71 - 2011

19

celebrating 40 years
March 2012

Casualty eNavigation
management ECDIS
guidelines operations
 THE ADMIRALTY
MANUAL OF
SEAMANSHIP

11th Edition 2011

Authored by
Vic Vance, The Royal Navy
Includes:
General sea terms
Anchors, cables and buoywork
Rigging, deck gear and towing
Sea survival

Buy now at www.nautinst.org/pubs

seaways_amos_A4_111121_v1.indd 1 11/21/2011 9:14:59 PM


The big E
T
ime waits for no maritime
professional as the saying goes.
This is an increasingly important
mantra, particularly in the age of
electronic navigation and eNavigation. For
those of you who ask the difference between
the two, and we suspect there may be many:
eNavigation is a specific work programme
of the IMO to harmonise the collection,
integration, exchange, presentation and
analysis of navigation information. This
initiative is explained by Mr John Erik
Hagen (pp 14-16), who is the Chairman of
the IMO eNavigation Work Groups. The
strength of this IMO initiative is that it
should lead to greater harmonisation of
navigation information and communication
on an international basis. This will be
essential for safety and international trade.
The weakness, however, is the time it will
take to obtain agreement by all nations and
stakeholders, particularly in a time of such
rapid technology advancement.
Electronic navigation is with us now
and is epitomised by ECDIS with GPS.
We recognise that this is widely relied
upon, or even over-relied upon. The
training requirements for ECDIS came
into force in January 2012 as per the
Manila amendment to STCW, and the
first phase of ECDIS carriage
requirements will begin as of July 2012.
Our President Captain James Robinson
is quoted as saying that ECDIS is a
complex system and will be one of the
most essential tools for supporting
Features
Captains
column 3-5
Casualty
management
guidelines 6 navigation
ECDIS:
Operations 8-11
Training 12-13
Seaways March 2012
FOCUS
mariners in their efforts to ensure the
safety of navigation and protection of the
marine environment. The ability to
harness the power of ECDIS and to avoid
catastrophe due to incompetence is
largely down to training and
familiarisation. Many of shippings
leading international organisations have
worked together to develop guidance to
assist ship operators, flag states and
training providers to interpret the IMO
minimum requirements to maximum
effectiveness. This guidance was
published by the NI in February and is
reproduced on pp 12-13. Mariners
questioning the effectiveness of their
ECDIS training should bring such
guidance to the attention of their
employers.
Should the importance of ECDIS be
questioned, the advice given by the UK
P&I Club in the second part of their
three part series (pp 8-10) should be
heeded. They state that It is becoming
increasingly evident that far from
reducing risk, ineffective operation of
complex ECDIS systems resulting from
poor management practice or training
can actually increase the risk of
incidents such as collision and
grounding with the interface between
computers extenuating the so called
human element . As stated in many of
the Institutes publications and
Seaways articles, ECDIS is a
revolutionary change in the task of
eNav:
Introduction 14-16
Aids to
21-22
Pivot point 23-24
Conferences 27-28
navigation and needs to be taken
extremely seriously in terms of training
and onboard operational practices and
procedures.
So, eNavigation will take some time to
come to fruition, and current technology
marches on where does this leave us?
Ideally with a balanced and pragmatic
approach. Mike Sollosi is not only the
Chief of the Office of Navigation Systems
for the US Coast Guard, but also the
Chairman of the IMO Safety of
Navigation Sub-committee (Nav) and has
outlined how a Coastal State has
adapted, and continues to adapt,
eNavigation type services in the here-
and-now (pp 21-22). This article was
taken from his address to the important
conference on eNavigation, reported on
pp 27-28.
Such technological developments
and the corollary maintenance of
competencies for their use, both onboard
and ashore, define the commitment
to being a modern maritime
professional. Unfortunately, if all goes
wrong casualties occur. Even at this
stage, professionalism and training is
essential, as outlined by John Noble
(p 6), introducing the NIs Casualty
Management Guidelines.
Conclusion
Continuing Professional Development
(CPD); contribution to evolving
technology; teamwork all goals of The
Nautical Institute.
MARS 17-20
Naval column 25
Nautelex 26
NI Log 29-32
Letters 33-34
People 35-36
1
 71 - 2011
19
celebrating 40 years

SEAWAYS
The International Journal
of The Nautical Institute
ISSN 01 44 1019

Editor
Lucy Budd BA (Hons)
email: editor@nautinst.org

Nautical Institute Chief Executive

Philip Wake MSc, FNI
email: cpw@nautinst.org

The Nautical Institute

President
Captain J A Robinson DSM, FNI,
Irish Navy (Retd)
Vice Presidents
Captain M K Barritt MA, FNI, RN
Captain A R Brink FNI
Mr P Hinchliffe OBE, FNI
Captain S Krishnamurthi FNI
Captain R J McCabe FNI
Captain S Tuck FNI
Hon. Treasurer
Captain R B Middleton FNI

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Seaways March 2012

2
 CAPTAINS COLUMN
Sendai, March 11 2011
Captain Makoto
Kusazagi
Master, VLCC
Nichihiko, Nissho
Shipping Co, Ltd
On 11 March 2011, an earthquake of
magnitude 9 on the Richter scale struck
Japan, followed by a 10 metre tsunami.
The impact moved Japans main island of
Honshu 2.4 metres to the west. Sendai
was the closest port to the earthquake
and the city most devastated by the
following tsunami. Captain Kusanagis
vessel was unloading crude at the Sendai
terminal when the earthquake struck
I
would primarily like to express my
deepest sympathy for victims of the
Tohoku or Great East Japan
Earthquake and Tsunami of 11 March
2011 and their bereaved families and friends.
On the day of the earthquake I was
serving as Master on the 280,000 dwt VLCC
Nichihiko. We had berthed at the Sendai
crude jetty on 10 March, and were still
discharging crude oil into the refinery on
the day of the earthquake. Conditions were
fine and clear, with a crisp wind blowing
across the scenic Matsushima Bay.
At approximately 1430, the crewing
manager from our office asked me whether
he could escort a team of five auditors for
a tour of the bridge. The Japanese
financial year ends at the end of March
and the auditors were on board for an
annual accounting audit of the Nichihiko.
It is a Japanese custom to include an
inspection of the ship as part of the audit
process.
I then proceeded to the Cargo Control
Room (CCR) knowing that the cargo
discharge should be finished around 1700.
I had a casual talk with Chief Officer (C/O)
and gave him permission to go ashore after
discharge. This was a rare opportunity for
him to get ashore, enjoy some good food
and a little time off the ship.
Seaways March 2012
Earthquake
At 1446 the pens in a penholder in the CCR
started to rattle and the computer screen
displays begun to jump erratically. I
paused and digested the sensation, one
well known in Japan. I said to the C/O, Its
an earthquake; I think we had better stop
discharge. The tremors continued, which
is not uncommon in Japan. Then came one
almighty tremendous thud, which felt as
though a massive force lifted the entire
vessel upwards several metres. This was
immediately followed by a violent shaking
movement, predominantly up and down. I
would have been thrown onto the deck but
managed to wedge myself between the
control panel and a bulkhead and hold on
as best I could. The Chief Officer was
shouting out an order to stop the cargo
pumps and to shut the manifold valves. I
grabbed a ships radio and staggered out
from the control room into the alleyway
and made for the stairwell.
In all my years at sea I have often
experienced ships in severe weather
conditions, however this was quite a
different sensation. The entire vessel was
shaking intensely as I held myself up prior
to entering the stairwell to the navigating
bridge. I stumbled up the stairwell as my
body was bashed against the handrails and
bulkheads. I noticed that the movements
had changed and the vessel was now
swaying from side to side. I then fell out
onto the navigation bridge.
As the severe shaking continued, my
first observation on entering the
wheelhouse was that our small shrine had
been smashed apart and sections of it
were strewn across the bridge deck. Our
Konpiras talisman, sacred sake and
Sakaki sacred tree leaves were scattered
everywhere. The visitors from ashore were
holding onto the bridge-front handrails as
best they could. I instinctively headed out
to the portside bridge-wing to check astern
of the vessel out to sea. The VHF was
broadcasting a warning to all ships relayed
from the Shiogama Japanese Coast Guard
(JCG), Warning, Warning, please be
aware a tsunami may be approaching!
The waters both within Sendai harbour
and out to sea however, were perfectly
calm, and the beautiful scenic surrounds of
the harbour were remarkably serene. A
repeat announcement came over the VHF,
Warning, Warning, Although I
understood the warning, I was yet to fully
appreciate its significance.
Preparation
The Chief Officer called me and relayed the
message that the terminal berth master
had said that we needed to immediately
evacuate the berth. From the bridge-wing,
I could see several smaller vessels heading
out to sea at what looked like full speed. I
ordered the engineers to prepare the main
engine as quickly as possible. Disconnec-
tion of the cargo arms had commenced and
tugs were making their way to the vessel in
preparation to evacuate.
I had previously spent several years
working ashore at an LNG/oil receiving
terminal. The staff there would often
debate the risk to the terminal of a
tsunami. Whenever I joined these debates I
would usually remind others of the timing
and impact of the tsunami following the
1944 Tonankai earthquake. The wave
height of that tsunami had been calculated
at several metres high and it would have
reached the land the terminal now sits on
around 20 to 30 minutes after the initial
earthquake.
The debates always centred around
whether a large vessel would be best to un-
berth without a pilot or tugboats, given that
neither would be available at such short
notice. I adamantly supported the case for
the vessels early departure, regardless of
any damage which might occur to the
loading arms, shore ladder, the terminal
infrastructure or the vessel itself. I now
found myself thrown into the very situation
we used to debate so often in the past.
The third mate came up to the bridge to
report that warnings were being broadcast
on television predicting that the tsunami
would reach the Shiogama precinct
shoreline at approximately 1500. I quickly
checked my wristwatch; it was 1450. With
only 10 minutes to prepare, I murmured
under my breath that it was too late.
3
 Captains Column
Several shore and ship staff were at the
ships manifold disconnecting the shore oil
loading arms. I became more and more
impatient as each small coastal vessel
passed us on their way out to evacuate the
port. The third mate now phoned me to
report that the tsunami was predicted to
be 10 metres high! Ten metres, are you
sure? I asked, sure that he must have
heard incorrectly. More than 10 metres,
he replied.
My mind was rushing frantically. I
wondered what effect a 10 metre high wall
of water would have on the vessel, whether
her hull was capable of sustaining the
initial impact, whether the tugs alongside
would be capable of riding out such a wave
and if their crews would survive. I was
contemplating where best to position the
vessel if we had time to get her off the
berth.
Can we unberth?
I was now overwhelmed with the
conviction that I needed to get my vessel
out to sea, regardless of any damage
sustained in the process. Putting a vessel
to sea in the face of an approaching storm
or danger is a fundamental rule of
seamanship. My frustration was increased
by the fact that we were berthed head-in to
shore, which for some obscure reason is
normal practice for large vessels in Japan.
Had my vessel been berthed heading out to
sea, I would have a reasonable opportunity
to depart safely. Being berthed head-in I
had no chance to turn the vessel without
the assistance of several tugs and a great
deal of time.
Over the VHF radio the Japanese Coast
Guard (JCG) at Shiogama issued a Major
Tsunami Warning (by now the warning
was being shouted rather than spoken). I
watched with envy as a shiny white ferry
slipped past our bridge-wing on her
passage out to the safety of open waters.
By now the shore loading arms had
been disconnected from the ship. I found
out later that they were actually
disconnected very soon after the
earthquake. However, due to the loss of
shore power, they needed to be pushed
manually towards the jetty. The terminal
berth manager arrived on the bridge and
declared that I should un-berth as soon as
possible. He stated that there was no
harbour pilot available; however, he could
assist if required. Being only my second
trip in command, I was concerned about
my lack of experience. It then dawned on
me that no harbour pilot has any
experience of 10 metre tsunami waves
either.
4
The terminal berth master provided me
with verbal support and again reiterated
that we needed to get off the berth
immediately. I abruptly informed the
visiting shore staff that they could not
leave the vessel, that we were to depart
immediately and that I would require their
help and assistance. On reflection after the
event, I recognised the value of the support
I received just by having my colleagues
with me during the events which were to
follow.
By now it was just after 1500, the
predicted time of the tsunami. The loading
arms were cleared sufficiently for us to
depart, but the shore gangway was still
connected and could not be removed
without shore power. Several shore
workers were trying to retrieve the oil-
boom which was placed around the vessel
as a precaution against oil spillage.
The sea level started to subside as
water flowed out through the harbour
entrance prior to the arrival of the first
tsunami wave. I could observe the seabed
from the bridge wing and a strong
undertow was quite evident as the tugs
were unable to maintain position. The tow-
line from a tug attempting to retrieve the
oil boom parted.
I couldnt wait any longer. I ordered the
crew at the mooring stations fore and aft
to let go all the mooring lines. Up until that
point I had been concerned about adhering
to the terminals operational requirements,
however there comes a point when a
Master has to place the safety of his ship
and crew above everything else. That time
had arrived.
My crew were struggling to take on
board the tug lines, due mainly to the
strong undertow. The officer down aft
informed me that we finally had a tug fast
on the port quarter. It was then that I saw
a massive wall of water approaching as it
thundered over and above the ports
breakwater.
I simultaneously ordered the crew to
heave in the mooring ropes from shore and
also let the tugs go. I realised my
instructions for the tug lines were contrary
to those I had just given, which would lead
to confusion. After seeing the size of the
approaching water, I believed the tug
crews would have little chance of survival
being tied up alongside us, and would need
every chance to fend for themselves.
Impact
The tsunami wave engulfed the entire port
area, ripping into and through the refinery.
From my high vantage point, I lost sight of
the top of the lighthouse at the end of the
breakwater. It had been totally swallowed
by water. I could see cars with their red
hazard lights flickering being tossed about
like toys. The tug alongside us was
unsuccessful in letting go. Her line
however, was ripped apart as the tsunami
swept through.
The sensation of the initial impact on
the vessel was similar to being in a fast
ascending lift. I still find it hard to estimate
how high the vessel moved on impact.
Some of the wire mooring lines still
connected to shore were stretched to their
limit before breaking and recoiling back to
ship and shore. Other lines remained
intact as their winch brakes rendered to
the sound of a piercing metallic screech
emanating from within a cloud of smoke.
The only command I could muster was to
yell for the crew to run away from the
winches! The wire holding the shore
gangway had parted and the whole thing
toppled overboard.
The shore loading platform was totally
engulfed under the tsunami wave, its
loading arms eventually swept away as
debris like much of the surrounds. The
vessel was being forced inland from the
berth (0 heading 280), straight towards
a jetty some 100 metres dead ahead. I
ordered the engines to full astern, but this
appeared to do absolutely nothing against
the force of the water.
I realised then I needed to get an
anchor down in the hope of reducing what I
expected would be a catastrophic collision.
I ordered the men on the focsle to Let go
an anchor, whichever one you can (not my
normal command!). In the confusion of
broken mooring lines strewn around the
deck, mooring winch brakes still
smouldering and the vessels violent
movements, it took the crew several
minutes before they could drop the port
anchor. This was an extremely long
several minutes for me.
We narrowly avoided the vessels bow
being thrust into the jetty ahead, thanks
mainly to a halt in the water surge towards
the shore. In spite of any engine or anchor
commands, the vessels movements were
totally controlled by the forces of the water
in which we floated. The best analogy I can
provide for what came next was that it felt
as though my 330 metre long vessel was a
cork being tossed about in a washing
machine which was rotating both
clockwise and anti-clockwise.
Aftermath
The image shows the vessels positions
within the harbour over the following two
hours. I refer to the numbered positional
Seaways March 2012
 Captains Column
L Position of the vessel in the two hours after the tsunami struck
markings as I describe the vessels
movements. Against each position, I have
added the vessels heading and log reading
at the time.
We were now thrust back into the
harbour basin (3 - heading 272, +4.3
knots) and were tossed about as the water
was sucked in and out with subsequent
tsunami waves. I then realised that we
were now being thrown to the north and
fast approaching the berth which was just
to seaward from our tanker berth (4 -
heading 275, 1.7 knots).
There appeared to be absolutely no
benefit in having an anchor down on the
harbour floor. I now feared the rudder and
propeller would be smashed apart on a
solid concrete breakwater. The brake
drum on the windlass holding the port
anchor was under extreme force. Sparks
and smoke were flying from the brake
lining as it tried to hold the anchor fast. I
ordered the starboard anchor to be let go. I
had grave fears that a parting anchor
chain would snap back injuring or killing
some of the crew.
With both anchors now down we
amazingly avoided hitting either the wharf
or a breakwater. We were forced back
south into the middle of the harbour (5 -
heading 285, 0.0 knots) and then again
thrust towards the shore as the ships head
veered to the north (6 - heading 002, 1.3
knots).
The vessels head continued to veer
clockwise and we were soon facing out to
sea as we continued further towards the
shore into a berth pocket on the south side
of the harbour (7 - heading 083, +1.0
knots). I was amazed that we didnt hit the
jetty just to our south or a spit just to our
north. As we were now facing out to sea, I
dearly wanted to steam ahead and clear
the harbour. However, the vessel remained
out of my control.
Again it felt as though we were being
Seaways March 2012
sloshed around in a bathtub with the
massive forces from the tsunami waves
dictating our every movement. We were
dragged out from the pocket into the
swinging basin, and were spun around and
around in the ever changing seas. The
ships head moved from north (8 - heading
000, +5.9 knots) through to south (9 -
heading 180, 0.9 knots) and then east (10
- heading 076, 0.4 knots) in the same
location before we were forced
dramatically out to the east. Amazingly, we
just avoided clipping the vessels stern on
a large inner breakwater (11 - heading
179, +2.3 knots) as we were dragged
sideways out towards the harbour
entrance.
Out to sea
The vessel spent about another hour being
thrown around between the outer seawalls
(12 to 16). By about 1700 (16 - heading
344, 2.1 knots) the violent movements in
the harbour had abated somewhat and I
believed I could escape to sea. We had
been thrown about the harbour for a full
two hours and by a series of miracles,
managed to avoid any major damage. By
now the anchor cables had become so
entangled that there was no possibility of
raising either of them. Any damage caused
by dragging anchors out through the
harbour was the least of my concerns as I
managed to turn the vessels head to
starboard and make a round turn to
starboard out towards the harbour
entrance.
While making way out to sea, the vessel
was still subject to strong undertow forces.
The bow or stern would be abruptly
thrown to port and starboard as if some
god or extraterrestrial being had control of
the vessel. As we passed the first
breakwater outbound, I prayed that these
forces would just let us get out of here.
Once clear of the port and breakwater
there was a period of time when all of us
felt somewhat devoid of emotions, positive
or negative. Once clear, the crew had the
opportunity to check around the vessel and
I received confirmation that there was no
major damage. It was a pure miracle that
little damage was done, and there were no
injuries. I handed out water bottles to the
crew.
Everyone was physically and
emotionally drained. I returned to my
cabin leaving the crew to conduct further
hull inspections and I broke down in tears.
My arms and legs were shaking
uncontrollably and I was unable to drink
from my water bottle. Trying to replay in
my mind the hours of fear, I could hardly
recall the engine or rudder orders I gave. I
dont know whether any of them had much
effect.
I was left with mixed emotions, from the
fear I still had from the numerous times my
vessel was close to grounding or colliding
with obstacles, to the great relief at now
finally finding myself and my crew safe. I
found it totally amazing that such a tragic
event should unfold before my very eyes.
I feel tremendous gratitude for my crew,
particularly the Chief Officer who spent the
time out on deck with his team ensuring
that they were safe while monitoring the
anchor windlasses under tremendous
forces, and the Chief Engineer and his
team in the engine room who could have
had no idea of what was happening to the
vessel while I gave numerous engine
commands for them to deal with.
I find it distressing that while we on
board were all safe and happy after our
ordeal, the death toll in the Tohoku region
was in the tens of thousands and many of
the survivors have lost their homes, friends
and families.
Lastly, I should express my sincere
appreciation to the berth master who
remained with me on the vessel, the
marine superintendent who gave good
advice, the crewing manager who
communicated with relevant parties in
most difficult circumstances, the
Kagoshima local ships agent, Kiire JCG
and the Kiire terminal which kindly
accepted the vessel for repair work and
received the remaining cargo.
I This article first appeared in
Japanese Master Mariner magazine.
It was translated by Captain Tatsuya
Kusumoto, with additional translation
by Captain Brett Whiteoak MNI.
5
Casualty Management
Guidelines
John M Noble FNI
Technical Editor
When a major casualty occurs, many
interests come into play. Knowing who
is responsible for what is often confusing,
and can get in the way of an effective
response. The Nautical Institutes new
publication on Casualty Management
Guidelines, published in association with
the International Salvage Union (ISU), is
an all-embracing training manual that can
be of real use and contribute to reducing
the period of apparent chaos that follows
a casualty
B
ack in 2009, the International
Salvage Union (ISU) issued a
draft Casualty Management
Guidelines paper for the salvage
industry. It was well received, but some
readers asked Why just salvage? Can the
guidelines be expanded to include others
who may become involved in dealing with
issues arising from a ship casualty? After
giving this question some thought, the ISU
readily agreed.
I doubt that many Seaways readers
have been involved in a major shipping
casualty. Perhaps the same can be said of
any sector in shipping, apart from those
whose job it is to deal with the aftermath of
a major incident, such as salvors or
underwriters.
I have been involved in over 60 major
casualties and have given evidence in
many post casualty hearings in Court and
Arbitration in a variety of jurisdictions and
therefore feel qualified to act as the
technical editor of the Casualty
Management Guidelines (CMG) book to
be launched at the ISU Associates day on
28 March.
Why expand the CMG?
When a major casualty occurs, many
interests in the voyage and the casualty
response leap into action. The response
6
might include but is not limited to the
Master; owners; charterers; cargo
interests (all with their respective legal
teams); Harbour Master; salvage
companies; local and national authorities;
hull and machinery underwriters; P&I
insurers; reinsurers; classification
societies; the media and, if there is a threat
of oil or Hazardous and Noxious
Substances (HNS) pollution, the
International Tanker Owners Pollution
Federation Limited (ITOPF). Quite a list!
Imagine, if you will, 50 individuals or
more arriving at the scene pretty much at
the same time, each with their own list of
priorities, many never having attended a
live casualty and few attendees having
met before. Perhaps naturally, each
attendee will think that their own agenda
is the most important (after safety of life)
and will jostle for position accordingly.
Without strong leadership from the outset,
the atmosphere at the response centres
and the casualty itself can rapidly
deteriorate. Even where there is a general
spirit of cooperation and goodwill, few will
really appreciate what the other attendees
priorities may be.
The character of a casualty response
will depend greatly on the interaction
between those attending. Given that most
will never have attended the real thing
before, each person will be finding their
feet, while at the same time having to react
and make important decisions about the
handling of the response. When first
arriving at the scene few individuals will
appreciate the role of others there, or the
rationale of some of the decisions being
made. A misunderstanding in the early
stages can result in an atmosphere of
mistrust building up as the response
activities develop. None of this helps, and
once an atmosphere has been poisoned, for
whatever reason, it becomes very difficult
for full cooperation to become possible. A
key to successful response is that the
individuals in attendance have an
appreciation of why others may be
reacting the way they are. For example,
why has the harbour master insisted that
all the bunkers be removed before a
salvage operation can begin? Who is in
charge? Whos who? Not everybody will be
readily identifiable. Access to those in
authority for the local or national
government can be limited. Those key
players, such as salvors at the forefront of
response activities, who need to explain
their own priorities to the authorities,
must have access to the correct
individuals. Knowing who is in charge
ashore is vital. There is nothing worse
than spending time explaining the salvage
plan to a uniformed individual who turns
out to be the door guard, only to be
redirected up the corridor to another
office. Believe me, this does happen!
The Casualty Management
Guidelines book has been written by
people who have extensive experience in
being part of or attending major casualties,
and who know both what should be
happening, and what often happens
instead. The aim is to educate everybody
who might become involved in a casualty
and offer an insight into where others
attending will be placing their priorities.
The CMG will also act as a reference book
for training purposes.
The Nautical Institute and International
Salvage Union have recognised the need for
an all-embracing training manual that can
be of real use and contribute to reducing
the period of apparent chaos that follows a
casualty. Training for emergencies is very
important, but as one contributor put it No
owner or manager carries within the
company all the skill-sets required to deal
with a disaster scenario. The Casualty
Management Guidelines will go some way
to demonstrate what skill sets may be
required when responding to a major ship
incident.
The CMG sets out in broadly
chronological order what may be happening,
taking all participants through the steps. Its
a slim volume, even though its a huge topic.
It should find its way onto every bridge, into
offices and administrations throughout the
maritime world. By using it all sides will
understand others priorities. It might not
solve specific problems around a casualty
but it may help smooth the way.
Seaways March 2012
 Annual General Meeting 2012
To be held at the Royal York Hotel, York, England
On Thursday 24 May 2012

Council Notice 1
In accordance with article 10 of the Constitution, the Annual General Meeting will be held at the Royal York Hotel, York,
England on Thursday 24th May 2012 at 1700 hrs. The Agenda is set out below. The AGM will take place after the first half
of the Seminar on Generation Y and the Maritime Profession the Industrys Needs and their Aspirations and will be
followed by a Reception and Gala Ball.

Council Notice 2
In accordance with article 20 of the Constitution, Council shall notify all members of vacancies which are to occur among
the officers and members of Council at the Annual General Meeting on 24th May 2012.
In accordance with article 21 of the Constitution, any two members entitled to vote may nominate eligible persons for
election to Council please send your nomination in writing to the Chief Executive at NIHQ.

Agenda
17:00 Welcome by the Hon. Secretary of the Humber Branch, Captain Richard Coates, FNI

Presidential address: Captain James Robinson, DSM FNI Irish Navy (Retired)

Institute business: To confirm the minutes;

To receive the annual report of Council;
To adopt the audited accounts;
To appoint auditors.

Special resolutions:
Clause 15 of the Constitution states:
15. The adoption of resolutions at General Meetings shall require a majority of two thirds of those present and voting if
the resolution requires a change in the Constitution or By-Laws and a simple majority in other cases when in the
case of equality of votes the Chairman shall be entitled to a second or casting vote. The Council shall make such
provision as is appropriate for a postal ballot by members in the event of a fundamental change proposed in the
Constitution or other matter affecting the Institute deemed to be sufficiently important by the Council.
Due to the Charities Act 2006, we are required to revise the Institutes Articles of Association and their
subsequent effect on the Constitution, By-Laws and Branch By-Laws to implement a new governance
structure (see article in January 2012 Seaways). These are available for download from the Institutes
website www.nautinst.org with a Proxy voting form. Under the Companies Act, a majority of 75% of those
voting is required to pass Special Resolution 1.
Special Resolution 1. THAT revised Articles be adopted in the form annexed.
Special Resolution 2. THAT revised Constitution, By-Laws and Branch By-Laws be adopted in the form annexed.
Election of Officers Nominated by Council
President: Capt S Krishnamurthi, FNI (India (South))
Senior Vice President: Capt R J McCabe, FNI (Ireland)
Vice President: Capt D A Snider, FNI (Canada/British Columbia)
There will be no vacancies on Council this year.
Acceptance Address: The new President
Presentations of Awards
Certificates of Fellowship and Honorary Fellowship
Recruitment Recognition Awards

18:30 Close of Business

Seaways March 2012

7
ECDIS Need to know
Part 2 Operational aspects
UK P&I Club
This second section of the UK P&I Clubs
three part ECDIS series considers the
operational aspects of ECDIS and the
intrinsic function that electronic chart and
navigation systems have to play in the
commercially operated ship of the future.It
also looks at the requirements of generic
and type specific training in greater detail.
T
he mandatory requirement and
introduction of ECDIS is seen by
the regulatory bodies guiding the
shipping industry as a major step
forward in safe ship operation and
protection of the environment. The
transition to electronic navigation and the
operation of a paperless bridge is however
initially viewed differently by the shipping
community with increased operational
costs of new equipment and additional
training requirements.
It is also becoming increasingly evident
that far from reducing risk, ineffective
operation of complex ECDIS systems
resulting from poor management practices
or training can actually increase the risk
of incidents such as collision and
grounding with the interface between
computers extenuating the so called
human element reported as causative in
almost every marine casualty.
Automation of traditional manual
navigational tasks has been observed as
delaying the opportunity for error
detection and recovery allowing a
L Proper training is vital to ECDIS operations
8
navigational single point failure to develop
undetected into a single point catastrophic
failure ultimately resulting in an incident.
With the key to reducing management
costs and navigational risk intrinsically
linked with effective ECDIS practices and
procedures we now consider ECDIS and its
fundamental operational requirements.
The modern ECDIS system
Electronic chart display and information
systems in their simplest forms are single
stand alone units with basic sensor
inputs such as course and speed
displaying the ships real time position on
an electronic navigational chart (ENC) that
complies with the performance standards
outlined under the provisions of IMO
Resolution A.817(19).
The ENC chart must further comply
with the IHO chart data transfer standard
S-57 (S-100 in the future) issued by an
authorised hydrographic office. The
system must have an adequate back up
arrangement comprising of a second
independent ECDIS or an adequate up to
date folio of paper charts before the
system can be considered as meeting the
SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19 chart
carriage requirements.
Although the basic ECDIS system may
be the equipment introduced during the
retro fit period for vessels presently in
operation, the ship of the future will
undoubtedly incorporate the electronic
chart display and information system into
the heart of the integrated bridge system
(IBS) combining navigational equipment
such as radar, differential global
positioning systems, automated
information systems, propulsion control
and system alarms into a single monitoring
station or navigation control module.
Although this combination of
navigational systems into a single control
panel is undoubtedly the way forward, the
change in navigational methodology does
present new challenges in relation to the
requirements of safe navigation of the
modern vessel.
Electronic charts
The subject of electronic charts in relation
to ECDIS operation is probably an area
which generates an element of confusion.
This is primarily due to the fact that
ECDIS can operate under the amendments
to the IMO ECDIS performance standards
in what is referred to as RCDS (raster
chart display systems) mode utilising
raster charts when vector chart coverage
of the navigational area is not available. In
order to fully analyse this provision and
mode of operation a clear distinction
between raster and vector charts must be
made.
ENCs or vector charts are compiled
from a database of individual items
(objects) of digitised chart data and
displayed as a seamless chart. When used
in an electronic navigation system, the
data can then be re-assembled to display
either the entire chart image or a user
selected combination of data. ENCs are
intelligent in that systems using them can
be programmed to give warning of
impending danger in relation to the
vessels position and movement.
RNCs or raster charts on the other
hand are produced by digitally scanning a
paper chart image. The resulting digital
file may then be displayed in an electronic
navigation system where the vessels
position can be shown.
Since the raster chart display is merely
a digital photocopy of the original paper
chart, the image has no intelligence and
other than visually, cannot be
interrogated. The fundamental differences
between vector and raster charts are
identified below:
G Vector charts have no defined
Seaways March 2012
 Feature
boundaries and provide a seamless visual
display where raster charts operate
similar to paper charts
G Raster chart data cannot itself trigger
automatic alarms although some alarms
may be entered manually by the user
G Horizontal datum and chart projection
may differ between raster charts
G Chart features cannot be simplified or
removed to suit particular navigational
circumstances
G Without selecting different scale charts
the look ahead capability of raster charts
may be somewhat restricted
G Orientation of the raster display to
other than chart up display may affect the
readability of the chart
G Display of a ship specific safety contour
L Type specific training using a simulator
or safety depth cannot be highlighted on a
raster chart unless manually entered by under the Manila amendments. This requirements for vessels fitted with ECDIS
the user during passage planning
requirement pertains to all vessels fitted systems identified under the company
G Excessive zooming in or out from the
with ECDIS equipment irrespective of the operating procedures to be used as an aid
natural scale of the raster chart can
fact that the primary form of navigation to navigation only with paper charts still
seriously degrade capability.
identified under the provisions of the identified as the primary means of
Under the present IMO legislation,
company management system may be navigation. As MIN 405 expired on 31
navigational areas not covered by ENC
paper. December 2011 it is assumed that a further
charts must be identified at the planning
In the UK the present situation has instruction will be issued reflecting the
stage with an appropriate portfolio of up-
recently been clarified to some extent by Manila amendments prior to the 1 January
to-date paper charts available onboard to
Marine Information Notice (MIN) 405 2012.
be used in conjunction with the ECDIS
entitled Training for ECDIS as Primary
equipment when operated in RCDS mode.
Although the wording appropriate Means of Navigation which was published Type specific training
used under the provisions of the IMO January 2011.The notice clarifies what In general terms the requirement for type
Resolution has been defined differently by training is acceptable for masters and specific training for ECDIS has been
the various authorities of sovereign states, deck officers of UK-flagged vessels which identified under Section 6 of the ISM Code
specific guidance can now be found on the have ECDIS as their primary means of which establishes a clear requirement for
IHO website www.iho-ohi.net/english/encs- navigation. not only effective training but
ecdis/enc-available/backup-paper- MIN 405 presently does not however familiarisation with respect to safety and
charts.html. make any reference to training emergency related duties.
With only a brief review of the require-
ments of electronic charts and their mode
of operation in conjunction with ECDIS
systems it is apparent that this is an area
which requires careful review by competent
well-trained and familiarised officers at all
stages of the navigational passage.
cwaves
Maritime & Engineering Consultants

Generic training
Effective training and familiarisation of the
master and officers in relation to ECDIS
operation has been identified by the
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
as an area of increased concern prompting
a revision of the training requirements at
the STCW 95 conference held in Manila on
21 June 2010.
Under the revised STCW 95 training
requirements which entered into force on
1 January 2012 under the tacit acceptance
procedure, the master and those in charge
of a navigational watch are required to
complete a generic ECDIS training course
which meets the new standards laid down
Seaways March 2012
Congratulates The Nautical Institute and ISU on the publication
of the Casualty Management Guidelines.
We are pleased to welcome Mark Loughlin to Cwaves.
He brings with him his expertise in salvage, diving,
emergency towing, wreck removal and oil removal.
This latest appointment enhances the services offered
by our multi-discipline team of Maritime Civil Engineers,
Master Mariners, Marine Engineers and Naval Architects.
For enquires regarding salvage and wreck removal
please contact m.loughlin@cwaves.co.uk
www.cwaves.co.uk T: +44 (0)20 7083 7188
9

In addition to the ISM Code
requirements, Marine Information Notice
(MIN) 405 paragraph 3 now identifies a
clear requirement for ship specific ECDIS
training relating to the make and model of
the equipment fitted on the ship on which
the master or navigation officer is
expected to operate. Marine Information
Notice 405 further clarifies that this
training should build on the MCA approved
generic training format and be delivered
by the manufacturer, the manufacturers
approved agent or a trainer who has
attended such a programme.
The present requirement relating to
type specific training for UK-flagged vessel
is now partially clarified under the
provisions of MIN 405. The use of the
words and be delivered does however
suggest that the present solution adopted
by many leading manufacturers providing
computer based training programmes may
not on their own merits be considered
suitable under the new guidelines.
With the dilemma relating to type-
specific training now clearly identified,
many shipping operators may be faced
with the logistical headache of either
training all their operational staff in every
ECDIS system within the fleet or be
required to provide an onboard certified
trainer having previously completed a
suitable train the trainer course.
With many shipping operators
encountering difficulties finding a solution
to their type specific training requirements
two alternatives have been identified
below.
At the centre for training excellence at
CSMART Almeria, Amsterdam, developed
in conjunction with a market leading
cruise ship operator, ECDIS equipment has
been standardised throughout the fleet
with the bridge layout replicated at the
training centre. This standardisation
effectively circumvents the additional
requirement for type specific training as
all the systems operated within the fleet
are the same.
This training has been further
advanced by the introduction of a
revolutionary bridge team management
approach moving away from the
traditional rank structure adopting a
function based airline style navigator / co-
navigator system which has been proven
to effectively reduce the risk of
navigational hazards.
An alternative solution to the issue of
the training requirements of a multi
functional and diverse shipping
organisation operating many different
ECDIS systems of various generations has
10
Feature
Disp Chart zero
lay
Safety depth
Shallow contour
Blue
Ligh Safety contour (input value)
t blu Safety contour (value existing in the
e
vector chart)
Grey Deep contour
-whi
te
Whit
e
Non-navigable area Navigable area
L Safety contours
been developed by ECDIS Ltd three stages namely Appraisal, Planning
Southampton (www.ecdis.org). and Control. Although this section does not
Focusing on the needs of the modern attempt to offer a guide to electronic
ship manager and their respective planning the key elements will be discussed.
requirements, ECDIS Ltd has developed a Appraisal: This stage of the plan should
centre of learning excellence providing a identify that the required electronic charts
generic training course utilising many are available and corrected up-to-date.
different types of ECDIS system in a single Areas where ECDIS would be operated in
training location. This provides increased RCDS mode should be identified with
system knowledge of ECDIS system appropriate paper charts available. The
operation, as well as complying with UK requirements of sovereign states during
regulations and issuing MCA / STCW periods of coastal passage must be
ECDIS certification. considered (IHO website) with all relevant
publications and sailing directions
Passage planning reviewed. Safety contours should be
Effective passage planning completed by established and information relating to
paper chart or by electronic systems is weather, current, tides, chart datum, draft,
essentially the process of defining the speed, environmental limits, air draft,
safest navigational route in conjunction squat and general hazards such as high
with established safety margins under traffic concentrations should be prepared
which the voyage will be executed. and made available.
The passage plan should be The concept of safety contours is a key
comprehensive, detailed and easy to function specific to electronic charts and
interpret and effectively reduce navigational further outlined in the diagram above.
risks and aid the ship and its officers to Planning: After the appraisal stage, the
safely navigating from berth to berth. planning officer now begins the track
Electronic navigational planning consists of planning. The planning stage can be divided
Guard sector moves
along with the ship
and its direction is
Safety contour
Safety contour always the same as
the ships direction of
movement (the guard
sector is not displayed
on the screen)
Ahead sector width,
set in the Chart
Alarms menu
Length was input in
the Safety Contour
Ships position frame in the Alarm
Settings > Chart
when the SAFETY
CONTOUR alarm Alarms menu
occurs
L The safety contour alarm in practice
Seaways March 2012

into three different sub-stages or cuts.
During the cuts, the planning officer will
move through a quality control process
from a general plan to the refined final
track which will be used for navigation and
approved by the master.
It is essential that the built in automatic
check function is used throughout the
planning stages. However, it must be
remembered that the effectiveness of the
automatic check system relies on the
accuracy of the safety parameters set by
the user.
The final track is then often displayed
with associated waypoint information and
navigational notes at the central conning
station or chart table for reference by the
navigational officer during the control
stage of the passage planning process.
Control: The control stage of the plan
establishes how the vessels progress and
the navigational systems will be monitored
throughout the passage. This will include
an effective analysis identifying all risks of
operation. When official ENC (vector
charts) are used, systems of automatic and
manual checks must be established if the
danger of over reliance on automated
systems is to be avoided.
Traditional track monitoring methods
such as parallel index and visual bearings
should be included at the control stage in
addition to modern techniques such as
radar overlay of the electronic chart. This
should however not obscure the radar
picture to the level where acquired targets
may be lost or the navigation officer may
be affected by information overload.
Risk analysis
On review of the increased technology
available to the modern navigator, one of
the conundrums must be why increased
computerisation and automation has not
removed, and perhaps not even reduced
the potential for failure in the systems in
which they were introduced.
In fact new pathways to failure seem to
have developed centred on an initial
miscommunication between man and
machinery resulting in a misalignment in
the reality of where the navigator thinks he
is and where the automated system has
actually taken him.
Research has shown that humans are
poor monitors of automated systems and
tend to rely more on system alarms than
manual checks especially in relation to
those systems which have proven
themselves as highly reliable.
In several casualty investigations it has
been determined that automation has
resulted in the navigator developing an
Seaways March 2012
Feature
operational bias relying on the automated zooming or operating the chart for
systems rather than the salient cues
provided visually through the bridge
window.
In this respect an extensive risk
assessment of ECDIS operation combined
with a clear requirement of manual system
checks of critical automated operations
must be established within the company
safety management system effectively
identifying operational risk and
introducing control measures to reduce the
effect of single point failures.
Before we consider the assessment
process, the term risk must be defined.
Risk in relation to ECDIS operation can be
considered as a hazard or source of
navigational error with the potential to
cause loss or harm to personnel, the
environment or the ship (or other ships)
itself.
The main areas of risk when
considering ECDIS operation can be
identified under three main categories:
1. The equipment itself may suffer from
failure (both hardware and software)
including power outages sensor input
failure and potential virus infection.
2. The charts are operated under permit
which may expire, charts in use not
corrected up-to-date, updates not correctly
applied, ENC chart coverage unavailable
requiring the system to be used in RCDS
mode without the appropriate paper chart
folio being available.
3. The operation of the ECDIS system
onboard carried out by poorly trained crew
following poor navigational practices and
operational procedures such as excessive
navigation with base information only
displayed.
Effective risk assessment as a critical
function of implementation of electronic
navigation is rarely emphasised when the
transfer from paper to digital navigation is
considered.
As our short review of this subject has
hopefully highlighted, a full and
comprehensive risk assessment clearly
identifying the hazards relating to the
operation of ECDIS systems should not
only assist those associated with the task
of transfer between the two methods of
navigation but also accelerate the
migration process and the positive aspects
of electronic chart operation relating to
increased crew efficiency whilst reducing
operational costs.
Summary
From this short review of ECDIS operation
and the functions to consider when
transferring navigational practices from
paper to electronic format, it is clear that
the process, although complex, can if
effectively completed reduce operational
cost whilst increasing levels of safety.
The effect of poor management and
training in relation to ECDIS operation can
however result in increased navigational
risk and operational costs including
detention during port state inspections and
increased navigational related incidents.
I All three parts of this series and much
more are available at the NIs online
ECDIS forum.
11
ECDIS
January 2012

Industry Recommendations for ECDIS Training

Being aware that the implementation of Electronic
Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS) has
given rise to confusion in regard to ECDIS training,
an industry group, organised and coordinated
by The Nautical Institute and comprising leading
international shipping industry organisations, held a
series of meetings in order to produce this guidance
on issues of training and competency for ECDIS.
Organization (IMO), when implemented will be
one of the most important navigation and decision
support tools. The complexity of ECDIS should
be recognised and the ability of a watchkeeping
officer to be competent and confident in operating
ECDIS as part of the shipboard navigational system
is essential for safety, security and protection of the
marine environment.

The 2010 amendments to the STCW Convention
for ECDIS training will not take full effect until
2017. Therefore in accordance with best practice
it is recommended that approved ECDIS training
be undertaken as soon as practical to ensure
that all bridge watchkeeping officers meet all the
competencies required by STCW prior to sailing on a
ship fitted with ECDIS.
It is recognised by all signatories to this guidance
that ECDIS, as defined by the International Maritime
The regulatory requirements for Generic Training
and Familiarisation in ECDIS are covered by various
international instruments including the IMO STCW
Convention, the ISM Code, SOLAS and also by national
laws. The industry also recognises that compliance
with these regulations including the required
competencies are increasingly being examined by
external parties including Port State Control, insurance
inspectors, charterers and accident investigators.
The industry organisations recognise the following
definitions for ECDIS Training:

Training definitions
Generic ECDIS Training: ECDIS training to ensure that navigators
can use and understand ECDIS in the context of navigation and can
demonstrate all competencies contained in and implied by STCW 2010.
Such training should ensure that the navigator learns to use ECDIS
and can apply it in all aspects of navigation, including the knowledge,
understanding and proficiency to transfer that skill to the particular
ECDIS system(s) actually encountered on board, prior to taking over
navigational duties. This level of training should deliver the competencies
at least equivalent to those given in IMO Model Course 1.27
Familiarisation: Following the successful
demonstration of competencies contained
in the Generic ECDIS Training, familiarisation
is the process required to become familiar
with any onboard ECDIS (including backup)
in order to assure and demonstrate
competency onboard any specific ships
ECDIS installation, prior to taking charge of a
navigational watch.
The industry further endorses the following issues Recommendations:
pertaining to ECDIS training:

1
Ship operators are
All watchkeeping officers must be competent in the use of the onboard recommended to
ECDIS prior to taking charge of a navigational watch. An implicit element of recognise the critical
continual competence is the ability to demonstrate that competence. importance of ECDIS for
Familiarisation pertains to any ECDIS onboard including any backup navigational safety and ensure
systems. This includes any pertinent information required for the safe that crew competency is
operation of the ECDIS including all updates and alterations. achieved and maintained.

2
Focus should be upon achieving and demonstrating the ECDIS trainers should
necessary competencies, rather than time spent on training or achieving take the contents of this
certification alone. document into account
There are a wide range of training methods and tools available and ensure that their courses
that can be used, alone or in combination, that may contribute to a deliver at least the competencies
navigators competency. for navigators which have been
Familiarisation should be structured, specific to the onboard identified by the IMO.

3
equipment and its arrangements and should be complementary to generic
ECDIS training. Equipment manufacturers
should take the contents
In order to meet the competencies identified in the IMO Model course of this document into
(1.27) The Operational Use of Electronic Chart and Information Display account, are urged to recognise
Systems (ECDIS) the minimum training time is unlikely to be less than the
their role in the familiarisation
IMO recommended 40 hours, and assessment of competency should be
process and to work with ship
conducted by a suitably trained instructor/assessor.
operators to meet their needs.
The competencies contained in Model course 1.27 should, for trainee

4
OOWs, be incorporated into the STCW Officer of the Watch II-1 Navigation at Flag States are
the operational level training. encouraged to note
this document and to
The requirement for familiarisation is recognised under the provisions of
section 6.3 & 6.5 of the ISM Code which requires not only effective training, consider its content when
but familiarisation of equipment and regulations with respect to safety and developing requirements and
emergency related duties. guidance for ECDIS.

5
Pilots should be able to demonstrate the competencies contained Port States and other
in Model Course 1.27, however pilots should not be expected to meet inspection/auditing
familiarisation requirements. authorities are encouraged
It is recognised that manufacturer provided tools for structured onboard to provide appropriate ECDIS
familiarisation will enhance and possibly add value to onboard ECDIS. training to their staff.

Supported by:
Why eNavigation?
John Erik Hagen Why is it, with all these improvements, we
have not significantly reduced the risk of
Chairman of IMO Working Groups on eNavigation accidents?
It is because ship structure and system
reliability are a relatively small part of the
safety equation. The maritime system is a
eNavigation is about getting the ship safely, securely and people system, and human errors figure
efficiently from berth to berth in an environmentally prominently in casualty situations.
friendly way, using globally enhanced systems for About 75% of marine casualties are
caused, at least in part, by some form of
navigation and communication with the human element human error.
in focus. This article, based on a presentation given at the In the last decades we have seen huge
NI Seminar in Delhi in December 2011, Chairman of IMO developments in technology within
navigation and communication systems.
Working Groups on eNavigation looks at what this will The use of digital communication has
mean for users in practice, and at the process that will shown endless opportunities.
lead to an implementation strategy. Manufacturers are developing solutions
based on the different needs of the
different users, but in order to be able to
actually communicate, the users will need
to be using the same maritime data

I
n 2009 the IMOs Maritime Safety
Committee (MSC) approved a proposal
for a coordinated approach to the
implementation of an eNavigation
strategy, following concerns that develop-
ments in electronic maritime navigation and
the consequent regulatory effort were not
proceeding in a coordinated manner. The
work will be undertaken by three sub-
committees: NAV (Safety of Navigation),
COMSAR (Radio communications and
Search and Rescue) and STW (Standards of
Training and Watch keeping). NAV, led by
Mike Sollosi, is coordinating the efforts (see
article, p21).
Why eNavigation?
There is an increasing intolerance of
adverse impacts on the marine environ-
ment caused by shipping, and in particular
of accidents that result in marine pollution.
Due to the transboundary character of the
shipping industry, environmental impacts
draw global attention and global
awareness. Our oceans are the common
heritage of mankind, and home to a wide
range of vulnerable forms of life.
Shipping might be the most
international of all the world's great
industries. At the same time it is one of the
most dangerous, with the potential to
cause major environmental damage. The
best way of improving safety, including
environmental protection, is by developing
14
international regulations that are followed
by all shipping nations.
Traditionally, coordinated action and
regulation have evolved as a result of
major accidents. The Torrey Canyon
disaster of 1967 and the Exxon Valdez
disaster in 1989 had far-reaching effects
on our current regulatory framework. And
in 1999 we saw new EU regulations
emerge after the Erika accident. Here are
some additional figures that demand
reflection. According to IHS Fairplay
world casualty statistics for 2010, 172
ships of 0.81 million gross tonnage were
reported as total losses. The number of
total losses of cargo carrying ships was
119 of 0.78 million GT (1.19 million dwt).
We also know that there are
externalities not included in this equation.
The losses of human life and damage to the
oceans are difficult to measure. What is
beyond discussion is that investment to
reduce the risk of such incidents is money
well spent.
Over the last 40 years or so, the
shipping industry has focused on
improving ship structure and the reliability
of ship systems in order to reduce
casualties and increase efficiency and
productivity. Weve seen improvements in
hull design, stability systems, propulsion
systems, and navigational equipment.
Todays ship systems are technologically
advanced and highly reliable. Yet, the
maritime casualty rate is still high. Why?
structure. There is a need to coordinate
systems.
With all this developing technological
opportunities, we also need to ask if there
is a sufficient link between technology,
procedures, people and training?
Thinking ahead
This time we want to think ahead, and take
action to reduce the risk of accidents. We
focus on prevention, and mobilise forces to
avoid such devastating accidents before
they are occurring. To achieve our goal we
are taking advantage of the newest, most
outstanding technology.
There will be bigger and more complex
ships, increased speed, greater port
efficiency, more regulations and above all
a far higher demand for public
accountability in the maritime industry.
There will be a need for a technology
convergence for safe navigation. We need
to use technology to enhance safe
navigation.
The IMO has taken a clear stand on the
duties of the maritime community, on its
responsibility for the environment.
In 2005 the British Minister of
Transport launched an initiative
concerning the lack of coordination in the
field of electronic maritime navigation and
related regulatory development.
IMOs Maritime Safety Committee was
called to undertake a major new work
Seaways March 2012

programme, with the intention to realise
the vision of global eNavigation.
In 2009 the IMOs Maritime Safety
Committee (MSC) approved a proposal for
a coordinated approach to the
implementation of an eNavigation strategy,
outlining a joint plan of work for its three
sub-committees. A correspondence group
coordinates the work of the sub-
committees.
Establishing a coordinated
approach
Since the development of an eNavigation
strategy plan three years ago, significant
progress has been made in designing a
coordinated approach to its implementa-
tion, covering not only safety of navigation,
but also radio communications, including
spectrum issues, search and rescue, and
human element and training related
aspects. The overarching architecture of
the concept was finalised this year, the
associated gap and cost-benefit risk
analyses will be completed next year
which might lead to the Strategy
Implementation Plan being finalised in
2014.
At NAV 57 the Secretary General of the
IMO stated that As intensive work
continues on the development and
implementation of a global strategy on
eNavigation, it is important not to lose
sight of the aim being pursued, which is to
contribute to meeting the needs for safe
and efficient maritime navigation and
shipping traffic in the 21st century.
The MSC introduced both a vision and a
definition of eNavigation at its eighty-fifth
session:
eNavigation is the harmonised
collection, integration, exchange,
presentation and analysis of maritime
information onboard and ashore by
electronic means to enhance berth to
berth navigation and related services,
for safety and security at sea and
protection of the marine environment.
eNavigation includes both onboard,
ashore and communications elements. The
vision is embedded in the following general
expectations:
G On board, this will include navigation
systems that benefit from the integration
of own ship sensors, supporting
information, a standard user interface, and
a comprehensive system for managing
guard zones and alerts. The core elements
of such a system will include actively
engaging the mariner in the process of
navigation to carry out his/her duties in a
most efficient manner, while preventing
Seaways March 2012
Feature
distraction and overburdening;
G Ashore, this will include the
management of vessel traffic and related
services enhanced through better
provision, coordination, and exchange of
comprehensive data in formats that will be
more easily understood and utilised by
shore-based operators in support of vessel
safety and efficiency;
G And last but not least, it includes
communications that will make up an
infrastructure providing authorised
seamless information transfer on board
ship, between ships, between ship and
shore and between shore authorities and
other parties with many related benefits.
Based on identified user needs which
includes several international surveys, a
gap analysis is ongoing, and will be
followed by risk and cost-benefit analyses.
The gap analysis at this stage identifies
gaps in the present regulations and
equipment performance standards that
need to be addressed, and will be used to
consider amendments to existing
regulations or equipment performance
standards.
The human element
A specific list of human elements is
integrated in the gap analysis, and will be
considered in the development of
guidelines and regulations at the technical,
operational, training and regulatory level.
A lot of the identified gaps are very
similar, and 30 possible solutions have
been identified that are expected to close
the majority of the gaps.
The maritime system is a people
system, and technology can not be
introduced alone. A key success factor for
eNavigation will be its ability to integrate
technology, usability, and the human
element in navigation. This is a concern for
IMO, and IMO NAV have issued guidance
on issues to be considered when
introducing new technology on board
ships.
There may be a need for people to have
different competences onboard and
ashore, but their ability to operate
interactively is important.
It is fundamental that a framework for
harmonising maritime information
systems must be designed to facilitate the
reduction of single person errors/single
unit errors, particularly on board. This
will require the system to reduce some of
the basic errors in perception,
communication and decision-making that
can occur on board as well as ashore.
Standardisation is another key element.
Development of standardised, module-
based bridge layout adapted to the
functions of the individual ship, is key to
facilitate the smooth familiarisation of ship
borne personnel when transferring from
one ship to another.
The eNavigation strategy will also need
to address training, competency, language
skills, workload and motivation. Alert
management, information overload and
ergonomics are the prominent concerns.
Training is one of the components of the
ongoing gap analysis, and will also be
included in the formal safety assessment.
After an in-depth consideration in the
Working Group at STW 42, it was stated in
the report to the Maritime Safety
Committee that the use of simulators
would assist training and might assist in
assessment, permitting the simulation of
diagnostic and contingency responses.
Usability
Usability is another key element of
eNavigation. Usability is important for
familiarisation. In order to evaluate the
usability of eNavigation elements,
following evaluation methods are
commonly used:
1. Usability testing;
2. Heuristic evaluation method;
3. Checklist method;
4. Questionnaire survey;
5. Field survey.
Taking into account commonly used
methods for usability evaluation, one may
identify characteristics of the maritime
sector and elements necessary to be
considered in developing a tool for
usability evaluation of navigation
equipment. The following four points may
be addressed in usability evaluation:
1. Navigation experiences of test
participants;
2. Computer literacy of test participants;
3. Scenarios for equipment to be used;
4. Collection of observations of test
participants.
The operational concept is a brief
outline of the possible solutions identified
at this stage.
The eNavigation concept is based on
structured and verified information to
support decision-making. It relies on a
largely automated communication
infrastructure, seamlessly connecting ship
and shore. The architecture is based on
a common maritime data structure, and
uses IHO Geospatial Standard for
Hydrographical Data, s-100.
eNav solutions
eNavigation is about how to get the ship
15
 Feature
safely, securely and efficiently from berth navigation equipment. eNavigation will services, improve navigational safety and
to berth in an environmentally friendly enhance the SAR communication through security and promote marine environment
way, using globally enhanced systems for automated communication, priority for protection and the sustainable
navigation and communication with the distress communication, information development and use of the coastal and
human element in focus. In practical collection and data coordination. marine resources of the Straits' littoral
terms, this could mean a variety of things, States, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.
some examples of which are listed below. Training
Some of solutions will be possible to Future training will need to take into The role of IMO
implement in the short term, others in the account the important elements of The eNavigation project cannot be fully
longer term. eNavigation: realised with the participation of only a
Equipment familiarisation will be G harmonisation; limited number of States, organisations,
intuitive as symbology, material require- G integration; institutions or private parties. Broad
ments and workstation layout are G standardisation; coordinated action would be necessary.
standardised. The mariner will have G efficiency and safety. IMO is in an unique position, possessing
access to all available nautical informa- Possible benefits would be more the strength necessary to bring the
tion, and a default interface setup option is efficient training under the STCW. eNavigation programme safely to shore.
accessible by one touch (S-mode).
The final eNavigation strategy
Reliability of nautical equipment will be
continuously verified by built-in-integrity
eNav in practice implementation plan will identify
The Marine Electronic Highway (MEH) responsibilities; propose a phased
tests. Several processes will be automated
project is a demonstration project in the implementation schedule, priorities for
and autonomous in order to reduce the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore that is deliverables, and an agenda for the
workload and administrative burden.
showing how eNavigation could work in continual assessment of user needs.
Electronic nautical charts and nautical
practice. It began from the need for an Furthermore, the plan will include a
publications will automatically be updated.
enhanced information technology system systematic assessment of how new
Target detection and integration of
in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in technology can best meet defined and
available information in nautical graphical
order to address navigational safety and evolving user needs, and how, in the longer
displays will be improved (e.g. information
trans boundary marine pollution issues. term, the development of any technology
sharing including real-time own-ship
The four year regional demonstration and institutional arrangements can fulfil
status information, MSI, AIS, next gen AIS,
project aims to link shore-based marine the requirements of eNavigation. Proposals
charts, guard zones, radar, environmental
information and communication on public relations and promotion of
information, berthing requirements etc).
infrastructure with the corresponding the eNavigation concept to relevant
The reporting burden will be eased by
navigational and communication facilities stakeholders will be a key component. The
automated entry of internal ship data,
aboard transiting ships, while being also identification of potential sources of
standardised formats, single entry of
capable of incorporating marine funding, particularly for developing
reportable information, more efficient
environmental management systems. The regions and countries and of actions to
distribution of reportable information, and
overall objectives are to enhance maritime secure that funding, will also be important.
harmonised national reporting require-
ments and procedures.
eNavigation intends to improve the level
of navigation assistance services (NAS)
provided by VTS to mariners.
VTS will be able to provide enhanced
traffic organisation service (TOS), through
automatic transfer of traffic flow plans,
coordination and exchange of reliable
qualitative data in comprehensive formats
to/from ships as well as to/from shore
stakeholder institutions.
Shore authorities will be able to provide
real time updates of navigation data,
virtual navigation aids, weather updates
and traffic information using standard
symbology and automated information
transfer.
Improved real time maritime picture
will enhance decision making and
monitoring for national authorities, ship
owners, VTS, SAR and port authorities.
Shore based authorities will be able to
remotely inspect navigation equipment and
the quality of on-board navigation through
determination of make and model of
Seaways March 2012
16
 The Nautical Institute
Mariners Alerting and
Reporting Scheme
MARS Report No 233 March 2012
Providing learning through confidential reports an international cooperative scheme for improving safety
MARS 201213
ECDIS anomalies and IHO
data checks
The International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) has
issued a set of data comprising two fictitious Electronic
Navigational Chart (ENC) cells and four sets of tests to
check for a number of anomalies or unexpected behaviour in
systems and to allow operators to see whether their ECDIS
software is up to date and conforms to the latest ECDIS
standards for displaying chart data. (Seaways January
2012).
The IHO have advised that, as of end of January 2012,
almost 400 reports of checks (covering 15 of the 25 or so
manufacturers of type-certified ECDIS) have been received
by IHO from sea. Despite this relatively low number of
responses, all those reports received by the IHO indicated
some level of unexpected behaviour was present on all the
systems that were checked. However, at the same time, the
nature of the unexpected behaviour was not exactly the
same in every manufacturers system.
While the anomalies range in their potential seriousness
for safety of navigation, there were concerns raised over
the display of underwater features and isolated dangers;
the display of complex lights as intended; the display
of submerged wreck dangerous as intended by the
standards; the display of underwater hazard with a
defined depth and the display of Archipelagic Sea Lanes
(ASL), Environmentally Sensitive Sea Lanes (ESSA)
and Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSA) properly.
s Q2 & 3 portrayal of complex lights. Is object 2 same as in the illustration?
Are light characteristics same as in the illustration
Visit www.nautinst.org/MARS for online database
Seaways March 2012
Additionally, about 1 in 2 of the reports showed the ECDIS
would not be able to display a new object properly if it
was introduced by IMO and 1 in 2 of the reports indicated
that the ECDIS had limitations in some aspects of the route
checking function.
We should all be concerned at the number of reports of
systems that appear to have shortcomings in the portrayal
of important chart data.
In order that all mariners using ECDIS are fully aware of
any limitations in the use of their particular ECDIS, owners,
managers, ship operators and ships officers should ensure
that they complete the IHO data checks on their ECDIS/ECS
and also report the results back to IHO. If you have not yet
received the check data it can be downloaded from the IHO
website (http://www.iho.int) via the Newslink button on the
homepage.
An article on the IHO data checks and the legal
implications was published in Seaways (January 2012).
This can be downloaded from the ECDIS Forum website at:
http://www.nautinst.org/en/forums/ecdis/index.cfm
In the meantime, Masters may need to take extra
measures, such as employing particular equipment
operating procedures.
MARS 201214
Dangers of poor ECDIS training
I have had several young bridge officers on my previous
vessel who did not understand running fixes or - more
worryingly - parallel indexing.
We had one ECDIS unit installed on the vessel. Due to this
we still had to use paper charts. During a coastal passage I
noticed that the OOW continually plotted GPS positions on
the paper chart. I had a chat with him and requested that he
start to plot the vessel position using range and bearings.
I then watched him proceed to the ECDIS unit, take the
range and bearing of a headland from the ECDIS and plot
this on the paper chart. Needless to say I was stunned. The
OOW thought he had plotted a perfectly acceptable position
using range and bearings. In hindsight I should have made
it clear to him that he should use the radar to take range
and bearings. But are we at the stage now that we have to
take certified OOWs by the hand and show them the basics
of coastal navigation?
17
MARS 201215
Release of inert gas/cargo vapour
mixture at berth
A tanker was berthed at a terminal in the tropics and
discharging crude oil. The port is in a notified volatile organic
compounds (VOC) controlled area. Soon after discharge
had commenced, the terminal requested a temporary cargo
stoppage without advising the reason or expected duration
(presumed to be due to lack of storage tank space ashore).
During this period, due to very high ambient temperature,
No 2P COT pressure relief valve opened, releasing inert gas
(IG)/cargo vapour mixture to the atmosphere, in breach of
the applicable Annex 6 of Marpol.
1. The vessel was carrying Maya crude, a highly volatile
and sour (containing hydrogen sulphide) cargo. Cargo was
loaded at a higher than usual temperature (48 C) and due
to the short voyage, the cargo temperature was unchanged
at the discharge port;
2. Cargo tanks were only part-full, so the inerted volume
was significant;
3. Prior to berthing, the tank inert gas pressures had been
reduced to 70 mm WG;
4. There was a lengthy delay between vessels arrival
and commencement of discharge, which was temporarily
suspended a few hours into the operation;
5. There were abnormal heat-wave conditions at the
discharge port;
6. During the stoppage, tank pressures rose significantly
probably as a result of the unsaturated ullage space
containing mainly inert gas;
7. After some time, No 2P COT pressure vacuum valve
(PVV) lifted at between 1200-1400 mm WG as per the design
parameters of the valve;
8. The Master immediately requested permission from
shore to cool the tank deck with sea water from deck
monitors. This was partially successful in reducing pressure
by 80 mm WG;
9. All personnel were properly briefed and trained and were
wearing personal multi gas detectors. Breathing apparatus
sets were distributed on the main deck;
10. As no H2S alarm was activated, it is highly probable that
the released vapour was mainly inert gas.
Root cause/contributory factors
1. Lack of planning Given the prevailing heat wave
conditions, the known properties of Maya Crude, and the
lack of shore tank space, the terminal should have planned
the berthing better, so that immediate and continuous
discharge could take place and avoid overpressure in ships
tanks;
2. The vessel should have both anticipated and more
closely observed the rise in cargo tank pressure and should
have notified the terminal immediately on the developing
hazardous condition.
Lessons learnt
1. In circumstances such as those described above,
terminals should plan berthing only when there is sufficient
18
space available to receive the cargo at the tankers optimum
discharge rate;
2. Terminals (and charterers agents where appropriate)
should freely provide vessels with timely and complete
information on anticipated operational delays, to allow
contingency planning;
3. Vessels must monitor cargo tank conditions continuously,
with due regard for prevailing and expected ambient
conditions. Company operating procedures and C/Os
standing orders for deck watchkeepers should reflect this
requirement;
Concerns about cargo/vessel conditions should be
communicated to the terminal promptly and updated as
necessary. Countermeasures should be discussed and agreed
with terminals. As far as possible, such countermeasures
should not lead to breaches of regulations, and practical
legitimate alternatives should be considered first, e.g.
Vapour Return Line. Under the Vessel General Permit for
Discharges (VGP) regulations in the USA, deck washdown
in US ports is an action of last resort, to be avoided except
in emergency;
4. Where pressure reduction by deck cooling is unavoidable,
it should be started as soon as possible, and the necessary
permissions must be obtained. If appropriate, a VGP Non-
compliance Report must be submitted to the authorities,
explaining the reasons. The best practices listed in
VGP Section 2.2.1 should be complied with to the extent
possible.
Corrective/preventative actions
A fleet circular on this incident was issued for information,
discussion and compliance.
MARS 201216
Cable reel deck cargo broke loose
An offshore support vessel sailed from her shore base on
a routine supply run to her designated oilfield. Her deck
was loaded with a variety of tubing, casings, pallets, tool
boxes, food containers and one large unpacked wooden
cable reel, weighing about 11 tonnes. The reel was stowed
with its axis fore-and-aft and was pre-slung with an extra-
long 12 mm steel wire sling passed through the very narrow
central hole, which precluded threading any other securing
rope or chain through the coil. The sling was unsuitable for
securing, so the ships crew secured the reel by pushing
wooden wedges under it and tightening a chain around its
girth. Additionally, the vessels tugger wire was tensioned at
the reels mid-height.
Soon after sailing, the ship rolled and pitched heavily
in a gale, and the accelerations imposed large forces on
the lashings. Suddenly, a link in the chain parted and the
tugger wire instantly became slack. Subsequent movements
displaced the wedges and the bridge watch observed the
reel moving freely on the deck. The Master was called, speed
reduced to minimum and heading altered into the sea and
swell. With the ship now pitching gently, the crew managed
to throw some square timber (4x4s) across the path of the
runaway reel path and gradually regained control over the
hazardous situation. A dunnage grid was quickly nailed
around the base and the reel remained safely inside this
Seaways March 2012
while the crew re-tightened additional wires and chains.
About an hour later, the reel was safely lifted off by the
offshore installation to which it was consigned.
Lessons learnt
1. Unpacked wooden cable reels, especially those with a
very narrow central hole, cannot be effectively secured and
must be shipped only in containers or skids;
2. Cable reels made of steel with exposed cross-members
or spokes may be shipped unpacked, but must be secured
with sufficient number of lashings (chains or wires) and
wooden wedges as determined from the vessels approved
Cargo Securing Manual (CSM) or as per the guidelines
contained in the IMO publication Code of Safe Practice for
Cargo Stowage and Securing (CSS Code);
3. Packing a cable reel inside a timber and plywood skid
before shipping on a vessel offers an effective and economical
method for safer carriage by sea.
s View of unpacked wooden cable reel note s Broken link of chain later
very narrow central hole with lifting wire sling recovered from deck
rove through, chain and tugger wire tightened
at mid-height.
s Cable reels made of steel can be more effectively secured
s Unpacked cable reel blocked by another cable reel packed on a wooden
skid
Seaways March 2012
MARS 201217
Hot work causes fire in workshop
A deck workshop/store on a survey vessel was a compact,
stand-alone structure, located abaft the wheelhouse. It was
originally designed as a store, but over the years, the crew
had also installed a wooden tool board and a work bench
against one of the bulkheads. Portable welding and other
equipment was also stored in this space. Adjacent to the
store was a designated storage arrangement for chemicals
and flammable liquids.
In order to re-arrange items inside the cramped space,
the boatswain (bosun) planned to weld two hooks on the
internal bulkhead frames directly above the tool board and
work bench for stowing a crowbar.
The bosun completed a permit for hot work form, which
was approved by the OOW (2/O), who failed to detect several
factual and procedural errors and did not conduct a proper
discussion or risk assessment. Working alone, the bosun
welded one of the hooks to the bulkhead and attended
briefly to another errand. The second hook was then welded
adjacent to the first one, this time with a seaman also
present. Neither of the men paid attention to the cardboard
box containing harnesses (made of flammable synthetic
fibre) that was lying on the workbench directly under the
weld site. They then left the area for a short break. Some
minutes later, as the master exited the wheelhouse, he
found thick black smoke billowing from the open door of
the workshop. He shut the door, returned to the wheelhouse
and informed the bosun on the radio that there was a fire
in the deck workshop. While the bosun rushed to the site
with the other ratings, the master sounded the fire alarm
and ordered the 2/O to take the nearest fire extinguisher to
the location. Upon arrival at the scene, the bosun opened
the door and could see flames on the work bench through
the dense smoke. He briefly entered the space and rapidly
discharged a portable CO2 and a foam extinguisher. This
was followed by a water jet from a charged fire hose and the
fire was soon extinguished.
n Editors note: Given the cramped space, a well-
established fire and flammable materials located
nearby, the bosuns action was unsafe due to the
hazards of toxic smoke, oxygen deficiency, burn injury,
electrocution from damaged electrical circuits and fire
spreading to outside the confines of the space. Only
the designated fire-fighting team wearing approved
firemans outfits and SCBA should approach and tackle
a shipboard fire.
Immediate causes
1. No proper risk assessment was conducted;
2. Combustible materials were not removed from the
worksite prior to the commencement of hot work;
3. No dedicated fire watch was in place either during the
hot work or after it was completed.
Root cause/contributory factors (as per
findings of investigator):
1. Lessons learnt from previous fire incidents arising
from hot work had not been effectively implemented (fires
19
resulting from failure to clear combustible materials from adequately monitored. Enforce compliance with the risk
the vicinity of hot work sites had occurred on four past assessment procedures as stated in the SMS;
occasions);
3. The definition of hot work (previously only gas-cutting
2. Personnel responsible for hazardous work not and welding) is expanded to include burning, brazing,
adequately trained in use of the permit-to-work system and grinding, soldering, thermal resistance heating, etc;
risk assessment methods;
4. It is clearly stated which activities are to be preceded
3. The company did not adequately monitor the quality of by a risk assessment and management procedure for each
risk assessments performed, permits completed onboard department on board;
and compliance with procedures related to the management
5. A fleet circular is issued informing all employees of the
of hazardous work;
lessons learned from this incident, and these are also shared
4. The risk assessment and toolbox meeting documents with the industry.
and records were all maintained within a computer based
(paperless) system. It was felt that printed material would
have improved workforce understanding of safety issues,
Hooks
promoted more effective risk assessments and job execution welded here
at the work site.
Recommended action
Ensure that:
Tool board
1. A system for the delivery of training in use of the
permit-to-work system, risk assessment methods, and the
general management of hazardous tasks is developed and
implemented. The system shall include a review of training
in general to determine if training is also required in other
areas; Workbench with burnt remains of harnesses

2. Management of hazardous work on board vessels is s View of interior of deck workshop cum store showing fire damage

MARS: You can make a difference.

You can save a life, prevent injury and contribute to a more effective shipping community.
Everyone makes mistakes or has or sees near misses. By contributing reports to MARS, you can help others learn
from your experiences. Reports concerning navigation, cargo, engineering, ISM management, mooring, leadership,
design, training or any other aspect of operations are welcome, as are alerts and reports even when there has been
no incident. The freely accessible database (http://www.nautinst.org/mars/) is fully searchable and can be used by
the entire shipping community as a very effective risk assessment, loss prevention and work planning tool and also
as a training aid.
Reports will be carefully edited to preserve confidentiality or will remain unpublished if this is not possible.
Editor: Captain Shridhar Nivas FNI
Email: mars@nautinst.org or MARS, c/o The Nautical Institute, 202 Lambeth Road, London SE1 7LQ, UK
The Nautical Institute gratefully acknowledges sponsorship provided by:
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20 Seaways March 2012

Transitioning from
traditional aids to
navigation
Mike Sollosi nately, we will always have to deal with
legacy systems at the same time that
Chief of the Office of Navigation Systems, US Coast technology is moving forward. So what
Guard Headquarters, Chairman of the IMO Safety of does this mean in practical terms?
Navigation Sub-committee
Visual references
First of all, visual references for
The transition to eNavigation has been going on for almost example, buoys and lights will be with us
for a long time to come. An integrated aids
40 years, and affects all areas of ship operation. The next
to navigation system will have to contain
level of transition may well be from analogue to digital, visual references in sufficient quality and
or visual to virtual. The IMO states that eNavigation is quantity to operate independently of any
electronic system. Virtual aids to
intended to establish an integrated information navigation or electronic positioning
environment for the maritime community. This environment systems cannot impart the same
will of necessity reach beyond the ship itself, and will affect information as a fixed or floating visual
aid. And there will always be some users
the provision of aids to navigation and waterway that are not able, not willing or not
management services. equipped to use more sophisticated tools.
Whats next for visual aids is:
G Augmented information through the use

T
he transition to eNavigation has
been going on for several years.
As so often in the maritime
industry, it sometimes takes an
accident to act as the catalyst to progress
and additional regulations. In January 1971,
two tankers collided near the Golden Gate
Bridge in San Francisco in near zero
visibility, spilling 800,000 gallons of oil into
San Francisco Bay, while Coast Guard
watchstanders at the experimental Harbor
Advisory Radar Project (HARP) looked on,
unable to contact either ship on VHF-FM.
The National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) report eventually led to
legislation mandating setting aside
channel 13 (156.65 MHz) for exclusive use
by the navigation team and giving the
Coast Guard authority to establish and
operate Vessel Traffic Services.
That legislation can be seen as a
significant milestone in the transition to
eNavigation in the US. As with all areas of
technology, the pace of delivery is
quickening and the number of new tools is
increasing. At the same time, there is
pressure to reduce costs in all areas,
Seaways March 2012
meaning that the question of how to
manage an increased or, at best, steady,
navigational risk with decreasing
resources becomes increasingly pressing.
In order for a smooth and efficient
transition to eNavigation, regulations and
technology will have to advance together,
and of course economics will always have
a role. But, as we proceed and progress,
we must also transition the user to the
next level.
Aids to navigation
The navigational challenges of the future
will be addressed through an integrated
system of visual, electronic, and regulatory
measures based on existing technology, but
able to readily adapt to new technology and
new competencies. An integrated aids to
navigation system will be asked to do more
than simply impart positioning information,
and it will have to be operated in
conjunction with existing rules, regulations
and restrictions, without having to rely
too much on regulatory change.
This is a lot to ask for, and unfortu-
of electronic means that provides, for
example, the health of the aid or more
detailed identity information;
G Improved optics that produce more light
and better sector definition and that
consume less energy;
G Interlinked aids with synchronous flash;
G Interactive aids such as user activated
sound signals;
G Better conspicuity through better
coatings;
G Better station keeping for floating aids
in exposed locations.
It is vital that changes in the aids to
navigation system should always be made
with user involvement. This is the same
whether it be discontinuing a sound signal,
changing the effective range of a light or
deploying new and untested technology.
For example, when the US Coast Guard
deployed their first set of synchronised
flashing buoys in the San Francisco Bar
Channel, they first used the California
Maritime Academys simulator to test the
buoys with the Bar Pilots in a laboratory
environment before deploying them in the
field.
21

Virtual aids to navigation
Most modern mariners have heard about
virtual aids to navigation. The topic has
been getting increased attention lately,
some of which can be attributed to
increased attention being placed on Arctic
navigation and the obvious difficulty we
would face in trying to maintain physical
aids to navigation in that environment.
Virtual aids have also been mentioned as a
less expensive alternative to floating aids.
While I do not condone this latter argument,
economics drives a lot of decisions.
Virtual aids have a place where it is not
possible to establish physical aids due to
either time pressures such as the need to
alert mariners to a newly created hazard
such as a wreck or environmental
conditions. But their use need not be
limited to these situations. Could virtual
aids be used to mark a navigable channel
in a river in which the water level, and
consequently the channel width, frequently
and rapidly changes faster than the buoy
tender can adjust the buoys? We have the
technology to transmit a polygon that
depicts a certain depth contour. This can
be displayed on the bridge and the
navigator need only keep his vessel within
the polygon. The US Coast Guard is
already looking for a laboratory to test this
concept with mariners involvement. This
is a drastic transition from placing
traditional visual references along the
route to using other visual references in
the wheelhouse.
Another type of environmental condition
that might preclude the establishment of
physical aids to navigation is quite the
opposite of arctic ice. Its tropical coral. The
Endangered Species Act will not allow us to
establish aids to navigation on top of
endangered coral or in any area or habitat
that could support the growth of endangered
coral. This has already prevented the US
Coast Guard from servicing long established
aids in the Gulf Coast. Are virtual aids to
navigation a workable solution in this case?
Only if they are augmented by two things:
improvement and growth in electronic
signals and improved navigation displays in
the wheelhouse.
eNav onboard
Theres been a lot of discussion about over
reliance on electronics and eNavigation
influenced accidents when seafarers forget
to look out of the window. But nobody has
counted the number of accidents that have
been avoided through the much improved
voyage planning, precise positioning and
better informed collision avoidance that
improved displays and, by extension,
22
Feature
eNavigation can deliver.
eNavigation improves situational
awareness and decision making at sea and
ashore. When used in conjunction with
other communications and display systems
it enables shore organisations to deliver
more timely and relevant information to
the mariner. And through its many levels
of sophistication and scalability it can
embrace all levels of system users from
recreational craft to the largest and most
modern commercial vessels.
However, one drawback of eNavigation
is that it requires a new level of
sophistication and equipment on the part
of the system users. This in turn requires
new levels of user training and
certification. Systems and procedures
cannot be imposed overnight, they will
have to transition gradually.
Space management
In the not too distant past, aids to
navigation were placed to enable a
mariner to determine his or her position,
determine a safe course to steer or to
avoid unseen dangers. A few visual aids
and the COLREGS were all that anyone
needed. Not any more. The aid mix of the
future will be asked to do much more. It
will define sea lanes and exclusion areas.
It will support security as well as
waterway efficiency. It will not only serve
the navigator, but its benefits will be
extended to a host of shore based users in
government and commerce.
The aid mix of the future will also
support regulatory efforts as sea space
that was once the exclusive domain of the
independent navigator becomes parcelled
into areas for aquaculture, minerals
extraction, renewable energy etc. The term
for this phenomenon is Coastal Maritime
Spatial Planning. This will be a challenge.
In the US, as in many areas around the
world, its already taking place, with 12
Wind Energy Areas being considered for
the Atlantic Coast, forcing the Coast Guard
to devise a system of Traffic Separation
Schemes and fairways around the
structures.
Coastal Marine Spatial Planning in
many ways is similar to airspace
management. The aviation community is
rigorous in ensuring that the activities in
any given piece of airspace are all
compatible. They would never allow a tall
building at the end of a runway or hang
glider to enter the airspace of a busy
international airport. Yet we happily allow
VLCCs, fishing boats, recreational craft, jet
skis and wind surfers to all compete for
the same channel with nothing to keep
them apart except the COLREGS.
This trend is only going to increase, and
the available sea room is shrinking. The
numbers of Particularly Sensitive Sea
Areas and Areas to be Avoided increases
each year. The aid mix of the future will
have to consider and support these trends.
If the waters under our jurisdiction are
divided into single use or limited access
areas, we will have to find a way to define
these limits and inform all waterway users
of the bounds. Supporting and enforcing
these regulatory efforts can be done by
either physical or electronic measures, but
it will need to be done.
Reducing the burden
Similar regulation of ship traffic movement
has been going on for many years. But,
through AIS and LRIT, shore based
authorities can already track and monitor
cooperative shipping anywhere in the
world. It is, I believe, only a matter of time,
before participation in a berth to berth
reporting and tracking regime is
mandatory for ships on international
voyages. This in turn will lead to attempts
by the shore authority to influence the
traffic in some way. It is essential that
shore authorities employ this new
capability to reduce the burden on the
ships master through some form of
integrated reporting and tracking and
information processing. eNavigation
principles, when properly applied, should
benefit all participants and not
redistribute, or worse, increase the burden
on the mariner.
eNavigation could bring all information
services that affect shipping into a cohesive
package. This includes not only navigation
services but all other government and
commercial activities that impact shipping,
and this should be done globally, without
regard to national boundaries.
eNavigation will, as is intended, start to
bring about an orderly evolution in
shipboard display and communications
systems and a better ship to shore
connection. It will deliver a considerable
portion of the aid mix of the future and it
will improve the safety and efficiency of
shipping. The transition will not happen
overnight but it will happen. Its already
started.
I This is an edited version of a
presentation made at the E-Navigation
Underway Conference and is
reproduced by permission of the author,
organisers and sponsors. See pp 27-28
for a full conference report.
Seaways March 2012
Where is my Pivot Point?
Arthur de Graauw
Director Port Revel
Shiphandling (France)
In recent years, there has been much
discussion on the pivot point (PP): What
is it? Where is it located? This paper
builds on previous publications to give
a mathematical definition of the location
of the pivot point that corresponds to
the intuitive feeling of seafarers.
(see Fig 1, bottom left). The pivot point is
defined as usual by the apparent point of
rotation. If we consider a vector from bow-
1 to bow-2 and a vector from stern-1 to
stern-2, we fully define the movement of
the ship from position 1 to position 2.
If we draw a connecting line between
the transversal component of both vectors,
the intersection with the ships axis will be
located exactly on the apparent point of
rotation. That is the pivot point (see also
John Clandillon-Baker in The Pilot,
November 2011). This vector approach is
simple and pragmatic; it allows us to
compute the pivot point of any ship
can artificially control its drift) (see Fig 2,
below).
The heading of this object is changing
constantly in a perfectly regular manner
and the position of the pivot point is shown
as a percentage of the ship length, starting
from the bow (positive if behind the bow
and negative if in front of the bow). This
object is moving at a speed of about 4.5
knots on a circle with a diameter of 4 L. If
the drift is 0, the pivot point will of course
be in the middle of the object. If the drift is
about 5, the pivot point is found at 33% of
the ship length from the bow. If the drift is
more than 15, it will be ahead of the bow.

T
he pivot point is the point around movement. This sounds pretty close to what
which the ship appears to be Let us see what happens for an object seafarers feel on a real ship. However, the
turning for an observer standing (with length L) moving along a perfect drift angle is a parameter that cannot be
on board the ship. This point is circle (I speak of an object because we chosen freely in the real world. So, let us
known to be usually located at about 1/4 or
1/3 of the ship length from the bow. It is also
well known that this location is not constant
and depends on external factors such as use
of tugs, bow thrusters, ship acceleration or
deceleration, ship motion ahead or astern,
etc. In fact, the location of the pivot point
results from a reaction to a very large
number of factors acting on the ship.
Fortunately, as Dr Seong-Gi Seo of
Warsash Maritime Academys Ship-
handling Centre concluded (Seaways,
August 2011): The pivot point is a
geometrical property. This means that it
must be possible to compute the position of
the pivot point from a given track after the
event. In other words, we can consider the
track as the result of all hydraulic forces
on the ship movement and we do not need
go into the question of why the ship has L Figure 2: Position of the pivot point during perfect turning circle
moved in a certain way, perhaps due to an
unnoticed gust of wind or a local current or
any other reason.
So, let us consider a ship track. The
ship moves from position 1 to position 2

L Figure 1: Vector approach definitions L Figure 3: Position of the pivot point during real turning circle

Seaways March 2012

23
 Feature
have a look at a track measured on one of
Port Revels manned model ships (255,000
dwt fully loaded tanker at scale 1:25) (see
Fig 3).
The heading is not completely constant
as it undergoes small variations due to
small changes in the forces acting on the
ship (eg local water depths, bank effects,
wind gusts, currents, etc). As a result, the
pivot point moves quite a lot, even after
some filtering of signals. Nevertheless, the
PP is located around 25-35% of the ship
length from the bow for most of the time
exactly what seafarers would expect.
In an accelerating turn, the ship is
started with full rpm and full rudder.
Observations show that the ship moves
on a kind of spiral track as shown above,
reaching a speed of nearly 6 knots after
L Figure 4: Position of the pivot point during an accelerating turn
about 10 minutes real time.
The pivot point is expected to be at the Being able to compute the position of on the ship in the very near future.
centre of the ship (50% from the bow) the pivot point from a given track at any In that sense, shiphandling will always
during the first stage of the manoeuvre, as time enables us to check whether the remain a kind of art that can only be
this would correspond to the ship turning seafarers intuition is in agreement with improved by practical experience.
around her own centre before any speed the calculated position. However, this Further information can be found on:
ahead is made. This can be seen above on knowledge will probably not change the www.portrevel.com
the left-hand side of figure 4, where the way seafarers handle ships because it is
I The author wishes to thank Nigel
pivot point is located at 40 to 45% of the unlikely that it will ever be possible to
Allen FNI, Southampton Pilot, and
ships length from the bow. After a short predict the exact location of a pivot point
Gordon Maxwell, Senior Lecturer
time, it moves to a fairly steady position on a real ship at any time, since this is a
Warsash Ship Handling Centre
around 35% of length from the bow. result of all the forces that are going to act

Seaways March 2012

24

Olympic security
from the sea
Lt Cdr David Mugridge
MA, MSc, AFNI, RN
P
lanning for the Olympics in
London 2012 is now in the
advanced stages, and the
completed stadia suggest that
work is well in hand to make this an event to
remember. As part of the security planning
for this sporting extravaganza, the Royal
Navy will be front and centre in the delivery
of a comprehensive and multi-agency
approach to policing the Games this
summer.
Both the UKs Royal Navy flagship and
its most operationally tasked carrier will
be used to provide part of a layered
maritime security shield. HMS Ocean will
be moored at Greenwich as a helicopter
base for Lynx and Pumas, while assault
ship HMS Bulwark will be in Weymouth
Bay for the duration of both the Olympics
and Paralympics as a floating command
centre for protecting sailing events. Their
envisaged roles once again proclaim the
unique versatility of large amphibious
platforms, following HMS Oceans stellar
performance at the heart of the Response
Force Task Group (RFTG) off Libya.
In October 2011, Defence Secretary
Philip Hammond announced to Parliament
widespread military involvement in
security arrangements for the Olympics,
which will see up to 13,500 personnel
involved at its peak. A move which again
Seaways March 2012
NAVAL COLUMN
speaks of the flexibility and value of armed
forces personnel more accustomed to
fighting recent wars in Libya, Afghanistan
and Iraq. This tasking will come under the
umbrella of Military Aid to the Civil Power
and will see the Metropolitan Police in
overall charge of security arrangements.
The British Government had agreed their
maritime forces should provide significant
support, including participation in all
major ceremonial events, and providing
invaluable logistical assistance as well as
wide-ranging security related duties. This
high visibility tasking will also test the
much scorned planning precepts of
Britains recent Strategic Defence and
Security Review, which drastically cut
naval numbers and platforms as part of
Britains fiscal austerity drive.
Overall, the British Armed Forces
involvement in the Games, according to
Royal Navy sources, includes:
G 5,000 personnel supporting the police
and other civilian authorities such as bomb
disposal teams, military working dogs and
RN support to maritime policing;
G 1,000-strong unarmed contingency
force to be deployed in the event of a civil
emergency during the Games;
G 1,000 personnel providing logistical
support;
G up to 7,500 personnel providing venue
security;
G up to four dozen personnel representing
the Navy as flag bearer parties at opening
and closing ceremonies, plus medal
presentations;
G HMS Ocean will be moored on the
Thames at Greenwich to provide
accommodation and logistical support. Her
flight deck will accommodate RAF Pumas
and Army and Fleet Air Arm Lynx which
will work with RAF Typhoon jets, based
temporarily at RAF Northolt, to provide
airspace security;
G Flagship HMS Bulwark off Weymouth
will provide a maritime command centre
for the security effort. She will also be used
by helicopters and as a base for small
boats.
These flag waving missions are not new
for the RN; during the 2005 Fleet Review a
mixture of warships and Royal Marines
landing craft successfully formed a
maritime shield around the 170
international warships and auxiliaries
gathered off Portsmouth to celebrate the
bicentenary of victory at the Battle of
Trafalgar. The Olympics is a wonderful
opportunity for the world to see Great
Britain at its best and it is wholly fitting
that the Royal Navy, as its Senior Service,
contributes to making the event an
unqualified success. The sad thing is a
generation of politicians and service chiefs
will herald this significant contribution as
justification for their unthinking wisdom in
culling Britains Maritime Forces in 2010-
2012. We should not forget the continued
demise of the Royal Navy means even this
sort of short-term operation adversely
impacts Fleet programming, manpower
and sees scant resources taken from other
front-line units to accommodate the
demand for personnel and platforms.
In a personal
capacity
Seaways authors are often employed in
senior positions within the shipping industry,
whether seagoing or ashore. They may
represent international organisations,
maritime authorities or ship-operating
companies. Many are active in The Nautical
Institute, at branch or Council level.
However when they write for our journal,
they do so in a personal capacity unless
otherwise stated. Their views are their own
and do not necessarily represent their own
organisations or the Institute.
25
Nautelex
David Patraiko FNI
Director of Projects
ECDIS guidance
The Australian Maritime Safety Authority
(AMSA) has issued a notice providing guidance
to ships fitted with ECDIS calling in Australian
ports.
This notice aims to clarify some of the
emerging issues relating to the carriage
requirements for ECDIS and provide guidance to
ships about what AMSA port state control
officers will be checking for during their
examinations. It includes two flow charts that
address ECDIS related issues, and which will be
used by AMSAs Port State Control (PSC)
inspectors.
Details of a ships navigational systems and
equipment must be recorded in Section 3 of the
ships Form E (Record of equipment Cargo Ship
Safety Equipment Certificate). The means of
complying with SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19
(ie paper charts and/or ECDIS) needs to be
indicated on this form. If the ship uses ECDIS for
navigation, Form E must clearly state the back-
up arrangement in place. If a vessel requires
flexibility in using either paper charts or ECDIS as
the means of navigation, such an arrangement
must be clearly indicated. In such cases, both
paper charts and ECDIS must comply with
SOLAS requirements.
AMSAs PSC inspectors will look for
evidence of planning and presentation of the
ships route for the completed or intended
voyage, using the means of navigation stated,
and for evidence of plotting and monitoring the
ships positions throughout the voyage. This
information will be cross-checked by the PSC
inspectors against entries made in the ships
deck log book.
An ECDIS that is not updated to the latest
version of IHO standards may not be considered
to meet the chart carriage requirement as set out
in SOLAS. The full Marine Notice 7/2012 can be
found at http://www.amsa.gov.au/Shipping_
Safety/marine_notices/2012/07.12.pdf
26
IMO & UN
IMO Secretary-General Koji Sekimizu met UN
Secretary-General Ban on 20 January 2012 to
discuss cooperation between the UN and the
IMO to combat Somalia-based piracy.
The meeting followed a recent report in
which the UN Secretary-General encouraged UN
Member States and multinational organisations
to consider how they could contribute further to
addressing the root causes of piracy, including
developing land-based initiatives to strengthen
Somali and regional maritime and law
enforcement capacity.
Ban agreed with Sekimizu that capacity
building in Somalia and neighbouring countries
should be enhanced through cooperation
between IMO and UN, UN specialised agencies
and other relevant international organisations.
This initiative will build on IMOs existing
capacity-building activities under the Djibouti
Code of Conduct, funded by the Djibouti Code
Trust Fund.
Liquefied cargoes
North P&I club has renewed its campaign to
warn shipowners of the potentially lethal
dangers of cargo liquefaction after six
liquefaction tragedies during the last two years
The loss of the bulk carrier Vinalines Queen retroactive enactment of legislation making
on Christmas day and three bulk carriers a year
earlier, with consequent loss of seafarers lives,
is a stark reminder of the catastrophic
consequences that can arise from loading
liquefiable cargoes, says Norths head of loss
prevention Tony Baker. In reality there are very
few ships that can safely carry a bulk cargo that
can change from a solid to a liquid state.
The International Maritime Solid Bulk
Cargoes (IMSBC) Code, which became
mandatory a year ago, identifies the steps that
should be taken when carrying cargoes that can
liquefy, such as nickel ore and iron ore. Shippers
are reminded about the importance of not
loading potentially liquefiable cargoes without a
valid shippers declaration together with
supporting certificates of transportable moisture
limit and moisture content. Can tests should be
performed throughout loading along with simple
visual checks for any signs of splattering. If
masters are in any doubt, they must stop loading
and seek additional advice.
Masters need to remember that the risk of
liquefaction is a fundamental ship safety issue.
As such they are fully backed by the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea part V regulation 34, which sanctions any
decision necessary in their professional
judgement for safe navigation, Baker said.
Further information can be found at
http://www.northpublications.com/signals/Sign
als_86/.
BIMCO urges fair treatment
Fair treatment of seafarers cannot be
compromised and must continue to be an
essential and intrinsic part of the maritime
industry agenda, according to BIMCOs
Reflections on Shipping Industry Issues for 2012.
Although there would appear to be a downward
trend in high profile cases involving unfair
treatment, in practice it seems to be almost
impossible to counter the combination of a zero
tolerance policy for environmental incidents
with massive media coverage or even the day-
to-day problems experienced by seafarers
during port calls.
It is essential that states strictly adhere to
and respect their international obligations in
UNCLOS, including article 230, which bars
states from imprisoning seafarers on board
foreign vessels except in cases of wilful and
serious acts of pollution within their territorial
waters. While criminalisation in terms of
something illegal is manifestly unfair, it is feared
that the increasingly severe environmental rules
around the world will result in more cases of
unfair treatment. BIMCO believes that seafarers
who are doing everything in their power to avoid
an accident or to mitigate its effects should not
be penalised based on hindsight.
The issue of unfair treatment also has
implications beyond the incident itself. Seafarers
who have been involved in such incidents may
suffer problems in obtaining employment or
entry visas to foreign countries. Furthermore,
seafarers in certain jurisdictions are exposed to
presumption of guilt rather than innocence.
BIMCO will continue to oppose such
discrimination and unfairness against seafarers.
The entry into force in 2010 of the IMOs
Casualty Investigation Code, containing
mandatory provisions to observe when
obtaining evidence from seafarers, is a welcome
development. In November 2011, the IMO
Assembly adopted a resolution urging states to
comply with the 2006 IMO/ILO guidelines
promoting fair treatment of seafarers, and
implement them alongside the Code.
Seaways March 2012
conferences
eNav Underway 2012
David Patraiko FNI
The 2012 eNavigation Underway
conference, From a birds eye perspective
to practical solutions gathered 143
delegates from 21 countries.
The conference was filmed and the
films are available on www.efficiensea.org.
The conference was hosted by the
EfficenSea project to highlight lessons
learned from the EfficenSea eNavigation
test bed, and those of other international
test beds. Thomas Christensen, of the
Danish Maritime Authority provided
background on the EfficienSea project and
on the aims with regard to eNavigation. He
outlined how test beds are established,
with the results already being fed back to
the IMO Correspondence Group. One key
question was the way in which user needs
are captured and assessed. This is done
through consultation with the users
throughout the project.
What is eNav?
Dr Andy Norris FNI, underlined the
difference between eNavigation and
electronic navigation, emphasising that We
have had electronic navigation for years.
eNavigation is very different. He showed a
simplified conceptual structure, with
emphasis initially on the communications
element and the use of existing standards.
Norris suggested that an apps-like
approach could be taken to development,
with various levels of apps having different
standing in the regulatory process. He also
looked at the applicability of introducing
eNavigation into new build ships, and the
challenges for retrofitting. Timescales for
introduction are a key factor here.
Manufacturers concerns
Mike Rambaut, Secretary-General, CIRM
(The International Association for Marine
Electronics Companies) looked at the
factors affecting the equipment available
and the process that manufacturers go
through when deciding where to
concentrate the resources. Production
drivers include the development of
industry standards, type approval, and
even the influence of committees.
The emergence of fixed standards is a
major concern for manufacturers. While
Rambaut believes that the current IMO Gap
Analysis paints too dark a picture, he said
Seaways March 2012
there are basic steps in the implementation
of eNavigation which still need to be taken.
He concluded with a plea to establish
standards as soon as possible. We, the provoking if not uncontroversial discussion
manufacturers, cant start designing things
until this is all clear, he said.
Learning from ECDIS
John Murray from the International
Chamber of Shipping, suggested that it
was reasonable to use the ECDIS
experience as a window onto the
introduction of eNavigation. In many ways,
this experience suggested things to be
avoided. In the case of ECDIS, there has
been considerable potential for conflict
between the pace of technological
development and the established
regulatory process.
With regard to the crucial issue of
competence, he again referred to the
industrys experience of ECDIS to make a
plea for generic familiarisation and
training, with compulsory assessment, to
determine competence. Further training,
provided onboard if necessary, can then be
used to acquire operational competence.
However, the automation, harmonisation
and integration driven by the definition of
eNavigation should ensure that training
additional to that already required under
the STCW is generally unnecessary.
Usability
David Patraiko FNI, Director of Projects,
The Nautical Institute acknowledged that
the need for eNavigation to be usable was
enshrined in the development strategy but
questioned how this theoretical goal could
be translated into good operational design.
He outlined several proposed and existing
usability tools, including the IMOs Human
Element Assessment Process (HEAP) and
stressed that it was essential to identify a
workable solution within the development
strategy.
Barbara Fogarty, from Irelands
National Centre for Sensor Research,
reviewed the main drivers for Marine ICT,
which include marine spatial planning and
the concept of multi-functional platforms.
Taking advantage of technology
convergence is a key interest, and in
future, the development of eNavigation
could lead to synergies between
communications links and the
implementation of scientific ocean sensors.
Dynamic routing
Capt Ulf Svedberg, Swedish Maritime
Administration, provided a thought
of dynamic and proactive routing. The
presentation featured the Mona Lisa
project. A short film showed the problem of
coping with green house gas reduction,
coupled with the expected growth in
transport, coming to the resulting
conclusion that sea transport has an
important role to play in an
environmentally friendly future. It was
asserted that Sea Traffic Management /
Sea Traffic Control are needed to control
this traffic. This leads to the concept of
Green Routes, marine spatial planning
and the ability to save on fuel usage. The
possibility for dynamic separation, as
opposed to static separation, was hinted
at. With ships routes held centrally in a
Sea Traffic Control system, assistance in
avoiding congestion and 'open sea pilotage'
becomes possible. Seaways readers are
encouraged to watch the videos at
www.sjofartsverket.se/en/MonaLisa/
SAR
Keith Oliver, head of operations for the UK
coastguard, looked at how eNavigation can
support search and rescue (SAR)
operations. SAR authorities need to know
the capability of nearby vessels, and
relevant meteorological data, whilst
improved data about ships can improve
search plans. The automated transmission
of search area coverage plans by AIS, can
also be used to monitor execution.
Turning to unregulated users, he
explained the challenges arising from the
variety of small boat user equipment
available. The growth in unregulated apps,
in particular, poses difficulties for shore
authorities, including issues around alarm
generation and charting. Small craft users
are increasingly using social media to
issue alerts or warnings, and authorities
must now find ways of managing this.
Delegates agreed the following
statements:
The regulatory environment:
1. Some level of regulation is necessary
but it should be goal-based.
2. More effective use of existing
navigational aids can be made by their
integration and harmonisation, together
with simplification of relevant rules and
27

regulations. This process is already
underway.
3. The IMO Integrated Navigation System
(INS) performance standards should be
used as the basis for the shipboard
integration of existing and future
navigational aids, as a component of
eNavigation.
4. Initially, existing performance
standards for navigational aids are most
likely to be satisfactory in the eNavigation
context, as they already work with INS.
Performance standards will need to be
refined and structured towards a modular
concept to accommodate changes in
technology within an eNavigation
environment.
5. eNavigation applications will be a
useful tool to support maritime spatial
management and coastal states should
consider their use.
6. All national authorities should consider
developing their own eNavigation strategic
action plans, taking into account the IMO
strategy.
Lessons learnt from test beds
7. Test beds are essential for progressing
eNavigation.
8. eNavigation test beds should
demonstrate a response to identified user
needs and should take into account the
human element and economic implications.
9. Test beds could look at ways to reduce
the administrative burden on mariners and
operators ashore.
10. It is recognised that errors occur, thus
eNavigation should help to reduce errors
onshore and aboard and mitigate the
consequences.
11. Tools, procedures and training for
ensuring usability of eNavigation
applications should be considered during
design and testing.
12. Test bed methodology and evaluation
criteria should be harmonised to facilitate
validation of outputs and quality
assurance.
It is anticipated that a third conference
will be held early in January 2013.
RAN Sea Power Conference
2012
Cmdr Ashley Papp MNI, RAN
The Royal Australian Navy Sea Power
Conference 2012 and Pacific 2012
Congress and Maritime Expo - and half a
dozen other related conferences - were
held in Sydney in early February. Attended
by Navy dignitaries from more than 30
nations, from regions including Southern
Africa, Scandinavia, Russia, Korea and the
Americas, and by industry professionals
28
Conferences
and academics from home and afar, SPC12
saw the largest gathering of maritime
experts and pundits in many a year.
The theme was The naval contribution
to national security and prosperity. The
Indo-Asia-Pacific region is one of 'strategic
flux,' according to Australian Defence
Minister Smith in his opening remarks.
With an unprecedented level of new
capability being delivered to the RAN in
coming years, the interlacing of design and
materiel, construction, R and D, and
industry economics cannot be separated
from maritime strategy, diplomacy and
national security.
Maritime Domain Awareness
Emphasising the links between the
maritime domain and other sectors, the
audience was addressed by Australia's
Army and Air Force Chiefs. For a nation
that is remote yet geo-strategically located,
concentrating on effect and objective
rather than size and mass requires an
integrated, intelligent and innovative
approach.
Provocative discussions were evident
during plenary Q and A sessions, and
during side-bar discussions. Several
speakers challenged the application of the
traditional doctrine of sea control, sea
denial and sea protection, proposing new
definitions and encouraging an evolution
in strategic thinking. The challenges of
developing and delivering direct combat
power projection, simultaneously with
diplomacy, capacity building, constabulary
enforcement, and humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief can be conflicting at
times.
In order to maintain sea lines of
communication (or perhaps of commerce),
we need to ensure that conflicts are
resolved peaceably and promptly. It is
important that all users operate
collectively in the maritime commons. Full
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) needs
inter-agency collaboration between all
partners that is, government, private
enterprise, academia, lobbyists, Defence
forces and law enforcement.
International cooperation
Cooperation in maritime security was a
central tenet of the conference, as regional
maritime security is a task too big for one
Navy. Naval leaders from Singapore and
Malaysia presented the outlines of a
successful security cooperation model in
the Malacca Straits and the South East
Asia region. The RAN presence in the
Middle East, over two decades and
counting, is a prime example of
cooperation in multilateral and bilateral
maritime security operations. Recent RAN
Task Force Commanders joined the US
Seventh Fleet Commander in outlining the
successes of coalition activities in the
Middle East/Indian Ocean/Horn of Africa
region, and engagement and maritime
security cooperation and exercises in the
region.
It is not just the human and commercial
cost of piracy that needs to be taken into
account. All manner of trans-national
crime across maritime borders affects
maritime security and thereby economic
prosperity. With the resources of even the
most powerful and affluent nations
stretched, the pragmatic approach for
dealing with this crime is cooperation.
Economic efficiencies and capacity
building of developing forces and nations
are realised, greater effects are evident,
and diplomatic value for money is
multiplied through cooperation.
A maritime strategy can include
military medical and humanitarian
services as an instrument of 'soft power'
diplomacy, and the RAN is an active
participant in civil-military humanitarian
cooperation. Throughout the conference,
the inherent flexibility of the Navy was
emphasised, making the Navy often the
first call of government diplomatic
response.
The integrity of hydrographic
information, simulation and live training,
ECDIS and digital navigation were among
some of the technical issues discussed, as
well as ship ownership and building and
Navy capability acquisition. There was
significant discussion of domestic versus
foreign defence industry reliance.
Expanding presence
Opportunities and challenges for the future
was a second key conference theme, with
an Australian Defence Force posture and
basing review outlining a need for
increased presence in north and north-
west Australia. Commercial-military
cooperation, and corporate social
responsibility, can include access for Naval
vessels to commercial berths to achieve
mutual objectives. The protection of
geographically remote shipping and
offshore resources requires sustainment
and resupply access from shore and
collaborative planning and design of
commercial and military capability.
The conference concluded with an
update on preparations for the
International Fleet Review in Sydney in
October 2013, marking a century since the
first RAN fleet arrivals.
Seaways March 2012

NW England and N
Wales Branch
Oceanography
Eighteen members and guests attended a
branch meeting to listen to Dr Kevin
Horseburgh outline the work of the Proudman
Oceanographic Laboratory (POL), where he is
Head of Marine Physics and Ocean Climate. The
POL operates five separate research groups,
and looks after 43 tide gauge sites in the UK
and others in the South Atlantic. In particular,
Dr Horsefield discussed the institutes work
with ocean levels, tides around the UK and
storm surges, such as identifying where the
strongest tidal currents occur to allow the best
siting of tidal energy turbines.
Tides were first recorded by William
Hutchison in the 18th century. Joseph
Proudman and Arthur Doodson established the
Institute and its ability to predict tides in 1842,
based on work by John Hartnup, while
harmonic analysis began with Lord Kelvin in
1867. The prediction of tides can be done
backwards as well as forwards, allowing for
investigation of past accounts of tidal events.
For example, it is possible to tell that the
flooding that occurred in the Bristol Channel on
30 Jan 1607, which killed many people, was
probably caused by a very high tide rather than
other effects.
Storm surges are the movement of the sea
surface over a large area rather than the
narrow areas covered by tides. The North Sea
often has surges which are three metres above
predicted levels. 1953 was a pivotal year with
respect to storm surges in the North Sea when
significant flooding occurred. After those events
the UK government supported a Storm
Reporting System. POL has surge models and
provides the environment agency with forecasts
and storm surge risks on a constant basis.
Elsewhere in the world storm surges can cause
major problems; for example in Bangladesh,
which typically sees 7-9 metre increases in
forecast water levels when storm surges occur.
Forecasting has allowed for timely evacuation
to prevent loss of life. For example, in November
Seaways March 2012
2007, 600,000 people were evacuated. Whilst
regrettably 3,000 lives were lost, a similar
storm in 1970 resulted in 300,000 deaths.
Whilst every effort is made to ensure
accuracy, inevitably predicting natural events
cannot be absolutely perfect. To work around
this, POL conducts ensembles which are
predictions using variables around model
inputs. It is found that a 10% variation in wind
speed input can have a 0.5 metre difference in
surge level. These ensemble results are
forwarded to government.
POL is also home to the Permanent Service
for Mean Sea Level (PSMSL). Records date
back to the 1700s and indicate that over time
average sea level rise is about 3mm per year.
Finally, Dr Horseburgh mentioned the effect of
land motion and ice melt effects on sea level.
Interestingly, Artic ice melt causes sea level rise
in the Antarctic and vice versa.
Dr Steve Bonsall FNI
US Gulf Branch
Reducing accidents through
mentoring
In a powerful presentation, Captain Andr Le
Goubin outlined the effects and the impact of
mentoring at sea. His first real mentoring
experience took place when he was just 11,
spending most of his free time as deck boy on a
small inter-island cargo and passenger vessel,
the Ile De Serk. The captain took him under his
wing, and tutored him in the skills of
seamanship. This was an experience that lasted
a lifetime, giving him a strong foundation for
his career at sea.
Human element
While the volume of accidents at sea dropped
with the introduction of the ISM code, they still
continue, despite the introduction of
continuously more sophisticated and reliable
equipment. So (simplistically) if accidents are
not being caused by equipment, they have to be
due to the Human Factor. Capt. Le Goubin
became so interested in this problem that he
decided to devote his thesis for his Masters
degree to it.
Andr felt that one of the causes of accidents
had to be the continuous reduction of manning
levels. The end result of this was fatigue. But
another more subtle result was that the high
call on the seafarers time left little chance to
mentor those coming up. He cited many cases of
ships hed visited where the crew were
obviously overworked, meaning the margin for
error had been trimmed to the minimum. One of
these was a European flag feeder container
ship, where the Master and mate worked six-on
six-off. This was bad enough on its own, but the
Master was also the engineer. The ship had a
total crew of five people. How could they
possibly cope in an emergency; and how was the
mate going to gain the knowledge to become
Master?
Following a continuous period at university,
many nations now only require the student to
undertake 12 months sea time before becoming
a qualified watch keeping officer. This does not
provide enough time to gain any decent
experience particularly on deep sea ships
which are out of sight of land and traffic for
long periods. The modern officer gets very little
opportunity to gain experience now, due to the
shorter sea-time required and rapid promotion.
As a result, Le Goubin believes there is a great
need for a formalised system of recorded
experience training for officers of all ranks,
similar to that used for cadets. The act of
recording induces reflection on the experience.
Quoting Steve Trautman, he pointed out that
70% of knowledge comes from experience. In
this respect, the Nautical Institute Command
Diploma scheme is a good start for those moving
toward command, but we need more than this.
Present day officers have become reliant on
what they have learned at college, and, through
lack of time and other factors, are not
benefitting from the knowledge handed down
from their superiors.
Experiential knowledge
Andr explained the concept of experiential
knowledge as knowledge gained from on the job
experience that has been reflected upon
particularly where the action was incorrect, or
29
 Letters
NI Log
resulted in a near-miss situation. This
experience need not be personal but can be
gained vicariously through listening to the
SW England Branch
stories and anecdotes of others. A mentor is a Life onboard a Dive Support
person who shares their own experiential Vessel
knowledge with others without a designated
Adan Lopez-Santander gave a fascinating
reward.
presentation on the 94 metre multi-role diving
As part of his thesis research, Andre sent
support vessel Bibby Sapphire, operated by
out a questionnaire throughout the maritime
Bibby Offshore. Adan has worked on the vessel L The 2005 built Bibby Sapphire
community asking what recipients thought was
as a deck and DP officer for more than three
the most significant element contributing to the azimuth/propulsion thrusters. Position
years since graduating from Plymouth
lack of experiential knowledge. 53% replied that University. reference systems include DGPS, acoustic , taut
officers lacked the feel for the job, lacked Adan spoke enthusiastically to an audience wire and Radascan, the latter complementing
seamanship, practical knowledge and of about 50 people about the work undertaken by the DGPS for close range work. The dive system
experience. Ships officers were not being the ship, in which a team of 100 people are consists of an external saturation system, living
trained to think and act independently. As one dedicated to the safety of up to eighteen divers and dive chambers, transfer lock, two three-man
of his colleagues put it; They lacked those gems working at depth. diving bells and a 15 man Self-Propelled
of wisdom that are passed on during an To maintain accurate position the Bibby Hyperbaric Lifeboat (SPHL).
operation, that consolidate theoretical Sapphire is fitted with a bow tunnel thruster, As is common in many support ships the
knowledge. one swing-up azimuth thruster forward, one action takes place on the after deck of 800
There are many cases where lack of swing-up azimuth thruster aft and two square metres. Dominating the after deck is a
experiential knowledge was a contributory heave compensated crane with a lifting
factor in maritime accidents. This is no idle capacity of 150 tonnes. The crane is used in
speculation it is a serious problem, which support of the diving teams and for lowering
needed to be tackled. and lifting underwater equipment, such as well
heads and manifolds.
What needs to be done? Possibly the most memorable part of the very
So what can be done about it? Captain Le professional presentation was the video clips of
Goubin suggested several steps; diving work being undertaken on pipeline laying
G Identify the barriers to an officers gaining and rig maintenance. Throughout the talk the
experiential knowledge such as the high audience was reminded of the intense effort
demands on their senior officers time. Other which is required to maintain the flow of crude
oil and the courage of the divers who work at
modern day problems include too rapid
saturation depths for weeks at a time.
promotion, language barriers and fatigue.
Paul Willerton FNI, Branch Chairman,
G Senior officers should take the Ten Minute
chaired an interesting question and answer
Challenge sit quietly for about 10 minutes,
session and thanked Adan for sharing his
without any distraction, and think about what
L Branch Chairman Paul Willerton welcomes Adan experience with Branch members.
concerns them most about the running of the
Lopez Santander Paul G Wright FNI
ship. For example, one captain said his concern
was Young officers disregarding the rules of
the road, and instead agreeing over the radio on
an alternative course of action. When they have
identified this concern, they should tackle it
by talking to the officers and looking for
remedies.
G Insist everyone on a ship talks a common
language whenever possible, certainly socially
and in the mess room, so no one is left out of
discussions and conversation. Many lessons are
learned through the telling of anecdotes or sea
stories.
G Urge responsible administrations to improve
manning, reducing fatigue and allowing more
time for mentoring. Abolish watch-on-watch
routines.
Andrs enthusiasm and passion for his
subject generated an enthusiastic and searching
question time after the presentation, which
closed out an entertaining and educational
evening.
Captain Derek McCann AFNI
Seaways March 2012
30

Solent Branch
Safety in Sail Training
Seminar
The Norwegian three-masted barque Statsraad
Lemkuhl was the fabulous venue for a joint
technical seminar with the Southampton Master
Mariners Club (SMMC) at the Ocean Cruise
Terminal in Southampton docks.
The evening started with a guided tour of the
vessel by the Master Captain Marcus Seidl. The
vessel was built in Germany in 1914 and is now
owned and operated by the Statsraad Lehmkuhl
Foundation. Based in Bergen, Norway, she is
used for various purposes including sea
training for the Royal Norwegian Navy, schools,
public institutions, companies, and others
wishing to charter her. The vessel is a regular
participant in The Tall Ships Races.
The seminar was held aboard, in the vessels
classroom, which meant that demand for places
unfortunately outstripped supply with
approximately thirty three places available in
total. Participants included representatives
from a number of Sail Training Organisations
including the Ocean Youth Trust, Sail Training
International, the Discovery Sailing Project, the
Association of Sail Training Organisations, and
included a number of serving and former Tall
Ship and yacht Masters and Officers. Also
present were a healthy mix of regulators,
trainers, naval architects, shipmasters, pilots,
managers and consultants.
The seminar followed close on the heels of a
meeting on safety in sail training held in
November 2011 in Toulon, organised by Sail
Training International. The Toulon event
brought together national maritime
administrations and vessel operators in a
unique forum. It is hoped that these events will
lead to a greater mutual understanding in
future, and will help develop regulatory regimes
appropriate to the vessels and their operators
but not so burdensome as to limit the success of
the sector.
Peter Cardy MNI, Chief Executive of Sail
Training International (STI), gave a brief
overview of sail training and safety. He thanked
the Nautical Institute, and the Solent Branch,
for its help in facilitating and promoting the
seminar, and spoke of the NIs long standing
interest in sailing vessels, and in particular,
square riggers.
There is no single register of sail training
vessels and no international definition of sail
training. The national member organisations of
STI include almost 600 vessels from 30 nations
a sizeable group by any measure. The vast
majority are not large enough to be subject to
the international conventions and are regulated
under widely-differing domestic codes and
Seaways March 2012
Letters
NI Log
regulations as yachts, small passenger vessels,
cargo ships or special purpose ships. While the
majority operate mainly in sheltered waters,
some also sail in deep-sea conditions, where
keeping totally inexperienced trainees safe is a
challenge and a constant concern.
Why discuss safety specifically in sail
training as if it were somehow different from
safety in the rest of the maritime world? Cardy
felt that the subject requires separate treatment
because sail training evokes such emotion
among the general public. An accident involving
a sail training vessel with a crew of young
trainees could dominate the headlines for days,
and the political and legal demands for an
inquiry and for someone to blame would be
ongoing. Secondly, the nature of the accidents is
different, as highlighted by the second speaker,
John Lang. The nature of the vessel operators
make yet another difference, as does the nature
of the vessels themselves.
Rear Admiral John Lang FNI, former Chief
Inspector of the Maritime Accident Investiagion
Branch (MAIB), gave an informative
presentation on two accidents involving tall
ships, one of which was a knockdown. He
underlined the importance of readiness at all
times, in particular the need to maintain
watertight integrity by keeping all ports,
portholes and other openings closed, and the
concept of knock down resistance. He also
outlined the desirability of using squall curves
to ensure adequate stability was maintained
and the need to carry appropriate sail plans was
also discussed. The second accident involved a
fall from the rigging. The importance of
systematic safety management, accident
reporting, and most importantly learning from
accidents was stressed.
Mark Todd of the Ocean Youth Trust South
(OYTS) stressed the importance of safety on
small sail training vessels. Parents leave their
children in the care of the vessel and naturally
expect to find them unharmed when they return.
Any other outcome is a total failure.
This is a huge responsibility for Master and
staff, many of whom are volunteers. He went on
to describe how his team of volunteer sea staff
maintained standards of safety and seamanship
whilst training youngsters in challenging
conditions.
David Ralph, a principal surveyor at the
MCA, explained the plethora of various national
regulations and conventions pertaining to the
various classes and sizes of vessel and called
for intelligent regulation for a unique sector.
Although sail training vessels are in one sense
an anomaly, there are now more square rigged
ships and sail training vessels afloat than at
any time in the last eighty years. The majority of
these were not yet built at the time of the first
Tall Ships Race in 1956. Indeed Sail Training
International estimates that 2.5 million young
persons have taken part in the Tall Ships Races
to date.
For the regulators, ensuring the safety of
these vessels, crews and trainees is a challenge.
Many of the vessels are built using archaic
materials with construction techniques that
have to be rediscovered from history, and all use
an obsolete form of main propulsion sails
and are designed to demand the maximum
physical effort of their crews.
The presenters kindly fielded a number of
questions from an engaged audience and views
and ideas were exchanged before Peter Cardy
brought proceedings to a close.
The Statsraad Lemkhul provides vocational
training, in addition to training for the young,
however it is the latter that dominates sail
training today. Young people are given the
chance to develop team skills and self-
awareness in a challenging environment and
adventurous setting. The majority will make
only one voyage and for many of them it will be
a life-changing experience. Others will return,
addicted to the lifestyle. The enthusiasm and the
passion of those managing and crewing Sail
Training vessels is tangible and one hopes the
sector is able to continue to flourish with a
tolerant and supportive international
community.
Matt Winter FNI
Ireland Branch
Skysails kite propulsion?
In conjunction with the Irish Institute of Master
Mariners and IMarEST, the Ireland Branch
hosted a presentation by Fabian Juers of
SkySails, which offers wind propulsion systems
for ships based on giant towing kites. The
system can be installed as an additional
propulsion system on both new builds and
existing vessels offering savings of up to 30% on
power consumption, as well as reducing
emissions and operating costs.
The system consists of a towing kite with a
rope, a launch and recovery system and a
control system for automated operation. The
ships officers operate the SkySails system
using a control panel installed on the bridge.
The launch and recovery process is partly
automated and requires only a few simple
actions by the crew on the foredeck. The regular
number of crew is sufficient for operating the
SkySails system.
Launching involves the telescopic mast
raising the towing kite from its storage
compartment. At a height of about 30 metres
above deck level the kite unfolds and at the push
of a button is launched from the mast. The
winch releases the towing rope until the kite
has reached its operating altitude, this allows
31

L Windpower now and then
for the use of stronger and more stable winds at
a height of up to 300 metres.
The towing kite is controlled automatically
at all times while in flight mode. Autopilot
software ensures that the towing kite flies
defined figures of eight based on wind direction
and velocity, as well as the speed of the ship, to
generate optimal propulsion. The control panel
on the bridge keeps the ship's officers informed
at all times about the systems operating status.
If the wind should drop, the system operates a
winch that can winch in at up to 4m/s allowing
the kite to remain flying. If the wind changes
direction, the autopilot moves the system in the
best operational angle.
If needed the kite has a security position
known as its zenith position, which can be
activated from the bridge. In the event of an
emergency manoeuvre, the SkySails automatic
control system steers the towing kite and
adjusts its path within seconds. Full recovery of
the kite takes approximately 15 minutes. The
towing kite also has an emergency release for
use in extreme situations.
Fabian described the kite not so much as a
sail but more like an aircraft wing. Optimum
wind speed for the kite is force three up to eight.
The kite can be flown downwind and on courses
of up to 50 to the wind. Regulations require that
the kite is lit during operation, and with SkySails
also currently working on an AIS status to
indicate that the vessel is operating the kite.
It is interesting to note that the development
of the kite has also led to the establishment of a
separate performance monitoring system, which
can be used to increase profitability, and which
can be fitted on vessels that may not be suitable
for fitting of the kite.
Deirdre Lane MNI
India South Branch
Training for the ship of the
future
The India South branch of Nautical Institute
London held a short seminar on Training for the
Ship of the Future in collaboration with
32
Letters
NI Log
GlobalMET. The seminar drew together
members, well-wishers and participants from a
wide cross section of the shipping and related
industry sectors in Chennai.
Captain Rod Short, a veteran in maritime
training, and currently the Executive Secretary
of GlobalMet, gave a presentation focussing on
social justice and development for Asian
seafarers, and on maritime institutions for
raising standards in teaching and training. He
underlined the need for improved training to
suit the requirements of coming decades,
keeping up with technology and regulatory
changes. In future, lectures using chalk and
blackboard or for that matter power point
presentations wont be helpful in addressing
the issues at hand. Todays Generation Y has to
be taught and handled differently. The teaching
gap needs to be bridged with specific focus on e-
Navigation, learning from the aviation
industry's methodology and success.
He also tackled the issue of fatigue, pointing
out that a ship in heavy traffic with
inadequately rested watch-keepers is a disaster
waiting to happen.
Captain Short called for efforts to reduce the
gap between ratings and officers, and to
improve interdisciplinary links between
navigation and engineering.
Mr Jai Acharya, Director of STET Maritime
Pte Ltd, discussed the optimum level of
technology for effective maritime education and
training. The aim is to create the best possible
personnel for both management and operational
tasks, and equip them with both leadership
qualities and a teamwork mentality.
Captain S Krishnamurthi FNI, Senior Vice
L Opening the training seminar
President of The Nautical Institute, explained
the structures and changes taking place in NI,
its spread, reach, the role of Seaways etc.
Underscoring the positives of the Institute, he
did not fail to mention the stumbling blocks too.
In training for the future, establishing syllabus
standards and understanding the human
element, in particular knowledge delivery and
soft skills will be particularly relevant, he said.
The main challenges will be providing personnel
with the tools and resilience to meet the
expectations set by environmental indices,
e-Navigation etc.
Captain Vivekanand FNI looked at some of
the same themes, stressing that distance
learning and web-based training is the future of
MET, with the human and environmental
elements set to have major impacts on the
training of the future. He emphasised the need
to be proactive with Generation Y, who ask
Why? to everything.
Captain Andy Crawford, business manager
of the International Association of Maritime
Institutes (IAMI) explained the benefits of
belonging to the Association, highlighting new
routes to certification. He also drew attention to
the International Tug Masters' Association,
founded in 2010 to foster professionalism in
those with non-deep sea background.
M S Nagarajan, CEO of Teledata talked
about developing environmentally friendly
ships. If there is a willingness to change, then
infrastructure, technology etc can all be in line
with these aims. However, institutional and
administrative inertia remain the stumbling
blocks, and character building remains a
challenge.
Hrishikesh Narasimhan, Joint General
Manager of L&T, who has a shipbuilding
background, covered a lot of ground on the broad
spectrum industry perspective with respect to
ships of the future. He differed with other
speakers, stating that competency cannot be
gained by e-learning. Underpinning
fundamentals, knowledge and commitment are
essential, he added. In India, training
shipbuilders is a major new task to be addressed.
Captain N Kumar AFNI
South East Australia
Branch
VP visit
Branch members were pleased to join NI VP
Captain Mike Barritt, who had travelled from
the UK for the RAN Sea Power Conference, at
the conference and branch gatherings, including
aboard the 1874 barque James Craig, part of the
Sydney Heritage Fleet, which has been
meticulously restored by volunteers to 1920s
authenticity.
Cmdr Ashley Papp MNI, RAN
Seaways March 2012
 letters
Costa Concordia
An excellent article by Philip Wake. The
number of people now being carried
aboard one vessel, together with the
multiplicity of languages among the crew
and passengers, must raise some concerns
over the ability to safely evacuate everyone
in an emergency. Some years ago I/we
were concerned at the possibility of having
to evacuate over 2,000 pilgrims from a
ship, now liners are carrying more than
twice that number!
The media hype following the recent
unfortunate incident off the coast of Italy
beggars belief. Whatever ones opinion as
to the cause of the accident, no person or
body should be tried and convicted in the
press and television.
The difference between a maritime
accident and a criminal act was brought
home to me when I was first asked to sit as
an Assessor in Hong Kong; when I queried
why the inquiry was to be held at the
Legislative Council Chambers and not at
the Marine Department, the Director of
Marine pointed out that the only room
large enough to accommodate the inquiry
at his Department was the magistrates
court, and a Marine Inquiry could not take
place in a courtroom.
Maurice Burbidge MNI, Bexhill-on-
Sea, UK
Marine investigations
I read, with some distress, The Nautical
Institute press release about speculation
in relation to marine accidents, and the
Chief Executives column headed The
Need for Investigation not comments.
While it would appear to be righteous to
refuse to make comments on marine
accidents until formal investigation have
been completed, the reality is that such a
stance will mostly result in no comments
being made at all.
After all, considering the Costa
Concordia, surely we all privately have a
view. There are eye-witness accounts in
the media, including interviews on the BBC
with survivors. For instance, one of those
interviewed in The Report, a Radio 4
Seaways March 2012
programme, was a 19 year old female
dancer, who had been put in charge of a
liferaft embarkation station, apparently
without any real training. There is more,
as we all know, and regardless of any
honourable intent to protect those accused
of a maritime crime, comment about
aspects of incidents such as the above
could still be made.
But if The Nautical Institute is going to
wait for investigations to be completed,
could they comment on the Costa Europa
accident at Sharm-el-Sheikh in 2010, in
which three seafarers died? The answer is
no, because the only entity to carry out an
investigation was Costa itself, who
submitted their report to the Italian
authorities. No-one else has seen it. Could
they comment on the loss of the Danny FII
which sank in December 2009 in the
eastern Mediterranean with the loss of
more than 40 lives including the master, or
on the loss of the Demas Victory in July
2009, off the coast of Doha with thirty
fatalities? The flag state, St Vincent and
the Grenadines, do not have a government
marine department even though large
numbers of ships are registered in the
country. I have written several letters to
the registry, incidentally in Geneva, but
have had no response. I could go on.
According to the IMO, an investigation
should be carried out by the country in
which the ship is registered, unless it is
carried out by the flag state in which the
ship was situated at the time of the
accident. In fact, there are now many
registries who would not have the ability to
carry out an investigation, nor I suspect
any enthusiasm for doing do. The IMO
should be doing something to encourage
them to act responsibly, or else should find
some means of preventing them from
existing as registries. And the Nautical
Institute should be doing something to
support this view.
It is unrealistic for the Nautical
Institute, one of whose objectives is to
support the improvement of health and
safety at sea, to hide behind the results of
formal investigations which may or may
not take place, before expressing a view.
They should be prepared, on our behalf, to
comment using expertise within the
organisation. It would then be possible for
them to put before the international media
those things that we all believe should be
changed, such as the enthusiasm of many
states for putting shipmasters in prison for
errors of judgment.
I am the compiler of a marine website
www.shipsandoil.com where I express a
view about many marine accidents. In
some cases I am one of the few exposing
them to public view. I will continue to do
this, and if my reports, which are
inevitably second hand, require some
speculation, then so be it. And having said
all this I will continue to publicly support
the view that seafarers should not be
subject to criminalisation.
Captain Victor Gibson FNI, Madrid,
Spain
Navigational audits
The old COLREGS used to say in Rule 15
that assumptions should not be based on
scanty information. Unfortunately far too
many assumptions are made in our
industry. I specifically refer to an
understanding of the ISM Code. The ISM
Code and the current audit process will
neither guarantee nor improve
navigational safety. This is because many
of the key activities undertaken in
navigation watchkeeping are either not
recorded or not recordable. Examples of
this are initial sighting of a target,
visual/radar bearing and risk of collision.
Apart from acknowledging a lookouts
report, there may be no verbal feedback to
the lookout. Similarly, position fixes may
be recorded, but not at the frequency they
were obtained. This can produce a
distorted picture.
I speak from experience. Several years
ago, whilst DPA of a large company, we
suffered a spate of serious navigational
incidents; both groundings and collisions.
At first level of investigation these were
inexplicable. We had recently totally
renewed our procedures, all the ships were
new and well equipped. The VDR
recordings pointed us in the direction to
identify the true causes. In a nutshell, our
33

procedures were not implemented
properly, expensive training ashore had
not been put into practice and we had
system collapse. Corrective and preventive
action involved presenting the procedures
in a new format, providing basic, hard
hitting training and above all conducting
our own internal navigational audits whilst
ships were under way.
I have also spent a short period in the
Loss Prevention Department of a P & I
Club where I have seen more major
navigational incidents. The underlying
reasons are all the same; inactivity. No
regular position fixing, non adherence to
the passage plan / or unplanned changes,
no basic collision avoidance techniques
and above all, no collision avoidance
manoeuvres. Worst of all, I started to see
repeats of major incidents that had
happened previously. Even inspection
reports indicated worrying trends in
navigational standards.
Just review some of the MAIB incident
reports and the same basic failures
surface again and again; and the majority
of their work, the last time I reviewed their
web site, was navigationally related.
The concept of navigational audits is
not new. OCIMF refer to this in section 5 of
TMSA. How many non-tanker companies
have studied this? I really recommend they
do so in light of recent events.
It is my opinion that independent,
navigational audits should be conducted
onboard all ships, including a period whilst
the ship is underway. This will close the
loop between the training, procedures and
equipment. I also believe it is necessary
that such audits follow a standard. I
believe our Institute could be instrumental
in establishing that standard.
As a first step, I think the subject would
be worthy of an open debate.
Captain Mark Bull FNI, Hatfield, UK
No place for VHF in
collision avoidance
On the morning watch in open seas and
good weather, I was sipping on my cup of
coffee, with the radar showing a vessel
heading on a reciprocal course about 12
miles off. The vessel had been acquired
and was being monitored. When it was
about 10 miles off, the VHF crackled: My
friend, please alter your course to port and
lets pass green to green. I wanted to ask
the caller Excuse me, are you going to tell
me how to steer now?
This is just one example of something
34
Letters
many of us experience out at sea
nowadays: collision avoidance using VHF.
The Bridge Procedures Guide is quite clear
about this, stating that VHF radio should
not be used for collision avoidance
purposes. Valuable time can be wasted
attempting to make contact since
positive identification may be difficult
and, once contact has been made,
misunderstandings may arise. (Bridge
Procedures Guide 3.2.3.2.) Every deck
officer must have come across this extract
if he/she has leafed through the Bridge
Procedures Guide, and every deck officer
should be following this when on watch
but sadly this is not the case.
In spite of repeated training and
various books emphasising the same rule,
we are still seeing confusion created by
officers using the VHF to decide between
themselves whether to pass red to red or
green to green, often leading to close
quarter situations or, in the worst cases,
collisions. Even with the AIS in use,
confusion may arise as some vessels may
have their AIS switched off or may not
display the correct information.
Many will argue that the VHF does
come in handy when a close quarter
situation arises, but then why should that
situation arise in the first place? If a good
lookout is being kept and COLREGS are
being followed, there will be no need for
the VHF, even when there is a clear need
to take action. The VHF is a part of the
GMDSS used for distress, safety and
urgent messages not a means for
collision avoidance, or an easy way for
seafarers to let their intentions be known.
A related problem is that some
seafarers seem to think using the VHF for
collision avoidance will save them the
trouble of large course alterations, which
may be needed when taking early action.
This is well-intentioned, but what they
dont understand is that they might be
putting the ship at risk by confusing the
other vessel on the VHF. If the other vessel
misunderstands your intentions, what
happens then?
Seafarers are requested to think twice
before reaching for the VHF the next time
they find themselves in a collision
avoidance situation, and strongly resist
depending on the equipment. Let us use
the equipment for what it is designed for
and not for our own convenience
especially for something so critical. On this
note, I wish good weather and safer seas to
all.
Ketan Bhatia MNI, Mumbai, India
For your diaries
March
(1) UK; North East England Branch; South
Tyneside College L Block; Technical meeting
- Issues Resulting from Seafarer Fatigue;
Email: dbyrne@nodent.com
(3) UK; North of Scotland Branch; Holiday Inn,
Westhill Drive, Westhill, Aberdeen, AB32 6TT;
Mariners' Dinner Dance; Tel: 01224 649923
Email:aec.struthers@btinternet.com
(8) UK; Solent Branch; Southampton Master
Mariners Club, 12-14 Queen's Terrace,
Southampton SO14 3BP; Evening meeting:
Work of the MCA; 1845 hrs for 1900 hrs;
Prior booking required. Email:
secretary@nisolent.org.uk
(8-9) UK; Dexter House, Royal Mint Court,
Tower Hill, London EC3N 4QN; Vessel Tracking
and Monitoring Conference; Website:
http://www.informamaritimeevents.com/FKT2
295NI; Member discount: 20%
(13-15) UK; ExCel Centre, London; Interspill
conference and exhibition; Website:
www.interspill2012.com
(14) UK; Solent Branch; Warsash Maritime
Academy Whalley Wakeford Lecture
Theatre; Technical meeting Project
HORIZON: The Impact of Fatigue on Seafarers;
No registration necessary; Email:
matthew.winter5@ntlworld.com
(30) US; NE USA Branch; Massachusetts
Maritime Academy; Seminar The Future
of Simulation in the Maritime Industry;
Email: Captain George Sandberg at
seasand@optonline.net; Tel: 001 631-375-
5830.
April
(2) UK; NW England and Wales Branch;
Room 218, LJMU, Byrom Street, Liverpool
L3 3AF; Evening meeting A technique
for repair of a ship after stranding;
Email:s.bonsall@lmju.ac.uk;
Tel: 01244 671817
(11-12) Singapore; Maritime HR and Crew
Development Conference; Website:
http://www.wplgroup.com/aci/conferences/
eu-mhr10.asp; Member discount 15%
(17) UK; North of Scotland Branch; Inn at
the Park, 3-4 Deemount Terrace, Aberdeen
AB11 7RX; Ladies Night; Email:
aec.struthers@btinternet.com;
Tel: 01224 649923
(24-26) Finland, Scandic Continental Hotel,
Helsinki; 8th Annual Arctic Shipping Forum;
Website: http://www.informaglobalevents.
com/event/arcticshipping
Seaways March 2012
People
Congratulations to Lt Commander Erika
Downing, Member, who has just assumed
command within the Irish Naval Service and is
currently serving as Captain of the LE Aoife.
Congratulations also to Captain Boris
Dunaevsky, Fellow, Chairman of the NI Baltic
States Branch, who has been appointed as an
arbitrator sitting on the Maritime Arbitration
Commission under the Chamber of Commerce
and Industry of the Russian Federation.
Chris Hammond, Member, writes to tell us
that for last year, he has been serving as Chief
Officer on the 96 metre superyacht Vava II,
being built in Plymouth.
Colonel (Retd) Mike Bowles MBE,
Member, writes to tell us that in May 2012,
there will be a memorial unveiled at the
National Memorial Arboretum (NMA) at
Alrewas in Staffordshire commemorating the
Falklands Conflict of 1982. Operation
Corporate, as the military operation was
known, was a success for many reasons not
least of which was the task force of Merchant
Navy and RFA ships that were requisitioned to
take part. Ships Taken up from Trade, or STUFT
as they were known, were a crucial part of the
operation. Merchant ships of many different
types took part from Cross Channel and North
Sea ferries to container ships, freighters and
tankers.
The dedication ceremony planned for 20th
May 2012 will commemorate the 30th
Anniversary of the landings on the Falkland
Islands. The Falklands Memorial will be
distinctive by reflecting the Falklands
landscape. The design and construction will be
based on the memorial and cemetery at Blue
Beach San Carlos, where the landings took
place, by imitating the wall of memorial
plaques on a smaller scale.
Whilst many Falklands veterans and their
families have visited the San Carlos Memorial
during the major pilgrimages and personal
visits, the majority have not had this
opportunity and are unlikely to in the future. By
creating a similar atmosphere in the NMA, it is
hoped that veterans and their families will feel
Seaways March 2012
it is somewhere in the UK where they can
connect with the Falklands and feel at peace.
The wall front will have seven plaques
reflecting the San Carlos design. The main
plaque, in the centre, will be flanked on each
side by three smaller plaques, and comprise an
engraved Joint Service Operations crest over
an inscription using similar wording as at San
Carlos. The six flanking plaques will each be
engraved with a crest of the participating
military and civilian forces: Royal Navy, Royal
Marines, Army, Royal Air Force, Royal Fleet
Auxiliary and the Merchant Navy. A dedication
plaque will be set below the main plaque. A
circular plaque depicting the South Atlantic
Medal will be placed on the rear of the wall;
below this will be a small plaque stating that
the Memorial was commissioned by
SAMA(82).
The Falkland Islands rock structure will be
the entrance point for visitors to the Memorial
space. A plaque mounted on the front will
comprise an outline map of the Falkland Islands
with, above the map, the words Falkland
Islands 1982 and below the map From the
Sea Freedom. The rear will have a matching
plaque to remember the three Falkland
Islanders who lost their lives.
This is an exciting project which will
provide a memorial that Falklands veterans
and their families will feel is theirs. For more
information please visit the SAMA 82 website,
www.sama82.org.uk or contact the SAMA
office on 01495 791592.
New members
The Membership Committee has nominated
the following for election by Council:
*Signifies members who have rejoined
Associate Fellow
Aldrich, P Mr/Director (UK/NE England)
Aly, M A H H Captain/Managing Director
(UAE)
Balston, D C W Captain/Director Safety &
Environment (UK/London)
Bhargava, V Captain/Master (India (West))
Brandholm, P Captain/Environmental Manager
(US Gulf (Houston))
Buitrago, A J Captain/Master (Colombia)
Burns, M R Captain/Director (US East Coast
(N))
Carr, M Mr/Managing Director (UK/NW Eng &
N Wales)
Eiras, C H D Captain
Professor/Master/Surveyor (Brazil)
Frew, J H Mr/Marine Surveyor (Brazil)
Gupta, A K J K Captain/Master (Singapore)
Harraway, P C Mr/Assistant Harbour Master
(UK/Humber)
Harsch, H Captain/Naval Adviser (UK/London)
Hemachandra, L Mr/Chief Examiner of
Engineers (Sri Lanka)
Islam, M A Captain/Master (Bangladesh
(Dhaka))
Islam, S M K Captain/Surveyor (Bangladesh
(Dhaka))
Kapoor, A Captain/Marine Surveyor (India
(South))
Karlsson, M Mr/Mate (Faroe Islands)
*Kirby, A J Captain/Marine Consultant
(UK/SW England)
Kumar, M Captain/Master (India (West))
Lorber, M Captain/Consultant (Iberian/Spain)
Medagama, P Captain/Dept. Head Marine
Simulation (Sri Lanka)
ODowd, B L Miss/Principal Marine Incident
Investigations (AUS WA)
Remeta, V Mr/Master (Croatia)
Robinson, P D Captain/Master (New Zealand)
Roy, K Mr/HSE Manager/DPA/CSO
(UK/London)
Schoemaker, A J Captain/Project Manager
(Japan)
Shaw, M Mr/Managing Director (UK/London)
Soh, W L Mr/General Manager (Singapore)
Soolapani, T V Captain/Master (India (South))
*Szeto, L K Captain/Marine Manager (China
(Hong Kong SAR))
Taylor, J E Captain/Supt/Fleet Manager (US
Gulf (Houston))
Velusamy, D Captain/Master DP (Malaysia)
Whyte, P S Captain RFA (Retd) (UK/Solent)
35
Youel, M Mr/Fleet OMS and Audit Manager
(UK/Humber)
Young, S J Captain/Master (AUS VIC)
Upgrade to Associate
Fellow
Alam, M J Captain/Master (Bangladesh
(Chittagong))
Barker, R H Captain/Dir Nav Requirements
(UK/London)
Colombage, J S K Rear Adm (Sri Lanka)
Crawford, A J Captain/Managing Director
(UK/SW England)
Healy, S C Captain/Resource Manager (UK/NE
England)
Hegarty, M J Captain/Pilot (Ireland)
Henry, T M Commander/Royal Navy
(UK/London)
Jayakody, N L Dr Captain/Director (Sri Lanka)
Jayaratne, R Captain (Sri Lanka)
Lingham, L R Captain/Master (UK/NE England)
Narvekar, H Captain/Master (India (West))
Perera, D N Captain (Sri Lanka)
Scorer, S J Commodore/Dir. Operations
(UK/London)
Spencer, F Captain/Director (UK/SW England)
Whiteley, A C Captain/Master (UK/Humber)
Wijetunga, D K Captain/Master (Sri Lanka)
Members
Ala, P Mr/DP Instructor (Philippines)
Bragg, M Captain/DP Consultant
(CAN/Maritime Provinces)
Bushe, S Mr/Pilot (Caribbean Islands)
Cassidy, T J Mr/Marine Coordinator (UK/N of
Scotland)
36
Do Lago, V M Mr/2nd Mate (Brazil)
*Donaldson, D W M Mr/Second Officer
(UK/W of Scotland)
Ercolano, G Captain/SDPO Lecturer (Italy)
Fiksdalstrand, T Mr/Chief Information Officer
(Norway)
Forbes, T J P Mr/Third Officer (UK/N of
Scotland)
Frost, D G Mr/Deputy Harbour Master (AUS
WA)
Harrison, M Mr/Director (UK/W of England)
James, N M Mr/Chief Officer (India (South))
Johansen, R Mr/1st Officer (Norway)
*Knight, D T Mr/Chief Mate/SDPO (New
Zealand)
Koleb, D Mr/Marine HSED Supt./Port Captain
(AUS VIC)
Ledgor, M Mr/Senior Marine Manager (UAE)
Lockwood, D H Mr/Fleet Ops. Supt.
(UK/London)
*MacLellan, A Captain/Offshore Installation
Manager (UK/W of Scotland)
*Malhotra, S Mr/Marine Consultant
(UK/London)
Manfredi, M Captain/SDPO Lecturer (Italy)
Neilson, D E Mr (UK/Solent)
Pande, M Mr/Second Officer (India (West))
Pearson, A P Mr/Port Ops Manager
(UK/Solent)
Petrov, I Captain/Assistant Professor (Ukraine)
Renny, P S Mr/2nd Mate/DPO (UK/NE England)
Rice, M R Mr/Port Safety Manager (UK/Solent)
*Ruether, J Captain/Senior Master (CAN
BC)
Sales, M A Mr/Engineer (Brazil)
Singh, M Mr/Chief Officer (India (North))
Smolyar, O Captain/Master (Ukraine)
Tanashchuk, D Mr/Chief Officer (Ukraine)
Thapliyal, P Mr/Deputy Commercial Manager
LNG (UK/London)
Turnbull, E Ms/Relationship Manager (UK/W
of Scotland)
Walton, P Mr/3rd Officer (UK/NE England)
Waters, R Mrs/Editor Sailing Directions
(UK/SW England)
Weerakone, R M Mrs/Director (Secretariat)
(Sri Lanka)
Wingfield, O J Mr/OOW (Deck) (UK/London)
Associate Member
Alexander, C Mr/Cadet (Sri Lanka)
Barron, A Miss/Cadet (Ireland)
Bryson, L Miss/Cadet (UK/W of Scotland)
Buckmire, Y A A Mr/Student (Carib Is/Trinidad
& Tobago)
Burns, V Mr/Cadet (UK/NW Eng. N Wales)
Dagli, O B Mr/Student (US East Coast (N) +
Turkey)
De Miranda, R R C Mr/Supervisor (Brazil)
Desappan, S K M Mr/Cadet (India (South))
Harvey, L Miss/Cadet (UK/W of Scotland)
Johnston, T W Mr/Cadet (UK/SW England)
Kuniyil, A P V T Mr/Cadet (India (South))
Lewis, C T Mr/Cadet (UK/London)
Podolin, D Mr/Cadet (Ukraine)
Rajendiran, H D Mr/Cadet (India (South))
Ross, B S Mr/Deck Cadet (UK/NW England &
N. Wales)
Sunny, A V A Mr/Cadet (India (South))
Vaughan, R H Mr/Deck Cadet (UK/N of
Scotland)
Wakefield, K B Mr/Cadet (US Gulf (Houston))
SeaGoing
Correspondence
Group (SGCG)
It is critical that The Nautical Institute has
access to those currently at sea to advise us
on a range of technical and operational
issues. Members who are currently active
seagoing officers are asked to join the SGCG
and give feedback on these issues on
average 10 to 12 times a year. This allows us
to better represent mariners such as at the
IMO and other forums.
If you think you can contribute, please
contact Harry Gale for more details at
hg@nautinst.org
Recent topics have included use of
ECDIS, use of AIS, environmental awareness
training, and enclosed space entry.
Seaways March 2012
 Branch Secretaries and development contacts
Australia: Shanghai: New Zealand: Ukraine:
Queensland: Sandy Lin, MNI www.nautinst.org.nz www.nautinst.com.ua
www.niqld.com Tel: 86 21 68868389 Capt. Kees Buckens, FNI Professor V Torskiy, FNI
Capt Adrian Rae MNI sandylin@fcaremarine.com.cn Tel: 64 9 522 0518 Tel: 38 048 2251766 (h)
Mobile: +61 412529102 Croatia nznisec@xtra.co.nz Tel/Fax: 38 048 7334836 (o)
adrian.rae@bigpond.com Capt Gordan Baraka MNI Nigeria: torskiy@farlep.net
SE Australia: Tel: + 38 522201161 Capt. Jerome Angyunwe MNI U.S.A.:
www.nisea.org Mobile: + 38 598445545 Tel: 234 1896 9401 Gulf Houston:
Jillian Carson-Jackson, MNI gb@adriamare.net Mobile : 234 80 2831 6537 www.niusgulf.com/
Tel: +61 2 6279 5092 Cyprus Jerome107@hotmail.com Robert Hanraads MNI
Mobile: +61 4484 68867 Evan Mackay, MNI Norway: Tel: +1 281 673 2747
sec@nisea.org Tel: 357 25 843 268 (o) Helle Oldetal, MNI RHanraads@absconsulting.com
SE Australia (VIC): Fax: 357 25 312 986 (o) Tel: +47 52 70 26 44
Tel: 357 99 532 236 (m) North East US Coast:
Capt. Ian Liley, MNI helle.oltedal@hsh.no Capt. George Sandberg, FNI
Mobile: + (0)410 478 992 e.mackay@csmcy.com
Pakistan: Tel: 631-878-0579 (h)
Email: imliley@optusnet.com.au Denmark:
Capt. S M A Mahmoodi, FNI Tel: 631-375-5830 (m)
SE Australia (SA): Capt Peter Rasmussen MNI
Tel: +45 44 366851 Tel: 92 21 285 8050-3 (o) seasand@optonline.net
Capt. Howard Pronk, MNI Fax: 92 21 285 8054 (o)
plr@bimco.org Pacific Southern California:
Tel: 61 8 8447 5924 mahmoodi@mintship.com
Egypt: www.nisocal.org/
Fax: 61 8 8431 1564
Capt. Eslam Zeid, MNI Panama: Captain James Haley, MNI
Pronk@arcom.com.au
Tel: +20111660757 Captain Samuel Ferreira De Sousa MNI Tel: 310 9515638
SE Australia (ACT): Tel: +507 211-2122
eslamzeid@gmail.com captjameshaley@yahoo.com
Capt. Iain Kerr, FNI samuel.ferreiradesouza@iti.com.pa
Tel: +61 2 6279 5958 France: Pacific Seattle:
ifk@amsa.gov.au Guillaume de Boynes MNI Philippines: Capt Robert Moore FNI
Tel: +33 (0)2 3292 9175 (o) Jim Nicoll, MNI Tel: +1 (206) 463 2109
Tasmania:
gdeboynes@groupama-transport.com Tel: + 63 917 866 3324 coastwatch@comcast.net
Capt John Lloyd MNI
john.lloyd@amc.edu.au Germany: James_Nicoll49@hotmail.com United Kingdom:
Western Australia: www.linkedin.com/groups?gid=3451665? Poland: Bristol Channel:
Capt. David Heppingstone, MNI Jens Hansen MNI Capt. Adam Weintrit, FNI Capt John Rudd, MNI
Tel: 61 8 9385 4583 Tel: +49 40 334 282 76 Tel +48 6 0410 8017 Tel: 01179 772173
Fax: 61 8 9385 4583 Fax: +49 40 334 282 78 weintrit@am.gdynia.pl Mobile: 07976 611547
niwau@yahoo.com nautinst.germany@googlemail.com Qatar: john.ruddmni@googlemail.com
Baltic States: Ghana: Capt. Joe Coutinho, FNI Humber:
Capt. Boris Dunaevsky, FNI Capt William Amanhyia, AFNI Tel: +974 4315 792 Capt Richard Coates FNI
Tel: +371 28832549 Tel: 233 2 4406 2438 Mobile: +974 5537 293 Tel: 01482 634997
Fax: +371 67588257 W_amanhiya@msn.com coutinho@qship.com Mob: 07850 943069
bdunaevskij@yandex.ru Greece (Hellenic): Russia: richard@swanmar.karoo.co.uk
Bangladesh: Capt. Babis Charalambides MNI St. Petersburg: Isle of Man:
Capt M A Malek MNI Tel: 30 210 429 2964 (o) Captain Alexandr B Nosko MNI
Fax: 30 210 429 2965 (o) Capt. Nigel Malpass FNI
Tel: +880 31 710973 Tel: + 7 812 334 51 61 Tel: 01624 813774
Mobile: 30 6944 301 666 Mobile: + 7 812 716 41 08
Fax: +880 31 716101 malmar@malmarmarine.com
tarpon@otenet.gr abnosko@gmail.com
nautinst.bangla@gmail.com London:
Chittagong: Iberia: a.nosko@scf-group.ru
Javier Saavedra, AFNI http://www.nautinst.flinthosts.co.uk/london/
Capt. Saifullah Al-Mamun, MNI Moscow: Harry Gale, FNI
Tel: 34 981 35 8952 (h) Capt. Andrey Voloshin, MNI
Tel: + 880-31-710973 (O) Tel: 020 7928 1351 (o)
Tel: 34 981 18 8411 (o)
Fax: + 880-31-716101 (O) Tel: 7 095 5170965 hg@nautinst.org
ajaviersaavedra@telefonica.net
Mobile: +880 171 3124272 anvoloshin@megawap.ru
India: North East England
nautinst.chittagong@gmail.com Singapore:
North & East (New Delhi): www.ninebranch.org
Dhaka: Capt. Pawan K. Mittal, MNI William Wesson BSc MNI David Byrne, FNI
Capt. Ghulam Hussain, AFNI Mobile: 91 98 1016 0883 Tel: 65 91004059 Tel: 0191 217 3660
Tel: + 880-2-9896597 (O) Tel/Fax: 91 11 2508 6500 ni.singapore@gmail.com dbyrne@nodent.co.uk
Fax: + 880-2-9889763 (O) pkmittal@ariworld.com Southern Africa:
nautinst.dhaka@gmail.com North of Scotland:
South (Chennai): http://www.nautinst.co.za Alistair Struthers, MNI
Belgium: Captain N Kumar, MNI Captain Simon Pearson MNI
www.nautinst.be Tel: 01224 649923
Mobile: +91 98403 65082 Tel: +27 (0)21 788 5429 aec.struthers@btinternet.com
Capt. Marc Nuytemans, FNI captainnkumar@gmail.com Mobile: +27 (0)82 396 8368
Tel: +32 (0)3 2475006 info@nautinst.co.za North West England:
West (Mumbai): www.ninw.org.uk
Fax: +32 (0)3 2475090 Capt Amol Deshmukh South Pacific Community:Fiji
marc.nuytemans@exmar.be Dr Steve Bonsall FNI
Tel: +91 98331 223337 Capt. John Hogan, FNI
Brazil: Tel: 01244 671817
amol.deshmukh@y7mail.com Tel: 679 337 0733
Otavio Fragoso Da Silva, FNI sec@ninw.org.uk
Indonesia: Fax: 679 337 0146
Tel: 55 21 2516 4479 New volunteer development contact required JohnPH@spc.int Shetland:
Fax: 55 21 2263 9696 Capt Andrew Clifton MNI Sri Lanka: Jim Ratter, MNI
otaviofragoso@conapra.org.br Tel: 62 21 7854 8525 (o) Ravi Jayaratne, MNI Tel: 01595 859 440
Bulgaria: Fax: 62 21 7854 9156 (o) Tel: 94 11 286 5795 jimratter@hotmail.com
Capt. Andriyan Evtimov, FNI Mobile: 62 815 1452 3544 exceltech@itmin.net Solent:
Tel: 359 52 631 464 (o) Andrew.clifton@uk.bp.com www.nisolent.org.uk
Sweden:
Fax: 359 52 631 465 Ireland: Matthew Winter FNI
www.nautinst.se
aevtimov@abv.bg http://www.linkedin.com/pub/nautical- Tel: 01962 855157
Capt Finn Wessel, MNI
Canada: institute-ireland-branch/29/953/561 matthew.winter5@ntlworld.com
Tel: 46 411 55 51 52
British Columbia: Deirdre Lane, MNI South East England:
Mobile: 46 703 83 62 95
www.nauticalinstitute.ca Mobile: +353 86 2297127 Chris Renault, FNI
finn.wessel@nautinst.se
Capt. Chris Frappell, MNI nautinst.ireland@gmail.com Tel: 01304 372192 (h)
Tel: +1 250 658 0393 (h) Syria
Japan: Captain M Hawsheh AFNI Mobile: 077 0226 9282
Mobile: +1 250 537 6378 Prof. Masao Furusho, MNI chrisrenault@btinternet.com
frappell@shaw.ca Tel: +963 41 370040
Tel: 81 78 431 6246 www.nauticalse.org
Maritime Provinces: Mobile: +963 933 414206
Mobile: 81 90 5362 2858 South West England:
Capt. Angus McDonald FNI furusho@maritime.kobe-u.ac.jp hawsheh@emirates.net.ae
Trinidad & Tobago: Capt Robert Hone MNI
Tel: +1 902 429 0644 Malta:
Leonard Chan Chow MNI Tel: 01752 862050 (h)
Ar550@chebucto.ns.ca Capt. Michael Pagan, MNI
Tel: 868 658 3347 Tel: 01752 586163 (w)
Central Europe: Tel: 356 21806467 (o) robert.hone@plymouth.ac.uk
Capt Juraj Boros, AFNI Fax: 356 21809057 (o) nauticalsolutions@yahoo.ca
Tel: +421 2 5262 2945 maritime@mcast.edu.mt Turkey: West of Scotland:
Mob: +421 904 063438 Capt. Mehmet Albayrak, MNI www.wosni.co.uk
Myanmar:
e-mail: juraj.boros@tatramarine.sk Tel: +90 216 474 6793 Capt. M.A. Shafique MNI
Capt Ba Nyan MNI
China : Tel: 95 9 511 0982 (Mobile) Fax: +90 216 474 6795 Tel: 0141 8839177
Hong Kong SAR: banyan51@gmail.com alia@topazmarine.com mashafique@yahoo.co.uk
www.nautinsthk.com Netherlands: UAE: Venezuela
Capt. Vikrant Malhotra MNI www.nautinst.nl www.niuae.ae Capt Oscar Rodriguez MNI
Tel: +852 97682264 Capt Fredrik Van Wijnen MNI Capt Brian Course, MNI Tel: (+58-212) 762.82.58
Fax: +852 22859309 Tel: +31 182 613231 Tel: 00 971 4 3123216 Mobile: (+58-412) 335.47.77
secretary@nautinsthk.com cesma.vanwijnen@planet.nl nauticalinstitute.uae@gmail.com orodriguez@consemargroup.com

I As many of these email addresses are private accounts, please refrain from sending multiple messages with attachments
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