512117

2013
IAS16410.1177/2233865913512117International Area Studies ReviewDoeser and Eidenfalk

Article
International Area Studies Review

The importance of windows of

16(4) 390406
The Author(s) 2013
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DOI: 10.1177/2233865913512117
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Fredrik Doeser
The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), Sweden

Joakim Eidenfalk
The University of Wollongong, Australia

Abstract
This article emphasizes how individual decision-makers and their perceptions of windows of
opportunity can play a decisive role for major changes in the foreign policy of states by conducting
two case studies. The first case is the change that occurred in Denmarks foreign policy in
August 1990 when its government dispatched a warship to the Persian Gulf to participate in
the monitoring of the United Nations sanctions against Iraq. The second case is the change
that occurred in Australias foreign policy in AprilMay 2003 when its government abandoned
Australias long-standing hands-off approach toward Solomon Islands by leading a multinational
military intervention. The article demonstrates that individual decision-makers, with a long-
standing desire to change policy, perceived structural changes as a window of opportunity
for initiating the desired policy changes. The article concludes that, had it not been for these
particular individuals, and their perceptions of the world around them, events would most likely
have unfolded in a different way.

Keywords
Australia, Denmark, foreign policy change, individual decision-makers, perception, window of
opportunity

When Australian Prime Minister John Howard received a letter from the Prime Minister of Solomon
Islands in April 2003, yet again asking for assistance, he did not dismiss the request as he had done
several times before. Instead, he consulted with his Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, who said:
Look, the situation is just dire. I think we should take this very seriously and have a look at what
we can do (OCallaghan, 2003b). Howard perceived the Prime Ministers letter as his window of

Corresponding author:
Fredrik Doeser, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), PO Box 27035, 102 51 Stockholm, Sweden.
Email: fredrik.doeser@ui.se
Doeser and Eidenfalk 391

opportunity on his long-standing desire to increase Australias influence in the South Pacific and to
solve the long-time deteriorating situation in Solomon Islands. The perception of Howard of an
opportunity window was what ultimately led to an Australian military intervention in Solomon
Islands in AprilMay 2003.
This article sets out to highlight how individual decision-makers and their perceptions of windows
of opportunity can play a decisive role for major changes in foreign policy.1 Foreign policy change as
a specific phenomenon within Foreign Policy Analysis has received increasing scholarly attention
since the end of the Cold War. Most of the previous research has given primary explanatory power to
structural factors, such as changes in international or domestic political circumstances, while over-
looking the importance of decision-makers (Cason and Power, 2009; Hermann, 1990; Huxsoll, 2003;
Lee, 2007; Meernik, 2011; Niklasson, 2006; Rosati et al., 1994; Skidmore, 2005; Volgy and Schwarz,
1991). However, there is a small but expanding literature examining how individuals matter for pol-
icy change (Aronoff, 2001; Farnham, 2001; Gustavsson, 1999; Jian, 1996; Stein, 1994; Ziv, 2011,
2013). In line with this research, the article demonstrates that the process of policy change can start
with the decision-maker, and not with structural change, thus placing the individual in the center of
the analysis. As a contribution to this literature, the article revisits the old notion of the window of
opportunity, which has previously been used in studies of armed conflict and of domestic institutional
change, but which has not figured prominently in studies of foreign policy change.
The article elaborates on what a window of opportunity is and illustrates empirically how a
leaders perception of an opportunity window can lead to policy change. More specifically, the
article shows that policy change can be the result of the determined efforts of an individual deci-
sion-maker, who perceives a structural change in the international environment as a window of
opportunity and acts on it in order to initiate desired policy changes.2 As demonstrated here, leaders
not only change their desires in response to structural changes, but they can also exploit such
changes in order to realize pre-existing desires. When leaders perceive the opening of opportunity
windows, it is essential that they act quickly, since a window may not be open for long and the
conditions can quickly change again.
We demonstrate the explanatory relevance of the window of opportunity in two cases of major
foreign policy change. The first case is the change that occurred in Danish foreign policy in August
1990 when its government decided to dispatch a warship to the Persian Gulf to participate in the
United Nations (UN) sanctions against Iraq.3 The second case concerns the change that occurred in
Australian foreign policy in AprilMay 2003 when the Howard Government abandoned its long-
standing hands-off approach toward Solomon Islands by leading a military intervention. The
subsequent empirical analysis shows that previous research on foreign policy change cannot pro-
vide a sufficient explanation of these two policy changes.
The article is divided into four sections. The first discusses the agency-structure issue and how
the window of opportunity has been conceptualized in previous research as well as elaborating on
the theoretical argument of the article. In the following two sections, policy change in Denmark
and Australia are investigated. Each empirical section starts with a discussion of the extent of the
policy change. Then it identifies the key decision-makers and their desires to change policy. After
that, it demonstrates how the decision-makers perceived an opportunity window and exploited it in
order to initiate the desired policy changes. The final section summarizes the main findings of the
case studies and discusses the need for further research.

Windows of opportunity and policy change

A central issue in the study of foreign policy change concerns the relationship between structure
and agency. Structural approaches hold that policy change occurs as a result of governments (as
392 International Area Studies Review 16(4)

unitary actors) adjusting their behavior in response to changes in the international and/or domestic
political environment (Cason and Power, 2009; Huxsoll, 2003; Lee, 2007; Meernik, 2011;
Niklasson, 2006; Rosati et al., 1994; Skidmore, 2005). These approaches are based on the assump-
tion that decision-makers perceive environmental constraints and opportunities relatively accu-
rately and similarly. Agency-based perspectives, however, argue that structural approaches have
obscured the autonomy that decision-makers often exercise in bringing about policy change
(Aronoff, 2001; Farnham, 2001; Gustavsson, 1999; Jian, 1996; Stein, 1994; Ziv, 2011, 2013). One
problem with the structural approaches is that decision-makers may perceive the environment dif-
ferently than indicated by objective measures. Agency-based perspectives doubt that the scholars
view of the situation and the actors view of the situation are likely to be the same. Another prob-
lem with the structural approaches is that perceptions about the same environmental circum-
stances may vary between different leaders and between different decision-makers within the same
government. Therefore, we need to place primary emphasis on the identification of the perceptions
actors have about the environment, rather than searching for explanatory factors in an objective
incentive structure of the environment.
Accordingly, in the study of foreign policy change, some scholars argue that, in order to have
any impact on policy, structural change needs to be perceived by individual decision-makers
(Gustavsson, 1999; Jian, 1996). In addition, agency-based scholarship has also included the notion
of learning in their explanations of policy change (Aronoff, 2001; Farnham, 2001; Stein, 1994; Ziv,
2011, 2013). In essence, the concern of the learning perspectives is the relationship between deci-
sion-makers changing beliefs and self-correcting policy change. What agency-based perspectives
have assumed so far is, thus, that changes in the desire or in the beliefs of decision-makers is a
necessary condition for policy change. However, this article investigates two cases in which there
was no significant change in the desires of the decision-makers prior to the policy change. In order
to explain such cases, we need to include the notion of opportunity windows.
This concept has mostly been used in studies of armed conflict (Lebow, 1984; Smith, 2007; Van
Evera, 1999; Zartman, 2001) and of domestic institutional change (Cortell and Peterson, 1999;
Huitema and Meijerink, 2010; Kingdon, 1984). The concept most often refers to a moment in time in
which some kind of structural change occurs, which either creates a situation in which a state possesses
a significant military advantage (as conceptualized in the literature on armed conflict) or creates a
moment of opportunity which can be used by leaders for introducing new policy proposals. Some
scholars define the occurrence of a window objectively, thus, from the outside, not taking into account
whether the actors recognized the window or not. We argue that it is crucial to look at the perceptions
of actors, since the window cannot be exploited by the actors unless they recognize its existence. A
weakness in the literature is that the individual and the state are often used interchangeably, thus mak-
ing it unclear whether windows are perceived by states or individuals. We argue that it is important to
look at how the individual must perceive the window, in order for policy change to occur.
Our conceptualization of the opportunity window is based on the works of Kingdon (1984) and
others working in his footsteps (Cortell and Peterson, 1999; Huitema and Meijerink, 2010).
Kingdon (1984) illustrates how policy entrepreneurs pursue a particular policy and wait patiently
for their opportunity to arrive to push it on to the agenda, thus already having the desire for a policy
change before the timing is right. In the study of foreign policy change, the concept has not been
used in this way. Gustavsson (1999) incorporates some of Kingdons basic ideas into a model of
foreign policy change.4 In this model, the decision-maker interprets the structural changes as an
opportunity window and then acts within the decision-making process to launch a political pro-
posal. However, Gustavsson writes that the beliefs of the decision-makers have to change as a
result of the structural change. In his study of the Swedish reorientation on membership in the
Doeser and Eidenfalk 393

European Community (EC), Prime Minister Carlsson suddenly becomes interested in EC member-
ship after perceiving the end of the Cold War as an opportunity, and proceeds to apply on behalf of
Sweden. In contrast to Gustavsson, we argue that a structural change needs to be perceived by
decision-makers as a window for initiating policy changes that they already desire, and that with-
out these particular individuals, the policy changes would most likely not have occurred. Gustavsson
argues that Sweden would have applied for EC membership even without Carlsson, but earlier or
later. The decision-maker Carlsson was only important for the timing of policy change, not for the
change to happen at all.
As defined here, a window of opportunity opens when an individual decision-maker perceives
a change in international or domestic political circumstances as an opportunity for initiating desired
policy changes if he/she acts quickly. This view of windows can be related to Zartmans (2001)
concept of ripeness, which he uses to explain the timing of peace initiatives. Ripeness, just like
opportunity windows, must be perceived and seized by the agents, according to Zartman (2001: 9).
Thus, even if a decision-maker is willing to change policy, he/she may not have the opportunity to
do so (Most and Starr, 1980). Crucial to whether there will be a policy change is whether the
decision-maker recognizes the window. Timing is of the essence here. As Kingdon (1984) has
shown, before too long, the window might close and the opportunity be missed.
Previous research would explain the changes in Danish and Australian policy as being the result
of one of the following causes: a unitary government adapts to structural change; a single decision-
maker becomes willing to change policy after perceiving a structural change; or, a single decision-
maker becomes willing to change policy after experiencing a learning process. This article argues
that previous research cannot provide a sufficient explanation of the two cases, since the initiative
to change policy in both countries can be linked to the determined efforts of key decision-makers,
who perceived changes in the international environment as an opportunity window and acted on it
in order to initiate changes that they already desired. In Denmark, the key decision-maker was
Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, while in Australia there were two key individuals: Prime
Minister Howard and Foreign Minister Downer, who worked together to initiate the policy change.
For Ellemann-Jensen, the international changes were the end of the Cold War, the rise of new secu-
rity threats in its aftermath, such as Iraqs invasion of Kuwait and, most importantly, the initiation
of the American-led coalition to combat Saddam Hussein. For the Australian decision-makers, the
international changes were the onset of the war-on-terror combined with deteriorating conditions
in Solomon Islands and, most importantly, the letter sent by the Prime Minister of Solomon Islands.
The argument here is that structural, international change by itself cannot explain the cases, since
a necessary condition for the policy changes was that the structural change was perceived by the
key decision-makers as a window of opportunity for initiating policy changes that they already
desired. Thus, the particular way in which Denmark and Australia responded to the structural
changes cannot be explained without reference to the decision-makers and their perceptions and
desires.
In order to demonstrate that the perception of decision-makers of an opportunity window
was a necessary factor, and that the particular individual(s) was/were the main initiator(s) of the
policy change, several methodological conditions are required. First, before the structural
change occurred, the key decision-maker should have in his speeches, interviews and remarks
expressed a desire for policy change. Second, other members of the decision-making process
should not have expressed similar ideas at this point in time, which indicates that the original
idea of changing policy came from the key decision-maker only. Third, the structural
change should be recognized as an opportunity to change policy by the decision-maker in
his statements and remarks.
394 International Area Studies Review 16(4)

The Danish participation in sanctions against Iraq

When the UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctioned a naval blockade against Iraq on 25 August
1990, Denmark decided to send a warship to the region to participate in the sanctions. In order to
understand the significance of this policy change, Denmarks role within the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and Denmarks relationship to the USA during the Cold War must first be
described.
During the Cold War, Denmark was often seen as a reluctant NATO member, since Denmark at
times demonstrated an unwillingness to participate in specific NATO programs and had a tendency
to diverge from the particular policies of the alliance (Holbraad, 1991: 108f). The reluctant NATO
policy of Denmark culminated with the so-called footnote policy, which started in 1982 when a
weak center-right coalition under the leadership of Prime Minister Poul Schlter of the Conservative
Party came to power. This minority government enjoyed parliamentary support in economic pol-
icy, but in the area of foreign policy four opposition parties (the Social Democrats, the Social
Liberals, the Left Socialists and the Socialist Peoples Party) established an alternative majority
in Parliament. This alternative majority began to adopt resolutions on foreign policy against the
will of the government, forcing the government to include dissenting footnotes in NATO commu-
niqus (Holm, 1989: 180).5
Between 1982 and 1988, Denmarks official foreign policy, which was formulated by Parliament,
was characterized by deep skepticism toward NATO and the USA. This infuriated especially
Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen of the Liberal Party, who desired Denmark to play a more active
role in international affairs and develop a closer relationship to the USA (Petersen, 2004: 223).
Since the Prime Ministers major area of interest was in domestic politics, the Foreign Minister
became the most vocal opponent of the parliamentary opposition within the government (Ellemann-
Jensen, 2004: 233ff; Petersen, 2004: 222f).
The final confrontation between the government and the alternative majority took place in
AprilJune 1988 when the government managed to put an end to the footnote policy after calling
parliamentary elections on one of the policy issues that had divided the government and parliament
(Doeser, 2011; 229f; Engell, 1997: 234f).6 After the elections the Social Liberals joined the govern-
ment and as a result the parliamentary opposition was split.
Although the fall of the footnote policy was a victory for the pro-NATO government, Denmark
was still perceived by other NATO members as a reluctant partner. The decision in August 1990
was an important step in changing the status of Denmark within NATO. First, this decision consti-
tuted a major turning point in support to the USA, which the Danish government perceived as the
informal leader of the UN-sanctioned coalition of the willing. As noted by Hkkerup (2002: 94),
the operation had a UN mandate, but it was not a UN operation. Second, the decision entailed the
first Danish out-of-area operation with an element of coercion (Petersen, 2004: 455).7 During the
Cold War, Denmarks security perspective was strictly regional, confined to the Western Baltic
and the North German plain, and as a consequence, Denmark was reluctant to envisage any geo-
graphical expansion of NATOs missions (Petersen, 1996: 179). Even though the warships pres-
ence in the Gulf was circumscribed by a ban on involvement in shooting operations, it constituted
a major change in foreign policy, especially in consideration of the countrys long tradition of
pacifism and skepticism toward the effectiveness of military means (Petersen, 1996: 180).
The change qualifies as a program change, since it introduced a new instrument of statecraft, that
is, military out-of-area operations, and it significantly improved Denmarks relationship to the USA.
For Denmark, in contrast with other small NATO countries participating in the sanctions, this deci-
sion was a major deviation from previous policy, because of Denmarks reluctant NATO policy
Doeser and Eidenfalk 395

during the 1980s. The decision did not affect the goals of foreign policy or other issue areas, which
are requirements for being considered as a goal or international orientation change (see Note 1).

The key decision-maker

Long before the Cold War ended and the Gulf Crisis erupted, Ellemann-Jensen had desired that
Denmark should be a core state within NATO and pursue a more active foreign policy
(Petersen, 2004: 223). When Ellemann-Jensen became Foreign Minister in 1982, he wanted to root
out the cautious and passive ideas of two former Foreign Ministers, Peter Munch and Erik
Scavenius, from the Foreign Ministry (Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995: 15f, 30). It thus became
vital for Ellemann-Jensen to get rid of Denmarks image as a footnote country, along with its tra-
ditional pacifist foreign policy, and to improve Denmarks standing within NATO (Hkkerup,
2002: 40, 97f; Jakobsen, 2005: 45n; Larsen, 1997: 230235). In May 1987, for instance, he said to
Parliaments Foreign Affairs Committee that he would no longer place footnotes in NATO com-
muniqus, irrespective of what Parliament might decide (Ellemann-Jensen, 2004: 272).
As the Cold War international structure started breaking down with peaceful revolutions in
Central and Eastern Europe, the Foreign Minister became even more active in arguing officially for
a change in foreign policy. On several occasions in 19881989, Ellemann-Jensen noted that, because
of the changes in the international system, Denmark should start to take more responsibility for its
own foreign policy and pursue a more active foreign policy (Ellemann-Jensen, 1988a: 148151,
1988b: 200, 1989: 210213, 1990d: 3540). The challenge for Denmark, Ellemann-Jensen said, is
to strengthen West European cooperation in order to create a Europe than can reinforce the ties
across the Atlantic Our destiny is inextricably bound up with that of North America (Ellemann-
Jensen, 1988a: 151). However, the international changes did not cause a change in the Foreign
Ministers view of Denmarks international role, as he already had this view. Rather the international
changes were used as an argument to change policy. In a meeting of the Foreign Policy Commission
in April 1989, the Foreign Minister used the term active internationalism to describe the new
policy under development, and referred to NATO as the unchallenged anchor of Danish security
(Ellemann-Jensen, 1990d: 3540; Report from the Foreign Policy Commission, 1990).8
As a result of the end of the Cold War, the Foreign Minister started to perceive increasing pos-
sibilities for changing Denmarks foreign policy, since the countrys low-profile NATO policy was
motivated by most Danish politicians on the basis of the Cold War international structure. During
the Cold War, the possibility of pursuing an active foreign policy by using military force out-of-
area was perceived by most Danes to be constrained by the threat of a Soviet invasion. The Danish
defense forces were, thus, assigned the role of territorial defense (Petersen, 2004). When the Soviet
threat began to disappear, Ellemann-Jensen started to argue that new types of threats would emerge,
such as regional and local conflicts between ethnic, national and religious groups. These external
developments created increasing opportunities for the Foreign Minister to lead Denmark into
closer security cooperation with NATO and to project military force in operations outside the
European theater (Ellemann-Jensen, 1990a: 254257; Wivel, 1990). However, the window would
not open until August 1990 when Ellemann-Jensen perceived the Gulf Crisis as an opportunity to
act on his desire.

The window of opportunity

On 6 August 1990 (four days after Iraqs invasion of Kuwait), the UNSC passed Resolution 661 to
embargo trade with Iraq, and the next day, the USA and other NATO members initiated a naval
396 International Area Studies Review 16(4)

blockade of Iraq. The naval blockade, however, was not sanctioned by the UNSC. Ellemann-
Jensen perceived these developments as a possibility for Denmark to improve its reputation after
the footnote period. He believed that this objective could be achieved by contributing militarily to
the naval blockade (Ellemann-Jensen, 2004: 299). As demonstrated below, Ellemann-Jensen acted
quickly in an attempt to get domestic support for involving Denmark in the operation at an early
stage, since it was widely believed that Iraq would withdraw its forces from Kuwait sooner rather
than later, and when that happened, the window would close.
At first, the Foreign Minister was not able to muster the political support for such action, since
Prime Minister Schlter was hesitant toward participating in the naval blockade without a UNSC
mandate (Schlter, 1999: 248). Moreover, the Social Democratic Party, which was the biggest
party in opposition, and the Social Liberal Party, which then was part of the government (together
with the Conservatives and Liberals), made it clear they were strongly against participation in a
naval blockade without a UNSC mandate (Ellemann-Jensen, 1996: 241). The Foreign Minister was
thus forced to assure that Denmark would not participate in a military operation without a UNSC
mandate. However, in a NATO meeting on 10 August, he informed his allies that Danish military
units could take over assignments in Europe from NATO forces operating in the Gulf if requested
by NATO. He also noted that Denmark was ready to participate in the blockade with naval units if
sanctioned by the UNSC (Petersen, 2004: 451).
In an article published in a Danish newspaper on 10 August, the Foreign Minister discussed
both a possible role for Denmark in the Gulf and out-of-area operations. He argued that there were
threats to Denmark that lay beyond the borders of Europe. In order to prevent such threats Europe
must act in concert. He also raised the question of whether it was reasonable for the Europeans to
continue to rely on the willingness of the USA to solve Europes security problems (Ellemann-
Jensen, 1990b).
On 16 August, the government received a letter of inquiry from the Americans asking whether
Denmark would aid Egypt with a transport vessel, which could carry an Egyptian division to Saudi
Arabia. Ellemann-Jensen immediately began to explore the possibilities of reaching a decision on
this matter within the cabinet and the opposition. However, the Social Liberals made it clear that
they would not support involvement in an American-led operation without a UNSC mandate.
Owing to the lack of support from the Social Liberals, the Foreign Minister was not able to commit
the resources of Denmark to this endeavor (Ellemann-Jensen, 1996: 240244).
A couple of days later, the Americans asked Ellemann-Jensen whether Denmark could assist in
the shipping of war material to the Gulf. Rather than discussing the matter with Parliament,
Ellemann-Jensen approached the ship owner Maersk McKinney Mller with this proposal.
McKinney Mller immediately decided that his company would supply the Americans with a num-
ber of transport vessels (Ellemann-Jensen, 1996: 244). During the following days, Ellemann-
Jensen discussed the possibility of sending a warship to the Gulf with Vice Admiral Hans Garde.
The Vice Admiral made it clear that a warship would be available if requested by the government
(Ellemann-Jensen, 2004: 299).
On 25 August, the UNSC approved Resolution 665, which sanctioned the naval blockade.
Immediately after receiving informal support from the Prime Minister for dispatching a warship,
Ellemann-Jensen stated to the media that the government would send a warship to the Middle East.
This statement was made before the proposal had been presented to the Social Liberals and a for-
mal decision had been agreed, which infuriated the Social Liberals and the Prime Minister (Schlter,
1999: 248). By making this statement Ellemann-Jensen tried to create a fait accompli, which made
it difficult for the Social Liberal Party to block participation in the sanctions. In the words of
Schlter (1999: 248), Ellemann-Jensen tried to monopolize foreign policy during the Gulf Crisis
Doeser and Eidenfalk 397

and make it a one-man show. However, in order to implement the new policy, Ellemann-Jensen
needed the support of his government and of a parliamentary majority. He was, nonetheless, the
main initiator of the policy change, since the original idea of sending the warship can be traced to
him. Agreement within the government was then facilitated by Resolution 665, which provided the
Prime Minister and the Social Liberals with UNSC authorization to use force (Ellemann-Jensen,
1990c: 188; Schlter, 1999: 248).
The following day, a unanimous government proposed to send the corvette Olfert Fischer
to the Gulf. Both Schlter and Ellemann-Jensen declared that Denmark needed to show soli-
darity with the USA (Ellemann-Jensen, 1990c: 185188; Lyngby, 1990; Schlter, 1999: 248).
The governments proposal was debated in Parliament between 27 and 31 August. The Social
Democrats were dissatisfied with the Foreign Minister, who, in their view, had pre-empted the
decision-making in a dishonest way. On the other hand, the situation had changed owing to the
UNSC mandate (Petersen, 2004: 453). During the parliamentary debate, Social Democrat
Hans Hkkerup demanded that there be several conditions on Danish participation in the Gulf,
including that it be under Danish command and not be coordinated by NATO (Hkkerup,
1990: 379).
Together with Schlter and Hkkerup, Ellemann-Jensen then managed to persuade the remain-
ing skeptics within the opposition to accept the deployment of the warship under the conditions
suggested by Hkkerup instead of limiting the Danish participation to humanitarian aid (Jakobsen,
2005: 41). The decision to send the corvette was the first major foreign policy decision after the
footnote period that was implemented on the basis of a broad majority in Parliament (Parliamentary
Records, 1990). Defense Minister Knud Enggaard called the decision a milestone in Danish
defense and security policy (Svensson, 1990), while Ellemann-Jensen (1990c: 185) called the
decision a radical break with previous Danish policy.
When allied forces commenced the bombing campaign of Iraq in mid-January 1991, the Foreign
Minister tried to get parliamentary support for expanding the Danish mission, arguing that the
corvette should take part in the war (Ellemann-Jensen, 2004: 301). However, during the remainder
of the Gulf War, the government had to settle for a policy that stated that the corvette should avoid
the war zone but continue to operate under Resolution 665 (Petersen, 2004: 456).9

The Australian-led intervention in Solomon Islands

Australian foreign policy toward Solomon Islands between 1998 and 2003 has been referred to as
a hands-off approach, which had been the defining characteristic of Australias relationship with
Solomon Islands since its independence in 1978. This period was characterized by the Howard
Governments fear of being seen as neo-colonialists and consisted of aid, technical assistance
and a persistent argument that the Pacific Islands had to be in charge of their own future (Monk,
2003). This approach persisted despite Solomon Islands deteriorating economy and law-and-order
post-1998 and several calls for Australian assistance.
Solomon Islands descent into chaos began in December 1998 when the Itsabu Freedom
Movement, consisting mainly of people of Guale background, violently harassed settlers on the
island of Guadalcanal, mainly Malaitans. The Malaitan Eagle Force was formed in response to
these attacks in mid-1999. About 80 people were killed in the ensuing conflict and there were
numerous reports of torture and rape. Somewhere between 20,000 and 35,000 people were dis-
placed (Fraenkel, 2003; Kabutaulaka, 2002: 12). Despite repeated requests for Australian police
and military assistance, Australia limited its engagement to aid and technical assistance (Moore,
2004: 196ff).
398 International Area Studies Review 16(4)

A coup dtat on 5 June 2000 by the Malaitan Eagle Force and parts of the police force led
to the government being overthrown. The previous government had asked for 50 armed police
officers from Australia to help with the law and order situation before the coup and Prime
Minister Howard declared two days after the coup that Australia would not be sending police
or military troops, stating that Australia would not be the policemen of this part of the world
(Howard, 2000). In addition, Foreign Minister Downer stated on 2 November 2000 that
Australia is not a neo-colonial power. We are not going to take over countries in the Pacific
and run their affairs for them (Downer, 2000). Australia did, however, help negotiate a peace
agreement between the main parties to the conflict, which resulted in the Townsville Peace
Agreement (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001) and contributed with observers
to the International Peace Monitoring Team that was to set up to oversee the agreement
(Moore, 2004: 149).
The situation in Solomon Islands deteriorated further. Despite Australian aid, gross domestic
product fell by 24% between 1998 and 2002 and formal government debt increased by over 40%
(Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004: xixii). Meanwhile, law and order followed in the
economys footsteps. By 2003, Prime Minister Kemakeza had stopped going to his office for fear
for his safety (OCallaghan, 2003a).
Downer sent a High Level Mission to Solomon Islands on 14 October 2002 amid continued
concerns of the situation there (Downer, 2002a). More requests had been made by the Solomon
government for assistance but they were all declined. Downer returned to Solomon Islands on
1718 December 2002, expressing deep concern of the state of affairs. However, he yet again
re-emphasized the Australian policy of restricting assistance to aid and economic advice (Downer,
2002b). The final re-affirmation of the hands-off approach came in an article in the daily news-
paper The Australian, written by Downer on 8 January 2003:

Sending in Australian troops to occupy Solomon Islands would be folly in the extreme. It would be widely
resented in the Pacific region. It would be very difficult to justify to Australian taxpayers. And for how
many years would such an occupation have to continue? And what would be the exit strategy? The real
show-stopper, however, is that it would not workno matter how it was dressed up, whether as an
Australian or a Commonwealth or a Pacific Islands Forum initiative. (Downer, 2003a)

Despite his strong defense of the current policy, Downer later admitted that, during his Solomon-
visit in December 2002 (about two weeks before this article was published), he had already
become uncertain that just by continuing the policy we were pursuing we were going to achieve
the breakthrough that I wanted (see below; Downer, 2003b). The DFAT White Paper launched
on 12 February 2003 reaffirmed the official policy, stating that Australia cannot presume to fix
the problems of the South Pacific countries (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2003: 93).
It was therefore all the more surprising when, over the next few months, the Howard Government
made a complete turn-around and decide to lead a multinational force into Solomon Islands in
July 2003. However, as demonstrated below, this U-turn can be explained by a previous desire on
the part of Howard to increase Australias influence in the South Pacific consistent with previous
policies toward the region, and by his perception of the opening of a window of opportunity in
April 2003.
In sum, the policy change in AprilMay 2003 from the hands-off approach to a much more
hands-on approach through the intervention and use of police and military troops on the ground
represents a program change according to Hermanns (1990) typology of change, as the goals
remained the samea secure, safe and economically viable Solomon Islands.
Doeser and Eidenfalk 399

The key decision-makers

The key decision-makers in the foreign policy decision-making process were Howard and Downer.
After leaving government, Downer admitted in an interview that he and Howard essentially con-
ducted foreign policy themselves without necessarily running it by Cabinet at all times (Australian
Broadcasting Corporation, 2008). In relation to Solomon Islands, Downer handled the day-to-day
affairs in the years leading up to the intervention. Only when the decision to change policy had
to be made did Howard step in; however, his view as Prime Minister clearly was the most
importantDowner did not have the authority to make this decision himself.
While Howard officially supported Australias hands-off policy between 1998 and March
2003, he also had a long-standing desire to increase Australias influence in the South Pacific and
to solve the deteriorating situation in Solomon Islands (Ayson, 2006; Brenchley, 1999; Eidenfalk,
2009; Leaver, 2001; Woodard, 1999/2000). Howards previous policies in the region had served to
ensure stability in the region and within its neighbors. The East Timor intervention in 1999 can be
seen in this light, as the destabilizing and deteriorating situation after the pro-independence ballot
led to the Howard government leading a multinational force to stop the violence and ensure East
Timorese independence (Eidenfalk, 2009). This followed from a previous intervention in
Bougainville, during the so-called Sandline Affair in 1997. It was discovered that the Papua New
Guinea (PNG) Prime Minister had used mercenaries to stop an uprising in Bougainville that had
lasted for 10 years and with more than 10,000 people dead. The Howard government put pressure
on the PNG government, which led to them ceasing the use of mercenaries and allowing an
Australian-led force to oversee the peace deal, thereby restoring stability in Australias region and
ensuring Australian influence (Barker, 2011: 2021). It is also indicative of Howards desire to
ensure stability in the region that more money was put in to the defense budget from 2001 onwards,
enabling the Australian military to intervene more decisively in its near region on its own and in
the wider South-East Asian area in tandem with US forces (Dixon, 2001). Howard just had to
await an appropriate window to open before continuing the Australian policy of stability through
intervention in the region.
As the situation in Solomon Islands deteriorated from 2002, Howard and Downer began to
perceive that the hands-off approach was failing. However, fear of being seen as a neo-colonial
power stopped them from acting earlier. Howard in particular was scarred by the reactions to an
interview in late September 1999 (soon after the Australian-led intervention in East Timor), in
which the journalist Fred Brenchley (1999) used the words deputy sheriff to the United States to
describe Australias role in the region. Howard himself never used those words, but the label was
ascribed to him and this created an angry reaction from several Asian countries (PMs doctrine
angers Asia, 1999). Howard quickly distanced himself from this label and strongly denied it
(Ayson, 2006: 252). However, the impression had been made and came to influence the Howard
Governments policies in the region for years to come.
Howard has been described as a pragmatist (Murray, 2006) and as someone who could wait for
an opportunity to rise in order to promote a policy that has previously been seen as impossible to
implement. Walter (2006) argues that Howard was prepared to defer, to await a better climate, but
he will never give up. Howard desired an increased interventionist role for Australia in the South
Pacific immediately after the East Timor intervention, as reflected in the Brenchley article. When
Brenchley referred to Australia as a deputy to the United States, Howard did not deny it and
appeared to see such a role for Australia in the region. It took, however, six days until the backlash
from the article forced him to back down and abandon any plans of an increased influence for
Australia in the South Pacific for the time being (Leaver, 2001: 18; Woodard, 1999/2000: 8). The
400 International Area Studies Review 16(4)

window would not open until April 2003 and any attempts for a hands-on approach in the region
were for the time being effectively made politically impossible.
It could be argued that the time for a more hands-on approach had arrived in late 2002;
however, the Howard Governments attention instead turned to Iraq, resulting in Australia par-
ticipating in the US-led invasion. In the meantime, several things occurred that created increas-
ing possibilities for an interventionist Australian role in the South Pacific. First, several
commentators began arguing for a policy change toward Solomon Islands and the South Pacific
as a whole (Dobell, 2003; Windybank and Manning, 2003). Second, the Bali bombing on 12
October 2002 killed 202 people, including 88 Australians, and brought the war-on-terror home
to the Australian public (Kabutaulaka, 2004: 4). Third, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute
(ASPI) soon thereafter argued in their report Beyond Bali that the hands-off approach did
not work and a more direct engagement with the countries in the South Pacific was needed. This,
if implemented, would be nothing less than a change of policy paradigm (Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, 2002: 29). ASPI pointed to the possibility of failing states in the South Pacific
becoming a security threat against Australia, as they could potentially be used as bases for ter-
rorist and criminal networks (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2002: 2829). This was a new
approach by the ASPI that fitted with Howards earlier view of the weak and failing states of the
South Pacific.

The window of opportunity

What opened the window of opportunity was the letter that Prime Minister Kemakeza sent to
Howard on 22 April 2003, asking to meet and for help with the dire situation in his country. Rather
than dismissing it as had previously been the case, Howard and Downer perceived an opportunity
window to change the previous policy toward Howards desire.
An invitation was immediately sent to Kemakeza to visit Australia and discuss what could be
done, which he did on 5 June 2003 (Downer, 2003c). Around the same time, Downer began to
explore options through his department, where there was a ready-made proposal waiting for him,
courtesy of the Director of ASPI, Hugh White, who had for months been supplying the relevant
departments with drafts of the next ASPI report on Solomon Islands. Before that, in December
2002, White had initiated consultative sessions with all the relevant ministries, departments, and
organizations to workshop some new ideas on the Solomons. White played a role in persuading
the bureaucracy of a policy change even before Downer came asking for suggestions (OCallaghan,
2003b). Downer himself launched the ASPI report Our Failing Neighbour on 10 June 2003,
indicating how much stock he put into this new policy. He referred to it in his speech as a very
timely report and as a key contribution (Downer, 2003d).
In the end, the Howard Government decided on a more military version of the ASPI plan that
included a total force of 2225 personnel, out of which 1500 were Australian Defense Force person-
nel (Howard, 2003b), having learned by the shock-and-awe approach favored by the US-led
coalition in Iraq. The ASPI proposed only 150 police in their report (Australian Strategic Policy
Institute 2003: 4, 4143), which indicates that Howard and Downer were necessary individuals for
the specific way in which the intervention was organized. The HowardDowner plan was an
Australian-led multinational interventioneight countries in totalnamed the Regional Assistance
Mission into Solomon Islands, and was launched on 24 July 2003 (Fraenkel, 2004).
The window of opportunity was finally perceived by Howard and Downer in April 2003 when
a number of events coincided to alter the political climate. First, it became increasingly clear that
the hands-off approach did not have the desired effect (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Doeser and Eidenfalk 401

2004: 67). Corruption in Solomon Islands escalated and the law-and-order situation deteriorated
with Solomon Islands quickly moved toward failed state status (Dobell, 2008: 5657).
Second, soon after the Bali Bombing, the ASPI Report was released, arguing that the hands-
off approach did not work and that to have failing states in the region could threaten Australias
security. Therefore, the report argued, a new hands-on approach was needed (Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, 2002: 2829).
Third, ASPI Director White had for months been working on a proposal for such a hands-on
approach and had involved large parts of the bureaucracy in developing it. When Downer began to
look around for alternative policy approaches, the ASPI report was ready to be used as a framework
for the governments new policy toward Solomon Islands (OCallaghan, 2003b).
Fourth, the lead-up to the war in Iraq had taken up most of the focus of both Howard and
Downer between December 2002 and the end of major combat operations in April 2003. Howard
met with President George W. Bush on 3 May 2003 (Howard, 2003a), which can be seen as the
point where Howard moved away from Iraq and toward Solomon Islands. As Fraenkel (2004: 161)
stated: The US has long encouraged greater Australian strategic engagement in the Southwest
Pacific. Finally, and most importantly, the letter from Prime Minister Kemakeza on 22 April 2003
asking for assistance gave them the invitation that they needed to avoid perceptions of Australia as
a neo-colonial power if they were to change policy.
Arguably, the window had been open since 2000 when the Solomon government first asked for
police to assist them; however, it was not perceived as such by Howard or Downer until April 2003.
It is crucial that the window is perceived by the decision-makers, or there will most likely not be a
policy change. Downer had already in December 2002 perceived that the current policy was not
working and that something would have to change. Indeed, Downer had been working hard to help
solve the situation in Solomon Islands in previous years as well; however, he did not perceive an
opportunity window for a more hands-on approach until April 2003 when the Kemakeza letter
arrived. The above-mentioned reasons were all pieces of the puzzle and they finally came together
in April 2003.
The change in policy was justified primarily for reasons of Australian security. It fitted with the
new war-on-terror environment and the Bali bombing, and thus made it easier to sell to the
public. Such threats needed to be fought through strength and with decisive action, according to
Howard (Walter, 2006: 34). Howard (2003d) stated on 1 July 2003: we know that a failed state
in our region, on our doorstep, will jeopardise our own security. The best thing we can do is to take
remedial action and take it now.
As demonstrated above, the policy change can be linked to an earlier desire of Howard to
enhance Australias strategic position in the South Pacific. The earlier indicated desire to act as a
deputy sheriff in 1997 and 1999 was abandoned after the harsh backlash from its Asian neigh-
bors (Leaver, 2001). However, it can be argued that, having been unable to act on his desire for a
few years, it could now be justified again and the previous approach continued. The international
environment was not conducive to any Australian forward actions in the area until the policy
change in 2003. Once Howard decided on the policy change, he repeatedly began referring to the
South Pacific area as our patch (Howard, 2003c, d), in a clear reference to Australia being the
main power in the area and his desire for it to remain so. In the meantime, Downers desire to sta-
bilize Solomon Islands and stop the conflict there was clear in the year leading up to the policy
change. A change in instruments can be seen as a continuation of this desire but with new means.
Howards desire to enhance Australian influence in the area was further displayed when it was
announced that Australia and PNG had reached an agreementthe Enhanced Cooperation
Packagein December 2003. However, negotiations had begun already in May 2003, at the same
402 International Area Studies Review 16(4)

time as plans to intervene into Solomon Islands were finalized. The package included a more direct
approach by Australia, including sending 230 Australian police to PNG to help with law and order
(Fry and Kabutaulaka, 2008: 7). This new hands-on approach to PNG shows Howards desire to
enhance Australias influence in the region, and not just in Solomon Islands.

Conclusions
This article has highlighted how individual decision-makers and their perceptions of opportunity win-
dows can have a decisive impact on changes in foreign policy. Both case studies demonstrated that key
decision-makers, with a long-standing desire to change policy, perceived an opportunity window and
acted quickly on it in order to initiate the desired changes in policy. The desires and perceptions of the
decision-makers were necessary factors for the specific way in which Denmark and Australia reacted
to the international changes. It seems very unlikely that Denmark would have sent a warship to the
Gulf had Ellemann-Jensen not been the Foreign Minister. Without the Foreign Minister, the participa-
tion would most likely have been limited to humanitarian aid. It also seems unlikely that Australia
would have intervened in Solomon Islands with such a large military deployment without Howard and
Downer. In fact, the policy change fits with their previous policy actions that had been temporarily
interrupted in 1999 and re-visited when Howard and Downer perceived the window in 2003.
The importance of opportunity windows should, however, be investigated further in other cases
of policy change. A possible case would be the USAs opening toward Myanmar after the regime
implemented political reforms, resulting in a visit to Myanmar in 2012 by President Obama and
Secretary of State Clinton to further promote such reforms through meeting not only with the
Myanmar President but also with opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. This policy change had
been previously desired but could only now be acted on. The actual visit to Myanmar could be seen
as an effort to seize the opportunity window. Another case to consider is the Russian intervention
in Georgia in 2008, reflecting a long-standing desire by Vladimir Putin to enhance Russias influ-
ence in its Near Abroad. The Georgian attack on South Ossetia in August 2008 opened the window
for Putin to do just that and Russia responded accordingly, thereby enhancing their standing in the
region through force.

Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit
sectors.

Notes
1. This article focuses on the phenomenon of major foreign policy change, which is defined using
Hermanns (1990) typology of foreign policy change, consisting of four graduated levels of change.
Adjustment changes occur in the level of effort (greater or lesser) and/or in the scope of the recipi-
ents. Program changes are qualitative and involve new instruments of statecraft (such as the
pursuit of a goal through diplomatic negotiation rather than military force). Problem/Goal changes
mean that the initial problem or goal that the policy addresses is replaced or simply forfeited.
International orientation change involves the redirection of the actors entire orientation toward
world affairs. In contrast to lesser forms of change that concern the actors approach to a single issue
or specific set of other actors, orientation change involves a basic shift in the actors international
role and activities. According to Hermann, the last three types of change can be regarded as a major
change in policy.
2. The phrase the determined efforts is taken from Hermanns (1990) illustration of leader-driven policy
change.
Doeser and Eidenfalk 403

3. An earlier version of this case study has previously been included in an article in International Political
Science Review (Doeser, 2013), which focused more on the personal characteristics of leaders and less
on the window of opportunity.
4. Breuning (2012) has similarly used Kingdons argument in relation to the importance of gatekeepers
in foreign policy. However, her focus is not on windows of opportunity. Meernik and Ault (2013) also
use some of Kingdons arguments in their study of the American Presidents foreign policy agenda.
However, they do not focus specifically on policy change.
5. This parliamentary situation was a result of the Social Liberal Party acting as a swing party that con-
fronted the government on foreign policy, but did not support declarations of no confidence while sup-
porting the government on economic matters.
6. The issue concerned a parliamentary resolution passed in April 1988, which obliged the government to
inform all visiting NATO ships about Denmarks policy of banning nuclear weapons from its territory in
time of peace. According to the government, the resolution constituted a threat to Denmarks full mem-
bership in NATO.
7. During the Cold War, Article 6 of the NATO Treaty, which establishes the Alliances borders as compris-
ing the territories of the allies in Western Europe and North America, was used to stop discussions of
so-called out-of-area operations, that is, operations in areas outside the European theater.
8. It should be noted, however, that Ellemann-Jensen was not the only person arguing for a more active and
pro-NATO foreign policy. Many individuals within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and within liberal
and conservative circles were of the same opinion (Petersen, 2004). What we are arguing for here is that
Ellemann-Jensen was the main initiator within the government for sending a warship to the Gulf, and that
his desire for a more active foreign policy was a necessary condition for this initiative.
9. The Danish engagement in the Gulf Crisis was an early step in the gradual reorientation in Danish for-
eign policy toward a more active role in international affairs and toward a closer partnership with the
USA, which would be fully implemented during the remainder of the 1990s and in the early 2000s.

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