SPECPRO| RULE 73| 1

G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973 It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having
yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners, requisite publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been
vs. complied with. Moreover, copies of the petition have not been
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL served on all of the heirs specified in the basic petition for the
CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, issuance of letters of administration. 2
CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO
GONZALEZ, respondents. In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the
Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the
TEEHANKEE, J.: court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the
deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in
her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
testament. The said proceeding was docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.
G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964, and its subsequent
Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration. Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss,
dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of
The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:
Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court
issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to
On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on
Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their the petition for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and
two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco." 3 Such order of the Cebu
Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and court deferring to the probateproceedings in the Quezon City court was neither
by his children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the
Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Cebu court nor did they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition
Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and proceedings in the appellate courts.
residing in Cebu.
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator) 1 respondent Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964, opposing probate of the will and assailing the
Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of first jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for
instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other things, that the probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the
late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc.
of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal properties in No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed
Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
the petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all
the heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss,
LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.
giving as a principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an
intestate proceeding." 4 The said court further found in said order that
The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y
modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order
to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu court. On the same follows:
date, a third order was further issued stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's
petition for the appointment of a special administrator dated 4 March 1964 was
On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the
not yet ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as reasons the
opposition and motion to dismiss reads as follows: "that since the
following:
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 2

decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of (a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by
Cebu at the time of his death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa law;
Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not filed with the proper
Court (wrong venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of (b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure
Rule 73 of the New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted and influence on the part of the beneficiary or some other
allegation, the Court is made to understand that the oppositors persons for his benefit;
do not mean to say that the decedent being a resident of Cebu
City when he died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should
(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or
prevail over the probate proceedings in Quezon City, because as
that the testator acted by mistake and did not intend that the
stated above the probate of the will should take precedence, but
instrument he signed should be his will at the time he affixed his
that the probate proceedings should be filed in the Cebu City
signature thereto. 6
Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of the
oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also be
entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of
probate of the will indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the hearing had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had been duly
the time of his death was a resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the three
Margal. Annex A (Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty. Florencio Albino,
Cuenco) of the petition for probate of the will shows that the Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty.
decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and the documentary
stated that he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates, income tax return,
Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all indicating that the decedent was a
his first choice and the latter as his second choice of residence." resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also affirmed by him in his last
If a party has two residences, the one will be deemed or will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to
presumed to his domicile which he himself selects or considers to probate the late senator's last will and testament as having been "freely and
be his home or which appears to be the center of his affairs. The voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and
petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before this Court, appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate without bond "following the
follows the first choice of residence of the decedent and once this desire of the testator" in his will as probated.
court acquires jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is to the
exclusion of all others. 5 Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to
probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with
court's said order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the
probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27 April Rizal court from proceeding with case No. Q-7898.
1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was
likewise denied. On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of
respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding that:
On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for
probate of the last will of the decedent was called three times at half-hour Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the
intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors appeared settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing in their covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R
absence. of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that court whose
jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is that
As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual
court noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid
opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 3

will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate
at the time of his death. court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court
ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testateproceedings
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its
the Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said admission to probate of the decedent's last will and testament and appointing
court must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance with the
in which the petition for probate was filed by the respondent testator's express wish in his testament. This issue is tied up with the issue
Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898). The said submitted to the appellate court, to wit, whether the Quezon City court acted
respondent should assert her rights within the framework of the without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and
proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it, in
another court. pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 expressly consenting in
deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings that it (the
Quezon City court) should first act "on the petition for probate of the document
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13,
purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus
1964, Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc.
Cuenco" - which order of the Cebu court respondents never questioned nor
2433-R, stated that the petition for appointment of special
challenged by prohibition or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon
administrator was "not yet ready for the consideration of the
City court to proceed without any impediment or obstruction, once it denied
Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon,
respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate proceeding for
it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this
alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, toproceed with the hearing of the
proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in this connection that
petition and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its due
the said judge was certainly not referring to the court's
execution and authenticity.
jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is
acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but only to
the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law
proceedings. At all events, jurisdiction is conferred and in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding
determined by law and does not depend on the pronouncements with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and
of a trial judge. actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's last will and
testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond
pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish, for the following
The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as
considerations:
follows:

1. The Judiciary Act 7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding
First Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates."
and directing the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal,
On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of
Branch IX, Quezon City, and the respondent Judge Damaso B.
venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict
Tengco to refrain perpetually from proceeding and taking any
among the different courts which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction
action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said
from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the
respondent court. All orders heretofore issued and actions
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
heretofore taken by said respondent court and respondent Judge,
of all other courts." The cited Rule provides:
therein and connected therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of
injunction heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No
pronouncement as to costs. Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition for review
Court of First Instance in the Province in which he resides at the
on certiorari.
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,

the Court of First Instance of the province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence, of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested
in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record. (Rule 73) 8
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his
estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely
of venue. This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa vs. Co It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with
Ho 9 as follows: whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in
probate cases the place of residence of the deceased is regarded
as a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we
decline to follow this view because of its mischievous
consequences. For instance, a probate case has been submitted
in good faith to the Court of First Instance of a province where
the deceased had not resided. All the parties, however, including
all the creditors, have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the court and the case is therein completely finished except for a
claim of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said court but
on appeal from an adverse decision raises for the first time in this
Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of
residence of the deceased in the province. If we consider such
question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial
court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole
proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents
which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same
case will have to be commenced anew before another court of
the same rank in another province. That this is of mischievous
effect in the prompt administration of justice is too obvious to
require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No.
48206, December 31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act No.
190, 10 providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be
settled in the province where he had last resided, could not have
been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court
over the subject-matter, because such legal provision is
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural
matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is one
thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.
(Attorney-General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.)
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 4
The law of jurisdiction Act No. 136, 11 Section 56, No. 5
confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate
cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased.
Since, however, there are many courts of First Instance in the
Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes
the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus,
the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter but merely of venue. And it is
upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province
where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly
called "venue".
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estateof a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule since it deals with venue and comity between courts
of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction indicates that the court with whom the
petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the
estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the
decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent
obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and
their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it
stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to
take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and
instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of
the decedent's alleged last will.
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a
motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in
abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City
court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in
the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the
Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of
Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and
improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the
exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu court left
it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the parties whether
the decedent's residence at the time of his death was in Quezon City where he

had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by respondents.
The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of
the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City
court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition
and the residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of
the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition
since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over
the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other
courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this
rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at case, the Quezon City court) although opining that certain considerations therein
least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it
and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the
Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue
of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City
court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled
hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the
appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the
decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in
accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
12 13
Occidental with facts analogous to the present case is authority against
respondent appellate court's questioned decision.
In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings
over intestate proceedings in this wise:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect
the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in
accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance
with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in
accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 5
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of
intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is
found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the
probate of the latter should replace the intestate
proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already
been appointed, the latter being required to render final account
and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor
subsequently appointed. This however, is understood to be
without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or
is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As
already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for
the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 14
"would seem to support the view that [therein respondent] should have
submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, [in this case, the Cebu court]
either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said
purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344," 15 thus:
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to
the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with
the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that
the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it
was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely
a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the
opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to raise
such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is
enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the
existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since
December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to
the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that
petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence
(presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the
filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since
August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for
the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these
notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with
the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus
motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and
annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date;

thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an
administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to
probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on
October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of
jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and
the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No.
51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must
be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul
proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was
not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have
the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar
jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the
objection against said proceedings is raised too late. 16
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City
court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the
will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City
was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and
domicile therein with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court
could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The
last paragraph of said Rule expressly provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want
of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record" could probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of the
Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had the
record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition
before it and assumed jurisdiction.
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late
senator, the appellate court while recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one"
held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that.
... The issue of residence comes within the competence of
whichever court is considered to prevail in the exercise
jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of First Instance of Cebu as
held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that the question of
the residence of the deceased is a serious one, requiring both
factual and legal resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 6
submitted in the ordinary course of procedure in the first
instance, particularly in view of the fact that the deceased was
better known as the Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to
be his also gives Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his residence. We
reiterate that this matter requires airing in the proper court, as
so indicated in the leading and controlling case of Borja vs. Hon.
Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.
In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of
the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings
filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to
determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and
testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings,
Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for
both courts at the behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu
court that Quezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who died
testate and therefore the proper venue, the Borja ruling would seem to have no
applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the
Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as indicated in the
decision under review, to determine for itself the actual residence of the
decedent (when the Quezon City court had already so determined Quezon City as
the actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and respondents have not
seriously questioned this factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if
the Cebu court should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or
its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after
years of waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in
Quezon City.
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is
taken into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for
allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional
facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court in Fernando vs.
Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his
death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such province."
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that
"(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a
pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole
world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon
everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by a court having
jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The
Quezon City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be
conceded that Quezon City was not the proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu
court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting the decedent's last will to
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 7

probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to
city court's action should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance
lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and should therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on
instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in dismissing jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to
the certiorari petition challenging the Manila court's action admitting the go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of
decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in accordance therewith in the estate to take up with the probate court.
the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this Court is not
inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73,
not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same section 2, 21 since petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the death of her
proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction." As stressed by husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to be administered
Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the administration and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under the
of justice" of considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of
appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and
the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon
the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province City court properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the
"is too obvious to require comment." deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise of
jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would have to continually leave her
8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the residence in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate
decedent's relatives gets first to file a petition for settlement of the decedent's even her own community property and conjugal estate with the decedent.
estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule 73, section 1
provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different courts which may 10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did
properly assume jurisdiction from doing so and creating conflicts between them not act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take
to the detriment of the administration of justice, and that venue is waivable, cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to
would be set at naught. As between relatives who unfortunately do not see eye the testate proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow
to eye, it would be converted into a race as to who can file the petition faster in and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the record before it
the court of his/her choice regardless of whether the decedent is still in cuerpo (the petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsityof the
presente and in disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is
left a last will and testament and the right of his surviving widow named as noteworthy that respondents never challenged by certiorari or prohibition
executrix thereof. Such dire consequences were certainly not intended by the proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate
Rule nor would they be in consonance with public policy and the orderly proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant
administration of justice. to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the
decedent's will to probate.
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all
the applicable rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court (where For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted
respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu court without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's
earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its
where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that the provisions of
death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and petitioned Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.
for letters testamentary and is admittedly entitled to preference in the
administration of her husband's estate, 20 would be compelled under the
Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's
appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and submit anew the
order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as
decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by asking that the
executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said
intestate proceedings be converted into a testate proceeding when under the
order, the said order of probate has long since become final and can not be
Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record
overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.
and as already affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the
decedent and petitioner-widow had their conjugal domicile.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 8

11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its
supervisory authority over all inferior courts, 22 it may properly determine, as it
has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by
and transferredto the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and
in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and
consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will and
testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in
pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders and actions taken in
the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized rather than to
annul all such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same
proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City
court should the Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined
by the Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible documentary
evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision

and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 9

G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000 In an order8 dated 08 June 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
93, sitting as a probate court, granted the private respondents' twin motions, in
RUFINA LUY LIM, petitioner, this wise:
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED Wherefore, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to lift,
DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING expunge or delete the annotation of lis pendens on Transfer Certificates of Title
CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC. respondents. Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and 5182 and it is hereby further
ordered that the properties covered by the same titles as well as those properties
BUENA, J.: by (sic) Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 613494, 363123, 236236 and 263236
are excluded from these proceedings.
May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included in
the inventory of the estate of a deceased person? SO ORDERED.

Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition for review on certiorari,
the decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 18 April 1996, in CA-GR SP
No. 38617, which nullified and set aside the orders dated 04 July 19952, 12
September 19953 and 15 September 19954 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate court.
Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition9 which contained
the following averments:
3. The late Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his lifetime the following
business entities, to wit:

Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose
Business
estate is the subject of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95-23334, Address:
Entity
entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina Luy Lim, represented by
George Luy, Petitioner".1wphi1.nt
xxx xxx xxx
Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation,
Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are
corporations formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws and which Alliance Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF
owned real properties covered under the Torrens system. Marketing, Homes, Paraaque, Metro
Inc. Manila.
On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving
spouse and duly represented by her nephew George Luy, fried on 17 March
xxx xxx xxx
1995, a joint petition5 for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Speed
Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory 910 Barrio Niog, Aguinaldo
Distributing
of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion6 for the lifting of lis Highway, Bacoor, Cavite.
Inc.
pendens and motion7 for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the
decedent.
xxx xxx xxx
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 10

Auto Truck 2251 Roosevelt Avenue, xxx xxx xxx

TBA Corp. Quezon City.

k. Auto Truck TCT No. 617726 Sto. Domingo TBA

xxx xxx xxx Corporation Cainta, Rizal

Active Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF q. Alliance Marketing TCT No. 27896 Prance, Metro Manila
Distributors, Homes, Paraaque, Metro
Inc. Manila.
Copies of the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title and/or Tax
Declarations are hereto attached as Annexes "C" to "W".
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx

Action 100 20th Avenue Murphy, 7. The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left by the late Pastor Y.
Company Quezon City or 92-D Mc- Lim, are all conjugal in nature, having been acquired by him during the existence
Arthur Highway Valenzuela of his marriage with petitioner.
Bulacan.
8. There are other real and personal properties owned by Pastor Y. Lim which
petitioner could not as yet identify. Petitioner, however will submit to this
3.1 Although the above business entities dealt and engaged in business with the
Honorable Court the identities thereof and the necessary documents covering the
public as corporations, all their capital, assets and equity were however,
same as soon as possible.
personally owned by the late Pastor Y Lim. Hence the alleged stockholders and
officers appearing in the respective articles of incorporation of the above
On 04 July 1995, the Regional Trial Court acting on petitioner's motion issued an
business entities were mere dummies of Pastor Y. Lim, and they were listed
order10, thus:
therein only for purposes of registration with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Wherefore, the order dated 08 June 1995 is hereby set aside and the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to reinstate the annotation of lis
4. Pastor Lim, likewise, had Time, Savings and Current Deposits with the
pendens in case said annotation had already been deleted and/or cancelled said
following banks: (a) Metrobank, Grace Park, Caloocan City and Quezon Avenue,
TCT Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and 51282.
Quezon City Branches and (b) First Intestate Bank (formerly Producers Bank),
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and in other banks whose identities are
Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT Nos. 613494, 365123,
yet to be determined.
236256 and 236237 by virtue of the petitioner are included in the instant
petition.
5. That the following real properties, although registered in the name of the
above entities, were actually acquired by Pastor Y. Lim during his marriage with
SO ORDERED.
petitioner, to wit:
On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special
Corporation Title Location administrator11 and Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 11

administrators of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after which letters of administration Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari14, with an urgent
were accordingly issued. prayer for a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the Court
of Appeals questioning the orders of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate
In an order12 dated 12 September 1995, the probate court denied anew private court.
respondents' motion for exclusion, in this wise:
On 18 April 1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private
The issue precisely raised by the petitioner in her petition is whether the respondents, rendered the assailed decision15, the decretal portion of which
corporations are the mere alter egos or instrumentalities of Pastor Lim, declares:
Otherwise (sic) stated, the issue involves the piercing of the corporate veil, a
matter that is clearly within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and not the Wherefore, premises considered, the instant special civil action for certiorari is
Securities and Exchange Commission. Thus, in the case of Cease vs. Court of hereby granted, The impugned orders issued by respondent court on July 4,
Appeals, 93 SCRA 483, the crucial issue decided by the regular court was 1995 and September 12, 1995 are hereby nullified and set aside. The impugned
whether the corporation involved therein was the mere extension of the order issued by respondent on September 15, 1995 is nullified insofar as
decedent. After finding in the affirmative, the Court ruled that the assets of the petitioner corporations" bank accounts and records are concerned.
corporation are also assets of the estate.
SO ORDERED.
A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon by oppositors, shows that the SEC's
exclusive (sic) applies only to intra-corporate controversy. It is simply a suit to Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, herein petitioner Rufina
settle the intestate estate of a deceased person who, during his lifetime, acquired Luy Lim now comes before us with a lone assignment of
several properties and put up corporations as his instrumentalities. error16:

SO ORDERED. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the orders of the lower court
which merely allowed the preliminary or provisional inclusion of the private
On 15 September 1995, the probate court acting on an ex parte motion filed by respondents as part of the estate of the late deceased (sic) Pastor Y. Lim with
petitioner, issued an order13 the dispositive portion of which reads: the respondent Court of Appeals arrogating unto itself the power to repeal, to
disobey or to ignore the clear and explicit provisions of Rules 81,83,84 and 87 of
Wherefore, the parties and the following banks concerned herein under the Rules of Court and thereby preventing the petitioner, from performing her
enumerated are hereby ordered to comply strictly with this order and to produce duty as special administrator of the estate as expressly provided in the said
and submit to the special administrators, through this Honorable Court within (5) Rules.
five days from receipt of this order their respective records of the savings/current
accounts/time deposits and other deposits in the names of Pastor Lim and/or Petitioner's contentions tread on perilous grounds.
corporations above-mentioned, showing all the transactions made or done
concerning savings/current accounts from January 1994 up to their receipt of this In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we affirm the orders
court order. issued by the probate court which were subsequently set aside by the Court of
Appeals.
xxx xxx xxx
Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review of the rules on
SO ORDERED. jurisdiction over probate proceedings is indeed in order.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 12

The provisions of Republic Act 769117, which introduced amendments to Batas Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters
Pambansa Blg. 129, are pertinent: of probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent.

Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner relies heavily on
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows: the principle that a probate court may pass upon title to certain properties, albeit
provisionally, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive or should not be included in the inventory.
jurisdiction:
In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by which the court may extend
xxx xxx xxx its probing arms in the determination of the question of title in probate
proceedings.
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of
the estate exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in probate This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,18 held:
matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000); . . . As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining
xxx xxx xxx whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of
estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
Sec. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows: determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in
a separate action to resolve title.
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS19:
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
. . . The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court.
where the value of the personal property, estate or amount of the demand does However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not
not exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in Metro Manila where conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be
such personal property, estate or amount of the demand does not exceed Two instituted by the parties.
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs, the amount of which must be Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE20 citing CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE21, We
specifically alleged, Provided, that interest, damages of whatever kind, made an exposition on the probate court's limited jurisdiction:
attorney's, litigation expenses and costs shall be included in the determination of
the filing fees, Provided further, that where there are several claims or causes of It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings
actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to
action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
different transactions; determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list
of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well
xxx xxx xxx and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator and the opposing
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 13

parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. . . .

Again, in VALERA vs. INSERTO22, We had occasion to elucidate, through Mr. . . . . In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a
Justice Andres Narvasa23: property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of
such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling
Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner
acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an
power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession
by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. . . .
parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to
the submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence was
interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the ever presented by petitioner to bolster her bare assertions as to the title of the
exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the properties. Even so, P.D. 1529, otherwise known
resolved by the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited as, "The Property Registration Decree", proscribes collateral attack on Torrens
jurisdiction as a special court (e.g. probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality Title, hence:
not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice
which may be waived. . . . xxx xxx xxx

. . . . These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall
title is not in the decedent's name but in others, a situation on which this Court not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled
has already had occasion to rule . . . . (emphasis Ours) except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of land covered under the In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at bar, the property
Torrens system and registered in the name of private respondent corporations subject of the controversy was duly registered under the Torrens system, We
should be included in the inventory of the estate of the decedent Pastor Y. Lim, categorically stated:
alleging that after all the determination by the probate court of whether these
properties should be included or not is merely provisional in nature, thus, not . . . Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the
conclusive and subject to a final determination in a separate action brought for possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate
the purpose of adjudging once and for all the issue of title. of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should
have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the
Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of land are registered in property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no
the name of private respondent corporations, the jurisprudence pronounced authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the
in BOLISAY vs., ALCID 24 is of great essence and finds applicability, thus: property. . . .

It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the
support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the name of
Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability private respondent corporations, which under the law possess a personality
until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which of separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 14

to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct
titles in favor of private respondents should stand undisturbed. from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that
of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal
Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents' indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it.28
motion for exclusion. While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in
a restricted capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality
competent to issue orders involving inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in distinct and separate from its stockholders or members. In the same vein, a
the inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by a protective
the question of title over properties, it is no less true that such authority mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons comprising it.
conferred upon by law and reinforced by jurisprudence, should be exercised
judiciously, with due regard and caution to the peculiar circumstances of each Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in FIRST PHILIPPINE
individual case. INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS29, We enunciated:

Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the Torrens . . . When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act
system in the name of private respondents, and as such were to be afforded the or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of
presumptive conclusiveness of title, the probate court obviously opted to shut its statutes, the achievement or perfection of a monopoly or generally the
eyes to this gleamy fact and still proceeded to issue the impugned orders. perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil with which the law covers and isolates
the corporation from the members or stockholders who compose it will be lifted
By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect acted in utter to allow for its consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals. . . .
disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of private
respondents. Certainly, the probate court through such brazen act transgressed Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the
the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on this matter. protective shroud which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily,
they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a seemingly
Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction.30
corporations are properly part of the decedent's estate but also the private
respondent corporations themselves. To rivet such flimsy contention, petitioner The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a
cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his lifetime, organized and wholly-owned corporation is just but the alter ego of a person or of another corporation. Where
the five corporations, which are the private respondents in the instant badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is defeated; where a wrong is
case.25 Petitioner thus attached as Annexes "F"26 and "G"27 of the petition for sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of legal entity
31
review affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao which among should come to naught.
others, contained averments that the incorporators of Uniwide Distributing, Inc.
included on the list had no actual and participation in the organization and Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the
incorporation of the said corporation. The affiants added that the persons whose veil of corporate fiction is as follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or complete
names appeared on the articles of incorporation of Uniwide Distributing, Inc., as stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and
incorporators thereof, are mere dummies since they have not actually business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate
contributed any amount to the capital stock of the corporation and have been entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of
merely asked by the late Pastor Y. Lim to affix their respective signatures its own; (2) Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud
thereon. or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty,
or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal right; and (3) The
aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 15

loss complained of. The absence of any of these elements prevent "piercing the WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby
corporate veil".32 DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals which
nullified and set aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93,
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly acting as a probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12 September 1995 is
all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for AFFIRMED.1wphi1.nt
disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities.33
SO ORDERED.
Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the
wrong-doing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be
presumed.34

Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely
acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed to
adduce competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale the veil
of corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by petitioner on the affidavits
executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao is unavailing considering that the
aforementioned documents possess no weighty probative value pursuant to the
hearsay rule. Besides it is imperative for us to stress that such affidavits are
inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as the affiants were not at all presented
during the course of the proceedings in the lower court. To put it differently, for
this Court to uphold the admissibility of said documents would be to relegate
from Our duty to apply such basic rule of evidence in a manner consistent with
the law and jurisprudence.

Our pronouncement in PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY

vs. LEONIDAS35 finds pertinence:

Affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally
prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the
affiant's statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the
one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for
being hearsay, unless the affiant themselves are placed on the witness stand to
testify thereon.

As to the order36 of the lower court, dated 15 September 1995, the Court of
Appeals correctly observed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 acted without
jurisdiction in issuing said order; The probate court had no authority to demand
the production of bank accounts in the name of the private respondent
corporations.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 16

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976 debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed
that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G.
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.
Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs. While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as
AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents. special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the
motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976 through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that
Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner, herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.
vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration
of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was
respondents. published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication
of general circulation in Southern Luzon.
MARTIN, J.:
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This
in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the supplemental petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was
appointment of a special administrator is sought to be reviewed. elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last
place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the
at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original
administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly
26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of
in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular
Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by
the same time, she moved Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not
date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion. possessed at the beginning because the original petition was deficient.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973,
contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix
was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of
administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there
has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a
regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be
preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and
supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of
jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G.
Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for
authority to take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 17

of third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang
motion, calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the
the special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered
properties making up the state of the deceased." to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any
qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already
Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion
Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as to reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental
special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition of May petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters
18,1973. of administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his
death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto
(1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been by praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.
acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is
not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to
G. Garcia. clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous
court order limiting the authority of the special administratrix to the making of an
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution of her motion to
substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of
Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded sister Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the
of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.
deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first,
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special
enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of properties in the administratrix, and the second, holding that the power allowed the special
hands of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to Amado administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of the assets of
G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for acting outside her the estate.
authority and against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf
of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the
action, jurisdiction, and improper venue. foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they
sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment,
Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special
the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba
administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
Court, 1 subject only to the previous qualification made by the court that the
administration of the properties subject of the marketing agreement with the On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19,
the latter; and that the special administratrix had already been authorized in a 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned orders: one, directing
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 18

Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of
Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for
statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta
her the corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B. granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix
Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.
the estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all
certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge
qualified with the word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia." Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her willingness
Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals
Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On annulling the proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp.
her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for
for 1973 showing that three months before his death his residence was in reconsideration.
Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in
Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings
1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna. before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of
the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay
special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before Estate Obligations."
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the
proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question
Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special
that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the decision of the Court
reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had been
supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three appealed to this Court; that the parties had already filed their respective briefs;
others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to the and that the case is still pending before the Court.
special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta,
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay
proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction. that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc.
No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule
forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.
docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp.
Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Pao from further acting in
letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City the case. A restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976.

We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R.
No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is
an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of administration,
Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition
therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the
appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the
name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of
assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who
seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The
fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are
foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of
the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the
time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on
the court to grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the
clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule
indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It
could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter,
because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely
with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject
matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter
"existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or
authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the
manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There
are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the
provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 19
the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby
lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered
defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this
provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has
nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain
words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance
jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the
deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the
country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place
where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the
deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of
administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the
Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean?
Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his
death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi
termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and rules Section
1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length of
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 20

time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived."
temporary. 11 In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to
substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court
the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to
original petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the
Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last
Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the residence of the decedent.
City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna,
and in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. 4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special
Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference
and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that
or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by
Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the
sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the
death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and
and in other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended administrator was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is
petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and
of residence was at Calamba, Laguna." such appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or
Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at not lies in the probate court. 15That, however, is no authority for the judge to
Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his
decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on
Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same
Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's should not be taken into account in the appointment of a special
residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of
Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special
over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others in this respect
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under
January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the
Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal
of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in
place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or
imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked
administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, ownership of a property. 18
Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is
subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 21

Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in
of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against
Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is petitioner.
a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On
this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the SO ORDERED.
appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the
issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a
regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine
who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the
administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of
distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the
administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B.
Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the
deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he
indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of
candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the First
District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of
Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be
reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G.
Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24

5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of
Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may
properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and
transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance
of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment
of special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and
the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the
case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.

6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975,
granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by
Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670,
and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special
administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate
obligations is hereby upheld.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 22

G.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987 and NUMERIANO ESTENZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE CUENCO
BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner, BORROMEO, and PETRA O. BORROMEO, respondents.
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of the x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, respondents.
No. L-65995 July 23, 1987
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
PETRA BORROMEO, VITALIANA BORROMEO, AMELINDA BORROMEO, and
No. L-55000 July 23, 1987 JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO,petitioners,
vs.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO, DECEASED, PILAR HONORABLE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Presiding Judge of Branch XV,
N. BORROMEO, MARIA B. PUTONG, FEDERICO V. BORROMEO, JOSE Regional Trial Court of Cebu; RICARDO V. REYES, Administrator of the
BORROMEO, CONSUELO B. MORALES, AND CANUTO V. BORROMEO, Estate of VITO BORROMEO in Sp. Proc. No. 916-R; and DOMINGO L.
JR., heirs-appellants, ANTIGUA, respondents.
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO, claimant-appellee. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x These cases before us all stem from SP. PROC. NO. 916-R of the then Court of
First Instance of Cebu.
No. L-62895 July 23, 1987
G.R. No. 41171
JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, petitioner,
vs. Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on March
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, As 13, 1952, in Paranaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but
presiding Judge of the (now) Regional Trial Court, Branch XV, Region leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
VII, RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the Estate of Vito Borromeo
in Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO and DOMINGO L. On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a
ANTIGUA, respondents. petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will and testament
left by the said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and designating
Junquera as executor thereof. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No.
No. L-63818 July 23, 1987 916-R. The document, drafted in Spanish, was allegedly signed and
thumbmarked by the deceased in the presence of Cornelio Gandionco, Eusebio
DOMINGO ANTIGUA AND RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the Cabiluna, and Felixberto Leonardo who acted as witnesses.
Intestate Estate of VITO BORROMEO, Sp. Proceedings No. 916-R,
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, joined by HON. JUDGE FRANCISCO P. Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On May 28, 1960, after due
BURGOS, as Presiding Judge of Branch XV of the Regional Trial Court of trial, the probate court held that the document presented as the will of the
Cebu, as a formal party, and ATTYS. FRANCIS M. ZOSA, GAUDIOSO RUIZ deceased was a forgery.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 23

On appeal to this Court, the decision of the probate court disallowing the probate Pantaleon Borromeo
of the will was affirmed in Testate Estate of Vito Borromeo, Jose H. Junquera et
al. v. Crispin Borromeo et al. (19 SCRA 656). Vito Borromeo

The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. Several Paulo Borromeo
parties came before the court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as
heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. Anecita Borromeo

The following petitions or claims were filed: Quirino Borromeo and

1. On August 29, 1967, the heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme Borromeo Julian Borromeo
filed a petition for declaration of heirs and determination of heirship. There was
no opposition filed against said petition. 2. Vito Borromeo died a widower on March 13, 1952, without any issue, and all
his brothers and sisters predeceased him.
2. On November 26, 1967, Vitaliana Borromeo also filed a petition for declaration
as heir. The heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme Borromeo filed an opposition 3. Vito's brother Pantaleon Borromeo died leaving the following children:
to this petition.
a. Ismaela Borromeo,who died on Oct. 16, 1939
3. On December 13, 1967, Jose Barcenilla, Jr., Anecita Ocampo de Castro,
Ramon Ocampo, Lourdes Ocampo, Elena Ocampo, Isagani Morre, Rosario Morre, b. Teofilo Borromeo, who died on Aug. 1, 1955, or 3 years after the death of Vito
Aurora Morre, Lila Morre, Lamberto Morre, and Patricia Morre, filed a petition for Borromeo. He was married to Remedios Cuenco Borromeo, who died on March
declaration of heirs and determination of shares. The petition was opposed by 28, 1968. He had an only son-Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo one of the petitioners
the heirs of Jose and Cosme Borromeo. herein.

4. On December 2, 1968, Maria Borromeo Atega, Luz Borromeo, Hermenegilda
Borromeo Nonnenkamp, Rosario Borromeo, and Fe Borromeo Queroz filed a
claim. Jose Cuenco Borromeo, Crispin Borromeo, Vitaliana Borromeo and the
heirs of Carlos Borromeo represented by Jose Talam filed oppositions to this
claim.
c. Crispin Borromeo, who is still alive.
4. Anecita Borromeo, sister of Vito Borromeo, died ahead of him and left an only
daughter, Aurora B. Ocampo, who died on Jan. 30, 1950 leaving the following
children:

When the aforementioned petitions and claims were heard jointly, the following a. Anecita Ocampo Castro
facts were established:
b. Ramon Ocampo
1. Maximo Borromeo and Hermenegilda Galan, husband and wife (the latter
having predeceased the former), were survived by their eight (8) children, c. Lourdes Ocampo
namely,
d. Elena Ocampo, all living, and
Jose Ma. Borromeo
e. Antonieta Ocampo Barcenilla (deceased), survived by claimant Jose Barcenilla,
Cosme Borromeo Jr.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 24

5. Cosme Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the war and c. Maximo Borromeo, who died in July, 1948
left the following children:
d. Matilde Borromeo, who died on Aug. 6, 1946
a. Marcial Borromeo
e. Andres Borromeo, who died on Jan. 3, 1923, but survived by his children:
b. Carlos Borromeo,who died on Jan. 18, 1965,survived by his wife, Remedios
Alfonso, and his only daughter, Amelinda Borromeo Talam aa. Maria Borromeo Atega

c. Asuncion Borromeo bb. Luz Borromeo

d. Florentina Borromeo, who died in 1948. cc. Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp

e. Amilio Borromeo, who died in 1944. dd. Rosario Borromeo

f. Carmen Borromeo, who died in 1925. ee. Fe Borromeo Queroz

The last three died leaving no issue. On April 10, 1969, the trial court, invoking Art. 972 of the Civil Code, issued an
order declaring the following, to the exclusion of all others, as the intestate heirs
6. Jose Ma. Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the war of the deceased Vito Borromeo:
and left the following children:
1. Jose Cuenco Borromeo
a. Exequiel Borromeo,who died on December 29, 1949
2. Judge Crispin Borromeo
b. Canuto Borromeo, who died on Dec. 31, 1959, leaving the following children:
3. Vitaliana Borromeo
aa. Federico Borromeo
4. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera
bb. Marisol Borromeo (Maria B. Putong, Rec. p. 85)
5. Salud Borromeo
cc. Canuto Borromeo, Jr.
6. Asuncion Borromeo
dd. Jose Borromeo
7. Marcial Borromeo
ee. Consuelo Borromeo
8. Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and
ff. Pilar Borromeo
9. The heirs of Canuto Borromeo
gg. Salud Borromeo
The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo
hh. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal and equitable
shares among the 9 abovenamed declared intestate heirs.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 25

On April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the exception of Patrocinio B. On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court concluding that the five
Herrera, signed an agreement of partition of the properties of the deceased Vito declared heirs who signed the waiver agreement assigning their hereditary rights
Borromeo which was approved by the trial court, in its order of August 15, 1969. to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same rights, declared the latter as entitled to
In this same order, the trial court ordered the administrator, Atty Jesus Gaboya, 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo.
Jr., to partition the properties of the deceased in the way and manner they are
divided and partitioned in the said Agreement of Partition and further ordered A motion for reconsideration of this order was denied on July 7, 1975.
that 40% of the market value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be
segregated. All attorney's fees shall be taken and paid from this segregated In the present petition, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the trial
portion. court's order dated December 24, 1974, declaring respondent Fortunato
Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo and the July 7, 1975
On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as order, denying the motion for reconsideration.
heir under the forged will, filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be
declared as one of the heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, alleging that he is an The petitioner argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
illegitimate son of the deceased and that in the declaration of heirs made by the the claim of respondent Fortunato Borromeo because it is not a money claim
trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of the law making him a forced heir against the decedent but a claim for properties, real and personal, which
entitled to receive a legitime like all other forced heirs. As an acknowledged constitute all of the shares of the heirs in the decedent's estate, heirs who
illegitimate child, he stated that he was entitled to a legitime equal in every case allegedly waived their rights in his favor. The claim of the private respondent
to four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child. under the waiver agreement, according to the petitioner, may be likened to that
of a creditor of the heirs which is improper. He alleges that the claim of the
Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the order private respondent under the waiver agreement was filed beyond the time
of the court dated April 12, 1969 declaring the persons named therein as the allowed for filing of claims as it was filed only sometime in 1973, after there had
legal heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, the court dismissed the motion on been a declaration of heirs (April 10, 1969), an agreement of partition (April 30,
June 25, 1973. 1969), the approval of the agreement of partition and an order directing the
administrator to partition the estate (August 15, 1969), when in a mere
Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum he memorandum, the existence of the waiver agreement was brought out.
submitted to support his motion for reconsideration, Fortunato changed the basis
for his claim to a portion of the estate. He asserted and incorporated a Waiver of It is further argued by the petitioner that the document entitled " waiver of
Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly signed by Pilar N. Borromeo, Hereditary Rights" executed on July 31, 1967, aside from having been cancelled
Maria B. Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo, and revoked on June 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and
Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. Amelia Borromeo, is without force and effect because there can be no effective
Borromeo, Consuelo B. Morales, Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B. Talam In the waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid acceptance of the
waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the inheritance the heirs intend to transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil
disputed estate. The motion was opposed on the ground that the trial court, Code, to make acceptance or repudiation of inheritance valid, the person must be
acting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; certain of the death of the one from whom he is to inherit and of his right to the
that respondent Fortunato Borromeo is estopped from asserting the waiver inheritance. Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were not certain of their right
agreement; that the waiver agreement is void as it was executed before the to the inheritance until they were declared heirs, their rights were, therefore,
declaration of heirs; that the same is void having been executed before the uncertain. This view, according to the petitioner, is also supported by Article
distribution of the estate and before the acceptance of the inheritance; and that 1057 of the same Code which directs heirs, devicees, and legatees to signify
it is void ab initio and inexistent for lack of subject matter. their acceptance or repudiation within thirty days after the court has issued an
order for the distribution of the estate.

Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that under Article
1043 of the Civil Code there is no need for a person to be first declared as heir
before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he
must first be certain of the death of the person from whom he is to inherit and
that he must be certain of his right to the inheritance. He points out that at the
time of the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to
the waiver document were certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead as well
as of their rights to the inheritance as shown in the waiver document itself.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court to pass upon the validity
of the waiver of hereditary rights, respondent Borromeo asserts that since the
waiver or renunciation of hereditary rights took place after the court assumed
jurisdiction over the properties of the estate it partakes of the nature of a
partition of the properties of the estate needing approval of the court because it
was executed in the course of the proceedings. lie further maintains that the
probate court loses jurisdiction of the estate only after the payment of all the
debts of the estate and the remaining estate is distributed to those entitled to
the same.
The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the properties
included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third
persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality
of the former. Nor do such properties have the character of future property,
because the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of the death of
the deceased, by principle established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of
the Civil Code, according to which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere
fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from the moment of the death of the
deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property, but the
acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance
with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon
the adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion." (Osorio v. Osorio and
Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531). The heirs, therefore, could waive their
hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the estate was issued only
in 1969.
In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be
considered to be effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential:
(1) the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3)
an intention to relinquish such right. (People v. Salvador, (CA) 53 O.G. No. 22, p.
8116, 8120). The intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 26
and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a party
does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent
to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that no other
reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible (67 C.J., 311). (Fernandez v.
Sebido, et al., 70 Phil., 151, 159).
The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver document
did not have the clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights, Thus:
(1) On October 27, 1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a
pleading entitled "Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal for the
amicable settlement of the case. In that Compliance, they proposed to concede
to all the eight (8) intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties, personal and
real, including all cash and sums of money in the hands of the Special
Administrator, as of October 31, 1967, not contested or claimed by them in any
action then pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In turn, the heirs
would waive and concede to them all the 14 contested lots. In this document, the
respondent recognizes and concedes that the petitioner, like the other
signatories to the waiver document, is an heir of the deceased Vito Borromeo,
entitled to share in the estate. This shows that the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights"
was never meant to be what the respondent now purports it to be. Had the
intent been otherwise, there would not be any reason for Fortunato, Tomas, and
Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to settle the case amicably,
and offer to concede to them parts of the estate of the deceased; (2) On April 21
and 30, 1969, the majority of the declared heirs executed an Agreement on how
the estate they inherited shall be distributed. This Agreement of Partition was
approved by the trial court on August 15, 1969; (3) On June 29, 1968, the
petitioner, among others, signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment"
purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the respondent and Tomas and
Amelia Borromeo all her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and
participation as an intestate heir in the estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo.
The stated consideration for said assignment was P100,000.00; (4) On the same
date, June 29, 1968, the respondent Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in
the aforementioned deed of assignment) in turn executed a "Deed of
Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-assignors named in the same deed of
assignment. The stated consideration was P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of
Deed of Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was signed by Tomas Borromeo
and Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968, while Fortunato Borromeo signed
this document on March 24, 1969.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 27

With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court had
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver agreement. It must be noted
that in Special Proceedings No. 916-R the lower court disallowed the probate of
the will and declared it as fake. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed the decision of
the lower court on March 30, 1967, in G.R. No. L-18498. Subsequently, several
parties came before the lower court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves
as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. We see no impediment to the
trial court in exercising jurisdiction and trying the said claims or petitions.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the trial court extends to matters incidental and
collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of
the estate.
In view of the foregoing, the questioned order of the trial court dated December
24, 1974, is hereby SET ASIDE.
the waiver agreement and without notice to the parties concerned, two things
which are necessary so that the lower court would be vested with authority and
jurisdiction to hear and decide the validity of said waiver agreement,
nevertheless, the lower court set the hearing on September 25, 1973 and
without asking for the requisite pleading. This resulted in the issuance of the
appealed order of December 24, 1974, which approved the validity of the waiver
agreement. The appellants contend that this constitutes an error in the exercise
of jurisdiction.
The appellee on the other hand, maintains that by waiving their hereditary rights
in favor of Fortunato Borromeo, the signatories to the waiver document tacitly
and irrevocably accepted the inheritance and by virtue of the same act, they lost
their rights because the rights from that moment on became vested in Fortunato
Borromeo.

G.R. No. 55000 It is also argued by the appellee that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is
no need for a person to be declared as heir first before he can accept or
This case was originally an appeal to the Court of Appeals from an order of the repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he is certain of the death of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, dated December 24, 1974, declaring person from whom he is to inherit, and of his right to the inheritance. At the time
the waiver document earlier discussed in G.R. No. 41171 valid. The appellate of the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the
court certified this case to this Court as the questions raised are all of law. waiver document were certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead and they
were also certain of their right to the inheritance as shown by the waiver
The appellants not only assail the validity of the waiver agreement but they also document itself.
question the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and decide the action filed by
claimant Fortunato Borromeo. On the allegation of the appellants that the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the claim because of the alleged lack of a pleading invoking its
The appellants argue that when the waiver of hereditary right was executed on jurisdiction to decide the claim, the appellee asserts that on August 23, 1973, the
July 31, 1967, Pilar Borromeo and her children did not yet possess or own any lower court issued an order specifically calling on all oppositors to the waiver
hereditary right in the intestate estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo because document to submit their comments within ten days from notice and setting the
said hereditary right was only acquired and owned by them on April 10, 1969, same for hearing on September 25, 1973. The appellee also avers that the claim
when the estate was ordered distributed. as to a 5/9 share in the inheritance involves no question of title to property and,
therefore, the probate court can decide the question.
They further argue that in contemplation of law, there is no such contract of
waiver of hereditary right in the present case because there was no object, which The issues in this case are similar to the issues raised in G.R. No. 41171. The
is hereditary right, that could be the subject matter of said waiver, and, appellants in this case, who are all declared heirs of the late Vito Borromeo are
therefore, said waiver of hereditary right was not only null and void ab initio but contesting the validity of the trial court's order dated December 24, 1974,
was inexistent. declaring Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo
under the waiver agreement.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the appellants contend that without any
formal pleading filed by the lawyers of Fortunato Borromeo for the approval of
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 28

As stated in G.R. No. 41171, the supposed waiver of hereditary rights can not be claims for attorney's fees, and that mandamus will not lie to compel the
validated. The essential elements of a waiver, especially the clear and convincing performance of a discretionary function, the appellate court denied the petition
intention to relinquish hereditary rights, are not found in this case. on May 14, 1982. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
The October 27, 1967 proposal for an amicable settlement conceding to all the
eight (8) intestate heirs various properties in consideration for the heirs giving to The petitioner's stand is that the inaction of the respondent judge on the motion
the respondent and to Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo the fourteen (14) contested filed on April 28, 1972 for the closure of the administration proceeding cannot be
lots was filed inspite of the fact that on July 31, 1967, some of the heirs had justified by the filing of the motion for inventory and accounting because the
allegedly already waived or sold their hereditary rights to the respondent. latter motion was filed only on March 2, 1979. He claimed that under the then
Constitution, it is the duty of the respondent judge to decide or resolve a case or
The agreement on how the estate is to be distributed, the June 29, 1968 deed of matter within three months from the date of its submission.
assignment, the deed of reconveyance, and the subsequent cancellation of the
deed of assignment and deed of reconveyance all argue against the purported The respondents contend that the motion to close the administration had already
waiver of hereditary rights. been resolved when the respondent judge cancelled all settings of all incidents
previously set in his court in an order dated June 4, 1979, pursuant to the
Concerning the issue of jurisdiction, we have already stated in G.R. No. 41171 resolution and restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals enjoining him to
that the trial court acquired jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver maintain status quo on the case.
agreement because the trial court's jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and
collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of As stated in G.R. No. 41171, on April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with
the estate. the exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement of partition of the
properties of the deceased Vito Borromeo which was approved by the trial court,
The questioned order is, therefore, SET ASIDE. in its order dated August 15, 1969. In this same order, the trial court ordered the
administrator, Atty. Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of the deceased
G.R. No. 62895 in the way and manner they are divided and partitioned in the said Agreement of
Partition and further ordered that 40% of the market value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of
A motion dated April 28, 1972, was filed by Atty. Raul M. Sesbreno, the estate shall be segregated and reserved for attorney's fees.
representative of some of the heirs-distributees, praying for the immediate
closure of Special Proceeding No. 916-R. A similar motion dated May 29, 1979 According to the manifestation of Judge Francisco Burgos dated July 5, 1982, (p.
was filed by Atty. Jose Amadora. Both motions were grounded on the fact that 197, Rollo, G. R. No. 41171) his court has not finally distributed to the nine (9)
there was nothing more to be done after the payment of all the obligations of the declared heirs the properties due to the following circumstances:
estate since the order of partition and distribution had long become final.
1. The court's determination of the market value of the estate in order to
Alleging that respondent Judge Francisco P. Burgos failed or refused to resolve segregate the 40% reserved for attorney's fees;
the aforesaid motions, petitioner Jose Cuenco Borromeo-filed a petition for
mandamus before the Court of Appeals to compel the respondent judge to 2. The order of December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato Borromeo as beneficiary
terminate and close Special Proceedings No. 916-R. of the 5/9 of the estate because of the waiver agreement signed by the heirs
representing the 5/9 group which is still pending resolution by this Court (G.R.
Finding that the inaction of the respondent judge was due to pending motions to No. 4117 1);
compel the petitioner, as co-administrator, to submit an inventory of the real
properties of the estate and an accounting of the cash in his hands, pending
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 29

3. The refusal of administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to render his accounting; On June 9, 1979, respondents Jose Cuenco Borromeo and Petra 0. Borromeo
and filed a motion for inhibition in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11,
presided over by Judge Francisco P. Burgos to inhibit the judge from further
4. The claim of Marcela Villegas for 1/2 of the estate causing annotations of acting in Special Proceedings No. 916-R. 'The movants alleged, among others,
notices of lis pendens on the different titles of the properties of the estate. the following:

Since there are still real properties of the estate that were not vet distributed to xxx xxx xxx
some of the declared heirs, particularly the 5/9 group of heirs due to the pending
resolution of the waiver agreement, this Court in its resolution of June 15, 1983, 6. To keep the agitation to sell moving, Atty. Antigua filed a motion for the
required the judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, to expedite production of the certificates of title and to deposit the same with the Branch
the determination of Special Proceedings No. 916-R and ordered the co- Clerk of Court, presumably for the ready inspection of interested buyers. Said
administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to submit an inventory of real properties of motion was granted by the Hon. Court in its order of October 2, 1978 which,
the estate and to render an accounting of cash and bank deposits realized from however, became the subject of various motions for reconsideration from heirs-
rents of several properties. distributees who contended that as owners they cannot be deprived of their titles
for the flimsy reasons advanced by Atty, Antigua. In view of the motions for
The matter of attorney's fees shall be discussed in G.R. No. 65995. reconsideration, Atty Antigua ultimately withdraw his motions for production of
titles.
Considering the pronouncements stated in:
7. The incident concerning the production of titles triggered another incident
1. G.R. No. 41171 & G.R. No. 55000, setting aside the Order of the trial court involving Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno who was then the counsel of herein movants
dated December 24, 1974; Petra O. Borromeo and Amelinda B. Talam In connection with said incident, Atty.
Sesbreno filed a pleading which the tion. presiding, Judge Considered direct
2. G.R. No. 63818, denying the petition for review seeking to modify the decision contempt because among others, Atty. Sesbreno insinuated that the Hon.
of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge Presiding Judge stands to receive "fat commission" from the sale of the entire
Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo property. Indeed, Atty. Sesbreno was seriously in danger of being declared in
and ordering the remand of the case to the Executive,Judge of the Regional trial contempt of court with the dim prospect of suspension from the practice of his
Court of Cebu for re-raffling; and profession. But obviously to extricate himself from the prospect of contempt and
suspension. Atty. Sesbreno chose rapproachment and ultimately joined forces
3. G.R. No. 65995, granting the petition to restrain the respondents from further with Atty. Antigua, et al., who, together, continued to harass administrator
acting on any and all incidents in Special proceedings No. 916-11 because of the
affirmation of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No. 63818. x x x xxx xxx

the trial court may now terminate and close Special Proceedings No. 916-R,
subject to the submission of an inventory of the real properties of the estate and
an accounting of the call and bank deposits of the petitioner, as co-administrator
of the estate, if he has not vet done so, as required by this Court in its Resolution
dated June 15, 1983. This must be effected with all deliberate speed.
G.R. No. 63818
9. The herein movants are informed and so they allege, that a brother of the
Hon. Presiding Judge is married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua.
10. There is now a clear tug of war bet ween Atty. Antigua, et al. who are
agitating for the sale of the entire estate or to buy out the individual heirs, on the
one hand, and the herein movants, on the other, who are not willing to sell their
distributive shares under the terms and conditions presently proposed. In this
tug of war, a pattern of harassment has become apparent against the herein
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 30

movants, especially Jose Cuenco Borromeo. Among the harassments employed Borromeo have had the courage to stand up and refuse the proposal to sell
by Atty Antigua et al. are the pending motions for the removal of administrator clearly favored by respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos.
Jose Cuenco Borromeo, the subpoena duces tecum issued to the bank which
seeks to invade into the privacy of the personal account of Jose Cuenco xxx xxx xxx
Borromeo, and the other matters mentioned in paragraph 8 hereof. More
harassment motions are expected until the herein movants shall finally yield to 20. Petitioners will refrain from discussing herein the merits of the shotgun
the proposed sale. In such a situation, the herein movants beg for an entirely motion of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua as well as other incidents now pending in the
independent and impartial judge to pass upon the merits of said incidents. court below which smack of harassment against the herein petitioners. For,
regardless of the merits of said incidents, petitioners respectfully contend that it
11. Should the Hon. Presiding Judge continue to sit and take cognizance of this is highly improper for respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos to continue to preside
proceeding, including the incidents above-mentioned, he is liable to be over Sp. Proc. No. 916-R by reason of the following circumstances:
misunderstood as being biased in favor of Atty Antigua, et al. and prejudiced
against the herein movants. Incidents which may create this impression need not (a) He has shown undue interest in the sale of the properties as initiated by Atty.
be enumerated herein. (pp. 39-41, Rollo) Domingo L. Antigua whose sister is married to a brother of respondent.

The motion for inhibition was denied by Judge Francisco P. Burgos. Their motion (b) The proposed sale cannot be legally done without the conformity of the heirs-
for reconsideration having been denied, the private respondents filed a petition distributees, and petitioners have openly refused the sale, to the great
for certiorari and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction before the disappointment of respondent.
Intermediate Appellate Court.
(c) The shot gun motion of Atty. Antigua and similar incidents are clearly
In the appellate court, the private respondents alleged, among others, the intended to harass and embarrass administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo in order
following: to pressure him into acceding to the proposed sale.

xxx xxx xxx (d) Respondent has shown bias and prejudice against petitioners by failing to
resolve the claim for attorney's fees filed by Jose Cuenco Borromeo and the late
16. With all due respect, petitioners regret the necessity of having to state herein Crispin Borromeo. Similar claims by the other lawyers were resolved by
that respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos has shown undue interest in pursing respondent after petitioners refused the proposed sale. (pp. 41-43, Rollo)
the sale initiated by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua, et al. Significantly, a brother of
respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos is married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L. On March 1, 1983, the appellate court rendered its decision granting the petition
Antigua. for certiorari and/or prohibition and disqualifying Judge Francisco P. Burgos from
taking further cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 916-R. The court also
17. Evidence the proposed sale of the entire properties of the estate cannot be ordered the transmission of the records of the case to the Executive Judge of the
legally done without the conformity of the heirs-distributees because the Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling.
certificates of title are already registered in their names Hence, in pursuit of the
agitation to sell, respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos urged the heirs- A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the appellate court on
distributees to sell the entire property based on the rationale that proceeds April 11, 1983. Hence, the present petition for review seeking to modify the
thereof deposited in the bank will earn interest more than the present income of decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits
the so called estate. Most of the heirs-distributees, however. have been Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the case of Intestate Estate of
petitioner timid to say their piece. Only the 4/9 group of heirs led by Jose Cuenco Vito Borromeo and orders the remand of the case to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 31

The principal issue in this case has become moot and academic because Judge subpoena duces tecum be issued for the appearance of the Manager of the
Francisco P. Burgos decided to retire from the Regional Trial Court of Cebu Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., bringing all the bank records in the name of
sometime before the latest reorganization of the judiciary. However, we decide Jose Cuenco Borromeo jointly with his wife as well as the appearance of heirs-
the petition on its merits for the guidance of the judge to whom this case will bedistributees Amelinda Borromeo Talam and another heir distributee Vitaliana
reassigned and others concerned. Borromeo. Simultaneously with the filing of the motion of Domingo Antigua, Atty.
Raul H. Sesbreno filed a request for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum to the
The petitioners deny that respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo has been harassed. Manager of Consolidated Bank and 'Trust Co., Inc.; Register of Deeds of Cebu
They contend that Judge Burgos has benn shown unusual interest in the City; Register of Deeds for the Province of Cebu and another subpoena duces
proposed sale of the entire estate for P6,700,000.00 in favor of the buyers of tecum to Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo.
Atty. Antigua. They claim that this disinterest is shown by the judge's order of
March 2, 1979 assessing the property of the estate at P15,000,000.00. They add On the same date, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces tecum to
that he only ordered the administrator to sell so much of the properties of the the Managert of the bank, the Register of deeds for the City of Cebu, the Register
estate to pay the attorney's fees of the lawyers-claimants. To them, the of Deeds for the Province, of Cebu. and to Jose Cuenco Borromeo.
inhibition of Judge Burgos would have been unreasonable because his orders
against the failure of Jose Cuenco Borromeo, as administrator, to give an On the following day, March 3, 1979, Atty Gaudioso v. Villagonzalo in behalf of
accounting and inventory of the estate were all affirmed by the appellate court. the heirs of Marcial Borromeo who had a common cause with Atty Barredo, Jr.,
They claim that the respondent court, should also have taken judicial notice of joined petitioner Domingo L. Antigua by filing a motion for relief of the
the resolution of this Court directing the said judge to "expedite the settlement administrator.
and adjudication of the case" in G.R. No. 54232. And finally, they state that the
disqualification of judge Burgos would delay further the closing of the On March 5, 1979, Atty. Villagonzalo filed a request for the issuance of a
administration proceeding as he is the only judge who is conversant with the 47 subpoena duces tecum to private respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring and
volumes of the records of the case. produce all the owners" copies of the titles in the court presided order by Judge
Burgos.
Respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo, to show that he had been harassed.
countered that Judge Burgos appointed Ricardo V. Reyes as co-administrator of Consequently. the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces
the estate on October 11, 1972, yet Borromeo was singled out to make an tecum commanding Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring and produce the titles
accounting of what t he was supposed to have received as rentals for the land in court.
upon which the Juliana Trade Center is erected, from January, 1977 to February
1982, inclusive, without mentioning the withholding tax for the Bureau of All the above-incidents were set for hearing on June 7, 1979 but on June 14,
Internal Revenue. In order to bolster the agitation to sell as proposed by 1979, before the date of the hearing, Judge Burgos issued an order denying the
Domingo L. Antigua, Judge Burgos invited Antonio Barredo, Jr., to a series of private respondents' motion for reconsideration and the motion to quash the
conferences from February 26 to 28, 1979. During the conferences, Atty. Antonio subpoena.1avvphi1
Barredo, Jr., offered to buy the shares of the heirs-distributees presumably to
cover up the projected sale initiated by Atty. Antigua. It was further argued by the private respondents that if ,judge Francisco P.
Burgos is not inhibited or disqualified from trying Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, there
On March 2, 1979, or two days after the conferences, a motion was filed by would be a miscarriage of justice Because for the past twelve years, he had not
petitioner Domingo L. Antigua praying that Jose Cuenco Borromeo be required to done anything towards the closure of the estate proceedings except to sell the
file an inventory when he has already filed one to account for cash, a report on properties of the heirs-distributees as initiated by petitioner Domingo L. Antigua
which the administrators had already rendered: and to appear and be examined at 6.7 million pesos while the Intestate Court had already evaluated it at 15
under oath in a proceeding conducted by Judge Burgos lt was also prayed that million pesos.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 32

The allegations of the private respondents in their motion for inhibition, more names as early as 1970, notwithstanding the pending inhibition case elevated
specifically, the insistence of the trial judge to sell the entire estate at before this Court which is docketed as G.R. No. 63818.
P6,700,000.00, where 4/9 group of heirs objected, cannot easily be ignored.
Suspicion of partiality on the part of a trial judge must be avoided at all costs. InThe petitioners further argue that the present status of Special Proceeding No.
the case of Bautista v. Rebeuno(81 SCRA 535), this Court stated: 916-R requires only the appraisal of the attorney's fees of the lawyers-claimants
who were individually hired by their respective heirs-clients, so their attorney's
... The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties fees should be legally charged against their respective clients and not against the
litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first estate.
sign of lack of faith and trust to his actions, whether well grounded or not, the
Judge has no other alternative but inhibit himself from the case. A judge may not On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the petition is a dilatory one
be legally Prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear and barred by res judicata because this Court on July 8, 1981, in G.R. No. 54232
that will induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor or of either directed the respondent Judge to expedite the settlement and liquidation of the
partly or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. decedent's estate. They claim that this resolution, which was already final and
He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of executory, was in effect reversed and nullified by the Intermediate Appellate
Justice is not impaired, "The better course for the Judge under such Court in its case-AC G.R.-No. SP - 11145 when it granted the petition for
circumstances is to disqualify himself "That way he avoids being misunderstood, certiorari and or prohibition and disqualified Judge Francisco P. Burgos from
his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserve ed. what is more important, taking further cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 916R as well as ordering the
the Ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up to. transmission of the records of the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling on March 1, 1983, which was appealed to
In this case, the fervent distrust of the private respondents is based on sound this Court by means of a Petition for Review (G.R. No. 63818).
reasons. As Earlier stated, however, the petition for review seeking to modify the
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits We agree with the petitioners' contention that attorney's fees are not the
Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the Intestate Estate of Vito obligation of the estate but of the individual heirs who individually hired their
Borromeo case and ordering the remand of the case to the Executive Judge of respective lawyers. The portion, therefore, of the Order of August 15, 1969,
the Regional Trial Court for re-raffling should be DENIED for the decision is not segregating the exhorbitantly excessive amount of 40% of the market value of
only valid but the issue itself has become moot and academic. the estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and paid should be deleted.

G.R. No. 65995 Due to our affirmance of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R.
No. 63818, we grant the petition.
The petitioners seek to restrain the respondents from further acting on any and
all incidents in Special Proceedings No. 916-R during the pendency of this WHEREFORE,
petition and No. 63818. They also pray that all acts of the respondents related to
the said special proceedings after March 1, 1983 when the respondent Judge was (1) In G.R. No. 41171, the order of the respondent judge dated December 24,
disqualified by the appellate court be declared null and void and without force 1974, declaring the respondent entitled to 5/9 of the estate of the late Vito
and effect whatsoever. Borromeo and the order dated July 7, 1975, denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the aforementioned order are hereby SET ASIDE for being
The petitioners state that the respondent Judge has set for hearing all incidents NULL and VOID;
in Special Proceedings No. 916-R, including the reversion from the heirs-
distributees to the estate, of the distributed properties already titled in their (2) In G.R. No. 55000, the order of the trial court declaring the waiver document
valid is hereby SET ASIDE;
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 33

(3) In G.R. No. 63818, the petition is hereby DENIED. The issue in the decision
of the Intermediate Appellate Court disqualifying and ordering the inhibition of
Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing Special Proceedings No. 916-R is
declared moot and academic. The judge who has taken over the sala of retired
Judge Francisco P. Burgos shall immediately conduct hearings with a view to
terminating the proceedings. In the event that the successor-judge is likewise
disqualified, the order of the Intermediate Appellate Court directing the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to re-raffle the case shall be
implemented:

(4) In G.R. No. 65995, the petition is hereby GRANTED. 'The issue seeking to
restrain Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further acting in G.R. No. 63818 is MOOT
and ACADEMIC:

(5) In G.R, No, 62895, the trial court is hereby ordered to speedily terminate the
close Special Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the submission of an inventory of
the real properties of the estate and an accounting of the cash and bank deposits
by the petitioner-administrator of the estate as required by this Court in its
Resolution dated June 15, 1983; and

(6) The portion of the Order of August 15, 1969, segregating 40% of the market
value of the estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and paid should be,
as it is hereby DELETED. The lawyers should collect from the heirs-distributees
who individually hired them, attorney's fees according to the nature of the
services rendered but in amounts which should not exceed more than 20% of the
market value of the property the latter acquired from the estate as beneficiaries.

SO ORDERED.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 34

G.R. No. 95574 August 16, 1991 They alleged that venues was improperly said and that the properties of the
decedent located outside Aguinaldo were beyond the jurisdiction of the Shari'a
HADJI WAHIDA MUSA, HADJI SALMA MUSA, RIZAL MUSA and BASSER District. Court, Fifth Shari'a District.
MUSA, petitioners,
vs. Finding the Joint Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Respondent
HON. COROCOY D. MOSON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari'a Judge issued the Order of Publication on 1 July 1989 and initially set the case for
District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, Cotabato City and HADJI JAHARA hearing on 18 September 1989.
ABDURAHIM, respondents.
All interested parties were duly represented during the hearing on said date
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:p where petitioners, through counsel, manifested their desire to have the case
amicably settled, Respondent Judo "in the interest of peace and harmony among
Questions of jurisdiction of the Shari'a District Court, and of venue, in an the heirs of the deceased Jamiri Musa," appointed the following as Special
intestate proceeding are herein raised. Administrators: ABDURAHIM, for all properties situated in Maguindanao; RIZAL.
for all properties situated in Davao Oriental; and BASSER. for all properties
Involved is the intestate estate of the late Jamiri Musa, a Muslim, who passed situated in Davao del Sul.
away on 31 December 1987. He had six (6) wives, three (3) of whom he later
divorced, and twenty three (23) children. He had extensive real and personal However, on 4 October 1989, ABDURAHIM, in her manifestation and Motion to
properties located in the provinces of Maguindanao, Davao del Sur and Davao Cite for Contempt," accused BASSER, among others, of having allegedly fired
Oriental. Petitioners, Hadji WAHIDA Musa and Hadji SALMA Musa, are among upon the house of her son in-law in Maguindanao on 21 September 1989.
those he divorced, while private respondent Hadji Jalai a ABDURAHIM is one of
the three (3) surviving widows, RIZAL Musa and BASSER Musa are two (2) of his Whereupon, on 13 October 1989, an "Opposition to Petition for Administration
sons. and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership" was filed by Petitioners, alleging that
ABDURAHIM was never legally married to the decedent and, as such, there was
On 7 July 1989, Respondent ABDURAHIM filed a "Joint Petition for the "nothing to support her claim" of having had a conjugal partnership with the
Administration and Settlement of the Inestate Estate of the Late Jamiri Musa and latter; and that venue was improperly laid. Petitioners also asked that RIZAL be
Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership," before the Shari'a District Court, Fifth issued Letters of Administration instead.
Sharia's District, with station at Cotabato City (SDC Spec. Proceedings No. 89-
19) (the Intestate Case). That Court embraces the province of Maguindanao In her Reply, filed on 25 October 1989, ABDURAHIM averred that, her marriage
within its jurisdiction but not the provinces of Davao del Sur and Oriental. to the decedent was admitted by the latter in various Deeds of Sale he had
signed, which were presented as documentary evidence. Since there was no
The Petition averred that the decedent Jamiri Musa a resident of Linao, Upi, amicable settlement reached, hearings on the Joint Petition were conducted,
Maguindanao, left various properties located in the provinces of Maguindanao commencing on 27 December 1989.
(184 hectares), Davao del Sur (61 hectares), and Davao Oriental (207 hectares).
Aside from the settlement of the vast estate, also prayed for was the liquidation On 16 May 1990, Respondent Judge, issued an Order appointing ABDURAHIM as
of the conjugal partnership assets of the decedent and ABDURAHIM and the Regular Administratrix upon the finding that she was legally married to the
segregation and turn-over to the latter of her one-half (1/2) share. decedent. Petitioners moved for reconsideration.

Appearing as oppositors were: Petitioners WAHIDA and SALMA, the divorced In the interim, Respondent Judge issued an Amended Order, dated 4 June 1990,
wives, who also claim to be widows of the deceased: RIZAL, Putih Musa, and incorporating the testimonies of the two (2) other witnesses presented by
Erum Musa, children of WAHIDA with the decedent; and BASSER, another son.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 35

Petitioners, which were omitted in the Order, dated 16 May 1990. Otherwise, the In invoking improper venue, however, petitioners call attention to the Rules of
appointment of ABDURAHIM as Regular Administratrix was maintained. Court mandating that:

On 10 August 1990, Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Motion to Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.If the decedent is an
Dismiss," raising once again, mainly the questions of venue and of jurisdiction of inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
the respondent Court over the real properties of the decedent situated in the alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
provinces of Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental. settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
Respondent Judge denied both Motions and upheld the Court's jurisdiction in his First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
Order, dated 22 August 1990. Hence, the elevation of the instant Petition for cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
Prohibition before this Court seeking to enjoin respondent Judge Corocoy D. jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
Moson, presiding over the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, from court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
further taking action on the "Joint Petition ." location his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
Petitioners take the position that Respondent Judge should have dismissed the appears on the record. (Rule 73). (Emphasis supplied).
Intestate Case for lack of jurisdiction and for improper venue. Private respondent
maintains the contrary. It is then claimed that since the residence of the decedent at the time of his
death was actually in Davao City, not Maguindanao, as averred by ABDUHARIM,
We rule against Petitioners. the proceeding is beyond the jurisdiction of the Shari'a District Court, Fifth
Shari'a District, and that venue is more properly laid in Davao City before the
Pres. Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of Regional Trial Court since there are no Shari'a District Courts therein.
the Philippines, explicitly provides that exclusive original jurisdiction, in matters
of settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, belong to Shari'a District At this juncture, it should be recalled that the residence of the deceased in an
Courts. Thus: estate proceeding is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but
merely of venue. The law of jurisdiction confers upon Courts of First Instance
Art. 143. Original Jurisdiction.The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive (now Regional Trial Courts) jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of
original jurisdictionover: the place of residence of the deceased (In the matter of the intestate estate of
Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239 [1943]).
xxx xxx xxx
To all appearances, the decedent was a resident of both Linao, Upi,
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of Maguindanao, and Davao City. In fact, in various Deeds of Sale presented as
deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or evidence by the parties, the decedent alternately stated his place of residence as
appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the either Linao, Upi,Maguindanao which is the residence of ABDURAHIM, or Davao
aggregate value of the property. (Chapter 1, Title I, Book IV, par. (b), (Emphasis City, where Petitioners reside. As this Court held in Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil.
supplied). 890 (1954), "a man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at
any time, but he may have numerous places of residence." Venue, therefore,
Since the disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of a deceased ordinarily could be at either place of the decedent's residence, i.e., Maguindanao
Muslim is, in fact, involved herein, the Joint Petition was correctly filed before the or Davao City, but for the provisions of the Muslim Code vesting exclusive
Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District. original jurisdiction, in matters of disposition and settlement of estates of
deceased Muslims, in Shari'a District Courts (supra).
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 36

But petitioners also contend that the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, When an action covers various parcels of land situated in different provinces,
presided over by respondent Judge, has no territorial jurisdiction over properties venue may be laid in the Court of First Instance of any of said provinces, and the
of the decedent situated in the provinces of Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental, judgment rendered therein may be executed in other provinces where the rest of
citing as statutory authority therefor the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, which the real estate is situated (National Bank v. Barreto, 52 Phil. 818 [1929]; Monte
provides: Piedad v. Rodrigo, 56 Phil. 310 [1931]; El Hogar Filipino v. Seva ,57 Phil. 573 [L-
1932]; Bank of P.I. v. Green, 57 Phil. 712 [1932]).
Art. 138. Shari'a judicial districts.Five special judicial districts, each to have
one Shari'a District Court presided over by one judge, are constituted as follows: The Rules of Court likewise provide that the Court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
xxx xxx xxx of all other Courts(Rule 73, sec. 1). There should be no impediment to the
application of said Rules as they apply suppletorily to the Code of Muslim
(e) The Fifth Shari'a District, the Provinces of Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Personal Laws, there being nothing inconsistent with the provisions of the latter
Sultan Kudarat, and the City of Cotabato. statute (Article 187 of said Code).

Indeed, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental are not comprised within the Fifth And while Rule 73 provides that "the jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
Shari'a District. In fact, those provinces are outside the Autonomous Region in depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
Muslim Mindanao created by Republic Act No. 6734, its Organic Act. But as estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding except in an appeal from
stated in that law, "the Shari'a District Court and the Shari'a Circuit Courts that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
created under existing laws shall continue to function as provided therein." (Art. record," we have taken cognizance of this Petition for Prohibition considering that
IX, Sec. 13). the jurisdiction of a Shari'a District Court, a relatively new Court in our judicial
system, has been challenged.
Additionally, the same Organic Act explicitly provides;
WHEREFORE, this Petition for Prohibition is DENIED, and the case hereby
(4) Except in cases of successional rights, the regular courts shall acquire REMANDED to the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, for continuation of
jurisdiction over controversies involving real property outside the area of the intestate proceedings. No costs.
autonomy. (Art. IX, Section 17[4]). (Emphasis supplied)
SO ORDERED.
Since the subject intestate proceeding concerns successional rights, coupled with
the fact that the decedent was also a resident of Linao, Upi, Maguindanao,
owning real estate property located in that province, venue has been properly
laid with the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, winch is vested with
territorial jurisdiction over Maguindanao, notwithstanding the location in different
provinces of the other real proper- ties of the decedent.

A contrary ruling would only result in multiplicity of suits, to the detriment of the
expeditious settlement of estate proceedings (See Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, 30
June 1988,163 SCRA 237 [1988]). Besides, the judgment that may be rendered
by the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, may be executed in other
provinces where the rest of the real estate is situated.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 37

G.R. No. 92436 July 26, 1991 No. I A-14 (Exh. "6-A"), were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's
children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the children thereafter secured tax
MARIA VDA. DE REYES, EFREN REYES, ELVIRA REYES-TIMBOL, ERLINDA declarations for their respective shares.
REYES-VALERIO, ERNESTO REYES, ELIZABETH REYES, ALEX, RAFAEL II,
EMELINA and EVELYN, all surnamed REYES, represented by their mother, In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original
MARIA VDA. DE REYES, petitioners, certificate of title for the whole property OCT No. 255 was issued. It was,
vs. however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-in-law of Marcelo Reyes, who was by then
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES DALMACIO GARDIOLA and already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of this fact.
ROSARIO MARTILLANOrespondents.
On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of
De Lara, De Lunas & Rosales for petitioners. 23,431 square meters, more or less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola
(Exh. "5"). According to the vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No. 1-A-14 of
Santos, Pilapil & Associates for private respondents. the subdivision plan aforestated. The deed of sale, however, did not specifically
mention Lot No. 1-A-14. The vendee immediately took possession of the property
and started paying the land taxes therein.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p In 1945 or thereabouts, Juan Poblete "revalidated" the original Certificate of
Title. As reconstituted, the new title is OCT (0-4358) RO-255 (Exhs. "4" to "4-
Assailed before Us in this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court A").
is the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934,
promulgated on 20 October 1989, 1 reversing the decision of 1 October 1986 of On 21 October 1967, when the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of
Branch 21 (Imus, Cavite) of the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Exh. "D") based on the aforestated
in Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17 entitled Maria vda. de Reyes, et al. vs. Spouses subdivision plan (Exh. "6"), the lot that was intended for Rafael Reyes, Sr., who
Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano, and Spouses Ricardo M. Gardiola and was already deceased, was instead adjudicated to his only son and heir, Rafael
Emelita Gardiola, 2 and the resolution of 1 March 1990 denying the petitioner's Reyes, Jr. (the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners herein). Private
motion for reconsideration. respondent Rosario Martillano signed the deed in representation of her mother,
Marta Reyes, one of the children of Gavino Reyes.
As culled from both decisions and the pleadings of the parties, the following facts
have been preponderantly established: As a result of the Extrajudicial Settlement, OCT RO-255 was cancelled and in lieu
thereof, several transfer certificates of title covering the subdivided lots were
During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 issued in the names of the respective adjudicatees. One of them is TCT No.
hectares, more or less, located at Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He 27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr. covering Lot No. 1-A-14. The Transfer
sought to bring said land under the operation of the Torrens System of Certificates of Title were, however, kept by one Candido Hebron. On 10 January
registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title having 1969, some of the heirs of Gavino Reyes filed a case of Annulment of Partition
been issued to him. The application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, and Recovery of Possession before the Court of First Instance of Cavite City,
who was the administrator of his property. which was docketed therein as Civil Case No. 1267. One of the defendants in said
case is herein private respondent Rosario Martillano. The case was dismissed on
In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs (Exh. 18 September 1969, but Candido Hebron was ordered by the trial court to deliver
"6"). In the subdivision plan, each resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and to the heirs concerned all the transfer certificates of title in his possession. 3
assigned to a specific heir. It appears therein that two lots, one of which is Lot

After obtaining the Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot No. 1-A-14 from Hebron,
pursuant to the aforesaid order in Civil Case No. 1267, petitioners herein, as
successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., filed on 14 March 1983 with the
Regional Trial Court the above-mentioned Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17 against
private respondents (defendants therein) for recovery of possession or, in the
alternative, for indemnification, accounting and damages. They allege therein
that after "having definitely discovered that they are the lawful owners of the
property," (Lot No. 1-A-14), they, "including Rafael Reyes, Jr., during his
lifetime, made repeated demands to (sic) defendants to surrender the possession
of and vacate the parcel of land belonging to the former, but defendants refused
to vacate and surrender the possession of the said land to herein plaintiffs;" the
last of the demands was allegedly made on 8 October 1982. They further allege
that they have been deprived by said defendants of the rightful possession and
enjoyment of the property since September 1969 which coincides with the
date of the order in Civil Case No. 1267. 4
In their answer, private respondents deny the material averments in the
complaint and assert that they are the owners of the lot in question, having
bought the same from Rafael Reyes, Sr., that the issuance of TCT No. 27257 is
null and void, for such sale was known to Rafael Reyes, Jr.; that they have been
in possession of the property and have been paying the land taxes thereon; and
that petitioners are barred by prescription and/or laches. 5
Petitioners amended their complaint on 21 March 1985 to implead as additional
defendants the spouses Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emerita Gardiola, on the basis of
the following claims:
xxx xxx xxx
9. Meanwhile, during the presentation of the defendants spouses Dalmacio
Gardiola and Rosario Martillano's evidence the former testified that they
mortgaged the subject land to the Rural Bank of Carmona Inc. For their failure to
redeem the mortgage the same was foreclosed by the bank.
10. However, within the period of one(1) year from such foreclosure the
questioned land was redeemed by the original defendants' son in the person of
Ricardo M. Gardiola, who was knowledgeable/aware of the pendency of the
above captioned case. The corresponding redemption was effected through a The trial court further held that the continued possession by private respondents,
deed of conveyance, . . . . 6 which it found to have started in 1943, did not ripen into ownership because at
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 38
The prayer of the amended complaint now contains the alternative relief for
indemnification for the reasonable value of the property "in the event restitution
of the property is no longer possible." 7
In its decision of 1 October 1986, 8 the trial court concluded that petitioners'
"title over the subject property is valid and regular and thus they are entitled to
its possession and enjoyment," and accordingly decided thus:
WHEREFORE, the defendants or anyone acting for and in their behalf are hereby
ordered to relinguish possession or vacate the property in question which is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 in favor of the plaintiffs.
All other claims and/or counterclaims of the parties relative to this case are
dismissed for lack of proper substantiation.
The conclusion of the trial court is based on its finding that (a) there is no
evidence that the heirs of Gavino Reyes entered into any written agreement of
partition in 1936 based on the subdivision plan; (b) there is no identity between
Lot No. 1-14-A and the land sold to private respondents by Rafael Reyes, Sr., or
otherwise stated, the description of the latter as indicated in the deed of sale
(Exh. "5") does not tally with the description of the former; and (c) moreover:
Granting, arguendo, that the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to the defendants
covered the land in question Lot No. 1-A-14 and that Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-27257 was obtained by means of fraud, the claim of the defendants
over the said property is already barred. Action for reconveyance prescribes in
four (4) years from the discovery thereof. If there was fraud, the defendant could
have discovered the same in 1967 when the partition was made in as much as
defendant Rosario Martillano was a party to that partition. Let us grant further
that the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 to Rafael Reyes, Jr.
created a constructive or implied trust in favor of the defendants, again, the
claim of the defendants is also barred. From 1967 to the filing of their answer
(let us consider this as an action for reconveyance) to this case sometime in July,
1983, a period of about sixteen (16) years had already elapsed. Prescriptibility of
an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust is ten (10)
years.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 39

that time, the property was already registered, hence it cannot be acquired by torrens title, as it was only in 1941 when said properties were brought into the
prescription or adverse possession. 9 application of the torrens system. With this factual milieu, it can also be
concluded that his heirs have indeed settled, subdivided and partitioned Gavino
Private respondents appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals which Reyes' landed estate without formal requirements of Rule 74 of the Rules of
docketed the appeal as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934. In its decision of 20 October Court when a parcel of land is covered by a torrens title. As told earlier, the
1989, the respondent Court of Appeals formulated the issues before it as follows: Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) undisputedly showed on its face that the 70 hectares of
land belonging to the late Gavino Reyes was subdivided and partitioned by his
I children in 1936. On this score, the partition of the said property even without
the formal requirements under the rule is valid as held in the case of Hernandez
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the property of the late vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 176, which states:
Gavino Reyes consisting of 70 hectares was partitioned only in 1967 by his
grandchildren after discovery of the existence of OCT No. 255 and that no actual xxx xxx xxx
partition was made in 1936 by the decedent's children.
Moreover, in the Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1943 (Exh. 5) executed by
II Rafael Reyes, Sr. in favor of appellant Dalmacio Gardiola, the land sold therein
was described as "na aking minana sa aking ama." This alone would confirm the
Whether or not the lower court erred in concluding that the parcel of land sold by contention of the appellants that there was already an actual partition (at least
the appellees' predecessor-in-interest, the late Rafael Reyes, Sr. to appellant an oral partition) of the property of Gavino Reyes in 1936. As aforestated, the
Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under litigation. 10 presence of the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) is an (sic) evidence of such partition
which appellees failed to controvert not to mention the fact that the lower court
and resolved such issues, thus: itself recognized the existence of said plan, in the same manner that it concluded
that the property was already surveyed and actually subdivided in 1936 (page 3,
On the first issue, We believe that the lower court committed a reversible error pars. 3 and 4, Decision).
when it declared that the landed estate of the late Gavino Reyes was partitioned
only in 1967 by the latter's grandchildren; and that no actual partition was made From the foregoing considerations it is evident that the Deed of Extrajudicial
in 1936 by the decedents' (sic) children. The evidence on record bears out the Settlement of Estate (Exh. D) executed by the grandchildren of the late Gavino
existence of a subdivision plan (Exh. 6) which was not controverted nor denied Reyes in 1967 is of no moment considering that the property subject of the
by the appellees. In like manner, the lower court itself recognized the fact that partition in the deed was already partitioned in 1936 by the children of Gavino
the property of the late Gavino Reyes consisting of 70 hectares was surveyed Reyes. It is for this reason that the lots supposedly inherited by the
and subdivided in 1936 as evidenced by the said subdivision plan (Exh. 6). With grandchildren named in the deed of 1967 were the same lots inherited and given
the existence of a subdivision plan, and from the uncontroverted testimony of to their respective fathers or mothers in 1936 while the land was not yet covered
appellants' witness, We can only infer that at least an oral partition, which under by the torrens system. Hence, in the case of Rafael Reyes, Sr., the land inherited
the law is valid and binding, was entered into by the heirs of Gavino Reyes by him was two (2) parcels of land known as Lots Nos. 1-A-3 and 1-A-14
regarding his properties in 1936. As held in a long line of decisions, extrajudicial described in the Subdivision plan of 1936 (Exh. 6), which were the same parcels
partition can be done orally, and the same would be valid if freely entered into of land allegedly inherited by Rafael Reyes, Jr. from Gavino Reyes in
(Belen v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997, March 1953). The reason for this is because a representation of his father, pursuant to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
partition is not exactly a conveyance for the reason that it does not involve Estate for which TCT No. 27257 was issued.
transfer of property from one to the other but rather a confirmation by them of
their ownership of the property. It must also be remembered that when Gavino Coming to the second issue, the lower court likewise erred when it concluded
Reyes died on March 7, 1921, his property was admittedly not yet covered by a that the parcel of land sold by appellee's predecessor-in-interest to appellant

Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under litigation. It must be
pointed out that the identity of the parcel of land which the appellees sought to
recover from the appellants was never an issue in the lower court, because the
litigants had already conceded that the parcel identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT
No. 27257 was the same parcel of land identified as Cadastral Lot No. 1228 and
1235 described in Tax Declaration No. 4766. Despite this admission, however,
the lower court declared that "as described in the deed of sale (Exh. 5), the
land's description does not tally with the description of Lot No. 1-A-14, the land
in litigation." As correctly pointed out by the appellants however, the discrepancy
in the description was due to the fact that the description of the land sold in the
Deed of Sale was expressed in layman's language whereas the description of Lot
No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was done in technical terms. This was so because,
when Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold the property in dispute to appellant Dalmacio
Gardiola on December 3, 1943, the only evidence of title to the land then
available in so far as Rafael Reyes, Sr. was concerned was Tax Declaration No.
4766, because at that time, neither he nor appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was
aware of the existence of OCT No. 255 as in fact TCT No. 27257 was issued only
in 1967. Consequently, the land subject of the Deed of Sale was described by the
vendor in the manner as described in Tax Declaration No. 4766. However, the
description of the land appearing in the Deed of Sale (Exh. 5) was exactly the
same land identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) of 1936.
Accordingly, the assumption of the lower court that "if the land sold by Rafael
Reyes, Sr. was the one now in litigation, he could have easily indicated Lot No. 1-
A-14" is bereft of merit under the foregoing circumstances. Interestingly enough,
the appellees never denied the identity of the subject lot during the hearing at
the lower court. What they were denying only was the sale made by Rafael
Reyes, Sr. to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola which does not hold true because of
the document denominated as Deed of Sale (Exh. 5). 11
It concluded that the trial court erred when it ordered the private respondents or
anyone acting in their behalf to relinquish the possession or vacate the property
in question. It thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is ordered REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
a new one is rendered declaring appellants to be the lawful owners of the lot
identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257. No
12
costs.
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 40
Their motion to reconsider the above decision having been denied by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution of 1 March 1990, 13 petitioners filed the instant petition
on 6 April 1990 after having obtained an extension of time within which to file it.
The petition does not implead original new defendants Ricardo Gardiola and
Emelita Gardiola.
As ground for their plea for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
petitioners allege that said court has decided questions of substance in a way not
in accord with law or applicable jurisprudence when it held that "the deed of
extrajudicial settlement of estate (Exh. "D") executed by the grandchildren of the
late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no moment considering that the property subject
of the partition was already partitioned in 1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes."
In support thereof, they claim that (a) TCT No. 27257 covers two parcels of land;
the lot described in paragraph 1 thereof is owned by petitioners and that
ownership was confirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 79882, hence, the Court of
Appeals should have affirmed the decision of the trial court; (b) private
respondent Rosario Martillano was a party to the extrajudicial settlement of
estate which was duly registered in the Registry of Deeds in 1967; said
registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien
upon the land and also constituted constructive notice to the whole world. The
court cannot disregard the binding effect thereof Finally, the pronouncement of
the Court of Appeals that private respondents are the lawful owners of the lot in
question "militates against the indefeasible and incontrovertible character of the
torrens title," 14 and allows reconveyance which is not tenable since the action
therefor had already prescribed, as stated in the decision of the trial court.
In the resolution of 7 May 1990, We required respondents to comment on the
petition. But even before it could do so, petitioner, without obtaining prior leave
of the Court, filed on 29 May 1990 a so-called Supplemental Arguments in
Support of The Petition For Review On certiorari 15 wherein they assert, among
others, that: (a) the findings of facts of respondent Court are contrary to those of
the trial court and appear to be contradicted by the evidence on record thus
calling for the review by this Court; 16 (b) it also committed misapprehension of
the facts in this case and its findings are based on speculation, conjecture and
surmises; (c) private respondents' attack on petitioners' title is a collateral attack
which is not allowed; even if it is allowed, the same had already prescribed and is
now barred.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 41

It was only on 15 June 1990 that private respondents filed their Comment. 17 We Durumpili case before the Third Division, the Court of Appeals relied on the
required petitioners to reply thereto, which they complied with on 8 August alleged confirmation of the sale executed by Angustia Reyes, while in the Reyes
1990. 18 A rejoinder was filed by private respondents on 29 August 1990. case before this Second Division, there was no sale that was executed by the
petitioners Reyes' predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr.
We gave due course to the petition on 19 September 1990 and required the
parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda which they The foregoing claim is not supported by the rollo of G.R. No. 92811, which
complied with. reveals the following: (a) On 18 September 1990, petitioners therein,
represented by De Lara, De Lunas and Rosales, who are the lawyers of
Attached as Annex "A" to private respondent's Memorandum, which was filed on petitioners in the instant case, filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
10 December 1990, is the Resolution of this Court (Third Division) of 20 August resolution of 20 August 1990. 19 b) This motion was denied in the resolution of 1
1990 in G.R. No. 92811 entitled Spouses Artemio Durumpili and Angustia Reyes October 1990. 20 c) On 17 November 1990, petitioners therein, through the
vs. The Court of Appeals and Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario same lawyers, filed a Motion For Leave Of Court To Refer Case To The Honorable
Martillano, which also involves the property of Gavino Reyes, the partition Supreme Court En Banc And/Or Motion For Reconsideration 21 wherein they
thereof among his children in 1936, and the extrajudicial settlement in 1967. specifically admit that said case and the instant petition have "identity and/or
similarity of the parties, the facts, the issues raised," even going to the extent of
In said resolution, this Court held: "graphically" illustrating where such similarities lie. 22d) This motion was denied
in the resolution of 28 November 1990. Copy thereof was furnished the attorneys
. . . The partition made in 1936, although oral, was valid. The requirement in for petitioners. 23 e) Entry of judgment had already been made therein and a
Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation, copy thereof was sent to petitioner's counsel per Letter of Transmittal of the
transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable Deputy Court and Chief of the Judicial Records Office dated 20 December 1990.
property must appear in a public instrument is only for convenience and not for
validity or enforceability as between the parties themselves. [Thunga Hui vs. Que What comes out prominently from the disquisitions of the parties is this simple
Bentec, 2 Phil. 561 (1903)] The subsequent execution by the heirs of the issue: whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible
Extrajudicial Partition in 1967 did not alter the oral partition as in fact the share error in setting aside the decision of the trial court.
pertaining to Angustia Reyes corresponded to that previously assigned to her
father. Considering that Angel Reyes sold this property to Basilio de Ocampo We find none. The reversal of the trial court's decision is inevitable and
who, in turn, sold the same to respondents, we agree with the Court of Appeals unavoidable because the legal and factual conclusions made by the trial court are
that the latter lawfully acquired the property and are entitled to ownership and unfounded and clearly erroneous. The Court of Appeals was not bound to agree
possession thereof. to such conclusions. The trial court erred in holding that: (a) there was no
partition among the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936 since there is no written
In answer to the charge of private respondents that petitioners deliberately failed evidence in support thereof; yet, it admits that there was a survey and
to cite this resolution, the latter, in their reply-memorandum dated 15 March subdivision of the property and the adjudication of specific subdivision lots to
1991 and filed three days thereafter, allege: each of the children of Gavino; (b) the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private
respondents is not identical to Lot No. 1-A-14, the lot specified for and
Our failure to mention the aforementioned resolution before this Honorable Court adjudicated to Rafael Reyes, Jr. in the partition agreement; and (c) if the land
is not deliberate nor with malice aforethought. The reason is that to date, we sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is indeed Lot
have not yet received any resolution to our Motion For Leave of Court To Refer No. 1-A-14 and that TCT No. T-27257 was obtained through fraud, the remedy
Case To The Honorable Supreme Court En Banc. Moreover, we honestly feel that open to the vendee was an action for reconveyance, which should have been
the resolution that will be issued therein will not be applicable to the case before brought within four (4) years from the discovery thereof in 1967 when the
this Honorable Court's Second Division. It should be mentioned that in the
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 42

Extrajudicial Settlement was executed since private respondent Rosario Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and
Martillano, wife of Dalmacio, was a party thereto. benefits pertaining thereto, and he may even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
Gavino Reyes in 1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid. 24 In Hernandez co-ownership.
vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court, held that the requirement that a partition be put in a public document and In Ramirez vs. Bautista, 27 this Court held that every co-heir has the absolute
registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time ownership of his share in the community property and may alienate, assign, or
the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of mortgage the same, except as to purely personal rights, but the effect of any
registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the
intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not partition of the property.
come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not
affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent
estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan Dalmacio Gardiola is his share in the estate of his deceased father, Gavino
different from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from which Reyes. It is the same property which was eventually adjudicated to his son and
it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners herein-in the
validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid. extrajudicial settlement of 1967.

Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral
partition is valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition
among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a
conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not involve transfer of
property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or
right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and
receiving the inheritance.
Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly
sustained by this Court in the Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811. 25
But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partition executed in 1936
was not valid for some reason or another, We would still arrive at the same
conclusion for upon the death of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically
became co-owners of his 70-hectare parcel of land. The rights to the succession
are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. 26 The estate of the
decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-
owner may validly dispose of his share or interest in the property subject to the
condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the division The participation of private respondent Rosario Gardiola in the Extrajudicial
upon termination of the co-ownership. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
In respect to the issue as to whether the property sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. is
identical to Lot No. 1-14-A, the trial court based its conclusion that it is not, on
his observation that the description of the former does not tally with that of the
latter, moreover, if Rafael did intend to sell Lot No. 1-14-A, he should have
specifically stated it in the deed since at that time, the property had already been
partitioned and said lot was adjudicated to him. In addition to the contrary
findings and conclusion of the respondent Court on this issue to which We fully
agree, it is to be stressed that Rafael had this property declared for taxation
purposes and the tax declaration issued was made the basis for the description of
the property in the deed of sale. Upon the execution of the deed of sale, vendee
herein private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola immediately took possession
of the property. This is the very same property which is the subject matter of this
case and which petitioners seek to recover from the private respondents. The
main evidence adduced for their claim of ownership and possession over it is TCT
No. T-27257, the certificate of title covering Lot No. 1-14-A. They therefore
admit and concede that the property claimed by private respondent, which was
acquired by sale from Rafael Reyes, Sr., is none other than Lot No. 1-14-A.
Settlement did not place private respondents in estoppel to question the issuance
of TCT No. T-27257. As correctly maintained by private respondents, she signed
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 43

it in representation of her deceased mother, Marta Reyes, a daughter and an heir SO ORDERED.
of Gavino Reyes. She did not sign for and in behalf of her husband, Dalmacio
Gardiola, vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr.

The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr.
in the estate of Gavino. Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael
Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael, Jr. could
transmit to them upon his death. The latter never became the owner of Lot No.
1-A-14 because it was sold by his father in 1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-
27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is concerned,
was clearly erroneous because he never became its owner. An extrajudicial
settlement does not create a light in favor of an heir. As this Court stated in
the Barcelona case, 28 it is but a confirmation or ratification of title or right to
property. Thus, since he never had any title or right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere
execution of the settlement did not improve his condition, and the subsequent
registration of the deed did not create any right or vest any title over the
property in favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr. The latter cannot
give them what he never had before. Nemo dare potest quod non habet.

There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners' immediate
predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr., never took any action against private
respondents from the time his father sold the lot to the latter. Neither did
petitioners bring any action to recover from private respondents the ownership
and possession of the lot from the time Rafael Reyes, Jr. died. As categorically
admitted by petitioners in their complaint and amended complaint, it was only in
or about September 1969 when, after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido
Hebron to them, that they definitely discovered that they were the owners of the
property in question. And yet, despite full knowledge that private respondents
were in actual physical possession of the property, it was only about thirteen and
one-half (13 1/2) years later that they decided to file an action for recovery of
possession. As stated earlier, the original complaint was filed in the trial court on
14 March 1983. There was then absolutely no basis for the trial court to place the
burden on private respondents to bring an action for reconveyance within four
(4) years from their discovery of the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in
the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.

The instant petition then is without merit.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition with costs

against petitioners.

G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y.
BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y.
PEALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a
Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a
Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular, petitioners assail the passport.13
July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No.
T-2246 for lack of cause of action.
The Facts
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins,4 filed a
complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject
complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E.
Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they
alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June
28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to
be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of
title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and
T-2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdalenos collateral relatives
and successors-in-interest.8
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as
evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic
School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of
affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action
against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 44
not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the
petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdalenos lawful heirs.10
The RTC Ruling
On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that
the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It
observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with
Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be considered as the
decedents compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily
established the fact that he is Magdalenos son and hence, his compulsory heir
through the documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however,
denied on August 31, 2011 due to the counsels failure to state the date on which
his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was issued.14
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-
2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not
the RTCs dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to
state a cause of action was proper.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right
of another.16 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is
determined by the allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is
said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its
face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed
for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 45

can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action
that may be averred by the defendants.19 which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs
therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as
declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial
latters favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and
would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a special
that the determination of a decedents lawful heirs should be made in the proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and
corresponding special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for hence, cannot be re-opened.24
cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of
Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear
that the determination of who are the decedents lawful heirs must be made in to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in
the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the
recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case: dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property.1wphi1 This
must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership.
The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be
made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong
while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration
of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners
here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of
heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil SO ORDERED.
action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the
same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material
to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with
applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an
ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of
Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out
that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudiosos heirship which should, as herein
discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding. As
such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal
effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is
hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to determine
the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant therewith.

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court
reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship
must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v.
Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 46

G.R. No. 177066 September 11, 2009 Finality thereof. To hasten the disposition of the case, the court conditionally
admitted the corrected birth certificate as genuine and authentic and ordered
JOSELITO MUSNI PUNO (as heir of the late Carlos Puno), Petitioner, respondent to file its answer within fifteen days from the order and set the case
vs. for pretrial.3
PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by JESUSA PUNO, Respondent.
On October 11, 2005, the court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of
DECISION which reads:

NACHURA, J.: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Jesusa Puno and/or Felicidad
Fermin to allow the plaintiff to inspect the corporate books and records of the
Upon the death of a stockholder, the heirs do not automatically become company from 1962 up to the present including the financial statements of the
stockholders of the corporation; neither are they mandatorily entitled to the corporation.
rights and privileges of a stockholder. This, we declare in this petition for review
on certiorari of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated October 11, 2006 and The costs of copying shall be shouldered by the plaintiff. Any expenses to be
Resolution dated March 6, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86137. incurred by the defendant to be able to comply with this order shall be the
subject of a bill of costs.
The facts of the case follow:
SO ORDERED.4
Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent
Puno Enterprises, Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, On appeal, the CA ordered the dismissal of the complaint in its Decision dated
claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint for specific October 11, 2006. According to the CA, petitioner was not able to establish the
performance against respondent. Petitioner averred that he is the son of the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno since his birth certificate was
deceased with the latters common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As surviving heir, he prepared without the intervention of and the participatory acknowledgment of
claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges of his late father as stockholder paternity by Carlos L. Puno. Accordingly, the CA said that petitioner had no right
of respondent. The complaint thus prayed that respondent allow petitioner to to demand that he be allowed to examine respondents books. Moreover,
inspect its corporate book, render an accounting of all the transactions it entered petitioner was not a stockholder of the corporation but was merely claiming
into from 1962, and give petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or income rights as an heir of Carlos L. Puno, an incorporator of the corporation. His action
pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. Puno.2 for specific performance therefore appeared to be premature; the proper action
to be taken was to prove the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno in a
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not have petition for the settlement of the estate of the latter.5
the legal personality to sue because his birth certificate names him as "Joselito
Musni Muno." Apropos, there was yet a need for a judicial declaration that Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its
"Joselito Musni Puno" and "Joselito Musni Muno" were one and the same. Resolution6 dated March 6, 2007.

The court ordered that the proceedings be held in abeyance, ratiocinating that In this petition, petitioner raises the following issues:
petitioners certificate of live birth was no proof of his paternity and relation to
Carlos L. Puno. I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
JOSELITO PUNO IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS DEMANDED HE BEING THE HEIR
Petitioner submitted the corrected birth certificate with the name "Joselito M. OF THE LATE CARLOS PUNO, ONE OF THE INCORPORATORS [OF] RESPONDENT
Puno," certified by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila, and the Certificate of CORPORATION.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 47

II. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT FILIATION OF As for the baptismal certificate, we have already decreed that it can only serve
JOSELITO PUNO, THE PETITIONER[,] IS NOT DULY PROVEN OR ESTABLISHED. as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not
of the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity.11
III. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT JOSELITO MUNO AND
JOSELITO PUNO REFERS TO THE ONE AND THE SAME PERSON. In any case, Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code enumerate the persons
who are entitled to the inspection of corporate books, thus
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT WHAT
RESPONDENT MERELY DISPUTES IS THE SURNAME OF THE PETITIONER WHICH Sec. 74. Books to be kept; stock transfer agent. x x x.
WAS MISSPELLED AND THE FACTUAL ALLEGATION E.G. RIGHTS OF PETITIONER
AS HEIR OF CARLOS PUNO ARE DEEMED ADMITTED HYPOTHETICALLY IN THE The records of all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of
RESPONDENT[S] MOTION TO DISMISS. any meeting shall be open to the inspection of any director, trustee, stockholder
or member of the corporation at reasonable hours on business days and he may
V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THEREFORE ERRED I[N] DECREEING demand, in writing, for a copy of excerpts from said records or minutes, at his
THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO INSPECT THE CORPORATE BOOKS OF expense.
DEFENDANT CORPORATION.7
xxxx
The petition is without merit. Petitioner failed to establish the right to inspect
respondent corporations books and receive dividends on the stocks owned by Sec. 75. Right to financial statements. Within ten (10) days from receipt of a
Carlos L. Puno. written request of any stockholder or member, the corporation shall furnish to
him its most recent financial statement, which shall include a balance sheet as of
Petitioner anchors his claim on his being an heir of the deceased stockholder. the end of the last taxable year and a profit or loss of statement for said taxable
However, we agree with the appellate court that petitioner was not able to prove year, showing in reasonable detail its assets and liabilities and the result of its
satisfactorily his filiation to the deceased stockholder; thus, the former cannot operations.12
claim to be an heir of the latter.
The stockholders right of inspection of the corporations books and records is
Incessantly, we have declared that factual findings of the CA supported by based upon his ownership of shares in the corporation and the necessity for self-
substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding.8 In an appeal via certiorari, the protection. After all, a shareholder has the right to be intelligently informed
Court may not review the factual findings of the CA. It is not the Courts function about corporate affairs.13 Such right rests upon the stockholders underlying
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh ownership of the corporations assets and property.14
the probative value of the evidence presented.9
Similarly, only stockholders of record are entitled to receive dividends declared
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not by the corporation, a right inherent in the ownership of the shares.151avvphi1
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar has Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become
no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of stockholders of the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the
a third person.10 As correctly observed by the CA, only petitioners mother deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be distributed first
supplied the data in the birth certificate and signed the same. There was no to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be
evidence that Carlos L. Puno acknowledged petitioner as his son. recorded in the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code
provides that no transfer shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the
transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation.16 During such interim period,
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 48

the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or
administrator duly appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the
stock.17 Until a settlement and division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the
decedent are held by the administrator or executor.18 Consequently, during such
time, it is the administrator or executor who is entitled to exercise the rights of
the deceased as stockholder.

Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that
he is the son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect
respondents books and be entitled to receive dividends from respondent, absent
any showing in its transfer book that some of the shares owned by Carlos L.
Puno were transferred to him. This would only be possible if petitioner has been
recognized as an heir and has participated in the settlement of the estate of the
deceased.

Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person,

claiming proprietary rights over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the
deceased must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the
purpose of settling the estate of the latter. The status of an illegitimate child who
claims to be an heir to a decedents estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary
civil action, as in a case for the recovery of property.19 The doctrine applies to
the instant case, which is one for specific performance to direct respondent
corporation to allow petitioner to exercise rights that pertain only to the
deceased and his representatives.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals

Decision dated October 11, 2006 and Resolution dated March 6, 2007 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 49

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007 Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no
children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets
and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a
x ---------------------------------------------------- x petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner, death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang
vs. Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his
second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and
DECISION exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of
set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of the improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of
May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He
further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with
Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother
Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the
predeceased Felicisimo. trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, withUnaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5,
whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing
that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the
regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14,Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree
1973. 6 of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii
to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 50

paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14 that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos
motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo
They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of
because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Felicisimos legitimate children.
Family Code.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from
hearing the case. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for dispositive portion of which states:
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed
the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are
Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October
because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial
S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion. court for further proceedings. 29

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16,
1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court,
Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of
facts and law on which it was based. the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation,
or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions
for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the
Arcangel. petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that
adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit,
papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively. State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the
elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 51

and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether
reason to sustain the individual view sweeping statement of Judge respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic administration.
policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts
cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force The petition lacks merit.
and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been
obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial
marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case
bigamous marriage. of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for
determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased. x x x 33 [T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing"
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
were denied by the Court of Appeals. purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and
petition which was granted. 36 not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the
terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna. particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence
must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and
bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latters It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the
marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with
retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant
bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction
of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes
administration. of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 52

when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may
not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner
continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a
residence in one place and domicile in another. divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid
under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no
Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983
showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in
Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village
Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to "The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
1990 sent by the deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and the competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
deceaseds calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when
Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or
in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna." a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the
nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently,
the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners
subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of conjugal property. 53
Makati City.
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should
letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to
1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 53

render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be 38.
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
54 (Emphasis added) On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held now provides:
that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his
Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56 laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58
Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect. and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been
interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and x x x x
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of Legislative Intent
upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his
treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61 where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and
legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
discussed, to wit: Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
Brief Historical Background obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order added)
No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3,
1988. Article 26 thereof states: As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall already established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a
mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs
where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse,
as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the
divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However,
in light of this Courts rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse
should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are
to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise,
we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of
the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the
intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in
such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied
in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we
are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the
same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law
is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the
law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to
its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words
import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 54
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this
Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for
decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the
facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming
that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would
have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving
foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of
the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the
annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show
that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in
Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they
must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject
petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 55

Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation. The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties
who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will
Rule 79 thereof also provides in part: only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as
known to the petitioner: x x x.
xxxx
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the
creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous
contingent. 75 marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a
direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be
with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision the opponents defense. x x x 81
governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the
beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code
the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the or Article 148 of the Family Code.
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court
be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77 which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which
dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which
has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the SO ORDERED.
property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if
the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code
took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime
under this provision as follows:
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 56
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 57

G.R. No. 127969 June 25, 1999 There being no opposition to the petition, petitioner was allowed to adduce his
evidence in the presence of the public prosecutor who had been deputized by the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the LAND Solicitor General to represent him for the Republic of the Philippines.
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs. Florinda Estrada, a 41-year old daughter of the petitioner who was duly
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE M. ESTRADA and THE authorized to represent her sickly father, introduced oral and testimonial
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE, respondents. evidence. The lost/burned certificate of titles were presented in court as well as
the tax declarations in the name of petitioner. The official receipts of tax
payments were likewise introduced. A copy of the Deed of Sale dated July 30,
1957 in favor of petitioner was submitted by him to the court. After Florinda
VITUG, J.: Estrada's testimonial evidence on the possession of her father of the land and its
not being mortgaged or encumbered, Francisco Cuenca, owner of all the
The instant petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA adjoining lots offered no objection to the petition. The public prosecutor Zenaida
G.R. SP No. 39816 which has affirmed the judgment and orders of the Regional de Castro cross-examined the petitioner's witnesses. 1
Trial Court ("RTC") or Cavite (Branch 20) in LRC Case No. 1077-95, entitled. In
Re: "Petition for Reconstitution of Los/Burned Original Copy of Transfer On 20 June 1995, the trial court granted the petition for reconstitution; thus
Certificates of Title No. 11203 and No. 11204.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered directing the
The Court of Appeals, in its decision, gave a brief factual and case settings of the Register of Deeds of Cavite to cause the reconstitution of the lost/burned original
controversy. of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 11203 and 11204 in the name of Jose
Estrada upon payment of proper fees.
On March 28, 1995, Jose M. Estrada, the private respondent in this case and
petitioner in LRC Case No. 1077-95 filed with the Regional Trial Court Branch 20, Furnish a copy of this Decision to the Register of Deeds, the Solicitor General,
Imus, Cavite the reconstitution of lost/burned original copies of certificate of the Land Registration Authority and to petitioner. 2
titles nos. T-11203 and T-11204 and for the issuance of new owner's duplicate
copies of the same certificates. These were allegedly lost or destroyed when the On 24 July 1995, private respondent filed a motion to cite the Registrar of Deeds
capitol building was burned. of Cavite for contempt alleging, among other things

On April 29, 1995, RTC Branch 20 of Imus Cavite set the hearing of the petition
on June 19, 1995 at 9:00 A.M. requiring all interested parties to appear and
show cause, if any, why the petition be not granted. The order required its
publication in the Official Gazette for two successive issues with the further
directive that copies be furnished the adjoining owners, Office of the Solicitor
General, Land Registration authority, and the Register of Deeds. It was likewise
required that the petitioner post copies of the order at the Bulletin Board of the
Court, at the main entrance of the Provincial Capitol Building, Trece Martirez City
and at the Municipal Building of Dasmarias, Cavite, as well as where the
properties is located.
3. That in spite of the finality of the judgment, and over the pleas of petitioner's
[private respondent's] representative, the Register of Deeds of Cavite has
refused and continues to refuse to effect the reconstitution, thereby depriving the
petitioner [private respondent] of the use of his Transfer Certificate of Title.
4. That the Register of Deeds of Cavite insists on referring the matter first to the
Land Registration Authority, which is uncalled for, without factual and legal basis,
an exercise in futility, considering that the LRA was very much aware of the
proceedings and did not oppose the petition, and is aware of the judgment and
did not appeal either.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 58

5. That the refusal of the Register of Deeds of Cavite to effect the reconstitution That this explanation is being submitted for the appraisal of the Honorable Court
is punishable contempt under Sec. 3(b) of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court. with a prayer that the Register of Deeds be not cited for contempt of Court.

6. That under Section 7 of the same Rule, the Register of Deeds of Cavite may In an Order, dated 03 August 1995, Atty. Villanueva was ordered as incarcerated
be imprisoned until he effect the reconstitution. 3 until such times he would have complied with the judgment of the RTC. A
warrant for his arrest was issued, and a bond of P100,000.00 for his provisional
Atty. Alejandro Villanueva, the then incumbent Registrar of Deeds of Cavite, liberty was fixed which he posted.
proffered his explanation asseverating
Shortly after the complete records of LRC No. 1077-95, in connection with the
That the Register of Deeds did not give due course to the registration of the contempt charge against him, were elevated to the appellate court for review,
above decision for reconstitution in view of the doubt entertained by the Register Atty. Villanueva assailants was slain by unidentified assailants in his residence in
of Deeds as to the authenticity and genuiness of the alleged owner's duplicate Las Pias, Metro Manila.
copy of TCT Nos T-11203 and T-11204 which serve as basis for reconstitution of
the original copy thereof when presented and suggested that the same be On 27 December 1995, the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Cavite caused the
subjected to government agencies like the NBI to determine their genuiness. reconstitution of the Originals of TCT No. 11203 and No. 11204 Pursuant to the
22nd December 1995 order of the RTC.
That the tax declarations presented to the court to support the petition for
reconstitution and marked Exhibits K and K-1 were not genuine as per On 20 February 1996, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Certification dated July 27,1995 issued by the Assistant Provincial Assessor which Solicitor General, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals for the annulment of
is hereto attached as Annex "A"; the judgment of the trial court. The petition for annulment was anchored on the
following grounds; to wit:
That the alleged certification issued by the Register of Deeds that TCT Nos. T-
11203 and T-11204 were among those burned and marked as Exhibit J is also (a) That the two (2) reconstituted titles are patent nullity as they were
not genuine. reconstituted pursuant to a void decision and secured thru fraud and
misrepresentation;
That Lot 5766 as allegedly covered by TCT Nos. T-11203 and T-11204, is already
covered by a certificate of title issued on November; 6 1967 namely TCT No. T- (b) that the amended order dated 29 April 1995 was not published;
26877 in the name of PILAR DEVELOPMENT CO. INC., Xerox copy hereto
attached as Annex "B"; (c) that the Solicitor General was not notified about the hearing on the case; and

That as held by the Supreme Court in RP vs. C.T. of APP. et al 1-46626 Dec. 27,
1979, (Pea, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds 1982 Ed. P-09) THUS,
where a certificate of title covering a parcel of land was reconstituted judicially,
and it was found later that there existed earlier a certificate of title covering the
same property in the name of another person, it was held that the existence of
such prior title ipso facto nullified the reconstitution proceedings and signified
that the evidence in said proceeding as to the alleged ownership under the
reconstituted title cannot be given any credence. That kind of reconstitution was
a brazen and monstrous fraud FOISTED on the courts of justice.
(d) that the Land Registration Authority was not furnished a copy of the decision,
The appellate court, in its now assailed decision of 27 January 1997, dismissed
the petition for annulment and affirmed the judgment and orders of the trial
court. Unsatisfied with this outcome, the Republic of the Philippines filed the
instant petition for review, contending that
I.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 59

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE REGIONAL 5. The void judgment reconstitution case was not served on the petitioner.
TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE RECONSTITUTION
CASE. This Court, in its resolution of 16 April 1997, required respondents to comment
on the petition and forthwith issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining
II private respondent Jose Estrada from conveying, encumbering or otherwise
dealing with the property, as well as public respondent Registrar of Deeds of
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE VOID DECISION. 5 Cavite Province from registering any transaction involving Transfer Certificates of
Title No. 11203 and No. 11204, subject matter of the reconstitution proceedings
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines would here insist that the RTC erroneously in LRC Case No. 1077-95. In accordance with the resolution, private respondent
proceeded to take cognizance of petition notwithstanding the existence of several Jose Estrada submitted his comment. Following the reply filed by petitioner, the
jurisdictional defects, among which included the following shortcomings, namely, Court gave due course to the petition. 6
that
The Court sees merit in the petition.
1. The amended order advancing the initial hearing of the case from 24 July
1995 to 19 June 1995 was not published. Reconstitution of a certificate of title, in the context of Republic Act No. 26,
denotes the restoration in the original form and condition 7 of a lost or destroyed
2. No notice to actual occupants and other interested persons were sent. instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. The purpose of the
reconstitution is to have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the
3. The owner's duplicate of TCT No. 11203 and No. 11204 presented by private title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction
respondent to the RTC were fake and of doubtful origin because occurred. Among the conditions explicitly required by the law is publication of the
petition twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and its posting at the
a. The said owner's duplicates are not in the official form. main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the
municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the
b. Lot No. 5766 is declared for taxation purposes in the name of Luis Pujalte from date of hearing. 8 This directive is mandatory; indeed, its compliance has been
1940 to 1994. held to be jurisdictional. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 9 the Court has said:

c. The signature of the Registrar of Deeds Escorastico Cuevas on both titles are Anent the publication requirement, R.A. No. 26 obligates the petitioner to prove
fake. to the trial court two things, namely that: (1) its order giving due course to the
petition for reconstitution and setting it for hearing was published twice, in two
d. The technical descriptions on subject titles when plotted did not consecutive issues of the Official Gazette; and (2) such publication was made at
coincide/conform, with the technical description of Lot 5766. least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. 10

e. The Alleged registered owner and his Attorney-in-fact are not the occupants of So also did the Court hold in Allama vs. Republic, 11
where the Court, again, has
the parcels of land. stated:

f. The tax declarations in the name of Jose Estrada are fake and spurious. The non-compliance with these requirements provided for under Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 26 as regards the notice of hearing is fatal and the trial court
4. The existence Of other titles the same property barred the reconstitution did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition. 12
proceedings before the Regional Trial Court.

Private respondent admits that the amended Order has not been published but
seeks to justify this failure by stating that the amended order is simply a
verbatim reproduction of the first Order, published in the Official Gazette on 29
May 1995 and 09 June 1995, and that, therefore, the omission is just a minor
lapse. The Court sees it differently. The flaw is fatal. The legally mandated
publication must be complied with in the manner the law has ordained. The date
of the actual hearing is obviously a matter of accurately be stated in the notice.
It is not here substance that must accurately be stated in the notice. It is not
here denied that the volume of the Official Gazette, where the Order of Initial
Hearing (for the 24 July 1995 setting) can be found, has officially been released
by the National Printing Office only on 14 June 1995 or merely actual five days
from the date of the actual hearing on 19 June 1995. The clear directive of the
law is for the notice to be made "at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing."
The Court of Appeals indeed must have failed to take note that the Exhibits "B,"
"C," "D" and "D-1" of the alleged jurisdictional requirements presented before the
trial court all pertain to the original order setting the initial hearing on 24 July
1995 and not to the amended order advancing the hearing to 19 June 1995.
Concededly, the amended order has not been published at all.
One other compelling reason that militates against respondent is the evident
failure of due compliance with the requirement of notice to actual occupants, the
(although one of the adjoining owners, Mr. Francisco Cuenca, would appear to
have been duly notified of the hearing of 19 June 1995) and all other persons
who may have an interest in the property. Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act
No. 26, provide:
Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2(c),
2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the
proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any
person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain,
among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the
certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's,
mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, a any had been issued,
the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of
the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if
any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses
of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses
of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the
adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the
property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 60
property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the
property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the
registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or
authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support to the
petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same:
Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources
enumerated in Section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further
accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved
by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, [now Commission of Land
Registration] or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior
certificate of title covering the same property.
Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding
section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive
issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the
provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in
which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The
court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or
otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein
whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said
notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed
Certificate of Title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the names of the
occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining
properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of
the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must
appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at
the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as
directed by the court.
The existence of several other titles, including
1. TCTs No. T-96019 (Lot 5766-B) and T-96011 (Lot 5766-A) both in name of
Susan D. Degollacion.
2. TCT No. T-148177 (Lot No. 5766-B) in the names of spouses Jose del Rosario
and Juliet dela Cruz.
3. TCT No. T-26877 (Lot No. 7524, a portion of Lot 5766) in the name of Pilar
Development Company, Inc. 13
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 61

mentioned in the records apparently have not been properly disclosed in the WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted and the decision of the Court of
petition for reconstitution nor in the corresponding notice caused to be given by Appeals, dated 27 January 1997, is set aside. The Temporary restraining order
the court, which notice the law requires to be sent to all interested parties at issued by this Court in 16 April 1997 is made permanent and the decision and
least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The registered owners named in the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite in the reconstitution case (LRC
these incompatible titles, as so aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, are Case No. 1077-95) are declared null and void for want of jurisdiction. No
interested persons within the meaning of the law entitled to notice of the date of costs.1wphi1.nt
initial hearing on 19 June 1995, the absence of which notice constitutes a
jurisdictional defect. This Court has repeatedly stated that the requirement of SO ORDERED.
actual notice to the occupants and the owners of the adjoining property under
sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26 is itself mandatory to vest jurisdiction
upon the court in a petition for reconstitution of title and to take the case on its
merits. The non-observance of the requirement invalidates the whole
reconstitution proceedings in the trial court. 14

The Court, given the foregoing circumstances, is constrained to accordingly hold

that the decision, dated 20 June 1995, in LRC Case No. 1077-95 decreeing the
reconstitution of TCT No. 11203 and No. 11204 is null and void. In contemplation
of law, the decision is non-existent; in MWSS vs. Sison, 15 the Court had said:

. . . (A) void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to valid judgment,
but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which
effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a
valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or
at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to
enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. All
Proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid.
In other words a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the
same as it would be if there were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties
litigants in the same position they were in before the trial. 16

For want of jurisdiction, the trial court must be held to have been without
authority to take cognizance of the litigation and all its aspects. 17

Finally, it may not be amiss for the Court to reiterate its admonition in Ortigas
and Company Ltd. Partnership vs. Velasco 18 that courts must exercise the
greatest caution in entertaining petitions for reconstitution of destroyed or lost
certificates of title in order to help avoid litigations and controversies, as well as
discordant supervening events, that may be spawned by a hasty grant of
reconstitution.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 62

G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013 her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for
Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties
QUIAZON, Petitioners, worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00. In order to
vs. preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE sought her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers estate.
QUIAZON, Respondent.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together
DECISION with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of
administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners
PEREZ, J.: asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas,
Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1,
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedents
Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Pias City. In
the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1 the decretal addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are
portion of which states: no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos
estate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of
Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Pias City are AFFIRMED in toto.2 Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled
that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby
The Facts discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseos last residence was
in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo
Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any
and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia- disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of
Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be
children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer). issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by this Court
of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In
mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able
Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City.3 In her to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by
Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar
child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For
were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate, the Court of
Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a
Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the resident of Las Pias City. The petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied
subsistence of the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 63

The Issues The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing"
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
and Resolution on the following grounds: purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the
QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS domicile in the technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the
PIAS; terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA "inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in
NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons actual
ADMINISTRATION.12 residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.19
The Courts Ruling
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted
We find the petition bereft of merit. for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate
of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pias City. It is evident from the records that
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death: may be laid in the said city.

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested
in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the
entry in Eliseos Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where
they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can
be considered proofs of a decedents residence at the time of his death, the
contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995.
This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for
judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That
Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts
of law renders untenable petitioners position that Eliseo spent the final days of
his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports
petitioners submission that the lower courts findings arose from an erroneous
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 64

appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos marriage to Amelia, we
affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon now proceed to determine whether or not the decedents marriage to Amelia is
this Court.21 void for being bigamous.

Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous
in declaring Amelias marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than
was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the
Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The
marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the
marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We
Family Code, making the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than
the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be
found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely
petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage
to therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had
from voidable marriages, to wit: been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore,
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either void ab initio.27
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons
interested party may attack a void marriage.24 who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:

It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is
and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust,
the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both,
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
would be prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage serve;
may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or
collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person
of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some
said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action. other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 65

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
to such other person as the court may select. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7
August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of
Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus: SO ORDERED.

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters

of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as
known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences
of the creditors, of the decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in

the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in
the estate as distributees.28

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to
Eliseo, the petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of
the decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse
the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right
as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the
debts of the estate are satisfied.29Having a vested right in the distribution of
Eliseos estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as
an interested party within the purview of the law.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 66

G.R. No. 128314 May 29, 2002 even supplied the entry appearing on the death certificate of their mother,
Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the said document.
RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner,
vs. Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the
COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents. decedents residence on the death certificates in good faith and through honest
mistake. He gave his residence only as reference, considering that their parents
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: were treated in their late years at the Medical City General Hospital in
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was merely transitory, in the
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and same way that they were taken at different times for the same purpose to
Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents Pericos residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The death certificates
left real estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal properties. could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents residence
in light of the other documents showing otherwise.5
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the
the estate of his parents, docketed as Special Proceedings No. Q-91- position.6 Both failed to comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the
8507.1 Pending the appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved that he petition be archived.7
be appointed as special administrator. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was
gradually dissipating the assets of the estate. More particularly, Rodolfo was Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived.8 After the
receiving rentals from real properties without rendering any accounting, and parties submitted the names of their respective nominees, the trial court
forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased parents and disposing of the designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as special administrator of the estate of
cash and valuables therein. Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao.9

Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper
venue.2 He argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City
either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The decedents actual
residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and
operate a bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated due to old age, they
stayed in Rodolfos residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for
the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and hospitalization. Rodolfo
submitted documentary evidence previously executed by the decedents,
consisting of income tax returns, voters affidavits, statements of assets and
liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor vehicle registration and passports, all
indicating that their permanent residence was in Angeles City,
Pampanga.1wphi1.nt
In his opposition,3 Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided
in Rodolfos house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, SO ORDERED.
it was conclusively declared in their death certificates that their last residence
before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City.4 Rodolfo himself
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied, to
wit:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in 1988
and 1989, respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the last place of
residence of the decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on the death
certificate of Andrea V. Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo V. Jao, whose
signature appears in said document. Movant, therefore, cannot disown his own
representation by taking an inconsistent position other than his own admission.
xxx xxx xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for lack of
merit movants motion to dismiss.
10
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 67

Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of Appeals VENUE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED.
rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
V
WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the court a
quo having been shown, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE ENTRY OF
questioned order of the respondent Judge is affirmed in toto. PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE DEATH
CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE OVERWHELMING
SO ORDERED.11 EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH
THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
Rodolfos motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the
assailed resolution dated February 17, 1997.12 Hence, this petition for review, VI
anchored on the following grounds:
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL AS
I AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR
INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE
APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT. VII

II RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS IN INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP. PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-8507.13
HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS. 593,
WHICH CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1 OF The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had ---
RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF COURT. in Pampanga, where the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon
City, where they actually stayed before their demise?
III
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN A
PLACE AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENTS RESIDENCE Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant
RATHER THAN THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE. shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in
the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his
IV death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance
of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE RESIDENCE settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERVING of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
SUMMONS TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 68

original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. contest the entry in Ignacios death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by
(underscoring ours) respondent.

Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus
administration granted in the proper court located in the province where the properly considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We agree
decedent resides at the time of his death. with the appellate courts observation that since the death certificates were
accomplished even before petitioner and respondent quarreled over their
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the time of
al.,14 where we held that the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place their parents death.
where the decedent had his permanent residence or domicile at the time of
death. In determining residence at the time of death, the following factors must The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents residence at the
be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and freedom of time of death, over the numerous documentary evidence presented by
choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen; and (c) intention to stay petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented by petitioner pertained not
therein permanently.15 While it appears that the decedents in this case chose to to residence at the time of death, as required by the Rules of Court, but
be physically present in Quezon City for medical convenience, petitioner avers to permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals,16 we
that they never adopted Quezon City as their permanent residence.1wphi1.nt held:

The contention lacks merit. xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides", like the
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic and should be interpreted in the light
therein, Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the process of transferring his of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
personal belongings to a house in Quezon City. He was then suffering from a application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules
heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to purchase a Quezon City of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant
residence, which was nearer to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a house factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as
in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before he could move therein. In said case, we meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile --- and hence, residence --- in San distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said that Eusebio changed his residence statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning
because, strictly speaking, his physical presence in Quezon City was just as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
temporary. understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
to petitioners Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
respondents assertion that their elderly parents stayed in his house for some domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
three to four years before they died in the late 1980s. place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention
to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
Furthermore, the decedents respective death certificates state that they were though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.17
both residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was
petitioner himself who filled up his late mothers death certificate. To our mind, Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents
this unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his have been living with petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time
deceased mothers residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to prior thereto. We find this conclusion to be substantiated by the evidence on
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 69

record. A close perusal of the challenged decision shows that, contrary to WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the decision
petitioners assertion, the court below considered not only the decedents of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.
physical presence in Quezon City, but also other factors indicating that the
decedents stay therein was more than temporary. In the absence of any SO ORDERED.
substantial showing that the lower courts factual findings stemmed from an
erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the same must be held to be
conclusive and binding upon this Court.

Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4,

Section 2,18 on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies
specifically to settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue in the former
understandably refers to actual physical residence for the purpose of serving
summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent which is significant in
Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the settlement of estates can
only refer to permanent residence or domicile because it is the place where the
records of the properties are kept and where most of the decedents properties
are located.

Petitioners argument fails to persuade.

It does not necessarily follow that the records of a persons properties are kept in
the place where he permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a
persons properties can be found mostly in the place where he establishes his
domicile. It may be that he has his domicile in a place different from that where
he keeps his records, or where he maintains extensive personal and business
interests. No generalizations can thus be formulated on the matter, as the
question of where to keep records or retain properties is entirely dependent upon
an individuals choice and peculiarities.

At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates

between venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in special proceedings.
In Raymond v. Court of Appeals19 and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,20 we ruled that
venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the
same meaning. As thus defined, "residence", in the context of venue provisions,
means nothing more than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided
he resides therein with continuity and consistency.21 All told, the lower court and
the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for the settlement of the
decedents intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City court.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 70

G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005 the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a
Joint Agreement8 dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2)
vs. tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to
EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents. assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the
tractor respectively taken by them.
DECISION
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities9 was
CALLEJO, SR., J.: executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein
the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
of Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated
May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the dismissal2 of the Demand letters10 for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union
petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same
of Makati City, Branch 63. and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a
Complaint11 for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund
The antecedent facts are as follows: and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case
No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no
Santibaez entered into a loan agreement3 in the amount of P128,000.00. The information on his address or the date of his return to the
amount was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford Philippines.12 Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent
6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Florence S. Ariola.
Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum
payable in five equal annual amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer13 and
and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985. alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party
thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she
agreement,4 this time in the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-
Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati
Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note City, Branch 63.14Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision was
for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they subsequently rendered by the court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement5 for the loan dated December 13, The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
1980.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic merit.15
will.6 Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the
RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706. On April The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with
9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez
of the estate of the decedent.7 During the pendency of the testate proceedings, was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 71

the said decedent. The trial court also found that the Joint Agreement apparently On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money
executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a claim of the petitioner should have been presented before the probate court.17
partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement was void,
considering that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that there The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the
can be no valid partition until after the will has been probated. The trial court petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate court as provided under
further declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was the now defunct Union Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the partition
Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and made in the agreement was null and void, since no valid partition may be had
liabilities. The court also agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. until after the will has been probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e)
Ariola that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings of the holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in generic terms
and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedents account. Ruling that when the deceased referred to them as "all other properties." Moreover, the
the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court held active participation of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount
that the petitioners cause of action against respondent Florence S. Ariola must to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, viz.:
necessarily fail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the Court Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
of Appeals (CA), assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
SO ORDERED.18
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT
(EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT. In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:

2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID I.

PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING.16 II.

The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had
passed to his legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence;
the unconditional signing of the joint agreement marked as Exhibit "A" estopped
respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot deny her liability under the
said document; as the agreement had been signed by both heirs in their personal
capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the same before the probate
court for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not one of
those enumerated in the holographic will made by the deceased; and the active
participation of the heirs, particularly respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the
present ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim
in the estate proceedings.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID
PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ UNTIL AFTER
THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD
WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING.
IV.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 72

RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH money claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses that both
THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF surviving heirs are being sued in their respective personal capacities, not as heirs
THE CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF of the deceased.
PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains that the
V. petitioner is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim
Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF P128,000.00 points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was
AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF P123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY already an existing probate proceedings of which the petitioner knew about.
ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES However, to avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay payment of the
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute the said
IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.19 agreement.1a\^/phi1.net

The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to
the heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for
the probate court to approve the joint agreement where the heirs partitioned the
tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the obligations related thereto.
Since respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint agreement without any
condition, she is now estopped from asserting any position contrary thereto. The
petitioner also points out that the holographic will of the deceased did not include
nor mention any of the tractors subject of the complaint, and, as such was
beyond the ambit of the said will. The active participation and resistance of
respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the petitioners
claim amounts to a waiver of the right to have the claim presented in the probate
proceedings, and to allow any one of the heirs who executed the joint agreement
to escape liability to pay the value of the tractors under consideration would be
equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and
prejudice of the petitioner.
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in declaring
that the agreement was null and void. She asserts that even if the agreement
was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have
been subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the
heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not waived any rights, as she even
stated in her answer in the court a quo that the claim should be filed with the
probate court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in
estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any
continuing guaranty agreement, nor was there any document presented as
evidence to show that she had caused herself to be bound by the obligation of
her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.

The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and appellate
courts failed to consider the fact that respondent Florence S. Ariola and her
brother Edmund executed loan documents, all establishing the vinculum juris or
the legal bond between the late Efraim Santibaez and his heirs to be in the
nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the Promissory Notes dated May 31,
1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by the late Efraim Santibaez, together
with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, made the obligation solidary as
far as the said heirs are concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering
the express provisions of the continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory
notes executed by the named respondents, the latter must be held liable jointly
and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to file its
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition
in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs
assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the
petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the deceased.1awphi1.nt
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to
determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered.20 The said court is primarily concerned with the administration,
liquidation and distribution of the estate.21
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 73

In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent.28 In the
until after the will has been probated: instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were
the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will was
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after still pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of
the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to
requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and
whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim
rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than against the estate of the deceased.
such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.22 The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the
indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to
properties embraced in the will.23In the present case, the deceased, Efraim divide between themselves and take possession and use the above-described
Santibaez, left a holographic will24 which contained, inter alia, the provision chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the
which reads as follows: chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit
Corp."29 The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their respective
later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the
immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children. partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the
chattel that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that
provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he
may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent.l^vvphi1.net The
being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus
The joint agreement25 executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule
tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late
fathers holographic will covering the said tractors. Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred;
exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract,
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims
over all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for
dispose of them in any way without the probate courts approval is tantamount to money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow.26 Every act intended to otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as
put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against
be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or
compromise, or any other transaction.27 Thus, in executing any joint agreement prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the
which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead
bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual
jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 74

rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be fact, petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its
considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been decision:
presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not
yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value. [T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed
to prove or did not present evidence to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is Bank is now the Union Bank of the Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply
mandatory.30 As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:31 here. "The power to take judicial notice is to [be] exercised by the courts with
caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative."
informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).36
him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which
should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the complaint is wanting.
settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the trial court did
the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt not err in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming the same.
presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order
to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
distribute the residue.32 assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.

Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent SO ORDERED.
Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The
documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the
continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late
Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money
claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker
of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of
course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As
the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it
unnecessary to delve into the matter further.

We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently
shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities.33 The petitioner in its
complaint alleged that "by virtue of the Deed of Assignment dated August 20,
1981 executed by and between First Countryside Credit Corporation and Union
Bank of the Philippines"34 However, the documentary evidence35 clearly reflects
that the parties in the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the
FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom
Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioners participation therein as a
party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial evidence was
presented during trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in