Daoang vs The Municipal Judge

[G.R. No. L-34568. March 28, 1988.]

Facts:

On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition
with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the
minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos.

On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father
and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned
petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a
legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March
1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil
Code.

"Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children
by legal fiction

Issue:

Whether the respondent is disqualified from adopting the 2 children.

Held:

We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children
mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the
respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.cralawnad

Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and
unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only
statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory
construction. 7

Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines,
obviously intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children, are
disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the
Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in its
Article 174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants from
adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have been
disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But,
when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word "descendants" was
changed to "children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.

Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt.

In Re Adoption of Stephanie Garcia, GR No. 148311

Facts:

Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Astorga Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie
had been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower
and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name be
changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed
to Catindig his surname.

The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of
the Family Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie
be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The
lower court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or
jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as
his middle name.

Issue:

Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

Held:

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and
Section 17 of Article V of RA 8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including
the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the
intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a
Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father.

Republic vs Hernandez

[G.R. No. 117209. February 9, 1996]

Facts:

The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses,
Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a petition [2] to adopt the
minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required
by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be
adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of which the
adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private
respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron
Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious
tradition, and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends
since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents residence. [3]

At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for
change of name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May 3,
1995,[4] petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption and
the petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petitions
should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.

After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties, the trial
court ruled in favor of herein private respondents

Issue:

Whether or not the change of proper or given name was valid.

Held:

Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the
surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the
adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary
consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of
the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.

However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of
the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation
of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the
adoptees registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised
solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of
adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such
that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot
properly be granted.
 Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to
warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence of
legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt
a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice
to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest.[54]

Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was baptized
by another name, under which he has been known and which he used, has been denied
inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned. [55] For, in truth, baptism is
not a condition sine qua non to a change of name.[56] Neither does the fact that the
petitioner has been using a different name and has become known by it constitute
proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name. [57] A name given to
a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which he is known in the community -
when at variance with that entered in the civil register - is unofficial and cannot be
recognized as his real name

LAHOM VS SIBULO
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

FACTS:

A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In
1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to
change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a
petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her
pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom
and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the
case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the
right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care
and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the
decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said
petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as
the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that:
"Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopters action
prescribed.

RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the
effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption
granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of
the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552
had come into force, could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is
subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period.
The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill
the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested
when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the
constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in
right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While
adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is
governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest
and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the
right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation.
Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before
it has been exercised.

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for
valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may
expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate

Diwata Ramos Landingin vs. Republic, G.R. No. 164948

FACTS:

Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino
parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors
Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on.
The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother (deceased),
and Amelia Ramos- who went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her
second marriage and no longer communicated with her children .

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for adoption is invalid for lack of consent of the biological
mother?

HELD:

No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers,
and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner
of the proposed adoption. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No.
8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the
biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the
minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors
had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of
their legal guardian.

REPUBLIC vs. VALENCIA

G.R. No. L-32181 March 5, 1986

FACTS:

Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children filed with the Court
of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of
birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. The
Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for correction
of entry in the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, contemplates a
summary proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors, those harmless and
innocuous changes such as the correction of a name that is merely mispelled,
occupation of parents, etc., and not changes or corrections involving civil status,
nationality, or citizenship which are substantial and controversial.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an
order directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in the Cebu
Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu, once a
week for three (3)the Revised Rules of Court and that they have caused reasonable
notice to be given to the persons named in the petition and have also caused the order
for the hearings of their petition to be published for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. Subsequently, the Local Civil Registrar
of Cebu City filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that since the petition seeks to
change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go from "Chinese" to
"Filipino" and their status from "Legitimate" to Illegitimate", and changing also the status
of the mother from "married" to "single" the corrections sought are not merely clerical
but substantial, involving as they do the citizenship and status of the petitioning minors
and the status of their mother. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the proper suit or appropriate action was filed by the respondent?

HELD:

The Court held in the affirmative. We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the
respondent in the lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or
correction of entries in established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the opposition
of the Solicitor General dated February20, 1970 while questioning the use of Article 412
of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court admits that "the
entries sought to be corrected should be threshed out in an appropriate proceeding. In
the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of
Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu was filed by
respondent Leonor Valencia on January 27, 1970, and pursuant to the order of the trial
court dated February 4, 1970, the said petition was published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in the, Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the City
of Cebu. Notice thereof was duly served on the Solicitor General, the Local Civil
Registrar and Go Eng. The order likewise set the case for hearing and directed the local
civil registrar and the other respondents or any person claiming any interest under the
entries whose corrections were sought, to file their opposition to the said petition. An
opposition to the petition was consequently filed by the Republic on February 26,1970.
Thereafter a full blown trial followed with respondent Leonor Valencia testifying and
presenting her documentary evidence in support of her petition. The Republic on the
other hand cross-examined respondent Leonor Valencia

Suarez vs Republic

[G.R. No. L-20914. December 24, 1965.]

Issue

Appellant (petitioner) maintains that the lower court erred: 1) in authorizing the adoption,
despite the alleged absence of competent proof of the consent thereto of the natural
parents of said minor; and 2) in permitting the latter to bear the petitioners surname as
a married woman, although her husband has not joined in the adoption

Facts

The minor Engracio Guligado, Jr. is the son of Capt. Engracio Guligado and Guneng T.
Guligado. The latter is a younger sister of petitioner herein. Engracio Guligado is, in
turn, a half-brother of petitioners husband, Col. Alejandro Suarez, Ret., who has several
children by a previous marriage and has expressly consented to the adoption of said
child by his wife.

Petitioner testified that she had written to them about her intention to apply for the
adoption of the minor and that they had given their consent thereto. And understandably
so, for, in addition to their close relationship by consanguinity and affinity, petitioner is
fairly well of financially, inasmuch as she owns real estate in the Islands of Jolo and
Siasi with an aggregate assessed value

Held

The lower court did not err in overruling said objection, admitting said statement in
evidence, and considering, as a proven fact, that the natural parents of the minor being
adopted had given their written consent to the adoption. Apart from the fact that said
statement was duly authenticated by a Notary Public, the other evidence on record
strongly indicate that it is what it purports to be.

We agree, however, with appellant herein that the minor cannot bear petitioners
surname as a married woman, for her husband has not joined in this petition for
adoption and can not join it, because he has children by a previous marriage. As stated
in the case of the adoption of the minor Ana Isabel Henriette Antonia Concepcion
Georgiana, L-18284 (April 30, 1963),

"Since the adoption gives the person adopted the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter (Art. 341, par. 1, Civil Code), much confusion would
indeed result, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, if the minor child herein
were allowed to use the surname of the spouse who did not join in the adoption.

"For one thing, to allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter,
would mislead the public into believing that she has also been adopted by the husband,
which is not the case. And when later, questions of successional rights arise, the
husbands consent to the adoption might be presented to prove that he has actually
joined in the adoption.