissive. Wests Ann.Pen Code, 1538.5(b).---Cuevas v. Superior Court, 130
Cal. Rptr. 238, 58 Cal.App.3d 406 ----Searches 191.
Should means desirable or recommended, not mandatory

Set to Signed. Pub. By Thomson West. P. 372-373)
Or. 1952. Where safety regulation for sawmill industry providing that a two by two
inch guard rail should be installed at extreme outer edge of walkways adjacent to
sorting tables was immediately preceded by other regulations in which word shall
instead of should was used, and word should did not appear to be result of
inadvertent use in particular regulation, use of word should was intended to
convey idea that particular precaution involved was desirable and recommended,
but not mandatory. ORS 654.005 et seq.----Baldassarre v. West Oregon Lumber Co.,
239 P.2d 839, 193 Or. 556.---Labor & Emp. 2857
Should isnt mandatory.

Set to Signed. Pub. By Thomson West. P. 369)
C.A.6 (Tenn.) 2001. Word should, in most contexts, is precatory, not mandatory.
----U.S. v. Rogers, 14 Fed.Appx. 303.----Statut227
Should doesnt require certainty

Blacks Law 79 (Blacks Law Dictionary Fifth Edition, p. 1237)
Should. The past tense of shall; ordinarily implying duty or obligation; although
usually no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation,
thereby distinguishing it from ought. It is not normally synonymous with may,
and although often interchangeable with the word would, it does not ordinarily
express certainty as will sometimes does.
Should = Expectation
Should is likely
The Free Dictionary 4(Thefreedictionary.com, January 9 2004)
Used to express probability or expectation
Should means what is expected

Merriam-Websters Collegiate Dictionary 2002 (Merriam-Websters
Used in auxiliary function to express what is probable or expected
Should describes what is probable

Compact Oxford English Dictionary, 8 (should, 2008,
http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/should?view=uk)
should
modal verb (3rd sing. should) 1 used to indicate obligation, duty, or correctness. 2
used to indicate what is probable. 3 formal expressing the conditional mood. 4 used
in a clause with that after a main clause describing feelings. 5 used in a clause
with that expressing purpose. 6 (in the first person) expressing a polite request or
acceptance. 7 (in the first person) expressing a conjecture or hope.
Should = Conditional
Should is conditional
Merriam-Websters Collegiate Dictionary, 2002 (Merriam-Websters
Used in auxiliary function to express condition
Should = Past Tense of Shall
Should means the past tense of shall
Collins English Dictionary 09 (Collins English Dictionary, tenth edition,
2009, should, p. 1515)
Should. Vb. The past tense of shall: used as an auxiliary verb to indicate that an
action is considered by the speaker to be obligatory (You should go) or to form the
subjunctive mood with I or we (I should like to see you; if I should be late, go
without me). See also shall.
AT: Should is Past Tense of Shall
Traditional rules regarding use of shall are now archaic.
Should means duty or obligation.
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 2000 (4th
Edition, p. 1612)
Usage Note Like the rules governing the use of shall and will on which they are
based, the traditional rules governing the use of should and would are largely
ignored in modern American practice. Either should or would can now be used in the
first person to express conditional futurity: If I had known that, I would (or
somewhat more formally, should) have answered differently. But in the second and
third persons only would is used: If he had known that, he would (not should) have
answered differently. Would cannot always be substituted for should, however.
Should is used in all three persons in a conditional clause: if I (or you or he) should
decide to go. Should is also used in all three persons to express duty or obligation
(the equivalent of ought to): I (or you or he) should go. On the other hand, would is
used to express volition or promise: I agreed that I would do it. Either would or
should is possible as an auxiliary with like, be inclined, be glad, prefer, and related
verbs: I would (or should) like to call your attention to an oversight. Here would was
acceptable on all levels to a large majority of the Usage Panel in an earlier survey
and is more common in American usage than should. Should have is sometimes
incorrectly written should of by writers who have mistaken the source of the spoken
contraction shouldve.
Should only means the past tense of shall when used as a

putative auxiliary verb. In the context of the resolution, it
means ought to.
The Grammar Logs 97
(#29.
http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/grammarlogs/grammarlogs29.htm,
Sept. 26 Accessed 7/7/13)
Question The Discrepancies among Shall, Will, Should & Would

I am always told that "should" is the past tense of "shall", just like "would" is the
past tense of "will". I believe that although the latter may be true, the former can
never be true.
"Should" is a normative term (a suggestion, "ought to").
A1. We should abolish this rule (normative advice).

A2. We shall abolish this rule (we have decided/are going to, = "will").
Clearly, A1 is NOT the past tense of A2.
Thus, in terms of meaning, "shall" and "will" should go together ("shall" for the
pronouns "I" and "we", and "will" for others), and "should" should stand alone, or go
with words like, "ought to".
Consider the following:
B1. If I stop now, I SHALL fail.

B2. If he stops now, he WILL fail.
B3. If I stopped yesterday, I WOULD fail.
Thus, "would" should be the past tense of both "will" and "shall", instead of "should"
being the past tense of "shall".
The past tense of "should" should be "should have":
C1. You should scold him now.

C2. You should have scolded him just now.
Now, under what case is SHOULD the past tense of SHALL, which most dictionaries
contend?
Source & Date
of Question Singapore
26 September 1997
Grammar's
Response In "should have scolded" you're using should as part of an auxiliary
string to create a past tense verb, so that doesn't really count. As a putative
auxiliary verb, however, should is more clearly the past tense of shall:
I was extremely upset that he should earn more money than my brother.
Substantially
Substantially- General Definitions
"Substantial" is of real worth or considerable value- this is the
usual meaning
Words and Phrases 2 Volume 40A, p. 458
D.S.C. 1966. The word substantial within Civil Rights Act providing that a place is a public
accommodation if a substantial portion of food which is served has moved in commerce must be construed in
its usual and customary meaning, that is, something of real worth and
light of
importance; of considerable value; valuable, something worthwhile as distinguished from
something without value or merely nominal
Substantial means considerable in quantity

Merriam-Webster 2003 www.m-w.com
Main Entry: substantial b : considerable in quantity : significantly great <earned
a substantial wage>
Substantially means including the material or essential part

Words and Phrases 05 v. 40B, p. 329
Okla. 1911. Substantially means in substance; in the main; essentially; by
including the material or essential part.
Substantially means to large extent

Merriam-Webster 2002 Merriam-Websters Collegiate Dictionary Tenth
Edition http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary
To a great extent or degree
Substantially means strongly

Merriam-Webster 2002 Merriam-Websters Collegiate Dictionary Tenth
Edition http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary
In a strong substantial way
Substantially means to have importance

Merriam-Webster 2002 (Merriam-Websters Collegiate Dictionary Tenth
Edition http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary)
Considerable in importance, value, degree, amount, or extent
Substantially means ample

Ample; sustaining
Substantially means relating to
Of, relating to, or having substance; material
Substantial" means in the main

Words and Phrases 2 (Volume 40A, p. 469)
Ill.App.2 Dist. 1923 Substantial means in substance, in the main, essential,

including material or essential parts
Substantially- %
Substantial increase is at least 30%
Bryson, 2001, Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals Federal
Circuit
265 F.3d 1371; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 20590; 60 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1272, 9/19, lexis
The term "to increase substantially" in claim 1 of the '705 patent refers to the claimed
increase achieved by the invention in the relative productivity of the catalyst used in the
Fischer-Tropsch process. The specification defines "substantially increased" catalyst
activity or productivity as an increase of at least about 30%, more preferably an
increase of about 50%, and still more preferably an increase of about 75%. '705 patent,
col. 1, ll. 59-63. Based on that language from the specification, the trial court found, and
the parties agree, that the term "to increase substantially" requires an increase of
at least about 30% in the relative productivity of the catalyst. Notwithstanding
that numerical boundary, the trial court found the phrase "to increase substantially" to be
indefinite because the court concluded that there were two possible ways to calculate the
increase in productivity, the subtraction method and the division method, and the patent
did not make clear which of those ways was used in the claim.
Substantial is 50%- two examples

Smythe 10 Tom, engineer,
http://www.co.lake.ca.us/Government/Directory/Water_Resources/Department_Progr
ams/Flood_Management/ Substantial_Damage_Improvement.htm, 6/15/2010, DA
6/21/11, OST
"Substantial damage" means damage of any origin sustained by a structure whereby the
cost of restoring the structure to its before damaged condition would equal or
exceed 50 percent of the market value of the structure before the damage occurred.
"Substantial improvement" means any reconstruction, rehabilitation, addition,
or other proposed new development of a structure, the cost of which equals or
exceeds fifty percent of the market value of the structure before the "start of
construction" of the improvement. This term includes structures which have incurred "substantial
damage", regardless of the actual repair work performed.
Substantially is at least 90%

Words and Phrases, 2005 (v. 40B, p. 329)
N.H. 1949. The word substantially as used in provision of Unemployment
Compensation Act that experience rating of an employer may be transferred to an
employing unit which acquires the organization, trade, or business, or substantially all
of the assets thereof, is an elastic term which does not include a definite, fixed amount of
percentage, and the transfer does not have to be 100 per cent but cannot be less
than 90 per cent in the ordinary situation. R.L. c 218, 6, subd. F, as added by
Laws 1945, c.138, 16.
Substantial increase is 50 to 100 percent

UNEP 2 United nations environmental program,
www.unep.org/geo/geo3/english/584.htm, October 1 2002, DA6/21/11, OST
Change in selected pressures on natural ecosystems 2002-32. For the ecosystem quality component, see the
explanation of the Natural Capital Index. Values for the cumulative pressures were derived as described under
Natural Capital Index. The maps show the relative increase or decrease in pressure between 2002 and 2032. 'No
small increase or
change' means less than 10 per cent change in pressure over the scenario period;
decrease means between 10 and 50 per cent change; substantial increase or
decrease means 50 to 100 per cent change; strong increase means more than doubling of
pressure. Areas which switch between natural and domesticated land uses are recorded separately.
Substantially must be 2 percent

Words & Phrases 60
'Substantial" means "of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable."
Bequest to charitable institution, making 1/48 of expenditures in state, held exempt
from taxation; such expenditures constituting "substantial" part of its activities. Tax
Commission of Ohio v. American Humane Education Soc., 181 N.E. 557, 42 Ohio
App. 4.
Substantial should be defined as 40 percent best avoids

vagueness
Schwartz 4 (Arthur, Lawyer Schwartz + Goldberg, 2002 U.S. Briefs 1609, Lexis)
In the opinion below, the Tenth Circuit suggested that a percentage figure would be
a way to avoid vagueness issues. (Pet. App., at 13-14) Indeed, one of the Amici
supporting the City in this case, the American Planning Association, produced a
publication that actually makes a recommendation of a percentage figure that
should be adopted by municipalities in establishing zoning [*37] regulations for
adult businesses. n8 The APA's well researched report recommended that the terms
"substantial" and "significant" be quantified at 40 percent for floor space or
inventory of a business in the definition of adult business. n9 (Resp. Br. App., at 15-
16)
Substantially- Quantitative Best
The qualitative definitions of substantially are vague and
unlimiting
Stark 97 Stephen J., Key Words And Tricky Phrases: An Analysis Of Patent Drafter's Attempts To Circumvent
The Language Of 35 U.S.C., Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Fall, 5 J. Intell. Prop. L. 365, Lexis
1. Ordinary Meaning. First, words in a patent are to be given their ordinary meaning unless otherwise defined.
consider the word
30 However, what if a particular word has multiple meanings? For example,
"substantial." The Webster dictionary gives eleven different definitions of the word substantial. 31
Additionally, there are another two definitions specifically provided for the adverb "substantially." 32 Thus, the
"ordinary meaning" is not clear. The first definition of the word "substantial" given by the Webster's Dictionary
is "of ample or considerable amount, quantity, size, etc." 33 Supposing that this is the precise definition that the
the meaning of "ample or considerable
drafter had in mind when drafting the patent,
amount" appears amorphous. This could have one of at least the following
interpretations: (1) almost all, (2) more than half, or (3) barely enough to do
the job. Therefore, the use of a term, such as "substantial," which usually has a
very ambiguous meaning, makes the scope of protection particularly hard to
determine.
Substantially- Qualitative Best
Substantial means considerable in amount, not an arbitrary
percentage.
Prost 4 Judge United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Committee
For Fairly Traded Venezuelan Cement v. United States, 6-18,
http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/04opinions/04-1016.html
The URAA and the SAA neither amend nor refine the language of 1677(4)(C). In
fact, they merely suggest, without disqualifying other alternatives, a clearly
higher/substantial proportion approach. Indeed, the SAA specifically mentions that
no precise mathematical formula or benchmark proportion is to be used for a
dumping concentration analysis. SAA at 860 (citations omitted); see also Venez.
Cement, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1329-30. Furthermore, as the Court of International
Trade noted, the SAA emphasizes that the Commission retains the discretion to
determine concentration of imports on a case-by-case basis. SAA at 860. Finally,
the definition of the word substantial undercuts the CFTVCs argument. The word
substantial generally means considerable in amount, value or worth. Websters
Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1993). It does not imply a specific
number or cut-of. What may be substantial in one situation may not be in
another situation. The very breadth of the term substantial undercuts the
CFTVCs argument that Congress spoke clearly in establishing a standard for the
Commissions regional antidumping and countervailing duty analyses. It therefore
supports the conclusion that the Commission is owed deference in its interpretation
of substantial proportion. The Commission clearly embarked on its analysis
having been given considerable leeway to interpret a particularly broad term.
Common definitions are more predictable, because

substantially is not a legal term of art.
Arkush 2 David, A.B.. Washington University, 1999: J.D. Candidate. Harvard Law
School. 2003., Preserving "Catalyst" Attorneys' Fees Under the Freedom of
Information Act in the Wake of Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law
Review, Winter,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/crcl/vol37_1/arkush.pdf Accessed 7/10/12
Plaintiffs should argue that the term "substantially prevail" is not a term of art
because if considered a term of art, resort to Black's 7th produces a definition of
"prevail" that could be interpreted adversely to plaintiffs. 99 It is commonly
accepted that words that are not legal terms of art should be accorded their
ordinary, not their legal, meaning, 100 and ordinary-usage dictionaries provide FOIA
fee claimants with helpful arguments. The Supreme Court has already found
favorable, temporally relevant definitions of the word "substantially" in ordinary
dictionaries: "Substantially" suggests "considerable" or "specified to a large
degree." See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1976) (defining
"substantially" as "in a substantial manner" and "substantial" as "considerable in
amount, value, or worth" and "being that specified to a large degree or in the
main"); see also 17 Oxford English Dictionary 66-67 (2d ed. 1989) ("substantial":
"relating to or proceeding from the essence of a thing; essential"; "of ample or
considerable amount, quantity or dimensions"). 101
Substantially- Contextual Definitions Best
Substantially must be interpreted in context
Devinsky 2 Paul, Is Claim "Substantially" Definite? Ask Person of Skill in the Art, IP Update, 5(11),
November, http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object_id/c2c73bdb-9b1a-42bf-a2b7-
075812dc0e2d.cfm
In reversing a summary judgment of invalidity, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
found that the district court, by failing to look beyond the intrinsic claim construction evidence to
consider what a person of skill in the art would understand in a "technologic context," erroneously
concluded the term "substantially" made a claim fatally indefinite . Verve, LLC v.
Crane Cams, Inc., Case No. 01-1417 (Fed. Cir. November 14, 2002). The patent in suit related to an improved
push rod for an internal combustion engine. The patent claims a hollow push rod whose overall diameter is
larger at the middle than at the ends and has "substantially constant wall thickness" throughout the rod and
rounded seats at the tips. The district court found that the expression "substantially constant wall thickness"
was not supported in the specification and prosecution history by a sufficiently clear definition of "substantially"
and was, therefore, indefinite. The district court recognized that the use of the term "substantially" may be
definite in some cases but ruled that in this case it was indefinite because it was not further defined. The
Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court erred in requiring that the meaning of the term
"substantially" in a particular "technologic context" be found solely in intrinsic evidence: "While reference to
intrinsic evidence is primary in interpreting claims, the criterion is the meaning of words as they would be
understood by persons in the field of the invention." Thus, the Federal Circuit instructed that
"resolution of any ambiguity arising from the claims and specification may be aided by
extrinsic evidence of usage and meaning of a term in the context of the invention." The Federal
Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instruction that "[t]he question is not whether
the word 'substantially' has a fixed meaning as applied to 'constant wall thickness,' but
how the phrase would be understood by persons experienced in this field of
mechanics, upon reading the patent documents."
Substantially- Without Material Qualifications
Substantially means without material qualifications
Blacks Law Dictionary 1991 (p. 1024)
Substantially - means essentially; without material qualification.
Material is relevant and significant

Hill and Hill 2005 (Gerald, practiced law for more than four decade, and Kathleen, writer, publisher
and newspaper columnist, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/material)
material adj. 1) relevant and significant in a lawsuit, as in "material evidence" as

distinguished from totally irrelevant or of such minor importance that the court
will either ignore it, rule it immaterial if objected to, or not allow lengthy testimony upon such a matter. 2)
"material breach" of a contract is a valid excuse by the other party not to perform. However, an insignificant
divergence from the terms of the contract is not a material breach.
Qualification is a limiting modification

Merriam-Webster Online 2011
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/qualification
1 : a restriction in meaning or application : a limiting modification <this statement

stands without qualification>
Substantially = Not Imaginary
Substantially is not imaginary
True or real; not imaginary
"Substantial" means actually existing, real, or belonging to

substance
Words and Phrases 2 (Volume 40A) p. 460
Ala. 1909. Substantial means belonging to substance; actually existing; real;

*** not seeming or imaginary; not elusive; real; solid; true; veritable
Substantially = Transparent, Not Concealed
Substantial requires transparency- cant be concealed
Words and Phrases 64 (40W&P 759)
The words" outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive," in connection
with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not
concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation,
reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is
opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine;
certain: absolute: real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal;
opposed to fonn; actually existing; true; not including, admitting, or pertaining to
any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.
Af- Substantial Flexible/Imprecise
Substantial is inherently flexible and imprecise
Mellinkof 92 (David, Law Professor UCLA, 1992 (Mellinkoffs Dictionary of American Legal
Usage, p. 626).
substantial is as flexible in the law as in ordinary English. That is its reason for
continued existence in the law. Long use of substantial in combinations , e.g., substantial
evidence, can produce impression of precision, which is lacking. The word is an alert!
What substantial fastens itself to becomes infected with substantials
flexibility. A place for discretion.
Increase
Increase- Make Greater
Increase is to make larger
American Heritage Dictionary 1American Heritage Dictionary
www.answers.com/topic/increase ,2/1/2001 , DA 6/20/11, OST
To become greater or larger. To multiply; reproduce.
Increase is to become greater in size, number or intensity

Merriam-Webster 5 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/increase,
dictionary, November 13 2005, DA 6/21/11, OST
to become progressively greater (as in size, amount, number, or intensity)
Increase is to add to
Dictionary.com 6 Dictionary.com: definitions, 11/3/2006, dictionary.reference.com, DA 6/21/11, OST
To make greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality ; augment; add to: to increase
taxes.
Increase means add duration to

Word and Phrases 8 (vol. 20B, p. 265)
Me. 1922. Within Workmens Compensation Act, 36, providing for review of any agreement, award, findings,
an
or decree, and that member of Commission may increase, diminish, or discontinue compensation,
increase may include an extension of the time of the award. Graneys Case, 118 A. 369,
121 Me.500.Work Comp 2049.
Increase is Preexisting
Increase must be of something that already exists
Buckley 6 Jeremiah, Attorney, Amicus Curiae Brief, Safeco Ins. Co. of America et al v. Charles Burr et al,
http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/06-84/06-84.mer.ami.mica.pdf
First, the court said that the ordinary meaning of the word increase is to make
something greater, which it believed should not be limited to cases in which a
company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged. 435 F.3d
at 1091. Yet the definition offered by the Ninth Circuit compels the opposite
conclusion. Because increase means to make something greater, there must
necessarily have been an existing premium, to which Edos actual premium may be
compared, to determine whether an increase occurred. Congress could have
provided that ad-verse action in the insurance context means charging an amount
greater than the optimal premium, but instead chose to define adverse action in
terms of an increase. That definitional choice must be respected, not ignored.
See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392-93 n.10 (1979) ([a] defin-ition which
declares what a term means . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated). Next,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the Insurance Prong includes the words
existing or applied for, Congress intended that an increase in any charge for
insurance must apply to all insurance transactions from an initial policy of
insurance to a renewal of a long-held policy. 435 F.3d at 1091. This interpretation
reads the words exist-ing or applied for in isolation. Other types of adverse action
described in the Insurance Prong apply only to situations where a consumer had an
existing policy of insurance, such as a cancellation, reduction, or change in
insurance. Each of these forms of adverse action presupposes an already-existing
policy, and under usual canons of statutory construction the term increase also
should be construed to apply to increases of an already-existing policy. See Hibbs
v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (a phrase gathers meaning from the words
around it) (citation omitted).
Increase implies pre-existence

Brown 3 US Federal Judge District Court of Oregon (Elena Mark and Paul Gustafson, Plaintiffs, v. Valley
Insurance Company and Valley Property and Casualty, Defendants, 7-17, Lexis
The plain and ordinary meaning of the verb "to

FCRA does not define the term "increase."
increase" is to make something greater or larger. 4 Merriam-Webster's [**22] Collegiate
Dictionary 589 (10th ed. 1998). The "something" that is increased in the statute is the "charge for any
insurance." The plain and common meaning of the noun "charge" is "the price demanded for something." Id. at
192. Thus, the statute plainly means an insurer takes adverse action if the insurer makes greater (i.e., larger)
the price demanded for insurance.
An insurer cannot "make greater" something that did not exist previously . The
statutory definition of adverse action, therefore, clearly anticipates an insurer must have made an initial charge
or demand for payment before the insurer can increase that charge. In other words, an insurer cannot increase
the charge for insurance unless the insurer previously set and demanded payment of the premium for that
insured's insurance [**23] coverage at a lower price.
Increase means to add to what already exists.

Corpus Juris Secundum 44
Corpus Juris Secundum, 1944, vol. 42, p. 546
Increase As a Verb. The term presupposes the existence in some measure, or to
some extent, of something which may be enlarged, connotes a change or alteration
in the original, and has been defined as meaning to extend or enlarge in size,
extent, quantity, number, intensity, value, substance, etc.
Increase Not Preexisting
Increase doesnt require prior existence
Reinhardt 5 U.S. Judge for the UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT (Stephen,
JASON RAY REYNOLDS; MATTHEW RAUSCH, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.;
HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees., lexis
Specifically, we must decide whether charging a higher price for initial insurance than the insured would
otherwise have been charged because of information in a consumer credit report constitutes an "increase in any
charge" within the meaning of FCRA. First, we examine the definitions of "increase" and "charge." Hartford Fire
contends that, limited to their ordinary definitions, these words apply only when a consumer has previously
been charged for insurance and that charge has thereafter been increased by the insurer. The phrase, "has
previously been charged," as used by Hartford, refers not only to a rate that the consumer has previously paid
for insurance but also to a rate that the consumer has previously been quoted, even if that rate was increased
[**23] before the consumer made any payment. Reynolds disagrees, asserting that ,under [*1091] the
ordinary definition of the term, an increase in a charge also occurs whenever
an insurer charges a higher rate than it would otherwise have charged because
of any factor--such as adverse credit information, age, or driving record 8 --regardless of whether
the customer was previously charged some other rate . According to Reynolds, he was
charged an increased rate because of his credit rating when he was compelled to pay a rate higher than the
premium rate because he failed to obtain a high insurance score. Thus, he argues, the definitions of "increase"
and "charge" encompass the insurance companies' practice. Reynolds is correct.
Increase" means to make something greater. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d
ed. 1989) ("The action, process, or fact of becoming or making greater; augmentation, growth, enlargement,
extension."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed. 1988) (defining
"increase" as "growth, enlargement, etc[.]"). "Charge" means the price demanded for goods or services. See,
e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The price required or demanded for service rendered, or
(less usually) for goods supplied."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college
Nothing in the definition of these words
ed. 1988) ("The cost or price of an article, service, etc.").
implies that the term "increase in any charge for" should be limited to cases in which a
company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged.
Increase = Net Increase
Must be a net increase
Rogers 5 Judge New York, et al., Petitioners v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent, NSR
Manufacturers Roundtable, et al., Intervenors, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12378, **; 60 ERC (BNA) 1791, 6/24, Lexis
[**48] Statutory Interpretation. HN16While the CAA defines a "modification" as any physical or operational
change that "increases" emissions, it is silent on how to calculate such "increases" in emissions. 42 U.S.C.
7411(a)(4). According to government petitioners, the lack of a statutory definition does not render the term
"increases" ambiguous, but merely compels the court to give the term its "ordinary meaning." See Engine
Mfrs.Ass'nv.S.Coast AirQualityMgmt.Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761, 158 L. Ed. 2d 529(2004);
Bluewater Network, 370 F.3d at 13; Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Glickman, 342 U.S. App. D.C. 7, 215 F.3d 7,
Relying on two "real world" analogies, government petitioners contend
10 [*23] (D.C. Cir. 2000).
the ordinary meaning of "increases" requires the baseline to be calculated
that
from a period immediately preceding the change. They maintain, for example, that in
determining whether a high-pressure weather system "increases" the local temperature, the relevant baseline is
the temperature immediately preceding the arrival of the weather system, not the temperature five or ten years
ago. Similarly, [**49] in determining whether a new engine "increases" the value of a car, the relevant baseline
is the value of the car immediately preceding the replacement of the engine, not the value of the car five or ten
years ago when the engine was in perfect condition.
Its
Its- Possessive
Its implies possession
Corpus Juris Secundum, 1981 (Volume 48A, p. 247)
The possessive case of the neuter pronoun it. Also, as an adjective, meaning of
Its.
or belonging to it. Sometimes referred to as the possessive word, but it does not necessarily imply
ownership in fee, but may indicate merely a right to use.
Its is an attributive adjective showing possession

Random House Dictionary, 1966 (p. 758)
Its (pronoun). The possessive form of it (used as an attributive adjective : The book has
lost its jacket. Im sorry about its being so late.)
Its means belonging to it or that thing

Oxford English Dictionary, 1989 (second edition, online)
Its A. As adj. poss. pron. Of or belonging to it, or that thing (L. ejus); also refl., Of or
belonging to itself, its own (L. suus). The reflexive is often more fully its own, for
which in earlier times the own, it own, were used: see OWN.
Its is belonging to
The Free Dictionary 5(Thefreedictionary.com, June 25 2005, DA 6/21/11, OST)
a. of, belonging to, or associated in some way with it its left rear wheel
b. (as pronoun) each town claims its is the best
Its is possessive
Merriam-Webster 11(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/its,
dictionary, June 1 2011, DA 6/21/11, OST)
of or relating to it or itself especially as possessor, agent, or object of an action
Economic and/or Diplomatic
Engagement
General Definitions

EE/DE Mil or Cultural
Economic engagement includes export credits, access to technology,
loans, economic aid, removal of penalties, reduction of tarifs, and
facilitated entry into global economic institutions. Diplomatic
engagement involves recognition, access to international
institutions, and high level summits.
Military and cultural engagement are distinct.
Haass and OSullivan 2000 Richard N. and Meghan L., Director and Fellow,
respectively, of the Foreign Policy Studies Program @ Brookings Institution, Honey
and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 4-6
Architects of engagement strategies have a wide variety of incentives from which to choose. Economic
engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to
technology, loans, and economic aid.12 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of
penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have impeded economic
relations between the United States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global economic
arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today's global market.13
Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition,

access to regional or international institutions, or the scheduling of summits
between leadersor the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could
involve the extension of International Military Educational Training (IMET) both to
strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country's armed
forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young
foreign military officers. 14 These areas of engagement are likely to involve working
with state institutions, while cultural or civil society engagement is likely to entail
building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organizations,
facilitating the flow of remittances, establishing postal and telephone links between
the United States and the target country, and promoting the exchange of students,
tourists, and other nongovernmental people between the countries are some of the
incentives that might be offered under a policy of cultural engagement.
Economic and diplomatic are distinct from military or cultural

engagement- our interpretation creates a reasonable case list
while avoiding common pitfalls in defining engagement.
Resnick 1
Evan, currently Assistant Professor, Coordinator of the United States Programme, Coordinator of
External Teaching, and Deputy Coordinator of the International Relations Programme at RSIS,
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2, Rogue States: Isolation
vs.Engagement in the 21st Century, (Spring 2001), pp. 551-566
A Refined Definition of Engagement
In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes , I
propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political
behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and
enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i .e.
diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the
specific forms that such contacts might include: DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS Extension
of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations Promotion of target-
state membership in international institutions and regimes Summit meetings and
other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender
state to target state and vice-versa MILITARY CONTACTS Visits of senior military
officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa Arms transfers Military aid
and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and
security-building measures Intelligence sharing ECONOMIC CONTACTS Trade
agreements and promotion Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of
loans and/or grants Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and
target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in
the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions
across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the
target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased
contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic
and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a
number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.26 For instance,
individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high
level of conditionality.27 Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using
engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the
behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic
balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by
shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political
change from below within the target state.
This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to
constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts
between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound
by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent
relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not
reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a
change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the
target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it
can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to
engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US
dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and
the near-total collapse of its national economy.28 Third, the target state must perceive the
engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or
prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited
regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's
Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of
engagement. This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing
scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means
rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be
engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the
existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be
shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.
Economic engagement is distinct from other forms, like

military, political, or cultural engagement.
Haass Director of Foreign Policy Studies @ Brookings, and
O'Sullivan, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies @
Brookings, 2000 (Richard and Meghan, "Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to
Punitive Policies,"
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer
%20haass/2000survival.pdf Accessed 7/7/13 GAL)
Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives.
Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits,
investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans and economic
aid.3 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties
such as trade embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs, which have impeded
economic relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated
entry into the economic global arena and the institutions that govern it rank
among the most potent incentives in todays global market. Similarly, political
engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or
international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders or the
termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of
international military educational training in order both to strengthen respect for
civilian authority and human rights among a countrys armed forces and, more
feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military
officers. While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state
institutions, cultural or civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people
contacts. Funding nongovernmental organisations, facilitating the flow of
remittances and promoting the exchange of students, tourists and other non-
governmental people between countries are just some of the possible incentives
used in the form of engagement.
Economic engagement includes export credits, access to technology, loans, economic aid,
removal of penalties, reduction of tariffs, and facilitated entry into global economic
institutions. Diplomatic engagement involves recognition, access to international
institutions, and high level summits. Military and cultural engagement are distinct
categories.
Architects of engagement strategies have a wide variety of incentives from which to choose. Economic
engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to
technology, loans, and economic aid.12 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of
penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have impeded economic
relations between the United States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global economic
arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today's global market.13
Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition,

access to regional or international institutions, or the scheduling of summits
between leadersor the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could
involve the extension of International Military Educational Training (IMET) both to
strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country's armed
forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young
foreign military officers. 14 These areas of engagement are likely to involve working
with state institutions, while cultural or civil society engagement is likely to entail
building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organizations,
facilitating the flow of remittances, establishing postal and telephone links between
the United States and the target country, and promoting the exchange of students,
tourists, and other nongovernmental people between the countries are some of the
incentives that might be offered under a policy of cultural engagement.
Maintaining mutually exclusive categories of military,

diplomatic, and economic statecraft is necessary for limits and
good policy-making.
Baldwin 85 David A., Professor of World Order Studies and Political Science at
Colombia, Economic Statecraft, p. 12-14
policy makers may choose from among a wide variety of
In making influence attempts foreign
alternative ways to promote their goals. Foreign policy tools, means, instruments, levers, and
techniques all refer to the policy options available to decision makers in pursuing a given set of objectives; and these terms will
To reduce the multitude of techniques of statecraft to
here be used interchangeably.
manageable proportions, a classification scheme that facilitates reference to broad categories of
statecraft is useful. The selection of a particular taxonomy, however, is not a purely
arbitrary undertaking, but rather should proceed according to specified criteria. The criteria employed
here are as follows: 1. Conformity with scientific canons requiring parallel categories to be mutually
exclusive and exhaustive of all cases. 2. Avoidance of unnecessary departures
from common usage. Ideally, categories would be consistent with common usage by laymen, academics, and policy
makers. 3. Utility in identifying and clarifying policy options for modern statesmen. The important
thing is to capture the richness and variety of available techniques without overwhelming the policy maker with a huge number of
categories. Some scholars reduce all techniques of statecraft to two categories war and diplomacy. Both Raymond Aron and Hans
Morgenthau illustrate this tendency to use diplomacy to refer to all the means of conducting relations with other states short of
war. While such an approach may be reasonably consistent with the first two criteria, it is seriously deficient in terms of the third
criterion. It is simply not very helpful to present a policy maker with only two sets of options. Even the busiest statesman is likely to
regard such categorization as overly simple and not especially useful. The trick is to give the policy maker a set of alternatives that
is simple enough to be readily understood yet complex enough to call attention to alternatives that might otherwise be ignored.
Charles F. Hermann has developed a taxonomy of foreign policy instruments based on eight categories: diplomatic, domestic
political, military, intelligence, economic, scientific/technological, promotive, and natural resources. Although this thought-provoking
list is more useful than the simple dichotomy suggested by Aron and Morgenthau, some of the categories are not mutually exclusive
(e.g., economic and natural resources); and, more importantly, this taxonomy may involve too many categories to be useful to a
policy maker. Bewildering complexity is as undesirable as oversimplification. If common usage is a desirable characteristic, an old
taxonomy may be more useful than a more recent one, since there has been more time for such categories to become accepted.
Harold Lasswells classic work, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, sets forth a classification scheme that seems well suited to the
study of policy instruments. In a postscript to this book written in 1958, Lasswell suggests that his fourfold division of policy
instruments is particularly convenient when the external relations of a group are considered: information, diplomacy, economics,
force (words, deals, goods, weapons). Lasswells formulation provides the basis for the following taxonomy of techniques of
Propaganda refers to influence attempts relying primarily on
statecraft employed in this book: 1.
the deliberate manipulation of verbal symbols. 2. Diplomacy refers to influence
attempts relying primarily on negotiation. 3. Economic statecraft refers to
influence attempts relying primarily on resources which have a reasonable
semblance of a market price in terms of money. (This category will be developed in chapter 3.) 4.
Military statecraft refers to influence attempts relying primarily on violence,
weapons, or force. Mutual influence attempts by states, of course, will often involve varying degrees of more than one of
these elements; but in most cases it is possible to make a reasonable judgment as to the
primary basis of the influence attempt . Words, for example, are often involved in diplomatic, economic, and
military statecraft; but that does not mean that all such influence attempts must be classified as propaganda. As in all classification
With a reasonable amount of
schemes, borderline cases exist that require the analyst to make judgments.
imagination and judgment the requirements that categories be mutually exclusive
and that they exhaust all cases can be satisfied, at least adequately if not perfectly.
EE= Incentives
Economic engagement means positive incentives, as opposed
to negative sanctions.
Mastanduno, Professor of Govt @ Dartmouth, 2001
Michael,Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice, June, Paper
prepared for Interdependence and Conflict, edited by Edward Mansfield and Brian
Pollins, http://www.scribd.com/doc/114249238/Economic-Engagement-Strategies-
Theory-and-Practice Accessed 7/7/13 GAL
This is problematic in the sense that even a cursory examination suggests that
positive economic measures have the potential to be as effective, if not more so,
than negative ones. Threats and coercion usually inspire resentment and resistance
in a target state; rewards and inducements are more likely to prompt a willingness
to bargain. Negative sanctions tend to produce the rally around the flag effect: as
Fidel Castros Cuba and Saddam Husseins Iraq demonstrate, leaders can often
mobilize internal political support for their regimes by pointing to the existence of
an external threat. Economic engagement strategies do not inspire this type of
patriotic coalescence in the target country. Negative sanctions typically require
multilateral support in order to be effective; economic engagement can benefit from
multilateral support but can also work unilaterally. Finally, negative sanctions, unlike
positive measures, carry the risk of escalation to more costly measures. If sanctions
fail, leaders face the choice of accepting failure or escalating to military means of
statecraft.
The distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is the use

of positive incentives to shape the behavior of the target.
The term engagement was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive
engagement pursued by the United States toward South Africa during the first term
of the Reagan administration. However, the term itself remains a source of
confusion. To the Chinese, the word appears to mean simply the conduct of normal
relations. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English
speakers, the concept behind the word is unclear. Except in the few instances in
which the United States has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably
''engages" states and actors all the time in one capacity or another simply by
interacting with them. This book, however, employs the term engagement in a
much more specific way, one that involves much more than a policy of nonisolation.
In our usage, engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends to a
significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly,
engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy
instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often
considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of
sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of
engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives
to shape the behavior of countries with which the United States has important
disagreements.
Engagement means positive incentives to alter another states

behavior.
Borer, Professor @ the Naval Postgraduate School, 2004
Douglas A, U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy & Strategy,
CHAPTER 12 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STATECRAFT: RETHINKING ENGAGEMENT,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/strategy2004/12borer.pdf
Accessed 7/6/13 GAL
The policy of engagement refers to the use of non-coercive means, or positive
incentives, by one state to alter the elements of another states behavior. As such,
some scholars have categorized engagement as a form of appeasement.21
However, I concur with the view articulated by Randall Schweller that, while
engagement can be classified in generic terms as a form of appeasement, an
important qualitative difference exists between the two: Engagement is more than
appeasement, he says: It encompasses any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied
power into acceptance of the established order. In practice engagement may be
distinguished from other policies not so much by its goals but by its means: it relies
on the promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment to influence the
targets behavior. . . . The policy succeeds if such concessions convert the
revolutionary state into a status quo power with a stake in the stability of the
system. . . . Engagement is most likely to succeed when the established powers are
strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, to use sticks as well as
carrots. . . . Otherwise, concessions will signal weakness that emboldens the
aggressor to demand more.22
EE = Positive Sanctions
A. Economic engagement means positive sanctions
(Michael,Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice, June, Paper
Theory-and-Practice Accessed 7/7/13 GAL)
Much of the renewed attention in political science to the question of
interdependence and conflict focuses at the systemic level, on arguments and
evidence linking the expansion of economic exchange among states on the one
hand to the exacerbation of international conflict or the facilitation of international
cooperation on the other. The approach taken in this contribution focuses instead at
the state level, on the expansion of economic interdependence as a tool of
statecraft. Under what circumstances does the cultivation of economic ties, i.e., the
fostering of economic interdependence as a conscious state strategy, lead to
important and predictable changes in the foreign policy behavior of a target state?
Students of economic statecraft refer to this strategy variously as economic
engagement, economic inducement, economic diplomacy, positive sanctions,
positive economic linkage, or the use of economic carrots instead of sticks. Critics
of the strategy call it economic appeasement.
B. Positive sanctions include.

Cortright 97 (David, president of the Fourth Freedom Forum in Goshen, Indiana, and fellow at the Joan B.
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, The Price of Peace: Incentives
and International Conflict Prevention, p. 6-7, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/price/chap01.pdf)
In his classic study, Economic Statecraft, David Baldwin offered the following
examples of what he termed positive sanctions:
granting most-favored-nation status
tariff reductions
direct purchases
subsidies to exports or imports
providing export or import licenses
foreign aid
guaranteeing investments
encouraging capital imports or exports
favorable taxation
promises of the above.6
Other examples that could be added to Baldwins list include:

granting access to advanced technology
offering diplomatic and political support
military cooperation
environmental and social cooperation
cultural exchanges
support for citizen diplomacy
debt relief
security assurances
granting membership in international organizations or security alliances
lifting negative sanctions.

EE= Removal of Sanctions
Removal of sanctions and trade barriers is an increase in
economic engagement.
Gratius 2005 Susanne, Doctor in Political Sciences from University of Hamburg,
Helping Castro? EU and US policies towards Cuba, Fundacin para las Relaciones
Internacionales y el Dilogo Exterior, www.fride.org, October
For this reason it is necessary to consider the creation of a transatlantic policy for
the promotion of democracy in Cuba. Apart from the well-known differences, the
policies of the US and the EU do have some elements in common which could serve
as a starting point to create a shared agenda. Since the approval of the Common
Position on Cuba in 1996, the EU has followed a conditional diplomacy, thus moving
closer to Washington's policy of pressure. The US lifted the sanction on exports of
medicines and food, aligning itself more closely with the EU policy of economic
engagement. This shows that US policy towards Cuba is not only limited to
sanctions and that the EU has not opted for a strategy of "constructive
engagement" but rather for one of "conditional engagement".
Engagement = Means not Ends
Defining engagement by the ends of accepting the
international order is overly narrow and biases empirical
research outcomes.
Resnick 1
Defining Engagement Too Narrowly The third trap that has ensnared numerous
scholars is the tendency to needlessly circumscribe the parameters of engagement .
This results from attempts to: define engagement as ends rather than means;
stipulate the types of states that can engage or be engaged; restrict the types of
behaviors that comprise engagement; and limit the types of behaviors that can be
modified through engagement. Each of these restrictions hampers the task of evaluating
the utility of engagement relative to other policies objectively accurately. Some scholars have
excessively narrowed the definition of engagement by defining it according to the
ends sought rather than the means employed . For example, Schweller and
Wohlforth assert that if any distinction can be drawn between engagement and
appeasement, "it is that the goal of engagement is not simply tension-reduction and
the avoidance of war but also an attempt to socialize [a] dissatisfied power into
acceptance of the established order."17 Such ends-based definitions hinder the
study of engagement in two ways. First, because the act of policymaking consists of
selecting from a variety of alternative means in the pursuit of a given end(s), it
stands to reason that policy instruments are more effectively conceptualized in
terms of means rather than ends. When defined as different means, policies can be more
easily compared with one another across a whole spectrum of discrete ends, in order to
gauge more accurately the circumstances under which each policy is relatively more or less
effective.18
Second, scholars who define engagement as the end of peaceful socialization

inevitably create a bias for future empirical research on engagement outcomes . This
is because it is difficult to imagine a more ambitious foreign policy objective than
the peaceable transformation of a revisionist state that rejects the dominant norms
and practices of the international system into a status-quo state that embodies
those same norms and practices. The equation of engagement with socialization
alone forecloses the possibility that engagement could be employed to accomplish
more modest goals such as tension-reduction . Therefore, all else being equal,
scholars using this loaded definition will be predisposed to conclude from
examination only of the hardest cases of attempted socialization that the policy is
ineffective.19 Considering engagement as a set of means would enable analysts to
more fairly assess the effectiveness of engagement relative to other policies in
achieving an array of ends.
Engagement is distinguished by the means of positive
incentives, not its goals.
Douglas A, U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy & Strategy,
Accessed 7/6/13 GAL
The policy of engagement refers to the use of non-coercive means, or positive
incentives, by one state to alter the elements of another states behavior. As such,
some scholars have categorized engagement as a form of appeasement.21
However, I concur with the view articulated by Randall Schweller that, while
engagement can be classified in generic terms as a form of appeasement, an
important qualitative difference exists between the two: Engagement is more than
appeasement, he says: It encompasses any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied
power into acceptance of the established order. In practice engagement may be
distinguished from other policies not so much by its goals but by its
means: it relies on the promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment to
influence the targets behavior. . . . The policy succeeds if such concessions convert
the revolutionary state into a status quo power with a stake in the stability of the
system. . . . Engagement is most likely to succeed when the established powers are
strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, to use sticks as well as
carrots. . . . Otherwise, concessions will signal weakness that emboldens the
aggressor to demand more.22
Engagement Appeasement
Appeasement is ceding territory or a sphere of influence

engagement requires an ongoing interdependent process.
Resnick 1
Differentiating Between Engagement and Appeasement In contrast to many
prevailing conceptions of engagement, the one proposed in this essay allows a
substantive distinction to be drawn between engagement and appeasement. The
standard definition of appeasementwhich derives from the language of classical
European diplomacy, namely "a policy of attempting to reduce tension between two
states by the methodical removal of the principal causes of conflict between
them"29is venerable but nevertheless inadequate.30 It does not provide much
guidance to the contemporary policymaker or policy analyst, because it conceives of a
foreign policy approach in terms of the ends sought while never making clear the precise
means involved. The principal causes of conflict between two states can be removed in a
number of ways.31 A more refined definition of appeasement that not only remains
loyal to the traditional connotations but also establishes a firm conceptual
distinction from engagement might be: the attempt to influence the political
behavior of a target state by ceding territory and/or a geopolitical sphere of
influence to that state. Indeed, the two best-known cases of appeasement, Great
Britain's appeasement of the United States at the turn of the 20th century and of
Nazi Germany in the 1930s, reveals that much of this appeasement adopted
precisely these guises. The key elements of the British appeasement of the US-
acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine permission for the US to build and fortify a
Central American canal, and acquiescence to American claims on the border
between Alaska and the Yukonconsisted of explicit acknowledgement of American
territorial authority.32 Meanwhile, the appeasement of the Third Reich by Great
Britain was characterized by acquiescence to: Germany's military reoccupation of
the Rhineland (1936); annexation of Austria (1938); acquisition of the Sudetenland
from Czechoslovakia as decided at the Munich Conference; and absorption of the
remainder of Czechoslovakia (1939).33 A more contemporary example of
appeasement is the land for peace exchange that represents the centerpiece of the
on-again off-again diplomatic negotiations between the Israeli government and the
Palestinian Authority. Thus, a rigid conceptual distinction can be drawn between
engagement and appeasement. Whereas both policies are positive sanctions
insofar as they add to the power and prestige of the target stateengagement does
so in a less direct and less militarized fashion than appeasement. In addition,
engagement difers from appeasement by establishing an increasingly
interdependent relationship between the sender and the target state. At
any juncture, the sender state can, in theory, abrogate such a relationship at some
(ideally prohibitive) cost to the target state.34 Appeasement, on the other hand, does
not involve the establishment of contacts or interdependence between the appeaser
and the appeased. Territory and/or a sphere of influence are merely transferred by
one party to the other either unconditionally or in exchange for certain concessions
on the part of the target state.
Engagement is not a synonym for appeasement- it requires

more than non-coercive means or the approaches become
indistinguishable.
Resnick 1
Conflating Engagement and Appeasement One serious flaw in scholarly
conceptualizations of engagement is the tendency to view engagement as simply a
synonym for appeasement, a policy approach that has fallen into disrepute since the
late 1930s. In their book, Force and Statecraft, Gordon Craig and Alexander George make the
following case: "constructive engagement.. .is essentially a policy of appeasement, though the
term itself cannot be used."11 Similarly, in a recently published article, Randall Schweller and
William Wohlforth refer to engagement as "simply a new, 'more acceptable' term for
an old policy that used to be called appeasement ."12 Another scholar, Victor Cha,
does try to differentiate appeasement from engagement, though he does so in a
manner that nevertheless renders the two policies indistinguishable. Cha
claims that engagement occurs when "non-coercive and non-punitive" means are
employed by a strong country toward a weak country, while appeasement is the use
of the very same means by a weak country against a strong country .13 This
suggests that only the strong can engage and only the weak can appease, though
the actual means deployed are virtually identical in both cases.
The disengagement test: if the plans concession can be done

while simultaneously abrogating contact with China, it is
appeasement, not engagement.
Resnick 1
Engagement vs. Isolation, Appeasement vs. Containment The proposed definition of
engagement helps clarify the distinctions between alternative foreign policy
approaches that rely on positive sanctions and also makes understandable
distinctions among some frequently mentioned alternative approaches that rely on
negative sanctions. In current discussions on US foreign policy toward rogue states,
and especially on US foreign policy toward China, engagement and containment are paired
as antipodal policies. In fact, one recent scholarly article addressing US-P.R.C. relations
decries the fact that "the media and many pundits have constructed US choices as limited
to 'engagement' and 'containment.'"35 However, in light of the distinction I posit
between engagement and appeasement, one could more intuitively construe
containment to be the opposite of appeasement rather than engagement.
Containment has been traditionally construed as the attempt to prevent the geopolitical
expansion of a target state.36 If appeasement constitutes the cession of territory and/or
spheres of influence to a target state, containment might more appropriately be
considered the policy of preventing a target state from expanding its territorial scope
and/or sphere of geopolitical influence. Thus, whereas a sender state can expand
contacts across multiple issue areas with a target state while simultaneously
deterring it from committing aggression and/or expanding its geopolitical influence
by allying with its neighbors (engagement plus containment), it would be impossible
for a sender state to cede territory and/or a sphere of influence to a target state
while simultaneously preventing that same state from expanding its territory or
sphere of geopolitical influence (appeasement plus containment ). The opposite of a
policy of engagement would be one in which a state comprehensively diminishes
and withdraws contacts across multiple issue areas with another state . Although such
a policy would be considered a negative sanction, it does not attempt to do so through
containment policy. One could label such a policy
direct geopolitical means, as does a
as disengagement or isolation.37 Thus, whereas a state can yield another state
territory or an enlarged sphere of influence while simultaneously
abrogating contacts with that state (appeasement plus disengagement), it
is impossible for a state to expand and diminish contacts with another
state across multiple issue-areas (engagement plus disengagement ).
The distinctions drawn between engagement, appeasement, containment and isolation allow for
a more focused and coherent discussion of some of the options available for dealing with rival
states. For example, current US policy toward China can be depicted as engagement plus
containment. Efforts in recent years to liberalize trade with China, integrate the P.R.C. into
international institutions and regimes, facilitate numerous diplomatic visits and summit
meetings, and conduct bilateral exchanges of senior military personnel and
academics are representative of engagement. However, at the same time, the US has
elected to contain rather than appease China by taking steps to prevent the P.R.C.
from expanding its territory or sphere of influence in East Asia. Most important, the US
has signaled that it would not stand aside if Beijing tries to absorb Taiwan by force. Toward
this end, the US has continued to sell large quantities of arms to the Taiwanese government,
and, in 1995 and 1996, it played high stakes gunboat diplomacy with China in the Taiwan
Straits.38 In addition, the United States has retained its Cold War military alliances with both
South Korea and Japan and has maintained a strong troop presence in both countries.39
The US has also expressed grave concern about "Chinese intrusions" into disputed island
territories in the South China Sea.40 Taken together, these steps exemplify Columbia
University Professor A. Doak Barnett's 1966 injunction to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that American policy toward China should constitute "containment but not
isolation."41
EE = Interdependence to Change Behavior
Economic engagement promotes interdependence as a long
term strategy of gradual change.
The basic causal logic of economic engagement, and the emphasis on domestic
politics, can be traced to Hirschman. He viewed economic engagement as a long-
term, transformative strategy. As one state gradually expands economic interaction
with its target, the resulting (asymmetrical) interdependence creates vested
interests within the target society and government. The beneficiaries of
interdependence become addicted to it, and they protect their interests by
pressuring the government to accommodate the source of interdependence.
Economic engagement is a form of structural linkage; it is a means to get other
states to want what you want, rather than to do what you want. The causal chain
runs from economic interdependence through domestic political change to foreign
policy accommodation.
Economic engagement is the expansion of economic

interdependence as a tool of statecraft- involves positive
sanctions and carrots
Michael,Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice, June, Paper
Theory-and-Practice Accessed 7/7/13 GAL
Much of the renewed attention in political science to the question of
interdependence and conflict focuses at the systemic level, on arguments and
evidence linking the expansion of economic exchange among states on the one
hand to the exacerbation of international conflict or the facilitation of international
cooperation on the other. The approach taken in this contribution focuses instead at
the state level, on the expansion of economic interdependence as a tool of
statecraft. Under what circumstances does the cultivation of economic ties, i.e., the
fostering of economic interdependence as a conscious state strategy, lead to
important and predictable changes in the foreign policy behavior of a target state?
Students of economic statecraft refer to this strategy variously as economic
engagement, economic inducement, economic diplomacy, positive sanctions,
positive economic linkage, or the use of economic carrots instead of sticks. Critics
of the strategy call it economic appeasement.
Economic engagement is expanding economic ties to change
behavior of an adversary.
Kahler, Professor of Political Science at UC San Diego and
Kastner, Professor of Govt and Politics @ U of Maryland, 6 (Miles
and Scott, Strategic Uses of Interdependence,
www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/kastner/KahlerKastner.doc , Accessed 7/7/13 GAL)
Economic engagementa policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an
adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and effect an
improvement in bilateral political relationsis the subject of growing, but still
limited, interest in the international relations literature. The bulk of the work on
economic statecraft continues to focus on coercive policies such as economic
sanctions. The emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without
justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well-documented,
and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between
countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade
(Gowa 1994; Pollins 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known
about how widespread strategies of economic engagement actually are: scholars
disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive
economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno 2003). Furthermore, beginning with the
classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies in this regard have focused on
policies adopted by great powers. But engagement policies adopted by South Korea
and the other two states examined in this study, Singapore and Taiwan,
demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great
power politics; instead, it may be more widespread than previously recognized.
AT: Engagement = Interdependence
Equating all engagement with economic interdependence is
overlimiting and leaves out core diplomatic engagement
ground.
Resnick 1
Scholars have limited the concept of engagement in a third way by unnecessarily
restricting the scope of the policy. In their evaluation of post-Cold War US
engagement of China, Paul Papayoanou and Scott Kastner define engagement as
the attempt to integrate a target country into the international order through
promoting "increased trade and financial transactions ."21 However, limiting
engagement policy to the increasing of economic interdependence leaves out many
other issue areas that were an integral part of the Clinton administration's China
policy, including those in the diplomatic , military and cultural arenas. Similarly, the US
engagement of North Korea, as epitomized by the 1994 Agreed Framework pact,
promises eventual normalization of economic relations and the gradual normalization of
diplomatic relations.22 Equating engagement with economic contacts alone risks
neglecting the importance and potential effectiveness of contacts in non economic
issue areas.
Engagement = Opposite of Isolation/Containment
Engagement is the opposite of isolation or disengagement
Capie and Evans 2002 (David Capie is a Post-doctoral Research Fellow @
Institute of International Relations, Liu Center for Study of Global Issues, U of British
Columbia, Vancouver. Paul Evans is Professor and Director of the Program on
Canada-Asia Policy Studies, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, p. 110-111)
In the wider literature on security, engagement is used in a looser sense. First it is
regularly employed to describe a state's attitude or posture towards the world at
large, or sometimes towards a particular region. While this usage most commonly
refers to the disposition of the United States, it has also been used to describe other
states' attitudes. In this context engagement is often defined by what it is not. It is
not "isolationism" or "disengagement". Speaking soon after the Clinton
administration came to power, National Security Adviser Tony Lake described the
"imperative" of continued U.S. engagement in world affairs. He gave as examples
the United States' role in the Middle-East peace process; its role in Haiti; its relations
with Russia and Japan; its role in the Group of Seven (G7); as well as in Somalia and
Bosnia. Engagement is closer to the school of American foreign policy that usually
falls under the label "internationalism". John Ruggie has said that American
Presidents from the turn of the century have "sought to devise strategies of
international engagement for the United States. They have differed little about why
such engagement was deemed necessary; differences lie in their preferred means
toward that end."11
Engagement is contrasted with containment or isolation

Capie and Evans 2002 (David Capie is a Post-doctoral Research Fellow @
Institute of International Relations, Liu Center for Study of Global Issues, U of British
Columbia, Vancouver. Paul Evans is Professor and Director of the Program on
Canada-Asia Policy Studies, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, p. 111-112)
Second, engagement is sometimes used in a slightly narrower sense to describe the
political relationship between specific states. Here there are two distinctive usages:
first, engagement can be described as a kind of loosely defined association. The
example that has received the most attention in the literature on Asia-Pacific
security is that of the United States' engagement of China. In this sense,
engagement connotes a relationship of dialogue and involvement and is often
contrasted with "containment" or "isolation".14 Nye has said "the attitude that
'engagement' implies is important." He claims the United States' decision to engage
China "means that [it] has rejected the argument that conflict is inevitable".15 A
related use of engagement is to describe formal state policies or strategies. In the
literature, with this particular' kind of usage, the concepts are often capitalized: for
example, the Clinton administration's "Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement"
and policy of "Comprehensive Engagement" with China. While such policies
sometimes go by similar or even the same names they, unhelpfully, can often be
very different in content. For example, contrast the constructive engagement policy
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as it applies to Myanmar,
with some American usages of the term referring to China (see below).
Must Be Exclusively Economic
Economic engagement means the af must be an exclusively
economic action
Jakstaite, 10 - Doctoral Candidate Vytautas Magnus University Faculty of
Political Sciences and Diplomacy (Lithuania) (Gerda, CONTAINMENT AND
ENGAGEMENT AS MIDDLE-RANGE THEORIES BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS
VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2 (2010), DOI: 10.2478/v10076-010-0015-7)
The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on
economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic
engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the
adversary in order to change the target state s behaviour and to improve
bilateral relations.94 Economic engagement is academically wielded in several respects. It recommends
that the state engage the target country in the international community (with the there existing rules) and modify
the target states run foreign policy, thus preventing the emergence of a potential enemy.95 Thus, this strategy
aims to ensure safety in particular, whereas economic benefit is not a priority objective. Objectives of economic
engagement indicate that this form of engagement is designed for relations with problematic countries those that
pose a potential danger to national security of a state that implements economic engagement. Professor of the
University of California Paul Papayoanou and University of Maryland professor Scott Kastner say that economic
engagement should be used in relations with the emerging powers: countries which accumulate more and more
power, and attempt a new division of power in the international system i.e., pose a serious challenge for the
status quo in the international system (the latter theorists have focused specifically on China-US relations). These
theorists also claim that economic engagement is recommended in relations with emerging powers whose regimes
are not democratic that is, against such players in the international system with which it is difficult to agree on
foreign policy by other means.96 Meanwhile, other supporters of economic engagement (for example, professor of
the University of California Miles Kahler) are not as categorical and do not exclude the possibility to realize
economic engagement in relations with democratic regimes.97 Proponents of economic engagement believe that
the economy may be one factor which leads to closer relations and cooperation (a more peaceful foreign policy and
the expected pledge to cooperate) between hostile countries closer economic ties will develop the target state s
dependence on economic engagement implementing state for which such relations will also be cost-effective (i.e.,
the mutual dependence). However, there are some important conditions for the economic factor in engagement to
be effective and bring the desired results. P. Papayoanou and S. Kastner note that economic engagement gives the
most positive results when initial economic relations with the target state is minimal and when the target state s
political forces are interested in development of international economic relations. Whether economic relations will
encourage the target state to develop more peaceful foreign policy and willingness to cooperate will depend on the
extent to which the target states forces with economic interests are influential in internal political structure. If the
target countrys dominant political coalition includes the leaders or groups interested in the development of
international economic relations, economic ties between the development would bring the desired results.
Academics note that in non-democratic countries in particular leaders often have an interest to pursue economic
cooperation with the powerful economic partners because that would help them maintain a dominant position in
their own country.98 Proponents of economic engagement do not provide a detailed description of the means of this
form of engagement, but identify a number of possible variants of engagement: conditional economic engagement,
using the restrictions caused by economic dependency and unconditional economic engagement by exploiting
economic dependency caused by the flow. Conditional economic engagement, sometimes called
linkage or economic carrots engagement, could be described as conflicting with economic sanctions. A state that
implements this form of engagement instead of menacing to use sanctions for not changing policy course
promises for a target state to provide more economic benefits in return for the
desired political change. Thus, in this case economic ties are developed depending on changes in the
target states behaviour.99 Unconditional economic engagement is more moderate form of
engagement. Engagement applying state while developing economic relations with an adversary hopes that
the resulting economic dependence over time will change foreign policy course of
the target state and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Theorists assume that economic dependence may
act as a restriction of target states foreign policy or as transforming factor that changes target state s foreign
policy objectives.100 Thus, economic engagement focuses solely on economic measures
(although theorists do not give a more detailed description), on strategically important actors of the international
arena and includes other types of engagement, such as the conditional-unconditional economic engagement.
EE can be Private Sector
Economic Engagement can be to the private sector, particularly
in the context of China.
Haass & OSullivan 2000 Richard N. Haass, president of the Council on
Foreign Relations since July 2003, prior to which he was Director of Policy Planning
for the United States Department of State and a close advisor to Secretary of State
Colin Powell. Meghan L. O'Sullivan former deputy national security adviser on Iraq
and Afghanistan. She is Jeane Kirkpatrick Professor of the Practice of International
Affairs,[2] and senior fellow at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of
Government Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy p. 11
Particularly when the economy of the target state is not state dominated, the
provision of economic incentives to the private sector can be an effective mode of
unconditional engagement. In more open economic climates, some of the benefits
of economic interaction may accrue to the regime or to the political elites who
support it; yet in all likelihood, some economic actors nourished by the exchanges
made possible under economic engagement will be agents for change and natural
allies in some Western causes. To the extent that economic engagement builds the
private sector and other nonstate ac tors within the target country, it is likely to
widen the base of support for engagement with America specifically and the
promotion of international norms more generally. Certainly, U.S. engagement with
China has nurtured pockets sympathetic, if not to American ideals per se, then at
least to trade and open economic markets and the maintenance of good relations to
se cure them.
QPQ/Conditional Engagement
EE- Can be Conditional or Unconditional
Economic engagement includes both explicit quid pro quos and
unconditional strategies.
Kahler, Professor of Political Science at UC San Diego and
Kastner, Professor of Govt and Politics @ U of Maryland, 6
Miles and Scott, Strategic Uses of Interdependence,
www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/kastner/KahlerKastner.doc , Accessed 7/7/13 GAL
Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement:
conditional policies that require an explicit quid-pro-quo on the part of the target
country, and policies that are unconditional. Conditional policies, sometimes called
linkage or economic carrots, are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of
threatening a target country with a sanction absent a change in policy, conditional
engagement policies promise increased economic flows in exchange for policy
change. Drezners (1999/2000) analysis of conditional economic inducements yields
a set of highly plausible expectations concerning when conditional strategies are
likely to be employed, and when they are likely to succeed. Specifically, he suggests
that reasons exist to believe, a priori, that policies of conditional engagement will be
less prevalent than economic sanctions. First, economic coercion is costly if it fails
(sanctions are only carried out if the target country fails to change policy), while
conditional engagement is costly if it succeeds (economic payoffs are delivered only
if the target country does change policy). Second, states may be reluctant to offer
economic inducements with adversaries with whom they expect long-term conflict,
as this may undermine their resolve in the eyes of their opponent while also making
the opponent stronger. Third, the potential for market failure in an anarchic
international setting looms large: both the initiating and the target states must be
capable of making a credible commitment to uphold their end of the bargain. These
factors lead Drezner to hypothesize that the use of economic carrots is most likely
to occur and succeed between democracies (because democracies are better able
to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of
international regimes (because such regimes reduce the transactions costs of
market exchange), and, among adversaries, only after coercive threats are first
used. Unconditional engagement strategies are more passive in that they do not
include a specific quid-pro-quo. Rather, countries deploy economic links with an
adversary in the hopes that economic interdependence itself will, over time, effect
change in the targets foreign policy behavior and yield a reduced threat of military
conflict at the bilateral level. How increased commercial and/or financial integration
at the bilateral level might yield an improved bilateral political environment is not
obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased economic
ties tend to be associated with a reduced likelihood of military violence, no
consensus exists regarding how such effects are realized. At a minimum, two causal
pathways exist that state leaders might seek to exploit by pursuing a policy of
unconditional engagement: economic interdependence can act as a constraint on
the foreign policy behavior of the target state, and economic interdependence can
act as a transforming agent that helps to reshape the goals of the target state.
Engagement can be conditional quid pro quos or unconditional
with no explicit reciprocity.
Punitive Policies,"
Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is
engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued.
Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges,
such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by
the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications
in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act
will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government;
unconditional engagement works with a countrys civil society or private sector in
the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation.
Incentives strategies include BOTH conditional quid pro quos

and unconditional actions, with no explicit expectation of
reciprocity.
Cortright 97 (David, president of the Fourth Freedom Forum in Goshen, Indiana,
and fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the
University of Notre Dame, The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict
Prevention, p. 6, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/price/chap01.pdf)
The definition of what constitutes an incentive is subject to varying
interpretations. The authors in this volume generally agree that the inducement
process involves the offer of a reward by a sender in exchange for a particular
action or response by a recipient. An incentive is defined as the granting of a
political or economic benefit in exchange for a specified policy adjustment by the
recipient nation. Often the incentive offered is directly related to the desired
policy outcome, as when the World Bank assisted demilitarization in Uganda and
Mozambique by providing financial support for demobilized combatants. It is also
possible and sometimes necessary to conceive of incentives in a more
unconditional manner, without the requirement for strict reciprocity. This is what
Alexander George has called the pure form of incentives where there is little or
no explicit conditionality.4 A sender may offer benefits in the hope of developing
or strengthening long-term cooperation, without insisting upon an immediate
policy response. In some circumstances, such as the Council of Europes
negotiations with Estonia, the principal incentive may be the simple fact of
membership itself, and the accompanying hope that a seat at the table may lead
to other more concrete benefits in the future. At a minimum, incentives policies
seek to make cooperation and conciliation more attractive than aggression and
hostility. The goal is to achieve a degree of policy coordination in which,
according to Robert Keohane, nations adjust their behavior to the actual or
anticipated preferences of others.5
Incentives strategies include more than just narrow, reciprocal

quid pro quosthe plan is pure incentives.
Cortright 97 (David, president of the Fourth Freedom Forum in Goshen, Indiana,
and fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the
University of Notre Dame, The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict
Prevention, ed. David Cortright, p. 270-271,
http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/price/chap11.pdf)
Incentives strategies can be both conditional and nonconditional. Cooperation
theorists have emphasized what might be termed the power of positive reciprocity,
the ability of cooperative gestures to induce similar behavior in others. Robert
Axelrod and others have found that the simple tit-for-tat process, in which one party
responds in kind to the gestures of the other, is a highly stable form of
cooperation.14 Incentives policies go beyond the concept of narrow
reciprocity, however. Inducements are sometimes ofered as part of a
long-range process in which no immediate response is requested or
expected. This is the so-called pure form of incentives in which there is
little or no explicit conditionality.15 Their purpose is to establish the basis for
cooperative relations in the future. They may also help to rebuild a society ravaged
by war in the hope that this will prevent a renewal of bloodshed, or encourage a
process of dialogue and negotiation. An emphasis on inducements can change the
entire setting in which interaction occurs and may even alter the recipients image
of self and of potential adversaries.16 Whether in their pure form or in a more
strictly conditional mode, incentives strategies attempt to address and shape the
subjective motivations that determine policy preferences. As such they are essential
to the art of diplomatic persuasion.
EE = Conditional Carrots and Sticks
Engagement requires more than just non-isolationit involves
use of incentives to influence countries to change their
behavior. Govt to Govt engagement takes the form of
incentives for specified changes in behavior. Unconditional
engagement is for civil society.
Haass and OSullivan 2000 (Richard N., Director of FoPo Studies @ Brookings
Institution, and Meghan L., Fellow in FoPo Studies program @ Brookings, Engaging
Problem Countries, June, http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb61.htm
Engagement as a policy is not merely the antithesis of isolation. Rather, it involves the use of
economic, political, or cultural incentives to influence problem countries to alter their behavior
in one or more realms. Such a strategy can take a variety of forms. Conditional engagement is a
government-to-government affair in which the United States offers inducements to a target
regime in exchange for specified changes in behavior. This was the approach favored in 1994
when the United States and North Korea entered into a framework agreement under which
Pyongyang pledged to curtail its nuclear weapons development in exchange for shipments of
fuel, construction of a new generation of nuclear power-generating reactors, and a degree of
diplomatic normalization. In contrast, unconditional engagement is less contractual, with
incentives being extended without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow.
Unconditional engagement makes the most sense in promoting civil society in hopes of creating
an environment more conducive to reform.
In the US context, economic engagement must include

conditional carrots and sticks.
Helweg, Professor of Public Policy @ SMU, 2000 Diana, Economic
Strategy and National Security, p. 145
Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright has argued that a U.S. policy of economic
engagement with a country does not mean endorsement of its regime. In fact, the
U.S. version of engagement is different from countries, such as France and Japan,
which often practice a policy of unlimited economic engagement based on the
rationale that unfettered trade and investment best promotes democratic values for
the targeted nation, and financial success for themselves. By contrast, U.S.-"style"
engagement must be coupled with a range of policy tools that includes the targeted
use of economic restrictions. In other words, it is a variation of the traditional carrot
and stick approach rather than one or the other.
South Africa example proves- Engagement is by definition

conditionalit requires QPQs for specific actions.
Chester A. Crocker, Former Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the
Department of State, Fall 1989, Foreign Affairs, p. 144, Southern Africa: Eight
Years Later
Regarding South Africa, constructive engagement was by definition a
conditional concept: in exchange for Pretoria's cooperation on achieving
Namibia's independence, we would work to restructure the independence
settlement to address our shared interest in reversing the Soviet-Cuban
adventure in Angola; in exchange for reduced rhetorical flagellation and minor
adjustments in certain bilateral fields (e.g., civilian export controls), we would
hold Pretoria to its self-proclaimed commitment to domestic reform. There would
be a change of tone toward reciprocity and even-handedness. But there would
be no change in basic policy parameters on such matters as the U.S. opposition
to South African apartheid laws and institutions or bilateral security ties -- no
"rewriting of the past 20 years of U.S. diplomacy," as the 1980 article put it -- in
the absence of fundamental internal change.
North Korea example proves- incentives are structured in a

strictly conditional manner.
Cortright 97 David, president of the Fourth Freedom Forum in Goshen, Indiana, and fellow at the Joan B.
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, The Price of Peace: Incentives
and International Conflict Prevention, p. 13, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/price/chap01.pdf
In chapter 3, Scott Snyder of the United States Institute of Peace provides an in-
depth analysis of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Beginning with the initial response
of the Bush administration and continuing through the sometimes erratic but
ultimately successful efforts of the Clinton administration, Snyder traces the
diplomatic history of the crisis and highlights the role of incentives in the bargaining
process with Pyongyang. As noted earlier, coercive measures were threatened but
never employed, and Washington had to rely almost entirely on incentives to
persuade North Korea to accept limitations and external controls on its nuclear
program. The Agreed Framework plan authorized international inspections of North
Koreas nuclear installations, in exchange for specified economic and diplomatic
commitments from the United States, Japan, and South Korea. As Snyder notes, the
Agreed Framework was structured in a strictly conditional manner, with the delivery
of each incentive tied to specific policy concessions from Pyongyang.
Incentives = QPQ
Incentives are rewards ofered for another country to take (or
not take) X action.
Smith 2004 (M. Shane., graduate student in the Political Science Department at
the University of Colorado, Boulder, Beyond Intractibility. Eds. Guy Burgess and
Heidi Burgess, Conflict Research Consortium, UC Boulder, April,
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/incentives/)
What is an incentive?
In an incentive, A promises rewards to B in an attempt to get B to do or not do X. (In
our discussion, we will refer to A as a "sender," and B as a "target.") When
punishments or sanctions are likely to be ineffective, providing rewards for preferred
behavior may produce a more desirable outcome. However, incentives have been
frequently associated with weakness or indecisiveness. As a result, scholarship has
tended to focus more on sanctions than incentives. This unequal attention has
skewed the perceived effectiveness of threats over promises. Incentives can be an
effective alternative for managing conflicts. As with all such devices, however, they
must be carefully administered with attention to matching the right tool with the
right problem.
Incentives are rewards to change specific policies.

Creative Associates International 2002 Economic and Social Measures:
Conditionality/ Incentives for Conflict Prevention,
http://www.caii.com/CAIIStaff/Dashboard_GIROAdminCAIIStaff/Dashboard_CAIIAdmin
Database/resources/ghai/toolbox10.htm
"Conditionalities and incentives are offered by third parties, typically governments or multilateral organizations,
to encourage an authority, usually a government, to change policies or actions to promote specific objectives."
This page includes information regarding conditionality and incentives as a tool in conflict prevention and
resolution.
Removal of penalties must be QPQ to be an incentive.

Smith 2004 (M. Shane., graduate student in the Political Science Department at
the University of Colorado, Boulder, Beyond Intractibility. Eds. Guy Burgess and
Heidi Burgess, Conflict Research Consortium, UC Boulder, April,
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/incentives/)
There are generally four different types of incentives:
1.) Relaxing Penalties:
One type is the removal of existing penalties, such as sanctions, embargoes,
investment bans, or high tariffs, in exchange for specific policy changes. This was
an implicit part of the U.S. incentives package, which tried to encourage Libyan
cooperation with U.N. antiterrorism conventions and seek Libyan assistance in the
hunt for the perpetrators of the September 11th attacks. However, this approach is
not always viewed as an actual incentive. If the penalties being relaxed are thought
to be disproportionate to the alleged actions, or the penalties are perceived to be
wrongly imposed in the first place, or their mere withdrawal is thought to be
insufficient compensation, then the target may not view such an offer as an
incentive at all. While these incentives may be viewed as bribes or be resented as
invasions of sovereignty, the willingness to lift sanctions in exchange for particular
policy changes can create an atmosphere more conducive to compromise than can
the threat of more sanctions.
AT: Incentives = QPQ
Incentives strategies include BOTH conditional quid pro quos
and unconditional actions, with no explicit expectation of
reciprocity.
Cortright 97 (David, president of the Fourth Freedom Forum in Goshen, Indiana, and
fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University
of Notre Dame, The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention,
p. 6, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/price/chap01.pdf)
The definition of what constitutes an incentive is subject to varying interpretations.
The authors in this volume generally agree that the inducement process involves
the offer of a reward by a sender in exchange for a particular action or response by
a recipient. An incentive is defined as the granting of a political or economic benefit
in exchange for a specified policy adjustment by the recipient nation. Often the
incentive offered is directly related to the desired policy outcome, as when the
World Bank assisted demilitarization in Uganda and Mozambique by providing
financial support for demobilized combatants. It is also possible and sometimes
necessary to conceive of incentives in a more unconditional manner, without the
requirement for strict reciprocity. This is what Alexander George has called the
pure form of incentives where there is little or no explicit conditionality.4 A sender
may offer benefits in the hope of developing or strengthening long-term
cooperation, without insisting upon an immediate policy response. In some
circumstances, such as the Council of Europes negotiations with Estonia, the
principal incentive may be the simple fact of membership itself, and the
accompanying hope that a seat at the table may lead to other more concrete
benefits in the future. At a minimum, incentives policies seek to make cooperation
and conciliation more attractive than aggression and hostility. The goal is to achieve
a degree of policy coordination in which, according to Robert Keohane, nations
adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others.5
Conditional Engagement = Gov-Gov
Conditional engagement is government to government.
Unconditional engagement targets the private sector.
Punitive Policies,"
Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is

engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued.
Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges,
such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by
the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications
in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act
will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government;
unconditional engagement works with a countrys civil society or private sector in
the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation.

Engagement QPQ
Economic engagement is distinct from quid pro quo carrots.
elik, Masters in Political Economy 11 (Arda Can, Economic Sanctions
and Engagement Policies: A review study on coercive and non-coercive diplomatic
actions, p. 12)
Literature of liberal school points out that economic engagement policies are
significantly effective tools for sender and target countries. The effectiveness leans
on mutual economic and political benefits for both parties (Garzke et all, 2001).
Economic engagement operates with trade mechanisms where sender and target
country establish intensified trade thus increase the economic interaction over time.
This strategy decreases the potential hostilities and provides mutual gains. Paulson
Jr (2008) states that this mechanism is highly diferent from carrots
(inducements). Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow goals.
Economic engagement intends to develop the target country and wants her to be
aware of the long term benefits of shared economic goals. Sender does not want to
contain nor prevent the target country with different policies. Conversely, sender
works deliberately to improve the target countries' GDP, trade potential, export-
import ratios and national income. Sender acts in purpose to reach important goals.
First it establishes strong economic ties become economic integration has the
capacity to change the political choices and behaviour of target country. Sender
state believes in that economic linkages have political transformation potential
(Kroll, 1993).
Engagement should be defined as political and economic

cooperation and interdependence- QPQ bargains are better
captured by the words negotiation or diplomacy
Dueck 6 Colin, assistant professor of political science at the University of
Colorado, Boulder, and the author of Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture and
Change in American Grand Strategy, Strategies for Managing Rogue States, Orbis
Volume 50, Issue 2, Spring 2006, Pages 223241
Engagement, a popular concept in recent years, actually has several possible meanings and
is used in a number of different ways. It can refer to (1) a stance of diplomatic or
commercial activism internationally;8 (2) the simple fact of ongoing political or
economic contact with an existing counterpart or adversary; (3) using such political or economic
contact as a strategy in itself, in the hopes that this contact will create patterns of
cooperation, integration, and interdependence with a rogue state;9 (4) a strategy under
which international adversaries enter into a limited range of cooperative agreements, alongside
continued rivalry or competition;10 or (5) the very act of diplomacy, negotiating, or
bargaining, regardless of its content. Only the third definition, focusing on
integration through contact, is analytically useful. The first is too vague to
be of much use; the second is a condition rather than a strategy; the
fourth is more accurately captured by dtente; and as to the last
definition, there is no compelling reason to abandon the words
diplomacy, negotiating, or bargaining when they have served very
well up to now.11
A. Economic engagement is structural linkage- a long term

strategy for change
The basic causal logic of economic engagement, and the emphasis on domestic
politics, can be traced to Hirschman. He viewed economic engagement as a long-
term, transformative strategy. As one state gradually expands economic interaction
with its target, the resulting (asymmetrical) interdependence creates vested
interests within the target society and government. The beneficiaries of
interdependence become addicted to it, and they protect their interests by
pressuring the government to accommodate the source of interdependence.
Economic engagement is a form of structural linkage; it is a means to get other
states to want what you want, rather than to do what you want. The causal chain
runs from economic interdependence through domestic political change to foreign
policy accommodation.
B. Structural linkage is unconditional and is distinct from

conditional, tactical linkage, AKA quid pro quos.
Mastanduno, Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences @
Dartmouth College, 8
(Michael, Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, edited by Steve Smith, Amelia
Hadfield, Timothy Dunne, p. 182 GAL)
Positive economic statecraft may be defined as the provision or promise of
economic benefits to induce changes in the behaviour of a target state.1 It is
important to distinguish between two types. The first involves the promise of a
well-specified economic concession in an effort to alter specific foreign or
domestic policies of the target government. I call this version tactical linkage;
others refer to 'carrots', or 'specific positive linkage'. A second version, which I
term structural linkage and which others refer to as 'general positive linkage' or
'long-term engagement', involves an effort to use a steady stream of economic
benefits to reconfigure the balance of political interests within a target country.
Structural linkage lends to be unconditional; the benefits are not turned on
and off according to changes in target behaviour. The sanctioning state expects
instead that sustained economic engagement will eventually produce a political
transformation and desirable changes in target behaviour. Tactical linkage and
long-term engagement are each informed by a different logic. Tactical linkage
operates at a more immediate level; the sanctioning state calculates that the
provision of a particular type of economic reward will be sufficient lo convince
policy makers in the target to reconsider their existing policies. For example,
immediately after the Second World War, the United States offered sizable
reconstruction loans lo Britain, France, and the So- viet Unionin exchange for
political concessions. The British and French were generally willing to ac-
commodate US demands that they liberalize their domestic and foreign economic
policies; the Soviets were not- In 1973, European states and Japan offered
economic inducements in Ihe form of aid and trade concessions in Arab stales
during the OPEC crisis in a largely successful atlempl lo assure that they would
receive access to oil supplies at predictable prices- In 1982, the United Slates
offered to increase sales of coal to its West European allies to discourage Ihem
from a gas pipeline deal with the Soviet Union. This influence attempt failed. Long-
term engagement, however, works at a deeper level, and its logic was most clearly
articulated in the classic work of Albert Hirschman (Hirschman, 1945 (1980)). The
sanctioning government provides an ongoing stream of economic benefits which
gradually transform domestic political interests in the target state. Over time,
'internation- alist' coalitions lhal favour interdependence with the sanctioning state
will form and strengthen, and will exert influence over the policy of the weaker
state in a direction preferred by the sanctioning state. Hirsch- man demonstrated
how Nazi Germany used an array of economic inducements to inculcate economic
dependence, and eventually political acquiescence, on the part of its weaker
central European neighbours during the interwar period.
Economic engagement is unconditional and is distinct from

inducements for specific policy changes.
elik, Masters in Political Economy 11 (Arda Can, Economic Sanctions
and Engagement Policies: A review study on coercive and non-coercive diplomatic
actions, p. 11)
Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves
the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in economic
diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic
intersection, interconnectedness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks
economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to
change the political behaviour of target state4. However they cannot be counted as
carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are
not restricted with short term policy changes (Kahler & Kastner, 2006). They can be
unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties.
Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting
institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major
concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and
nonmilitarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway to perceive the international
political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and
Kastner define the engagement policies as follows, "It is a policy of deliberate
expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behaviour of
target state and improve bilateral relations " (p. 523/abstract). It is an intentional
economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains
and more importantly, political gains. The main idea behind the engagement
motivation is stated by Rosencrance (1977) in a way that "the direct and positive
linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the
position of others in the same direction."
Conditional QPQ engagement is a worse literature base in the

case of China- economic incentives to the private sector are
how the US engages with China.
Haass and OSullivan 2000 Richard N., Director of FoPo Studies @ Brookings
Institution, and Meghan L., Fellow in FoPo Studies program @ Brookings, Engaging
Problem Countries, June, http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb61.htm
Despite the utility of road maps, such step-by-step reciprocal engagement with a
problem regime will not always be possible. Opaque domestic politics in the target
country may frustrate efforts to discern who is in a position of power and who can
deliver on promises made in exchange for certain incentives. Or the overriding goal
may be the change of a regime, something no government will voluntarily agree to.
Although these sorts of situations may preclude conditional engagement, they may
be ideal for the initiation of unconditional engagementthe offering of incentives
without any expectation of reciprocal acts. While any type of incentive could be
offered unconditionally, cultural incentives or inducements to civil society are the
most appropriate measures because they are the least likely to shore up dubious
regimes. Such incentives may also be the only realistic option when the U.S.
government is faced with domestic lobbies adamant on the isolation of certain
regimes, but willing to accept measures geared toward easing physical hardship and
cultural isolation of the population in the target country without bolstering the
power of the regime.
The provision of economic incentives to the private sector can also be an effective
mode of unconditional engagement, particularly when the economy of the target
country is not entirely state-controlled. In these more open climates, economic
actors nourished by exchanges will often be agents for change and natural allies in
some Western causes. To the extent that economic engagement builds the private
sector and other non-state elements within the target country, it is likely to widen
the base of support for engagement with America specifically and the promotion of
international norms more generally. Certainly, U.S. engagement with China has
nurtured constituencies which are sympathetic, if not to American ideals per se,
then at least to trade and open markets and the maintenance of good relations to
secure them.
Carrots with explicit quid pro quos are distinct from long-
term engagement strategies.
Drezner 7
Daniel, a professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University
and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, The trouble with carrots: Transaction
costs, conflict expectations, and economic inducements, Security Studies, 9:1-2,
188-218, DOI: 10.1080/09636419908429399
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636419908429399
The existing literature on inducements is too small to be much of a guide for
explanation. The work on carrots is paltry when compared to the literature devoted
to economic or military coercion. Indeed, it is small enough to leave the definition of
an intuitive notion somewhat unclear. It is telling that articles focusing on financial
inducements talk about 'carrots' or 'bribes' while articles on other kinds of
inducements talk about 'linkage.'4 This paper will use a three-part definition of
carrots or inducements. First, relative to the status quo, a carrot is a transfer of
benefits offered by one actor, called the sender, to another actor, called the
receiver. Second, the carrot comes with a clear quid pro quo; in return for the
benefit, the receiver is expected to grant some concession to the sender.5 Third,
the sender's demanded concession is well-defined; the carrot is not proffered in the
hopes of influencing the receiver country's policies over the long run.6
6.For discussions of the use of inducements as a long-term strategy of increasing
influence over the receiver, see Rawi Abdelal and Jonathan Kirshner, "Strategy, Economic
Relations, and the Definition of National Interests," Security Studies 9, nos. 1/2 (autumn 1999- winter
2000): 119-56; and Paul A. Papayoanou and Scott L. Kastner, "Sleeping with the (Potential)
Enemy:Assessing the U.S. Policy of Engagement with China ," Security Studies 9, nos. 1/2
this distinction between short-term
(autumn 1999-winter 2000): 157-87. Note that
carrots and long-term engagement strategies corresponds to the
distinction in the sanctions literature between economic warfare and
economic coercion. See Robert Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International
Security 22, no. 2 (fall 1997): 90-1
Engagement includes trade, commercial, and financial

concessions without explicit reciprocity
Lobell 13
Steven E., Engaging the Enemy and the Lessons for the Obama Administration,
Political Science Quarterly, Summer, Vol. 128 Issue 2, p. 261-287
Britain's 1930s double policy (rearmament and diplomacy) and America's 1970s
dtente grand strategy also called for engaging the enemy in order to reduce the
number of foreign threats to an affordable level, conserve financial strength, and
restore the balance between financial capabilities and global commitments.5
Scholars and policymakers tend to focus on the political concessions and
inducements that London and, to a lesser extent Washington, extended. My focus in
this article is to highlight the commercial and financial concessions that were also
an important component of engagement, though not always the central part. Britain
extended credits, loans, trade concessions, market guarantees, and export earnings
in sterling to Germany and Japan. The United States proposed or extended capital
and technology, export-import bank financing, most-favored nation (MFN) tariff
treatment, and long-term credit to the Soviet Union. The United States granted
China MFN trading status, foreign investment, and export import bank financing.
Scholars and policymakers have depicted British and American trade concessions
and commercial inducements to their adversaries as part of a general appeasement
policy.6 I contend that despite the aggregate material power and threat, British and
American leaders identified moderate political and societal leaders in Germany, the
Soviet Union, China, and Japan. Specifically, one intent of British and American
concession and inducement policies was to strengthen reformers or moderates in
the political leadership or wings of power who were engaged in leadership struggles
with hard-liners, and concomitantly, to increase the size of their domestic win-set
and to expand their base of support. By strengthening their power and position,
London and Washington sought to assist in realigning the foreign policies of these
adversaries away from massive rearmament, extreme autarky, and war
preparation--or at least to slow them down and to buy time for moderately paced
rearmament.7

EE QPQ- AT: South Africa/Chester Crocker
Definitions
Constructive Engagement was originally formulated with no
explicit QPQs
Davies 7 (J.E., Dept. International Relations @ Univ. of Wales Constructive
Engagement: Chester Crocker and American Policy in South Africa, Namibia and
Angola, p. 121)
Although constructive engagement was frequently criticized for presenting South
Africa with too many concessions, the extent to which Pretoria actually benefited
from this policy has never been clear. Constructive engagement did provide the
South African government with material benefits from early in Reagan's first term. In
1981-2 `grey area' exports, including non-lethal military equipment, were resumed,
together with military training and liaison. Increased consular interchange was also
established. Although the US continued to criticize Pretoria openly for refusing to
sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the US continued in the role of Pretoria's
most important foreign source of nuclear expertise. In Sep- tember 1982 seven
American companies were granted licences - worth $50 million in total - to service
South Africa's Koeberg nuclear power plant. From the beginning of the constructive
engagement policy US trade and investment in South Africa increased, but the role
of this increased trade was contested. Although many argued that foreign
investment was vital for the welfare and advancement of South African blacks,
opponents warned that this masked a lack of any real progress in achieving black
political rights. This economic advancement could simply succeed in creating a
black middle class which Pretoria could co-opt into supporting the apartheid system.
As Greenberg explains: `Constructive engagement under these circumstances may
unwittingly facilitate the motives of the South African Government to create a
privileged urban African stratum, economically and politically divorced from the
majority of the African population.'1 As well as the tangible benefits of increased
trade and technology transfer, constructive engagement also provided Pretoria
with much-needed legitimacy on the world stage. The US supported South Africa by
preventing or softening many UN resolutions which would have been dis-
advantageous to Pretoria. Peter Vale is damning in his account of the advantages
this aspect of constructive engagement afforded Pretoria: Constructive engagement
deliberately chose South Africa's government - and its supporting establishment -
over the country's people. South Africa's rulers recognised this: they knew, too, that
it provided them with much valued space in an international community which was
closing in on them.... They saw in [Crockerl a means to conduct their foreign policy
in a higher league than they deserved.2 Commentators also criticized this
diplomatic support for providing South Africa with an aura of respectability and a
degree of tolerance, whilst it pursued its policy of destabilization of the Frontline
States (FLS): Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho and
Swaziland (see Chapter 9). Constructive engagement provided an umbrella under
which South Africa could target the ANC points of operation in the FLS, eventually
succeeding in forcing the organization out of the immediate neighbourhood, but at a
great cost to the FLS themselves.3 An unsatisfactory feature of the benefits
that constructive engagement was providing to South Africa was that they
all appeared to be granted with no specific quid pro quo. South Africa was
led to believe that, in the final analysis, the US under Reagan could be counted on
for support. When Crocker was asked to identify just what he saw as America's
`coercive' power over South Africa if there was any he explained: `Our coercive
power was to remove legitimacy and to isolate them with our rhetoric, pointing out
to them what we would see as acceptable.'4 This seems a rather lean analysis from
a man who took up his post strongly condemning the futile and counterproductive
use of rhetoric during the Carter administration. It also demonstrates what Pretoria
had already appeared to grasp - that there was no flip side to constructive
engagement. A failure to respond to the increasing number of
concessions being ofered by Washington was not going to be met by any
tangible negative alternative.
Economic engagement is about gradually creating reform via

corporate presence, not explicit quid pro quos- South Africa
example proves.
Forcese 2002 Craig, BA, McGill, MA, Carleton, LL. B., Ottawa, LL.M., Yale, Yale
Human Rights and Development Law Journal, 5 Yale H.R. & Dev. L.J. 1, p. l/n
1. Constructive Engagement in South Africa
United States policy towards apartheid-era South Africa was initially guided by a
strong constructive engagement philosophy. While constructive engagement was
often invoked to describe a pattern of [*23] diplomatic relations, its proponents 112
clearly viewed the substantial U.S. corporate presence in South Africa as a

potentially important agent of change. Specifically, defenders of economic
engagement with the apartheid regime urged that economic growth would increase
demand for black labor, creating black upward mobility and ultimately social and
political reform. 113
Constructive engagement with South Africa was NOT a quid-

pro-quo, it involved unilateral concessions without
conditioning.
Rotberg 86 Robert I., Professor of Political Science and History, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, BEYOND CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT: UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD AFRICA, ed. Elliot P. Skinner, p. 133
Crocker and his associates may still think that they can square the unholy triangle, but to believe so is optimistic.
The United States has made dozens of concessions. South Africa has been rewarded. But there has been no
attempt at operant conditioning. South Africa has feared no or little punishment. Indeed, the basic flaw in
constructive engagement was, and is, its lack of an incentive structure. The concessions were made willy-nilly,
in no hierarchical sequence which might have commanded South African attention, if not positive performances.
Constructive Engagement was originally formulated without
explicit quid-pro-quos.
Rotberg 86 Robert I., Professor of Political Science and History, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, BEYOND CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT: UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD AFRICA, ed. Elliot P. Skinner, p. 138
The point was repeatedly made, and seldom challenged, that the administration's policy of constructive
engagement did not live up to its original intention of encouraging South Africa to move towards a more
just and effective way of dealing with its overwhelming black majority. Failure here was attributed to the
reluctance of United States officials to exact a sufficient quid pro quo from South Africa, thereby stimulating
change. One discussant remarked that instead of "using a carrot and a stick," the administration never even used
a "twig." This allegedly left the South Africans free to exploit United States fears of Soviet penetration of the
region and relentlessly to pursue its policy of apartheid.
There was rejection of the suggestion that the United States was not interested in ending apartheid. Instead, there
was a comment that the administration's overcommitment to constructive engagement placed its practitioners in
such a situation that they applauded even slight and cosmetic changes in the Republic. Again, the allegation that
the United States was ignoring the ethical problems posed by overt racism and doing business with a
"pigmentocracy" was countered with a statement that in foreign relations, power, rather than sentiment, was the
operating principle. A further suggestion was made that policies such as constructive engagement, when applied
to South Africa, would not work unless "calibrated" in such a manner so as to exact the greatest change possible
in the behavior of the country to which they are applied.
Constructive engagement was unconditional

Baker 2000 Pauline H., President of the Fund for Peace and adjunct professor in the
Graduate School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Honey and Vinegar:
Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, ed. Haas and OSullivan, p. 96-97
Namibiaparticularly linking its independence from South Africa to the removal of Cuban troops from Angola
became the key to this approach. Holding out the promise of a reduction of the Soviet-Cuban threat in the
region and warmer bilateral ties with the United States, Crocker reasoned that constructive engagement
would put relations with Pretoria on a new footing. In this scheme of thinking, there was no place for sanctions
or penalties because, as Crocker's memo to Haig indicated, "we . . . need Pretoria's cooperation."3 Indeed, as
Jeffrey Herbst observes, the policy derived its distinction from the fact that it forswore sanctions altogether. "A
commitment not to sanction was in effect an incentive." 4 Thus at the outset, the United States adopted a
position of unconditional engagement with the South African government. However, it became apparent
after a couple of years that the approach was not yielding the promised results. As some analysts concluded,
"Crocker's strategy contained two basic problems. First, it failed to take into account the changing military
situation inside Angola; and second, it assumed that South Africa was interested in a settlement." 5
When violent unrest erupted in South Africa in 1983, a backlash ensued against
constructive engagement as well as against the white regime. The thesis
triggered the antithesis, a policy of conditional engagement that held
internal change in South Africa as its primary objective. This antithesis
involved a mix of incentives and penalties enacted by Congress over the veto of a
popular president after two years of grassroots anti-apartheid activism in the United
States. The new approach was not merely an adjustment to
existing policy, but a totally diferent form of engagement,
aimed at diferent targets and using diferent policy
instruments. Engagement was no longer directed at the government, but at
supporting the anti-apartheid opposition in South Africa. At the same time, the
South African government was also targeted with limited trade and financial
sanctions, which would be lifted if Pretoria adopted specific measures that would
lead to negotiations with the black opposition. A commitment to lift sanctions when
those steps were taken was the new incentive for Pretoria. The measures were
spelled out in a clear road map defined in the legislation, the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA). The measures did not call for total isolation or
abdication of the white government, but rather defined a set of five "doable" actions
that would level the playing field for negotiations.
The use of conditional incentives for specific quid pro quos in

South Africa was a fundamental shift away from the policy of
constructive engagement, which was unconditional.
Baker 2000 Pauline H., President of the Fund for Peace and adjunct professor in
the Graduate School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Honey and
Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, ed. Haas and OSullivan, p. 112-
113
In the end, a mix of U.S. policy instruments contributed to the dramatic changes that occurred in southern Africa.
However, the outcome was not carefully planned, the methods employed were hammered out in a prolonged
debate, and the price paid in U.S. domestic political terms was high. Such a rancorous political debate over
foreign policy had not occurred in America since the Vietnam War.
Nevertheless, the dichotomy between incentives and sanctions, when they came into balance, is what actually
made U.S. policy effective. Proponents of each strategy have claimed credit for the success. In part, each can
legitimately declare to have played a positive role in achieving some part of the outcomethe tenacity of
Crocker's engagement led to success in regional diplomacy when the timing was ripe, and the tenacity of
activists for pressing for internal political change and sanctions helped bring an end to apartheid in South Africa.
Both approaches were needed to accomplish the full range of U.S. policy objectives in the region. Neither policy
alternative, engagement or disengagement, was applied fully. The "good cop, bad cop" synthesis applied
coercion and incentives, leaving the Pretoria government a way out. It is important to understand that, contrary
to statements by the Reagan administration at the time that nothing had really changed, the targets and tactics of
engagement had fundamentally shifted from Reagan's first term to his second. Moving from a policy that aimed
at engaging the South African government, the U.S. Congress insisted on engaging civil society and the political
opposition at the risk of alienating Pretoria and freezing regional negotiations. Moving from the use of
unconditional incentives to influence Pretoria, the United States applied conditional negative incentives in the
form of sanctions, with a clear road map on what steps had to be taken to get them lifted. And the United States
switched from little engagement with civil society and the political opposition to unconditional engagement with
nongovernmental groups and organizations.
The policy instruments also changed. An economic aid program unique for its time
was applied to assist a broad group of civic organizations. It bypassed the South
Africa government, becoming the first U.S. economic aid program with avowedly
political, not developmental, objectives that did not go through the government.
The United States also withdrew the ambassador associated with constructive
engagement, appointed a new one, and met with high-level officials in the ANCthe
first time in the seventyfive-year history of the ANC. Moreover, Washington changed
its public characterization of the organization. Rather than describing the ANC as
using calculated terror, the United States portrayed the organization as having a
legitimate voice in South Africa. Finally, the United States dropped the term
constructive engagement, sparking humor that this was a policy that dares not
speak its name.
The explicit link to Angolan troops was not part of

Constructive Engagement to begin with; it was a later reaction
to criticism of CE as carrots only, and it was part of a
regional policy framework, not bilateral engagement with
South Africa.
Johnson 86 Walton R., Professor of African Studies, Rutgers University, BEYOND CONSTRUCTIVE
ENGAGEMENT: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD AFRICA, ed. Elliot P. Skinner, p. 253-254
There was disagreement about the relationship between constructive engagement

and the Cuban presence in Angola. One discussant stressed that one should not
forget that constructive engagement was initially not designed with Angola in mind,
but to bring about change in South Africa by use of the carrot and not by the
unproductive stick. As such, this American policy was deemed basically nave,
because it did not take into consideration the determination of Afrikaners to hold
onto power by all the means at their disposal. Then, by extending this policy to all of
southern Africa, in keeping with its global approach to the Soviets, the Reagan
administration was said to have attempted to link problems which should have been
tackled separately. It was argued that possible collusion between the United States
and South Africa against the MPLA forces in Luanda may have led to the
introduction of Cuban troops into the region. There was disagreement as to whether
the United States was responsible for halting the South African invasion of Angola
and the possibility of their going "all the way to Lagos." But it was suggested that
the Cubans should not really be viewed as Soviet surrogates in Angola. Moreover, to
link the Cuban presence in Angola to both the Namibian and internal South African
issues was viewed as a mistake.
CE in South Africa had no penalties for failure to reciprocate.

Baker 2000 Pauline H., President of the Fund for Peace and adjunct professor in the
Graduate School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Honey and Vinegar:
Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, ed. Haas and OSullivan, p. 103
The South African experience points to the vulnerabilities of engagement strategies
that do not sufficiently take internal politics into account, both in the country of
origin, where in this case the administration failed to anticipate the strength of
domestic opposition, and in the targeted country, where the administration failed to
anticipate the strength and duration of the black uprising. In tying events in South
Africa to the wider global struggle to combat Soviet influence, constructive
engagement was a politically astute way of getting a conservative administration
that otherwise would not have been very interested in the region to focus on South
Africa.10 However, the policy neglected to take into account several other important
factors: it had few allies (most of the Western countries, except for Margaret
Thatcher's Britain, opposed it); it had no credible penalties for South Africa for
failing to reciprocate; and it ignored the human rights component of the issue by
giving exclusive attention to the strategic dimension of the policy. Ultimately, these
weaknesses proved to be the undoing of the policy as public opposition mounted.
Crocker Indicts
Crockers later writings cant be trustedhe is at the head of a
revisionism campaign to vindicate his Constructive
Engagement policy.
Thomson 95 (Alex, Lecturer in Government and Politics, Department of Public Policy,
University of Central Lancashire, Preston, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 33,
No. 1, Mar, p. 83-101)
As will be seen, the implementers of the US South Africa policy struggled against
the obduracy of those in power in Pretoria, as well as a growing anti-apartheid
movement in America. The township uprisings of the mid- I 980s in South Africa
eventually extinguished any last hopes about the effectiveness of Constructive
Engagement. Against this background, and pro-economic sanctions protests back in
the United States itself (resulting in state legislature divestment campaigns, US
corporate withdrawal from the Republic's economy, and mass arrests outside the
South African embassy in Washington, DC), Congress enacted its comprehensive
anti-apartheid legislation over the veto of President Reagan in October 1986.
Although a semi-autonomous advisory committee appointed by George Shultz, the
Secretary of State, reported in 1987 that 'The Administration's strategy of
constructive engagement has failed to reach its objectives',' there is now a growing
body of work portraying this policy as a success. Leading this school of revisionism
is Crocker himself,' who points to several developments that occurred in the last few
months of the Reagan era, and during the Presidency of George Bush, as
justification for the approach he took while Assistant Secretary of State. He wrote in
1989: as a result of our efforts, a new regional order is emerging in southern Africa.
Africa's last colony, Namibia, is gaining independence; Cuban and South African
soldiers are going home; a start has been made in ending the wrenching civil
conflict in Angola. A younger generation of Afrikaner nationalists is assuming power
in South Africa, and there is growing talk on all sides of a new era of negotiation^.^
The part played by the United States in promoting negotiations between the
Resisthcia Nacional Magambicana (Renamo) and the Frente de LiberagZo de
Mogambique (Frelimo) Government was also emphasised. 1
Emphasis on the Namibia-Angola negotiations is part of the

revisionist efort to focus attention away from Constructive
Engagements failure in South Africa.
No. 1, Mar, p. 83-101)
The bulk of Crocker's memoirs, entitled High Noon in Southern Africa : making
peace in a rough neighbourhood, is understandably enough given over to describing
the mechanics of the Namibia-Angola negotiations.'' It was here, after all, that
Constructive Engagement, after eight years, bore some fruit. Prompted by an
increasingly bloody military deadlock on the ground in Angola, the regimes in
Pretoria and Luanda were persuaded to accept the negotiation framework that had
been advocated by Crocker and his colleagues since 1981.In the last full month of
the Reagan Administration, an agreement was signed that led to Cuban troops
withdrawing from Angola and Namibia's independence from South African
occupation. This was Constructive Engagement's finest hour. The emphasis placed
on these events by the revisionists, however, obscures the poor performance of
American policy as regards South Africa's internal situation. The fact remains that
the Reagan Administration operated an anti-apartheid strategy for eight years
without any real positive results. In the wake of Crocker's 1992 memoirs, a reminder
of what occurred in South Africa is required. Only then can an accurate balance
sheet of Constructive Engagement be produced. In this respect, the central
argument of this article is that Reagan's South Africa policy failed, not least because
of the unwillingness of Washington fully to implement its advocated engagement
strategy. To make matters worse, cold war priorities dictated that resources were
concentrated on the NamibiaIAngola 'linkage' negotiations, leaving the United
States with a fatally weak series of anti-abartheid initiatives.
Linkage in CE was only part of the regional strategy

emphasis on the Angola-Namibia negotiations ignores CE as a
gov-gov strategy with South Africa, and plays into Crockers
campaign of revisionism.
No. 1, Mar, p. 83-101)
Southern Africa can certainly be described as having enjoyed a level of peace since
mid-1988 that had not been experienced during the preceding years, and there can
be little doubt that the diplomatic skills of US officials contributed greatly to this
improved situation. The way in which these successes for American policy are
portrayed, however, should not come to disguise the fact that the Reagan
Administration operated eight years of its Constructive Engagement strategy
towards South Africa with few, if any, positive results. Crocker, in his memoirs,
concentrating on the Angola-Namibia negotiations, explains to those who criticise
the Reagan Administration's record towards South Africa that Constructive
Engagement makes 'no sense except as a regional strategy'.73 This may be the
case, but achievements elsewhere should not come to hide the failings of American
policy in the Republic. Although Crocker made a creative and determined attempt to
ease tensions in a highly volatile area, should the South African components of the
US strategy have paid the price for a myopic concentration on the 'linkage'
negotiations? Could not parallel initiatives have been implemented in the Republic?
In the borrowed phraseology of one former US diplomat who worked in the
American embassy in Pretoria during the 1g8os, 'Couldn't they walk and chew gum
at the same time?'.74 There is some validity in Crocker's belief that if Constructive
Engagement had only 'one chance of ten of success', then it was 'worth trying'.75
Such odds, however, could have been considerably reduced if this strategy had ever
been fully implemented. No revisionism concerning the performance of the United
States, based on regional events, should be used to vindicate the reality of the
Reagan Administration's incomplete engagement in South Africa.
AT: Specific Definitions
Clinton Era Definitions Bad
Clinton administration definitions bad- their use of economic
engagement was a moving target
Sanger 97 David E., The New York Times, March 2, p. l/n
Mr. Clinton and his aides say they are anything but Pollyannaish, and that they will
only let China into the trade organization on "commercially viable terms," not as a
political gesture to Beijing. While President Clinton acknowledged recently that
economic engagement had not yet yielded the results he sought, he repeated that it
was the only way to keep China from turning inward, isolated and militaristic.
But there are many definitions of engagement, and the Administration's

interpretation of the phrase is clearly a moving target. None of Mr. Clinton's top
economic officials, for example, use the term "commercial diplomacy," a favorite of
the late Secretary of Commerce, Ronald Brown, during his trade missions around
the world. As one senior Administration official noted recently, the term sounds too
much like commerce and too little like hard-nosed diplomacy.
Obama Era Definitions Bad
Obama administration uses engagement to describe
everything they do- its unlimiting.
Traub 10 James Traub, Fellow of the Center for International Cooperation and
Contributing Writer for the New York Times Magazine, Terms of Engagement,
Foreign Policy, 2-19,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/19/terms_of_engagement?
print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full
Virtually all conversations with Obama administration foreign-policy officials , no matter
where they begin, come to rest at "engagement" -- that vexing, mutable, all-purpose
word. The U.S. president has "engaged" with rogue states, civil society, the United
Nations, and citizens around the globe . Iran vindicates the policy of engagement -- or discredits it.
China is a failure of engagement, Russia a success. Inside the Obama realm, engagement has
come to mean "good diplomacy." To critics on both the left and right, however, it has come to mean
"bad diplomacy" -- cynical or naive, depending on which side you come from. These days -- these shaky days -- the critics seem to be
gaining the upper hand, making those Obama officials increasingly defensive about their policy toward autocratic states, whether in the Middle East or Eurasia, Iran or Sudan. Having
spent years thinking hard thoughts in universities and think tanks, magazines and books, they cannot believe that they are losing the definitional war over their own policy. They are
eager, and maybe a little desperate, to set things aright. And so it was, earlier this week, that when I asked to talk to one official about democracy promotion, I wound up having a 75-
minute phone conversation with four White House figures, much of it about "engagement." "A lot of the baggage we carry," said an officeholder I might as well designate as Senior
Official #1 -- the conversation was on background and the White House that offered up these folks to defend the policy was insistent they not do so on the record -- "is the word
'engagement.' People hear the word and they think 'constructive engagement.'" I'm not sure this is true outside certain New England common rooms, but it's definitely not an association
the Obama White House would like to encourage. After all, Ronald Reagan's administration used that expression to justify the United States's ongoing relationship with South Africa's
apartheid government, a policy widely derided as a cynical pretext to preserve ties with a Cold War ally. And it failed. If "constructive engagement" is one definition the Obamans are
eager to avoid, another is straightforward, old-fashioned Kissingerian "realism" -- if by realism one means dealing with the interests of states, including brutal states, to the exclusion of
those of ordinary citizens. As another interlocutor -- call him Senior Official #2 -- growing rather hot under the telephonic collar, put it, "A lot of my friends said, 'You guys are a bunch of
engagement realists. They'll never talk about democracy and human rights.'" Barack Obama himself arguably encouraged this view during his 2008 presidential campaign by criticizing
George W. Bush's moralistic bluster, by regularly expressing his high regard for archrealists like James Baker and Brent Scowcroft, and by stipulating his willingness to meet "without
preconditions" with even the worst tyrants. And since becoming president he has muted criticism of the regimes in Sudan and Burma, and referred respectfully to "the Islamic Republic of
Iran." The allegation of realpolitik is still intolerable -- even baffling -- to these officials, who pledged themselves to Obama out of a deep faith in his redemptive promise. But if
engagement rests upon the expectation that treating autocrats and theocrats with respect will significantly alter their behavior, then it suffers less from cynicism than from credulity --
which is the other article of baggage under which engagement now staggers. How can anyone believe that? Administration officials have been at pains to deny that they ever did,
especially since Iran has trampled Obama's entreaties underfoot. The goal of engaging Iran, they now say, was not to change Iran's behavior but to change the behavior of more
tractable states, like Russia and China, by showing that the United States was willing to go the last mile even with the Axis of Evil. Of course, there is abundant evidence that Obama and
some of his chief advisors really did hope that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would moderate nuclear policy if they showed due regard for his country's national interests, as
Helene Cooper recently noted in the New York Times. But it's also true that from the outset, officials have made the secondary argument for the virtues of engagement. The SOs insisted
to me, as other SOs have in the past, that Obama's Iran policy in fact constitutes a triumph of engagement because Russia has increasingly come around to the American view on the
imperative for sanctions. They argue that the Russian change of heart owes not only to the country's growing alarm over Iranian ambitions, but also to the White House's persistent effort
to put relations with Russia on a less adversarial footing than they were at the end of the Bush years. We have engaged with Russia and reaped the benefits. Of course, Russia hasn't yet
signed on to a tough sanctions measure against Iran; and China, which so far has pocketed Obama's shows of deference without much display of gratitude, may scotch the whole affair.
Let us stipulate, then, that engagement is not quite so naive as it appears. But is it not, still, a realist bargain, trading away those universal values that the president so often evokes in
the hopes of geostrategic wins, whether on Iran or climate change or the global economy? "We're trying to say 'no,'" says SO #2. "We're not going to accept that tradeoff. We're going to
do this in parallel." Trying, of course, isn't doing. But in Russia, this official argues, Obama successfully lowered the temperature with President Dmitry Medvedev while still meeting with
dissidents and civil society groups, and he criticized the country's undemocratic elections last fall. And it was "parallel," not a "tradeoff": Obama didn't offer to go easy on human rights,
or for that matter missile defense, to get an arms deal, nor did he insist that progress on arms control would depend on democratization. There is a term for such a nuanced policy:
"double-track engagement," an expression used by George Shultz, secretary of state during Reagan's second term, who pursued national interests while at the same time helping to pry
open such autocratic Cold War allies as Chile and the Philippines. And since Obama, unlike Reagan, puts real store by the United Nations and other multilateral institutions, he is in fact
practicing a yet more nuanced "triple-track engagement" -- with states, with peoples, and with international bodies. The United States has rejoined the Human Rights Council, paid up its
It became clear enough, after 75 minutes, that engagement is

U.N. dues, and promoted the G-20 over the G-8.
not one thing, or two things. It's three or four things. It's "multifaceted and
complex." It's complicated because the world is complicated. Maybe that's why the Obama administration clings
to its favorite word -- because complicated is hard to explain. Simple policies, like Bush's Freedom Agenda, afford
immediate gratification -- and then deep disappointment down the road. Nuanced, many-things-at-once policies
require patience and a tolerance for ambiguous victories. We now have abundant evidence that this is not a patient
or tolerant moment. You have to wonder how long complicated can survive in the absence of big wins. All of which
leaves our senior officials increasingly defensive. "Does it take time to get a bureaucracy oriented around the idea
of multitrack diplomacy?" asked SO #1. "All the habits of interaction are binary. So it does." Sometimes, as in China
or Egypt, engagement with the state seems to preclude engagement with the aspirations of citizens and you get,
Of course, we might feel less confused if
well, realism. Other times, folks like us just don't get it.
the Obamans used some term other than "engagement" to cover virtually
everything they do.
AT: Daga Evidence
Sample of the card they will read for their interpretation:
Engagement requires sustained government to government
interaction. That means an affirmative can promote trade
agreements but cannot promote private investment or
commerce
Daga 13
Sergio, Director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, in Bolivia, and a
visiting senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, Economics of the 2013-
2014 Debate Topic: U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela,
National Center for Policy Analysis, 5/15,
http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message_to_Debaters_6-7-13.pdf
Economic engagement between or among countries can take many forms, but this
document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1)
international trade agreements designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2)
government foreign aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government
economic engagement with private economic engagement through 3)
international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) remittances and
migration by individuals. All of these areas are important with respect to the
countries mentioned in the debate resolution; however, when discussing economic
engagement by the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with
respect to some countries than to others.
The Daga evidence explicitly acknowledges in the first

sentence that economic engagement can take many forms,
but this document will focus on government-to-government
engagement There is clearly no intent to define, and the
author concludes that foreign direct investment in the private
sector IS part of economic engagement.
Daga 13
Sergio, Director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, in Bolivia, and a
visiting senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, Economics of the 2013-
2014 Debate Topic: U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela,
National Center for Policy Analysis, 5/15,
http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message_to_Debaters_6-7-13.pdf
Another way countries engage economically is through the transfer of wealth.
Specifically, individuals and businesses in one country may transfer wealth to
another country by investing in its business enterprises; this kind of wealth transfer
is called foreign direct investment. In 2011 the United States received a flow of
foreign direct investment of nearly $227 billion, and Americans invested directly
abroad almost $400 billion. The United States alone is both the source and the
recipient of more foreign direct investment than any other country in the world. In a
similar way, citizens of a given country may also put their money in another
countrys banks, which will in turn make loans to individuals and enterprises; this
method, too, is indirect foreign investment. Yet another option is to buy bonds
issued by a foreign government. At the end of 2012, people in other countries held
48 percent of the bonds issued publicly by the United States.
AT: Litwak QPQ Evidence
This evidence has no intent to define economic engagement as
exclusively conditional, it is from the paragraph directly after
Litwak describes unconditional engagement strategies as
especially well-suited to China.
Litwak 7 Robert S. Litwak, Director of the Division of International Security
Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former director for
nonproliferation on the National Security Council staff, 2007 Strategies for a
Change of Regime or for Change within a Regime?, Regime Change: U.S.
Strategy Through the Prism of 9/11, Published by JHU Press, ISBN 0801886422, p.
116-117
Unconditional Engagement Under unconditional engagement, a policy change is
made with no explicit expectation of reciprocation by the target state . This shift can take
the form of a political gesture at the governmental level to reduce tensions and facilitate additional steps to
improve relations -such as the United States's symbolic lilting of some minor economic sanctions on Iran in March
2000.4-' Alternatively, unconditional engagement can be conducted through
nongovernmental actors operating at the societal level to promote change. In a
case where the economy is not totally state-controlled, economic contacts can
foster the development of autonomous interest groups. The easing of travel
restrictions can permit the flow of people and ideas into the target state and
promote the positive evolution of the state's civil society. Eco- nomic, scientific,
cultural, and other activities outside the regime's direct control can become seeds
of long-term change. China is the most striking and important example of
this phenomenon. The exponential expansion of China's private sector and
its increased links to the outside world at the societal level have been
both a reflection of domestic reform and spurs for further measures to
promote democratization and the creation of a market economy. Cuba and
Iran are both candidates for unconditional engage- mentwhere some experts
believe such activities would strengthen civil society.44
AT: Haass & OSullivan/Positive Incentives
Defining engagement as positive incentives is unlimiting
Resnick 1
Defining Engagement Too Broadly A second problem associated with various
scholarly treatments of engagement is the tendency to define the concept too
broadly to be of much help to the analyst. For instance, Cha's definition of
engagement as any policy whose means are "non-coercive and non-punitive" is so
vague that essentially any positive sanction could be considered
engagement. The definition put forth by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross in
their edited volume, Engaging China, is equally nebulous. According to Johnston and
Ross, engagement constitutes "the use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the
non-status quo elements of a rising power's behavior ."14 Likewise, in his work, Rogue
States and US Foreign Policy, Robert Litwak defines engagement as "positive
sanctions."15 Moreover, in their edited volume, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives,
Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan define
engagement as "a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on
positive incentives to achieve its objectives."16 As policymakers possess a highly
differentiated typology of alternative options in the realm of negative sanctions from
which to chooseincluding covert action, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, containment,
limited war and total warit is only reasonable to expect that they should have a
similar menu of options in the realm of positive sanctions than simply engagement .
Equating engagement with positive sanctions risks lumping together a
variety of discrete actions that could be analyzed by distinguishing among
them and comparing them as separate policies.
See QPQ Section for AT: Crocker/South Africa
Definitions
2ac/2nc Precision Cards
EE Precision Impacts
Precise interpretations of economic and diplomatic
engagement are criticalthere are over 30 qualified forms of
engagement described in the literature, all with diferent
strategies and mechanisms.
Capie and Evans 2002 David Capie is a Post-doctoral Research Fellow @ Institute of International
Relations, Liu Center for Study of Global Issues, U of British Columbia, Vancouver. Paul Evans is Professor
and Director of the Program on Canada-Asia Policy Studies, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, p. 113
Third, engagement increasingly appears in the literature on Asia-Pacific security in qualified, or, to use Kim
Nossal's term, "adorned" forms. A wide range of adjectives now proceed the word, usually purporting to give it
some kind of nuanced meaning, These modifiers include: active engagement;22 ad hoc engagement; adversarial
engagement;23 broken engagement; coercive engagement; commercial engagement; Comprehensive
Engagement;24 compulsory engagement; conditional engagement; constructive engagement; Co-operative
Engagement; deep engagement and deeper engagement; defence engagement; destructive engagement; Dual
Engagement;25 economic engagement;26 effective engagement; Flexible and Selective Engagement;Z1 focused
engagement;28 full engagernent;29 Global Engagement;30 hidden engagement; incomplete engagement; intense
engagement; peaceful engagement; Peacetime Engagement; positive engagement;31 presumptive engagement;
preventive engagement; proportional engagement;32 pseudo-engagement; realistic engagement; sceptical
engagement; selective engagement; sham engagement;33 Soft Engagement;34 strategic engagement; 35 and
sustained engagement36
Engagement is used to describe U.S. interactions with a whole

host of countriesa more precise interpretation is necessary
to set any limit.
Capie and Evans 2002 David Capie is a Post-doctoral Research Fellow @ Institute of International
Relations, Liu Center for Study of Global Issues, U of British Columbia, Vancouver. Paul Evans is Professor
and Director of the Program on Canada-Asia Policy Studies, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, p. 112-113
Furthermore, the United States' use of the language of engagement has not been limited to its relations with
China. Speaking to the National Press Club in July 1995 on the topic "A Peaceful and Prosperous Asia-Pacific",
the then Secretary of State Warren Christopher described U.S.--Japan relations as "the cornerstone of our
engagement in the Asia-Pacific region". He also discussed the need for the "closer engagement" of Vietnam, as
well as the "engagement... [of] other leading nations of Asia... Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore".19 The
United States' relationship with North Korea has also been described in the language of engagement.20
Similarly, engagement is not a policy or approach pursued solely by the United States, Australia and several
ASEAN member states have also set out what they mean by their policies of engagement.21
Precision is essential to limited engagement debates- key

errors to avoid are conflation with appeasement and expansive
interpretations that justify all positive incentives.
Resnick 1
While the term "engagement" enjoys great consistency and clarity of meaning in
the discourse of romantic love, it enjoys neither in the discourse of statecraft.
Currently, practitioners and scholars of American foreign policy are vigorously
debating the merits of engagement as a strategy for modifying the behavior of
unsavory regimes. The quality of this debate, however, is diminished by the
persistent inability of the US foreign policy establishment to advance a coherent and
analytically rigorous conceptualization of engagement. In this essay, I begin with a
brief survey of the conceptual fog that surrounds engagement and then attempt
to give a more refined definition. I will use this definition as the basis for drawing a
sharp distinction between engagement and alternative policy approaches,
especially appeasement, isolation and containment. In the contemporary lexicon
of United States foreign policy, few terms have been as frequently or as
confusingly invoked as that of engagement.1 A growing consensus extols the
virtues of engagement as the most promising policy for managing the threats posed to
the US by foreign adversaries. In recent years, engagement constituted the Clinton
administration's declared approach in the conduct of bilateral relations with such
countries as China, Russia, North Korea and Vietnam. Robert Suettinger, a onetime
member of the Clinton administration's National Security Council, remarked that the
word engagement has "been overused and poorly defined by a variety of
policymakers and speechwriters" and has "become shopworn to the point that there
is little agreement on what it actually means."2 The Clinton foreign policy team
attributed five distinct meanings to engagement:3
1) A broad-based grand strategic orientation: In this sense, engagement is

considered synonymous with American internationalism and global leadership. For
example, in a 1993 speech, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake observed that
American public opinion was divided into two rival camps: "On the one side is protectionism
and limited foreign engagement; on the other is active American engagement abroad on
behalf of democracy and expanded trade."4 2) A specific approach to managing
bilateral relations with a target state through the unconditional provision of
continuous concessions to that state: During the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate
Bill Clinton criticized the Bush administration's "ill-advised and failed" policy of "constructive
engagement" toward China as one that "coddled the dictators and pleaded for progress, but
refused to impose penalties for intransigence."5 3) A bilateral policy characterized by the
conditional provision of concessions to a target state : The Clinton administration
announced in May 1993 that the future extension of Most Favored Nation trading status to
China would be conditional on improvements in the Chinese government's domestic
human rights record.6
Likewise, in the Agreed Framework signed by the US and North Korea in October 1994, the
US agreed to provide North Korea with heavy oil, new light-water nuclear reactors and
eventual diplomatic and economic normalization in exchange for a freeze in the North's
nuclear weapons program.7 4) A bilateral policy characterized by the broadening of
contacts in areas of mutual interest with a target state: Key to this notion of
engagement is the idea that areas of dialogue and fruitful cooperation should be
broadened and not be held hostage through linkage to areas of continuing
disagreement and friction. The Clinton administration inaugurated such a policy toward
China in May 1994 by declaring that it would not tie the annual MFN decision to the Chinese
government's human rights record.8 Similarly, the administration's foreign policy toward the
Russian Federation has largely been one of engagement and described as an effort to
"build areas of agreement and...develop policies to manage our differences."9 5) A bilateral
policy characterized by the provision of technical assistance to facilitate economic
and political liberalization in a target state: In its 1999 national security report, the
White House proclaimed that its "strategy of engagement with each of the NIS [Newly
Independent States]" consisted of "working with grassroots organizations,
independent media, and emerging entrepreneurs" to "improve electoral processes
and help strengthen civil society," and to help the governments of the NIS to "build the
laws, institutions and skills needed for a market democracy, to fight crime and
corruption [and] to advance human rights and the rule of law."10
Unfortunately, scholars have not fared better than policymakers in the effort to
conceptualize engagement because they often make at least one of the following
critical errors: (1) treating engagement as a synonym for appeasement; (2) defining
engagement so expansively that it essentially constitutes any policy relying on
positive sanctions; (3) defining engagement in an unnecessarily restrictive manner.
Precise definitions of economic engagement are critical- the

common usage of the term is a moving target.
Sanger 97 David E., The New York Times, March 2, p. l/n
Mr. Clinton and his aides say they are anything but Pollyannaish, and that they will
only let China into the trade organization on "commercially viable terms," not as a
political gesture to Beijing. While President Clinton acknowledged recently that
economic engagement had not yet yielded the results he sought, he repeated that it
was the only way to keep China from turning inward, isolated and militaristic.
But there are many definitions of engagement, and the Administration's

interpretation of the phrase is clearly a moving target. None of Mr. Clinton's top
economic officials, for example, use the term "commercial diplomacy," a favorite of
the late Secretary of Commerce, Ronald Brown, during his trade missions around
the world. As one senior Administration official noted recently, the term sounds too
much like commerce and too little like hard-nosed diplomacy.
Contextual uses of engagement are virtually infinite and ruin

precision
Traub 10 James Traub, Fellow of the Center for International Cooperation and
Contributing Writer for the New York Times Magazine, Terms of Engagement,
Foreign Policy, 2-19,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/19/terms_of_engagement?
print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full
Virtually all conversations with Obama administration foreign-policy officials , no matter
where they begin, come to rest at "engagement" -- that vexing, mutable, all-purpose
word. The U.S. president has "engaged" with rogue states, civil society, the United
Nations, and citizens around the globe . Iran vindicates the policy of engagement -- or discredits it.
China is a failure of engagement, Russia a success. Inside the Obama realm, engagement has come to mean "good
diplomacy." To critics on both the left and right, however, it has come to mean "bad diplomacy" -- cynical or naive,
depending on which side you come from. These days -- these shaky days -- the critics seem to be gaining the upper hand, making those Obama officials
increasingly defensive about their policy toward autocratic states, whether in the Middle East or Eurasia, Iran or Sudan. Having spent years thinking hard thoughts in universities and
think tanks, magazines and books, they cannot believe that they are losing the definitional war over their own policy. They are eager, and maybe a little desperate, to set things aright.
And so it was, earlier this week, that when I asked to talk to one official about democracy promotion, I wound up having a 75-minute phone conversation with four White House figures,
much of it about "engagement." "A lot of the baggage we carry," said an officeholder I might as well designate as Senior Official #1 -- the conversation was on background and the White
House that offered up these folks to defend the policy was insistent they not do so on the record -- "is the word 'engagement.' People hear the word and they think 'constructive
engagement.'" I'm not sure this is true outside certain New England common rooms, but it's definitely not an association the Obama White House would like to encourage. After all,
Ronald Reagan's administration used that expression to justify the United States's ongoing relationship with South Africa's apartheid government, a policy widely derided as a cynical
pretext to preserve ties with a Cold War ally. And it failed. If "constructive engagement" is one definition the Obamans are eager to avoid, another is straightforward, old-fashioned
Kissingerian "realism" -- if by realism one means dealing with the interests of states, including brutal states, to the exclusion of those of ordinary citizens. As another interlocutor -- call
him Senior Official #2 -- growing rather hot under the telephonic collar, put it, "A lot of my friends said, 'You guys are a bunch of engagement realists. They'll never talk about democracy
and human rights.'" Barack Obama himself arguably encouraged this view during his 2008 presidential campaign by criticizing George W. Bush's moralistic bluster, by regularly
expressing his high regard for archrealists like James Baker and Brent Scowcroft, and by stipulating his willingness to meet "without preconditions" with even the worst tyrants. And since
becoming president he has muted criticism of the regimes in Sudan and Burma, and referred respectfully to "the Islamic Republic of Iran." The allegation of realpolitik is still intolerable --
even baffling -- to these officials, who pledged themselves to Obama out of a deep faith in his redemptive promise. But if engagement rests upon the expectation that treating autocrats
and theocrats with respect will significantly alter their behavior, then it suffers less from cynicism than from credulity -- which is the other article of baggage under which engagement
now staggers. How can anyone believe that? Administration officials have been at pains to deny that they ever did, especially since Iran has trampled Obama's entreaties underfoot. The
goal of engaging Iran, they now say, was not to change Iran's behavior but to change the behavior of more tractable states, like Russia and China, by showing that the United States was
willing to go the last mile even with the Axis of Evil. Of course, there is abundant evidence that Obama and some of his chief advisors really did hope that Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad would moderate nuclear policy if they showed due regard for his country's national interests, as Helene Cooper recently noted in the New York Times. But it's also true that
from the outset, officials have made the secondary argument for the virtues of engagement. The SOs insisted to me, as other SOs have in the past, that Obama's Iran policy in fact
constitutes a triumph of engagement because Russia has increasingly come around to the American view on the imperative for sanctions. They argue that the Russian change of heart
owes not only to the country's growing alarm over Iranian ambitions, but also to the White House's persistent effort to put relations with Russia on a less adversarial footing than they
were at the end of the Bush years. We have engaged with Russia and reaped the benefits. Of course, Russia hasn't yet signed on to a tough sanctions measure against Iran; and China,
which so far has pocketed Obama's shows of deference without much display of gratitude, may scotch the whole affair. Let us stipulate, then, that engagement is not quite so naive as it
appears. But is it not, still, a realist bargain, trading away those universal values that the president so often evokes in the hopes of geostrategic wins, whether on Iran or climate change
or the global economy? "We're trying to say 'no,'" says SO #2. "We're not going to accept that tradeoff. We're going to do this in parallel." Trying, of course, isn't doing. But in Russia, this
official argues, Obama successfully lowered the temperature with President Dmitry Medvedev while still meeting with dissidents and civil society groups, and he criticized the country's
undemocratic elections last fall. And it was "parallel," not a "tradeoff": Obama didn't offer to go easy on human rights, or for that matter missile defense, to get an arms deal, nor did he
insist that progress on arms control would depend on democratization. There is a term for such a nuanced policy: "double-track engagement," an expression used by George Shultz,
secretary of state during Reagan's second term, who pursued national interests while at the same time helping to pry open such autocratic Cold War allies as Chile and the Philippines.
And since Obama, unlike Reagan, puts real store by the United Nations and other multilateral institutions, he is in fact practicing a yet more nuanced "triple-track engagement" -- with
It
states, with peoples, and with international bodies. The United States has rejoined the Human Rights Council, paid up its U.N. dues, and promoted the G-20 over the G-8.
became clear enough, after 75 minutes, that engagement is not one thing, or two
things. It's three or four things. It's "multifaceted and complex." It's complicated because
the world is complicated. Maybe that's why the Obama administration clings to its favorite word -- because
complicated is hard to explain. Simple policies, like Bush's Freedom Agenda, afford immediate gratification -- and
then deep disappointment down the road. Nuanced, many-things-at-once policies require patience and a tolerance
for ambiguous victories. We now have abundant evidence that this is not a patient or tolerant moment. You have to
wonder how long complicated can survive in the absence of big wins. All of which leaves our senior officials
increasingly defensive. "Does it take time to get a bureaucracy oriented around the idea of multitrack diplomacy?"
asked SO #1. "All the habits of interaction are binary. So it does." Sometimes, as in China or Egypt, engagement
with the state seems to preclude engagement with the aspirations of citizens and you get, well, realism. Other
Of course, we might feel less confused if the Obamans
times, folks like us just don't get it.
used some term other than "engagement" to cover virtually everything they do .
Our more precise interpretation of engagement increases

foreign policy efectiveness.
Resnick 1
In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a
precondition for effective policymaking. Decision makers who invoke critical terms
in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk
exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars
who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical
research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define
"engagement," they undermine the ability to build an efective foreign
policy. The refined definition I propose as a substitute for existing descriptions of
engagement is different in two important ways: First, it clarifies the menu of choices
available for policymakers by allowing engagement to be distinguished from related
approaches such as appeasement, containment and isolation. Second, it lays the
groundwork for systematic and objective research on historical cases of
engagement in order to discern the conditions under which it can be used
effectively. Such research will, in turn, help policymakers acquire the information
necessary to better manage the rogue states of the 21 st century . 566
Precise Interp of Engagement Impossible
Impossible to distinguish between forms of engagement with

any precision they are used interchangeably, and lines
between them are consistently blurred.
Capie and Evans 2002
David Capie is a Post-doctoral Research Fellow @ Institute of International Relations,
Liu Center for Study of Global Issues, U of British Columbia, Vancouver. Paul Evans
is Professor and Director of the Program on Canada-Asia Policy Studies, The Asia-
Pacific Security Lexicon, p. 114
As is apparent from the above discussion, the use of engagement in the rapidly growing literature on the Asia-
Pacific security cooperation covers a diverse range of sometimes contradictory ideas, approaches, and policies.
Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly, like concepts of security the different forms of engagement are often
used interchangeably by officials or scholars in their writings and speeches. Even concepts which purport to
describe specific state policies are often used without consistency or precision. Therefore, it should be
remembered that some of the distinctions drawn below are often blurred in practice.
Engagement cant be an efective or predictable limiter: the

literature is wildly inconsistent with its use, and it has several
diferent meanings.
Capie and Evans 2002
David Capie is a Post-doctoral Research Fellow @ Institute of International Relations,
Liu Center for Study of Global Issues, U of British Columbia, Vancouver. Paul Evans
is Professor and Director of the Program on Canada-Asia Policy Studies, The Asia-
Pacific Security Lexicon, p. 108
Engagement
According to the Oxford Concise Dictionary, the noun engagement and the verb to engage have several different
meanings. Among these, to engage can mean "to employ busily", "to hold a per-son's attention", "to bind by a
promise (usually a marriage)", or to "come into battle with an enemy". The noun engagement can mean "the act
or state of engaging or being engaged", an "appointment with another person", "a betrothal", "an encounter
between hostile forces", or "a moral commitment". The gerund engaging means to be "attractive or charming" In
the literature on security in the Asia-Pacific engagement most commonly refers to policies regarding the People's
Republic of China. However, the term has been used in many different ways leading to a great deal of confusion
and uncertainty. A Business Week interview with the Chinese VicePremier summed this up with the headline:
"Li Lanqing: Does 'engagement' mean fight or marry?" l
For one of the most important and ubiquitous terms in the Asia-Pacific security discourse, engagement is
generally under-theorized. Most of the literature on the term is either descriptive or prescriptive. There is a
remarkable lack of agreement about the meaning of engagement and a great deal of inconsistency in its use. An
article in the New York Times noted that "there are many definitions of engagement" and described the Clinton
administration's use of the phrase as a "moving target" 2 This indeterminacy has prompted a host of scholars and
officials to offer their own modified interpretations of engagement - the number of which now exceeds thirty.
These, in turn, have arguably made for less, rather than greater conceptual clarity.
No consensus on engagement usage, even among its
advocates.
Alterman 9
Jon B., Defining Engagement, CSIS Middle East Notes and Commentary,
July/August, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/0709_MENC.pdf
For much of last month, dramatic images out of Tehran displaced a brewing debate
over engaging Iran. Similar debates over engaging Hamas and Hezbollah fell by
the wayside, too, and the debate over engaging Syria seemed to have been decided
in the affirmative, with the announcement that the United States would return an
ambassador to Damascus for the first time in more than four years. Just as the
isolation of adversaries lay at the heart of the Bush administrations strategy in the
Middle East, properly calibrating engagement lies at the heart of the Obama
administrations strategy. For advocates, engagement with real or potential
adversaries is an elixir that softens hostility and builds common interests. For
opponents, it is a sign of surrender to dark forces of violence and hatred. Yet, for all
of the passion that the issue of engagement excites, no one seems to want to
define it. Each side would rather talk about the effects of engagement than the
nature of engagement itself. Part of the problem is a matter of definition. Refusing
to have any official contact with a group or country does not constitute
engagement. But what then? Engagement must mean more than merely holding
diplomatic discussions, but how much more? How should issues be sequenced?
Should symbolic statements be demanded at the beginning as a sign of positive
intentions, or held to the end as part of a final declaration? Even staunch advocates
of engagement differ on these key issues. History is replete with examples of both
engagement and disengagement working well. Europeans often cite the role the
Helsinki Process played in diminishing threats from the Soviet Union; similarly,
South Africas international isolation in the 1980s helped guide a transition to
majority rule in the country. Disengagement followed by engagement can be
effective too, as two decades of isolation of Libya, followed by a cautious
engagement in this decade, have helped moderate Libyan behavior.
EE Contextual/Inclusive Definitions
Includes Energy and Environmental Coop
Economic engagement includes energy and environmental
cooperation.
Hormats, Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and
the Environment, 2012
(Robert D., U.S. Economic Engagement with the Asia Pacific, December 7,
http://www.state.gov/e/rls/rmk/2012/201746.htm Accessed 7/6/13 GAL
During the U.S.-ASEAN Summit last month, President Obama and ASEAN leaders
also launched what we called the U.S.-ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement
Initiative to promote economic cooperation between the United States and ASEAN.
This initiative, which we called the E3, will focus on enhancing ASEAN members
capacity for advancing cooperation in many areas that we think will further enhance
trade.
In addition, an exciting new area for our outreach is in the energy sector. At the East
Asian Summit, President Obama and his counterparts from Brunei and Indonesia
announced the U.S.-Asia Pacific Comprehensive Energy Partnership. The Partnership
will offer a framework for expanding energy and environmental cooperation to
advance efforts to ensure affordable, secure, and cleaner energy throughout the
region. We will foster active private sector involvement in the partnership, which will
focus on the four key areas of renewable and clean energy, markets and
interconnectivity, the emerging role of natural gas, and sustainable development.
And the U.S. Government will add support to the effort through utilizing various U.S.
government agencies, including the Export-Import Bank, OPIC, and TDA, in order to
promote the use of American technology, services, and equipment in the energy
infrastructure area and also to provide financing for American companies that wish
to become engaged in these projects.
Includes Removal from Terrorism List
Iraq example proves- removal from the terrorism list is an
economic engagement strategy.
(Douglas A, U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy & Strategy,
Accessed 7/6/13 GAL)
In March 1982, the U.S. Government officially began engaging Saddam Hussein by
removing Iraq from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The official reason was
to recognize Iraqs improved record,4 a claim that a Defense Department official
later rebutted in stating, No one had any doubts about [the Iraqis] continued
involvement in terrorism. . . . The real reason was to help them succeed in the war
against Iran.5 Thus Iraq, no longer on the list of terrorist states subject to highly
binding export restrictions on weapon purchases and technology exports, became
eligible for U.S. Government-financed credits designed to promote the export of
U.S. goods. It was presumed that after Iraq began to benefit from and become
reliant on U.S. economic linkages, the United States would be able to induce Iraq
to behave more in accordance with international norms. Engagement of Saddams
regime was anchored on the assumption that trade interdependence would be
asymmetrical in favor of the United States, and that, in turn, the United States
would be able to shape Iraqs behavior, using trade as a tool of influence. In
November 1984, after Reagans reelection, Washington resumed full diplomatic ties
with Baghdad.
Includes Streamlining Customs
Economic engagement includes changing customs procedures
to promote greater trade.
Office of the White House Press Secretary 12
(November 19, Fact Sheet: The U.S.-ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement (E3)
Initiative, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/19/fact-sheet-us-
asean-expanded-economic-engagement-e3-initiative Accessed 7/7/13)
Today, at the U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, President
Obama and Leaders of the ten ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)
states welcomed the launch of the U.S.-ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement
(E3) initiative a new framework for economic cooperation designed to expand
trade and investment ties between the United States and ASEAN, creating new
business opportunities and jobs in all eleven countries. E3 identifies specific
cooperative activities to facilitate U.S.-ASEAN trade and investment, increase
efficiency and competitiveness of trade flows and supply chains throughout ASEAN,
and build greater awareness of the commercial opportunities that the growing U.S.-
ASEAN economic relationship presents. Furthermore, by working together on these
E3 initiatives, many of which correspond to specific issues addressed in trade
agreements, the United States and ASEAN will lay the groundwork for ASEAN
countries to prepare to join high-standard trade agreements, such as the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement that the United States is currently negotiating
with ten countries in Asia and the Western Hemisphere. E3 will begin with a set of
concrete joint activities that will expand trade and investment: negotiation of a
U.S.-ASEAN trade facilitation agreement, including simplified customs procedures
and increased transparency of customs administration; joint development of
Information and Communications Technology principles, to guide policymakers on
issues like cross-border information flows, localization requirements, and the role of
regulatory bodies. joint development of Investment Principles; principles would
address essential elements of investment policies, including market access, non-
discrimination, investor protections, transparency, and responsible business
conduct. additional work on standards development and practices; Small and
Medium-sized Enterprise (SMEs); and trade and the environment. Joint work under
E3 will be further reinforced by USAIDs trade facilitation capacity-building
assistance to the ASEAN members. E3 will also help ASEAN countries integrate their
markets further as ASEAN seeks to build an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015.
Includes Infrastructure and Technical Assistance
Economic engagement includes infrastructure development
and technical assistance.
Daily News 7
("India attaches highest importance to Lankan ties," 1/26,
http://www.dailynews.lk/2007/01/26/news33.asp Accessed 7/7/13)
Bilateral economic and commercial relations between India and Sri Lanka are multi-
faceted. The wide swath of our economic engagement includes buoyant trade,
investments, services, infrastructure development, technical training and extension
of lines of credit.
Includes Anti-Corruption, Regional Integration
Economic engagement includes improved economic
governance and anti-corruption measures.
Senator Chris Coons, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on African Afairs, 3/17/13
( Embracing Africas Economic Potential,
http://thehill.com/images/stories/blogs/globalaffairs/africareport.pdf Accessed
7/7/13)
The Obama Administration has recognized the urgent need to accelerate and
deepen economic engagement in sub-Saharan Africa. In a June 2012 policy
document entitled, U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, the Administration laid
out a series of policies to meet this objective, including: working with
ourAfrican partnersto promote an enabling environment for trade and
investment; improving economic governance and transparency while reducing
corruption; promoting regional integration; expandingAfrican capacity to access
global markets; and and encouraging U.S. companies to trade with and invest in
Africa.5
Diplomatic Engagement
DE = Sustained Diplomatic Dialogue
Diplomatic engagement is continuous, sustained dialogue
conducted by diplomats to foster cooperation or build
confidence.
Fields 15
Jeffrey R., Engaging Adversaries: Myths and Realities in American Foreign Policy,
Diplomacy & Statecraft, 26:294321
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592296.2015.1034570
Policy and academic circles debate the wisdom and utility of diplomatic
engagement.2 Nonetheless, perhaps unconsciously, feelings of selfrighteousness,
moral superiority, and American exceptionalism drive United States policies that
spurn or restrict constructive engagement and find general basis on myths and
narratives. Rather than delve into the sources of those ideological or emotional
drivers, it is important to focus on the misperceptions, many of accepted as truth
and conventional wisdom.3 These myths are specious and selectively applied as
rationales used to support isolationist policies. Diplomatic engagement or
constructive engagementthe central focus here is but one amongst many tools of
statecraft employed by governments to help achieve their foreign policy
objectives.4 In this analysis, engagement means a continuoussustained
dialogue, conducted by diplomats to foster co-operation, build confidence, reduce
tensions, or create a space for further interaction.5 In this sense, the terms
engagement and diplomatic engagement are synonymous.
DE = Process to Change Behavior
Diplomatic engagement requires direct talks, and a process of
step by step reciprocal gestures to modify the targets policies
and behavior.
Crocker 9
Chester A., Ass. Sec of State for African Affairs 81-89 and architect of Constructive
Engagement w/South Africa, Terms of Engagement, NYT Sept. 13,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/opinion/14crocker.html?_r=0
PRESIDENT OBAMA will have a hard time achieving his foreign policy goals until he
masters some key terms and better manages the expectations they convey. Given
the furor that will surround the news of Americas readiness to hold talks with Iran,
he could start with engagement one of the trickiest terms in the policy lexicon.
The Obama administration has used this term to contrast its approach with its
predecessors resistance to talking with adversaries and troublemakers. His critics
show that they misunderstand the concept of engagement when they ridicule it as
making nice with nasty or hostile regimes.
Lets get a few things straight. Engagement in statecraft is not about sweet talk. Nor
is it based on the illusion that our problems with rogue regimes can be solved if only
we would talk to them. Engagement is not normalization, and its goal is not
improved relations. It is not akin to dtente, working for rapprochement, or
appeasement.
So how do you define an engagement strategy? It does require direct talks.
There is simply no better way to convey authoritative statements of position or to
hear responses. But establishing talks is just a first step. The goal of engagement
is to change the other countrys perception of its own interests and
realistic options and, hence, to modify its policies and its behavior.
Diplomatic engagement is proven to work in the right circumstances. American
diplomats have used it to change the calculations and behavior of regimes as varied
as the Soviet Union, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Cuba, China, Libya and,
intermittently, Syria.
There is no cookie-cutter formula for making it work, however. In southern Africa in
the 1980s, we directed our focus toward stemming violence between white-ruled
South Africa and its black-ruled neighbors. This strategy put a priority on regional
conflict management in order to stop cross-border attacks and create better
conditions for internal political change. The United States also engaged with the
Cubans in an effort aimed at achieving independence for Namibia (from South
Africa) and at the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. In Mozambique,
engagement meant building a constructive relationship with the United States,
restraining South African interference in Mozambiques internal conflicts and
weaning the country from its Soviet alignment.
More recently, the Bush administrations strategy for engagement with Libya
ultimately led to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations and the elimination of
that countrys programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.
While the details differ, each case of engagement has common elements.
Engagement is a process, not a destination. It involves exerting pressure, by
raising questions and hypothetical possibilities, and by probing the other countrys
assumptions and thinking. Above all, it involves testing how far the other country
might be willing to go. Properly understood, the diplomacy of engagement means
raising questions that the other country may wish to avoid or be politically unable to
answer. It places the ball in the other countrys court.
Engagement, of course, comes with risks. One is that domestic opponents will
intentionally distort the purposes of engagement. Another risk is that each side may
try to impose preconditions for agreeing to meet and talk and ultimately
negotiate. But we will not get far with the Iranians, for example, if we (and they)
insist on starting by establishing the other sides intentions.
Another risk is that, no matter what we say, the rogue regime may claim that
engagement confers legitimacy. A more consequential danger is that a successful
engagement strategy may leave the target regime in place and even strengthened,
an issue that troubled some critics of the Bush administrations 2003 breakthrough
that led to the normalizing of relations between the United States and Libya.
But by far the greatest risk of engagement is that it may succeed. If we succeed in
changing the position of the other countrys decision-makers, we then must decide
whether we will take yes for an answer and reciprocate their moves with steps of
our own. If talk is fruitful, a negotiation will begin about taking reciprocal steps down
a jointly defined road. Engagement diplomacy forces us to make choices. Perhaps
this is what frightens its critics the most.
As the Obama team works to fend off accusations that it is rushing into Russian,
Iranian, Syrian or even North Korean arms, it will need to get the logic and definition
of engagement right. In each case, we will need a clear-eyed assessment of what
we are willing to offer in return for the changed behavior we seek. Engagement
diplomacy may be easier to understand if the Obama administration speaks clearly
at home about what it really requires.
DE = Engagement
Diplomatic engagement and engagement are synonymous-
diplomatic engagement is any sustained dialogue to foster
cooperation, reduce tension, or further interaction.
Fields 15
Jeffrey R., Engaging Adversaries: Myths and Realities in American Foreign Policy,
Diplomacy & Statecraft, 26:294321
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592296.2015.1034570
Policy and academic circles debate the wisdom and utility of diplomatic
engagement.2 Nonetheless, perhaps unconsciously, feelings of selfrighteousness,
moral superiority, and American exceptionalism drive United States policies that
spurn or restrict constructive engagement and find general basis on myths and
narratives. Rather than delve into the sources of those ideological or emotional
drivers, it is important to focus on the misperceptions, many of accepted as truth
and conventional wisdom.3 These myths are specious and selectively applied as
rationales used to support isolationist policies. Diplomatic engagement or
constructive engagementthe central focus here is but one amongst many tools of
statecraft employed by governments to help achieve their foreign policy
objectives.4 In this analysis, engagement means a continuoussustained
dialogue, conducted by diplomats to foster co-operation, build confidence, reduce
tensions, or create a space for further interaction.5 In this sense, the terms
engagement and diplomatic engagement are synonymous.

DE Track 2
Diplomatic engagement is direct political contact to foster
cooperation, reduce tension or further interaction. Track two
diplomacy is distinct.
Fields 7
Jeffrey, PhD in politics and international relations, from his dissertation @ USC,
ADVERSARIES AND STATECRAFT: EXPLAINING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD
ROGUE STATES, December, p. 303-304 Italics in original
I define engagement as a diplomatic posture that employs direct (even if it is
at a low level) political contact as a strategy to foster cooperation, build confidence,
reduce tensions, or to create a space for further interaction.10 I separate the use of
incentives from the definition, though positive incentives can be an important part
of an engagement strategy. Engagement in and of itself without the use of
incentives
can signal a willingness to cooperate on issues or at a minimum that relations
between two states are important enough to maintain a vehicle for direct
diplomacy.
The United States has engaged Syria for many years. Even after Washington
recalled
its ambassador in 2005, the United States continued to talk with Syria about
regional
matters. The negotiations that eventually disarmed Libya look place in secret over
the course of a decade - while Washington and Tripoli did not have diplomatic
relations. These are notable cases of engagement that stand in contrast the
episodes
of isolation of Iran and North Korea.
Engagement can, however, make exclusive use of negative incentives. Haass
and O'Sullivan consider incentives as bound into the definition of engagement. They
write: "In our usage, engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends to
a
significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives-"" Therefore,
though Haass and O'Sullivan's approach is quite useful I modify their definition of
engagement to disaggregate incentives. And as they note, engagement "does not
preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments."1' This is
certainly the case and why I contrast engagement, broadly defined, with isolationist
policies.
10 I emphasize direct, official contact recognizing that states that are
isolated diplomatically by the
United States such as Iran often are still engaged regularly through track-
two diplomacy.
DE Limits Impact
Our interpretation of high level, direct and official contact is
necessary to preserve limits. Contextual uses of diplomatic
engagement include grants for musical performances, sports
tours, and medical goodwill ambassadors.
Lemery 10 Jay, A Case for White Coat Diplomacy, JAMA. 2010;303(13):1307-
1308. doi:10.1001/jama.2010.384.
http://jama.jamanetwork.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/article.aspx?
articleid=185603
A closer partnership between academic medicine and foreign policy could serve as
a model for US diplomatic engagement worldwide. There is precedent for this.
The US State Department has a long history of tapping into the best and brightest
talent from the United States to promote diplomacy. Such grant-funded programs
include musical performances, English-language initiatives, and sports team tours.
The strategy is predicated on the premise that individuals will transcend politics to
connect through the arts, music, and sportsmanship, and find mutual wellness,
respect, and goodwill in return. By logical extension, medicine should be part of this
list.
By extending its mandate to include international medical outreach, the US
diplomatic service could reap the benefits of engaging a talent pool of thousands of
physician-ambassadors whose goals overlap their own at the professional level, to
foster reciprocal goodwill with US colleagues and, at the humanitarian level, to
showcase US concern for the well-being of people in each country in which such a
program is undertaken.
Economic
Economic Efects Bad
Defining whether a plan is economic on the basis of efect
makes nuclear war potentially topical- only focusing on means
avoids the worst kind of efects topicality.
Colombia, Economic Statecraft, p. 33-36
Alternative Concepts
As with policy options, the value of a particular conceptualization is best measured by comparing it with available
economic statecraft is defined in terms of means, alternative
alternatives. Whereas
concepts are usually defined in terms of actual or intended efects of a policy or in terms of the
process by which the policy was made.
Foreign Economic Policy
The term "foreign economic policy" is sometimes used in much the same way as "economic statecraft" is used here.
Other uses, however, should be noted. Benjamin Cohen and Robert Pastor define it in terms of governmental
actions intended to affect the international economic environment.17 An important drawback to this conception is
that it makes it definitionally impossible to consider foreign economic policy as an option when a statesman wants
to affect the noneconomic aspects of the international environment, say the international climate of opinion with
respect to the legitimacy of the government of Rhodesia. Rational adaptation of means to ends in foreign policy
making is not facilitated by defining some policy options in terms of particular ends. Still another objection to this
definition is that it says nothing about the means to be used, thus leaving open the possibility that the use of
noneconomic techniques, such as threats of violence, could be considered foreign economic policy. Such a
possibility strays needlessly from common usage.
I. M.Destler offers a definition of foreign economic policy in terms of the actual

impact of governmental actions on foreign and economic concerns. This definition
implies nothing whatever about either the means used or the effect intended; instead it focuses on the
actual efects intended or not. Thus, a nuclear war could be labeled as foreign
economic policy if it had important side effects on foreign economic matters . Any
conception of foreign economic policy that cannot differentiate between nuclear
attack and trade restrictions is hopelessly at odds with common usage. Any
conception of policy that ignores both means and ends is unlikely to be of much use in
assessing the rationality of a given policy.
International Economic Policy
Stephen D. Cohen argues that the term "international economic policy" is preferable to the more commonly used
phrase, "foreign economic policy." He contends that "international economic policy must be viewed as being a
separate phenomenon, not a tool for use by either foreign policy or domestic economic policy officials." The reasons
underlying Cohen's position can be summarized as follows: (1) "International economic policy" is the "preferable
term because . . . policy making in this area must take account of too many questions of domestic. . . policy to be
considered 'foreign.' " (2) "The term 'foreign economic policy' usually connotes a subdivision of foreign policy as a
whole and is therefore an oversimplification." And (3) acceptance of international economic policy as a distinct
policy area is the "best and quickest way" to improve understanding of the "forces of economics in international
economic policy" and of "the global political impact of U.S. international economic policy."19 The following points,
however, should be noted in response to Cohen's position: (1) Foreign policy has traditionally been defined in terms
of attempts to influence foreigners, not in terms of the factors that should be taken into account in formulating the
policy. The fact that making international economic policy requires consideration of foreign and domestic political
and economic factors in no way distinguishes it from traditional conceptions of foreign economic policy. (2) It is not
self-evident that treating foreign economic policy as a subdivision of foreign policy as a whole constitutes
"oversimplification." Cohen provides little evidence or argument to support this contention. Indeed, from an a priori
standpoint, it would seem simpler to consider international economic policy by itself than to treat it as part of a
larger whole. Treating more variables may lead to overcomplexity, but it rarely leads to oversimplification. And (3)
the question of whether Cohen's approach is the "best and quickest way" to enhance understanding is best
answered after consideration of alternative
At least three common meanings of the term economic sanctions may be identified .
The first is a rather narrow concept referring to the use of economic measures to enforce international law. The
second refers to the types of values that are intended to be reduced or augmented
in the target state. And the third usage corresponds to the concept of economic techniques of statecraft as
used here. The first is narrowly legalistic and therefore unsuitable for general foreign policy analysis. The
second emphasizes intended effects rather than the means for achieving those
effects. The difficulty is that any or all of the policy instruments discussed in the previous
chapter can be used to affect the economic values in a target state. Diplomatic
pressure on other states can be used to discourage trade with the target; propaganda can be
used to undermine confidence in the target states currency; and military attack can be used to
destroy factories. Thus, conceiving of economic sanctions in terms of the intended
effects on the receiving state is no help at all in distinguishing economic from
noneconomic tools of statecraft. The term economic sanctions is used in so many different ways that
there is much to be said for avoiding it altogether. Unfortunately, the term is so deeply embedded in the literature
of economic statecraft that ignoring it is impossible. Later chapters will therefore use this term, but only in its third
sense.
Focusing on ends that have an economic efect is unlimiting-

economic engagement should be defined by the means, not
the outcome.
David Baldwin 1985 Senior Political Scientist, Woodrow Wilson School of Public
and International Affairs, Princeton University Economic Statecraft What is
Economic Statecraft? pp. 29-50
Choosing a concept of economic statecraft is not merely a matter of "semantic
taste," at least not if that is meant to imply that " there is no disputing matters of taste .' ' Some concepts
are better suited for the analysis of governmental influence attempts than others. In
comparison with available alternatives , the concept of " economic statecraft" has several
advantages. The most important of these can be summarized as follows: 1. "Economic statecraft"
emphasizes means rather than ends . This usage is probably closer to ordinary
language than definitions in terms of ends. Bombing a library is not called cultural
warfare; bombing homes is not called residential warfare; bombing
nuclear reactors (with conventional bombs) is not called nuclear warfare; and
bombing factories should not be labeled economic warfare. 2. " Economic
statecraft" does not restrict the range of goals that may be sought by economic
means. It makes it conceptually possible to describe the empirically undeniable fact
that policy makers sometimes use economic means to pursue a wide variety of
noneconomic ends. 3. "Economic statecraft" treats policy instruments as property
concepts, thus facilitating the maintenance of a clear distinction between
undertakings and outcomes. 4. Unlike most alternative concepts, the definition of " economic
statecraft" includes a definition of " economic." It thus provides criteria for
distinguishing economic techniques of statecraft from noneconomic techniques.
Economic requires exchange transactions of goods with a
market value- alternative interpretations are unlimiting.
Columbia University, Economic Statecraft, p. 30-31
economic techniques of statecraft were defined as governmental
In the previous chapter
influence attempts relying primarily on resources that have a reasonable semblance
of a market price in terms of money. Although the rationale for defining techniques of statecraft in
terms of influence attempts was covered in the previous chapter, the justification for defining economic in terms
of money prices was postponed until now.
Not everyone would agree that this is worthwhile. Klaus Knorr, for example, focuses his attention on explicating the
concepts of power and influence, while virtually ignoring economic concepts. He defends this by asserting that the
conceptualization of economic phenomena. . . [can be taken] for granted, because it is highly standardized and
easily accessible in good textbooks. Thus, when Knorr defines economic power in terms of economic policy, it
is presumably all right since one has only to consult a good textbook in order to ascertain criteria for
distinguishing economic from noneconomic policy. The best known textbook available, however, is not very helpful
in this respect. Paul A. Samuelsons Economics lists six different definitions of economics and notes that the list
could be extended many times over. Some of these are clearly unacceptable for differentiating economic from,
noneconomic statecraft. For example,to define economic activities as those which involve
exchange transactions among people regardless of whether money is used is to
include many areas of social life not normally considered to be economic. The social
exchange theorists have demonstrated that the exchange of status, favors, respect, love,
friendship, and so on are ubiquitous in social life ; yet few economists or noneconomists would
label such exchanges as economic. Similarly, to define economics as the study of how to
improve society is too broad to be helpful in defining economic statecraft. An
equally broad definition favored by some economists depicts economics as a science responsible for the study of
human behavior as the relationship between ends and means which have alternative uses. So defined, it
encompasses the whole field of means-ends analysis and is utterly worthless for distinguishing economic
In defining economic statecraft or economic
techniques of statecraft from other techniques.
power, as in other areas of intellectual inquiry, it is risky to take agreement on
basic concepts for granted.
Definition of the "economic" aspect of social life in terms of the production and consumption of
wealth that is measurable in terms of money corresponds with long-standing usage
by the classic textbooks13 of economics and is descriptive of the interests of most
contemporary economists. In addition, such usage captures the basic intuitive
notion of economic activities used by laymen and policy makers.
Economic refers to material wealth

AHD 13 American Heritage Dictionary, Economic,
http://education.yahoo.com/reference/dictionary/entry/economic
economic (k-nmk, k-) KEY
ADJECTIVE:
Of or relating to the production, development, and management of material

wealth, as of a country, household, or business enterprise.
Of or relating to an
And/Or
And/Or
One or the other or both
Words and Phrases 7 (3A W&P, p. 220)
Words and/or, for contract purposes, commonly mean the one or the
C.A.1 (Mass.) 1981.
other or both.Local Division 589, Amalgameted Transit Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Com. Of Mass., 666 F.2d 618,
certiorari denied Local Div. 589, Amalgamated Transit Union AFL-CIO v. Massachusetts, 102 S.Ct. 2928, 457 U.S.
1117, 73 L.Ed.2d 1329.Contracts 159.
And/or means one or the other or both

Pullum 8 (Geoffrey K., Professor of General Linguistics University of Edinburgh,
And/or: "and AND or", or "and OR or"?, Language Log, 4-14,
http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=35)
Does and/or mean "and and or", or "and or or"? That is, if I say I am interested in A and/or B, do I
mean I'm interested in A and B and I'm interested in A or B, or do I mean that I'm interested in A and B or I'm
interested in A or B? (You may want to say that it means I'm interested in A and B and/or I'm interested in A or B;
Having reflected on it for a little while, I am convinced that
but in that case I repeat my question.)
the answer has to be that A and/or B must mean "A and B or A or B" . That is, if an entity A
is claimed to have the property of being F and/or G, the claim amounts to saying that either (i) A has the property of
being both F and G or (ii) A has the property of being either F or G. And to claim that F is a property of entities A
and/or B is to claim that either (i) F holds for A and B or (ii) F holds for A or B. However, in that case and/or is
effectively identical in meaning with or , so it is at first rather hard to see why and/or exists at all. But
I do have a guess. The right theory of what or means in English is that it is in general inclusive but that sometimes
the exclusive special case is conveyed as a conversational implicature. I'm going to study linguistics at either York
or Edinburgh would often be taken to have the exclusive sense: since you typically go to a single university to take
a single degree, and during the degree course you have no time to study elsewhere, a decision to choose York
would normally exclude choosing Edinburgh as well. The exclusive sense is thus conveyed: one or the other of York
and Edinburgh will be chosen, and if it is York it will not be Edinburgh, and if it is Edinburgh it will not be York. But of
course if you think about it, someone who says she is choosing between those two universities does not commit
herself for life to never studying at the other. When the two alternatives exclude each other, then the exclusive
meaning is the only one that makes sense. If you are asked whether you want to sit in the stalls or in the balcony,
When they don't
it's one or the other but not both, because you can only be in one place at one time.
exclude each other, it's always understood that or allows for both: obviously
someone whose ambition is to win either an Oscar or an Olympic medal wouldn't feel
a failure if they won both. Winning both would satisfy the ambition in spades. So my guess would be that
and/or is a way of underlining the point that the or is to be understood in its inclusive sense rather than its exclusive
sense. Sometimes you want to explicitly indicate "or more than one of the above", and and/or does that. Take the
first example of and/or in the Wall Street Journal corpus of 1987-1989 (a 44-million-word collection of random
articles that linguists often use as a source for real-life examples because the Linguistic Data Consortium the
host for the giant Language Log servers made it available in 1993 nice and cheap). The example (which actually
happens to be a quotation from the Washington Post) is this: Too many of his attitudes, claims and complaints are
careless, conflicting, dubious, inaccurate, mean, petty, simplistic, superficial, uninformed and/or pointlessly biased. I
take it as obvious that if one hundred percent of the hapless man's attitudes, claims and complaints had all ten
properties every single one was careless and conflicting and dubious and inaccurate and mean and petty and
simplistic and superficial and uninformed and pointlessly biased then the quoted claim would be regarded as
An or would have done the job here, but the and/or injects a (logically
true, not false.
redundant) reminder that it may well be the case that more than one of the list of ten properties applies to
the miserable individual in question.
X or Y or both
Wood 1 (Diane P., Circuit Judge United States Court of Appeals, Susan E. Hess,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Company, 12-13,
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?
court=7th&navby=case&no=002043)
Having determined that Hess's 1996 employment contract is properly a part of the administrative record the district
court was entitled to consider, we must next decide whether Hartford could reasonably have determined that
Hess's benefits as of April 19, 1996, should have been based only on her 1995 draw amount. Like the district court,
we cannot read the contract that way. Hess's 1996 contract clearly states that the draw system was to be phased
out as of April 5. The contract also specifies that her benefits, including long-term disability benefits, would be
calculated based on her "base salary and/or draw." (We note in passing that the phrase "and/or" has its
critics. Bryan A. Garner reports in A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 56 (2d ed. 1995), that "and/or has been
vilified for most of its life-- and rightly so." He goes on to say, however, that the expression, while "undeniably
clumsy, does have a specific meaning (x and/or y = x or y or both)." Id.) Here, this
would mean that Hess could have her benefits calculated on the basis of her base
salary, or her draw, or both. In the context of Fleet's transition away from a draw system, the only
reasonable interpretation of this provision was that the benefits would be based on the draw while it was in effect
and on the base salary thereafter. As of April 5, Hess was thus contractually entitled to a benefits package based on
her base salary--that is, based on the average of her previous two years' commissions. The fact that Fleet may have
breached the contract (or been slow in implementing its details) by failing to move from the draw system to the
base salary system until June 1 does not change the package of compensation and benefits to which Hess was
contractually entitled. Nor could the fact that Fleet failed to inform Hartford about the date the change-over was to
have occurred affect Hess's benefit amount. The Hartford policy states that "[i]f [Fleet] gives The Hartford any
incorrect information, the relevant facts will be determined" to establish the correct benefit amount. Once informed
by Hess's attorney that Hess believed the information Fleet provided Hartford was incorrect, it was incumbent on
the examiner to refer to Hess's employment contract to determine her actual regular monthly pay. Had he done so,
he would have seen that Hess became entitled to the higher level of benefits on April 5, two weeks before her
disability. The district court therefore did not err when it concluded that Hartford's failure to consider the contract
was arbitrary and capricious.
And/or can mean either defer to general community

practice
N.D. 1964.And/or as used in contract may mean either and or or, and
interpretation should be one which will best effect purpose of parties as determined
in light of equities of the case.Hummel v. Kranz, 126 N.W.2d 786Contracts 159.
And/or is now grammatically acceptable

Brians 13 , Paul Brians, Emeritus Professor of English, Washington State
University Pullman Common Errors in English Usage: The Book (3rd Edition,
November, 2013), http://public.wsu.edu/~brians/errors/andor.html)
The legal phrase and/or, indicating that you can either choose between two
alternatives or choose both of them, has proved irresistible in other contexts and is
now widely acceptable though it irritates some readers as jargon. However, you can logically use it only
when you are discussing choices which may or may not both be done: Bring chips and/or beer. Its very much
overused where simple or would do, and it would be wrong to say, you can get to the campus for this mornings
meeting on a bike and/or in a car. Choosing one eliminates the possibility of the other, so this isnt an and/or
situation.
And/or means or
Or. 1942. As used in the constitutional amendment and statue relating to the creation of public utility districts, the
hybrid phrase and/or may be construed as meaning or .Ollilo v. Clatskanie Peoples
Utility Dist., 132 P.2d 416, 170 Or. 173.
And
In addition
Ansell 00 (Mary, Chapter 28: Conjunctions, English Grammar: Explanations and
Exercises, http://www.fortunecity.com/bally/durrus/153/gramch28.html)
Coordinate conjunctions are used to join two similar grammatical constructions; for
instance, two words, two phrases or two clauses. e.g. My friend and I will attend the meeting. Austria is famous for
the beauty of its landscape and the hospitality of its people. The sun rose and the birds began to sing. In these
examples, the coordinate conjunction and is used to join the two words friend and I, the two phrases the beauty of
its landscape and the hospitality of its people, and the two clauses the sun rose and the birds began to sing. The
most commonly used coordinate conjunctions are and, but and or. In addition, the words nor and yet may be used
as coordinate conjunctions. In the following table, each coordinate conjunction is followed by its meaning and an
example of its use. Note the use of inverted word order in the clause beginning with nor. Coordinate
Conjunctions and: in addition She tried and succeeded .
Requires both
Inclusion of conjunctive and in regulation indicated that all three of the
C.A.Fed. 2001.
enumerated criteria had to be demonstrated.Watson v. Department of Navy, 262 F. 3d 1292,
certiorari denied 122 S.Ct. 817, 534 U.S. 1083, 151 L.Ed.2d 700.Admin Law 412.1.
Not or
The word and is to be accepted for its conjunctive connotation rather

C.A.5 (Tex.) 1988.
than as a word interchangeable with or except where strict grammatical construction would
frustrate clear legislative intent.Bruce v. First Federal Sav. And Loan Assn of Conroe, Inc., 837 F.2d 712Statut
197.
Or
Or can be one does not have to be both
Websters 96 (Revised Unabridged Dictionary, Or,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/or)
1. One of two; the one or the other; -- properly used of two things, but sometimes of
a larger number, for any one
Exclusive evidence or means only one

Quirk 93 (Randolph, Professor of Linguistics University of Durham, and Sidney
Greenbaum, A University Grammar of English,
http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/conjunctions.htm)
OR To suggest that only one possibility can be realized, excluding one or the other :
"You can study hard for this exam or you can fail." To suggest the inclusive combination of alternatives: "We can
broil chicken on the grill tonight, or we can just eat leftovers. To suggest a refinement of the first clause: "Smith
College is the premier all-women's college in the country, or so it seems to most Smith College alumnae." To
suggest a restatement or "correction" of the first part of the sentence: "There are no rattlesnakes in this canyon, or
so our guide tells us." To suggest a negative condition: "The New Hampshire state motto is the rather grim "Live
free or die." http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/conjunctions.htm - top To suggest
a negative alternative without the use of an imperative (see use of and above): "They must approve his political
style or they wouldn't keep electing him mayor."
Or does not mean and

Ct.Cl. 1878.The word or in a contract will not be construed to mean and, where it
connects propositions reasonably in the alternative. Thus, the word in a contract which binds the
contractor to supply so many pounds, more or less, as may be required for the wants of certain
government stations between a certain time, cannot be construed to mean and, and does not
entitle the constractor to furnish all the oats which may be needed at the station.Merriam v. U.S., 14
Ct.Cl. 289, affirmed 2 S.Ct. 536, 107 U.S. 437, 17 Otto 437, 27 L.Ed. 531.
Or Means And
Or means and
C.A.2 (Conn.) 1958. Where words in will are placed in the disjunctive, and intent of testator is clear, word or is
often construed as and.Hight v. U.S., 256 F.2d 795.Wills 466.
Or is the equivalent of and/or

Bryan A Garner, The Elements of Legal Style, 2d ed (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002) at 103:
and/or. Banish from your working vocabulary this "much condemned conjunctive-
disjunctive crutch of sloppy thinkers" (citing Raine v Drasin, discussed below) . . . .
The word or usually includes the sense of and:
No food or drink allowed.
That sentence does not suggest that food or drink by itself is disallowed while food
and drink together are OK . . . .
With
Participant
With requires that China be a participant in engagement

Websters 16 Merriam-Websters Online Dictionary, with,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/with
2
a used as a function word to indicate a participant in an action, transaction, or
arrangement <works with his father> <a talk with a friend> <got into an accident
with the car>
b used as a function word to indicate the object of attention, behavior, or feeling
<get tough with him> <angry with her>
c : in respect to : so far as concerns <on friendly terms with all nations>
d used to indicate the object of an adverbial expression of imperative force <off
with his head>
e : over, on <no longer has any influence with them>
f : in the performance, operation, or use of <the trouble with this machine>
With means engagement is done together

Cambridge 16 Cambridge Dictionaries Online, with,
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/with?a=british
with preposition (COMPANY)
A1 used to say that people or things are in a place together or are doing
something together:
I was with Sylvia at the time.
He lives with his grandmother.
He's impossible to work with.
I'm going to France with a couple of friends.
Ingrid Bergman starred with Humphrey Bogart in the movie "Casablanca".
I left my books with Sandra.
Ice cream with your apple pie?
Mix the butter with the sugar and then add the egg.
I'll be with you (= I will give you my attention) in a second.
She's staying with her parents (= at their house) for a few months.
He's been with the department (= working in it) since 2010.
In Relation To
With means in relation to
Oxford 16 Oxford Dictionaries Online, with,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/with
Accompanied by (another person or thing):
a nice steak with a bottle of red wine
More example sentences Synonyms
1.1In the same direction as:
marine mammals generally swim with the current
More example sentences
1.2Along with (with reference to time):
wisdom comes with age
1.3In proportion to:
the form of the light curve changes with period in a systematic way
2Possessing (something) as a feature or accompaniment:
a flower-sprigged blouse with a white collar
2.1Marked by or wearing:
a tall dark man with a scar on one cheek
a small man with thick glasses
3Indicating the instrument used to perform an action:
cut it with a knife
treatment with acid before analysis
3.1Indicating the material used for some purpose:
fill the bowl with water
4In opposition to:
we started fighting with each other
5Indicating the manner or attitude of the person doing something:
with great reluctance
6Indicating responsibility:
leave it with me
7In relation to:

my father will be angry with me
This is particularly true in the context of international relations
Websters 16 Merriam-Websters Online Dictionary, with,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/with
2 a used as a function word to indicate a participant in an action, transaction, or
arrangement <works with his father> <a talk with a friend> <got into an accident
with the car>
b used as a function word to indicate the object of attention, behavior, or feeling
<get tough with him> <angry with her>
c : in respect to : so far as concerns <on friendly terms with all nations>
d used to indicate the object of an adverbial expression of imperative force <off
with his head>
e : over, on <no longer has any influence with them>
f : in the performance, operation, or use of <the trouble with this machine>
With Requires Gov-Gov
With the PRC has an essential limiting function that
prevents small economic or humanitarian assistance facilitated
by NGOs- you should hold the line on the Government-to-
Government requirement.
Kahl and Repko 99
Colin and Biza, University of Michigan debate coaches, Comments on Constructive
Engagement And the Proposed Wording of the 1999-2000 College Debate Topic,
http://debate.uvm.edu/wprepko.html
Thus, plans with conditions that call for a net increase in sanctions (or other hard-
line measures) would have a difficult time proving that they are topical. There are
good definitions that exclude such cases, and the negative will also have an
excellent "limits/ground" argument for preferring such an interpretation. In addition,
it is not clear that many viable affirmatives exist that would increase sanctions.
Given the incredible isolation imposed on the proposed topic countries by the
United States, most unilateral actions are simply not inherent. Furthermore,
attempts to build a multilateral coalition to strengthen these sanctions have already
been attempted for most of the proposed topic countries. These U.S. efforts have
largely failed due to resistance from the rest of the international community,
including America's closest allies in Europe. In sum, given exclusionary definitions
and substantive limits on the viability of hard-line plans, we do not feel that there is
much risk of a constructive engagement resolution evolving into a bidirectional
topic. A second possible objection is that even a unidirectional topic would be too
broad. Some might argue, for example, that allowing plans with conditions on their
mandates provides too much affirmative ground. This is not a significant problem.
Indeed, as we noted above, given the commonality of conditional plans in the
literature, not allowing them would probably overlimit affirmative ground, especially
if our goal is to have a topic where there are actual solvency articles. Moreover,
negatives will have several obvious and effective ways of attacking plans with
conditions. If the conditions are too tough, there is a good chance the target country
will say no, providing a powerful solvency argument for the negative. The negative
could also counterplan with different conditions or no conditions at all. Given the
diversity of plans in the literature, it would not be difficult for the negative to find
solvency evidence for these counterplans. And as long as the conditions outlined in
the counterplan are less than the ones advocated in the plan, the counterplan
would be mutually exclusive. Finally, the discussion of conditional plans is inevitable
regardless of the topic wording. If the topic allows conditional plans, affirmatives will
run them; if it does not, negatives will run them as counterplans. Others have
expressed the fear that an expansion of the topic beyond economic sanctions would
allow an infinite number of humanitarian and economic assistance cases. We do not
feel this would be a major problem as long as the topic wording required that
the policy of constructive engagement be "with the government(s)" of the
chosen countries. Most definitions of constructive engagement imply a net
increase in government-to-government ties, but some definitions suggest the
possibility of directly aiding non-governmental organizations and groups that may
oppose the government. Therefore, the topic should explicitly require that
constructive engagement be with the government. This would limit the number
of cases that solely provide humanitarian and economic assistance because there
are not many viable forms of economic or humanitarian assistance that could be
given directly to the target government without also lifting some or all of the
sanctions. Most cases that provided economic or humanitarian assistance while
leaving sanctions untouched would: (a) be of little benefit to the populace of the
target country due to the possibility of diversion by the government; and (b) could
not be implemented without removing at least some of the economic sanctions,
either because existing U.S. sanctions would make such assistance illegal or
because the target government would reject the assistance if the sanctions were
not removed first. Moreover, even if an affirmative could prove that economic or
humanitarian assistance could help the populace, would be accepted by the
government, and would not require the lifting of sanctions first, most of these cases
would not be strategically viable. Strategically, the best affirmative cases will have
to prove that the U.S. government is critical to solving the advantages they isolate.
If the affirmative fails to prove this, they will be vulnerable to NGO or international
actor counterplans. While cases that claim a harm directly from American sanctions
can easily meet the "U.S. government key" burden, most cases that focus solely on
economic and humanitarian aid and do nothing to ease U.S. sanctions cannot. Thus,
while the constructive engagement topic would certainly allow the affirmative to go
beyond simply lifting sanctions, there are many reasons to suspect that, in practice,
the topic would not allow for many viable cases that did nothing to ease sanctions.
The PRC
***Note- See Advanced Labs work on CCP vs PRC
vs PLA

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The Resolution

Resolved: The United States federal government should

Resolved means a determination reached by voting

Resolved means to settle formally by voting

Resolved implies a specific course of action

Resolved means certain or fixed

Resolved doesnt require immediacy

Colon- the business follows it

Colon- the second clause elaborates on the first

The is used to denote a specific entity

USfg is the three branches

National govt, not the states

Federal government is the central government

Should means ought

Should indicates a desirable condition

Should isnt mandatoryits a persuasive recommendation

Should means desirable or recommended, not mandatory

Should isnt mandatory.

Should doesnt require certainty

Should means what is expected

Should describes what is probable

Should only means the past tense of shall when used as a

Question The Discrepancies among Shall, Will, Should & Would

"Should" is a normative term (a suggestion, "ought to").

A1. We should abolish this rule (normative advice).

Consider the following:

B1. If I stop now, I SHALL fail.

C1. You should scold him now.

Substantial means considerable in quantity

Substantially means including the material or essential part

Substantially means to large extent

Substantially means strongly

Substantially means to have importance

Considerable in importance, value, degree, amount, or extent

Substantially means ample

Of, relating to, or having substance; material

Substantial" means in the main

Ill.App.2 Dist. 1923 Substantial means in substance, in the main, essential,

Substantial is 50%- two examples

Substantially is at least 90%

Substantial increase is 50 to 100 percent

Substantially must be 2 percent

Substantial should be defined as 40 percent best avoids

Common definitions are more predictable, because

Material is relevant and significant

material adj. 1) relevant and significant in a lawsuit, as in "material evidence" as

Qualification is a limiting modification

1 : a restriction in meaning or application : a limiting modification <this statement

"Substantial" means actually existing, real, or belonging to

Ala. 1909. Substantial means belonging to substance; actually existing; real;

To become greater or larger. To multiply; reproduce.

Increase is to become greater in size, number or intensity

Increase means add duration to

Increase implies pre-existence

The plain and ordinary meaning of the verb "to

Increase means to add to what already exists.

Its is an attributive adjective showing possession

Its means belonging to it or that thing

Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition,

Economic and diplomatic are distinct from military or cultural

Economic engagement is distinct from other forms, like

Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition,

Maintaining mutually exclusive categories of military,

The distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is the use