A r m s races and the b a l a n c e of

power: a mathematical
model*
M i c h a e l D. W a l l a c e

Department Of Political Science, University O/ British Columbia, Canada

(Received April 1976)

Introduction China, the relentless progress of horizontal nuclear

proliferation and the rapid increase in the conventional
Inspired by the pioneering work of Richardson 1, a
armed strength of many middle powers. Therefore, an
number of world politics scholars 2"3 have devoted
arms race model which aspires either to general
themselves to constructing formal mathematical models
explanatory validity or to a useful predictive role in the
of arms races in the hope of specifying those structural
contemporary period must be n-adic in structure.
and behavioural properties of the international system
In this paper a modest beginning in this direction
which result in runaway competitions for military
will be described. First, the theoretical rationale behind
hegemony, since the evidence suggests that such arms
the model will be outlined with reference to the
races are followed almost inexorably by war+. Many of
"balance of power' literature. Secondly, its major
these formal models have provided important
assumptions will be explicated. Thirdly, an attempt will
theoretical insights by systematically exploring the
be made to try to explain the mathematical contents of
implications and consequences of various competing
the model itself. Fourthly, the partial validation of the
propositions about arms competition to be found in model will be attempted with reference to the three
the literature. Almost without exception, however, they
most important arms races in the modern period, i.e.
contain so many simplifying assumptions that they
those preceding each of the two world wars, and the
drastically distort the complex empirical reality they
cold war arms race. Fifthly, some possible improve-
purport to represent-15 . Thus, while they may be
ments are suggested that might be incorporated into
invaluable as heuristics, such models have proved to be
the model to improve its performance. Finally, some
inadequate from both theoretical and practical policy
very tentative suggestions are outlined for
perspectives. On the one hand, they have not
contemporary strategic policy which arise from the
contributed significantly to the construction of
behaviour of the model.
empirically testable generalizations concerning the
growth of arms levels in the international system nor,
on the other hand, have they led to the identification n-Adic arms races and the b a l a n c e o f power
of those factors which would allow u~ to predict the
When one attempts to formulate theoretical
initiation and outcome of arms races in the real world.
propositions governing military competition in a
One assumption common to virtually all mathemati-
multipolar international system, the body of literature
cal arms race models is that arms competition is
termed 'balance of power theory' will spring
essentially dyadic. While this assumption was probably
immediately to mind. Of course, the multifaceted
realistic during the period of intense cold war
nature of this loose and often contradictory melange of
competition in the 1950s and 1960s, it is scarcely
hypotheses, axioms, assumptions, exhortations and
adequate to describe either the preceding or
decision rules has become a clich~ 6 s Nevertheless, few
subsequent temporal domains. Before 1945, there is
would quarrel with the assertion that the balance of
scarcely any lengthy period in which the competition
power refers to inter alia a set of interconnected
for military supremacy did not involve at least three
theoretical propositions about the international system
powers, and in recent years, this multipolar situation
which attempt to account for each state's decision to
has arisen once more with the growing strength of
acquire military might. According to this theory, the
* An earlier version of this paper was presented to the International amount of resources a state allocates to defense is
Studies Association, Royal York Hotel, Toronto, February 25-29, viewed as a function of its goals with regard to the
1976.
overall distribution of armed force in the system as a
+As reported in an earlier study 4 there appears to be a very high
correlation between the rate of increase in system wide expenditures
whole, and hence of the parallel goals and allocations
and the amount of war begun in the system in the subsequent five- of the other state members of the system 8. Considering
year period. the significant if not central role of the balance of

Appl. Math. Modelling, 1976, Vol 1, September 83

Arms races and the balance of power." M. D. Wallace
power model in the speculative literature of the
discipline, it would seem reasonable to begin here in
constructing an n-adic arms race model.
Now both opponents and proponents of the balance
of power model may well raise objections to using it as
a starting point for such a mathematical model. Those
who believe the basic concept of the balance of power
to be theoretically weak and empirically misleading 9
would naturally prefer an alternative formulation. To
this, one can ,Only give the scientist's perennial reply:
the relative merits of the balance of power model and
its major rivals (such as Organski's ~power
predominance' model) can only be determined by
comparing (a) their performance vis-gt-vis the real world
data used for validation, and (b) their consequences for
other theoretical propositions and empirical
generalizations for which we have hard evidence. Since
there is, at the moment, very little basis on which to
make such a comparison, it is reasonable to start with
the most popular model.
The proponents of the balance of power model
might put forward two objections. First, it will be
argued that the balance of power is much more than a
theory linking the arms levels of the various state
members of the system. Along with armed might, the
model includes such components as strategy,
diplomacy, war, beliefs, expectations and, above all,
formal and informal military pacts and alliances
a m o n g states 1. To analyse arms levels in isolation,
therefore, lays one open to the charge of misconstruing
the fundamental dynamics of the model.
In reply, the following may be said: when faced with
the problem of modelling a complex system, it is
always a good strategy to select one or m o r e central
components and to examine their behaviour in
isolation, modelling other major components as
parameters or exogenous variables. Attempting to
model everything at once will usually only complicate
the results, making sensitivity testing and empirical
validation far more difficult. On the other hand,
examining the performance of an admittedly
incomplete model in isolation will usually give us
valuable information as to which additional variables
need to be included in the complete model. While
the distribution of armed force is certainly not the sole
focus of the balance of power model, it is
unquestionably the central one; there is a clear
consensus in the literature that all other c o m p o n e n t s of
the model are dependent upon arms levels 1. Thus, it is
reasonable to begin by isolating and examining the
arms level component of the balance of power model.
Subsequent studies in this series will attempt to build
additional components into the model, particularly
those relating to the formation and dissolution of
alliances and the onset and termination of war ~ .
A second objection the balance of power adherents
might raise is that the model was meant to apply to
the Europe of the seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth
centuries; it is difficult to extend its assumptions to
cover the interwar period, let alone the post-war
nuclear world 7. But scholars are far from u n a n i m o u s
on this subject; some, such as Morgenthau, assert the
model's continuing utility even in the c o n t e m p o r a r y
period. However, this very uncertainty highlights one
of the great virtues of mathematical modelling; by
applying the model to three historically sequential
84 Appl. Math. Modelling, 1976, Vol 1, September
arms races, it should be possible to identify precisely
those parameters and structural conditions which have
changed over time, a theoretical result of no small
importance.
Let us now turn to an examination of the key
theoretical assumptions in the proposed model.
Assumptions of the model
Underlying the mathematical model described below
are six key assumptions, all derived from the balance
of power literature. Let us examine them ad seriatim.
First, there must be at least three autonomous
major actors in the system 7. Without at least three
actors, it is argued, military equilibrium will be difficult
or impossible to achieve as the stronger state is
checked by only one potential opponent. Some would
even claim that three actors is too small a number for
a stable balance of power systemS; this is important_as
the actual mathematical model uses only three. Once
again, let me resort to the basic modelling dictum
which counsels simplicity in the early stages of
construction and testing. Whether a three-actor model
can perform satisfactorily remains an open question.
Moreover, the complexity of the model is roughly a
function of N !, where N is the number of actors; thus,
a 5-actor model would be nearly 20 times as complex
as a 3-actor one. It therefore seems wise to limit the
number to three initially. In subsequent versions of the
model, it is hoped to relax this constraint.
Note that it is not necessary that these actors be
single states. In the real world arms races analysed
below, one or more actors are always coalitions of
states. This does not affect the operation of the model
provided we make the auxiliary assumptions (a) that
the coalition if not frangible for the period under
consideration, and (b) that the military strength of the
coalitions can be estimated in the same fashion as that
of a single nation.
A final point to be made here is that it is presumed
no outside actors act to influence armed forces levels
within the subsystem under consideration. While this
assumption will generally be true for the arms races
examined below, any exogenous influences will
adversely affect the fits obtained.
Equilibrium as a goal
The second and in some ways most crucial
assumption is that no actor aspires to unlimited
military growth vis-fi-vis its rivals, nor are any content
to see their coevals grow unchecked. Rather, each state
has as its goal the achievement of what it perceives to
be its optimum share in the distribution of military
capability in the system. It adjusts its additions to (or,
occasionally, deletions from) its own strength to strive
for that share. This does not necessarily imply that the
system will achieve equilibrium as a result; nations'
goals with respect to the global military balance may
be (and in fact usually are) incompatible, leading to a
continuing upward rise in system-wide arms levels as
nations attempt to achieve their objectives at the
expense of others. But if such incompatible goals do
not lead to equilibrium, neither do they necessarily
lead to a runaway arms race except under very special
conditions.

Lack q['domestic' constraints
A third assumption is that external constraints and
pressures represent by far the most important
influences on national decision-making in the military
security field. By comparison, such internal factors as
culture, ideology, economic resources, and public
opinion are relatively unimportant v.
Naturally, it is conceded that such variables do
occasionally impinge on the" policy process; nations
may embark upon a policy of military adventurism for
ideological reasons, or they may refuse to respond to
the adventurism of others as a result of economic or
domestic political constraints. If such a situation
continues for any length of time, the theory predicts
the breakdown of equilibrium, with war and the
possible disappearance of one or more actors
resulting ~. Thus, such domestic variables are regarded
as exogenous constraints to which the state actors must
collectively respond rather than as an inseparable part
of the policy process.
Our model takes account of this assumption in two
ways. First, it assumes no predefined limits to the
amount of economic resources a given actor can
commit for military purposes. Secondly, it assumes
that national goals with regard to the system-wide
distribution of military capability remain constant
throughout each period under consideration; domestic
changes do not lead a nation to either increase or
decrease its aspirations defined in military terms.
While both of these decisions involve considerable
oversimplification, the first has proven easier to live
with than the second. While economic constraints are
vital, they change little over the relatively short time
periods considered in arms race models. As we shall
see, the empirical performance of the model provided
no evidence that such constraints were important in
the short run, and thus their inclusion was deferred to
a later study.
The assumption that national goals remain fixed,
however, is much harder to justify; in particular, we
know that changes in rGgime or the operational code
of decision makers can and do lead nations to aspire
to a more dominant military position. Not
surprisingly, it was discovered that good fits to the
empirical data could not be obtained without taking
this variable into account. Hence, an alternative and
more sophisticated assumption was substituted in later
runs; it was postulated that at certain times (as
determined by a consensus of historians), one or more
actors began to aspire to a greater share of military
power within the system, and sought to increase this
share by devoting more resources to the military
sector. The results of both the simple and the more
complex assumption are compared below.
Commensurability of military strength
A fourth assumption is that each actor possesses a
method of rationally estimating and comparing the
strength of national military forces, and that these
estimates and comparisons are the same for all actors.
In other words, not only are the actors presumed to be
able to compare the might of a British warship with
that of a German:. panzer division, and the efficiency
of a British soldier with that of a Russian, but also
that the actors all agree upon these evaluations. Clearly,
Arms races and the balance of power." M. D. Wallace
objections may be raised to this simplifying
assumption, but in the final analysis its validity can
only be determined by the sensitivity testing to be
carried out in later studies. For now it is enough to
say that the assumption of commensurability is
ubiquitous in the balance of power literaturC.
Adequate in/c~rmation and processing system
A fifth theoretical assumption is that all states have
access to complete and current information regarding
the distribution of military strength, and that no errors
are introduced in processing this information. Of all
the simplifying assumptions of the model, it is this that
will raise the most objections; many of these
reservations are shared by the author. Indeed, some
scholars have gone to great lengths to develop and test
much more sophisticated assumptions a b o u t
information processing 12 and it is worth noting some
of these alternatives.
It is likely that in the real world information will be
subject to delay: even the best intelligence service is
likely to report, not the current situation, but one that
existed many months or years prior. Information may
be incomplete; there may simply exist no good estimate
of effective enemy strength. Indeed, in the nineteenth
century, some nations may not have been entirely
aware of their own armed might, as accounts of
the situation in nineteenth century Russia suggest.
Information is subject to attenuation by random
noise, in both collection and processing, by the
inefficiency of the political and social institutions
involved; military history is cluttered with examples.
Finally, information is subject to systematic bias for
cultural or ideological reasons; the American
experience in Vietnam gives ample evidence of this
process.
Nevertheless, it was decided to assume perfect
information for the same two reasons cited above: first,
the desire to use the balance of power assumptions,
however questionable, as the starting point for the
model; second, to avoid introducing excessive
complexity into the model at an early stage in the
analysis. The wide variety of alternative assumptions
would have presented formidable problems of
validation if they were introduced before the null
behaviour of the model was thoroughly explored. Since
information assumptions are so crucial, follow-up
studies will explore the sensitivity of the model to
changes in information patterns.
First-order sensitivity
The last assumption made in the early runs is that
only current armed strength is to be considered.
Projections based on the rate of increase of an
opponent's strength (first derivative) or on its
acceleration (second derivative) were not considered.
The reasoning here was two-fold. As always, the major
concern was to begin with the simplest possible
assumptions; in later studies, we intend to introduce
higher-order sensitivity into the model. Moreover, the
necessary data to validate models containing rates of
increase or acceleration are not yet available;
observations a year apart will scarcely give us
adequate estimates of rate of increase, let alone
acceleration.
Appl. Math. Modelling, 1976, Vol 1, September 85
Arms races and the balance of power." M. D. Wallace
Having specified the verbal assumptions of the
model, let us now turn to its quantitative specification.
The mathematical model
As noted above, our model presupposes three
autonomous actors; since the same basic assumptions,
structures and processes are assumed to be c o m m o n to
all three, only the equations for the first actor
will be explained. The corresponding equations for the
other two may be obtained by altering the appropriate
subscripts. The model as run in the computer consists
of all three sets of equations.
For each of the three actors, we postulate the basic
variable to be its actual armed strength. These
variables are unique in that they do not vary
instantaneously; a nation's armed strength is the result
of accumulation, i.e. it is assumed to begin at the
predetermined level and is incremented and
decremented over time as the result of the processes
that take place within the model. Thus, we treat armed
forces as possessing a certain inertia; they do not
appear and disappear instantaneously, but are built up
and demobilized over periods of time. In a parallel
fashion, capital purchases for armed forces (including
such things as ships, aircraft, etc.) are amortized and
depreciated over relatively long periods.
The concept of military strength as an over-time
accumulation suggests the use of integral rather than
differential equations. By proceeding in this direction
we are following in the footsteps of the biological and
operations research modellers, who use integral
equations to describe any process which involves
quantities persisting over a period of time 13. In this
fashion we may write the basic question for the first
nation's arms level as:
ARM1 = ARMI1C + (RTAM1 - ARMDP1)dt
(1)
In other words, a nation's current forces level is a
function of a specified starting level augmented over
time by such increases as the nation decides to make,
and decremented by natural attrition and depreciation.
In time of war this attrition is far greater, but in this
early version of the model we are not attempting to
account for variations in arms strength during major
wars. For now we assume that this attrition factor is
directly proportional to the actual arms level, viz.:
ARMDP1 = ARM1. DPC1 (2)
The equation for the rate of augmentation is slightly
more complex. The entire equation is:
RTAM1 = MNC1 + DAL1.MNM1 (3)
where M N C 1 = the 'upkeep constant'; D A L 1 = desired
arms level and M N M 1 = the 'catch-up constant', i.e.
the rate at which a nation moves from where it is to
where it would like to be in terms of armed forces
strength. M N C 1 represents that portion of armed
forces strength which is generated solely for reasons
internal to the actor concerned. One may consider this
either as the "idling speed' of a nation's military
production machine, or as simple upkeep.
Now M N C 1 is in turn proportional to A R M 1 , i.e.
86 Appl. Math. Modelling, 1976, Vol 1, September
rate of a nation's internally generated production is
assumed to be a constant function of its total strength,
viz.:
MNC1 = ARM1 . MCON1 (4)
In practice we set M C O N < D P C O N , so that unless a
nation is driven by a perceived security need from
outside, over time its forces level will gradually decline.
This would appear to be reasonable given the
economic and political cost of maintaining a military
establishment, but of course, it is not the only possible
assumption. We could have decided that internal
imperatives might mandate an additional increase, for
example, because of the existence of a 'military
industrial complex'. But even those who make the
existence of such a military industrial establishment a
major part of their explanation of increases in
armaments do not divorce it from the presence of a
perceived outside threat; on the contrary, they
typically insist that a large part of the domestic
political power of such establishments is their ability to
capitalize on the increases in the military might of
other actors 14. At all events, it was quickly determined
in early runs that none of the three data series could
be fitted to the model regardless of the values of the
other parameters if we assumed M C O N > D P C O N .
In the model M N M 1 = M N M 2 = M N M 3 , i.e. it is
assumed that each actor will "catch up' to its currently
desired armed forces strength in a fixed number of
years. Two points should be made here. First, it could
be argued that this parameter should vary from nation
to nation according to some estimate of their relative
military and industrial efficiency. Secondly, it will be
argued that it should also vary over time as the
potential for social mobilization and industrial
efficiency improves. We have decided to leave these
refinements for follow-up studies, as good fits could be
obtained by allowing it to remain constant. At all
events, equally persuasive counter-arguments could be
made that it should be varied in the opposite fashion.
First, while the resources that permit a nation to catch
up militarily are, of course, greater in later periods, so
too is the absolute magnitude of the catching up to be
done, as the reader may determine from inspection of
the empirical data. Secondly, it could be argued that
the M N M parameters should be reduced for the later
periods when the D A L variable is a larger proportion
of A R M , since in such cases there is a greater
incremental drain on a nation's resources. Such a
modification might be made along the lines of
Caspary's concept of 'diminishing returns'IS. Given the
existence of an equally persuasive case for varying the
M N M parameter in opposite directions, we felt that it
would be best to leave it fixed until we could justify its
modification in light of the actual performance of the
model.
This brings us to D A L 1 , one of the most crucial
variables in the model. Verbally, D A L 1 may be defined
as the first nation's perceived ideal arms level given its
perception of the existing balance between its own
forces and those ranged against it. In equation form,
we may write:
DAL1 = DSUPMI.(NARM2 + N A R M 3 --
NARM1) (5)

where D S U P M 1 stands for the acceptable ratio of
opposing armed forces vis-~-vis one's own, and
N A R M 1 - 3 represent the perceived armed forces
strength of the three nations in the model.
The verbal meaning of the D S U P M variables may
be stated as follows: where D S U P M is relatively small,
a nation accepts a position of relative military
inferiority vis-gz-vis its opponents; where it is large, that
state insists upon parity, or even superiority, in the
perceived military balance.
While this parameter is crucial to the "fine tuning' of
the model, there unfortunately exists little or no hard
evidence to aid the modeller in determining its precise
values. However, historical sources allow us to
reconstruct a fairly consistent rank ordering of the
D S U P M values for given periods of time, and other
evidence (such as Britain's "two power standard"
regarding naval strength) guides us to rough estimates
of at least some of the ratios from which we could
begin sensitivity testing. In practice, it was discovered
that the model is extremely sensitive to the values of
these parameters; regardless of the values used for the
other parameters, only a very narrow range of the
D S U P M values will produce even an approximate fit
for any given time period. In every case, the values
used were roughly in accord with intuitive expectations
except as noted below.
The final term in the D A L 1 equation, N A R M 1 , is
mandated by the balance of power assumptions
outlined in the previous section. As noted there,
absolute forces levels (however measured) do not
necessarily accord with perceptions of military threat.
To derive such threat perceptions, we must attenuate
the arms levels data by c o m m o n estimates of relative
military efficiency, for example, that a British soldier
was worth so m a n y Russians in the field, or that a
dollar spent by China would buy proportionally ~more
army' than the same dollar spent in the USA. Once
again, using historical sources, we defined a 'military
efficiency' parameter such that:
NARM1 = A R M I M I L E F 1 (6)
N o w the values of this parameter are also difficult to
determine precisely. However, we discovered the model
to be reasonably tolerant of variations in the M I L E F
values provided that their rank order was not
permuted. In every case good fits could be obtained
using intuitively reasonable estimates. Having specified
the model mathematically, let us now turn to an
examination of its empirical performance.
Validating the model: three historical arms races
To validate the model presented here, we have
examined its performance in simulating three historical
great power arms races: (a) the great power arms race
from 1870 to 1913 which culminated in World War I;
(b) the arms race in Europe from 1925 to 1939 prior to
World W a r II; and (c) the global arms race between
China, N A T O and the Warsaw Pact from 1952 to
1973.
There were three reasons for choosing these
particular arms races. First of all, they are of greater
contemporary salience and historical importance than
smaller regional arms competitions. Second, in each
case, arms competition is almost exclusively
Arms races and the balance of power." M. D. Wa//ace
endogenous to the system under consideration; i.e. the
actors were scarcely concerned with the arms levels of
actors other than those being modelled. Thirdly, the
data on armed forces levels for the actors in these arms
races are readily available and of high quality.
Pre-World War I arms race. We have considered the
pre-World War l arms race as starting in 1870 with
the termination of the Franco-Prussian war, and
ending in 1913, the last year before World War I. It
might be argued that this arms race does not really
begin until the 1890s with the formation of the
German-Austrian and Franco-Russian alliances. We
reasoned, however, that the course of military
competition in Europe prior to World W a r I was
largely determined in 1870 as a consequence of the
French defeat in the Franco-Prussian war and the
resulting enmity between those two powers; it is from
this fixed point that post-1870 European alignments
were drawn.
It was mentioned earlier that the need to limit
ourselves to three independent actors in the simulation
compels us to aggregate nations into formal and
informal coalitions, and to view the armed forces levels
of these coalitions as single quantities. For the pre-
World War l period, we consider France and Russia as
a single actor, likewise G e r m a n y and Austria-Hungary,
leaving Britain as a separate actor on its own. (Italy we
omit as being of little military significance.) This
decision was a compromise, since obviously these
alliances did not begin until well after 1870. Moreover,
during the early 1870s, Germany, A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y
and Russia were united in a loose and often
quarrelsome alliance known as the Dreikaiserbund.
However, this alliance broke apart quickly after the
Congress of Berlin, and the informal alignments of
European powers locked quite rapidly into their World
War I configuration consisting of France and Russia
on one side, and Germany and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y on
the other.
Britain is retained as a separate actor for two
obvious reasons: first, during most of the period under
consideration, Britain felt to be and acted as the
European 'balancer', standing somewhat aloof from the
continental alignment patterns. Secondly, even during
the period when Britain began to move closer to
Europe, her formal alliance commitments were never
as firm as those of the French and Russians to one
another.
Thus, in this simulation, Actor 1 will be the UK,
Actor 2 will be France together with Russia (hereafter
the 'Entente') and Actor 3 will be Germany together
with Austria-Hungary (the "Alliance'). Let us now
examine the assumptions we make about the goals and
perceptions of the actors in the course of the
simulation.
First, it is assumed that M I L E F 1 > M I L E F 3 >
M I L E F 2 . This would appear to be reasonable, for
most historians acknowledge that the British armed
forces performed more effectively man for man than
any in Europe. Second in this respect was the Alliance,
since the relative inefficiency of the Austrian army was
matched and overmatched by the legendary efficiency
of the Prussian military machine. At the bottom is the
Entente, since the French army did not show itself to
advantage by comparison with the German, and the
inefficiency of the Russian army was legion.
Appl. Math. Modelling, 1976, Vol 1, September 87
Arms races and the balance of power. M. D. Wallace

2200 D S U P M 1 and D S U P M 2 parameters. In Figure 2 we

see the results when we increase the D S U P M
parameters in 1904. The fit is somewhat better for both
~o 18OO ~.g~ I
the Alliance and the Entente, but still noticeably
X
underestimates the actual values except for the last two
.~ 14OO ............. .... years. This would suggest that neither the
Russo-Japanese war nor the Anglo-French treaty are
solely responsible for the errors in our results.
I000 Alliance .j
However, there is another possibility, beginning in
1899 and continuing until 1902, British and German
6oo representatives exchanged views on the possibility of a
Britain j~. .............. .,r/2 defensive alliance between their two countries. Needless
to say, these discussions alarmed the Entente powers,
200 ''~:":~-':'~'~-'~'~'''~ ........ ~1,, ;,, , , I ,~
1870 1880 1890 1900 1910
leading them to strengthen their military posture. If we
Time (years) simulate this shift by increasing D S U P M 2 in 1899, we
obtain the results displayed in Figure 3. The fit is
Figure I Real vs. simulated data for the pre-World War arms improved for both Britain and the Alliance, as well as
race, 1870-1 91 3 Constant DSUPM values ....... Simulated data;
for the Entente up until 1909. After 1910, however, the
real data
model sharply overestimates Entente strength. In
mitigation, it might be added that if one projects the
It is also assumed that D S U P M 3 > D S U P M 2 >
results ahead one year further, the gap closes sharply
D S U P M I : in other words, that the Alliance aspired to
as all powers begin to mobilize, leading the actual and
a greater share of system-wide military strength than
simulate values to converge once again.
the Entente and that both exceeded Britain in this
respect. Once again, this seems to accord with the 2200[
dominant view of historians.
If we compare the results of the simulation run with
the actual data for armed forces levels in Europe for
the 1870-1913 period*, the results are mixed (Figure I). 18001 Entente / ,.,
For the UK, the fit is reasonably good. From 1870 to
1899 the model somewhat overestimates the real values, >~ 1 4 0 0 ...... .,, '"...... ""
up to a maximum of 200/o in 1899. In the following
decade, the model successively under- and over-
Iooo
estimates the actual values up to about the same
maximum, arriving at a reasonably accurate estimate
for the final prewar years. For the Alliance, the model 600 ..... ' ~
generally underestimates the actual values, with the Britain /]~x . . . . . . . . . "/~
maximum percentage deviations occurring in 1894 and
1913. For the Entente, the fit is not good at all; the 2 0 0 t ~ , . ~ ; ~ .... ;,,I".',', ..... , ......... ~ ,,
1870 1880 1890 19OO 1910
real values fluctuate quite markedly about the
Time (years)
simulated ones, diverging quite sharply upward
beginning in 1904. Figure2 Real vs. simulated data for the pre-World War I arms
race, 1870-1913: DSUPM1, 2 increased in 1904 . . . . simulated
This last result suggests that some important data,--., real data
assumption in our model breaks down shortly after the
turn of the century. Two possibilities present
themselves. First, in 1904 Russia begins a major war
with Japan, introducing an external influence on the
size of the Entente's armed forces. Second, at about the
same time, European diplomats, for various reasons 2200 . * "' " * i
began to regard G e r m a n military might with far
greater suspicion than heretofore. Indications of these mo 1 8 o c
new fears are to be found in the Anglo-French X

agreement of 1904 and the growing naval arms race

between England and Germany beginning about 1900. ~4oc
Historians argue that these shifting perceptions of
German intentions led both England and the Entente
powers to attempt to alter the balance of military
advantage in their favour.
ooc
V
To take account of this in our model, we reran the 600 ~ ........
simulation with the addition of a time switch to the Britain ~.,.,,-~.~"f

* The empirical values used here and for the interwar arms race
represent the number of regular military personnel for each actor. 1870 1880 1890 1900 Ig I0
The data were compiled by the Correlates of War Project under the Time (years)
direction of J. David Singer at the University of Michigan. For the
Cold War arms race, the data on military expenditures in constant Figure 3 Real vs simulated data for the pre-World War t arms
dollars compiled by the Swedish International Peace Research race, 1870-1913; DSUPM2 increased in 1899 . . . . Simulated
Institute were used. data, : real data

88 Appl. Math. Modelling, 1976, Vol 1, September

 Arms races and the balance of power," M. D. Wa//ace

Interwar arms race. The second arms race we model
is that occurring in the interwar period. O u r starting
point for this simulation is 1925, by which time the
postwar fluctuations have dampened down, and the
European military balance has more or less stabilized.
For this period our three actors are the U K France
coalition, the G e r m a n - I t a l i a n coalition and Soviet
Union. It was reasoned that after the First World War,
the interests of the United Kingdom and France with
regard to the European balance were essentially
inseparable. By this time, as well, the G e r m a n s and
Italians were the two 'revisionist' powers of Western
Europe. The Soviet Union was also a revisionist
power, but it remained essentially isolated from the
rest of Europe at this time despite its tentative
approaches to Germany. For this arms race we set the
parameters within the model as follows: First,
M I L E F 2 > M I L E F 1 > M I L E F 3 . This seems to accord
with historical accounts which stress the G e r m a n
advantage in military efficiency over both UK and
France and the tremendous inefficiency and
disorganization in the Soviet armed forces as a
consequence of p o o r equipment, inadequate training
and continual political purges in the officer corps. We
also set D S U P M 1 > D S U P M 2 > D S U P M 3 ; in other
words, U K and France together claimed a larger share
of total European armed strength than the
German Italian coalition which, in turn, aspired to a
level of armed strength greater than that claimed by
the Soviet Union.
Running the model with the parameters set in this
fashion, we obtain the results portrayed in Figure 4. It
is readily apparent that the situation similar to the one
observed for the pre-World War I arms race obtains,
but in a far more extreme fashion. The fit is very good
from 1925 to 1933 for all actors, but after that date the
actual arms levels diverge sharply upwards from the
simulation results.
Little knowledge of history is required to
the end of the Korean conflict. The three actors in this
arms race are the N A T O block, the Warsaw Pact, and
China. In this case, a few would question that the
N A T O allies and the Warsaw pact constitute
infrangible coalitions for military purposes. Some
might question the inclusion of China, as it was not a
nuclear power until quite late in this period, nor was it
ever the true military equal of the USA or the Soviet
Union. However, its performance in 'tLe Korean
conflict, its participation in military conf:onmtions
with both of the other powers, and its growing
influence in world affairs combine to mandate its
inclusion. I11 this case, we set M I L E F 1 > M I L E F 2 >
M I L E F 3 . In other words, we assume that the
American armed forces are more efficient than Soviets'
which, in turn, are more efficient than the Chinese.
This would appear to accord well with the estimates of
military commentators. We also set D S U P M 2 >
D S U P M 1 > D S U P M 3 . In other words, we assume
that the USA was, throughout the period, attempting
merely to maintain military hegemony, that the Soviet
Union was strongly challenging this hegemony, and
a
900
70C
b
IOOC
/
800
%
600 L
X

understand why. In 1933, Adolf Hitler came to power >

in Germany and began a massive rearmament *d ~._.....~{..~ . :; .......~, . . ~ , , ,,,. ,,.......,........
g 400
programme. Correctly fearing his intentions, UK, C

/
France, and the Soviet Union all responded in kind,
leading to a situation in which all major powers strove O

to better their military position. To incorporate this

15OC
change to our model, we included a time switch to
alter the D S U P M values for all three actors in 1933.
D S U P M 2 is increased by almost an order of ;300 r
magnitude, on the assumption that the G e r m a n
repudiation of the Versailles Treaty and subsequent /
rearmament policy represented a drive for military
hegemony within the European system. Corresponding
but lesser increases were made in D S U P M I and
D S U P M 3 , indicating increasing concern on the part of
,,o4
900
/
the UK, France and the Soviet Union regarding
German intentions, and a growing concern to maintain
/
collective militaw parity. The rank order of these 70(
values becomes D S U P M 2 >> D S U P M 3 > D S U P M I .
When we re-run the simulation changing the
5001 i I * ~ I I i ; i I i
parameter values in this fashion at the time 1925 1930 1935
corresponding to the year 1933, we obtain the results
shown in Figure 5. The fit is quite strikingly improved, Time (years)
and indeed m a y be considered quite good for such a
p-~'eliminary incomplete model. Figure4 ReaIvs simulated data for the interwar arms race.
1925- 39. constant DSUPM values ........ Simulated data:
Cold war arms race. The third arms race we model real data (a) Britain and France: (b) Germany and Italy,
is that occurring during the cold war period following (c) USSR

Appl. Math. M o d e l l i n g , 1976, Vol 1, September 89

Arms races a n d the balance of power." M. D. Wallace

the source of the deviation can be readily identified:

the Vietnam war drastically increased US military
900 spending from 1965 to 1970. It is relatively easy to
take account of this in the model: D S U P M 1 is
increased for the 1965-70 period, so that D S U P M 1 >
700 D S U P M 2 > D S U P M 3 . With these new parameters, we
b obtain the results portrayed in Figure 7. The fit for
NATO is improved somewhat, if we judge by the
average deviation; however, it still fails to account
I000 adequately for the sharp increase in spending in 1965,
nor does it fall off rapidly enough after 1970.

800 a
~ I100
"ff oO
x
0 x9OO
600 O,
7O0 I I ~ l b l l l

/
eo b
400 O
C x

/
u 700
O

1500 / 0 500

3O0
~3o( rC

I lOC /#......." / OIO00

aooi
i
....... *
.~- .....

90( o 600F
,I .......
~ .~-. ""~'"

o-. 4 0 0 ~. ....... ".....

700 /"/
200F~,-~ t ~-~,~,F-, . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1952 1955 1960 1965 1970
..... ~.......* .........'.......~ ...... t(....... ,',""~ ........
Time (years)
500 ' . . . . ' ' ' ' ' ' '
1925 1930 1935 Figure6 Real vs simulated data for the cold war arms race.
1952-73: constant D S U P M values . .. Simulated data:
Time (years) real d a t a (a) NATO: (b) Warsaw Pact, (c) China
F/gure5 Realvs simulated data for the interwar arms race
1925-39. DSUPM values increased in 1 9 3 ~ , Simulated
data; -; real data (a) Britain and France; (b) Germany and
b llO0
Italy; (c) USSR
90o
that China did not seriously attempt to catch up with O,
either. 7 0 0 b' '~ ' ' '7"i~ r- ~ , C , . . . . . . .
Setting the parameters in this fashion, we obtain the
results displayed in Figure 6. Overall, the fits are not x

nearly as good as those obtained for the other two _o 7OO

...~-

arms races. The simulation results predict the real "o

values for NATO with reasonable accuracy, except for O
I-,- 5O0
the 1965-70 period. However, they seriously
overestimate the arms levels for China throughout the 3OO
C
period, and to a lesser extent for the Soviet Union
from 1952 to 1967. Once again, it is evident that some ~C)_ I000 ..~,...
factor or factors have been taken into consideration in x
..~.-

the model. _a 8 O C
One likely cause of the deviations for the % ...w...-x"

Communist states has to do with domestic constraints; o 6OC .x- " ~ " ~

many scholars have suggested that neither power has, o,_

since World War II, allocated the maximum possible 4OC
resources to the military sector, preferring instead to
concentrate on domestic reconstruction and 2O0
1952 1955
1960 1965 1970
development. It was felt, however, that these domestic Time (years)
factors would be nearly impossible to incorporate into Figure 7 Real vs. simulated data for the cotd war arms race
the model at this stage. 1 9 5 2 - 7 3 DSUPMincreased 1 9 6 5 - 7 0 ....... Simulated data,
N A T O was another matter, however. Once again, real data (a) NATO; (b) Warsaw Pact, (c) China

90 Appl. Math. Modelling, 1976, V o l 1, S e p t e m b e r


Overall, then, we must conclude that the balance-of-
power model, at least in incomplete formulation
presented here, is not very useful in accounting for the
cold war arms race, at least by comparison with the
rather good fits obtained for the pre-World War I and
interwar arrns races.
Improving the performance of the model
The results of the partial validation of the model
presented above may be summarized as follows. For
the pre-World War I arms race, reasonably good fits
were obtained once D S U P M 2 was increased in 1899.
With the intel~'ar arms race, an excellent fit was
obtained when the D S U P M values were increased
beginning in 1933. However, for the Cold War arms
race the fits must be considered mediocre at best,
regardless of the D S U P M values employed. What do
these results tell us about the model?
Before we proceed further, one important caveat
should be entered. As Busch 2 has noted, the relative
paucity of high quality arms level data virtually
precludes the complete empirical validation of complex
mathematical arms race models at this stage in the
development of our knowledge. Clearly, when one has
as few as 14 data points, a number of quite different
models can generate good empirical fits. Consequently,
the curve-fitting operation described above can only be
considered at best a partial validation of the model.
The slippage between the real and the simulate data
may be accounted for in three ways. First, and most
obviously, there may very well be errors in the real
data themselves. This is especially true for the Russian
and Chinese data as their respective sources make
clear. Secondly, recall that the model presented here in
no sense represents a complete representation of the
balance of power theory. We have omitted inter alia the
effects of shifts in alignment patterns and changes in
arms levels owing to war. Finally, as noted above,
shifts in domestic constraints and pressures have not
been incorporated into the model proper. Their
absence is particularly noticeable in the Cold W a r
arms race: for example, most Chinese historians would
argue that the domestic turbulence associated with the
collectivization programme, the "100 Flowers'
campaign, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural
Revolution, all combine to attenuate the Chinese
response to external stimuli.
The last two explanations suggest two alternative
strategies that might be used to improve the model.
On the one hand, one might incorporate into a new
version those domestic, political, economic and social
processes which affect the decision to allocate resources
to the military sector. An interesting example of a
model of this type was constructed by Porat and
Martin 16. They have constructed a large, complex
mode! which takes into account demography, health
care, food and agriculture, education, labour, industry,
energy, capital allocation and urbanization as factors
influencing international behaviour. However, this
strategy has two main pitfalls. First, as the Porat and
Martin model amply illustrates, the introduction of
domestic constraints would result in a model more
complex by many orders of magnitude. Their World
IV model consists of no less than 236 equations,
containing over 1000 variables. To undertake such a
Arms races and the balance of power." M. D. Wallace
task at this early stage in the development of our
knowledge seems almost foolhardy. Moreover, even if
such a model were to be constrticted, there would be
virtually no way of validating it; it would be virtually
impossible to determine what structural feature, or
which parameter, was responsible for a given result. Of
course, modelling domestic constraints need not
involve such enormous complexity; a good example of
a compromise strategy might be the Brunner and
Brewer model of national voting patterns 17. But even
this more modest approach would involve at least a
doubling of the model's complexity; for this reason, it
would seem preferable to leave such refinements until
after the balance of power model proper has been fully
systematized and tested.
This leads us to the second possible strategy:
expanding the existing model to incorporate more of
the variables, assumptions and theoretical propositions
contained in balance of power theory. This strategy
has two main attractive features. First, the variables to
be included, e.g. alliance patterns and war onset and
termination, are highly salient to the international
politics scholar. Indeed, as the goal of arms race
studies is a better understanding of the processes which
lead to the onset of war, the inclusion of such variables
is intrinsically desirable. A second reason for
proceeding in this direction is that alliances and wars
can probably be included as endogenous variables
within the model with far less complication than in the
case of domestic constraints; as will be shown in later
studies, balance of power theory itself provides us with
a set of rather simple propositions linking arms levels
alliances, and war. Finally, the data on these variables
are readily available; the Correlates of W a r Project, for
example, has already compiled much of what would be
needed. For all these reasons, further studies in this
series will attempt to construct a more complete model
of the balance of power as it operated between and
amongst the major powers in the global system.
Policy relevance
Given that the model presented above is in a relatively
early stage of development, it might seem presumptuous
to suggest that it has any immediate relevance for
public policy. However, as this author has often
argued, world politics scholars have generally been far
too reticent in drawing the implications of their
findings for policy purposes; type II errors are surely
at least as dangerous as type 1 when the subject matter
is war and peace. Let us compromise between
brashness and timidity and confine ourselves to one
small but frightening implication of what has been
presented here.
A central feature of both the pre-World War I and
interwar arms races was the existence of a sharp
upward bend (positive second derivative) in arms levels
for the period immediately prior to the onset of a
major war. Of course, one must be careful of imputing
causality here. To some extent the relationship is
probably spurious; the tensions that ultimately resulted
in a war no doubt also produced an increased rate of
a r m a m e n t construction. Nevertheless, historical
accounts do suggest that a certain portion of the pre-
war fears and tensions were generated by the self-
accelerating arms spiral itself. This finding is reinforced
Appl. Math. Modelling, 1976, Vol 1, September 91
Arms races and the balance of power. M. D. Wallace
by a n early study u n d e r t a k e n by Wallace 4, which
f o u n d a strong statistical relationship between the rate
of increase in a r m a m e n t s spending a n d the a m o u n t of
war b e g u n in the s u b s e q u e n t five-year period, even
when the influences of m a n y other factors were
controlled.
It is therefore particularly a l a r m i n g to note the
trend of the current superpower arms race which
c o n t i n u e s apace despite the existing S A L T agreements
a n d the current SALT II negotiations. Both the USA
a n d the Soviet U n i o n are p l a n n i n g m a j o r new strategic
arms acquisitions of a m a g n i t u d e which almost
overshadows even existing arsenals. W h e t h e r we
measure these by m e a n s of arms expenditures, the
n u m b e r of nuclear warheads, or the total m e g a t o n n a g e
of nuclear explosives involved, the curves for both
powers projected to 1980 a n d b e y o n d exhibit precisely
the same sort of sharp u p w a r d bend discovered in 1899
a n d 1933. W i t h o u t wishing to make too much of the
parallel, one c a n n o t avoid being somewhat alarmed.
F o r t u n a t e l y , the die has n o t yet been cast; there is still
time to draw back from the abyss.
Acknowledgements
The a u t h o r wishes to t h a n k the D o n n e r C a n a d a
F o u n d a t i o n for its grant in s u p p o r t of this research.
92 Appl. Math. Modelling, 1976, Vol 1, September
The indefatigable assistance a n d good h u m o u r of Ms.
D i a n a Leigh Browne is gratefully acknowledged.
References
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. Quadrangle Press, Chicago, 1960
2 Busch,P. A. in "What Price Vigilance?', (Ed. B. M. Russett),
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970
3 Chatterjee,P., J. Peace Res. 1974, 11, (3) 203
4 Wallace,M. D in 'Peace, War, and Numbers', (Ed. B. M.
Russett), Sage Press, Beverly Hills, 1972
5 Rapoport, A. J. Conflict Res. 1957, 1,249
6 Haas,E. B. World Politics 1953, 5, 442
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University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1956
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10 Claude,I. L. "Power and International Relations', Random
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1975
12 Bremer,S. Ph.D. Dissertation Michigan State University
(1970)
13 Forrester,J. W. "Principles of Systems', Wright-Allen Press,
Cambridge, Mass., 1968
14 Singer,J. D. in 'The Nature of Human Conflict', (Ed. E. B.
McNeil), Prentice-Hall, Toronto, 1965
15 Caspary,W. R. Int. Stud. Q. 1967, 11, 1
16 Porat, M. U. and Martin, W. Stanford J. Int. Stud. 1974, 9, 71
17 Brunner, R. D. and Brewer, G. D. 'Organized Complexity',
The Free Press, New York, 1971